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THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
IN US POLITICS

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Role of Emotions in the Symbolic Representation of Women in US Politics

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This dissertation provides a new framework for understanding the relationship between gendered political representation and engagement through the mechanism of emotions, such as anger, fear, pride, and hope. I analyze congressional candidates' rhetoric about women and gendered policy issues. I then consider how citizens' emotional responses to elite rhetoric impact their levels of political engagement at the intersection of their gender, race, ethnic, and partisan identities.

Methodologically, the project is based on a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of congressional campaign websites, interviews with women campaign volunteers for congressional candidates, and a secondary survey analysis of American National Election Studies data from 1980 to 2016. The content analysis allows me to examine how candidates have rhetorically represented women in elections favoring Republicans (2010) and Democrats (2018). The interviews help me uncover women's motivations to participate in politics in 2018. Finally, the survey analysis enables me to examine the relationships between emotions and political engagement over time and with nationally representative samples.

Chapter 1 lays out the motivations and expected contributions of the project, and Chapter 2 reviews relevant bodies of literature that contribute to my theoretical framework. In Chapter 3, I identify patterns in congressional candidates' rhetoric about women and gendered policy issues. I then consider women's responses to candidate rhetoric using interviews with campaign volunteers. Chapters 4 and 5 utilize survey data from the American National Election Studies to demonstrate how positive and negative emotions mobilize women in the electorate over time and in electoral contexts where gender is especially salient. While Chapter 4 investigates overall trends for women compared to men, Chapter 5 turns to partisan, racial, and ethnic differences among women. Finally, Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks and discusses the implications of this research for women's political inclusion in the United States.

I find that women candidates were significantly more likely than their male counterparts to discuss women on their campaign websites in 2010 and 2018. In 2018, many Democratic women candidates called out President Trump for advancing sexist and racist rhetoric and policies, identifying his administration as a threat to women. I find that similar sentiments were echoed by women activists in 2018. The activists also claimed that negative emotions were central to their motivations to participate in politics. Among women in the electorate, I find that both positive and negative emotional responses are associated with increased political engagement—but only when they conform to partisan expectations. I also find modest evidence that women's emotional responses to candidates have significantly differed from men's in electoral contexts where gender was especially salient. But women's likelihood of expressing the most mobilizing emotions varies depending on how their partisan, racial, and ethnic identities overlap.

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I cannot possibly convey the depths of my gratitude to everyone who has made this dissertation possible—whether through their direct involvement with the project or through guiding me on the path to graduate school in the first place. But here is my best attempt.

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I thank Kira Sanbonmatsu for her mentorship and guidance throughout my time in graduate school. I appreciate how Kira has helped me see beyond each of my individual interests and projects to think about how they cohere as a research agenda. At every step of my graduate career, Kira has pushed me to think about what comes next, which has given me a sense of direction and purpose. She also provided me with several invaluable opportunities to collaborate on projects, which taught me important practical skills about how co-authorship works, how to plan and execute projects, and how to organize data. I also thank Kira for making me a better researcher by encouraging me to take advantage of opportunities to learn new skills. I'm not sure I would have stuck with R long enough to make it through the initial learning curve unless Kira had given me an excuse to teach myself while working on projects for the Center for American Women and Politics.

I owe so much gratitude to Sue Carroll for seeing me through to the end of this dissertation even after her retirement. I feel incredibly fortunate to benefit from the immense wisdom and expertise she has built up throughout her career. I always value Sue's feedback on my work because she helps me articulate my ideas so much more clearly. She has often been able to see what I am trying to say even when I am not explaining it very well. And when she doesn't understand what I'm trying to say, she has a way of asking exactly the right questions that help me find the words I need. When I have gotten lost in the details, Sue has pushed me to think about the bigger picture of my research—what it all means and why it is important.

I thank Rick Lau for taking an active interest in my work and my development as a researcher, even when I wasn't one of his primary advisees. When I first arrived at Rutgers, I had no prior interest in or knowledge about political psychology. While taking Rick's "Psychology of Political Behavior" course, I realized that it was something I was interested in; I just wasn't sure how it fit with my primary interest in women's representation. After working with Rick on a few projects and gaining a better understanding of experimental methods, I began to see how my interests in women's representation and political psychology could come together.

I am also grateful to Leonie Huddy for taking the time to serve as the external reader on my committee. Her review chapter on emotions in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* was my first exposure to the topic while taking Rick's class in the Fall of 2015. It stuck with me as I observed the aftermath of the 2016 election.

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My decisions to study gender and politics, to go to graduate school, and specifically to go to Rutgers were significantly shaped by the incredible education and mentorship I received from my professors at Muhlenberg College—especially Drs. Lanethea Mathews-Schultz, Chris Borick, Jack Gambino, Mohsin Hashim, Brian Mello, and Michele Deegan. While directing my undergraduate thesis, Lanethea introduced me to the CAWP website and made sure I knew that if I wanted to study gender and politics, Rutgers was *THE* place to do it.

I thank my parents, Mary-Pat and Robert Rogers, for their endless support and for making everything in my life possible. I am also grateful to my siblings, Kevin and Kerry, for helping me de-stress by trading funny memes, Tik-Toks, and cute animal videos in our “Wombmates” group chat. Thanks as well to my fur-child, Arya, for being my most consistent companion during graduate school—often curled in my lap or perched nearby as I worked. I thank Jael Baez for being my main sounding board—

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It was challenging to become a mom just as a global pandemic took away much of the support that I assumed I could rely on. But I imagine that living and dissertating through the COVID-19 pandemic would have been far more demoralizing without the distraction of a new amazing little person. I thank Robyn for being that distraction.

Finally, while everyone in my family has been immeasurably supportive of my ambition to go to graduate school, no one quite understood my decision to study gender and politics like my grandma, Mary Rogers. My grandma was born in 1933 and was so frustrated by the limitations of being a woman as she came of age. Her determination to buck expectations earned her a full scholarship to St. John's University School of Commerce, where she graduated at the top of her class—in which men outnumbered women by 15 to 1 (see newspaper clipping pictured in the dedication). I have vivid memories of my grandma helping me with my summer schoolwork in her sunroom and of the many cards she would send me—always adorned with elaborate illustrations of cats—accompanied by newspaper clippings and messages about women's value to society (see one example pictured in the dedication). Shortly before she passed in April 2019, we were talking about my work, and she told me that I was everything she had wanted to be but couldn't be. Remembering that conversation has been a key source of motivation as I have completed this dissertation. I want to thank all the women who came before me and made my achievements not only possible but relatively easy.

DEDICATION

For Mary S. Rogers

And a Lady Leads 'Em All

The female of the species is not only more deadly than the male—it apparently is smarter. At least, that's the way it appears at the St. John's University School of Commerce.

The first Bachelor of Business Administration degree to be awarded summa cum laude in three years will be given to Mary Roberta Speranza, 22-year-old daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Robert R. Speranza of 60-49 Catalpa Ave., Ridgewood, at the school's June graduation exercises.

Mary, who entered the school on a full scholarship, outranked a predominantly male class in which the ratio was 15 men to 1 girl by earning 3.89 honor points out of a possible 4.00. She will enter the St. John's graduate school in September to work for her master's degree.



Mary Roberta Speranza

*especially their sexuality,
Women's value is enormous
so they societies want to
control them,*

*Love you
Brandma Mary*

2/29/12

*Hi Kate,
Congratulations on getting
your driver's license. I just
found out about it. It's a big
milestone.*

*Here's another Jane Brody
article. Do you know that until
Margaret Sanger (1920) birth
control was a crime as well
as a sin—only prostitutes
had condoms. (Women's
History course)*

*I left the Catholic Church
because of the Pope's
hypocrisy about the birth
control issue during
Vatican II. All religions
want to control women*

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Women have led the major public counter-responses to the last two presidential election outcomes in the United States. On January 21, 2017, Women’s March participants donned pink “pussy hats” and shouted refrains such as, “Not My President,” referring to Donald Trump, who was inaugurated the day prior. Between 3.3 and 4.6 million people participated in the 2017 *Women’s March on Washington* and “sister marches” throughout the United States. It was widely considered the largest single-day protest in US history¹ (Rafferty 2021).

On January 6, 2021, the “Save America Rally” was organized by the group *Women for America First* to protest Congress’s certification of Joe Biden’s victory. The event featured the slogan, “Stop the Steal,” referring to President Trump’s false claims of election fraud. Later, Trump supporters who attended the event stormed and vandalized the US Capitol Building, resulting in at least five deaths. By the end of the day, *Women for America First* had released a statement denouncing the violence that occurred at the Capitol, saying, “our organization played absolutely no role in the unfortunate events that transpired” (Women for America First 2021).

¹ The *Black Lives Matter* demonstrations sparked by George Floyd’s murder at the hands of police on May 25, 2020 may be the largest movement in US history overall, with an estimated 15 to 26 million participants over the course of about a month (Buchanan, Bui, and Patel 2020). The *#BlackLivesMatter* movement was founded in 2013 by three Black women activists—Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi—in response to George Zimmerman’s acquittal in the murder of Trayvon Martin (Black Lives Matter 2021). The largely peaceful protests in May and June 2020 were met with devastating state violence and police brutality encouraged by President Trump (Lopez 2020). While the protests were responding to a long history of state violence targeting Black people, Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric and support of violent police tactics stoked further outrage and engagement in the protests. Similarly, the *#MeToo* or “*me too.*” *Movement*, which was also founded by a Black woman activist—Tarana Burke—saw a spike in action under Trump’s presidency when the *#metoo* hashtag went viral in 2017 (me too. 2021). Like *Black Lives Matter*, the “*me too.*” *Movement* is a response to the long-standing issue of sexual violence but has gained steam as allegations of misconduct by powerful people in Hollywood, the media, and politics have piled up and received overdue attention. Of note, there are at least 25 women who have accused Trump of sexual misconduct since the early 1980s (Pearson, Gray, and Vagianos 2020).

In both 2017 and 2021, women mobilized *as women* to reject the incoming presidents' claims to represent them. While Democratic women mobilized in far greater numbers than Republican women, both sides cast women as “saviors of America”—whether it was Black women voting near-universally against Trump (Graham 2019) or conservative white women countering attacks from “liberal feminists and their cohorts” (Women for America First 2021). That America needs saving entails that America is under threat. Indeed, both liberal and conservative women claimed that the respective out-party administrations and their supporters represented threats to women.

The original mission statement for the 2017 *Women's March on Washington* presented the march as a response to the feelings of “threat,” “concern,” and “fear” inflicted on diverse groups of women by Donald Trump's rhetoric during the 2016 election cycle (Women's March 2017).

The rhetoric of the past election cycle has insulted, demonized, and threatened many of us—immigrants of all statuses, Muslims and those of diverse religious faiths, people who identify as LGBTQIA, Native people, Black and Brown people, people with disabilities, survivors of sexual assault—and our communities are hurting and scared... This march is the first step towards unifying our communities, grounded in new relationships, to create change from the grassroots level up. We will not rest until women have parity and equity at all levels of leadership in society.

Women for America First's mission responded to “attacks and lies” from the political left and the establishment, broadly defined (Women for America First 2021).

One of the reasons we started *Women for America First* was because liberal feminists and their cohorts have spent BILLIONS of dollars to defeat conservative principles and values... [W]e will support candidates who will fight the establishment by educating and registering voters, engaging online through social media and hosting events around the country... We're keeping this movement together by giving women the tools and a safe place to speak out—even when the haters come after us and try to shut us up just because we are women.

Whether real or imagined, these gendered threats—and the negative emotions they inspire—have powerfully mobilized US women across the partisan divide. For liberal Democratic women, Trump’s rhetoric about women, immigrants, people of color, and other groups all represent threats to women because of women’s “multiple and intersecting identities” (Women’s March 2017). For conservative Republican women, Biden is not so much a threat as an individual, but more so because he represents liberals overall, who collectively threaten conservative family values (Women for America First 2021).

Women on the right also issue counterclaims to dispute liberals’ portrayals of women. For example, *Women for America First’s* website included a page calling on women to support Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination to the Supreme Court, saying, “We will not sit by and let the left ‘Kavanaugh’ this highly qualified woman” (Women for America First 2021). Another page advertising “swag” opened with large unflattering photos of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and offered T-shirts and mugs with logos reading, “Boot Pelosi” and “Impeach This!” (Women for America First 2021). Rather than Biden, Pelosi is often identified as the individual posing the greatest threat to women on the right *because she is a woman*.

In each of the examples described above, individual politicians—Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Nancy Pelosi—inspire negative feelings associated with threat and are accordingly rejected as representatives by specific groups of women. Donald Trump is a particularly intriguing figure, as he is just as vehemently accepted as a representative by conservative women as he is rejected by liberal women. In what follows, I argue that the emotions bound up in the acceptance or rejection of political representatives are powerful

motivators for women's political action, forging a connection between women's representation among political elites and women's political engagement in the electorate. The present chapter summarizes the motivations for the project, my contributions to existing research, my data sources, and the outline for the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 will provide a deeper dive into the existing theories and empirical research that I introduce in this chapter.

MOTIVATION

One hundred years since women in the United States gained the right to vote, women have only just cleared a quarter of the US Congress, constitute an even smaller proportion of governors (CAWP 2021a), and have yet to “shatter that highest, hardest glass ceiling” of the presidency (Clinton 2008). This severe underrepresentation of a group that comprises 51 percent of the population is consequential since women's presence in politics is associated with policy advancements in areas such as women's health, child care, and social welfare (Carroll 1994; Dodson et al. 1995; Hawkesworth et al. 2001; Swers 2002; 2013). The underrepresentation of women in US politics can signal to women in the electorate that politics is not a place for them.

Since about the mid-2000s, women have been no less likely than men to engage in certain forms of political participation, such as working for a candidate or party (Burns et al. 2018). Moreover, women have voted in higher proportions than men since 1980 (CAWP 2021b). Yet, women remain less psychologically engaged in politics as measured by levels of electoral interest and are somewhat less likely than men to donate money to parties and candidates (Burns et al. 2018). Scholars have also argued that women have lower levels of “political ambition” than men, which prevent them from

emerging as candidates for public office (Lawless and Fox 2015). A gender gap in political engagement is problematic if we subscribe to the normative standards of democratic citizenship, which require that citizens are actively engaged in politics.

At the intersection of political science and cognitive psychology, scholars argue that the ideal democratic citizen who is fully engaged in politics and rationally calculates the costs and benefits of all available information does not exist because of humans' basic cognitive limitations. Instead, people routinely rely on cognitive shortcuts based on emotional responses or heuristics such as partisanship, stereotypes, and endorsements to make reasonable decisions about political alternatives (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) argue that emotional evaluations of threat and novelty in the political environment can interrupt the use of cognitive shortcuts and induce more deliberative attention to politics. As such, they suggest that emotion and reason should be viewed as complementary rather than oppositional.

While expressing emotion about politics has traditionally been associated with “psychological distraction, distortion, extremity, and unreasonableness” (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, 2), the public emotional displays of certain social groups have long been afforded more political legitimacy than those of others. In addition to the judgment that emotional citizens are bad citizens, there is a historical association of women and racial minorities with emotion and white men with reason. For women—especially women of color—expressing anger can lead to dismissive accusations of irrationality or hysteria (see Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018; Jasper 2018; Traister 2018). Such disparities in emotional entitlement raise concerns about access to political power.

Who is empowered to care about politics, and in what ways? Who is entitled to have their feelings about politics voiced by political representatives and institutionalized in public policy?

An important way in which the political system conveys whose emotions about politics will be taken seriously is through forms of political representation. A woman citizen who sees women in positions of power, who sees her concerns being raised by politicians, or who can point to enacted policies that address those concerns will be more likely to see the political system as taking women's feelings about politics seriously. This, in turn, should lead to more political engagement among women. In contrast, a complete lack of representation should lead women to disengage from politics. But what about women who perceive that they are being represented badly? Women who feel that their interests are being perverted or threatened might disengage, but it is also possible that they might feel a sense of urgency to rectify the situation. My research examines some of the causes and consequences of these possible responses to women's representation in politics.

LINKING WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

In *The Concept of Representation*, Pitkin (1967) identifies four forms of political representation—formalistic, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. Formalistic representation refers to the institutional arrangements that structure representation, including the means through which representatives are authorized and held accountable. In descriptive representation, a representative shares certain salient features with the represented—for example, a woman representing women. Substantive representation requires representatives to act in the interests of the represented. Theorists and empiricists

alike have since argued that descriptive representatives—in this case, women—are more likely than non-descriptive representatives to substantively represent women (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Swers 2002; 2013).

Symbolic representation occurs when a leader evokes some meaning beyond herself that leads an audience to believe in or accept her as their representative. This form of representation has received little scholarly attention—perhaps in part because Pitkin (1967) was not keen on the concept. Regarding symbolic representation, she writes:

If one asks which people must believe in political representation for it to exist, writers slip all too easily into the ‘democratic’ answer: the people who are represented, of course... This view leads one to concentrate on questions of social psychology: What makes men *feel* represented—identification? marching bands? voting? I want to ask, rather: When *should* men feel that they are represented (9, emphasis added).

Pitkin is interested in the normative question of what ideal political representation *should* look like, which leads her to endorse substantive representation over descriptive or symbolic representation. Feelings about one’s representation in politics are not inconsequential, however. Feeling represented well, poorly, or not at all can lead someone to engage in political action or withdraw from politics—with consequences for democratic norms of civic duty and the equal representation of interests. Pitkin even states that “it is important to ask what makes people believe in a symbol or accept a leader;” she is simply more interested in “when they ought to accept, have good reason for accepting a leader” (1967, 111).

In my research, I am *not* making an argument about what political leaders’ representation of women *should* look like or how it *should* be received by women citizens. My findings have implications for these questions—which I touch on in Chapter 6—but my focus is more on the downstream consequences of citizens’ responses to

elites' representation of women, irrespective of the substantive or normative quality of politicians' representation or citizens' responses to that representation. Instead, I mainly focus on the political effects of women's *perceptions* about whether leaders represent them well or poorly.

RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION

Empirical research on the symbolic representation of women in US politics has examined the link between women's descriptive representation and increased political engagement among women in the electorate (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; Lawless 2004). This work proposes several possible psychological mechanisms at the center of this relationship—often implicitly positive in nature. For example, a woman politician can convey to voters that the political system is responsive to women's political interests (Atkeson 2003; Reingold and Harrell 2010). The presence of a woman may mobilize women citizens around a shared group identity (Dolan 2008a; Fridkin and Kenney 2014) or can provide a source of inspiration (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018). Several studies of symbolic representation do *not* find a consistent relationship between the descriptive representation of women and the political engagement of women citizens, however (see Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Wolak 2015). As a result, scholars have suggested that perhaps the conceptualization of symbolic representation needs to be broadened or that research should examine the specific circumstances under which women candidates *do* have an effect (Dolan 2006).

My research makes three contributions to this literature. First, I introduce a role for the *rhetorical representation* of women in addition to the standard focus on women's *descriptive representation* in politics. Whereas existing research only considers whether

women are physically present or absent in politics, my broader framework also considers whether women are present or absent in elite political rhetoric. Moreover, I consider whether the rhetoric in question evokes positive or negative emotions among different groups of women. Studying women's rhetorical representation introduces opportunities to examine the impact of misogynist political rhetoric and men's representation of women. By adding more variance to measures of presence, I can provide a more precise explanation for the ways in which group representation drives women's political engagement.

Pitkin (1967) argues that—for symbolic representation to occur—people must “accept or believe [that a] political leader represents them” (102). As such, I will argue that rhetorical representation—like descriptive representation—can be a tool of symbolic representation. Through their rhetoric about women, political leaders portray women as a political group in ways that they hope will lead women in the electorate to accept them as a representative. My concept of rhetorical representation is an empirical application of Saward's (2010) representative claim. Saward (2010) conceptualizes representation as a dynamic process in which a “would-be representative” makes claims to represent a particular audience, and the audience can accept or reject those claims. He writes, “representation in politics is at least a two-way street: the represented play a role in choosing or accepting representatives, and representatives ‘choose’ their constituents in the sense of portraying them or framing them in particular, contestable ways” (47).

In Saward's view, being elected does not make someone representative; instead, representation is an iterative performance requiring a constituency to continually accept someone as their representative. Saward's articulation of representation as claims-making

is not limited to traditional electoral representation. In his conceptualization, the roles of representative and constituent can be filled by various actors, ranging from parties and candidates to nonhuman nature. My empirical application of this theory adopts the idea of the representative-constituent relationship being an ongoing dynamic process, but I restrict my focus to the setting of electoral politics and the traditional representative-constituent relationship.

I define women's rhetorical representation in politics as any spoken or written discussion of women or women's interests that is publicly attributed to a politician—regardless of the politician's gender. This can include mentions of women on a politician's official website, in campaign materials, formal speeches, debates, interviews, press releases, and even statements that resurface from before the candidate or representative entered politics. References to women in a candidate's rhetoric may be related to specific policy positions but need not be. As such, rhetorical representation can be related to the substantive representation of women's interests but is not limited to substantive representation. This definition of rhetorical representation would include Trump's crude descriptions of sexually assaulting women in the 2005 *Access Hollywood* tape (Taylor 2016). It would also include Trump's more traditional political appeals to suburban women about getting their husbands back to work (Wolbrecht and Cassese 2020). Importantly, references to women in political rhetoric portray women and women's interests in selective and contestable ways. As in Saward's (2010) theory of the representative claim, individual women or groups of women in the electorate can accept or reject a leader's portrayal of women.

In its broadest iteration, rhetorical representation can also include others' claims about what a politician has said or written about women even if those claims are untrue—so long as the claims are publicly presented to an audience as fact. Such claims can come from political allies or opponents, journalists, pundits, celebrities, verified Twitter users, or anyone with a sufficiently large public platform. As Pitkin (1967) writes, “for a political leader to represent symbolically, like any symbol he must be believed in, and such belief can be fostered or created” (104). Politicians do not always have direct control over their own symbolic significance. They can play a role in crafting their image, but so can others. The key point for rhetorical representation is that a relevant audience believes that a politician has made a particular statement, ascribes some symbolic meaning to the politician as a result, and consequently accepts or rejects the politician as their representative.

Studies of symbolic representation in US politics have traditionally been motivated by a desire to examine the consequences of women's descriptive representation outside of their substantive contributions to public policy. Given that a focus on women's physical presence in politics is often *the* essential feature of this research, it would be unfair to critique this literature for not including the rhetorical representation of women or a similar concept. Instead, I take the existing symbolic representation framework as a foundation and inspiration for my own broader framework that adds a focus on women's presence in politicians' rhetoric.

THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS

My second contribution concerns the mechanism that links women's representation and engagement. According to Pitkin (1967), “symbolic representation

seems to rest on emotional, affective, irrational psychological responses rather than on rationally justifiable criteria” (100). Though affect, or emotion, has been portrayed as theoretically important in the extant literature on symbolic representation (see Dolan 2008a; Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018; Simien and Hampson 2017), the precise roles of emotion remain largely unexplored. Research in political psychology has found robust effects for the influence of emotions such as anger and enthusiasm on political mobilization and participation as well as in relation to the formation of group identities (e.g., Huddy 2013; Valentino et al. 2011). Given these findings, it is surprising that studies of symbolic representation—which are attentive to both political engagement and group identity—have generally not examined the role of emotions (see Simien and Hampson 2017 for an exception). My research will integrate these bodies of work to open new avenues for future research.

My attention to women’s rhetorical representation in politics introduces the opportunity to examine *negative* responses to politicians’ rhetoric about women—regardless of the politician’s gender. I will argue that selective portrayals of women and women’s policy interests in candidate rhetoric can be met with acceptance (indicated by positive emotional responses) or rejection (indicated by negative emotional responses) from individual women citizens. While the existing symbolic representation framework focuses on *positive* psychological mechanisms that could lead to greater engagement (Dolan 2008a; Simien and Hampson 2017), research from political psychology suggests that *negative* emotional responses, such as anger, can be powerful mobilizing forces as well—and in some cases, more powerful than positive emotions (Valentino et al. 2011). Within political psychology, I add to a growing body of work on group experiences of

political emotion that has primarily focused on partisanship and race or ethnicity thus far (e.g., Burge 2020; Gutierrez et al. 2019; Mason 2018; Phoenix 2020).

DIFFERENCES AMONG WOMEN

My third contribution is to take seriously the intersection of women's gender, partisan, racial, and ethnic identities. Unlike most politically marginalized groups, including racial, religious, and sexual minority groups, women comprise a slight majority of the population and, due to heterosexual norms, are geographically dispersed and intimately connected to their more politically powerful counterparts. Where gender and race intersect, white women's proximity to white heterosexual male power and their own racial privilege can prevent many white women from identifying as feminists and seeing shared interests with other women (Strolovich, Wong, and Proctor 2017). Bejarano (2017) writes, "even though researchers have increasingly acknowledged the call for intersectionality... there are still very few studies that employ this concept in their research" (112). As Brown and Gershon (2017) note, the symbolic representation literature is no exception.

Work on symbolic representation often discusses the importance of party congruence between candidates and voters (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010), and a few studies consider racial and ethnic differences in responses to women's presence in politics (Simien and Hampson 2017; Uhlaner and Scola 2016). The focus on women's physical presence in these studies limits the analysis to the impact of shared identities between women politicians and citizens. By adding the concept of rhetorical representation, my research provides opportunities for scholars to also consider the complex ways in which gender, race, ethnic, and partisan identities are co-constituted

in political rhetoric about women and women's interests. I provide an example of this kind of analysis in Chapter 3. And in Chapter 5, I disaggregate women by race and ethnicity to consider disparities and cross-cutting political pressures that structure women's experiences of emotion and patterns of political engagement.

ELECTORAL CONTEXT AND GENDER SALIENCE

As it stands, the existing symbolic representation literature is unable to account for Donald Trump's rhetorical representation of women, which has contributed to soaring levels of political engagement among women in both major political parties. In addition to women's participation in the record-breaking 2017 *Women's March on Washington*, record numbers of Democratic women ran for and won election to the US Congress in 2018, with many citing feelings of anger and fear toward President Trump as key motivations for their campaigns (Dittmar 2020a). A similar surge among Democratic women occurred in 1992, after "people were so mad about Anita Hill's treatment" during the all-male Judiciary Committee hearings to confirm Clarence Thomas's appointment to the US Supreme Court in 1991 (Schroeder 2015).

Republican women may not have been at the front and center of pro-Trump demonstrations, but they played central roles in organizing events such as the 2021 "Save America Rally." They have also been key vectors for spreading false claims about election fraud in the 2020 presidential race and QAnon conspiracy theories about Trump defending the country against liberal elites involved with child sex trafficking (North 2021). In 2020, Republican women ran for Congress in record-breaking numbers, while Democratic women met their 2018 record once again (Dittmar 2020b). Two QAnon

supporters were among the Republican women who won their elections in 2020 (Tully-McManus 2020).

Pre-dating Trump's entry into politics, conservative women became visible leaders in the conservative Tea Party movement (Deckman 2016). Following the 2008 financial crisis and Barack Obama's election as the first Black US president, the Tea Party emerged in 2009 as a conservative populist social movement ostensibly opposed to excessive taxation and big government (Ray 2020). Scholars have since argued that much Tea Party support has been driven by threat and anxiety about a changing racial order in the US represented by President Obama (see Parker and Barreto 2013). In 2010, Tea Party women ran for Congress in such high numbers that they nearly closed the typically large gap between Democratic and Republican women's candidacies (Dittmar 2020b).

Notably, Tea Party women identified Obama as a threat to women. In one instance, a conservative woman blogger responded to an ad meant to appeal to women by referring to Obama as "a chauvinistic control freak who would tether every last woman and child to his ever-expanding, budget-busting Nanny State" (Deckman 2016, 132). Like Trump, Obama mobilized women in both parties. While Republican Tea Party women ran for office in 2010, Black women—a critical Democratic constituency—turned out to vote at a higher rate than any other group in 2008 and 2012 (Williams 2016). Moreover, women's responses to Obama and Trump were starkly divided based on their partisan, racial, and ethnic identities; Republican white women generally rejected Obama and accepted Trump as representatives for women, while Democratic women of color demonstrated the opposite response.

Sapiro and Conover (1997) argue that differences in women's and men's electoral behavior might vary over time "because some aspect of the electoral context—e.g., the confluence of issues, personalities, or events—cues gender as politically or symbolically important in specific elections" (499). They focus on the 1992 presidential election, during which gender was especially salient due to the Thomas/Hill Supreme Court hearings, media attention to sexual violence, culture wars about feminism and gay rights, and the symbolic importance of Hillary Clinton during Bill Clinton's campaign. These combined factors generated "an emotional element to the gender component of the election" (501).

Sapiro and Conover (1997) find little evidence that gender had a direct effect on political engagement, emotional responses to the presidential candidates, or evaluations of the candidates; instead, they find that the determinants of these attitudes and behaviors were different for women and men within the electoral context of 1992. As such, their study highlights the importance of integrating individual-level theories from political psychology with context-rich theories about institutional politics.

Burns (2007) has similarly advocated that scholars integrate individual- and aggregate-level analyses. She writes, "aggregate approaches can provide ideas about relevant dimensions of context and about contours of inequality. Individual-level approaches can offer ideas about the mechanisms through which context could come to matter in individuals' lives" (108). Because I am interested in emotions as a mechanism, this project will rely most heavily on individual-level approaches; however, I will also study the relationships between representation, emotions, and engagement in different electoral contexts over time—with special attention to electoral contexts in which gender

is especially salient. As such, I will grapple with changing political contexts that condition women's emotional responses to candidates and levels of political engagement.

DATA AND METHODS

This project is based on a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 2010 and 2018 congressional campaign websites, interviews with women campaign volunteers for 2018 congressional candidates, and a secondary survey analysis of American National Election Studies data from 1980 to 2016. The content analysis allows me to examine how candidates have rhetorically represented women in elections favoring Republicans (2010) and Democrats (2018). The interviews allow me to uncover women's motivations to participate in politics in 2018. Finally, the survey analysis enables me to examine the relationships between emotions and political engagement over time and with nationally representative samples.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

A comprehensive study of candidates' rhetorical representation of women would draw on all speech and writing that is attributed to a candidate and occurs or comes to light during a campaign. In this study, I aim to define rhetorical representation and conduct an initial analysis to provide evidence that I hope will motivate future research on the symbolic consequences of political rhetoric about women in US politics. As a reflection of this limited scope, I strategically rely on only a selection of candidates' campaign rhetoric. Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2009) argue that candidates' campaign websites "capture the general rhetorical thrust of the campaign, while providing near limitless opportunity for a campaign to directly include any information it deems relevant" (346). In choosing among candidates' campaign websites, ads, public

statements, and other potential data sources, I opted to examine candidates' campaign websites because they represent something akin to a one-stop-shop for candidate rhetoric.

The midterm election years 2010 and 2018 are interesting cases because they represent successful electoral cycles for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. As midterm elections, both electoral cycles were referendums on first-term presidents, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Both years also included large increases in women's candidacies within the respective parties. My sample for each year of the content analysis consists of all women candidates for the US House and Senate and, where applicable, their male opponents. I examine differences in rhetoric about women between descriptive and non-descriptive representatives. I also analyze the content of the rhetoric to describe the multiple and contestable portrayals of women and gendered policy issues that emerge in candidates' claims to represent women.

The examples of Tea Party women's and Black women's responses to President Obama and women-led protests for and against President Trump suggest that *presidential* candidates' rhetoric has played a particularly influential role in women's political engagement. Presidential campaigns are more highly visible than campaigns for any other level of office; therefore, exposure to presidential candidate rhetoric is higher than exposure to candidate rhetoric at lower levels of office. As such, rhetorical representation may be most relevant at the presidential level. Studying *congressional* candidates, however, provides greater opportunities to examine the interplay between candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women. In contrast to major-party presidential nominees who have been overwhelmingly white and male thus far, congressional candidates are more diverse in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity.

Certainly, the average citizen can be expected to respond with less intensity to lower-information congressional races than to presidential races. But the greater number and diversity of congressional candidates makes it possible to identify gender, racial, and ethnic patterns in candidates' rhetoric. These patterns may become increasingly relevant to presidential politics as the pool of executive candidates becomes more diverse over time.

Examining congressional candidates' campaign rhetoric offers insight into both sides of the representative-constituent relationship. As representatives or would-be representatives, congressional candidates portray women and women's interests in contestable ways that may be accepted or rejected by individual women citizens. Additionally, because running for office can be thought of as an extreme form of political participation (see Scott and Collins 2020), first-time candidates can be thought of as would-be representatives as well as the constituents of incumbent politicians. To the extent that political newcomers discussed their motivations for running on their campaign websites in 2010 and 2018, such statements may offer insight into their responses to women's symbolic representation in US politics.

INTERVIEWS

To examine women citizens' motivations to participate in politics, I conducted in-person interviews with 23 women volunteers for three moderate Democratic women candidates running in competitive US House races. All three candidates—Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11), Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-05), and Susan Wild (PA-07)—won their races, flipping their districts' seats from Republican to Democrat. My primary question was, "What motivated you to volunteer today?" Later, I asked if any specific emotions came to mind

when thinking about their motivations to volunteer. I also asked if participants thought women in politics do things differently than men and what role, if any, participants felt their personal identities—such as gender, race, class, or religion—played in their political views.

By asking those who are already very politically involved about their motivations to participate in politics, I can provide insight into causal mechanisms that connect women's representation with greater political engagement among women citizens. Certainly, many of these individuals were motivated to participate for reasons other than candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women, but I gauge the prevalence of this route to participation. I also assess the role of different types of emotions in mobilizing women to engage in this more arduous form of political participation.

Of course, campaign volunteers are not representative of the average US citizen as they are likely to be very politically engaged, knowledgeable, and ideologically extreme (Enos and Hersh 2015). However, I would expect the process of symbolic representation to be working most strongly among this subset of women since—as activists—they are much more likely than the average woman citizen to be attentive to women's representation in politics. Insights from this unique population are therefore helpful for identifying causal mechanisms that can be tested with larger and more representative samples.

SURVEY ANALYSIS

The content analysis of campaign websites allows me to define my concept of rhetorical representation and describe the connection between descriptive and rhetorical

representation. And the interviews with campaign volunteers help me identify causal mechanisms underlying the link between women's representation and engagement. But neither of these data sources is adequate for testing specific hypotheses about the relationships between representation, emotions, and engagement over time. Additionally, they are not generalizable to the broader population of women in the United States. For these reasons, I also analyze nationally representative survey data between 1980 and 2016.

Since 1980, the American National Election Studies (ANES) has asked a battery of questions about whether presidential incumbents and candidates have ever made respondents feel emotions such as anger, fear, pride, and hope. I analyze repeated cross-sections of respondents between 1980 and 2016 to examine gender differences in emotional responses to candidates. I devote special attention to electoral contexts in which gender was salient due to presidential candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women. I also assess the relationship between emotional responses and various forms of political engagement over time. Additionally, I take advantage of the larger sample size offered by pooling ANES data between 1980 and 2016 to examine partisan, racial, and ethnic differences among women in their emotional responses to candidates and levels of political engagement.

CHAPTER PREVIEW

The primary goal of this project is to develop a new framework for understanding the relationship between women's political representation and engagement through the mechanism of emotions, such as anger, fear, pride, and hope. I address the following research questions: In what ways do candidates invoke women in their campaigns?

Which candidate characteristics and rhetoric successfully engage women—which women?—and through what mechanisms? How do women’s partisan, racial, and ethnic identities influence their emotional responses to candidate characteristics and rhetoric? How do women’s emotional responses impact their political behavior?

Chapter 2 reviews and integrates relevant scholarly work on women’s political representation, engagement, group identities, and emotions that contribute to my overall framework. In Chapter 3, I identify patterns in congressional candidates’ rhetoric about women in successful electoral cycles for Republicans (2010) and Democrats (2018). I ask: how do congressional candidates selectively portray women and women’s interests within their campaign rhetoric? I also analyze women activists’ emotional responses to candidates’ descriptive and rhetorical representation of women. Chapters 4 and 5 utilize survey data from the ANES between 1980 and 2016 to examine women’s emotional responses to presidential candidates over time and in varied electoral contexts. I also consider which of these emotions consistently mobilize women in the electorate. While Chapter 4 investigates overall trends for women relative to men, Chapter 5 turns to partisan, racial, and ethnic differences among women. Chapter 6 concludes with some implications of this work, limitations, and ideas for future research.

CHAPTER 2 A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN US POLITICS

In this chapter, I integrate relevant scholarly work on women's political representation, engagement and participation, group identities, and emotions to develop a more expansive theoretical framework for the symbolic representation of women in US politics.

REPRESENTATION

As noted in Chapter 1, the study of women's symbolic representation in US politics draws on two forms of representation articulated by Pitkin (1967): descriptive and symbolic representation. When applied to women, descriptive representation is the physical presence of women as political leaders. Regarding symbolic representation, Pitkin writes that "to say that something symbolizes something else is to say that it calls to mind, and even beyond that evokes emotions or attitudes appropriate to the absent thing" (96). Pitkin describes the key activity in symbolic representation as "symbol-making," by which leaders create or foster belief, loyalty, acceptance, and satisfaction through manipulating affective responses and cultivating habits in the represented (1967, 107). Here, the crucial outcome of symbolic representation is an audience's acceptance of or belief in a leader as their representative.

Empirical work on women's symbolic representation typically focuses on descriptive representatives as symbols of women. But based on Pitkin's definition, any political leader can symbolically represent women when they "call to mind" and "evoke emotions or attitudes" about women that lead women citizens to believe in or accept the leader as their representative. By adding the concept of "rhetorical representation" to the

empirical study of symbolic representation, my research can capture men's symbolic representation of women as well as additional ways that women symbolically represent women beyond their mere physical presence. I will argue that rhetorical representation is a tool of symbolic representation. Through their rhetoric about women, candidates call women to mind in ways that may foster acceptance among women citizens and cultivate habits, such as political engagement.

Applying Pitkin's work to group representation, Phillips (1995) discusses several arguments about why women's descriptive presence in politics matters. Increasing women's presence can provide role models for other women, compensate for the injustice of women's historical exclusion from politics, contribute to greater democratic legitimacy, and enhance political deliberation by adding new perspectives about overlooked interests. She ultimately argues that "[t]he real importance of political presence lies in the way it is thought to transform the political agenda" (176). Phillips cautions, however, that women's presence in politics should not be taken as a guarantee that all women leaders will act in the interests of women; instead, increasing women's presence in politics is "a shot in the dark" (83). Women leaders should be more likely than men to substantively represent women citizens based on shared experiences, but to see such an outcome as a guarantee would be essentialist. Phillips suggests that as women's presence in politics becomes normalized, there will be room for a greater diversity of women who may or may not feel compelled to speak for women (168).

Just as descriptive representation refers to women's physical presence in politics (Phillips 1995), I suggest that rhetorical representation refers to women's rhetorical presence in politics. Also like descriptive representation, the rhetorical representation of

women does not *guarantee* the substantive representation of women's interests. Individual women politicians may be feminist or antifeminist; likewise, politicians' rhetoric about women may be feminist or antifeminist. Still, increasing women's rhetorical presence in political deliberation should tend to increase the likelihood of women's substantive representation, compared to an alternative scenario in which women are rhetorically absent from politics. Moreover, since women leaders' contributions to political deliberation are often considered the most important way in which women's descriptive presence matters (see Phillips 1995), the rhetorical representation of women could be considered an important mechanism linking women's descriptive and substantive representation.

As Phillips (1995) and other scholars argue, women leaders can transform the political agenda by identifying women's interests through their participation in democratic deliberation. Women's lives and opportunities are shaped by political, social, and economic forces that often result in similar lived experiences or circumstances on the basis of gender (e.g., Beckwith 2014; Phillips 1995). When women enter politics within contexts of inclusion and introduce their gendered perspectives by speaking for women, they may contribute to the crystallization of previously undefined women's issues (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). Importantly, women's experiences can differ substantially based on other cross-cutting social cleavages, such as race, ethnicity, and class, however. On this point, Young (2000) writes the following.

Differences of race and class cut across gender, differences of gender and ethnicity cut across religion, and so on. Members of a gender or racial group have life histories that make them very different people, with different interests and different ideological commitments. The unifying process required by group representation tries to freeze fluid relations into a unified identity, which can re-create oppressive exclusions (122).

For this reason, Dovi (2002) suggests that descriptive representatives should ideally have close relationships with “dispossessed subgroups” of the historically marginalized group they represent (729). Having such relationships should lead women representatives to transform the nature of political debate by giving voice to the interests of the most disadvantaged subgroups of women. Given the strong focus on descriptive representatives’ contributions to political deliberation within theories of group representation, many scholars have turned to the study of claims, rhetoric, and discourse (Celis and Childs 2020; Celis et al. 2014; Lombardo and Meier 2014; Wineinger 2019)—a strand of research to which I contribute.

Compared to substantive representation and even descriptive representation, Pitkin (1967) adopts a somewhat dismissive tone in her discussion of symbolic representation. Her ambivalence toward symbolic representation stems in part from her suggestions that a symbol does not provide clear information about what it represents and that the meaning of a symbol varies from person to person. But when individual politicians operate as symbols, they often *do* in fact provide information about what they represent. For example, a woman politician might claim that she holds certain political views “*as a woman*” or “*as a mother*.” It is also possible, however, that such a claim could be contestable by other women who may feel that they hold the exact *opposite* political views—but also “*as a woman*” or “*as a mother*.”

Saward’s (2010) theory of representation as a dynamic “claims-making” process is well-equipped to incorporate competing claims about women and women’s interests. According to Saward (2006), “representation is an ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting claims—in, between, and outside electoral cycles”

(36). A representative claim includes five central elements: “A *maker* of representations (‘M’) puts forward a *subject* (‘S’) which stands for an *object* (‘O’) that is related to a *referent* (‘R’) and is offered to an *audience* (‘A’)” (Saward 2010, 36). As I stated in Chapter 1, my concept of “rhetorical representation” is an empirical application of this theory, which I restrict to the realm of electoral politics. I operationalize representative claims in my research as follows: A candidate and their campaign team (*maker*) offers the candidate (*subject*) as a champion of women’s interests (*object*) to the electorate—and especially to women (*audience*). The *referent* is actual women in the electorate. The *object* is a selective and contestable portrayal of women’s interests.

In my research, the “*maker* of representations” is usually the candidate and their campaign team—although my definition of rhetorical representation from Chapter 1 suggests that political opponents, media figures, and others can also make claims about candidates’ representation of women or gendered policy issues. In Chapter 3, I consider congressional candidates’ patterns of gendered rhetorical representation—in other words, their selective portrayals of women and women’s interests. In Chapter 4, I examine whether women accept or reject—respond with positive or negative emotions to—candidates’ descriptive and rhetorical representation. I also consider the consequences of those emotional responses for women’s political engagement. And in Chapter 5, I explore partisan, racial, and ethnic differences in women’s responses to candidates.

Recent studies of women’s representation have increasingly drawn on Saward’s (2010) theory of the representative claim or incorporated similar concepts to rhetorical representation. Wineinger (2019) introduces the concept “partisan woman-invoked rhetoric” to explain how Republican congresswomen’s rhetorical claims to represent

women are increasingly aligned with their party's policy platform and strategic messaging. Lombardo and Meier (2014) study symbolic representation from a comparative perspective as the discursive construction of women and men in policy texts and communications. They focus less on specific politicians' representation of women and more on how women and men are symbolically constructed as political groups within political texts. Additional comparative work considers claims to represent women from a broad range of elected and nonelected actors (Celis and Childs 2020; Celis et al. 2014; Lombardo and Meier 2014).

Unlike the various comparative approaches, I do not fully adopt the broader claims-making approach that expands the scope of representation beyond traditional electoral politics. Like Wineinger (2019), I restrict my analysis to the rhetorical representation provided within the confines of electoral politics. I depart from Wineinger (2019) in studying rhetorical representation within both major parties as well as men's rhetorical representation of women. Her concept of "partisan woman-invoked rhetoric" is a critical subset of what I consider to be the "rhetorical representation" of women. Additionally, I am principally concerned with citizen responses to representatives' rhetoric—thus incorporating both sides of the representative-constituent relationship.

Studying representation as claims-making blurs the distinction between symbolic and substantive representation. As Saward (2010) writes, "the symbolic and the substantive are not separable. Policy substance carries symbolic values or messages" (13), and "the performance of symbolism is required to convey a *sense* of representing substance" (72, emphasis in original). Therefore, when I operationalize the rhetorical representation of women, I include all candidate statements about women and women's

interests—whether or not they have anything to do with actual policy proposals. I take this approach because statements about women that do not address policy are meaningful symbolic tools that discursively construct women as a political group in selective and contestable ways. And statements about policy can fulfill that same symbolic function while also contributing to the substantive representation of women’s policy interests.

Because Pitkin is concerned with the normative question of what representation *should* be, she is understandably wary of the potential for symbolic representation to be used by a dramatic leader as an exploitative or fascist tool (107). Pitkin’s “normative filtering of representation’s meaning” is a perfectly defensible approach (Saward 2014, 724). But the strong reliance of contemporary empirical research on Pitkin’s forms of representation can limit scholars’ abilities to consider the effects of more troubling forms or examples of representation.

Scholarship has not shied away from addressing the impact of Donald Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric about women, immigrants, Muslims, and other groups during his 2016 presidential campaign (Cassese and Holman 2019; Frasure-Yokley 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018). Yet, Trump’s sexist and racist rhetoric is not usually theorized as a form or tool of antifeminist representation that has resonated with and mobilized a specific subset of women. Donald Trump may be a prime example of the kind of “dramatic leader” Pitkin warned about who could take advantage of symbolic representation. As such, Trump’s electoral success and other Republican candidates’ adoption of his rhetorical strategies (see Kelly 2020) suggest the importance of studying symbolic representation with an eye toward its potential dangers.

WOMEN'S POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN US POLITICS

A common explanation for variation in levels of political engagement and participation is unequal access to certain resources, including time, money, civic skills, political interest, political efficacy, and recruitment networks (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) find that higher levels of income, education, experience, and feelings of political efficacy are associated with a higher likelihood of voting, persuading others how to vote, working for campaigns, and donating money to campaigns. Those who are wealthier and more educated have more money to contribute and more elite social networks that facilitate political participation, and individuals gain participatory and psychological resources as they grow older and get more involved in politics.

In their landmark study on gender and political action, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) identified small but persistent gender gaps in various forms of political participation. They argue that these gaps result from unequal access to civic and recruitment resources provided by non-political institutions, such as the family, schools, workplaces, unions, religious institutions, and volunteer organizations. While they found, surprisingly, that the time women spend on household maintenance and child care does not significantly detract from political participation, familial responsibilities hamper women's access to occupational opportunities that lead to higher levels of participation. They also found that the most important factor producing participatory disparities between women and men was lower educational attainment among women.

Over time, resource disparities between women and men have become less pronounced. Most notably, women now have an advantage over men in educational

attainment (Burns et al. 2018; Bos and Schneider 2017). As a result, an updated study by Burns and colleagues (2018) finds that the earlier gender gaps in political participation have largely closed; however, women remain less interested than men in campaigns and somewhat less likely to donate money.

As the resource model of participation suggests, the costs of participating in the most arduous forms of political activity likely outweigh the material benefits for an individual. Yet, many people are long-term activists or volunteers. Using a survey with an oversample of political activists, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1995) find that activists involved in collective action efforts most often cite concerns about civic involvement, the good of the community or nation, and specific public policy issues as justifications for their “irrational” behavior. These activists receive expressive rewards from the performance of the act rather than instrumental benefits resulting from their actions. Foster (2018) finds that urban environmental volunteers are motivated to lend their time and physical labor because of intense emotional attachments to neighborhoods, neighbors, animals, and the environment. As such, psychological resources and rewards play a major role in motivating the most highly engaged citizens.

I borrow Burns, Schlozman, and Verba’s (2001) definition of political participation as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly, by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (4). I differ from them, however, in that I also focus on attention to and interest in electoral politics. For this reason, I more often use the broader term “political engagement” to refer to acts of political participation plus psychological engagement in politics, including expressing

electoral interest. This broader approach reflects the finding that women's lower psychological engagement in politics has remained the most persistent gender gap in political behavior as gendered resource disparities have become less substantial (Burns et al. 2018; Bos and Schneider 2017).¹

THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN US POLITICS

Group political representation can provide psychological resources that compensate for resource disparities that influence levels of political participation. Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) found that women in states or districts with visible women candidates and officeholders were more interested in politics, which is a key predictor of political participation. Moreover, the magnitude of this finding suggested that the psychological resources gained by seeing oneself represented in politics could fully compensate for unequal access to material resources and civic socialization. They were unable to find evidence for a specific mechanism but suggested that visible women candidates and officials could act as role models and signal that the political sphere is inclusive and open to women.

Research on the symbolic representation of women in US politics focuses on the link between women's descriptive representation in politics and the political engagement of women citizens. Table 2.1 lists some of the studies that address this relationship within the last two decades, including a few studies finding null results (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004).

¹ Additionally, because I am primarily interested in the psychological mechanisms that link representation and engagement, I control for the material resources that influence levels of participation in all quantitative analyses of political behavior.

Table 2.1 Some Recent Studies of Women's Symbolic Representation in US Politics

Citation	Data	Years	Measure of Representation (IV)	Measure of Engagement (DV)	Proposed Mechanisms	Important Considerations	Findings
Ladam, Harden, & Windett (2018)	State Leg. Election Returns	1978-2012	Senator; Governor	Proportion of women who run for State Leg.	Inspiration; Increased recruitment		Positive
Simien & Hampson (2017)	ANES Panel	2008	Clinton	Positive affect; Pride; Proselytizing; Stating an intention to vote in the Dem primary	Gender affinity/Group identity; Enhanced group status; Positive affect/Pride; Cross-pressures	Party; Race; Age	Positive, vary by race, ethnicity, and age
Uhlaner & Scola (2016)	CPS	2000-2012	% in State Leg.	Turnout	Increased knowledge, Interest, and/or Trust; Perception of open political system	Collective representation; Race	Positive, vary by race-gender groups
Fridkin & Kenney (2014)	CCES	2006	Senator	Knowledge of Senator's Ideology, Party, and Voting record; Participation in several political activities	Novelty; Salience of identity		Positive
Jones (2014)	CCES	2006-2010	Senator	Knowledge of Senator's voting record; Approval of Senator's job; Vote choice	Perception of open political system	Party congruence	Positive
Stout & Tate (2013)	ANES Panel	2008	Obama and Palin	Internal and external efficacy	Perception of responsiveness; Greater participation of women and African Americans	Party congruence; Time	Positive for Obama, mixed for Palin
Reingold & Harrell (2010)	ANES	1984-2004	House, Senate, and Gov candidates and officeholders combined and separate	Campaign interest; Political discussion; Proselytizing; Candidate recognition	Perception of responsiveness	Party congruence; Candidates vs. officeholders; Candidate viability	Positive for candidates
Dolan (2008)	ANES	1990-2000	House candidate	Knowledge of the candidates; Positive affect; Vote choice	Gender affinity	Party congruence	Positive for Democrats
Stokes-Brown & Neal (2008)	ANES; Newspaper articles	2002-2004	Senate and House candidates plus their discussion of women's issues	Proselytizing	Conformity to stereotypes		Null, but positive for economic issues
Dolan (2006)	ANES	1990-2004	House and Senate candidates	Efficacy; Political interest; Proselytizing; Participation; Voting	Psychological benefits; Perception of open political system	Party congruence; Competitiveness; Level of office	Mixed, mostly null
Lawless (2004)	ANES	1980-1998	House rep; Senator; % in Congress; % in State Leg.	Higher evals for MC; Trust; External efficacy; Proselytizing; Turnout; Registering to vote; > 3 political activities	Perception of responsiveness; Perception of shared experience; Gender consciousness	Party congruence; Recognition of MC	Mixed, mostly null
Atkeson (2003)	ANES	1990-1998	Senate and Gov candidates	Internal efficacy; Political interest; Discussion; Proselytizing; Party affect; Political knowledge	Perception of open political system; Perception of responsiveness	Candidate viability	Positive

Scholars have looked at the descriptive presence of women as *candidates* for president, Congress, and governor. They have also considered women's presence as *officeholders* at the congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative levels. And some studies clarify that the women candidates need to be viable to have an effect (Atkeson 2003; Reingold and

Harrell 2010). Most studies measure dyadic representation—or women’s one-to-one relationship as representatives and constituents; however, a few studies examine women’s collective representation—or the effect of women’s overall presence in an institution (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Lawless 2004; Uhlener and Scola 2016).

The measures of political engagement that serve as the dependent variables in this research range widely and include political interest, efficacy, knowledge, voting, registering to vote, stating an intention to vote, discussing politics, proselytizing, attending rallies, wearing buttons, donating to a party or candidate, working for a party or candidate, and running for office. While most voters have a baseline preference for candidates of their own gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002), demonstrating support for women candidates is not typically an outcome of interest in research on symbolic representation. Instead, this research is focused on the mobilizing impact of women’s descriptive presence in politics—regardless of whether that mobilization actually benefits women candidates. As such, this framework can easily be extended to consider how women may be mobilized against a woman or man who they perceive as threatening to their gendered interests.

As I noted in Chapter 1, the proposed mechanisms for the link between representation and engagement in this literature tend to be implicitly or explicitly positive in nature and include a perception that the political system is responsive to women, perceptions that women leaders will have shared experiences and concerns, or inspiration. Most scholars have not directly tested for these mechanisms; however, Ladam, Harden, and Windett (2018) find more evidence for the presence of women

leaders being a source of inspiration than for women leaders being a source of recruitment for other women.

DIFFERENCES AMONG WOMEN

Most studies of symbolic representation find that women's descriptive representation increases women's political engagement conditionally. In some cases, symbolic representation "works" for candidates but not for officeholders (Reingold and Harrell 2010) or Democrats but not Republicans (Dolan 2008a). In other instances, the findings for women citizens vary by race and ethnicity or age (Simien and Hampson 2017; Stout and Tate 2013; Uhlener and Scola 2016). In my research, I devote particular attention to partisan, racial, and ethnic differences among women in their responses to candidates.

PARTISANSHIP

Several studies incorporate "partisan congruence" between women representatives and women citizens into their models of symbolic representation (Dolan 2006; 2008; Jones 2014; Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010; Stout and Tate 2013). We should expect women to react differently to in-party and out-party women candidates not only because of differences in values and policy priorities between the parties but also because of substantial differences in women's descriptive representation within the parties. Of the 24 women currently serving in the US Senate, only one-third are Republicans. And of the 119 women in the US House, just over a quarter are Republicans. Moreover, only five of the 49 congresswomen of color are Republicans (CAWP 2021a). In the electorate, women have been more likely than men to identify as Democrats over the last four decades (Ondercin 2017). As party polarization increases

both in political institutions (Lee 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) and in the electorate (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018), women within the parties are also becoming more polarized (Ondercin and Lizotte 2020).

Recent work on affective partisanship in the mass public has conceived of partisanship as a group identity, much like politicized racial or gender group identities. This line of research suggests that mere identification with a party—rather than actual policy preferences—is responsible for increased dislike of the opposing party and the attribution of negative traits to members of the opposition party (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Of note, women are more likely than men to identify as partisans, and women’s political attitudes are more likely to be influenced by their partisanship (Ondercin and Lizotte 2020). Because women’s gender and partisan identities are interdependent, we should not expect women to respond to in-party and out-party candidates in the same ways.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

Just as partisanship fundamentally shapes women’s political identities *as women*, so does race and ethnicity. Research on Black women’s political attitudes has found that their gender and racial identities are mutually reinforcing (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien 2005). And white women are more likely than white men to explicitly identify as white (Jardina 2019). Moreover, while women are more likely to support Democrats overall, white women are more likely than women of other racial and ethnic groups to endorse sexist beliefs and vote for Republican candidates (Cassese and Barnes 2019; Junn 2017). Given that much of the increase in women’s representation in both state and national politics can be attributed to Democratic women of color specifically (Carroll and

Sanbonmatsu 2013; CAWP 2021a), it is vital that studies of symbolic representation consider the role that race and ethnicity may play in the relationship between women's representation and engagement.

As Uhlaner and Scola (2016) note, "treating 'women' as a single group is misleading. The politically relevant experiences of African American women diverge widely from those of white women, and 'race' has been a defining cleavage in the United States for far longer than gender" (233). In their study of symbolic representation, Uhlaner and Scola (2016) find that it is important to consider the intersection of race and gender identities. They separate their analysis by race-gender groups and find strong positive relationships between increases in the percent of each race-gender group in the state legislatures and voter turnout among that specific race-gender group. They further find that while white women turn out in greater numbers when the percent of overall women increases in the state legislatures, Black women's turnout levels are only responsive to increases in the percent of Black women. In fact, as the percent of overall women increased in the state legislatures, Black women's levels of turnout decreased.

Simien and Hampson (2017) similarly find racial and ethnic differences in women's responses to Hillary Clinton's candidacy in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary. They find that Black and Latina women demonstrated greater positive affect and feelings of pride in response to Clinton's candidacy than did white women. However, when women *did* experience positive affect and pride in response to Clinton, only white women and Latinas were more likely to proselytize and state an intention to vote in the primary election.

CROSS-PRESSURED AND REINFORCING IDENTITIES

Party, race, and ethnicity exert cross-cutting influences on women that fundamentally shape women's political attitudes and behavior. As such, research on women's political behavior must account for these intersecting identities (Cassese and Barnes 2019; Junn 2017). As the Democratic and Republican parties become increasingly sorted based on social identity categories, including gender, race, ethnicity, class, and religion, it becomes more likely that specific intersections of partisan, gender, race, and ethnic identities will present conflicting or reinforcing political pressures (Brader, Tucker, and Therriault 2013; Mason 2018). Conflicting social group identities, or cross-pressures, have been shown to exert a moderating effect on political attitudes, emotions, and participation. In contrast, reinforcing identities have the opposite effect (Brader, Tucker, and Therriault 2013; Cassese 2020; Mason 2016; 2018).

Ondercin (2017) argues that both women and men have shifted their partisanship over time to align with the party that best represents their gendered social identities, forming a gender gap in which women are more likely to be Democrats. Women have been more likely than men to vote for Democratic candidates since the 1980s, but this relationship is primarily driven by women of color, especially Black women. In fact, most white women have voted Republican in 16 of the last 18 presidential elections (Junn and Masuoka 2020).

Over time, party realignments have led the Democratic party to become increasingly associated with social welfare policies and minority interests. The Republican party, in contrast, has become more racially homogenous (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; Mason 2018; Ondercin 2017). Whereas heterosexual norms lead women

and men to share many economic and political interests (Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor 2017), Black Americans are often residentially segregated from white Americans and have a shared history of slavery and discrimination that encourages them to act politically as a group (Anoll 2018; Burge 2020; Dawson 1994; Hutchings and Valentino 2004). These dynamics have produced a context in which Black Americans are “captured” by the Democratic party (Frymer 1999). Because Republicans are uninterested in competing for minority support, Black Americans—both women and men, but especially women—overwhelmingly vote for Democrats, even as Democrats take their support for granted.

Likewise, Latinos have increasingly identified with the Democratic party, with the strongest Latina/o identifiers identifying as the strongest Democrats (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016). While there is some variation in Latina/o partisanship by national origin and generation, Latinas are somewhat more likely to identify as Democrats than their male counterparts (Bejarano 2014). Hajnal and Lee (2011) issue an important caveat to the general association between racial and ethnic minority groups and Democratic partisanship, however. Most immigrant-based groups, including Latina/o and Asian Americans, are not affiliated with any party due to lower information about the parties, an ideological misfit, or a stronger connection to their racial or ethnic group identity.

Because Republicans are a more racially homogenous group, there is a closer alignment between their partisan and social identities. As such, Republicans tend to be more easily mobilized and emotionally responsive than Democrats (Mason 2018; Phoenix 2020). In Chapter 5, I consider how women’s cross-pressured or reinforcing partisan and racial or ethnic identities may produce different emotional responses to candidates, with consequences for women’s levels of political engagement.

POLITICAL EMOTION

Several studies of symbolic representation make passing reference to affective attachments but generally do not draw out the specific roles that affect or emotion play in the process of symbolic representation (Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018; Lawless 2004). Ladam, Harden, and Windett (2018) define symbolic representation as a representative “evok[ing] an emotional or affective response in constituents leading them to feel represented” (370). Studies that claim to measure affect or “gender affinity” typically do so through a simple feeling thermometer or like/dislike scale (Dolan 2008a; Stout and Tate 2013).

Drawing on research about emotions from psychology and sociology (e.g., Huddy 2013; Jasper 2018; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), I take the position that people do not typically move from positions of political inaction to political action because they dispassionately calculate the rational utility of various policy alternatives. Instead, they are especially likely to turn out or take to the streets because some policy or statement felt like a slap to the face or a punch in the gut, because some idea was so resonant to them that it felt like electricity coursing through their body, or because of their emotional attachments to specific groups and social networks. While long-term, stable factors like material resources and civic socialization structure individuals’ *opportunities* to engage in politics, individual-level participation often varies between elections. Emotions can help explain this shorter-term variation (Valentino et al. 2011). By ignoring emotion because it is seen as an inferior basis for political action and unworthy of scholarly attention, researchers can fail to grasp the importance of affect for politics.²

² For example, Kreiss, Barker, and Zenner (2017) analyzed 123 articles that employ content analysis published in the journal *Political Communication* between 2003 and 2016. They argue that political

Political psychologists have found that certain emotions—such as enthusiasm, pride, hope, anger, fear, and anxiety—impact political behavior (e.g., Brader 2005; Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). Brader and Marcus (2013) describe three major theoretical approaches to the study of emotion in political psychology. The first, “approach-avoidance,” takes a simple valence view, with positive affect encouraging action and negative affect prompting caution. The second, “appraisal,” focuses on the distinct emotional states that arise from individuals’ assessments of a given situation in relation to their goals. The third approach attends to the “neural processes” that produce emotional responses, which have cognitive and behavioral consequences. This final approach has tended to focus on the downstream effects of two—and increasingly three—dimensions of emotion: enthusiasm, anxiety or fear, and aversion or anger.

Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen’s (2000) affective intelligence theory (AIT) derives from the third “neural process” approach and relies on a “dual systems” theory of emotions. They propose that, by default, individuals respond to political actors, issues, and events without much conscious thought based on prior learning and habits. In the background, however, individuals are continuously scanning the political environment for novelty or threat. When a novel or threatening stimulus emerges, anxiety disrupts the reliance on habit and triggers more careful attention to allow for political learning to take place. By gathering new information about a novel or threatening situation or actor, individuals can respond to similar circumstances in the future with less effort.

communication scholars have under-emphasized or entirely ignored the importance of emotional self-interest. They further suggest that the lack of attention to emotional self-interest left political science unprepared to explain the rise of Donald Trump and that this gap is related to a lack of field and interview-based research.

These processes are related to two systems associated with the brain's limbic region. The first is the "disposition system," which manages the execution of habitual behavior by regulating levels of enthusiasm. Positive responses to political stimuli signal that all is well in the political environment and that the same habits, heuristics, and group-based cues that individuals have previously relied on will continue to serve them well. Higher levels of enthusiasm—often assessed by combining measures of pride and hope—are associated with higher levels of political engagement. As such, enthusiasm is considered an "approach" emotion that can spur political action (Brader and Marcus 2013; Valentino et al. 2011)

The second system, the "surveillance system," alerts us to novel or threatening stimuli by regulating levels of anxiety and calmness. In contrast to enthusiasm, anxious or fearful responses to political stimuli signal that something is awry in the political environment and that an individual's existing habits, heuristics, and group-based cues may not be adequate to deal with a novel, threatening, or unfamiliar circumstance. As responses to novelty and threat, anxiety and fear are associated with risk aversion (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000; MacKuen et al. 2010) and demonstrate mixed findings for driving political action (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). The most consistent outcome of fear and anxiety is increased attention and information-seeking, which helps an individual determine what to do about an unfamiliar situation (MacKuen et al. 2010; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).

While Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) originally measured anxiety as an average of anger and fear, later work has distinguished between fear as an "avoidance"

emotion and anger as an “approach” emotion (Brader and Marcus 2013). In a study about reactions to 9/11 and the Iraq War, Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007) found that anxiety led to perceptions that the Iraq War was risky, whereas anger reduced the perceived risk. This difference in risk assessment produced lower support for the war in anxious individuals and higher support for the war in angry individuals.

A key difference in the determinants of fear and anger is the familiarity of the threat at hand. Fear is related to greater uncertainty and leads to pessimistic assessments of risk. In contrast, anger is related to greater certainty and produces optimistic assessments of risk (Lerner and Keltner 2000; MacKuen et al. 2010). While fear or anxiety can make people more persuadable, anger leads people to cling even more strongly to their preexisting beliefs and group commitments. As such, angry individuals tend to limit their exposure to new information (MacKuen et al. 2010).

Both AIT and cognitive appraisal theories (CAT) consider how appraisals of one’s situation or environment shape emotional responses (Brader and Marcus 2013). Preconscious appraisals can trigger emotions along dimensions such as “enthusiasm-lethargy” and “anxiety-calm.” Conscious appraisals then translate generalized affective responses into specific emotional states, such as anger, fear, sadness, and joy. As individuals become more conscious of their emotions, they may further interpret more precise variations of emotion, such as differentiating between anger and contempt. They may also experience a blending of emotions, as with nostalgia. AIT focuses more on the preconscious side of this process, whereas CAT focuses more on an individual’s conscious evaluations of their affective responses (Brader and Marcus 2013). My research examines emotions on the conscious side of this process, after women and men

have already reacted to political candidates with generalized affective responses, applied those responses to evaluations, become aware of their emotions, labeled their emotions, and potentially gone through several more rounds of applying their emotions to political evaluations and updating the labels they assign to their emotions.

Valentino and colleagues (2011) suggest that preconscious feelings of anger and anxiety prepare the body to act in response to a threat, but conscious appraisals of the threat at hand—whether it is familiar or how much control an individual has over it—determine whether the individual interprets their emotional reactions as anger or anxiety. These conscious appraisals lead to divergent effects for anger and anxiety. In unfamiliar or uncertain situations, individuals may feel anxious and engage in low-cost behaviors, like information-seeking. In contrast, familiar threats or feelings of certainty—about who to blame for a threat, for example—lead to anger and engagement in riskier, high-cost behaviors (MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2011). Like Valentino and colleagues (2011), I do not argue that emotions replace resource explanations for political engagement. Instead, resources and socialization structure opportunities to engage, and emotions may determine whether and how much citizens will put those resources to use in a given election.

GROUP EXPERIENCES OF EMOTION

Burge (2020) argues that political psychology scholarship has mainly focused on how *individuals* experience emotions, leaving us with unanswered questions about *group* experiences of emotion. Recent scholarship has sought to address these questions by devoting attention to the political consequences of emotions for partisans, across racial and ethnic groups, and between women and men.

PARTISANSHIP

Mason (2018) finds that strong partisans react with greater enthusiasm and anger to political messages than weaker partisans. She suggests that such responses are natural psychological reactions to in-group and out-group competition. Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) grapple with the distinction between emotions directed at in-party and out-party candidates using an “expectancy violation” framework. Expectancy violation theory (EVT) shares a similar logic to affective intelligence theory (AIT) in that novelty and threat—or in this case, disconfirmed expectations—such as experiencing negative affect toward an in-party candidate or positive affect toward an out-party candidate—can disrupt an individual’s reliance on habit.

Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) define *negative* emotions toward *out-party* candidates and *positive* emotions toward *in-party* candidates as “expectancy-confirming emotions,” and they define *positive* emotions toward *out-party* candidates and *negative* emotions toward *in-party* candidates as “expectancy-violating emotions.” They find that expectancy-violating emotions behave similarly to the proposed role of anxiety in AIT by decreasing the effect of partisanship on vote choice and increasing the impact of issue congruity between candidates and voters. Experiencing expectancy-violating emotions also increases the time it takes to make a vote decision and the probability of defection. The opposite is true of expectancy-confirming emotions. While Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) mostly focus on the effect of expectancy-violating emotions on voter decision-making, their theory would also suggest that expectancy-*confirming* emotions could be expected to act similarly to enthusiasm and anger in AIT, by leading to increased political participation (e.g., Valentino et al. 2011).

Motivated by findings from the symbolic representation literature that women are only more likely to engage in politics in response to party-congruent descriptive representatives (Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010), I argue that women's emotional responses to candidates are fundamentally shaped by their partisan identities. As such, the expectancy violation framework is attractive because it allows me to account for partisan group loyalties in the measurement of emotions. While Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) apply EVT to voter decision-making, I apply EVT to the study of gender differences in political engagement in Chapter 4. If expectancy-violating emotions work similarly to anxiety in AIT, then expectancy-confirming emotions should work similarly to enthusiasm and anger by encouraging political engagement.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

Research on emotions and Black politics finds that “identity moderates the connections between emotions and politics” (McGowen and Wylie 2020, 397). Towler and Parker (2018) find that Black Americans with negative opinions of Trump were more likely to vote in 2016, and Scott and Collins (2020) find that anger predicts political ambition for Black Americans. Latina/o Americans who perceived Latinos as a racialized group and felt a sense of immigrant linked fate were also more likely to feel angry toward Donald Trump in 2016. Moreover, expressing anger was associated with increased participation (Gutierrez et al. 2019).

These studies point to a distinctive role for negative emotions—and anger in particular—as a mobilizing emotion for Black and Latina/o Americans. Phoenix (2020), however, demonstrates that there is a “racial anger gap” between Black and white Americans, with Black Americans expressing lower levels of anger in surveys. He argues

that this gap is the result of exhaustion and despair from the constant state of threat that Black Americans face in US politics. He notes that in most election years, Black women's levels of anger are even lower than those of Black men—though the pattern reversed in 2016. Phoenix also finds that when they do experience anger, white Americans are more likely to engage in virtually all forms of political participation, but Black Americans are only more likely to engage in system-challenging forms of participation, such as protesting. In some contexts, however, Black Americans exhibit an enthusiasm advantage over white Americans, with hope and pride leading to increased participation. Latina/o and Asian Americans also demonstrate an anger gap and an enthusiasm advantage relative to white Americans, though the effects of these emotions on participation are mixed (Phoenix 2020).

Analyses of white working class anger or resentment in US politics have considered the role of relative social status in fostering negative emotions. For white Americans, justified economic anxiety has been linked to perceptions that groups such as immigrants, people of color, and women are unfairly cutting ahead in line. This perception of a decline in relative social status enables white Americans to point to what they view as concrete threats, translating the uncertainty associated with their economic anxiety into anger toward specific out-groups (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016; Kreiss, Barker, and Zenner 2017; Mendelberg 2016). The validation of these stories from conservative media sources like Fox News and political elites like Donald Trump *feels* good and offers hope, reinforcing feelings of moral superiority, threat, anger, and resentment toward out-groups (Hochschild 2016; Kreiss, Barker, and Zenner 2017).

GENDER

As with research on race and ethnicity, political psychologists are increasingly examining the role of emotions in politics between and among women and men. Since the 2016 US presidential election, there has been increased attention to women's anger amid the #MeToo movement and record-breaking Women's Marches (see Traister, 2018). In 2018, Democratic non-incumbent women—especially white women—were motivated to run for the US Congress in large numbers due to feelings of anger, frustration, threat, and perceptions of urgency (Dittmar 2020a). DeMora and colleagues (2020) presented women with vignettes about Donald Trump's treatment of women, Hillary Clinton's historic candidacy, the Women's Marches, or the #MeToo movement. They found that women in the Trump condition expressed greater anger, while women in the remaining conditions expressed greater enthusiasm. These emotional responses led to slight increases in political ambition.

Fridkin and colleagues (2019) used facial recognition software to measure subjects' emotional responses to the first 2016 presidential debate between Trump and Clinton. They found that women were more likely to react with sadness, and men were more likely to react with anger and disgust. There were no significant gender differences in expressions of fear and contempt. Additionally, the authors found that—relative to men—women's emotional responses have a greater effect on their evaluations of the candidates than men's emotions have on their evaluations. Scholars have also examined the interplay of sexism and negative affect in the post-2016 moment. Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno (2018) found that hostile sexism was strongly related to support for Trump in

the 2016 election, but anxiety reduced the impact of sexism. They also found that anger increased the likelihood that voters high in sexism would turn out to vote.

Whereas research on racial and ethnic minority groups finds that both the *levels* of different emotions experienced and the *effects* of those emotions on political engagement differ across groups (Phoenix 2020), I argue that gender differences between women and men should appear more in the *levels* of emotions expressed and less in the *effects* of those emotions on engagement. Heterosexual norms result in women and men sharing many political interests and experiences (Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor 2017), and the gender resource gaps that explain much of the variation in political engagement have increasingly closed (Burns et al. 2018). These realities mark an important structural difference between gender on one hand and race or ethnicity on the other. In heterosexual relationships, women's and men's interests and resources often converge in such a way that—given similar *levels* of emotional response—there should not be substantial differences in the extent of their political engagement. Racial segregation, divergent experiences with discrimination, and vastly unequal access to the resources that predict political engagement should naturally result in more substantial differences in the *effects* of emotions across racial and ethnic groups.

Wolak (2020) employs national survey data between 2016 and 2018 to examine gender differences in emotions and political engagement. She finds that women are somewhat more likely than men to express negative emotions, including anger, anxiety, and embarrassment, but women are no more likely than men to translate those emotions into action. While little to no gender differences in the *effects* of emotions on engagement might lead researchers to mistakenly conclude that gender is irrelevant, I show in Chapter


4 that gender simply matters earlier in the process: in the *levels* of emotions that women and men experience in response to the salience of gender in a given electoral context.

For the most part, political psychologists studying group-based emotions have primarily focused on either gender or race and ethnicity (see Simien and Hampson 2017 for an exception). As these bodies of work continue to grow, it will be important to consider how the role of emotions in politics varies when group identities overlap. In Chapter 5, I contribute such an analysis as it pertains to the effect of partisanship on the expression of emotions among white, Black, and Latina women. I also examine the effect of emotions on political engagement across these race-gender groups.

A NEW FRAMEWORK INTEGRATING WOMEN'S POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, EMOTIONS, AND ENGAGEMENT

Figure 2.1 illustrates the existing symbolic representation framework as applied to women citizens. The physical presence of an in-party woman candidate leads women in the electorate to engage in politics through a positive mechanism, such as perceptions that the political system is responsive to women's interests or inspiration based on a shared identity (Atkeson 2003; Dolan 2008a; Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018). A key finding in the symbolic representation literature is that the presence of an *out*-party woman candidate does *not* lead to increased engagement (Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010).

Figure 2.1 Traditional Symbolic Representation Framework




The boxes with dashed borders in Figure 2.1 point out implied elements of the traditional symbolic representation framework that do not receive much explicit attention in research on the subject. Because this research generally aims to underscore the impact of women’s descriptive representation in politics, the symbolic meanings associated with men’s representation of women are justifiably underemphasized. And while scholars have proposed several possible positive mechanisms at the center of the relationship between representation and engagement, few directly test for these mechanisms (for an exception, see Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018).

Another key finding from the symbolic representation literature—not pictured in Figure 2.1—is that the relationship between representation and engagement is conditioned by race and ethnicity. Women in the electorate respond differently to candidates based on their own racial or ethnic identities (Simien and Hampson 2017) as well as based on candidates’ and representatives’ racial or ethnic identities (Uhlener and Scola 2016).

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present my revised framework for the process of symbolic representation as applied to women citizens. As in Figure 2.1, the left-hand boxes in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 indicate the physical presence of in-party and out-party descriptive and non-descriptive representatives. The next column of boxes indicates candidates' rhetorical representation of women and whether the rhetoric in question is likely to lead individual women in the electorate to accept or reject the candidate as their representative. As a reminder, the key outcome for symbolic representation, according to Pitkin (1967), is an audience's acceptance of a leader as a representative.

Figure 2.2 New Symbolic Representation Framework – The Role of Expectancy-Confirming Emotions



In Chapter 3, I examine the relationship between descriptive and rhetorical representation. Women candidates might be expected to discuss women and women's interests more often than men due to shared lived experiences that may inform shared political interests and grievances among women. But because the Democratic party embraces identity politics while the Republican party rejects identity politics (Grossman

and Hopkins 2016), and because women are more closely aligned with the Democratic party (Ondercin 2017), I also expect that Democrats will be more likely than Republicans to rhetorically represent women. As such, I offer the following hypotheses.

Descriptive and Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis: Within each party, women will be more likely than men to rhetorically represent women by discussing women and women's interests.

Partisan Identity Politics Hypothesis: Democrats—both women and men—will be more likely than Republicans to rhetorically represent women by discussing women and women's interests.

Chapter 3 also analyzes themes in candidates' discussion of women, including tendencies to discuss women's multiple and intersecting identities. For similar reasons to the hypotheses above, I test the following expectation.

Intersectional Representation Hypothesis: Democratic women of color will be the most likely group to discuss women and women's interests in relation to their racial and ethnic identities and interests.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the most common scenario, in which in-party candidates—both women and men—rhetorically represent women in ways that are likely to resonate positively with their target audience. The rhetoric of out-party candidates, in contrast, is most likely to be received negatively. This dynamic reflects findings from the symbolic representation literature regarding party-congruence (Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010). Additionally, it reflects findings that women elites represent women through a distinctively partisan lens (Deckman 2016; Osborn 2012; Wineinger 2019).

The bolded arrows between the first and second rows of boxes indicate that rhetoric from descriptive representatives should resonate more strongly with women than rhetoric from non-descriptive representatives. While in-party women's rhetoric is likely to be received most *positively*, out-party women's rhetoric may be received most

negatively. Based on a shared gender identity, some women may hold expectations that other women should share their interests and perspectives. If women candidates violate those expectations, then women citizens may have a stronger negative reaction than they would have had to a man with whom they did *not* expect to share gendered interests or perspectives. Such a dynamic may partly explain conservative women's extreme animosity toward liberal women leaders like Nancy Pelosi, for example.

The second half of Chapter 3 examines emotional responses to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation among a unique population of women activists. In this exploratory component of the project, I consider the emotions that emerge as being most central to political engagement among highly engaged women citizens. Despite the exploratory focus, I have a couple of general expectations. Based on the traditional symbolic representation framework, I expect that women activists will report being motivated to participate in politics due to positive emotions directed at in-party women candidates or in-party candidate rhetoric about women. Departing from the traditional symbolic representation literature and informed by political psychology research on emotions (e.g., Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015; Valentino et al. 2011), I also expect that women activists will report being motivated to participate because of negative emotions triggered by out-party candidate rhetoric about women. In each of my expectations, the rhetoric in question could come from descriptive or non-descriptive representatives.

In Chapter 4, I use nationally representative survey data to test similar expectations in individual election years between 1980 and 2016.

Descriptive Representation Hypothesis: In election years where there is an in-party woman on one of the major-party presidential tickets—1984, 2008, and 2016—


women will be more likely than men to express pride and hope toward their party's candidates.

Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis: In election years where an out-party candidate was prominently associated with rhetoric about women, women will be more likely than men to express anger and fear toward the candidate. When an in-party candidate is prominently associated with rhetoric about women, women will be more likely than men to express pride and hope toward the candidate.

The survey data I employ in Chapter 4 is not ideal for testing the *Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis* because it does not directly measure responses to candidate rhetoric. However, I can exploit a couple of measures in 2016 regarding Donald Trump's rhetoric about women and in 2012 regarding rhetoric about a "Republican War on Women" to see whether these factors played a role in women's expressions of candidate-centric emotions in each election year.

Figure 2.3 illustrates an uncommon scenario where in-party candidates rhetorically represent women in ways that they reject while out-party candidates rhetorically represent women in ways that they accept. These kinds of novel or potentially threatening scenarios may trigger the surveillance system and result in anxiety, as posited in affective intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Expectancy-violation theory (EVT) proposes a similar process, with the exception that expectancy-violating emotions should result instead of anxiety (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015). Expectancy-violating emotions include positive emotions toward out-party candidates and negative emotions toward in-party candidates. Because I am interested in in-party and out-party group dynamics and emotions directed at specific candidates, the EVT framework is easily applied to my research.

Figure 2.3 New Symbolic Representation Framework – The Role of Expectancy-Violating Emotions



In the absence of a rare novel or threatening scenario, the surveillance system is not triggered, expectations are not violated, and individuals can safely fall back on their existing habits, heuristics, and group allegiances. Such is the case in Figure 2.2. Accept-worthy rhetoric from in-party candidates should result in pride or hope toward those candidates. And reject-worthy rhetoric from out-party candidates should result in anger or fear toward those candidates. In contrast to the expectancy-violating emotions in Figure 2.3, the expectancy-confirming emotions in Figure 2.2 should operate similarly to enthusiasm and anger in AIT by increasing political engagement. Based on political psychology research about emotions (e.g., Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015), I test the following hypotheses in Chapter 4.

Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis: Expectancy-confirming emotions—out-party anger, out-party fear, in-party pride, and in-party hope—will lead to higher levels of campaign interest and political participation.

De-mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis: Expectancy-violating emotions—in-party anger, in-party fear, out-party pride, and out-party hope—will lead to lower levels of political participation. These emotions may lead to higher levels of campaign interest, however, because of the association between disconfirmed expectations and increased attention and information search.

Emotional responses to candidates' rhetoric about women are likely to be stronger among women than men, and the specific emotions triggered are likely to differ between women and men. In other words, gender should shape the *levels* of different emotions experienced in response to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation. In contrast, gender differences are likely to be small in the *effects* of emotions—once felt—on political engagement. As I explained earlier in the chapter, this is because heterosexual norms often result in women and men sharing certain economic and political interests (Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor 2017), and gendered resource gaps are increasingly closing (Burns et al. 2018). This is an important way in which gender differs from race or ethnicity and in which my findings may differ from studies of emotions in the race and ethnic politics literature. As a result, when testing the *Mobilizing* and *De-mobilizing Emotions Hypotheses*, I anticipate that expectancy-confirming and expectancy-violating emotions will exert similar effects on women's and men's levels of political engagement. The second half of Chapter 4 argues that gender is a more significant factor earlier in the process: in the *levels* of emotions that women and men express in response to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation. There, I test the *Descriptive Representation* and *Rhetorical Representation Hypotheses* I described earlier in this section.

In Chapter 5, I examine racial and ethnic differences among women in the *levels* of different emotions expressed toward candidates and in the *effects* of those emotions on

political engagement. Existing research finds that Black Americans report lower levels of anger than white Americans in surveys, and Black women tend to report even lower levels of anger than Black men (Phoenix 2020). In some contexts, however, Black Americans demonstrate an “enthusiasm advantage.” Phoenix (2020) suggests that the anger gap may be related to exhaustion and despair from constant threats to communities of color in the United States, and he credits the enthusiasm advantage to the centrality of hope and pride in African American discourse. Based on this research, I offer the following hypotheses:

Anger Gap Hypothesis: Black women and Latinas will be less likely than white women to express anger toward out-party candidates, and out-party anger will be less likely to increase political engagement among Black women and Latinas.

Enthusiasm Advantage Hypothesis: Black women and Latinas will be more likely than white women to express pride and hope toward in-party candidates, and these positive emotions will be more likely to increase political engagement among Black women and Latinas.

Based on research about cross-pressured and reinforcing identities, I also examine the differential impact of partisanship on women’s expression of emotions across racial and ethnic groups. Women in all racial and ethnic groups are more likely than men to identify as Democrats (Bejarano 2017). But most white women have tended to vote for Republican candidates (Junn and Masuoka 2020). As such, Republican white women’s racial and partisan identities may be reinforcing. And Republican Black, Latina, and Asian American women’s racial and partisan identities may—to different degrees—be cross-pressured. Cross-pressured identities typically moderate emotional responses, while reinforcing identities fuel emotional responses (Mason 2018).

Partisan Cross-Pressure Hypothesis: Identifying as a Republican will tend to decrease Black women’s and Latinas’ reports of expectancy-confirming emotions, while identifying as a Democrat should increase Black women’s and Latinas’

reports of expectancy-confirming emotions. Republican white women should be somewhat more likely than Democratic white women to express these emotions, but the magnitude of this difference should be smaller than the partisan differences for the other race-gender groups.

I end Chapter 5 with a discussion of differences in the expression of political anger between white women and women of color. For women of color who have experienced near-constant political threat, their anger is persistent and exhausting. For white women, anger in response to political threats is less constant. In historical moments where white women's political anger spikes, it may feel more novel and exciting—even exuberant. As Young (2000) writes, the excitement of making one's anger heard is real, but the work gets harder with time.

To be sure, democratic politics has some joys: the thrill of being part of a crowd of thousands marching down the street chanting and singing for a cause we believe in; the sense of solidarity with others as we work in a campaign; the excitement of victory. Defeat, co-optation, or ambiguous results are more common experiences than political victory, however. Citizens must often put in a great deal of time to gain a small reform (16).

When their anger grows older and more tiresome, will women—in particular, the Democratic white women energized by their anger toward Donald Trump—continue to engage in politics at similar levels to those immediately following the 2016 election?

CHAPTER 3 THE RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN US CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS

I begin this chapter by discussing how rhetorical representation—like descriptive representation—can serve as a tool of symbolic representation. The remainder of the chapter proceeds in two parts. In the first, I examine the relationship between the descriptive and rhetorical representation of women by looking at candidates' congressional campaign websites from the 2010 and 2018 midterm elections. In the second part, I provide an exploratory analysis of women activists' emotional responses to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women during the 2018 election.

RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION AS A TOOL OF SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION

In her discussion of symbolic representation, Pitkin (1967) writes, “to say that something symbolizes something else is to say that it calls to mind, and even beyond that evokes emotions or attitudes appropriate to the absent thing” (96). As such, political representatives can be said to symbolize women when they call women to mind and evoke emotions or attitudes related to women. The most direct way in which political leaders can symbolize women is by literally being women. Naturally then, empirical research on the symbolic representation of women in US politics has primarily focused on the mobilizing effects of women's descriptive representation (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; Lawless 2004). In this chapter, I will argue that an exclusive focus on women's physical presence can underestimate other ways in which women leaders symbolically represent women and entirely obscure the ways in which men symbolically represent women.

To symbolically *represent*—rather than merely *symbolize*—Pitkin (1967) argues that people must “accept or believe [that] the political leader represents them” (102). In symbolic representation, the key activity is “symbol-making,” by which leaders create or foster belief, loyalty, acceptance, and satisfaction through manipulating affective responses and cultivating habits in the represented (107). Of course, as Pitkin notes, this form of representation can be exploited by a leader with malintent. For this reason—among others—substantive representation is normatively superior to symbolic representation. And yet, if we are to maximize the substantive representation of women, it is important to understand the processes by which a candidate such as Donald Trump—known for his sexist and racist rhetoric (see Frasure-Yokley 2018; Kelly 2020; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Ocenio 2018)—can symbolically represent women such that a large share of women believe in and accept him as a representative. So long as such candidates can mobilize women’s action and support, the success of candidates who would substantively represent women may be undermined.

Theories about group representation suggest that one of the most significant impacts of women’s descriptive representation lies in the potential for women leaders to transform the political agenda through voicing women’s interests during political deliberation and debate (Beckwith 2014; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). Recent debates have highlighted the tension between the need to reach an objective definition of women’s interests to measure substantive representation and the empirical reality of competing claims about the content of women’s interests (Beckwith 2014; Celis and Childs 2018; Reingold and Swers 2011). Conservative representatives present a particularly challenging puzzle to scholars because conservative representatives often—

though not exclusively—offer claims to represent women that are antifeminist (Celis and Childs 2018). While most studies of women’s substantive representation focus on feminist policy initiatives as the key outcomes, increases in conservative women’s descriptive representation raise questions about how to evaluate conservative claims to represent women (Celis et al. 2014; Celis and Childs 2018). Celis and Childs (2018) argue that scholars should not outright dismiss conservative claims to represent women. Instead, scholars should evaluate whether conservative representatives are responsive to conservative women in society, whether the claims lead to tangible action, and whether the claims are undercut by other actions or policies that are harmful to women.

Beckwith (2014) encourages scholars to differentiate between interests, issues, and preferences. She argues that “interests” are broad values that stem from women’s lived experiences or circumstances as women, such as a desire for freedom from violence. Political actors strategically organize around more specific “issues” that are derived from women’s interests. One such issue could be legislation that criminalizes spousal assault. “Preferences” are the range of policy alternatives for a given issue, which may concern the role of the state in criminalizing spousal assault or the amount of funding allocated to addressing the issue, for example. Beckwith (2014) argues that most debate about women’s interests is related to disagreements about specific policy preferences rather than overarching interests. She further argues that disputes among women are those most likely to deal with a core women’s interest. While women may share an overarching interest, they may hold different issue positions related to that interest. One such example is women’s reproductive rights. While Democratic and

Republican women may disagree about the content of women's reproductive rights, they generally agree that reproductive rights are a core interest for women.

To evaluate leaders' *substantive* representation of women, it is usually necessary to settle on a specific definition of women's interests or issues—since the advancement of these concerns is often the dependent variable (Beckwith 2014; Swers 2002; 2013). To evaluate leaders' *symbolic* representation of women, however, the dependent variable should be some measure of belief, loyalty, acceptance, or satisfaction toward the representative among women citizens. As such, a central—and open—question for symbolic representation is whether and how leaders choose to define women's interests or otherwise portray women to achieve these outcomes.

Reingold and Swers (2011) advocate taking an “endogenous approach to women's interests” by investigating the ways in which women's interests or issues are socially constructed by political actors in different contexts rather than defining them a priori. Such an approach can yield insight into processes of marginalization that lead some interests to be prioritized over others. While an endogenous approach may be less appropriate for studies of substantive representation—in which scholars must define women's interests or issues in advance to measure their dependent variables—studies of symbolic representation do not require a priori definitions of women's interests or issues. As such, I take an endogenous approach to the study of women's interests in this chapter by observing the ways in which candidates symbolically construct women's political identities and interests to gain women citizens' acceptance and support.

Saward's (2010) claims-making framework is well-suited to the evaluation of symbolic representation because of its focus on the acceptance or rejection of claims to

represent a particular audience. He writes, “a representative claim is a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something” (38). He goes on to explain that representative claims are contestable: “there is no claim to be representative of a certain group that does not leave space for its contestation or rejection by the would-be audience or constituency” (45). No single definition of women’s interests or portrayal of women will foster belief, loyalty, acceptance, and satisfaction among all women in the electorate; instead, political candidates offer selective portrayals of women and women’s interests that appeal to an electorally valuable subset of their would-be women constituents.

I argue that candidates frequently provide such portrayals of women through *rhetorical representation*. Building from Pitkin (1967) and Saward (2010), I examine rhetorical representation as acts of symbol-making, in which political leaders advance claims to represent a specific audience. Symbolic representation is achieved when the relevant audience accepts the leader as their representative. An individual woman need not accept a leader as a representative of *all* women; symbolic representation is achieved when a woman accepts a leader as *her* representative at least in part *because* of that leader’s representation of women. As a tool of symbolic representation, rhetorical representation may be successful or unsuccessful; in other words, women citizens may accept or reject candidates based on their rhetoric about women. Symbolic representation only exists where candidates are accepted as representatives. But failed attempts at symbolic representation—in which women reject candidates as representatives—may have implications for women’s political behavior as well. Additionally, rhetorical representation is an ongoing process. Just because an individual accepts a representative

at one point in time does not mean that the individual cannot later reject that leader as a representative. The representative must continue to nurture that relationship.

In a more tangible sense, I define women's rhetorical representation in politics as any spoken or written discussion of women or women's interests that is publicly attributed to a politician—regardless of the politician's gender. Through their public rhetoric about women and women's interests, politicians symbolically construct women as a political group in ways that individual women or groups of women may accept or reject, with consequences for women's political behavior. While I argue that the symbolic impact of candidate rhetoric has been understudied in comparison to that of descriptive representation, the latter is still integral to my framework. As I aim to demonstrate in this chapter, descriptive and rhetorical representation are usually strongly related.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DESCRIPTIVE AND RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION

Campaigns are gendered institutions, and candidates strategically present themselves to counter or benefit from voters' gender stereotypes (Dittmar 2015). For example, women have been stereotyped as being more liberal than men, less competent on "masculine issues" such as the military or crime, and more competent on "compassion issues" such as poverty and "women's issues" like abortion (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000). Dittmar (2015) argues that candidates and their campaign consultants take stereotypes seriously in the early stages of crafting a candidate's image and message. Consultants seek to help women candidates minimize the impact that gender might have on their electoral success by balancing typically masculine strengths, such as toughness, with typically feminine strengths, such as honesty.

District demographics and party norms can further constrain candidates' rhetorical expression. Candidates of color running in majority white districts may deracialize their campaigns to avoid perceptions of racial favoritism (Cannon 1999; Christie and O'Brien 2020; Haines, Mendelberg, and Butler 2019; Perry 2011). This dynamic can result in a mismatch between low rhetorical representation but greater substantive policy representation of minority interests (Christie and O'Brien 2020; Haines, Mendelberg, and Butler 2019). The Republican party's rejection of identity politics can also lead Republican women and candidates of color to deemphasize gender and race in their campaigns (Dittmar 2015; Grossman and Hopkins 2016; Wineinger 2021). Democratic women can benefit from emphasizing their gender and championing gendered policy issues because such a focus is consistent with a liberal ideology and Democratic policy priorities (Koch 2000; Swers 2013; Winter 2010). But Republican women may be disadvantaged by the disconnect between voters' stereotypes about women and the more masculine stereotypes associated with their party (Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009; Winter 2010). Wineinger (2021) argues, however, that Republican candidates such as Mia Love have strategically invoked their gender and racial identities in sophisticated ways to bolster their conservative credentials.

Candidates and their campaign teams craft rhetoric and messaging to navigate the constraints and opportunities presented by voter stereotypes, district demographics, and party norms. Whether or not these strategic considerations are influencing a candidate's messaging, candidate rhetoric about women symbolically constructs women as a political group by including or excluding certain elements of women's experiences and political interests or grievances. Regardless of their intent, candidates define women's interests in

selective and contestable ways that may or may not resonate with actual women in the electorate.

Much like the connection between descriptive and substantive representation (e.g., Phillips 1995; Swers 2002; 2013), we should expect that women candidates will be more likely than men to discuss women and women's interests and to do so in ways that more strongly resonate with women citizens. Because women often share gendered lived experiences, women candidates' rhetoric about women may feel more authentic to women citizens and yield greater belief or acceptance—the relevant outcomes for symbolic representation. Since women's lived experiences can vary drastically by race, ethnicity, partisanship, and other salient categories, however, we should also expect greater acceptance of candidate rhetoric about women when candidates and citizens share multiple salient identity categories.

Research on floor speech and debate has found that women in Congress typically speak more about women and women's issues than their male colleagues (Osborn and Mendez 2010; Pearson and Dancey 2011; Walsh 2002). They also tend to speak more about the interests of other politically marginalized groups (Walsh 2002). In interviews, women officeholders often underscore their strong motivation to represent women both inside and outside their districts (Dittmar, Sanbonmatsu, and Carroll 2018; Dittmar et al. 2017). Many women express an additional desire to be a “voice for the voiceless,” including children, the unborn, and other un- or underrepresented groups (Dittmar, Sanbonmatsu, and Carroll 2018). Women of color frequently report motivations to represent working class perspectives and racialized minorities inside and even outside of the United States (Carroll 2002; Fraga et al. 2007). In a study of official online

biographies, Brown and Gershon (2016) find that Black and Latina congresswomen differ from white women and men of color by highlighting both their gender and racial identities more often and without prioritizing one over the other.

In a study of floor speeches in the 105th Congress, Shogan (2001) observes that while Democratic and Republican congresswomen were equally likely to invoke women in their rhetoric, they tended to address different topics. Republican congresswomen's rhetoric about women included topics such as taxes, business, or pensions. In contrast, Democratic women devoted more attention to social welfare. Additionally, Shogan (2001) finds that white women of both parties were most likely to invoke women while speaking about abortion, whereas women of color tended to speak about women most often regarding health care, welfare, and the economy.

Unlike the studies of officeholders discussed above, analyses of campaign websites have generally not found major gender differences in candidate self-presentation or issue priorities (Banwart and Winfrey 2013; Bystrom 2009; Dolan 2005; McDonald, Porter, and Treul 2020). These studies have tended to take a broad focus on candidate biographies or the topics listed on candidates' issue pages, which may overlook more subtle gender differences in the ways in which issues are framed. While women have certainly introduced brand new and previously "uncrystallized" issues to the political agenda (Mansbridge 1999), they have also introduced new perspectives on seemingly gender-neutral issue categories like taxes or criminal justice based on their lived experiences as women (e.g., Shogan 2001) or as women of color (e.g., Smooth 2011). Simply comparing the prevalence of topics on campaign websites might therefore miss

differences in the perspectives that women and men bring to their discussion of these topics.

In the next section of this chapter, I analyze partisan, gender, racial, and ethnic differences in candidate rhetoric on campaign websites during the 2010 and 2018 midterm elections. Rather than looking at differences in overall rhetoric and topic prevalence as previous studies of campaign websites have done, I focus specifically on candidates' invocation of women on their websites. I test the following hypotheses.

Descriptive and Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis: Within each party, women will be more likely than men to rhetorically represent women by discussing women and women's interests.

The Republican party's rejection of identity politics (Grossman and Hopkins 2016) and association with "masculine" issues (Winter 2010) may lead Republican women to deemphasize their gender identity and rhetoric about women's interests in their campaigns. Moreover, as partisan polarization has increased over time, many moderate Republican women have decided not to run for Congress (Thomsen 2017). Consequently, Republican women running for Congress are increasingly conservative and may therefore be less likely to rhetorically represent women. While individual Republican women may find opportunities to use their gender or racial identities to bolster their conservative credentials (see Wineinger 2021), they are still operating within constraints that do not apply to their Democratic counterparts. Conversely, Democratic men may find it advantageous to target women voters by emphasizing women's interests when facing a Republican woman opponent (see Dittmar 2015).

Partisan Identity Politics Hypothesis: Democrats—both women and men—will be more likely than Republicans to rhetorically represent women by discussing women and women's interests.

In addition to testing these hypotheses, I also provide an analysis of the themes and policy issues that feature most prominently in candidates' rhetorical representation of women, offering insight into the selective and contestable definitions of women's interests that candidates employ in the course of their "symbol-making" (Pitkin 1967, 107) or "claims-making" (Saward 2010). While this analysis is mostly exploratory, I offer one specific hypothesis about the prevalence of intersectional rhetoric about women.

Intersectional Representation Hypothesis: Democratic women of color will be the most likely group to discuss women and women's interests in relation to their racial and ethnic identities and interests.

Just as we might expect women candidates to discuss women more often than their male counterparts based on shared gendered experiences, we might also expect that women of color will be more likely than both white women and men of color to rhetorically represent women and racial and ethnic minorities simultaneously (see Brown and Gershon 2016). Women of color candidates are best positioned to rhetorically represent women in ways that reflect the co-constituted and intersectional nature of gender and race in the lived experiences of women of color in the US electorate (Crenshaw 1989; 1991; Hill Collins 2000). This should be especially true of Democrats because most women of color candidates are Democrats, and the Democratic party is more accepting of explicit references to identity politics than the Republican party (CAWP 2021a; Grossman and Hopkins 2016). White candidates running in districts with large proportions of racial and ethnic minorities may also be more likely to raise the concerns of women of color compared to candidates in more homogenous districts in an

effort to be responsive and accountable to their would-be constituency (Dittmar et al. 2017).

REPRESENTING WOMEN ON CAMPAIGN WEBSITES

As I noted in Chapter 1, rhetorical representation can occur in many mediums, including official websites, campaign materials, ads, speeches, debates, interviews, press releases, and even statements that resurface from before the candidate or representative entered politics. As a tool of symbolic representation, the critical outcome of rhetorical representation is someone's "belief" or "acceptance" that a politician represents them (see Pitkin 1967, 107; Saward 2010). As such, rhetorical representation can even include others' claims about what a politician has said or written—so long as the content of such claims contributes to people's acceptance or rejection of a representative.

The kind of analysis I present below is not an original approach. As I detailed in the previous section, other scholars have analyzed candidates' rhetoric about women in a variety of mediums, including congressional floor speeches (e.g., Pearson and Dancey 2011; Shogan 2001; Walsh 2002; Wineinger 2019) or campaign websites (e.g., Schreiber 2012). Most often, the analysis is focused on women's rhetoric about women and therefore does not directly test for a relationship between descriptive and rhetorical representation (but see Pearson and Dancey 2011). My unique contribution in this analysis is framing it within the context of symbolic representation rather than substantive representation. Perhaps because Pitkin's prioritization of substantive representation looms so large in the literature on women's representation, scholars have tended to justify the significance of politicians' rhetoric about women in its potential to contribute to substantive representation (e.g., Pearson and Dancey 2011). Certainly, this

rhetoric can contribute to the crystallization of interests that *might* be incorporated into substantive policy achievements in the future. But rhetoric about women *always* contributes to the symbolic and selective construction of women as a political group, which has implications for the acceptance and legitimation of political representatives who claim to represent women. This symbolic angle of rhetoric about women has been relatively neglected in recent scholarship on women's representation in US politics.

A benefit of looking at rhetorical representation on campaign websites is the relatively consistent availability and format of candidates' websites. In 2010, over 91% of general election congressional candidates had a dedicated campaign website. In 2018, the same was true of more than 97% of candidates. Campaign websites also have a consistent format, which includes a "Biography" or "About" page in addition to one or more "Issues" or "Priorities" pages that are organized by discrete policy categories. In contrast, it may be difficult to compile a comprehensive dataset of comparable ads, speeches, or isolated statements for many candidates. Additionally, candidates and their campaign teams have direct and complete control over the amount and type of content presented on campaign websites (Dolan 2008b; Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009). As such, candidates are mostly free to discuss women and women's issues as much or as little as they want on their campaign websites (Dolan 2008b). Since my aim in this analysis is to demonstrate the close relationship between descriptive and rhetorical representation, I require a large sample of comparable data with enough variation in candidate demographics and the prevalence of rhetoric about women. Of all potential sources of candidate rhetoric, campaign websites may best fit these criteria.

Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2009) find that people involved in the design of congressional campaign websites aim to target specific audiences, including undecided voters, supportive voters, journalists, and bloggers. Given that supportive voters are one of the main targets of candidates' websites, many of the visitors to campaign websites are already primed to accept a candidate as their representative before they are even exposed to the candidate's rhetoric. Additionally, many voters will not visit candidates' websites at all. But journalists frequently use the information on campaign websites to write profiles or stories that may ultimately reach these voters. This is one way in which someone other than the candidate may make a claim about what the candidate has said about women, which can contribute to the rhetorical representation of women.

A significant drawback of using campaign websites is that they tend to be highly curated. Most candidates (and their consultants) are going to steer clear of inflammatory rhetoric that could be perceived as misogynist or insulting to women, even if a candidate might engage in such rhetoric through another medium. Some candidates may use their websites to call attention to their opponent's inflammatory rhetoric, however. Campaign websites may also overrepresent policy-related rhetoric due to the dominance of the "Issues" page. Moreover, the rigid formatting of "Issues" pages often leads candidates to restrict their discussion of women to a single "Women's Issues" section or paragraph. Such a format may prevent candidates from discussing women in relation to a greater variety of issues when they otherwise might be inclined to do so in more open-ended mediums. These drawbacks of campaign websites may lead me to understate the scope, presence, and intensity of candidates' rhetorical representation of women. In this exploratory analysis of rhetorical representation, it may be preferable to err on the

conservative side by understating rather than overstating the impact of rhetorical representation. My hope is that future research builds on this analysis to offer a more comprehensive look at the rhetorical representation of women in congressional campaigns.

The midterm election years 2010 and 2018 are interesting cases because they represent successful electoral cycles for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. As midterm elections, both electoral cycles were referendums on first-term presidents, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Coming shortly after her vice presidential candidacy, Sarah Palin encouraged conservative women to run for office in 2010 by invoking rhetoric about “Mama Grizzlies” protecting their families (Deckman 2016). And the 2018 election came on the heels of Hillary Clinton’s shocking loss to Donald Trump and historic Women’s Marches protesting the outcome. Within these contexts, both years saw large increases in women’s candidacies within the respective parties (Dittmar 2020b). The relatively greater number of women candidates running in these election cycles compared to others provides me with a sample that has a decent amount of variation in descriptive representation within the two parties, allowing me to test the relationship between the descriptive and rhetorical representation of women.

For each year—2010 and 2018—the sample includes all women candidates for the House and Senate and, where applicable, their male opponents. In her study of gendered campaign strategy, Dittmar (2015) finds that men adjust their strategy when running against a woman candidate. For Democratic men, in particular, this often means targeting women voters more than they otherwise would (130). In contrast, Dolan (2008b) finds little evidence of differences in the issue priorities of men who ran against

women compared with men who ran against other men. Since running against a woman either does not substantially change men's campaign priorities (see Dolan 2008b) or may lead men—especially Democratic men—to discuss women more (see Dittmar 2015), my exclusion of men who ran against other men should result in a conservative estimate of gender differences in the rhetorical representation of women. If there is any systematic difference in the rhetorical representation of women by men running against men, it should be in the direction of less rhetorical representation of women.

Between October and November 2018, I archived the campaign websites of all 2018 women congressional candidates and any male opponents. The archived websites include all text from the “Biography” and “Issues” pages and any additional pages in which the candidates provide some narrative about who they are and what they stand for. Some candidates included a separate “Motivation” or “Why I’m Running” page, for example. Any mention of women by candidates may call women to voters’ minds and contribute to voters’ acceptance or rejection of the candidate as their representative.

Voters should be more likely to take issue with candidates’ portrayal of women in their policy positions and priorities than in their biographies or motivations for running. But these less contentious sites for the rhetorical representation of women nevertheless provide context about whom candidates are speaking of when they reference women. For example, conservative women may use biographical information to demonstrate their adherence to traditional feminine roles (see Wineinger 2021). And many congresswomen of color use their biographies to highlight their identities and experiences in ways that communicate empathy for women, racial and ethnic minorities, and the working class (see Brown and Gershon 2016). As such, biographies can provide meaningful context to

voters about the groups of women candidates will best represent. And while men have fewer opportunities to use their biographies to rhetorically represent women, they may find ways to do so by discussing the influence of the women in their lives or past experiences working on behalf of women.

The 2018 sample includes website text for 197 Democratic women, 60 Republican women, 33 Democratic men, and 142 Republican men (Total N = 432). Thirteen candidates (2.9%) are excluded from the 2018 analyses because they either only had a Facebook page or their website did not provide enough meaningful information. In these cases, the website was usually restricted to a donation form without any narrative about the candidate.

To archive text from the 2010 campaign websites, I consulted the United States Elections Web Archive hosted by the Library of Congress. I collected website text for 92 Democratic women, 48 Republican women, 37 Democratic men, and 82 Republican men (Total N = 259). Twenty-four (8.5%) candidates are excluded from the 2010 analyses because they only had a Facebook page, their website did not have enough meaningful information, or their website was not available in the Library of Congress archive.

Using Saward's (2010) representative claim as a model, I operationalize rhetorical representation in my research as follows: A candidate and their campaign team (maker) offers the candidate (subject) as a champion of women and women's interests (object) to the electorate—and especially to women (audience). An individual woman within the audience can then accept or reject the candidate as her representative. The remainder of this chapter is organized around these central elements of a representative claim. I begin with the "subject," who is often also the "maker" of a claim to represent women. In this

next section, I ask: Who is most likely to rhetorically represent women—that is, who is most likely to make more claims to represent women?

THE SUBJECT

A candidate and their campaign team (maker) offers the candidate (subject) as a champion of women and women’s interests (object) to the electorate—and especially to women (audience).

To test my first two hypotheses—the *Descriptive and Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis* and the *Partisan Identity Politics Hypothesis*—I quantify candidates’ mentions of women on their campaign websites as a measure of how often they rhetorically represent women. Similar to Pearson and Dancey’s (2011) analysis of congressional floor speeches, I used the content analysis program, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis 2015), to create a dictionary for the category “women,” including mentions of woman, women, woman’s, women’s, girl, girl’s, girls, girls’, female, female’s, females, and females’. Based on this dictionary, the program generated a count of the number of times a candidate used one of these words on their campaign website. Because the dependent variable is the non-negative count of “women” mentions on campaign websites, I employ a count model using negative binomial regression (see Long 1997, 230-233). My key independent variables of interest are dummy variables for Democratic women, Democratic men, Republican women, and Republican men. Republican men are the excluded category to which the remaining categories are compared because Republican men should be the least likely to rhetorically represent women.


Automating the content analysis allows for a more accurate count of “women” mentions compared to hand coding hundreds of websites, but it can misinterpret context. For example, mentions of “men and women”—usually in reference to “brave men and

women” serving in the military—are counted as references to women. To adjust for these kinds of references that do not meaningfully invoke women, I add a control for mentions of “men.” I created this variable in the same way as the “women” count measure but using the equivalent masculine keywords. Like Pearson and Dancey (2011), I also control for the Democratic vote share in the last presidential election since running in more Democratic districts may lead candidates to discuss women more than they otherwise would. I add a control for whether a candidate is the incumbent because Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2009) find substantial differences in the rhetorical strategies of incumbents and challengers on campaign websites (351). Finally, I control for the overall word count of a candidate’s website to ensure that a large number of references to women is not simply a function of more text on the website overall.

Figure 3.1 displays the results of negative binomial regression models for each election year. When control variables are held at their medians, a typical Republican woman running in 2010 is expected to reference women about twice on her campaign website. Republican men, in contrast, are predicted to reference women less than once on average. In 2018, the prediction for Republican men remains about the same, while it increases slightly for Republican women. A typical Democratic woman in 2010 references women about three times, while a typical Democratic man references women once. In 2018, these predicted counts increase to two for Democratic men and more than five for Democratic women. While these may seem like small differences, the average word counts on candidates’ websites were 1,921 in 2010 and 2,464 in 2018, and candidates usually cover a lot of ground in those couple thousand words. They often include a lengthy biography and a synopsis of their positions on a wide range of issues

including healthcare, the economy, foreign policy, the environment, and issues specific to their district, among others.

Figure 3.1 Predicted Counts of “Women” Mentions on Campaign Websites



Predicted counts of “women” mentions on candidates’ campaign websites based on negative binomial regression. Control variables held at medians: Democratic presidential vote share, incumbent status, “men” mentions, and overall website word count. See Table B.3.1 in Appendix B for full models.

In 2010, 84 candidates (32.4%) did not mention women at all on their websites, and the same was true of 122 candidates (28.2%) in 2018. The maximum mentions of women in 2010 were 43 on Senator Richard Blumenthal’s (D-CT) website, followed by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) at 29 mentions. In 2018, Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) mentioned women 79 times on her website, followed by former-Rep. Gil Cisneros (D-CA) at 73 mentions. The gender differences within each party are statistically significant at conventional levels and support my *Descriptive and Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis*. Women are more likely than men within each party to rhetorically represent women and women’s interests on their campaign websites.

The inter-party differences in the rhetorical representation of women are less clear cut. According to my *Partisan Identity Politics Hypothesis*, I had expected that Democrats—both women and men—would invoke women more often than Republicans because of constraints posed by the Republican party’s rejection of identity politics and the disconnect in voter stereotypes about women and Republicans. Democratic women are significantly more likely to discuss women than any other group in 2018, but the differences between Democratic men and Republican women are not statistically distinguishable from zero in either election year. Moreover, in both years, the direction of the relationship suggests that Republican women are more likely than Democratic men to discuss women. If men who ran against men had been included in the sample, it is possible that a significant difference between Republican women and Democratic men would have emerged, with Republican women invoking women more often. This is because men running against men may not feel compelled to compete for support from women voters as much as men running against women (see Dittmar 2015). As such, the findings for Democratic men may be somewhat inflated in this sample. While Democratic men are significantly more likely to discuss women than Republican men in 2018, the difference is not statistically significant in 2010. And the same dynamic is true for Democratic women and Republican women in 2010.

Compared to other election cycles, gender was very salient in 2018 following the 2016 election, the Women’s Marches, and the #MeToo movement, and this may have inflated Democratic women’s rhetorical representation of women in 2018. The salience of gender in a given electoral cycle will likely impact candidates’ rhetorical representation of women, but the overall pattern observed here should hold in other

election years—with Democratic women discussing women most often, Republican men least often, and a roughly similar level of discussion about women among Democratic men and Republican women.

While Palin’s influence on conservative women and their presence in the Tea Party Movement raised the salience of gender somewhat in 2010, research has found that this gendered context was largely absent on women’s 2010 campaign websites. Schreiber (2012), who has also analyzed women’s 2010 congressional campaign websites, found that while 80% of candidates who were mothers mentioned having children, only 26% of mothers referenced motherhood in relation to their policy priorities. Even when using a less strict coding scheme to identify gendered rhetoric, Schreiber (2012) also finds evidence of Republican women deemphasizing their identities as women and mothers on their campaign websites. As such, the 2010 results displayed above may be somewhat more representative of an election year in which gender is not especially salient.

In terms of the control variables, Democratic vote share in the last presidential election and incumbency status did not have any effect on the number of times candidates discussed women in either election year. References to men and the overall word count of a candidate’s website both yielded positive and significant effects as anticipated (See full models in Appendix Table B.3.1).

The analysis above sheds light on the “subject” of candidates’ claims to represent women—*who* is most likely to rhetorically represent women. I find that the descriptive representation of women—especially Democratic women—is closely related to the rhetorical representation of women. I now turn to the “object” of candidates’ rhetorical

representation of women—*how* candidates selectively portray women and women’s interests.

THE OBJECT

A candidate and their campaign team (maker) offers the candidate (subject) as a champion of women and women’s interests (object) to the electorate—and especially to women (audience).

To better understand the context in which candidates rhetorically represent women on their campaign websites, I created a new dataset where the unit of analysis is individual sentences from candidates’ websites, and I filtered out all sentences that did not contain the “women” keywords that I counted in the previous analysis. I then hand-coded each of the remaining sentences using an inductive and open-ended coding scheme. The codes were *not* mutually exclusive. Using an inductive approach allows me to observe the ways in which candidates choose to selectively portray women and women’s interests to foster women voters’ belief in or acceptance of them as a representative.

While hand coding, I also deleted any sentences that were captured by the automated content analysis that did not meaningfully invoke women. These primarily included mentions of “brave men and women” in the military or generic references to “hardworking men and women.” I was ultimately left with 1,914 sentences across both election years that meaningfully invoked women. The choice to restrict my analysis to only the most explicit and unambiguous mentions of women means that I am leaving out implicit invocations of women. For instance, in both election years, candidates tended to discuss paid leave and child care policies without explicitly mentioning women even though women perform the vast majority of child and elder care. Instead, they framed these issues as being of interest to “working families.” Women voters may pick up on

implicit claims to represent women in candidates' discussion of these issues, but the actual rhetoric is somewhat ambiguous.

In her discussion of symbolic representation, Pitkin (1967) is troubled by the notion that a symbol does not provide clear information about what it represents and that the meaning of a symbol varies from person to person. In this exploratory analysis of rhetorical representation, I have chosen to focus on only the most explicit invocations of women because they provide the clearest information about a candidate's representation of women, and voters should face no ambiguity in determining whether the candidate is indeed making a claim to represent women. It is also possible that candidates who make a point of explicitly drawing attention to the disproportionate impact of a particular policy on women have a greater commitment to the representation of women's interests. As I will discuss later in this section, the abortion debate provides an interesting challenge to this approach. My hope is that future research builds on this analysis to assess more implicit forms of rhetorical representation across a more diverse set of mediums.

Campaign websites tend to cover predictable topics since candidates usually sort their issue priorities into discrete categories that are meant to be easily compared to those of other candidates (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009). Most candidates restricted their discussion of women to a separate "Women's Issues" category where they usually addressed women's health and abortion. Some also discussed workplace discrimination, expanding economic opportunities for women, or violence against women. A much smaller portion of candidates addressed women across multiple discrete issue categories, with an emphasis on how each issue specifically impacts women. Table 3.1 displays the

percent of sentences about women that fall into each topic that I coded as well as the number of unique candidates who broached each topic.

Table 3.1 Topic Prevalence in Sentences that Invoke Women on Candidates' Campaign Websites

	2010		2018	
Biography	37.8%	(82)	19.1%	(139)
Health	27.7%	(47)	36.3%	(159)
<i>Abortion & Contraception</i>	15.9%	(31)	23.1%	(131)
Workplace	13.4%	(27)	27.5%	(124)
<i>Pay Equity</i>	7.4%	(14)	14.3%	(92)
Families	6.8%	(18)	16.6%	(115)
Poverty	2.7%	(9)	5.5%	(46)
Violence	9%	(20)	11%	(82)
Military & Foreign Policy	11%	(20)	4.1%	(43)
Education	1.6%	(5)	5.2%	(50)
Intersectional	6.8%	(17)	10.8%	(83)
The President	1.9%	(7)	3.3%	(38)
Other	12.9%	(35)	7.9%	(82)
N	365	(130)	1549	(253)

Percentages in the left column for each year represent the *percent of all sentences about women* that fall into each category. Numbers in parentheses are the *number of unique candidates* who addressed the topic. N gives the *total number of sentences and unique candidates invoking women* in each election year. Italicized topics are sub-categories of the topics listed above them. Topics are not mutually exclusive.


For the six most common topics across both years,¹ I ran logistic regressions to predict the likelihood of candidates addressing these topics in their rhetoric about women by party and gender.² Figure 3.2 presents the predicted probabilities of candidates addressing each topic in relation to women in 2010, and Figure 3.3 presents the same information for 2018.³

¹ Each of these topics was mentioned in at least 10% of all sentences that meaningfully invoked women across both election years.

² Because this analysis is descriptive and exploratory, I only include one control—for candidates' overall website word count. Candidates with short websites are less likely to cover many different topics.

³ In this section of the chapter, all predicted probabilities are visualized with 84 percent confidence intervals to make it easier to visually detect group differences at the 95 percent confidence level (see Cassese 2020; Schenker and Gentleman 2001).

Figure 3.2 Predicted Probabilities of Mentioning Topics in Candidates' Rhetoric about Women, 2010




Predicted probabilities of mentioning various topics in relation to women based on logistic regression. Control variable held at median: overall website word count. See Tables B.3.2-3 in Appendix B for full models.

For the most part, the general patterns are predictable, with Republican men being the least likely to discuss a variety of topics in relation to women and Democratic women being the most likely to do so. In 2010, many of the differences between partisan-gender groups are not statistically significant, but bigger group differences emerge in 2018.

Below, I describe some examples of the most prevalent topics and noteworthy group trends.⁴

Figure 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Mentioning Topics in Candidates' Rhetoric about Women, 2018



Predicted probabilities of mentioning various topics in relation to women based on logistic regression. Control variable held at median: overall website word count. See Tables B.3.4-5 in Appendix B for full models.

⁴ Topics that appeared somewhat less often in candidates' rhetoric about women included domestic violence, sexual assault and harassment, gun violence, joint references to women and families or women and children, LGBTQ issues, issues affecting women veterans and servicewomen, the status of women abroad, education and student loans, housing, criminal justice, and addiction. For the most part, these issues followed similar trends to the others, with Democratic women raising them much more often than the other partisan-gender groups—though the difference was less stark for military and foreign policy issues, perhaps reflecting the more “masculine” valence of this set of issues.

BIOGRAPHY

The “Biography” topic includes candidate statements about being the first woman or woman of color to hold a certain position. It also includes references to awards or memberships in professional associations related to women. Some candidates discussed previous work experience that promoted women’s interests. Naturally, these kinds of references are going to be rare among men, though some men did discuss women in this way. For example, Jeff Doctor (D-NC) referenced his “commitment to human rights, working with battered women and children as a family violence counselor.” And Rep. John Yarmuth (D-KY) mentioned being recognized “by Working Mother magazine and Corporate Voices for Working Families for his leadership on issues relating to women and families.” Other men discussed the influence of the women in their lives. On his website, Eliot Rabin (R-NY) stated, “Without these two strong-minded women, Eliot would not have been able to embark upon his patriotic journey to become the next Congressman who represents these three boroughs and the United States.”

Democratic and Republican women were about equally likely to include biographical references to women on their campaign websites in both election years. Compared with other topics, however, Republican women were much more likely to include biographical references to women. Of all mentions of women by Republican women in 2010, over 71% were coded as biographical. In 2018, the share of biographical references decreased to 54%. In contrast, Democratic women’s mentions of women were more dispersed across topics. Only 43% of Democratic women’s mentions of women were biographical in 2010, and this decreased to 17% in 2018. The high proportions of

biographical information in Republican women's rhetoric about women may be reflective of Republican party norms and voter stereotypes that lead Republican women to deemphasize gender in their discussions of policy issues. In contrast, a candidate's biography may be a more acceptable place for these candidates to reference women.

Candidates' biographical references to women can provide signals about the kinds of women they are likely to represent. Being the first woman to hold a particular office or being one of only a few women in a male-dominated field may resonate with professional women who have found themselves in similar circumstances. And a previous career as a social worker serving women and children who have experienced domestic violence may suggest a level of empathy that resonates with not only survivors of violence but also women who have experienced other forms of hardship stemming from racism or poverty. But references to women in relation to specific policy issues are likely to give women citizens an even clearer idea of who is included or excluded when a candidate mentions women.

HEALTH

The most common policy issue that came up in candidates' rhetoric about women was healthcare. Non-partisan examples of this topic included references to breast cancer prevention, prenatal care, improved access to healthcare for women veterans, or generalized references to promoting "women's health." The recent passage of the Affordable Care Act led some 2010 candidates to express their support or opposition by invoking women. For example, Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) was one of many Democrats to suggest that the law would "dramatically improve American women's access to medical care, and will end the shameful practice by insurance companies of charging

women more for health insurance.” Even in 2018, this was a common point discussed by Democrats. In contrast, Gerald Hashimoto (R-CA) warned of the “unnecessary death of untold women each and every year that we do not rescind Obamacare.” This was the only reference to women and the ACA among Republicans in either year, however.

Most joint references to women and healthcare were about abortion and came from Democrats. In 2010, four Republican women (8.3%) and seven Republican men (8.5%) explicitly referenced women when discussing abortion on their websites, compared with five Democratic men (13.5%) and fifteen Democratic women (16.3%). In 2018, five Republican women (8.3%), five Republican men (3.5%), eight Democratic men (24.2%), and 113 Democratic women (57.3%) explicitly discussed women in relation to their position on abortion. Here, it is important to note that my choice to only examine explicit references to women on candidates’ websites underrepresents Republicans’ discussion of abortion because they frame the issue very differently than Democrats.

While anti-abortion legislators have increasingly used a pro-woman frame to strategically counter perceptions of hostility toward women (Johnstonbaugh 2020; Roberti 2021), anti-abortion candidates still largely frame their discussion of abortion around the interests of the unborn without explicitly mentioning women. Teresa Collett (R-MN) pointed out this conflict between advocating for fetal rights and women’s rights on her website:

For too long the unborn child’s right to life and the woman’s right to equality have been pitted against each other; with supporters of each side attacking the other’s good faith and methods of persuasion. I firmly believe in the unborn child’s right to the protection of the law, and I firmly believe in the right of women to be treated as equals in society. Women and children deserve better options when facing an unwanted pregnancy than legalized abortion.

Because conservative women's conception of womanhood is often tied to traditional feminine caregiving roles—which are inherently other-oriented—advocating for fetal rights may fit more squarely within their conception of women's interests than self-oriented policies that explicitly champion women (Deckman 2016; Schreiber 2012). Even though both Democratic and Republican women use motherhood appeals to represent women, Deckman (2016, 130) explains that Democratic women often feel more comfortable grounding their political rhetoric in women's rights as individuals. Republican women, however, often use motherhood appeals to justify their political anger in a way that society reads as legitimate for conservative women.

To feel angry and aggrieved for oneself transgresses conservative gender norms, but feeling aggrieved in the name of children is an acceptable way for Republican women to express political anger that is rooted in their identity and status as women. This presents an interesting challenge for studies of symbolic and rhetorical representation. If a particular group of women defines their identity as women largely based on caring for others, then do explicit claims to represent those others (e.g., the unborn or children) also count as claims to represent that particular group of women? If so, what should we make of instances where the interests of those others are presented as being in conflict with women's interests, as they often are in the abortion debate? Given that the critical outcome of women's symbolic representation is the acceptance of someone as a representative based on their portrayals of women, future research on rhetorical representation should seek to address this challenge by examining women citizens' responses to and attitudes about other-oriented representational claims that may prime some women's identities as caregivers. Another possibility is that invocations of fetal

rights prime a religious identity more so than a gendered caregiving identity—or that these two identities are both relevant and mutually reinforcing.

WORKPLACE

The “Workplace” category consists of issues related to workplace discrimination or economic opportunities for women and minorities. The issues within this topic include pay equity, paid leave, child care, sexual misconduct in the workplace, job protections for pregnant women, promoting women in male-dominated fields such as STEM, and raising the minimum wage. Overall, this topic is dominated by Democrats, with only one Republican—Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD)—raising it in 2010 regarding the promotion of women in agriculture. In 2018, eight Republican women (13.3%) and four Republican men (2.8%) discussed women and economic opportunity, with their main focus being the promotion of women in STEM and a couple mentions of pay equity.

In 2010, 21 Democratic women (22.8%) and four Democratic men (10.8%) discussed this topic, focusing largely on pay equity. Several incumbents publicized their role in the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in the previous year. For example, Rep. Rosa DeLauro’s (D-CT) website stated: “Lilly Ledbetter is a remarkable woman who has worked tirelessly so that all women can fight wage discrimination, and Rosa was proud to stand with her as this legislation was signed into law.” Challengers, like Rebekah Davis (D-NE), criticized their incumbent opponents for voting against the bill. In 2018, 103 Democratic women (52.2%) and 9 Democratic men (27.2%) discussed women’s economic issues. They maintained their strong focus on pay equity by emphasizing the impact that this issue has on women’s families. Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-FL) put it this way: “women and families in America, in total, are losing nearly \$500

billion every year, including the more than 15.2 million households headed by women.” And Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ) emphasized the disproportionate impact on “women with low incomes and single mothers.”

The partisan differences in how candidates invoked women to discuss these economic issues demonstrate a clear class divide in the women each party claims to represent. While Republicans focused on promoting women in lucrative and male-dominated fields like STEM and tech, Democrats—especially women—advocated for living wages and focused on the impact of pay inequity and other forms of workplace discrimination on working class women and female-headed households. Plenty of Democrats also addressed the promotion of women in lucrative careers, but their portrayals of women and women’s interests were more inclusive of women in a range of economic situations. From the perspective of symbolic representation, a greater diversity of women have reason to see themselves represented in Democratic candidates’ rhetoric—and therefore reason to accept Democratic candidates as their representatives.

INTERSECTIONAL

Drawing from Crenshaw’s (1989; 1991) concept of intersectionality, I coded candidate rhetoric as intersectional when it invoked gender and race simultaneously, in reference to women of color. While scholars have applied intersectionality to categories beyond race and gender, my decision to keep this topic focused on women of color reflects the origins of intersectionality in black feminist theory (see Cooper 2015; Smooth 2013). As a result of shared lived experiences, we should expect that women of color would be the most likely to use this rhetoric, and this is indeed the case. In 2010, I coded 25 sentences as intersectional. Of those, Democratic women of color were responsible for

20 (80% of intersectional sentences), while three were from Democratic white women, and one each was from a Democratic man of color and a Democratic white man. In 2018, I coded 167 sentences as intersectional, with 85 (50.9%) provided by Democratic women of color, 58 (34.7%) by Democratic white women, and 12 (7.2%) by Republican women of color. An additional eight intersectional mentions were from Democratic men of color, one from a Democratic white man, and three from Republican white women. With the majority of intersectional representative claims in both years coming from Democratic women of color, I find support for my *Intersectional Representation Hypothesis*.

Many of these intersectional references were about “historic firsts” for women of color, including Rep. Karen Bass (D-CA) as the first African American woman Speaker for the California Assembly, Rep. Mazie Hirono (D-HI) as the “first immigrant woman of Asian ancestry to serve in Congress,” and Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) as “the first Latina in history to serve on the Judiciary Committee,” among others. First time candidates also discussed the possibility of being the first woman of color to represent their states or districts. Now-Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) mentioned being the “first woman of color to *ever* run in NY-14 (a district that’s 70% people of color).” And Pearl Kim (R-PA) described her potential to be the first woman of color to serve in PA and the first Korean-American woman to serve in Congress in several different places on her website. For Republican women of color, it can be difficult to navigate party norms and voter stereotypes. Calling attention to the diversity they contribute to the party while otherwise downplaying their race and gender can be an effective strategy (see Wineinger 2021).

A few white women from districts with relatively large proportions of Black and Latina/o residents pointed out that the gender pay gap is even greater for women of color.

For example, now-Rep. Carolyn Bourdeaux (D-GA) whose district is about 21% Black and 20% Latina/o said the following: “Women deserve equal pay for equal work. Currently, women make 80 cents for every dollar a man earns. A black woman makes 63 cents and a Latina only 54 cents.” In general, pay equity was the main issue for which intersectional mentions most increased between the two election years. While no 2010 references to pay equity mentioned the larger gaps for women of color, about 15% of 2018 references did.

Other issues that were coded as intersectional included violence toward immigrant and Native women, higher levels of student debt among Black women, higher maternal mortality rates among Black women, the low-paying care work that is performed most often by women of color, and Native American family separation. Now-Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) described wanting to “create a society in which women, which includes Black women, Native women, poor women, immigrant women, disabled women, Muslim women, lesbian queer and trans women, are free and able to care for and nurture their families in safe and healthy environments free from structural impediments.” Across both election years, this is the most direct and explicit example of a candidate defining the specific groups of women they seek to represent.

These more inclusive representative claims give a greater diversity of women reason to see themselves represented in Democratic candidates’ rhetoric. In their study of symbolic representation, Uhlaner and Scola (2016) find that white women turn out in greater numbers when the percent of overall women increases in the state legislatures. But Black women’s turnout levels are only responsive to increases in the percent of Black women. Similarly, women of color may observe candidates’ rhetoric about women in

general and determine whether that rhetoric is actually inclusive of them. In many cases, they may decide that it is not, and that may lead them to reject those candidates as their representatives. Intersectional representational claims clarify the specific groups of women who are included and may be more likely to be accepted by subgroups of women who have been historically marginalized from politics.

At the same time, racial resentment may also lead to backlash against intersectional representative claims among white women who feel alienated and threatened by the perception that their relative social status is declining (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016; Mendelberg 2016). Such feelings can lead to strong negative responses to intersectional representative claims that signal the rejection of these candidates as representatives for this racially privileged subset of women.

CALLING ATTENTION TO PRESIDENTS' REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN


Candidates in 2010 and 2018 also called attention to other politicians' rhetoric about women to compare or contrast with their own representation of women. Sometimes the other politician was their opponent. For example, Charlotte Bergmann's (R-TN) website claimed that "Congressman Cohen has been insulting to many Black women, including Charlotte Bergmann." This claim could lead some Black women to simultaneously accept Bergmann as their representative and reject Cohen as their representative. Or given that Bergmann is the Republican, this claim may lead Black women to reject both candidates as their representative. Others may not be swayed at all by this claim. While voters' responses will vary, candidates' claims about another politician's representation of women may contribute to the rhetorical representation of women by *both* candidates. While there are a couple of examples of candidates

discussing their opponents' representation of women, it was more common for candidates to reference the president's representation of women.

In each year, I coded for any discussion of the president in relation to women on candidates' campaign websites: President Obama in 2010 and President Trump in 2018. Figure 3.4 presents the predicted probabilities of candidates referencing each president in relation to women, with the overall website word count held at its median. In 2010, there were only seven joint references to Obama and women. Six of them came from Democrats who were praising the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the Affordable Care Act, and President Obama's goal of improving the Veterans Administration, which would benefit women veterans. The sole Republican mention of Obama in relation to women included Gerald Hashimoto's (R-CA) criticism of the Affordable Care Act.

In 2018, there were 51 joint references to Trump and women. All of these references came from Democrats, including 34 Democratic women and three Democratic men. Now-Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV) described the way "Trump ridicules women, people of color, the LGBTQ community, immigrant families, and anyone who challenges him." Lauren Baer (D-FL) noted that the Trump administration and Republicans in Congress "have made clear that they're hostile to the idea that women are equal partners in society." Many Democratic women candidates claimed that President Trump, his administration, and congressional Republicans were attacking women's health and rolling back women's reproductive rights. For example, Julie Oliver's (D-TX) website stated, "The Trump administration is waging an all-out war on women's health, which disproportionately and unjustly affects African American women."

Figure 3.4 Predicted Probabilities of Mentioning the President in Candidates' Rhetoric about Women, 2010 and 2018



Predicted probabilities of mentioning the president in relation to women based on logistic regression. Control variable held at median: overall website word count. See Table B.3.6 in Appendix B for full models.

Vanessa Enoch (D-OH) connected the threat posed by the Trump administration to a need for more descriptive representation of women, saying, “The absence of representation of women in DC means that our voices have been excluded and our exclusion has become ever more obvious during this administration.” Dittmar (2020a), who has also analyzed women’s 2018 congressional campaign websites, found that Democratic non-incumbent women frequently stated that they were motivated to run for office by perceptions of urgency, anger, frustration, or threat—often in response to President Trump. I argue that these negative emotional responses are signals that these women candidates reject Donald Trump as their representative, often based on his rhetorical representation of women and other groups. Dittmar (2020a) also finds that

white women were especially likely to be motivated by Trump. In my analysis, I find that only four Black women (10.5%) and two Asian American women (12.5%) referenced Trump in their rhetoric about women, compared with 27 white women (15%).

A TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE AND THE REPRESENTED

Overall, my analysis of campaign websites in 2010 and 2018 reveals that women are more likely than men to rhetorically represent women, which is especially true of Democratic women. Whether a candidate's rhetoric about women inspires positive or negative emotions for an individual woman or a specific group of women is often subjective. This may occur based on policy agreements or disagreements, for example. If individual women or groups of women cannot see themselves in candidates' portrayals of women and women's interests, then they should be more likely to reject those candidates as their representatives. This may be most clearly observed in abortion debates where the parties directly clash in their portrayals of women's interests. While Democrats advocate for women's bodily autonomy and criticize Republican "attacks" on women's reproductive freedom, Republicans like Ava Pate (R-TX) question the notion that "the taking of an innocent life is truly liberating women."

Existing empirical research on symbolic representation—which typically focuses on the effects of women's descriptive presence—highlights the importance of "party congruence" between a representative and the represented (e.g., Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010). The descriptive representation of women only mobilizes women citizens within each party. The effect of party congruence in these studies may function similarly to candidates' rhetorical representation of women. In the same way that a

candidate's rhetoric about women signals the kinds of women they will most likely represent, voters make assumptions about which women a candidate will likely represent based on party stereotypes and their knowledge of each party's relationship to women and women's interests.

Certain kinds of inflammatory, vulgar, or insulting rhetoric may be more or less universally rejected by women. Widespread negative emotional responses to Donald Trump's rhetoric about women and other historically marginalized groups appear to have been powerfully mobilizing for women after the 2016 election (see Traister 2018). This is especially true of Democratic women, who participated in the Women's Marches and ran for office in record numbers in 2018 (Dittmar 2020a). But Trump even lost support among some Republican women after his crude comments about women in the 2005 *Access Hollywood* tape were made public (Rhodes et al. 2020). Most candidates and their campaign teams—who want to win an election—will aim to minimize rhetoric that is likely to be perceived negatively by many women. As such, candidate rhetoric that has the potential to be universally rejected by women is likely to be uncommon. My use of campaign websites as a data source makes it difficult to determine the exact prevalence of this kind of rhetoric—although we may occasionally see a reflection of inflammatory rhetoric about women on campaign websites when candidates draw attention to the rhetoric of their opponents or other political actors.

Thus far in this chapter, I have addressed the “subject” of representational claims by asking who is most likely to represent women. I have also identified some patterns in the “object” of representational claims—or the selective and contestable ways in which

candidates portray women and women's interests. I turn now to the "audience," who can accept or reject candidates' claims to represent them.

THE AUDIENCE

A candidate and their campaign team (maker) offers the candidate (subject) as a champion of women and women's interests (object) to the electorate—and especially to women (audience).

Recall that the key activity in symbolic representation is what Pitkin calls "symbol-making" (Pitkin 1967, 107) or what Saward (2010) calls "claims-making." In both cases, the crucial outcome is whether an audience or constituency accepts a leader as their representative. Saward explains in more detail that what is being accepted or rejected is a selective and contestable portrayal of the represented. As I have tried to demonstrate in the earlier sections of this chapter, candidates often present selective and contestable portrayals of women through their campaign rhetoric, and women candidates—especially Democrats—are more likely than their male counterparts to rhetorically represent women. I will now consider what it looks like when an audience accepts or rejects a representative.

Pitkin (1967) writes that symbolic representation seems to rest on emotional, affective, irrational psychological responses rather than on rationally justifiable criteria" (100). And empirical studies of symbolic representation have tended to define it similarly (see Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018). Research from political psychology has demonstrated that campaigns can manipulate emotional responses in voters, leading to outcomes such as persuasion or increased participation (Brader 2005). Moreover, there is some evidence that the same campaign material can evoke different types of emotions in women and men (Fridkin et al. 2021). As such, a promising place to look for evidence of

a constituency accepting or rejecting a representative is in their emotional responses to that representative.

Between late October and early November 2018, I conducted in-person interviews with 23 women volunteers for three white women candidates running in competitive House races in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.⁵ All three candidates—Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11), Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-05), and Susan Wild (PA-07)—ultimately won their races, flipping their districts’ seats from Republican to Democrat. They all ran for open seats and had little political experience before running for Congress. In comparison to all 435 congressional districts, the populations of these three NJ and PA districts are whiter, older, more highly educated, and have higher family incomes, on average. Table 3.1 displays these demographic differences.

Table 3.2 District Demographics

	All 435 Districts	NJ-11	PA-05	PA-07
Median Age	38.2	43.3	41.5	41.9
Median Family Income	\$71,701	\$134,978	\$65,178	\$109,939
College +	31.6%	54.2%	25.5%	45.5%
White non-Hispanic	60.9%	72.6%	91.9%	83.6%
Black	14.0%	4.5%	3.4%	7.1%
Latino/a	17.9%	11.4%	2.1%	3.0%
Asian	6.6%	11.7%	2.3%	6.0%
Foreign-Born	13.5%	19.9%	3.4%	7.4%

Data from U.S. Census 2017 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates

I dropped in at “Get Out the Vote” events that were publicized on the candidates’ campaign websites or social media pages, and I approached campaign staff for

⁵ These three races were chosen for their competitiveness (based on October 2018 Cook ratings), the presence of women candidates, and convenience of location (within driving distance of Rutgers University). Both Pennsylvania districts had been reconfigured by court-ordered redistricting in early 2018 that aimed to remedy partisan gerrymandering.

permission to interview volunteers.⁶ In most cases, I was able to speak with volunteers immediately before or after they went out to knock on doors for the candidate. The interviews ranged from about five to twenty minutes in length. Of the 23 women volunteers I interviewed, 10 were canvassing for Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11), five for Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-05), and eight for Susan Wild (PA-07). Twenty volunteers were white. The three remaining volunteers each identified as Black, Asian American, and Arab American.

My primary question was, “What motivated you to volunteer today?” I also asked about past political participation. Often, answers to these initial questions included references to specific emotions. Later, I asked if any specific emotions came to mind when thinking about their motivations to volunteer, specific candidates, or politics in general. If I had enough time, I also asked if interview participants thought women in politics do things differently than men and what role, if any, participants felt their personal identities—such as gender or race—played in their political views.

THE CANDIDATES

All three candidates are white women and fall into the group of mostly moderate Democrats credited with flipping the House in favor of the Democratic party during the 2018 midterms. They all ran for open seats and had little political experience before running for Congress.

Mikie Sherrill, a first-time candidate with a Navy pilot and legal background, ran for the open seat in NJ-11 left by retiring Republican Rodney Frelinghuysen, who had held the seat since 1995. On her website, Sherrill explained her motivation for running as

⁶ I also approached campaign staff for a Republican woman candidate but was not permitted to conduct interviews.

follows: “I am a former Navy helicopter pilot, former federal prosecutor, and mother of four... As a mom, I want to build the brightest possible future for all of our children and make sure that New Jersey is a place they can raise families of their own.” She highlighted issues such as jobs, healthcare, tax relief, women’s rights, the opioid crisis, and national security. Her discussion of women’s rights focused primarily on reproductive healthcare and pay equity, including the racial and ethnic disparities in women’s wages. Volunteers I interviewed were excited that a Democrat and a woman finally had a chance to win the seat, with one older woman saying, “This is the first campaign to be excited about. Frelinghuysen has been around so long.”

Both Pennsylvania districts had been reconfigured by court-ordered redistricting in early 2018 that aimed to remedy partisan gerrymandering. Mary Gay Scanlon, a former School Board member and lawyer, ran for the open seat in PA-05, after the sexual harassment-related retirement of Republican Pat Meehan. Redistricting had made this district somewhat friendlier to Democrats. On her website, Scanlon emphasized her legal experience and prominently focused on issues such as gun violence as well as education, healthcare, immigration, criminal justice reform, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights. Her section on women’s rights largely focused on equal opportunities for women in education, including sports, as well as pay equity and reproductive healthcare.

Susan Wild, a former city solicitor with a legal background, ran in PA-07 after Republican Charlie Dent’s retirement. Of the four newly elected women from Pennsylvania, Wild was the only one to run in a true swing district. On her campaign website, Wild described herself as a fighter, “who stands with hardworking Pennsylvanians because she is one,” and she emphasized issues such as jobs, criminal

justice reform, women’s rights, LGBTQ+ equality, campaign finance reform, and the opioid epidemic. Her website’s section on women’s rights was the longest of the three candidates and covered reproductive healthcare, pay equity, paid family leave, and protections against retaliation for sexual harassment allegations in the workplace.


TYPES OF EMOTIONS

Of the 23 women volunteers I interviewed, 10 were canvassing for Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11), five for Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-05), and eight for Susan Wild (PA-07). Twenty volunteers were white. The three remaining volunteers each identified as Black, Asian American, and Arab American. Based on my perceptions of the volunteers’ ages, I estimate that seven were in their 20s, five were in their 30s, four each were in their 40s and 50s, and three were in their 60s.

I categorized the types of emotions that activists cited as being related to their political participation by counting explicit references to specific emotions. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 display the broader categories of emotions I identified in bold, with additional keywords listed underneath. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 display the frequencies for each broader category.

Table 3.3 Negative Emotions Mentioned in Interviews

anger	fear	anxiety	dislike	sadness	disbelief	shame	disgust
frustration	terrifying	nervous	bad	despair	horrified	embarrassed	disturbed
infuriated	afraid	worried	disappointed	depressed		guilt	vile
hate	scary	uncertain	pessimistic				


Figure 3.5 Negative Emotions Mentioned in Interviews

Raw counts of categories of emotions mentioned across all 23 interviews.

As the figures demonstrate, negative emotions were mentioned substantially more often than positive emotions, and the range of negative emotions was much larger and generally of a greater intensity. In total, there were 80 explicit references to specific negative emotions throughout the interviews and only 34 references to positive emotions. Among the emotion references, anger and fear—relatively intense emotions—were most common, whereas the most common positive emotions mentioned included words such as “like,” “nice,” and “glad,” which are relatively mild.

Table 3.4 Positive Emotions Mentioned in Interviews

like	enthusiasm	pride/hope	compassion
nice	excited	inspired	empathy
glad	passionate	proud	
happy		hopeful	

Figure 3.6 Positive Emotions Mentioned in Interviews

Raw counts of categories of emotions mentioned across all 23 interviews.

While many volunteers expressed that they were “excited” about supporting a woman candidate, the vast majority of references to specific emotions were negative and targeted at President Trump, Republicans, and the overall political environment. These findings suggest that studies of symbolic representation that only consider descriptive representation and positive mechanisms leading to women citizens’ political engagement are unable to explain the mobilizing potential of comparatively more intense negative emotional responses to women’s rhetorical representation.

RESPONSES TO DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATIVES

Most volunteers said that they would support any Democratic candidate in the current climate, but many also added that it is “nice” to be able to support a woman or that women candidates are particularly good alternatives to politics as usual. A young

woman canvassing for Mary Gay Scanlon explained, “In an emotional way, it’s always nice to see women win something. But when it comes down to it, that’s not my dividing line.” An older woman supporting Susan Wild said, “I’m hopeful about her being a woman. I would be willing to vote for a man as well, but I think it’s great that she’s running.”

Others felt that while they were more motivated to participate out of opposition, women are especially good alternatives: “I’m totally glad there’s so many more women running. We need women’s voices out there. You know, they talk about women’s healthcare, then it’s 18 men in a room, not one single woman. There has [sic] to be female voices there.” Two older women volunteers for Mikie Sherrill canvassed together but had different attitudes about the candidate. The first said, “At this point, I’d vote for a monkey. Anyone. It’s not Mikie Sherrill necessarily. I’m motivated by mainly horror at what’s going on in this country.” According to the second woman, however, “Mikie Sherrill is a good candidate. I’d vote for anyone else too, but it’s better that it’s Mikie Sherrill.”

A handful of women did report that they were inspired to participate specifically because of the woman candidate. A volunteer for Scanlon put it this way: “I feel like we can trust her and that she really just wants to help people and work really hard, as opposed to just being someone from a really privileged background. That makes me feel really inspired that I should try to work hard to make a difference, too.” Positive responses to descriptive representatives are the main focus of the traditional symbolic representation literature (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Lawless 2004). Such responses appear to have motivated some women to participate in politics due to inspiration or a perception

that women candidates will be more likely to adequately address women's healthcare interests. But these were not the primary motivations cited by the women activists I interviewed in 2018.

RESPONSES TO NEGATIVE RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION

No volunteers reported motivations to oppose the specific Republican running against their candidate. All oppositional emotions and motivations were directed at President Trump and the Republican party generally. When asked what about Trump was stirring up so many negative emotions, interviewees almost universally referenced his rhetoric and policies targeting women, immigrants, and other politically marginalized or vulnerable groups. Most responses mirrored the following statement from a volunteer for Scanlon: "I'm a woman, I know people who are immigrants, minorities, people worried that they'll lose healthcare. When I think about all of his different policies... I know now he made a statement against trans—he is attacking LGBTQ. For each policy, it's either myself, people I love, people I care about." A volunteer for Sherrill explained that her feelings of despair and anger toward Donald Trump stemmed from "unceasing attacks on basically everybody but cis white rich men." She added, "But also, I think the fact that he's so systematically undermining any way we have of defending rights or of reporting on them. I think his systematic undermining of the news media and the judiciary is pretty terrifying."

These reactions to President Trump both implicitly and explicitly relate to perceptions of threats toward women and other politically marginalized groups. Activists grounded these feelings in their own identities as women and in their concern for other groups. The women I interviewed were more likely to state that they were motivated to

participate because of threats toward other people or groups that they cared about than to threats that could impact them directly as individuals. Perhaps these expressions of concern for others reflect activists' feelings that their anger or fear is more legitimate when it is expressed on behalf of others rather than out of self-interest.

Interestingly, these references to threats toward women and other politically marginalized groups echo some of the rhetoric on Democratic women's campaign websites. For example, Rep. Judy Chu's (D-CA) website read, "over the last two years we have seen the Trump administration attack women, immigrants, people of color, and the LGBTQ community." And now-Rep. Katie Porter's (D-CA) stated that "Donald Trump's Supreme Court pick represents a huge threat to women's rights." Candidates' and activists' reactions to Donald Trump also echo the 2017 Women's March mission statement, reading, "The rhetoric of the past election cycle has insulted, demonized, and threatened many of us—immigrants of all statuses, Muslims and those of diverse religious faiths, people who identify as LGBTQIA, Native people, Black and Brown people, people with disabilities, survivors of sexual assault" (Women's March 2017).

While I do not have direct evidence of the origins of activists' perceptions of threat posed by the Trump administration, it is possible that activists adopted their articulation of the threats posed by Trump from Democratic women elites or social movements like the Women's March, #MeToo Movement, and the Black Lives Matter movement. In other words, while the women activists I interviewed generally downplay the impact of women descriptive representatives on their political participation, women political elites may have actually played a substantial role in activating activists' feelings of threat and anger toward Trump through their rhetorical representation of women. To

the extent that this is true, it suggests an additional symbolic role for women politicians beyond their descriptive presence in politics. Future research on symbolic and rhetorical representation should more directly examine this phenomenon. To what extent do women activists and citizens adopt representatives' or candidates' rhetoric about women? And are they more likely to adopt the rhetoric of descriptive representatives?

SALIENT PERSONAL IDENTITIES AND EXPERIENCES

The women activists that I interviewed offered several different explanations for what fueled their emotional responses toward women candidates and Donald Trump. These explanations were largely rooted in activists' personal identities, experiences, and socialization related to their race, religion, family, and occupation.

Two of the three women of color specifically referenced their race when asked about their motivations to volunteer in this election. One explained, "Well, I'm a little nervous... no, very nervous about the current political state of the country, given who the President is and what's going on with Republicans controlling Congress, and I think it's really important that Democrats control the Congress so that the future is more secure." Regarding her feelings of anger and sadness about Donald Trump, she added, "I'm a woman, and I'm black, and he hates women, and he hates black people, so it's like a direct thing, I guess."

With one exception, the white women tended not to reference their whiteness, but a few discussed their experiences of class privilege as an important motivator. For example, one said, "because I do come from an upper-middle-class family, and so my view is sort of along the lines of I've had every privilege in the world. I've never had to

worry about being able to go to the doctor. I think everybody should be able to experience that.”

The youngest volunteer, an undergraduate student, said:

I think because apart from being a woman, I’m not a minority, and I know I’m really privileged... I didn’t really face many personal battles with my own identity... I support, you know, like intersectional feminism, like Black Lives Matter, all of that, but I think, personally, I benefit from privilege more than I [face] oppression with my own identity.

I did not specifically ask the volunteers for their religious affiliation, but several women explained that their religious beliefs were important sources of motivation for their political activism. Four women self-identified as Jewish, one as Christian, one as Mormon, one as Muslim, and one as Catholic Buddhist. Every woman who mentioned religion as being important to them also described being an experienced volunteer—some being involved in politics even as children.

Women who identified their religion as a salient personal and political identity were much less likely to reference negative emotions. As opposed to non-religious women who often discussed their anger and sadness about Donald Trump’s presidency, religious women more often implied a negative emotional response to the overall political environment by talking about the need to care for others and not leave anyone behind. While religion is likely a source of civic skills and experience for these women, no one described the specific tools or resources they received from being part of a congregation or religious community as being especially important; instead, discussions of religion’s influence mostly centered around the role that religion has played in shaping their worldview, which includes their political attitudes and beliefs.

A young woman explained:

I think that not necessarily being spiritual or observantly Jewish, but sort of understanding what it means to be Jewish as a political identity and a historical identity, you know, there is probably some part of like, okay, you have to repair the world. You have to fight for justice. You have to fight for people who don't have as many privileges as you have. You can't ignore the stranger.

Another woman said that her religious identity was central to her identity as a Democrat: "For me, it's a religious perspective, because the Bible says you should take in a refugee, you should take care of the poor... I look at the government as an extension of what we can all do, and we keep calling ourselves a Christian nation, and we don't do Christian things."

One volunteer knew Susan Wild personally because they both belong to "a group of Jewish and Muslim women that get together to understand each other better... They've come over to the mosque, and we've had joint yoga sessions... we fed homeless people on Christmas because we don't do Christmas." This connection motivated her to support Wild even though they do not agree on everything.

One of the oldest women offered an interesting take on the role of emotions based on her religious beliefs: "I'm a Buddhist, a Catholic Buddhist... And I recognize that emotion is present all the time and is probably a motivator and so one of the principals I'm open to is being responsive rather than reactive. And so I'm very responsive and aware that I have fear, that fear is very prominent for the injustice, social injustice. So I think fear is very motivating for me." When I asked about her distinction between being responsive and reactive, she elaborated that being responsive means being aware of one's feelings, whereas being reactive means acting without intent and awareness.

Family socialization was another common explanation for why the most experienced volunteers were motivated to participate. Moreover, many of the women

who discussed family socialization from a young age as being important were also motivated by their religious beliefs. As such, it appears that family and religion are important conduits for women's emotional motivations to participate in politics, both through providing civic resources and experiences as well as by providing a framework for one's moral and political attitudes and beliefs.

A woman who brought her six-year-old with her to canvas, said, "As a very young child, I went canvassing. My six-year-old is canvassing with me today, and this is his fifth time canvassing, and so, I believe very strongly that it was my childhood experience of watching my mom." One of the younger volunteers explained, "Growing up with gay parents in the 90s is like, you're just always aware of stuff."

Others explained that they had never been very involved until their children got them interested: "I didn't vote until probably the last eight, nine, ten years... I don't know, just listening to [my children], and hearing what they want for their futures, I guess motivated me. And [Donald Trump], too. I just can't stand him." Another said, "My kids have got me more involved. My son is 25, my daughter's 22, and they are more engaged than I ever was at their age, and they, you know, they're encouraging."

An exception to the influence of family for long-term volunteers was a middle-aged woman who has been highly engaged since she was 18: "I got my first paying job, where I paid taxes... my dad said to me, 'You know, about a quarter of your income's gonna be gone. You might wanna make sure it's not going for evil.'" Since then, she has "tried to contact an elected official three times a week, different ones, to either say, 'Great job. Please vote this way. You didn't vote that way. You're horrible.' Whatever it

is.” Despite the implication in her dad’s comment, she said that her family never discussed politics much.

The same woman explained, however, that her work as a nurse increased her desire to be involved in politics because she saw that many of her patients wanted to be more involved but lacked the resources or physical ability. She also came to see how broken the American healthcare system is: “I don’t protest a lot. I don’t make a lot of signs. However, the repeal—and I’m air-quoting—replace of the Affordable Care Act really got me out to protest in front of Pat Toomey’s office. And there were a bunch of middle-aged women with their pussy hats on and this kind of thing, and a few of the men who are aware enough to come out with them.”

ACCEPTING AND REJECTING REPRESENTATIVES

While emotions are often characterized as being irrational (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Pitkin 1967), some of the activists I interviewed were strategic about how they channeled their emotions into activism. Four of the youngest women explained that they were not actually residents of the districts in which they were volunteering and had specifically sought out a nearby swing district. All four also self-identified as strong progressive Democrats and expressed that they were more enthusiastic about other candidates but recognized that moderates who were attempting to flip districts needed more help. One elaborated:

We both live in Brooklyn, so this was one of the closer swing districts for us... I’m also frustrated that centrist candidates are the only ones we can run in swing districts, and there noticeably aren’t LGBTQ tiles on the wall and other issues, mass incarceration is not something we’re going to talk about with people when we walk up to their doors.

Another said, “the most progressive candidate that I’m excited about would be Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, but she’s going to win, so that’s why I’m here.” As such, a few activists may have been mobilized by more progressive women candidates like now-Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), but they channeled that energy into political participation that would be more strategically impactful.

The goal of these interviews is not to provide a representative picture of what symbolic representation looks like for average women citizens; instead, these extreme examples of highly engaged women responding to an unusual electoral context where gender is especially salient can offer lessons about the mechanisms connecting women’s descriptive and rhetorical representation to increased political engagement. Because they are highly engaged and politically knowledgeable, these women activists are more likely than average citizens to be able to articulate their responses to representatives. They are also much more likely to have been exposed to candidate rhetoric than average citizens. As such, the process of symbolic representation—in which candidates make representational claims to represent women, and women accept or reject those claims—should be most easily observed in this unique group of women.

The picture that emerges from these interviews is that descriptive representation does induce some positive emotional responses that encourage political engagement, but negative emotional responses to non-descriptive representatives tended to be more mobilizing. The similarities in candidates’ and activists’ articulation of threats posed by the Trump administration suggest another possible role for women candidates; by drawing citizens’ attention to examples of the negative rhetorical representation of

women, women candidates can further activate and fuel highly-mobilizing negative emotions in women activists.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I have argued that rhetorical representation is a tool of symbolic representation. Through their rhetoric about women, candidates symbolically construct women as a political group in selective and contestable ways. Based on these portrayals of women and women's interests, actual women in the electorate either accept or reject candidates as representatives for women. My analysis of 2010 and 2018 campaign websites suggests that descriptive representation and rhetorical representation are strongly linked—with women being more likely than men to rhetorically represent women.

My interviews with women activists suggest that descriptive representation can motivate increased participation by activating positive emotions toward women candidates, but a more powerful route to mobilization may be through the activation of negative emotions by candidates who represent women in ways that they reject. Aside from their descriptive presence, however, women candidates may play an important role in drawing attention to threats posed by other political actors' representation of women. By emphasizing these threats, descriptive representatives may add fuel to activists' highly mobilizing negative emotions, leading to more participation.

In the next two chapters, I examine the implications of these emotional responses to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women by focusing on women's political engagement and participation. I draw on research from political psychology to consider (1) *which* emotions are most mobilizing for women, (2) *when*

emotions are most mobilizing for women, and (3) *for which women* emotions are most mobilizing.

CHAPTER 4 WOMEN'S EMOTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT IN US POLITICS

In Chapter 3, I argued that rhetorical representation is a tool of symbolic representation. Political candidates—both women and men—make claims to represent women through their rhetoric. In my analysis of congressional campaign websites, I found that women—especially Democratic women—are the most likely to rhetorically represent women. Women in the electorate may accept or reject candidates as their representatives based on the candidates' rhetoric about women, their descriptive presence as women, or a combination of the two—in addition to other factors that are not gender-specific. For an individual candidate, the goal of symbolic representation is for women citizens to accept them as their representative. While the previous chapter examined some ways in which candidates portray women to achieve this outcome, the present chapter will focus on the behavioral consequences of women citizens' acceptance or rejection of a candidate as their representative.

Based on the prominence of emotion in both theoretical and empirical definitions of symbolic representation (see Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018; Pitkin 1967), I argue that women's emotional responses to political candidates can signal the extent to which they accept or reject candidates as their representatives. A key finding from Chapter 3 was that Democratic women activists and congressional candidates cited President Trump's rhetoric about women and other marginalized groups as a key motivation to volunteer for campaigns or run for office in 2018. While discussing their motivations to engage in politics, these women activists and congressional candidates often emphasized negative emotions, including anger, fear, and perceptions of threat—usually directed at President Trump and the Republican party (see also Dittmar 2020a). These negative

emotions may signal women's rejection of Trump as a representative, while positive emotions may indicate acceptance of a candidate as a representative.

The existing literature on the symbolic representation of women in US politics typically examines the effect of women's descriptive representation on women citizens' engagement in politics (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Lawless 2004). This work proposes several possible psychological mechanisms at the center of this relationship. A woman politician can convey to voters that the political system is responsive to women's political interests (Atkeson 2003; Reingold and Harrell 2010). The presence of a woman may mobilize women citizens around a shared group identity (Dolan 2008a; Fridkin and Kenney 2014) or can provide a source of inspiration (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018). Few studies directly test for these mechanisms, though some research has found evidence that inspiration or pride are at work (see Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018; Simien and Hampson 2017). Building on this research, I focus on the relationship between the descriptive or rhetorical representation of women and women's political engagement. I also investigate the intermediate role of emotions, bridging representation and engagement.

My main point of departure from the existing literature is the inclusion of rhetorical representation in addition to descriptive representation, which allows for the possibility of men representing women. Additionally, scholars generally imply that women citizens' reactions to women's descriptive representation as candidates will be positive in nature—at least toward an in-party candidate (see Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010). But responses to candidates' rhetoric about women are much more likely to be mixed in valence, with in-party rhetoric more likely to evoke positive responses and

out-party rhetoric more likely to evoke negative responses. As such, I consider the consequences of both positive and negative emotional responses to candidates' representation of women.

Drawing on research from political psychology, I will argue that both positive and negative emotions can lead to increased political engagement among women citizens, depending on the object of the emotions in question. Negative emotions toward an *out-party* candidate—signaling the rejection of a representative—and positive emotions toward an *in-party* candidate—signaling acceptance—should be mobilizing. In contrast, negative emotions toward an in-party candidate and positive emotions toward an out-party candidate should be demobilizing.

In this chapter, I will also argue that gender matters more in the *levels* of emotions that citizens express in response to candidates and their campaigns. But gender should be less relevant in the *effects* of emotions on political engagement. Due to heterosexual norms, many of women's and men's interests and resources converge in such a way that—given similar levels of emotional response—there should not be substantial differences in the extent of their political engagement. But women may experience higher *levels* of certain emotions in electoral contexts where gender is highly salient, which may indirectly promote greater engagement and participation among women relative to men within those contexts.

Throughout the chapter, I compare women to men to get a better sense of whether shifts in women's emotions are reflective of unique gendered contexts as opposed to general patterns that apply to the entire electorate. If I restricted the analysis to only women, then I could misinterpret an increase in some emotion or in the effect of some

emotion on participation as being related to gender when in fact the same dynamic emerged across the entire electorate for some reason unrelated to gender. While men's emotional responses to the descriptive and rhetorical representation of women in politics are a worthy area of study, it is beyond the scope of the current project to give a full account of men's responses to women's representation—though this chapter does provide some insight. For the most part, however, I include men in this chapter as a comparison group to contextualize women's responses to presidential candidates within the larger electorate.

My analysis of interviews with women activists provided one example of women being mobilized by their negative emotions toward the gendered rhetoric of an out-party male politician, Donald Trump. But the samples of women activists in Chapter 3 are not representative of women citizens in the United States, and Trump's rhetorical representation and mobilization of women could be exceptional. In this chapter, I turn to nationally representative survey data between 1980 and 2016 to examine women's emotional responses to presidential candidates and the consequences of those emotions for women's political engagement. While the findings presented in this chapter may be more representative of average women citizens than my interview findings, I sacrifice direct measures of women's responses to candidate rhetoric about women. Such measures are generally not available in large, publicly available, and nationally representative surveys. In contrast, the small and unrepresentative samples of websites and interviews I analyzed in Chapter 3 provided direct and explicit evidence linking Trump's rhetoric about women to women's motivations to engage in politics. While the data and methods in each chapter have their limitations, my hope is that the strengths of each analysis are

complementary enough to motivate future research—especially experimental work—that more directly examines women’s emotional responses to candidate rhetoric about women using more representative samples.

DATA AND MEASURES

I rely on data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) between 1980 and 2016. The ANES Time Series studies are nationally representative surveys conducted during every presidential election year since 1948, including separate pre- and post-election components. Since 1980, respondents have reported whether each of the major-party presidential candidates have ever made them feel angry, afraid, proud, or hopeful. Over the same period, respondents also reported their level of interest in the campaign, whether they had voted for president, attempted to influence others’ vote choice, attended a political meeting or rally, displayed a button or bumper sticker, donated to a candidate or party, or done any other work for a candidate or party.

I begin by examining the effects of candidate-centric emotions on levels of political engagement among both women and men—or the downstream consequences of citizens’ acceptance or rejection of political representatives. Given debates about the best way to measure certain emotions in the ANES (see Ladd and Lenz 2008; 2011; Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman 2011), I first establish the approach I take to measuring emotions in this study before proceeding with the main analyses of gender differences in emotions and engagement. Additionally, by first identifying the emotions that are most strongly correlated with political engagement, I can narrow my focus to the most consequential emotions for women’s political engagement in later analyses.

The remainder of the chapter considers how the prevalence of certain emotional responses to candidates has shifted in electoral contexts where gender is especially salient due to candidates' descriptive or rhetorical representation of women. In the language of symbolic representation, the first set of analyses in this chapter examines the consequences of women's acceptance or rejection of candidates as representatives—measured by their emotional responses to candidates. The second set of analyses considers the impact of gendered electoral contexts—including candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women—on citizens' likelihood of accepting or rejecting candidates as representatives.

MEASURING EMOTIONS

Many scholars note the limits of the ANES's candidate-centric measurement of emotions because they are interested in the impact of more generalized feelings of anger, anxiety, or enthusiasm on information search, political decision-making, and participation (e.g., Burge 2020; Ladd and Lenz 2008). In my study, however, emotional responses *to candidates and representatives* are the core focus; therefore, the ANES approach to measurement is well-suited for my purposes. Scholars who wish to study theories about generalized emotions using the ANES often sum emotions across candidates such that “anger,” for example, represents reports of anger toward both the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates (e.g., Valentino et al. 2011). Others create measures of “comparative” emotion by taking the difference between responses to the candidates (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Ladd and Lenz 2008; 2011).¹ These composite measures

¹ In contrast, when using original experimental data, researchers typically prime specific emotions by having respondents write about general political or non-political concerns that make them feel the target emotions (e.g., Phoenix 2020). Scholars who use the Collaborative Multi-racial Post-Election Survey benefit from

may conceal important differences in the effects of emotions toward in-party versus out-party candidates, however.

In a back and forth in *Political Psychology*, Ladd and Lenz (2008; 2011) and Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman (2011) end up agreeing to disagree about whether “anxiety” should be measured as anxiety toward the in-party candidate or by summing anxiety across candidates. Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman (2011) make the case that anxiety toward an in-party but *not* an out-party candidate reflects the kind of novel threat that triggers the surveillance system in their theory of affective intelligence (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Anxiety toward an out-party candidate is not unexpected, surprising, or novel; it is a standard feature of our polarized political environment and should not snap someone out of their habitual political behaviors. In contrast, anxiety toward an in-party candidate can sound the alarm that habitual behavior may no longer be effectively relied upon. Research on expectancy violation theory has found distinct effects for anger, fear, and enthusiasm depending on whether they are directed at in-party or out-party candidates (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015).

Originally, scholars combined anger and fear as a measure of anxiety (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), but later research has reached the consensus that anger and fear should be studied separately (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Valentino et al. 2011). While many scholars continue to combine measures of hope and pride to create a measure of enthusiasm (e.g., Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015; Marcus Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2011), there is also precedent for studying them separately. Just, Crigler, and Belt (2007) study the distinctiveness of hope as a future-

more agnostic question wording that simply asks about emotions felt during the election season, generally (Gutierrez et al. 2019; Phoenix 2020).

oriented emotion that, like fear, is associated with uncertainty. In contrast, they argue that enthusiasm is more present-oriented. Simien and Hampson (2017) study pride independently and find that it leads to political engagement among women conditionally depending on race, ethnicity, and age. In this study, I opt not to combine measures of pride and hope to allow for the possibility of gender differences in their expression or effect.

Each of the emotion variables and voter turnout are dichotomous and analyzed using logistic regression. I recoded each emotion variable to reflect whether the emotion was directed toward the in-party or out-party presidential candidate.² As a result, pure independents are excluded. This choice reflects research suggesting that emotions yield different effects depending on whether they are directed at in-group or out-group members (Huddy 2013; Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015; Mason 2016; 2018). Campaign interest is coded into three categories—“Not much interested,” “Somewhat interested,” and “Very interested”—and analyzed using ordinal logistic regression. I summed the remaining forms of participation to create an index of non-voting participation, which I analyze using OLS regression. I look at the direct impact of gender in each analysis as well as whether the predictors of emotional responses to candidates and political engagement differ fundamentally for women and men.

In keeping with resource models of political participation and other research on emotions and participation (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Valentino et al. 2011), I control for resources that are known to predict participation, including age,

² While it might seem intuitive that the in-party and out-party versions of each emotion would be strongly and negatively correlated, the correlations are actually very close to zero. The correlations between the in-party and out-party versions of each emotion are as follows: anger, 0.13; fear, 0.16; pride, -0.06; hope, -0.12. As such, the in-party and out-party versions of each emotion are not simply the reverse of each other.

education, income, employment, and religious attendance. I also control for demographic and political factors including race and strength of partisanship. Party ID is incorporated into the emotion measures, which are coded to reflect whether the emotion in question is directed at the in-party or out-party candidate. And the voter turnout and non-voting participation models include a control for campaign interest, which is a strong predictor of participation (see Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).³

PREDICTING THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONS ON ENGAGEMENT

To explain political engagement, including campaign interest, voter turnout, and non-voting participation among women and men, I draw on theories of affective intelligence, cognitive appraisal, and expectancy violation (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). While the details of each of these theories differ from one another, they share a similar logic: experiencing novelty, threat, familiarity, certainty, or uncertainty in one's political environment can encourage or discourage a reliance on habitual behavior and group influence by activating specific emotions.

Anxiety generally decreases the influence of group memberships and primarily leads to information search (Huddy 2013; MacKuen et al. 2010). But anxiety is inconsistently related to participation (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). In contrast, enthusiasm and anger are associated with a greater reliance on habitual thinking and group influence and tend to encourage participation, while often decreasing or having little to no effect on information search (Huddy 2013; Valentino et al. 2011).

³ I rescaled all variables to have a one-point range.

Expectancy violation theory (EVT) makes a distinction between emotions directed at in-group or out-group members (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015). Violated or disconfirmed expectations, such as experiencing negative affect toward an in-party candidate or positive affect toward an out-party candidate decrease group influence and habitual behavior, much like anxiety in AIT. Because of its more explicit focus on in-group and out-group oriented emotions, EVT is intuitively applicable to the candidate-centric measurement of emotions in the ANES surveys. Using the ANES measures of emotions, Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) define *negative* emotions toward *out-party* candidates and *positive* emotions toward *in-party* candidates as “expectancy-confirming emotions,” and they define *positive* emotions toward *out-party* candidates and *negative* emotions toward *in-party* candidates as “expectancy-violating emotions.” While Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) apply EVT to voter decision-making, scholars have not yet—to my knowledge—specifically applied this theory to political participation. In accordance with this research, I propose the following hypotheses.

Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis: Expectancy-confirming emotions—out-party anger, out-party fear, in-party pride, and in-party hope—will lead to higher levels of campaign interest and political participation.

De-mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis: Expectancy-violating emotions—in-party anger, in-party fear, out-party pride, and out-party hope—will lead to lower levels of political participation. These emotions may lead to higher levels of campaign interest, however, because of the association between disconfirmed expectations and increased attention and information search.

Table 4.1 summarizes my expected results corresponding with these two hypotheses.

Table 4.1 Summary of Hypothesized Relationships

		Campaign Interest	Voting for President	Non-Voting Participation
Expectancy- Confirming Emotions	Out-Anger	+	+	+
	Out-Fear	+	+	+
	In-Pride	+	+	+
	In-Hope	+	+	+
Expectancy- Violating Emotions	In-Anger	+	-	-
	In-Fear	+	-	-
	Out-Pride	+	-	-
	Out-Hope	+	-	-

Plus signs indicate the expectation of positive coefficients; minus signs indicate negative coefficients.

Previous research has found gender gaps in political participation, with men being more likely than women to express an interest in campaigns and engage in most forms of participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Many of these gaps have closed over time, though small gaps in campaign interest and donating remain (Burns et al. 2018). Women have, however, been more likely than men to vote since 1980 (CAWP 2021b). Among both women and men, rates of political participation are related to civic and recruitment resources provided by non-political institutions, such as the family, schools, workplaces, unions, religious institutions, and volunteer organizations (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).

While material resources and civic socialization structure individuals' opportunities to engage, emotions can determine whether and how much citizens will put those resources to use from election to election (Valentino et al. 2011). While it is possible that the emotions under study could have different *effects* on interest and participation for women and men—either in direction or magnitude, I do not expect to find many gender differences here. Indeed, one recent study of gender differences in emotions and engagement in 2016 and 2018 finds that women are no more likely than men to translate their emotions into action (Wolak 2020). Instead, I expect to find gender

differences earlier in the process—in the *levels* of emotions that women and men express in electoral contexts where gender is especially salient. I will turn to this topic in the second half of the chapter.

I anticipate that expectancy-confirming emotions will be mobilizing for both women and men, but the prevalence of expectancy-confirming emotions may differ among women and men depending on the salience of gender in a given electoral context. I argue that the expression of positive or negative emotions toward a specific candidate signals the extent to which citizens accept or reject that candidate as their representative. In the language of symbolic representation, gendered electoral contexts—which may involve the descriptive or rhetorical representation of women—may lead women and men to accept or reject specific candidates as representatives to different degrees. To the extent that women and men have equally accepted or equally rejected a candidate as a representative, however, the consequences for their levels of political engagement should be similar.

I start with an analysis of the end result—the effect of emotions on engagement—so that I can establish which emotions most influence women’s political behavior. By examining the process out of order, I can focus the later analysis of gendered electoral contexts on the emotions that are most consequential for women’s political engagement.


FINDINGS—FROM FEELING TO ACTION

In this section, I examine the effects of gender and emotions on campaign interest and participation in the ten presidential election years between 1980 and 2016. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present the pooled findings for campaign interest, voter turnout, and non-voting participation, respectively. Table 4.2 summarizes the findings of the pooled

analyses in comparison to my *Mobilizing* and *De-mobilizing Emotions Hypotheses*.


Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 present the corresponding findings separately for women and men within each individual election year.

Figure 4.1 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Campaign Interest, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of ordinal logistic regression. See Table C.4.1 in Appendix C for full model with controls, including gender, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, and election year dummies.

Figure 4.2 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Voting for President, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression. See Table C.4.1 in Appendix C for full model with controls, including gender, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, campaign interest, and election year dummies.


I find support for my *Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis* in the pooled models for campaign interest, voter turnout, and non-voting participation with only two exceptions. All four expectancy-confirming emotions are positively and significantly associated with expressing campaign interest (see Figure 4.1). For voting, the same is true except for anger toward out-party candidates, which is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels (see Figure 4.2). Out-party anger, out-party fear, and in-party pride are positively and significantly associated with other forms of participation, but the coefficient for in-party hope is not statistically significant (see Figure 4.3).

Findings are more mixed for the *De-mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis*. Hope toward the out-party candidate is negative and significant for voting, as expected. But

pride toward the out-party candidate is positively and significantly associated with voting (see Figure 4.2), and in-party anger is positively and significantly associated with non-voting participation (see Figure 4.3). The remaining coefficients for the expectancy-violating emotions are not statistically significant at the conventional $p < 0.05$ level in the models for voting and non-voting participation.

Rather than being demobilizing, I find that reports of anger and fear toward the in-party candidate and pride and hope toward the out-party candidate tend not to have a discernable effect on participation. When comparing the findings for expectancy-confirming and expectancy-violating emotions, the main takeaway is that expectancy-confirming emotions have a distinctly positive impact on interest and participation.

Figure 4.3 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Non-Voting Participation, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression. See Table C.4.1 in Appendix C for full model with controls, including gender, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, campaign interest, and election year dummies.

In contrast to the participation outcomes, I anticipated that expectancy-violating emotions would lead to increased levels of campaign interest. This is because expectancy-violating emotions are thought to work similarly to anxiety in affective intelligence theory; they should signal that something in the political environment is unfamiliar and that existing habits and patterns of behavior can no longer be trusted. As a result, they should increase attention, information-search, and risk-averse behavior (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that campaign interest is a form of attention that should increase when the surveillance system is activated in response to novel or threatening circumstances. I find support for this part of my *De-mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis* regarding anger toward the in-party candidate and pride toward the out-party candidate. Counter to my expectations, however, in-party fear significantly decreases campaign interest.⁴

⁴ This result is especially surprising because, where EVT, AIT, and CAT theories of emotion have slight disagreements about the effects of anger, pride, and hope, they are all consistent that anxiety or fear should increase attention. Overall, my findings suggest greater support for expectancy-violation theory (EVT) than affective intelligence theory (AIT). According to many portrayals of AIT, I should have observed similar effects for the in-party and out-party versions of each emotion. Instead, I find very different patterns of effects depending on whether the object of each emotion belongs to an in-party or out-party candidate. These findings further suggest that scholars should be careful about summing the ANES emotion measures across candidates because such an approach can obscure important in-group/out-group dynamics.

Table 4.2 Review of Hypothesized Relationships and Findings

		Campaign Interest		Voting for President		Non-Voting Participation	
		H	F	H	F	H	F
Expectancy-Confirming Emotions	Out-Anger	+	+***	+	+	+	+***
	Out-Fear	+	+***	+	+**	+	+***
	In-Pride	+	+***	+	+*	+	+***
	In-Hope	+	+***	+	+***	+	+
Expectancy-Violating Emotions	In-Anger	+	+***	-	-	-	+***
	In-Fear	+	-**	-	-	-	-
	Out-Pride	+	+***	-	+*	-	-
	Out-Hope	+	+	-	-***	-	-

“H” stands for my initial hypothesis. “F” stands for the actual finding. Plus signs indicate positive coefficients. Minus signs indicate negative coefficients. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses at conventional levels of statistical significance.

Controlling for resources and emotions, women are significantly less likely than men to report both campaign interest and non-voting participation between 1980 and 2016 (full models with controls are available in Appendix Table C.4.1). In contrast, women are significantly more likely than men to vote in the pooled model. These results replicate previous findings about gender gaps in political participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). As expected, resources and civic socialization, including age, education, income, and religious attendance are positively and significantly associated with all three outcomes. Additionally, campaign interest is positively and significantly associated with voting and non-voting participation. Strength of party identification is a consistently positive and significant predictor of each outcome, whereas the findings for race and employment are mixed.

Now that I have established that expectancy-confirming emotions are most consequential for citizens’ political engagement, I turn to an analysis of gender differences in the effects of expectancy-confirming emotions on levels of political engagement. As I explained previously, I do not expect to observe many gender

differences in the *effects* of emotions on interest and participation. The main gender differences—to the extent they exist—should emerge earlier, in the *levels* of emotions women and men express toward the candidates, which I examine later in this chapter. Indeed, the effects of all four expectancy-confirming emotions are—for the most part—consistently positive for campaign interest among both women and men, and most are statistically significant (see Table 4.3).⁵ There are five negative—though statistically insignificant—coefficients for the impact of expectancy-confirming emotions on campaign interest. These include out-party anger among women in 2008 and 2016, out-party fear among men in 2008, in-party hope among men in 2000, and in-party hope among women in 2016.

⁵ The mixed and null findings I observed for expectancy-violating emotions in the pooled data also hold for both women and men in the cross-sectional analyses (see Appendix C for full models).

Table 4.3 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Campaign Interest

		1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Out-Anger	Women	0.20 (0.16)	0.19 (0.14)	0.44** (0.16)	0.34* (0.14)	0.58*** (0.17)	0.36^ (0.19)	0.16 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.22)	0.58*** (0.10)	-0.18 (0.22)
	N	659	927	883	994	761	686	494	498	2431	1815
	Men	0.46* (0.19)	0.47** (0.16)	0.48** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.52** (0.18)	0.53** (0.19)	0.45* (0.22)	0.74** (0.25)	0.51*** (0.11)	0.51* (0.20)
	N	485	740	670	900	628	584	425	388	2290	1614
Out-Fear	Women	0.58*** (0.18)	0.40** (0.15)	0.30^ (0.17)	0.35* (0.14)	0.56** (0.17)	0.65*** (0.20)	0.30 (0.21)	0.97*** (0.22)	0.46*** (0.09)	0.41* (0.17)
	N	659	927	883	994	761	686	494	498	2431	1815
	Men	0.20 (0.21)	0.28^ (0.16)	0.80*** (0.17)	0.23 (0.15)	0.27 (0.18)	0.72*** (0.20)	0.87*** (0.22)	-0.09 (0.25)	0.33** (0.10)	0.13 (0.17)
	N	485	740	670	900	628	584	425	388	2290	1614
In-Pride	Women	0.19 (0.18)	0.43** (0.16)	0.58*** (0.16)	0.37** (0.14)	0.23 (0.18)	0.44* (0.20)	0.39^ (0.23)	1.07*** (0.25)	0.50*** (0.11)	0.76*** (0.17)
	N	659	927	883	994	761	686	494	498	2431	1815
	Men	0.33 (0.21)	0.71*** (0.18)	0.56** (0.17)	0.41** (0.15)	0.42* (0.19)	0.60** (0.19)	0.28 (0.25)	0.94*** (0.25)	0.60*** (0.10)	0.34* (0.16)
	N	485	740	670	900	628	584	425	388	2290	1614
In-Hope	Women	0.25 (0.22)	0.59** (0.19)	0.19 (0.16)	0.35* (0.16)	0.47* (0.20)	0.66** (0.20)	1.24*** (0.31)	1.04*** (0.27)	0.54*** (0.14)	-0.18 (0.18)
	N	659	927	883	994	761	686	494	498	2431	1815
	Men	0.10 (0.24)	0.13 (0.20)	0.39* (0.18)	0.43** (0.16)	0.22 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.77** (0.27)	0.25 (0.28)	0.50*** (0.13)	0.41 (0.18)
	N	485	740	670	900	628	584	425	388	2290	1614


^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of ordinal logistic regression – separate models for women and men. DV is campaign interest. Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See columns 3-4 of Tables C.4.2-11 in Appendix C for full models with controls, including all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength.

The null finding for out-party anger in 2016 might be especially surprising given the substantial attention devoted to the impact of women's anger in the wake of the 2016 election (see Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018; Traister 2018). One potential explanation for this result could be that Republican women faced a cross-pressure between their partisan and gender identities during the 2016 election because the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton, was a descriptive representative of women, and the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, made sexist and misogynistic rhetoric a cornerstone of his campaign.

Perhaps this cross-pressure prevented Republican women from effectively converting their anger toward the out-party candidate, Hillary Clinton, into campaign interest?

Figure 4.4 Effect of Party, Gender, and Anger toward Out-Party Candidates on Campaign Interest, 2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing campaign interest based on weighted ordinal logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table C.4.32 in Appendix C for full model.

Figure 4.4 displays the predicted probabilities of expressing campaign interest for Democratic and Republican women who did and did not express anger toward their respective out-party candidates in 2016.⁶ It should be noted that Democratic and Republican women were equally likely to express out-party anger, with 94% of Democratic women expressing anger toward Trump and 93% of Republican women expressing anger toward Clinton. Moreover, the right-hand panel of Figure 4.4 reveals

⁶ In this chapter, all predicted probabilities are visualized with 84 percent confidence intervals to make it easier to visually detect group differences at the 95 percent confidence level (see Cassese 2020; Schenker and Gentleman 2001).

that Republican women's anger toward Hillary Clinton had roughly the same impact on their level of campaign interest as did Democratic women's anger toward Donald Trump. The left-hand panel, however, suggests that Republican women who were *not* angry at Hillary Clinton tended to express the highest levels of interest in the campaign. This finding runs counter to my *Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis*. But it could indicate that Republican women's neutral or positive responses to Hillary Clinton—which violate partisan expectations of negative responses to an out-party candidate—increased their attention to the campaign. Such a finding could be consistent with EVT, in which emotional responses that violate partisan expectations lead to increased attention or information search. Perhaps Clinton's presence as a descriptive representative of women counteracted some Republican women's habitual partisan responses? Substantively though, this result only applies to the mere seven percent—or 57 total Republican women ANES respondents—who reported that they had *not* felt anger toward Hillary Clinton.

While the results in the pooled models for voting and non-voting participation generally supported my *Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis*, the cross-sectional results for the impact of expectancy-confirming emotions on women's and men's participation are less consistent—particularly for voter turnout. There are even several instances where expectancy-confirming emotions exert a negative effect on participation—though only two reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These include the effects of out-party anger among men and in-party hope among women on voting in 2016 (see Table 4.4). As such, the findings for the effects of expectancy-confirming emotions on campaign interest are generally more supportive of my *Mobilizing Emotions Hypothesis* than the findings for voting and non-voting participation.

Table 4.4 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Voting

		1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Out-Anger	Women	0.33 (0.24)	-0.05 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.23)	0.63** (0.21)	0.12 (0.24)	0.18 (0.28)	0.61^ (0.36)	0.07 (0.32)	0.29* (0.13)	-0.45 (0.32)
	N	577	830	778	921	687	597	429	446	1571	1598
	Men	-0.05 (0.29)	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.26)	0.13 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.27)	0.17 (0.30)	0.08 (0.33)	0.45 (0.38)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.67* (0.31)
	N	436	672	606	821	567	509	384	358	2267	1394
Out-Fear	Women	0.12 (0.27)	0.09 (0.22)	0.33 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.29)	-0.22 (0.37)	-0.19 (0.33)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.72** (0.23)
	N	577	830	778	921	687	597	429	446	1571	1598
	Men	0.45 (0.31)	0.07 (0.25)	0.21 (0.27)	0.50* (0.24)	0.49^ (0.29)	0.37 (0.32)	0.25 (0.34)	0.42 (0.37)	0.24^ (0.13)	0.61** (0.22)
	N	436	672	606	821	567	509	384	358	2267	1394
In-Pride	Women	-0.29 (0.27)	-0.10 (0.23)	0.28 (0.24)	0.28 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.27)	0.35 (0.29)	-0.31 (0.38)	0.59^ (0.33)	0.07 (0.15)	0.67** (0.23)
	N	577	830	778	921	687	597	429	446	1571	1598
	Men	-0.09 (0.32)	0.33 (0.25)	-0.30 (0.26)	0.24 (0.22)	-0.22 (0.29)	-0.56^ (0.31)	0.53 (0.35)	0.61^ (0.34)	0.08 (0.13)	0.25 (0.22)
	N	436	672	606	821	567	509	384	358	2267	1394
In-Hope	Women	0.18 (0.30)	-0.22 (0.26)	0.19 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.24)	0.36 (0.28)	0.04 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.49)	0.37 (0.37)	0.38* (0.17)	-0.78** (0.26)
	N	577	830	778	921	687	597	429	446	1571	1598
	Men	-0.08 (0.34)	0.44 (0.27)	0.76** (0.27)	0.11 (0.23)	0.34 (0.29)	0.67* (0.32)	0.29 (0.37)	-0.24 (0.39)	0.24 (0.16)	0.23 (0.24)
	N	436	672	606	821	567	509	384	358	2267	1394

^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression – separate models for women and men. DV is voting for president. Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See columns 3-4 of Tables C.4.12-21 in Appendix C for full models with controls, including race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance party strength, and campaign interest.

In most cases, the direction of the relationships between expectancy-confirming emotions and interest or participation are similar for women and men; however, the direction differs in several instances across Tables 4.3 to 4.5. Models including interactions between gender and each of the emotion measures reveal that these inconsistent effects between women and men are statistically significant in ten instances⁷

⁷ These include the effects of out-fear on voting and in-hope on non-voting participation in 1992, the effect of in-hope on non-voting participation in 1996, the effects of in-pride on voting and in-hope on expressing

(see column 2 of Tables C.4.2-31 in Appendix C). It may appear at first glance that several inconsistent findings challenge my contention of minimal gender differences in the effects of emotions on engagement, but relatively few of these inconsistencies reach conventional levels of statistical significance.⁸

Table 4.5 Effect of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Non-Voting Participation

		1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Out-Anger	Women	0.22** (0.08)	0.14* (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13^ (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.14 (0.09)	0.25^ (0.13)	0.24^ (0.13)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.12)
	N	571	801	775	919	687	599	428	444	2253	1589
	Men	0.25** (0.09)	0.23* (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.23* (0.09)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.43*** (0.13)	0.41** (0.14)	0.22*** (0.06)	-0.11 (0.13)
	N	433	657	604	818	566	511	384	359	2157	1386
Out-Fear	Women	0.33*** (0.09)	0.17* (0.07)	0.14 (0.09)	0.14* (0.07)	0.13^ (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)	0.14 (0.12)	0.25^ (0.14)	0.16** (0.05)	0.18^ (0.10)
	N	571	801	775	919	687	599	428	444	2253	1589
	Men	0.16^ (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.17^ (0.09)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0.32** (0.11)	0.18 (0.12)	0.17 (0.14)	0.17** (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)
	N	433	657	604	818	566	511	384	359	2157	1386
In-Pride	Women	0.23** (0.09)	0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	0.15* (0.07)	0.15^ (0.08)	0.20* (0.09)	0.31* (0.14)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.13 (0.10)
	N	571	801	775	919	687	599	428	444	2253	1589
	Men	0.11 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.19* (0.08)	0.05 (0.10)	0.19^ (0.11)	0.29^ (0.15)	0.30* (0.15)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.29** (0.10)
	N	433	657	604	818	566	511	384	359	2157	1386
In-Hope	Women	-0.14 (0.10)	0.00 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.31 (0.19)	0.05 (0.18)	-0.15^ (0.08)	-0.04 (0.10)
	N	571	801	775	919	687	599	428	444	2253	1589
	Men	-0.10 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)	0.19* (0.09)	0.17 (0.10)	0.09 (0.12)	0.13 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.17)	0.07 (0.08)	0.02 (0.12)
	N	433	657	604	818	566	511	384	359	2157	1386

^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of OLS regression – separate models for women and men. DV is non-voting participation. Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See columns 3-4 of Tables C.4.22-31 in Appendix C for full models with controls, including race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, and campaign interest.

campaign interest in 2000, the effects of out-anger and out-fear on interest and in-pride on voting in 2008, and the effects of out-anger and in-hope on interest in 2016.

⁸ For context, there are 120 possible instances in which gender differences could have emerged in the direction of the relationship between the four expectancy-confirming emotions and campaign interest, voting, and non-voting participation across the ten election years. In total, there are 34 instances (28%) in which the direction of the relationship differs between women and men (see Tables 4.3-4.5), but only 10 instances (8%) involve statistically significant gender differences (see column 2 of Tables C.4.2-31 in Appendix C).

In this first set of analyses, I examined the impact of emotions on political engagement and found—as anticipated—that expectancy-confirming emotions, including negative emotions toward out-party candidates and positive emotions toward in-party candidates, are associated with higher levels of political interest and participation. Additionally, I find that these results apply similarly to women and men. While there are some gender differences in the effects of emotions on political engagement, relatively few are statistically significant.

In the remainder of this chapter, I focus exclusively on the prevalence of the four expectancy-confirming emotions that I have found to be mobilizing for both women and men: anger and fear toward out-party candidates and pride and hope toward in-party candidates. For ease of interpretation, I will primarily refer to these four expectancy-confirming emotions as “*mobilizing emotions*” from this point forward. Gender differences in the expression of mobilizing emotions are meaningful because these emotions are associated with higher levels of campaign interest, voting, and other forms of electoral participation. Likewise, I will refer to expectancy-violating emotions—negative emotions toward in-party candidates and positive emotions toward out-party candidates—as “*non-mobilizing emotions*,” reflecting my findings that these emotions tend *not* to be significantly related to participation.

The next set of analyses turns to an earlier point in the process—the effect of gendered electoral contexts on the expression of mobilizing emotions among women and men. As I explained earlier, I expect to find gender differences in the expression of emotions in electoral contexts where gender is especially salient due to candidates’ descriptive or rhetorical representation of women. Such differences in the levels of

emotions expressed by women and men may signal different degrees of acceptance or rejection of candidates as representatives. When they occur, gender differences in the expression of mobilizing emotions may lead to gender differences in political engagement.

MOBILIZING EMOTIONS IN GENDERED ELECTORAL CONTEXTS

By only looking at changes in *women's* emotional responses to candidates, it is impossible to tell whether women's emotional responses are the result of any specific gendered context. By comparing women to men, however, it is possible to make a more convincing case that a given change in women's emotions—and any subsequent increase in interest or participation—is related to gender in some way. For example, if women's average level of a particular emotion increases from one election to the next at a higher rate than men's *and* gender was especially salient in that election, then it is likely that the change in women's emotions was at least somewhat influenced by the role of gender in that election. If, however, women's level of a particular emotion changes to the same degree as men's from one year to the next, then the change may not necessarily be related to gender. In cases where it is possible to measure women's exposure to specific gendered factors in an election year, I can assess the role of those factors in shaping women's emotional responses to candidates without needing men as a comparison. In the following section, I use both of these approaches to suggest that women's emotional responses to candidates are influenced by gendered electoral contexts, including contexts where the descriptive or rhetorical representation of women featured prominently.

To understand how gendered factors may indirectly impact political engagement through emotions, I turn to an examination of gender differences in levels of emotions

expressed during individual election years. It is important to study emotional responses to candidates cross-sectionally because emotions are highly sensitive to the context of a particular election. When gender is nationally salient, women's emotional responses may differ relative to men. Research on group-based emotions suggests that when group memberships are salient, emotions run higher—particularly out-group anger and in-group enthusiasm (Huddy 2013; Mason 2016; 2018).

In the following analyses, the emotion variables are recoded to reflect whether the emotion in question is directed at the Democratic or Republican candidate rather than at in-party or out-party candidates. This coding choice allows me to better capture women's emotional responses to specific candidates. I still want to assess in-party and out-party dynamics, however, so I run all models separately for Democrats and Republicans. Since I am primarily interested in the emotions that most drive interest and participation, I only examine gender differences in expectancy-confirming emotions—which I call *mobilizing emotions*: anger and fear toward out-party candidates and pride and hope toward in-party candidates.

My decision to study gender differences within the parties instead of across both parties is motivated by findings from the symbolic representation literature specifying that only *party-congruent* women candidates and officeholders inspire women in the electorate to engage in politics at higher levels (e.g., Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Reingold and Harrell 2010). While women have been more likely than men to identify as Democrats over the last four decades (Ondercin 2017), women in both parties are more likely than men to identify as partisans (Ondercin and Lizotte 2020). Moreover, women's political attitudes are more likely than men's to be influenced by their partisanship

(Ondercin and Lizotte 2020). Women elites are also partisan creatures, who represent women through a distinctively partisan lens (e.g., Deckman 2016; Osborn 2012; Wineinger 2019). As such, we should expect women to respond emotionally to candidates first and foremost as partisans; yet, in particular contexts, we may observe gender differences in emotional expression within the parties.

In a given election, gender can become salient in many ways. Because the available emotion measures in the ANES are directed at specific presidential candidates, I adopt a somewhat narrow definition of gender salience in this study, which includes the descriptive representation of women on a presidential ticket and any prominent rhetorical representation of women by a presidential candidate. In other words, I define gender as being salient in 1984 when Walter Mondale selected Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate, in 2008 when John McCain selected Sarah Palin as his running mate, and in 2016 when Hillary Clinton was the Democratic presidential nominee. Consistent with the existing symbolic representation literature (e.g., Reingold and Harrell 2010; Simien and Hampson 2017), I propose the following hypothesis regarding descriptive representation.

Descriptive Representation Hypothesis: In election years where there is an in-party woman on one of the major-party presidential tickets—1984, 2008, and 2016—women will be more likely than men to express pride and hope toward their party's candidates.

The rhetorical representation of women is a trickier metric of gender salience because most candidates will reference women or women's interests at some point in their campaigns. But when are women referenced enough for gender to be considered especially salient in an election?

In 2016, Donald Trump's rhetoric about women and other politically marginalized groups was widely acknowledged and was often cited as a motivation for

political action among women—including women congressional candidates and women activists, as I discussed in Chapter 3. Trump’s rhetoric about women was also cited as a central motivation behind the 2017 Women’s March (Women’s March 2017). As such, the 2016 election appears to be a reasonably clear example of an election in which a candidate’s rhetoric about women made gender especially salient.

Another recent example that could qualify is 2012. Democrats accused Republicans of waging a “War on Women” due to Republicans’ opposition to Planned Parenthood and the Obamacare contraception mandate, among other policies (Cohen 2012; People for the American Way 2012). Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, attempted to fight off this line of attack by vocally and consistently asserting his support for women throughout his campaign (Cohen 2012). I propose the following hypothesis for rhetorical representation.

Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis: In election years where an out-party candidate was prominently associated with rhetoric about women, women will be more likely than men to express anger and fear toward the candidate. When an in-party candidate is prominently associated with rhetoric about women, women will be more likely than men to express pride and hope toward the candidate.

While the available data does not enable me to directly observe emotional responses to candidates’ rhetoric about women, I can exploit a few imperfect measures in the ANES to see whether candidates’ rhetoric about women may have factored into women’s feelings about the candidates. In addition to the standard sets of measures that are repeated across election years, the ANES often adds questions about issues or events that featured prominently in individual elections. If a question related to women’s relevance in a particular election year is included in one of the ANES surveys, it is likely because some issue or event made gender salient in that election. In the 2016 and 2012

ANES surveys, I was able to identify questions that may tap into candidate rhetoric about women.

A 2016 question asks whether respondents heard about Trump's 2005 *Access Hollywood* tape in which he casually discussed sexually assaulting women. And in 2012, a question about which party does a better job representing women's interests may tap into respondents' reactions to rhetoric about a Republican "War on Women" and Romney's responses to that rhetoric. While the emotion questions that serve as my main dependent variables are always asked in the pre-election survey of each ANES study, these two questions from 2016 and 2012 were asked in the post-election survey. As such, I cannot assess the appropriate direction of causality with these measures. In these cases, I use the post-election feeling thermometer for each candidate as an alternative to the pre-election emotion measures, and I add the pre-election feeling thermometer for each candidate as a control. To the extent that the two measures from 2016 and 2012 successfully tap into Donald Trump's and Mitt Romney's rhetorical representation of women in these election years, I can assess the influence of these factors on women's feelings toward the candidates after the election while controlling for their feelings toward the candidates before the election. Because these measures do not enable me to directly observe emotional responses to specific examples of candidate rhetoric, I will not be able to make bold claims about the link between the rhetorical representation of women and emotions expressed by women citizens. But the limited findings from this study could motivate future research on this topic.


As the so-called "Year of the Woman," 1992 also presented a context in which gender was especially salient, but the salience of gender in 1992 was not specifically tied

to the presidential candidates' descriptive or rhetorical representation of women. While women's descriptive representation as congressional candidates was at a record high for the time, women were not present on either of the presidential tickets. And the ANES does not offer emotion measures for responses to congressional candidates. Sapiro and Conover (1997) explain that gender was also salient in 1992 because of the Thomas/Hill Supreme Court confirmation hearings, media attention to sexual violence, culture wars about feminism and gay rights, and the symbolic importance of Hillary Clinton during Bill Clinton's campaign. It is possible that women's attitudes about sexual harassment could have filtered through to their feelings toward then-President George H.W. Bush who nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Feelings toward Hillary Clinton could have affected feelings toward either candidate, reflecting her role in her husband's campaign or Republican attacks against her. These connections are difficult to assess using the imperfect measures available in the ANES; however, it is likely that the salience of gender influenced women's emotional responses to candidates in 1992. As such—in addition to testing the *Descriptive Representation* and *Rhetorical Representation Hypotheses* above—I draw on available measures in the ANES to examine factors that could have produced gender differences in emotional responses in 1992.

FINDINGS—GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EMOTIONS

Descriptively, expressions of mobilizing emotions appear very similar for women and men between 1980 and 2016 (see Figure 4.5). Tables 4.6 and 4.7 compare gender differences in the expressions of these emotions over time for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.

Figure 4.5 Mobilizing Emotions among Women and Men, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Raw percent reporting each emotion.

I begin by evaluating my *Descriptive Representation Hypothesis*, which suggests that Democratic women should demonstrate greater in-party pride and hope in 1984 and 2016 relative to men because of Geraldine Ferraro's and Hillary Clinton's descriptive presence on the presidential tickets. Likewise, Republican women should demonstrate greater in-party pride and hope in 2008 when Sarah Palin was the Republican vice presidential candidate.

I then evaluate my *Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis* as it pertains to the 2016 and 2012 elections. Democratic women should respond to Donald Trump with more negative feelings relative to their male counterparts based on his rhetoric about women in the 2005 *Access Hollywood* video, which was made public in October 2016. Based on

Mitt Romney’s responses to Democrats’ claims about a Republican “War on Women,” Democratic women should express more negative feelings toward Romney than Democratic men, and Republican women should express more positive feelings toward Romney than Republican men.

I end this section by considering the impact of gendered factors in 1992 that may have influenced women’s emotional responses but that do not specifically pertain to the presidential candidates’ descriptive and rhetorical representation of women.

Table 4.6 Effect of Gender on Expressing Mobilizing Emotions toward Presidential Candidates – Democrats Only

DV		1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Out-Anger (R)	Women	0.27	0.02	-0.50**	-0.13	-0.14	0.06	0.29	-0.01	0.19^	0.58*
	(vs Men)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.23)
	N	693	912	828	1085	808	731	513	1186	2864	1810
Out-Fear (R)	Women	-0.37^	0.03	-0.23	0.55***	-0.10	-0.20	0.41^	0.11	0.07	-0.19
	(vs Men)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.19)
	N	693	912	828	1085	808	731	513	1186	2864	1810
In-Pride (D)	Women	0.45*	0.39*	-0.01	0.29*	-0.01	0.09	-0.57*	0.43**	0.08	0.26
	(vs Men)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.18)
	N	693	912	828	1085	808	731	513	1186	2864	1810
In-Hope (D)	Women	0.07	-0.07	0.13	-0.24	0.55**	-0.33^	0.17	-0.40*	0.00	-0.23
	(vs Men)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.19)
	N	693	912	828	1085	808	731	513	1186	2864	1810

^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression. DVs are the four mobilizing emotions. Coefficients represent the effect of being a woman (as opposed to being a man). Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded columns indicate years in which I expect Democratic women to emotionally respond to a gendered electoral context. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my expectations and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance (only relevant in bolded years). See even-numbered Tables C.4.33-52 in Appendix C for full models with controls, including all other emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength.

Table 4.7 Effect of Gender on Expressing Mobilizing Emotions toward Presidential Candidates – Republicans Only

DV		1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Out-Anger (D)	Women	-0.01	-0.16	0.40*	0.32[^]	-0.24	-0.21	-0.42 [^]	0.23	-0.32*	0.15
	(vs Men)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.24)
	N	454	756	728	813	581	539	406	582	1859	1619
Out-Fear (D)	Women	0.12	-0.15	-0.87***	-0.19	0.12	-0.14	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.23
	(vs Men)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.18)
	N	454	756	728	813	581	539	406	582	1859	1619
In-Pride (R)	Women	-0.09	0.10	0.05	-0.41[^]	0.41 [^]	0.12	-0.76 [^]	-0.77**	0.41***	-0.06
	(vs Men)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(0.26)	(0.11)	(0.17)
	N	454	756	728	813	581	539	406	582	1859	1619
In-Hope (R)	Women	-0.13	0.25	-0.15	0.48**	0.25	-0.14	1.25**	0.46*	0.10	-0.21
	(vs Men)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.44)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.20)
	N	454	756	728	813	581	539	406	582	1859	1619

[^]p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression. DVs are the four mobilizing emotions. Coefficients represent the effect of being a woman (as opposed to being a man). Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded columns indicate years in which I expect Republican women to emotionally respond to a gendered electoral context. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my expectations and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance (only relevant in bolded years). See odd-numbered Tables C.4.33-52 in Appendix C for full models with controls, including all other emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength.

WOMEN'S DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN 2016

In 2016, 87.2% of Democratic women and 83.1% of Democratic men expressed that Hillary Clinton had made them feel pride. The same was true of hope for 88.9% of women and 86.8% of men. Once control variables are accounted for, however, neither of these gender differences is statistically significant. The coefficient for hope is actually in the negative direction, suggesting that Democratic men expressed more hope toward Clinton than comparable Democratic women (see Table 4.6). These null results for gender differences in pride or hope toward in-party candidate, Hillary Clinton, run counter to my *Descriptive Representation Hypothesis*. The symbolic representation literature suggests that seeing a viable woman candidate running for a visible political office should lead women in the electorate to engage in politics through positive psychological mechanisms, such as perceptions that the political system is responsive to women, inspiration based on a shared group identity, or pride (Atkeson 2003; Dolan

2008a; Ladam, Harden, and Windett 2018; Simien and Hampson 2017). As such, we might expect to see reflections of those positive mechanisms in positive emotional responses to Clinton. It is difficult to imagine a more viable or visible woman candidate than Hillary Clinton, and yet Democratic women did not respond to Clinton's candidacy with significantly more pride or hope than their male counterparts.

This example suggests that descriptive representatives—even *in-party* descriptive representatives—may not always produce positive feelings that spur greater engagement among women. The extent to which positive feelings emerge in response to a particular candidate may depend on additional contextual factors, including their rhetorical representation of women or baggage from a long and storied political past. In 2016, some Democratic women—especially young women—bristled at the notion of supporting a woman candidate primarily because of a shared gender identity (Kurtzleben 2016). Many Democratic Black women expressed ambivalence about Clinton's nomination in the context of a long history in which Black voters have been taken for granted by the Democratic party; moreover, the political advancement of white women has not often extended to other groups of women (Massie 2016). Additionally, Hillary Clinton's unique prior experiences as a First Lady and her husband's numerous sex and political scandals meant that she was often deemed responsible not only for her own personal and political flaws but also for those of her husband (Peek 2016). The mixed feelings about Clinton among Democratic women are reflected in the 2016 ANES data, in which 39.9% of Democratic women expressed that Clinton had made them feel both pride *and* anger.

Burns and colleagues (2018) suggest that the stronger findings for symbolic representation in the 1990s relative to more recent years may reflect the greater novelty


of women in politics at that time. While women are certainly less novel in politics today than they were three decades ago, they remain nowhere near reaching parity with men at any level of political office (CAWP 2021a). A potential explanation for this disconnect is that women in the electorate may perceive that women in politics are less novel than they really are. Sanbonmatsu (2003; 2020) finds that many voters overestimate women's representation in Congress, with women as likely or even more likely to overestimate than men. Crucially, overestimation of women's representation is associated with less support for women in office.

For many, Hillary Clinton's victory in 2016 seemed a foregone conclusion until it did not come to fruition. It is possible that some Democratic women did not express greater pride or hope in response to Clinton because they overestimated women's representation in politics or they took for granted that she would win the election. To the extent that this is true, women who had a more accurate sense of women's underrepresentation in politics and who supported increasing women's representation may have been more likely to express positive emotions toward Clinton. In other words, an accurate sense of women's underrepresentation in politics might make women more likely to accept a woman candidate as their representative.

To assess this possibility, I draw on a question from the 2016 ANES that asks how important it is to elect more women on a five-point scale. Because this question was asked in the post-election survey while the emotions questions were asked in the pre-election survey, I use the post-election feeling thermometer for Hillary Clinton as the dependent variable instead of the pre-election measures of pride and hope toward

Clinton.⁹ Figure 4.6 displays the predicted values of the post-election feeling thermometer based on perceptions about the importance of electing more women. As expected, a belief that it is important to elect more women is positively and significantly associated with expressing warmer feelings toward Hillary Clinton in 2016 among both women and men. While the effect of this belief was similar for women and men, women are more likely to hold this belief than men—with 53.4% of women and 42.6% of men expressing that it is “very” or “extremely” important to elect more women. As such, this belief is ultimately more consequential for women’s emotional expressions toward descriptive representatives.

Figure 4.6 Effect of Beliefs about Women’s Representation on Democrats’ Feelings toward Hillary Clinton, 2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 2016. Predicted probabilities based on weighted OLS regression, with Hillary Clinton’s post-election feeling thermometer as the DV. Control variables held at medians: pre-election feeling thermometer, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table C.4.53 in Appendix C for full model.

⁹ I also control for the pre-election feeling thermometer to diminish the possibility that feelings toward Clinton are leading to a belief in the need to elect more women instead of my proposed direction of causality—that beliefs about the need to elect more women are leading to warmer feelings toward Clinton. This approach cannot completely rule out the alternative direction of causality, however.

The example of Hillary Clinton suggests the possibility that women's descriptive representation is likely to have a greater positive impact on women citizens when less is known about a woman candidate. I find some evidence that women's positive emotions toward Clinton are related to a belief in the importance of electing more descriptive representatives. But Democratic women's expressions of pride toward Clinton were possibly lower than they might have been for another in-party descriptive representative because of the baggage that Clinton carried from her long and highly visible career in politics. In the absence of information, women citizens may be able to project positive symbolic meaning onto women candidates' gender identity, such as perceptions that women candidates will be responsive to gendered policy interests. But the availability of more information about a candidate raises the chances that women citizens will have negative responses to the past rhetoric or actions of a woman candidate, potentially leading them to reject the woman candidate as a representative. As such, accounting for factors beyond women's descriptive presence—such as a candidate's rhetoric about women, especially when more is known about the candidate—could help explain some of the null effects in the existing symbolic representation literature.

WOMEN'S DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN 1984 AND 2008

An important limitation of the ANES data is that the emotions are only measured in response to each party's presidential candidate. There are no equivalent measures of emotional responses to the vice presidential candidates or to candidates running in lower level races where women's descriptive representation is more common. As such, in this analysis, I must take the dubious leap of assuming that emotional responses to Mondale


in 1984 and McCain in 2008 at least somewhat reflect their selections of Geraldine Ferraro and Sarah Palin as running mates, respectively. I attempt to determine the extent to which feelings about Ferraro and Palin are reflected in emotions toward Mondale and McCain by adding feeling thermometers for the vice presidential candidates to the models predicting pride and hope toward Mondale and McCain.

Women's presence as vice presidential candidates in 1984 and 2008 raised the salience of gender in these elections. News coverage of Ferraro in 1984 and Palin in 2008 was more negative, more focused on appearance and familial role, and more sexist than coverage of male vice presidential candidates between 1984 and 2008 (Conroy et al. 2015). As the first woman to ever be selected for a major-party presidential ticket, Ferraro generated excitement among women, but she also sparked significant debate about women's reproductive rights due to her pro-choice statements during the campaign (Sullivan 1987).

I find that Democratic women did express greater pride toward Mondale than their male counterparts in 1984, and this finding is statistically significant (see Table 4.6). In contrast, the coefficient for hope is negative but not statistically significant. After adding the Ferraro feeling thermometer to the models, I find that warmer feelings toward Ferraro are positively and significantly associated with expressing pride and hope toward Mondale among both women and men. Figure 4.7 displays these results as predicted probabilities. I also ran a separate OLS model that regresses the Ferraro feeling thermometer on gender and several demographic and political controls (see Table C.4.71 in Appendix C). I find that Democratic women were slightly more likely than Democratic men to express warmer feelings toward Ferraro in the 1984 survey, but this result just

misses statistical significance at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.059$). These results do not provide strong evidence for my *Descriptive Representation Hypothesis* because the available measures are limited, but the direction of the results I observe is at least consistent with this hypothesis.

Figure 4.7 Effect of Feelings toward Geraldine Ferraro on Democrats' Positive Emotions toward Walter Mondale, 1984




Data from ANES cumulative file, 1984. Predicted probabilities based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.54-55 in Appendix C for full models.

In 2008, three-quarters of voters felt that John McCain selected Sarah Palin as his running mate more to win the election than because of her qualifications. In contrast, less than one-third said the same thing of Barack Obama's selection of Joe Biden (Court and Lynch 2015, 903). Despite the tension conservative women face between advocating traditional gender roles and pursuing political leadership, Palin actively highlighted her status as a mother by inviting her young children onstage for events and calling herself a

“hockey mom” (Schreiber 2016). Most conservative women’s organizations and leaders supported Palin’s candidacy (Schreiber 2016), and strong conservatives felt more warmly toward her than they did toward McCain (Court and Lynch 2015). Moreover, holding traditional views on gender made Republican National Convention delegates more likely to evaluate Palin positively (Sharro et al. 2016), suggesting that activists’ feelings toward Palin’s presence on the ticket were related to gendered concerns.

In the 2008 ANES data, I find that Republican women actually expressed less pride toward McCain than their male counterparts, and this gender difference is statistically significant (see Table 4.7). In contrast, Republican women were more likely than Republican men to express hope toward McCain, but this difference was not statistically significant. To gain somewhat more insight into whether Sarah Palin’s presence on the ticket was related to these emotions, I added the feeling thermometer for Sarah Palin to the models. Among both women and men, warmer feelings toward Palin were positively and significantly associated with expressing hope toward McCain. The effect for pride was positive but not statistically significant for both women and men. Figure 4.8 displays these results as predicted probabilities. A separate OLS model regressing the Palin feeling thermometer on gender and several controls suggests that there is no difference in Republican women’s and men’s feelings toward Palin (see Table C.4.71 in Appendix C).

Figure 4.8 Effect of Feelings toward Sarah Palin on Republicans' Positive Emotions toward John McCain, 2008



Data from ANES cumulative file, 2008. Predicted probabilities based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.56-57 in Appendix C for full models.

While the available measures are far from ideal, there does seem to be some association between Ferraro's presence on the Democratic ticket in 1984 and positive emotional responses to Mondale among Democratic women in the electorate. But Palin's presence on the Republican ticket in 2008 is not consistently associated with positive emotions toward McCain among Republican women. Taken together, the results for 1984, 2008, and 2016 provide limited support for my *Descriptive Representation Hypothesis*. There is some modest evidence that women's emotional responses to candidates were related to the presence of women candidates on the presidential tickets, but the overall pattern of findings is mixed.

WOMEN'S RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION IN 2016

Gender was especially salient during the 2016 presidential election, when the first woman nominated by a major party seemed poised to defeat her Republican opponent whose campaign was dominated by sexist and racist rhetoric. Kelly (2020) argues that Donald Trump's rhetoric is not unique, but its exaggerated transgressiveness makes it easy to identify which aspects of his rhetoric evoke such strong emotions. Specifically, Trump not only appeals to hostility toward racial Others, immigrants, Democrats, the press, the #MeToo movement, and others, but he roots this animus in the moral high ground of victimhood. By combining powerful feelings of rage with a sense of relative deprivation and righteousness, "Trump transforms short-lived yet intense emotions such as anger...into nearly inexhaustible rhetorical resources" (4). Moreover, his *us vs. them* framing evokes strong negative emotional responses among both his supporters and his opponents that are rooted in politically salient partisan, gender, racial, and ethnic group identities.

Donald Trump's victory sparked historic Women's Marches around the globe, and women's anger toward Trump took center stage in media coverage and academic work that followed (e.g., Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018; Dittmar 2020a; Traister 2018). These accounts also made clear that there was a stark divide among women, with most white women voting for Trump (Cassese and Barnes 2019; Junn 2017). Unsurprisingly, then, I find that—among Democrats—women were significantly more likely than men to express anger toward out-party candidate, Donald Trump (see Table 4.6). The coefficient for fear is in the negative direction, however—though it is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

To get a better sense of the extent to which Democratic women’s negative emotions toward Trump are related to his rhetoric about women, I used a question from the 2016 ANES that read, “In October, the media released a 2005 recording of Donald Trump having a crude conversation about women. Have you heard about this video, or not?” This example involves vulgar rhetoric about women that resurfaced from before Trump entered politics and that was brought to light by the media. While very different than most rhetoric about women on candidates’ campaign websites—which are carefully curated by the campaign and generally avoid inflammatory rhetoric—Trump’s comments from 2005 would fall under the definition of the rhetorical representation of women that I developed in Chapter 3.


The recording was released shortly before the second presidential debate and only a month before the 2016 election. In it, Trump brags about sexually assaulting women, saying, “I’m automatically attracted to beautiful—I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything... Grab ’em by the pussy” (*New York Times* 2016). A follow-up question in the 2016 ANES asked respondents how much Trump’s comments in the video should matter to people when deciding how to vote. A clear majority of respondents—63.3% of women and 54% of men—responded that the comments should matter “a lot” or “a great deal.” At the time, Trump’s own campaign team thought his comments guaranteed his defeat, and prominent Republicans called for his removal from the ticket (Alberta 2019). Scholars have since found that the video did somewhat reduce support for Trump among Republicans (Rhodes et al. 2020).

Since the question about the *Access Hollywood* video was asked in the post-election survey, I use the post-election feeling thermometer for Trump as my dependent variable instead of the pre-election measures of anger and fear toward Trump.

Additionally, I control for Trump's pre-election feeling thermometer to ensure that pre-existing negative feelings toward Trump are not driving the results. Figure 4.9 displays the predicted values of the post-election feeling thermometer for Trump among

Democratic women and men who did or did not hear about the 2005 video.

Figure 4.9 Effect of Hearing about Donald Trump's Vulgar Rhetoric about Women on Democrat's Feelings toward Trump, 2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 2016. Predicted probabilities based on weighted OLS regression, with Donald Trump's post-election feeling thermometer as the DV. Control variables held at medians: pre-election feeling thermometer, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table C.4.58 in Appendix C for full model.

Democratic women gave Trump a rating of about 9.2 out of 100 on the post-election feeling thermometer regardless of whether they heard about the video. Among Democratic men, those who had not heard about the video gave Trump a rating of about

13, which fell to 9.3 among men who had heard about the video. While the finding for men is in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant. This is a very conservative test, however, because the pre-election survey was still in the field for a month after the video was released on October 7, 2016. As such, the pre-election feeling thermometer that I include as a control likely already reflects some respondents' reactions to the video, possibly muting the effect of hearing about the video. Moreover, only 47 Democratic women (4.3%) reported that they had not heard about the video by the time of the post-election survey. And Democrats' negative feelings toward Trump were so high to begin with that there may have been very little room for movement; only 64 (5.8%) Democratic women did not express anger toward Trump in the pre-election survey. While I do not find support for my *Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis* in this analysis, several important limitations to the data and measures suggest a need for caution in interpreting these results.

WOMEN'S RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION IN 2012

In the 2012 election, Mitt Romney fought back against Democratic allegations of a Republican "War on Women." He turned this rhetoric around on Democrats by talking about women's job losses during President Obama's first term, saying, "This president has failed America's women and if I'm the next president of the United States I will go to work to get American women good jobs, rising incomes, and growing businesses" (Haake 2012). Romney's campaign team ensured that he was surrounded by women at events and arranged meetings with women business owners. Romney also made statements arguing that he is "pro-opportunity for women, pro-moms, pro-working moms, pro-working women" (Cohen 2012), and he touted the "binders full of women" he


had considered for state posts as governor of Massachusetts (O'Sullivan 2017). In the language of symbolic representation, Democrats advanced claims about Republicans' rhetorical representation of women, and Romney offered counterclaims in response. Democratic women may have rejected Romney as a representative based at least partly on the narrative of a Republican "War on Women" or Romney's responses. And Republican women may have accepted Romney as a representative based at least partly on their approval of his counter-responses to the narrative.

In this context, I find that Democratic women expressed greater anger toward Romney than did Democratic men in 2012, but the finding just misses significance at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.052$, see Table 4.6). Additionally, Republican women were significantly more likely to express pride toward Romney relative to their male counterparts (see Table 4.7). The findings for fear toward Romney among Democratic women and hope toward Romney among Republican women were similar in direction to the results for anger and pride, but the coefficients were not statistically significant (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7).

To examine whether Democratic women's negative emotions toward Romney or Republican women's positive emotions toward Romney were influenced by his rhetoric about women, I use a question from the 2012 ANES that asks, "Which party do you think does a better job looking out for the interests of women?" There were no questions that specifically asked about exposure to Democrats' rhetoric about a Republican "War on Women" or any of Romney's statements about women. But this question may have called such rhetoric to mind since Romney's responses to the "War on Women" rhetoric were a prominent focus of his campaign. Since this question was asked in the post-election survey, I again replace the pre-election emotion measures with the post-election feeling

thermometer as the dependent variable. To minimize the possibility that mere partisanship or respondents' pre-existing feelings about Romney are driving the results, I control for the strength of partisan identity¹⁰ and Romney's pre-election feeling thermometer. Figure 4.10 displays the predicted values of the post-election feeling thermometer depending on which party respondents believe is better for women.

Figure 4.10 Effect of Beliefs about the Better Party for Women on Feelings toward Mitt Romney, 2012



Data from ANES cumulative file, 2012. Predicted probabilities based on weighted OLS regression, with Mitt Romney's post-election feeling thermometer as the DV. Control variables held at medians: pre-election feeling thermometer, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.59-60 in Appendix C for full models.

For Democrats who may have experienced negative responses to Romney due to rhetoric about a Republican “War on Women,” a more appropriate question might have

¹⁰ As with the other analyses in this section of the chapter, I run separate models for each party and therefore do not include a separate control for party. I include additional controls for race, age, education, income, unemployment, and religious attendance.

asked which party is worse for women. But given the question framing that was available, Democratic women who feel that the Democratic party is better for women should be more likely to express negative emotions toward Romney than those who believe the parties are equal in their representation of women—even when controlling for their pre-election feelings toward Romney and other factors. I find that Democratic women who believe that the parties are equally good or bad for women are predicted to give Romney a rating of 65.5 out of 100, and this decreases to 54 among women who believe that the Democratic party is better for women. The respective values for Democratic men are 62.7 and 53.7. These differences are statistically significant for both women and men and are consistent with my *Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis*.

Republican women who believe that the Republican party is better for women may have come to this conclusion—at least in part—based on Romney’s rhetoric about his support of women. As such, they should express more positive feelings toward Romney compared with Republican women who believe the parties are equal—even when controlling for their pre-election feelings toward Romney. I find that Republican women who believe that the parties are equally good or bad for women are predicted to rate Romney at a 70.7 out of 100, and this increases to 74.6 among Republican women who believe that the Republican party is better for women. For Republican men, the respective values are 68.2 and 73.2. These results are also statistically significant for both women and men, consistent with my *Rhetorical Representation Hypothesis*.

These results should be interpreted with caution, however. While I tried to isolate the direction of causality by controlling for pre-election feelings toward Romney, it is still possible that feelings about Romney are leading to respondents’ feelings about which

party is better for women rather than the other way around. It is also not clear how much correspondence there is between respondents' reactions to the "War on Women" rhetoric and their responses to this question about which party is better for women.

THE 1992 "YEAR OF THE WOMAN"

Women's underrepresentation was thrown into sharp relief in 1991 during the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. As Pat Shroeder (2015) recalls, "people were so mad about Anita Hill's treatment" by the all-male Judiciary Committee regarding her allegations of sexual harassment by Thomas. This event drew greater attention to the threat of women's underrepresentation and is credited with mobilizing a record number of women to run for—and win—election to Congress. In addition, Sapiro and Conover (1997) note that Republican attacks against eventual First Lady Hillary Clinton and her visibility in her husband's campaign made gender especially salient during the 1992 election.

In this context, I find statistically significant evidence of greater fear toward Republican President George H.W. Bush among Democratic women relative to Democratic men and greater hope toward Bush among Republican women compared to Republican men. The gender differences for anger toward Bush among Democrats and pride toward Bush among Republicans are not significant, however (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). The candidate-centric emotion questions in the ANES may not neatly capture reactions to the Hill/Thomas hearings because the public's takeaway was more about the general consequences of women's underrepresentation in Congress than about any specific political candidate. But given that Bush nominated Thomas to the Supreme Court, perhaps some of the negative affect related to the hearings could have rubbed off


on the president. To consider this possibility, I incorporate a measure that taps attitudes about sexual harassment in the aftermath of the Hill/Thomas hearings. The question reads, “Recently there has been a lot of discussion about sexual harassment. How serious a problem do you think sexual harassment in the work place is?” The responses included “not too serious,” “somewhat serious,” and “very serious.” If negative emotional responses to Bush are related to his nomination of Clarence Thomas and the ensuing events, then Democrats who believe that sexual harassment is a serious problem may be more likely to express negative emotions toward Bush.

Figure 4.11 displays the predicted probabilities of expressing anger and fear toward Bush among Democrats. Among Democratic women, a belief that sexual harassment is a serious problem is positively but not significantly associated with expressing anger and fear toward Bush. And among men a belief that sexual harassment is a serious problem is negatively but not significantly associated with expressing anger and fear toward Bush. The effect of the interaction between gender and attitudes about sexual harassment is significant for anger toward Bush, however (see Table C.4.61 in Appendix C).

It is interesting to note that the effect of attitudes about sexual harassment has the opposite effect on Democratic women’s and men’s expressions of negative emotions toward Bush. In the more recent election years that I examined gendered factors seem to have had similar effects on women’s and men’s expressions of emotions toward candidates in terms of direction, even if the magnitude of the effects somewhat differed between women and men. The difference in direction that I observe in the effects of sexual harassment on emotional responses in 1992 may reflect the increased sorting of

the parties on gender-linked issues over time (Winter 2010). This increased sorting may have led Democratic men to react more similarly to Democratic women in response to gendered electoral contexts in more recent years. Such a convergence in Democratic women's and Democratic men's reactions to gendered electoral contexts may not have been as pronounced in 1992.

Figure 4.11 Effect of Beliefs about Sexual Harassment on Democrats' Negative Emotions toward Bush, 1992




Data from ANES cumulative file, 1992. Predicted probabilities based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.61-62 in Appendix C for full models.

In addition to the Hill/Thomas hearings, Hillary Clinton's role in her husband's 1992 campaign made gender salient in the election. As a respected attorney and the primary source of her family's income, the public was attentive to the ways in which Hillary Clinton would break the mold of a traditional First Lady. In his campaign, Bill Clinton even suggested that his wife would be involved in policy matters and that by

electing him, voters were essentially getting a two-for-one deal. Hillary Clinton's transgression of traditional feminine norms also garnered strong criticism from Republicans (Burrell 1997; Jamieson 1995; Prysby and Scavo 2008; Sapiro and Conover 1997).

To consider the possible impact of Hillary Clinton on the public's reactions to both Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush, I add a feeling thermometer for Hillary Clinton to all the emotion models for each candidate. The results are displayed as predicted probabilities in Figures 4.12 and 4.13 for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.


Figure 4.12 Effect of Feelings toward Hillary Clinton on Democrats' Candidate-Centric Emotions, 1992



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1992. Predicted probabilities based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.63-66 in Appendix C for full models.

Hillary Clinton’s presence in Bill Clinton’s campaign—and eventually his presidency—offered a form of descriptive representation that may have positively resonated with Democratic women, and Republican attacks targeting Hillary Clinton may have been a form of rhetorical representation that negatively resonated with Democratic women. Among both Democratic women and men, warmer feelings toward Hillary Clinton were associated with expressing anger and fear toward Bush and with expressing pride and hope toward Bill Clinton. While these findings for Democrats are in the expected directions, the only statistically significant results are for women’s and men’s pride toward Clinton and for men’s fear toward Bush.

Figure 4.13 Effect of Feelings toward Hillary Clinton on Republicans’ Candidate-Centric Emotions, 1992



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1992. Predicted probabilities based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at medians: all emotions, race, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Tables C.4.67-70 in Appendix C for full models.

Among both Republican women and men, colder feelings toward Hillary Clinton were associated with a greater likelihood of expressing anger and fear toward Bill Clinton, and these results are statistically significant. Such findings are consistent with the possibility that Hillary Clinton's break with traditional feminine norms was perceived as threatening to Republicans and contributed to their negative emotions toward her husband. Surprisingly, however, warmer feelings toward Hillary Clinton are positively associated with expressing pride toward Bush among both women and men as well as with expressing hope toward Bush among men. More intuitively, Republican women with colder feelings toward Clinton were more likely to express hope toward Bush. None of these findings for positive emotions toward Bush are statistically significant, however. As such, Republican attacks against Hillary Clinton do not seem to have influenced Republicans' positive emotions toward their in-party candidate.

In the analyses above, I suggest that gender was especially salient in the 1984, 1992, 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential elections due to women's descriptive representation, candidates' rhetorical representation of women, or other well-publicized factors such as the Hill/Thomas confirmation hearings. While the measures available in the ANES are not ideal to test the impact of these gendered factors on women's emotional responses to presidential candidates, there was at least some evidence of predictable gender differences in emotions within these gendered electoral contexts (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7).

But gender can become salient in many ways over the course of a campaign, and gendered factors may have contributed to significant gender differences in emotions that appear in other election years (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7). These differences include a

greater likelihood of expressing pride toward Jimmy Carter in 1980 and hope toward Bill Clinton in 1996 among Democratic women relative to Democratic men. Democratic women were also significantly less likely than their male counterparts to express anger toward George H.W. Bush in 1988 and pride toward John Kerry in 2004. Republican women were significantly more likely than Republican men to express anger but less likely to express fear toward Michael Dukakis in 1988. Republican women were also more likely than their male counterparts to express hope toward George W. Bush in 2004. While the ANES surveys for these specific election years do not offer any obvious measures to examine the influence of specific gendered factors, future research may be able to exploit other data sources to examine how women's emotional responses to the presidential candidates shifted throughout these campaigns.

SUMMARY

In the first part of this chapter, I find that expectancy-confirming—or *mobilizing emotions*, including anger and fear toward out-party candidates and pride and hope toward in-party candidates—lead to increased campaign interest and participation among both women and men. In the second part of the chapter, I find that during elections in which gender was especially salient due to presidential candidates' descriptive or rhetorical representation of women, women's expressions of mobilizing emotions often shifted in predictable ways. These findings suggest that the same emotions that increase campaign interest and participation are—at least in part—responsive to factors related to women's representation.

If emotional responses to presidential candidates reflect women's acceptance or rejection of these candidates as their representatives, then these findings highlight the

possible consequences of women's symbolic representation. The rejection of out-party candidates and the acceptance of in-party candidates are sources of mobilization. But the acceptance of out-party candidates and the rejection of in-party candidates do not have much bearing on political engagement. I find few to no gender differences in the *effects* of emotions on engagement. But some significant gender differences emerge in the *levels* of candidate-centric mobilizing emotions expressed within specific electoral contexts where gender is especially salient. These gender differences in the *levels* of candidate-centric emotions can indirectly impact women's political engagement relative to men.

While I do find evidence of gender differences in the expression of mobilizing emotions across individual election years, the available measures in the ANES data are not ideal for uncovering the specific determinants of these effects. Nevertheless, by exploiting a few of these imperfect measures, I find some limited evidence that women's emotional responses to candidates are informed by specific gendered factors. For example, while not all Democratic women responded to Hillary Clinton's descriptive representation of women with pride, women who expressed a belief in the importance of electing more women did express significantly more pride toward Clinton than those who did not express this belief. I also found some modest evidence of changes in women's emotional responses to Mitt Romney based on feelings about which party is best for women. No single emotion stands out as being distinctively important in these analyses. Instead, different emotions appear to matter more or less depending on a given electoral context.

CHAPTER 5 WOMEN'S POLITICAL EMOTIONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER, PARTY, RACE, AND ETHNICITY

In the previous chapter, I argued that women's emotional responses to candidates can be shaped in part by candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women in electoral contexts where gender is especially salient. Positive emotional responses to candidates may indicate that women accept those candidates as their representatives. Such acceptance forms the basis of symbolic representation. In contrast, negative emotional responses to candidates may signal women's rejection of those candidates as their representatives. Drawing on theories from political psychology, I have also found that expectancy-confirming emotions—which reflect typical partisan responses and include positive emotions toward in-party candidates and negative emotions toward out-party candidates—lead to greater campaign interest and participation. In contrast, expectancy-violating emotions, including negative emotions toward in-party candidates and positive emotions toward out-party candidates, are not similarly mobilizing. Based on these findings and for ease of interpretation, I will refer to expectancy-confirming emotions as “*mobilizing emotions*” and to expectancy-violating emotions as “*non-mobilizing emotions*” in this chapter.

While the previous chapter compared women with men, I now turn to an examination of differences among women. After the 2016 presidential election, in the context of the Women's Marches and the #MeToo movement, scholars and journalists have turned their attention to “the revolutionary power of women's anger” (Traister 2018) as well as the potential benefits of anger for other historically marginalized groups (e.g., Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018; DeMora et al. 2020; Dittmar 2020a; Gutierrez et al.

2019; Phoenix 2020; Towler and Parker 2018; Scott and Collins 2020; Traister 2018).

Anger—at least anger directed toward an out-group—may indeed be mobilizing for women citizens, but it is possible that there are limits to the political power of anger for different groups of women. To the extent that relatively privileged groups of women are more empowered to utilize anger as a political resource, the resulting mobilization may not be sufficiently inclusive of more marginalized groups of women and therefore may not adequately address their interests and grievances.

Drawing on lessons from intersectional challenges to research on political engagement and emotions (e.g., Brown 2014; Junn 2003; Phoenix 2020), I will argue that the transformative potential of anger for women is somewhat overstated given structural disparities in access to anger as a psychological resource. Instead, I point to opportunities for political elites to foster both positive and negative affect through their representation of women. Fostering a diversity of emotional responses among women citizens may help to counter the disparities in political engagement that can be exacerbated by anger's dominance in contemporary US politics (see Webster 2020).

RACE, GENDER, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Resource models of political participation have not been sufficient to explain levels of political engagement among racial and ethnic minority groups in the United States (Brown 2014; Junn 2003). While socioeconomic status accounts for much of the variation in political activity across racial and ethnic groups, Black Americans are more likely to participate, and Latinos and Asian Americans are less likely to participate than traditional resource models would predict (Junn 2003; Phillips and Lee 2018). Moreover, statistically controlling for resources such as education and income removes a substantial

amount of the context that fundamentally structures racial and ethnic inequalities. Holding resources constant may therefore lead to misinterpretations about racial differences in political engagement. Resource models also assume that resources are equal in quality and effect across racial and ethnic groups and that participation offers the same incentives and consequences for all groups (Junn 2003).

Junn (2003) points out the paradox that while education is hailed as an important resource that drives participation, an increasingly educated citizenry has not led to a more politically engaged public. She suggests that this contradiction stems from the ways in which access to education reproduces class hierarchies. Due to systemic differences in access to quality education, advantaged groups can develop skills and practices that are socially, politically, and economically rewarded, while disadvantaged groups fall further behind. Education may be empowering at the individual-level, but at the group-level it often maintains racial and economic inequalities. Anoll (2018) adds that historically restricted access to voting rights and electoral politics has led minority groups to put a greater value on less conventional forms of participation, such as protesting, regardless of access to resources. This is especially true in segregated Black and Latina/o communities where group cohesion is high—though Black Americans are also more likely than white and Latina/o Americans to value the act of voting.

Brown (2014) investigates racial and ethnic differences among women in political participation using survey data from 2004, finding that the predictors of voting, electoral, and non-traditional forms of participation vary by race-gender identities. Of note, she finds that white women and Asian American women—who have more resources such as income and education at their disposal—are most likely to engage in all forms of

participation. Counterintuitively, however, for Asian American women, education is not a significant predictor of participation. In contrast, education seemed to be distinctively important for Latinas' engagement in politics. While political interest was a strong predictor of participation across all groups of women, linked fate was a key predictor for Black women but not for other groups. These findings suggest the importance of accounting for women's distinct experiences at the intersection of their multiple group identities. Studies of either gender or race and ethnicity alone can misrepresent the experiences of women of color who have been marginalized from politics on multiple fronts.

RACE, GENDER, AND EMOTIONS

Whereas most of the political psychology research on individuals has focused on the role of anxiety or fear (Brader and Marcus 2013), much of the group-based research on emotions has turned its attention to anger (e.g., DeMora et al. 2020; Gutierrez et al. 2019; Phoenix 2020). This difference in focus is intuitive, given that anger typically mobilizes responses to group threat, whereas anxiety reduces the centrality of group commitments in individuals' decisions and behavior (Huddy 2013). The expression of anger among women and people of color is often not taken seriously or even subject to punishment, however, which can undermine the potential mobilizing force of anger for historically marginalized groups.

Chemaly (2018) writes that "anger remains the emotion that is least acceptable for girls and women because it is the first line of defense against injustice" (24). Anger often calls out a wrong and demands accountability; as such, it invokes the possibility of social transformation and redress (Chemaly 2018; Lorde 1984). Whereas anger and masculinity

are viewed as consistent, reinforcing, and empowering, women's expressions of anger violate gender norms. Gendered expectations about the appropriate expression of emotions are further shaped by race and ethnicity. Stereotypes such as the "Angry Black Woman" or "Fiery Latina" are invoked to penalize Black and Latina women for transgressing standards of white femininity. Meanwhile, white women are portrayed as being innocent and in need of protection, and women of Asian descent are stereotyped as being quiet and agreeable (Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018). Whether these race-gender stereotypes strip women of their anger or punish them for expressing it, the potential power of women's anger is often diminished. Compared to other groups of women, however, white women's anger—like white women's pain—is often taken more seriously (Chemaly 2018).

Research on emotion in race and ethnic politics finds that women of color may be further disadvantaged by a "racial anger gap." Phoenix (2020) finds that Black Americans report lower levels of anger than white Americans, and Black women typically report even lower levels of anger than Black men. He argues that this gap is the result of exhaustion and despair from the constant state of threat that Black Americans face in US politics. Critically, anger leads to increased political engagement (e.g., Phoenix 2020; Valentino et al. 2011). Moreover, while white Americans who experience anger are more likely to engage in virtually all forms of political participation, Black Americans experiencing anger are only more likely to engage in system-challenging forms of participation, such as protesting (Anoll 2018; Phoenix 2020).

In some contexts, Black Americans demonstrate an "enthusiasm advantage," in which positive emotions exert a stronger effect on participation among Black Americans


than among white Americans. Phoenix (2020) credits Black Americans' enthusiasm advantage to the centrality of hope and pride in African American discourse. As a future-oriented emotion (Just, Crigler, and Belt 2007), hope shifts focus away from individual agency and toward beliefs in what is possible. As such, hope can be especially powerful for groups with lower levels of individual agency (Phoenix 2020). Pride is even more versatile than hope because it may affirm group-centric agency even in contexts where a group is suffering. For this reason, pride is likely to be especially powerful for highly cohesive groups. Phoenix (2020) also finds evidence of a similar "anger gap" and "enthusiasm advantage" among Latina/o and Asian Americans. By shifting focus away from individual agency and toward group-centric perspectives, the impacts of hope and pride fit squarely with findings from the race and ethnic politics literature that group consciousness and linked fate are important predictors of political engagement for communities of color (e.g., Bejarano 2014; Brown 2014; Junn 2003).

DATA AND METHODS

In what follows, I extend my analysis of gender differences in emotions and engagement to examine racial, ethnic, and partisan differences among women. As in Chapter 4, I rely on ANES survey data between 1980 and 2016. Figure 5.1 displays white women, Black women, Latinas, and Asian American women as a proportion of ANES respondents in each election year. Due to insufficient numbers of racial and ethnic minority respondents in most individual election years, I only conduct multivariate analyses using the pooled data in this chapter. I also point to raw descriptive statistics in a few individual election years, however. Even in the pooled data, there are only 193 Asian

American women ANES respondents across four decades and ten election cycles. As such, I restrict my analysis to white, Black, and Latina women.

Figure 5.1 White, Black, Latina, and Asian American Women as a Percent of All ANES Respondents, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Raw percent of ANES respondents belonging to each race-gender group. The total sample sizes for each year are 1614 (1980), 2257 (1984), 2040 (1988), 2485 (1992), 1714 (1996), 1807 (2000), 1212 (2004), 2322 (2008), 5914 (2012), and 4270 (2016).

While the consistent measurement of emotions and some forms of political engagement over a long span of time is a strength of the ANES data, my inability to examine the impact of specific electoral contexts in cross-sectional analyses is an important weakness of this chapter. This limitation means that I am not able to provide much insight into women's responses to the rhetorical representation of women across partisanship, race, and ethnicity—though I do provide some limited information about responses to descriptive representatives in 1984, 2008, 2012, and 2016 (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). Additionally, pooling data across four decades and ten elections does not allow me to account for the influence of changing political contexts such as increasing partisan

polarization, shifts in racial and ethnic migration patterns, or shifts in the status of women and racial and ethnic minorities over time.

The race and ethnic politics literature emphasizes the importance of including linked fate or group consciousness, national origin, generation, language, and non-electoral forms of engagement in studies of political behavior (e.g., Bejarano 2014; Brown 2014; Dawson 1994). But these measures are not consistently available in the ANES data. While the data are certainly imperfect, I conduct one of the first analyses of race and ethnic differences in emotions and engagement among women (see also Simien and Hampson 2017)—and the first, to my knowledge, that compares multiple emotions and examines multiple years.

The term “intersectionality” evolved out of black feminist theory and was coined by Crenshaw (1989) to describe how legal and policy frameworks that protect women *or* people of color often do not protect women of color. These frameworks are insufficient because they do not address the ways in which gender and race exert multiplicative rather than additive effects on women’s lives—producing experiences of relative privilege and marginalization that differ among women (Cooper 2015; Crenshaw 1989;1991; Smooth 2013). As a research paradigm, intersectionality has challenged scholarship that treats gender, race, class, sexuality, and other structural identity categories as mutually exclusive and analytically separable. Instead, intersectional research has investigated the political consequences of overlapping systems of power, such as patriarchy and white supremacy (Cooper 2015).

Scholars have cautioned that individual-level quantitative analyses may misrepresent the origins and spirit of intersectionality. Weldon (2006) argues that

intersectionality refers to the intersection of power structures such as patriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalism, rather than to the intersection of individuals' identities. And quantitative methods often simplify categories such as race and gender as dichotomous variables and statistically control for these categories as if it is possible to disentangle their independent effects (Simien 2007). Moreover, quantitative methods often fail to consider how categories may interact differently across time and space (Hancock 2007; Simien 2007). Still, some scholars have suggested that while qualitative methods such as ethnography may be preferable, there is room for large-n quantitative research that draws on intersectionality as long as researchers acknowledge the limits of these methods (Hancock 2007; Smooth 2013).

My research largely relies on the individual-level quantitative methods that are ill-equipped to study intersectionality. Rather than conducting true intersectional research, my analyses in this chapter are inspired by intersectionality, which encourages a recognition of the differences among women (see Smooth 2013). My research aims to characterize general patterns in women's emotional responses to political candidates and in the effects of those emotions on women's political engagement. Large-n quantitative methods are well-suited to this task, but they require a vast simplification of complex differences among women. To better reflect the multiplicative nature of gender and race or ethnicity in this chapter, I utilize separate statistical models for Black women, Latinas, and white women to consider how partisanship and emotions may exert fundamentally different effects for these different groups of women. Additionally, while I do not directly consider the impact of patriarchy and white supremacy as intersecting structures, the relationships I observe among women's partisan, gender, and racial or ethnic group

identities reflect the impact of those structures on the experiences and behaviors of different groups of women.

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN WOMEN'S EMOTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT

Heterosexual norms often work to reduce gender differences in many of the interests and resources that structure differences in political engagement (see Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor 2017). For this reason, I argued in Chapter 4 that gender differences should matter more in the *levels* of emotions experienced in specific electoral contexts and less in the *effects* of those emotions on political engagement. In contrast, racial segregation, divergent experiences with discrimination, and vastly unequal access to the resources that predict political engagement result in stronger levels of group cohesion within communities of color (Anoll 2018; Burge 2020; Dawson 1994; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Junn 2003). As such, racial and ethnic differences in emotions should appear both in the *levels* of emotions experienced and in the *effects* of those emotions on engagement. Racial and ethnic differences among women should function similarly.

PARTISAN CROSS-PRESSURES


In the first part of this chapter, I will argue that cross-pressures posed by women's partisan and racial identities shape the extent to which different groups of women are likely to express the kinds of emotions that lead to campaign interest and participation. Over time, party realignments have led the Democratic party to become increasingly associated with minority interests while the Republican party has become more racially homogenous (Mason 2018; Ondercin 2017). Because Republicans are a more racially homogenous group, there is a closer alignment between their partisan and social

identities. As such, Republicans tend to be more easily mobilized and emotionally responsive than Democrats (Mason 2018; Phoenix 2020).

Since Republicans are uninterested in competing for minority support, Black Americans—both women and men, but especially women—overwhelmingly vote for Democrats, even as Democrats take their support for granted (Frymer 1999). Latinos have also increasingly identified with the Democratic party, with the strongest Latina/o identifiers identifying as the strongest Democrats (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz 2016). Bejarano (2014) finds that the gender gap—where women are more likely than men to vote Democrat—has been greater for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites since 2004, with the largest gap among Latinos. Hajnal and Lee (2011) issue an important caveat to the general association between racial and ethnic minority groups and Democratic partisanship, however; the majority of immigrant-based groups, including Latina/o and Asian Americans, are not affiliated with any party.

While women in all racial and ethnic groups are more likely than their male counterparts to identify as Democrats, white women are the most evenly distributed across both parties, and most white women have tended to vote for Republican candidates for president (Junn and Masuoka 2020). Figure 5.2 displays the self-reported partisan breakdown for each race-gender group in the pooled ANES data. Between 1980 and 2016, white women ANES respondents are split near-evenly between the Democratic and Republican parties, with a difference of less than four percentage points. In contrast, the difference between Democratic and Republican Black women is over 79 percentage points, and the difference between Latina Democrats and Republicans is about 40 percentage points.

Figure 5.2 Party ID by Race-Gender Groups, ANES 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Raw percent of women identifying with each party.

Because of the uneven distributions of Black women and Latinas across the parties, Democratic Black women's and Latinas' racial and partisan identities are—to different degrees—reinforcing. In contrast, Republican Black women's and Latinas' racial and partisan identities are cross-pressured. Among Republicans, white women's racial and partisan identities may be reinforcing because of the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the Republican party. But since white women are distributed evenly across both parties, Democratic white women's racial and partisan identities should not necessarily be cross-pressured or reinforcing.

While reinforcing identities typically fuel emotional responses, cross-pressured identities usually moderate emotional responses (Mason 2018). Like enthusiasm or anger in affective intelligence theory (AIT), expectancy-confirming emotions—or *mobilizing*

emotions, including anger and fear toward out-party candidates and pride and hope toward in-party candidates—signal that individuals can safely rely on their existing behaviors and group commitments. Expectancy-violating emotions—or *non-mobilizing emotions*, including negative emotions toward in-party candidates and positive emotions toward out-party candidates—draw individuals’ attention to dissonance in the political environment and encourage caution and risk-averse behavior (Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson 2015).

Due to the conflicting political pressures caused by cross-pressured identities, Republican-identifying Black women and Latinas should express non-mobilizing emotions at higher levels and mobilizing emotions at lower levels than their Democratic counterparts. This should be especially true of Black women, who are the strongest Democratic identifiers by far. Republican white women’s partisan and racial identities should be reinforcing due to the racial homogeneity of the Republican party (see Mason 2018). As a result, Republican white women should be more likely to express mobilizing emotions and less likely to express non-mobilizing emotions than Democratic white women. I test the following hypothesis.

Partisan Cross-Pressure Hypothesis: Identifying as a Republican will tend to decrease Black women’s and Latinas’ reports of expectancy-confirming emotions, while identifying as a Democrat should increase Black women’s and Latinas’ reports of expectancy-confirming emotions. Republican white women should be somewhat more likely than Democratic white women to express these emotions, but the magnitude of this difference should be smaller than the partisan differences for the other race-gender groups.

AN ANGER GAP AMONG WOMEN?

In my analysis of race and ethnic differences in the effects of women’s emotions on their engagement, I focus exclusively on the mobilizing emotions that I identified in

Chapter 4: anger and fear toward out-party candidates and pride and hope toward in-party candidates. Based on existing race and ethnic politics research on emotions suggesting that Black and Latina/o Americans tend to express lower levels of anger but higher levels of enthusiasm than white Americans (Phoenix 2020), I offer the following hypotheses.

Anger Gap Hypothesis: Black women and Latinas will be less likely than white women to express anger toward out-party candidates, and out-party anger will be less likely to increase political engagement among Black women and Latinas.

Enthusiasm Advantage Hypothesis: Black women and Latinas will be more likely than white women to express pride and hope toward in-party candidates, and these positive emotions will be more likely to increase political engagement among Black women and Latinas.

Across all groups, the four mobilizing emotions—out-party anger and fear and in-party pride and hope—should more often than not exert a positive effect on engagement. But for women of color, anger’s effect may not be consistently associated with engagement. Conversely, the effects for pride and hope may be even more consistently related to engagement for women of color than for white women.

FINDINGS

First, I examine the effect of women’s reinforcing or cross-pressured partisan and racial or ethnic identities on expressions of mobilizing and non-mobilizing emotions toward presidential candidates. I then provide a limited analysis of women’s emotional responses to descriptive and rhetorical representation, followed by a look at the relationship between mobilizing emotions and engagement across race-gender groups. I end with a discussion of disparities in women’s access to the expression of anger as a psychological resource.

CROSS-PRESSURED AND REINFORCING IDENTITIES

Table 5.1 presents the results for the effect of identifying as a Republican—as opposed to identifying as a Democrat—on the expression of mobilizing emotions among white women, Black women, and Latinas. For white women, the coefficients for all four mobilizing emotions should be positive, reflecting the role of Republican white women’s reinforcing racial and partisan identities in driving these approach-oriented emotions. This is only the case for anger toward out-party candidates and pride toward in-party candidates, however. Democratic white women are significantly more likely than their Republican counterparts to express hope toward in-party candidates, and there is no distinguishable partisan difference among white women for expressing out-party fear. While I expected that Republican white women would generally be more likely to express mobilizing emotions than Democratic white women, I also anticipated that there would be smaller differences between white women partisans. As such, the two findings for white women that contradict my *Partisan Cross-Pressure Hypothesis* are not entirely surprising.

Because Republican identification conflicts with Black women’s and Latinas’ racial and ethnic identities, these cross-pressures should create dissonance that dampens approach-oriented emotions. As such, the coefficients for all four mobilizing emotions should be negative among women of color. This is true in all but one case (out-party fear for Latinas). Only one of the negative coefficients is statistically significant, but another three coefficients approach conventional levels of statistical significance. To the extent that cross-pressures between women’s partisan and racial identities reduce the expression of mobilizing emotions, they may also reduce women’s political engagement. The

findings presented in Table 5.1, for example, suggest that Republican white women's partisan and racial identities are associated with expressing two of the four mobilizing emotions, which may lead to increased campaign interest and participation. But Republican women of color are less likely to express mobilizing emotions, which may decrease their likelihood of engaging in politics compared to Democratic women of color and all white women.

Table 5.1 Effect of Republican Identification on Expressing Mobilizing Emotions toward Presidential Candidates

DV		White Women	Black Women	Latinas
Out-Anger	Republican (vs Democrat)	0.19** (0.06)	-0.59^ (0.34)	-0.35^ (0.20)
	N	7385	1651	1174
Out-Fear	Republican	0.00 (0.06)	-0.39 (0.35)	0.12 (0.19)
	N	7385	1651	1174
In-Pride	Republican	0.39*** (0.06)	-1.47*** (0.34)	-0.06 (0.19)
	N	7385	1651	1174
In-Hope	Republican	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.50 (0.31)	-0.35^ (0.21)
	N	7385	1651	1174

^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression – separate models for each race-gender group. DVs are the four mobilizing emotions. Coefficients represent the effect of identifying as a Republican (as opposed to identifying as a Democrat). Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See Tables D.5.1-4 in Appendix D for full models with controls, including all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, and election year dummies.

Table 5.2 presents the results for non-mobilizing emotions. The opposite patterns should be observed here. Non-mobilizing emotions function similarly to anxiety in AIT. They typically occur in situations of uncertainty, threat, or disconfirmed expectations. Republican white women, whose partisan and racial identities are reinforcing, should be less likely to experience the dissonance associated with non-mobilizing emotions. As

with my findings for mobilizing emotions, however, only the results for anger and pride are consistent with my expectations for white women. Republican white women are significantly more likely than Democratic white women to express in-party fear and out-party hope. Republican Black women and Latinas, whose partisan, racial, and ethnic identities are at odds, should be more likely to express non-mobilizing emotions.

Consistent with my *Partisan Cross-Pressure Hypothesis*, all but one of these coefficients are positive, and three are statistically significant (in-anger and out-pride for Black women and out-hope for Latinas). These emotions are typically not associated with increased political engagement, so being more likely to express these emotions confers no benefit for Republican women of color.

Table 5.2 Effect of Republican Identification on Expressing Non-Mobilizing Emotions toward Presidential Candidates

DV		White Women	Black Women	Latinas
In-Anger	Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.31*** (0.06)	0.99** (0.31)	-0.06 (0.21)
	N	7385	1651	1174
In-Fear	Republican	0.24*** (0.07)	0.60 (0.40)	0.19 (0.23)
	N	7385	1651	1174
Out-Pride	Republican	-0.27*** (0.07)	1.57*** (0.32)	0.33 (0.22)
	N	7385	1651	1174
Out-Hope	Republican	0.24*** (0.07)	0.53 [^] (0.30)	0.43* (0.20)
	N	7385	1651	1174

[^]p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001


Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of logistic regression – separate models for each race-gender group. DVs are the four non-mobilizing emotions. Coefficients represent the effect of identifying as a Republican (as opposed to identifying as a Democrat). Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See Tables D.5.5-8 in Appendix D for full models with controls, including all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, and election year dummies.

Figures 5.3 through 5.6 plot the predicted probabilities of expressing the four mobilizing emotions among Democrats and Republicans within each race-gender group. These plots are based on the logistic regression models presented in Table 5.1. Looking across all four figures, there does appear to be some evidence of a “racial anger gap” and an “enthusiasm advantage” among women of color which is consistent with Phoenix’s (2020) findings for Black Americans. When resources, party strength, and other emotions are held at their respective means for each race-gender group, the probability of Republican white women expressing anger toward Democratic presidential candidates is 0.73. For Republican Black women and Latinas, it is only 0.47 and 0.52, respectively. The probabilities of expressing anger toward Republican candidates are 0.69 among Democratic white women, 0.62 among Democratic Black women, and 0.61 among Latina Democrats (see Figure 5.3). The differences between white women and women of color in expressing anger toward out-party candidates are much starker among Republicans than among Democrats. These findings support the notion that cross-pressures between the partisan and racial or ethnic identities of Republican women of color may contribute to findings of a “racial anger gap.” Even among Democrats, however, there is modest evidence of an anger gap between white women and women of color. Overall, these patterns of findings support my *Anger Gap Hypothesis*.

There are somewhat smaller differences in the probabilities of expressing out-party fear for each group (see Figure 5.4). Among white women, the probability of expressing fear toward out-party presidential candidates is 0.53 for both Republicans and Democrats. For Black women, the probabilities are 0.38 for Republicans and 0.48 for


Democrats. And for Latinas, the probabilities are 0.45 for Republicans and 0.42 for Democrats.

Figure 5.3 Effect of Women's Partisan Identities on Anger toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing emotions based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.1 in Appendix D for full models.

Figure 5.4 Effect of Women's Partisan Identities on Fear toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016




Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing emotions based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.2 in Appendix D for full models.

In terms of expressing pride toward in-party candidates, Democratic Black women have the highest probability at 0.88, followed by Republican white women at 0.75. The probability is 0.70 for Latina Democrats and 0.66 for both Latina Republicans and Democratic white women. Black Republican women, whose partisan and racial identities are most cross-pressured, are the least likely to express in-party pride. The finding for Democratic Black women supports my *Enthusiasm Advantage Hypothesis*.


Finally, all groups of women are very likely to report feeling hope toward in-party presidential candidates, with all predicted probabilities ranging between 0.84 and 0.91. Still, cross-pressured Black and Latina Republican women are the least likely to express this emotion.

Figure 5.5 Effect of Women's Partisan Identities on Pride toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing emotions based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.3 in Appendix D for full models.

Figure 5.6 Effect of Women’s Partisan Identities on Hope toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing emotions based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.4 in Appendix D for full models.

Differences in the likelihood of expressing mobilizing emotions among women are consequential because—as I demonstrated in Chapter 4—these emotions are associated with increased political interest and participation. To the extent that women of color are less likely to express these emotions, they may be less likely to engage in politics, which can ultimately exacerbate existing racial disparities in political power and influence among women. As the results above suggest, cross-pressures between women’s partisan and racial identities contribute to disparities in women’s expressions of these emotions, with the effect of diminishing these emotional responses among women of color but having less of an effect on white women partisans. In some cases, the disparities in the expression of mobilizing emotions are also present for *Democratic* women of

color, which suggest that partisan cross-pressures are only one factor among others influencing women's emotional responses to candidates.

RESPONSES TO DESCRIPTIVE AND RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION


As I noted in the previous chapter, it is not possible to determine whether women's emotional responses to candidates have anything to do with candidates' descriptive or rhetorical representation of women by looking at changes in the expressions of these emotions out of context. As such, I provide a limited analysis of women's responses to descriptive and rhetorical representation across partisanship, race, and ethnicity. Because of small sample sizes for women of color in individual election years and imperfect measures available in the ANES data, I restrict this section to raw descriptive statistics of emotional responses without any controls.

Figure 5.7 displays levels of pride toward in-party candidates in election years with a woman on the party's ticket. In 2016, the measure reflects pride toward Hillary Clinton among Democrats. In 1984 and 2008, this measure reflects pride toward Walter Mondale among Democrats and pride toward John McCain among Republicans—since there is no measure available to examine specific emotional responses to their female running mates, Geraldine Ferraro and Sarah Palin. In Chapter 4, I found positive and significant relationships between warm feelings toward Geraldine Ferraro and reports of pride and hope toward Mondale among Democratic women. I also found a positive and significant relationship between warm feelings toward Sarah Palin and reports of hope toward McCain among Republican women. The finding for pride was positive, but not statistically significant. Despite these associations, the emotional responses to the male candidates are likely a poor proxy for responses to the women vice presidential

candidates. For this reason, I also report average feeling thermometer ratings for Ferraro and Palin among the different groups of women.

When women had a descriptive representative on the Republican ticket in 2008, Republican white women were much more likely than Republican Black women and Latina Republicans to report pride toward McCain. Consistent with that pattern, Republican white women rated their feelings toward Palin at 75.8 out of 100 on average, while Latina Republicans rated her at 66.9 and Republican Black women rated her at 58.6 on average. When women had descriptive representatives on the Democratic tickets in 1984 and 2016, Democratic Black and Latina women were more likely to report pride toward Mondale and Clinton than were Democratic white women. This pattern also holds in the average feeling thermometer ratings of Ferraro, which are 78 for Democratic Black women and 73.4 for Latina Democrats but only 68.2 for Democratic white women.

Figure 5.7 Pride toward In-Party Candidates with a Woman on the Presidential Ticket




Data from ANES cumulative file. Raw percent reporting in-party pride in election years where there was a woman on the presidential ticket. In 1984 and 2016, this is the percent of Democrats reporting in-party pride. In 2008, this is the percent of Republicans reporting in-party pride.

Likely due to their reinforcing partisan and racial identities and strong racial group cohesion, Democratic Black women report extremely high levels of pride toward in-party descriptive representatives. In both 2008 and 2016, about 92% of Democratic Black women reported pride toward both President Obama—a descriptive representative of their race—and Hillary Clinton—a descriptive representative of their gender. In 2012, 97% of Democratic Black women reported pride toward then-incumbent President Obama. In contrast, only 86% of Democratic white women reported pride toward Hillary Clinton—a descriptive representative of both their gender *and* race. Latina Democrats also reported more pride toward Clinton than Democratic white women, at 89%. These results suggests that even though women of color are less likely than white women to express one mobilizing emotion—out-party anger—the presence of a descriptive

representative may boost expressions of another mobilizing emotion—in-party pride—among women of color. Perhaps this “enthusiasm advantage” can compensate for disparities in women’s political engagement caused by an “anger gap”? Since Republican women of color face cross-pressures between their partisan and racial identities, however, this enthusiasm advantage in response to descriptive representatives is only likely to appear among Democrats.

Given the prominence of racist and sexist rhetoric in Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, out-party anger and fear directed at Trump likely indicate negative responses to Trump’s rhetorical representation of women—though additional factors certainly contributed to these emotional responses as well. Figure 5.8 shows the percent of Democratic women across race-gender groups who expressed anger and fear toward Trump. All groups of Democratic women expressed these negative out-party emotions at extremely high levels, with little difference between groups. The difference between Latinas—who were most likely to express anger toward Trump—and Black women—who were least likely to express anger—is only five percentage points. For fear, the difference between Democratic white women and Black women is also about five percentage points.

Figure 5.8 Anger and Fear toward Donald Trump among Democratic Women, 2016

Data from ANES cumulative file. Raw percent of Democrats reporting anger and fear toward Trump in 2016.

These are only raw descriptive statistics, but it is interesting to note that while Latinas usually report the lowest levels of out-party anger of any group of women (see Figure 5.3), they are the most likely group to report out-party anger toward Donald Trump. For comparison, Latina Democrats were the least likely to report out-party anger toward Mitt Romney in 2012, with only 58.6% doing so. In contrast, 66.4% of Democratic white women and 69% of Democratic Black women reported anger toward Romney. It is possible that Latinas' uncharacteristic emotional response to Trump in 2016 is related to his rhetoric about women and—probably more so—his xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric. McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) find that while many people might have expected Latina/o immigrants to pull back from politics out of fear in response to Trump's rhetoric, Latina/o immigrants' levels of political engagement actually increased after the 2016 election. Moreover, this pattern was true among citizens,

legal permanent residents, and the undocumented. They also find that feelings of anger and fear were important factors in the political resilience they observe among Latina/o immigrants. Similar to my interview findings in Chapter 3, McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) noticed that the most engaged Latina/o immigrants often reported more worry for other people in their communities than for themselves personally, particularly when they knew someone who they feared might be deported.


While Democratic Black women were the least likely to express anger toward Trump, this particular “anger gap” was negligible, with only a two percentage point difference from white women’s reported anger toward Trump. In fact, about the same percentage of Democratic Black women expressed anger toward Trump as expressed pride toward non-incumbent descriptive representatives, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. In 2012, however, Democratic Black women expressed pride toward incumbent President Obama to a greater degree than anger toward Trump in 2016. For white and Latina Democrats, anger toward Trump exceeded pride toward Clinton by a decent margin—between eight and eleven percentage points. While I cannot make bold claims based on this analysis of raw descriptive statistics, the general patterns support the notion that women’s responses to candidates may be shaped at least in part by candidates’ descriptive and rhetorical representation.

FROM FEELING TO ACTION

Figure 5.9 displays the percent of each race-gender group expressing each of the four mobilizing emotions between 1980 and 2016. In these raw trends, Latinas consistently report the lowest levels of these emotions, and this pattern corresponds with their typically lower levels of voting compared to Black and white women (see CAWP

2021b). In all but three years, Black women express lower levels of out-party anger than white women. But Black women express in-party pride at much higher levels than the other groups of women in 2008, 2012, and—to a lesser extent—2016. Given that the vast majority of Black women identify as Democrats, these data points reflect Black women’s feelings of pride in response to in-party descriptive representatives, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Corresponding with this pattern, Black women’s levels of voter turnout were highest in these years and actually surpassed all other race-gender groups in 2008 and 2012 (CAWP 2021b; Williams 2016).

Figure 5.9 Mobilizing Emotions among Race-Gender Groups, 1980-2016



Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Raw percent reporting each emotion.

Table 5.3 summarizes the results for the influence of mobilizing emotions on campaign interest, voter turnout, and non-voting participation. As in Chapter 4, I expect

all four mobilizing emotions to exert a positive effect on political engagement more often than not across all groups. But my *Anger Gap* and *Enthusiasm Advantage Hypotheses* suggest that the effect of anger toward out-party candidates should be smaller and possibly even be negative for women of color, compared with white women. For women of color, in-party pride and hope should be more consistently associated with engagement than among white women.

Across the three separate campaign interest models for each race-gender group, all 12 coefficients are positive, and eight of those are statistically significant. For voting, ten of 12 are positive, but only two are significant. And for non-voting participation, nine of 12 are positive, and five are significant. These findings suggest that these four emotions are indeed mobilizing for women across racial and ethnic groups. The *Anger Gap* and *Enthusiasm Advantage Hypotheses* do not receive much support here, however. Anger toward out-party candidates is positively and significantly associated with non-voting participation for all groups of women, and this is also the case for white and Black women when it comes to campaign interest. For voting, however, out-party anger is positive and statistically significant for white women only, which does support the *Anger Gap Hypothesis*.

Table 5.3 Effect of Mobilizing Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Political Engagement

DV		White Women	Black Women	Latinas
Campaign Interest	Out-Anger	0.34*** (0.06)	0.41** (0.14)	0.20 (0.17)
	Out-Fear	0.52*** (0.06)	0.47*** (0.14)	0.31^ (0.16)
	In-Pride	0.50*** (0.06)	0.38* (0.16)	0.49** (0.16)
	In-Hope	0.44*** (0.07)	0.22 (0.17)	0.33^ (0.18)
	N	7142	1514	1060
Voting	Out-Anger	0.19* (0.08)	0.16 (0.20)	0.11 (0.23)
	Out-Fear	-0.03 (0.08)	0.27 (0.19)	0.01 (0.22)
	In-Pride	0.19* (0.08)	0.13 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.22)
	In-Hope	0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.22)	0.43^ (0.24)
	N	6563	1385	934
Non-Voting Participation	Out-Anger	0.13*** (0.03)	0.19* (0.07)	0.17* (0.08)
	Out-Fear	0.18*** (0.03)	0.13^ (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)
	In-Pride	0.17*** (0.03)	0.09 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)
	In-Hope	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
	N	6429	1351	906

^p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Weighted results of ordinal logistic regression (interest), logistic regression (voting), and OLS (participation) – separate models for each race-gender group. DVs are campaign interest, voting for president, and non-voting participation. Standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cells indicate that the finding supports my hypotheses and approaches or meets conventional levels of statistical significance. See Tables D.5.9-11 in Appendix D for full models with controls, including all emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, party strength, campaign interest (for voting and non-voting participation only), and election year dummies.

Regarding hope or pride, the results run counter to my hypothesis for voting and non-voting participation, with white women being the only group for whom the pride coefficient is positive and significant. The same is true of hope for campaign interest. Pride toward in-party candidates is positively and significantly associated with campaign

interest for all groups of women. As such, it appears that an “anger gap” or “enthusiasm advantage” is more likely to influence the levels of emotions women report in response to candidates rather than in the effects of those emotions on participation.

DISPARITIES IN THE POLITICAL POWER OF WOMEN’S ANGER

Table 5.4 looks back at the predicted probabilities of expressing anger toward out-party candidates that are visualized in Figure 5.3. When resources, party strength, and the expression of all other emotions are held at their respective means for each race-gender group, a racial anger gap is evident between Republican white women and women of color. There is also somewhat of a gap among Democrats.

Table 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Anger toward Out-Party Candidates

Democrat			Republican		
White Women	Black Women	Latinas	White Women	Black Women	Latinas
0.69	0.62	0.61	0.73	0.47	0.52

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing out-anger based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.1 in Appendix D for full models.

If access to the expression of political anger is unequal among different groups of women, then positive relationships between anger and engagement may not be as transformative as scholars and journalists suggest—even as political anger among women appears to increase in the aggregate (DeMora et al. 2020; Dittmar 2020a; Gutierrez et al. 2019; Phoenix 2020; Towler and Parker 2018; Scott and Collins 2020; Traister 2018). In *Sister Outsider*, Lorde (1984) writes the following.

Women of Color in america have grown up within a symphony of anger, at being silenced, at being unchosen, at knowing that when we survive, it is in spite of a world that takes for granted our lack of humanness, and which hates our very existence outside of its service. And I say symphony rather than cacophony because we have had to learn to orchestrate those furies so that they do not tear us apart. We have had to learn to move through them and use them for strength and force and insight within our daily lives. Those of us who did not learn this difficult lesson did not survive (129).

As Lorde makes clear, it is not that women of color do not feel anger; they have simply been forced to downplay or otherwise translate their anger to survive at the often deadly nexus of patriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalism (see also Chemaly 2018). Similarly, Phoenix (2020) suggests that the “racial anger gap” between white and Black Americans is not a result of Black Americans simply having less anger; it is rather a reflection of the ways in which Black Americans have both been denied their expressions of anger and been put in a state of near-constant threat that leads to exhaustion and despair. Within this context, people of color have had to translate their anger or rely on alternative psychological resources, such as pride or hope. This, Phoenix (2020) argues, is where an enthusiasm advantage sometimes appears for racial and ethnic minority groups in comparison to white Americans.

Table 5.5 presents the predicted probabilities of expressing pride toward in-party candidates among women across party, race, and ethnicity. In comparison to anger, there is less difference between Republican white women and women of color. Among Democratic Black women, there is an enthusiasm advantage over white women, and Latina Democrats are also slightly more likely to express in-party pride than their white counterparts.

Table 5.5 Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Pride toward In-Party Candidates

Democrat			Republican		
White Women	Black Women	Latinas	White Women	Black Women	Latinas
0.66	0.88	0.70	0.75	0.63	0.66

Data from ANES cumulative file, 1980-2016. Predicted probabilities of expressing in-pride based on weighted logistic regression. Control variables held at respective means for each group: all other emotions, age, education, income, unemployment, religious attendance, and party strength. See Table D.5.3 in Appendix D for full models.

In this chapter, I found some evidence that Democratic Black women and Latina Democrats were more likely than their white counterparts to express pride toward in-

party descriptive representatives. As such, increases in the descriptive representation of women of color may help to compensate for potential “anger gaps” between white women and women of color that could otherwise lead to disparities in levels of political engagement.

Dovi (2002) argues that certain descriptive representatives are preferable to others. Just as Strolovitch (2006) finds that advocacy groups tend to ignore the most disadvantaged of their members, Dovi (2002) suggests that descriptive representatives in elected office will likely ignore the most disadvantaged as well, unless they have mutual relationships with “dispossessed subgroups” of historically marginalized groups. By dispossessed, she means “groups that are unjustly excluded from and/or stigmatized by the political process and consequently lack the political and economic resources necessary for effective representation” (738). As I found in Chapter 3, descriptive and rhetorical representation are closely linked; women of color candidates are the most likely to rhetorically represent women of color. Advancing the descriptive representation of Democratic women of color may increase the rhetorical representation of women of color as well as expressions of pride among women of color citizens, leading to higher levels of political engagement.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I found some evidence of reinforcing and conflicting political pressures that structure differences in the expression of emotions among white, Black, and Latina women. While Republican white women’s racial and partisan identities are reinforcing, Republican Black women and Latina Republicans’ racial and partisan identities are cross-pressured. These differences matter because reinforcing identities are

associated with stronger emotional responses, while cross-pressures moderate emotions. Additionally, while I found that mobilizing emotions such as out-party anger and in-party pride are generally mobilizing for women across racial and ethnic groups, I find that the likelihood of expressing out-party anger is lower for women of color than for white women. Such disparities in access to anger as a political resource may dampen the transformative potential of women's political anger. Yet, Democratic Black women's greater likelihood of expressing pride—especially in response to descriptive representatives—could potentially alleviate disparities in political engagement among women.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

In 2020, a record six women ran in the Democratic presidential primary, and Kamala Harris was ultimately selected as Joe Biden's running mate in the general election. Harris is the first woman, the first Black American, and the first South Asian American vice president. As one might expect based on my findings in Chapter 3, this increase in the descriptive representation of women candidates at the presidential level was also associated with an increase in the rhetorical representation of women. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand was the most explicit about centering women in her campaign, offering what she called a "women plus" platform (Dittmar 2021a).

Gillibrand, who was working on addressing sexual misconduct in the military and on college campuses long before the #MeToo movement became widely recognizable, was the first senator to publicly call on former Senator Al Franken to resign in 2017 due to sexual harassment allegations (Zhou 2019). She has also fundraised for women seeking office through her *Off the Sidelines* PAC (Lerer and Goldmacher 2019). On the heels of Donald Trump's mobilization of women, the Women's Marches, and the reinvigoration of the #MeToo movement, Gillibrand saw 2020 as a unique opportunity to leverage her track record on women's issues and craft an explicitly feminist presidential campaign. While she attracted support from some women donors—who made up about two-thirds of her donor base—she was ultimately unable to gain much traction in the crowded field. Gillibrand's campaign largely attributed her fate to backlash related to Franken's resignation. Several high-profile Democratic donors characterized her call for Franken to resign as being "opportunistic" and "duplicious" (Kaplan and Goldmacher 2019; Korecki and Nahmias 2018).

Other women candidates in the field were also vocal about women and women's interests. One of Senator Elizabeth Warren's most central plans was a proposal for universal child care, which she frequently talked about by referencing her own experiences as a working mom (Kliff 2019; Warren 2019). Now-Vice President Kamala Harris announced a plan to hold corporations accountable for gender wage discrimination, referencing the larger disparities for women of color (Herndon 2019). She also frequently discussed being asked about "women's issues" and responding, "I'm so glad you want to talk about the economy," because "all issues are women's issues" (Lerer 2019). And Senator Amy Klobuchar suggested that women and men candidates are held to a different standard regarding qualifications (Kelly 2019).

Meanwhile, President Trump lobbied for support from suburban women, making statements such as "We're getting your husbands back to work," "I love women, and I can't help it. They're the greatest. I love them much more than the men," and "Suburban women, will you please like me?" These appeals did not appear to resonate with most suburban women, however (Cassese and Wolbrecht 2020; Lerer 2020; Santucci 2020). Cassese and Wolbrecht (2020) describe the limits of Trump's portrayal of women in 2020 as follows.

Defining women's interests in terms of suburban women...too easily ignores the interests of many women who do not align with the ideal type. That includes those who are not mothers, Black women, Latinas, Asian and Pacific Islander women, rural women, urban women, poor women, older women, professional women, women on welfare, immigrant women, and college-aged women — that is, the majority of women in the U.S.

As these examples demonstrate, the 2020 presidential candidates advanced rhetoric about women that portrayed women and women's interests in selective and contestable ways that resonated with some women but not with others.

Among 2020 congressional candidates, too, rhetoric about women was prominently featured. Democratic women ran in numbers that matched their record set in 2018 and continued to call out President Trump’s rhetoric and policies that presented threats to women and other marginalized groups (Dittmar 2021b). Unlike 2018, however, Republican women also ran in record numbers and issued counterclaims about the threats posed by Democrats. In particular, they often focused on the newly-elected progressive women of color who make up “The Squad”—Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)—as well as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). Republican congressional candidates—both women and men—suggested that these specific Democratic women were agents of “socialism, radicalism, and extremism” (Dittmar 2021b). While most of these Republican counterclaims did not explicitly reference women, the attacks against the first woman House Speaker and especially against the young women of color who make up “The Squad” are implicitly gendered and racialized. As Dittmar (2021b) writes, “[the members of ‘The Squad’] are being used as symbols of a direct challenge to the white, male status quo.”

A more explicit Republican counterclaim to represent women came from Sandy Smith (R-NC), whose campaign website read, “Yes, we have the most women ever elected to Congress and the Senate, which is truly a great thing. The problem is that, in many cases, we’ve elected the *wrong* women. The time is now that we elect the *right* women” (See Dittmar 2021b, emphasis in original). Through their campaign rhetoric, congressional candidates running in 2020 made competing claims to represent women by drawing contrasts with the brand of representation offered by the opposing political party.

To the extent that women citizens accepted any of these candidates as their representatives at least partly based on these claims, we can say that these candidates symbolically represented women.

The primary aim of this project is to explain the connection between political elites' representation of women and women citizens' political engagement. The most relevant existing framework that examines this link provides modest evidence that the physical presence of in-party women candidates leads to increases in women citizens' engagement (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; Reingold and Harrell 2010). But null results in some studies (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Wolak 2015) and recent events such as Donald Trump's mobilization of women suggest there is more to the story. I build on the foundation provided by research on the symbolic representation of women in US politics by considering the impact of elite rhetoric about women on women's electoral mobilization and by clarifying the intermediate role of emotions in this process.

RHETORICAL REPRESENTATION AS A TOOL OF SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION

The relevant outcome of symbolic representation is citizens' acceptance of a leader as their representative (Pitkin 1967, 107). As I have argued in the preceding chapters, rhetorical representation and descriptive representation—alone or in combination—can be tools of symbolic representation. Through their physical presence as women and/or their rhetoric about women, political leaders portray women in selective and contestable ways that may or may not resonate with individual women or groups of women in the electorate.

Rhetorical representation may be successful or unsuccessful; in other words, women citizens may accept or reject candidates based on their rhetoric about women. Symbolic representation only exists where candidates are accepted as representatives, and this has implicitly been the focus of the traditional symbolic representation literature. But my findings suggest that failed attempts at symbolic representation—in which women reject candidates as their representatives—can also lead to increased political engagement among women.

In Chapter 3, I found that congressional candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation are closely related. Women candidates—especially Democrats—were significantly more likely than their male counterparts to explicitly discuss women on their campaign websites in 2010 and 2018. Moreover, Democratic women of color were the most likely to discuss women in relation to their racial and ethnic identities and interests.

I also examined the prevalence of different topics in candidates' rhetoric about women. The most common topics included biographical references to women, healthcare including reproductive health, and workplace policies such as pay equity. Democratic women were the most likely group to broach most topics on their websites, while Republican men were usually the least likely to discuss each topic. In both 2010 and 2018, Republican women's discussion of women was mainly restricted to their biographies, which may reflect pressures to downplay gender in their campaigns due to voter stereotypes or Republican party norms (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009; Wineinger 2021).

On their 2018 campaign websites, many Democratic women candidates called out President Trump's sexist and racist rhetoric and policies and identified them as threats to

women and other groups. I found that similar statements and sentiments were echoed by women activists volunteering for Democratic women candidates. These findings suggest one potential way in which women candidates may symbolically represent in-party women citizens beyond their descriptive presence: by calling out other political actors who they feel negatively represent women. While Democratic women candidates made explicit claims about Donald Trump and Republicans' representation of women in 2018, Republican women candidates made somewhat more implicit counterclaims about Democrats' representation of women in 2020 (see Dittmar 2021b). Through such rhetoric—whether explicit or implicit—women candidates may provide greater fuel for women citizens' feelings of threat, anger, and fear toward members of the opposing party, which may in turn motivate political action.

When explaining their motivations to participate in politics, the Democratic women activists I interviewed in 2018 were substantially more likely to cite negative emotions toward President Trump and other Republicans than positive emotions toward women candidates. Moreover, the negative emotions they mentioned tended to be of greater intensity than the positive emotions. Still, while negative responses to Trump were especially motivating, several activists also saw women candidates as good solutions to the current political moment and emphasized their potential to alleviate the threats posed by Republican rhetoric and policies.

MOBILIZING EMOTIONS

I have argued that women's acceptance of a candidate as their representative may be indicated by positive emotional responses to that candidate, such as pride or hope. Rejection may instead be indicated by negative emotional responses, such as anger or

fear. In Chapter 4, I suggest that the acceptance *or* rejection of a candidate as a representative can be mobilizing. Based on nationally representative survey data between 1980 and 2016, I find that both positive and negative emotional responses are associated with increased electoral engagement—but only when they conform to partisan expectations. Positive emotions toward in-party candidates and negative emotions toward out-party candidates are mobilizing. But positive emotions toward out-party candidates and negative emotions toward in-party candidates are not related to campaign interest or participation.

While these emotions have similar effects on political engagement for both women and men, I find modest evidence that women’s emotional responses to candidates have significantly differed from men’s in electoral contexts where gender was especially salient. In 2016, Democratic women were more likely than Democratic men to report anger toward Donald Trump, whose sexist and racist rhetoric has been widely acknowledged in media coverage and academic research (Cassese and Holman 2019; Frasure-Yokley 2018; Kelly 2020; Traister 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018). Amid rhetoric about a Republican “War on Women” and Mitt Romney’s counter-responses to that rhetoric in 2012, Democratic women were more likely to express anger and Republican women were more likely to express pride toward Romney than their male counterparts in each party. In 1992—the so-called “Year of the Woman”—Democratic women were more likely than Democratic men to express fear toward George H.W. Bush, who nominated Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. And Republican women were more likely to express hope toward Bush than Republican men in 1992.

In 1984, when Walter Mondale named Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate, Democratic women were more likely than Democratic men to express pride toward Mondale. Moreover, warmer feelings toward Ferraro were positively and significantly associated with expressing pride toward Mondale among Democrats. Contrary to my expectations, however, Democratic women were *not* more likely than their male counterparts to express pride or hope toward their descriptive representative—Hillary Clinton—in 2016. And Republican women were significantly *less* likely than Republican men to express pride toward John McCain, who named Sarah Palin as his running mate in 2008.

I also find evidence of a few gendered factors that significantly contributed to women's emotional responses to presidential candidates. Democratic women who believed that it is important to elect more women were more likely to express warmer feelings toward Hillary Clinton in 2016. In 2012, beliefs about which party is better for women were significantly associated with both Democratic and Republican women's feelings toward Romney in the expected directions—controlling for their pre-election feelings toward Romney. Such a finding may be related to rhetoric about the Republican “War on Women” during the 2012 campaign—though the available measures in the ANES are not ideal for testing this claim. Hearing about Trump's vulgar comments about women in the 2005 Access Hollywood was *not* significantly associated with Democratic women's feelings toward Trump in 2016 when controlling for their pre-election feelings. But since the pre-election survey was still in the field when the recording was released, there may be a genuine relationship between hearing about the video and greater negative emotional responses toward Trump that is not captured in this data.

Warmer feelings toward Hillary Clinton—whose presence contributed to the salience of gender in 1992—were negatively and significantly associated with expressing anger and fear toward Bill Clinton among Republican women. This finding may suggest that Hillary Clinton’s role in Bill Clinton’s campaign and future presidency represented a threat to conservative expectations of women. Taken together, the findings from Chapter 4 suggest that women’s emotional responses to candidates are—*in certain contexts*—rooted at least partly in gendered factors such as candidates’ descriptive or rhetorical representation of women.

The impact of some of the mobilizing emotions I identified varies when women’s partisan, racial, and ethnic identities overlap, which can contribute to disparities among women in the potential of certain emotional responses to encourage political engagement. Like Phoenix (2020), I find evidence of an “anger gap” between white women and women of color—namely Black women and Latinas—and an “enthusiasm advantage” among Democratic Black women. Republican Black women and Latinas were much less likely than Republican white women to express anger toward out-party presidential candidates between 1980 and 2016. This gap emerges for Democrats too, but to a much lesser extent. These findings matter because anger toward out-party candidates is associated with increased political participation. Women of color may have less access to anger as a psychological resource due to feelings of fatigue and despair in response to constant political threats and marginalization as well as pressure to resist raced-gendered stereotypes, such as the “angry Black woman.” In contrast, white women’s political anger—while less likely to be taken seriously than white men’s anger—is at least more

likely to be taken seriously than anger expressed by women of color (Chemaly 2018; Cooper 2018; Traister 2018).

I suggest that some of the differences among women could be related to cross-pressures between women's partisan and racial or ethnic identities. I find some evidence that cross-pressures between the partisan and racial or ethnic identities of Republican women of color decrease their likelihood of expressing the emotions that I find to be mobilizing. In contrast, I find evidence that Republican white women's reinforcing partisan and racial identities heighten their expressions of out-party anger and in-party pride. These partisan cross-pressures and reinforcing identities cannot explain all of the differences in the emotions expressed by white women and women of color, however. Democratic women of color—whose partisan and racial identities should be reinforcing—still express somewhat lower levels of most of the mobilizing emotions than white women in both parties. The major exception is that Democratic Black women are the most likely group to express in-party pride. Overall, there are smaller differences in the expressions of positive emotions toward in-party candidates among women, which could potentially mitigate some of the disparities in political engagement related to gaps in the expression of out-party anger.

The ANES data do not offer enough racial and ethnic diversity among respondents to conduct multivariate analyses with subgroups of women at the intersection of race, ethnicity, and partisanship in individual election years. But I find some evidence in women's raw responses to candidates that the usual anger gap between white women and women of color closed in 2016 in response to Donald Trump. Democratic Black women and Latinas were also more likely than Democratic white women to express

positive feelings toward in-party descriptive representatives in 1984 and 2016. In contrast, Republican women of color responded with less positive feelings toward Sarah Palin in 2008 than their white counterparts.

Contrary to my expectations, I did not find many predictable racial and ethnic differences in the effects of emotions on political engagement. As with the differences between women and men I observed in Chapter 4, the most consequential differences among women appear to be in the levels of emotions expressed in response to specific candidates rather than in the effects of those emotions on political engagement.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The data I have employed in the previous chapters is limited in several ways, but my findings may provide some direction for future research. Most critically, I do not directly observe women's emotional responses to specific examples of candidates' rhetoric about women. The findings from my interviews with women activists suggest strong negative responses to Donald Trump's rhetorical representation of women, but the sample of activists is small and unrepresentative of women citizens in the United States. In contrast, the ANES data that I employ in Chapter 4 is nationally representative and includes a few measures of gendered factors that I find to be associated with women's emotional responses to candidates. But most election years did not have questions specifically related to candidates' rhetoric about women. Even in the couple of cases where a measure could potentially be related to a candidate's rhetorical representation of women, the measures are not ideal, and I cannot isolate the direction of causality.

The question about whether respondents heard about the 2005 video in which Trump brags about sexually assaulting women comes closest to providing a direct

measure of exposure to rhetoric about women; however, the timing of the video's release in the middle of the pre-election field dates and the lack of specific emotion measures in the post-election survey makes it difficult to compare women's emotional responses to Trump before and after the release of the video. The question from 2012 about which party is better for women may be even less appropriate because it does not explicitly ask respondents about their reactions to the Republican "War on Women" rhetoric—even though exposure to that rhetoric could have informed respondents' opinions about which party is better for women.

A significant limitation of Chapter 5 is my inability to conduct multivariate analyses of partisan, racial, and ethnic differences among women in individual election years. The pooled analyses in Chapter 5 cannot provide insight into how emotional responses are likely to vary among women in different electoral contexts in which gender, race, ethnicity, and their intersections are especially salient. Future research should employ samples with greater racial and ethnic diversity to consider these contextual differences.

The natural next step for this research is a series of experimental studies to directly observe women's emotional responses to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women. Experimental methods can be leveraged by manipulating the specific examples of candidate rhetoric presented to subjects to examine which statements most resonate with different groups of women and which specific emotions are evoked. Subjects could also be asked about their future intentions to participate in politics or be presented with a prompt to write a letter to a representative or some other task that could test whether women's emotional responses to candidate rhetoric are

mobilizing. Given that I find a close relationship between descriptive and rhetorical representation in Chapter 3, additional experimental research could manipulate candidates' party, gender, and race to determine whether emotional responses differ when candidates' rhetoric is held constant, but their descriptive characteristics differ.

Experimental research—which is typically weaker in external validity—can point to the observational findings I present in this project as justification that this topic is a worthy area of study and is politically consequential. And the real-life examples of candidate rhetoric about women that I identify in Chapter 3 can be used to create realistic examples for an experiment.

My analysis of candidates' rhetoric about women on their campaign websites also has important limitations. First, campaign websites are highly curated and may therefore underrepresent more inflammatory rhetoric that could be perceived as misogynist or insulting to women. Democratic women candidates referenced insulting rhetoric coming from Donald Trump and other Republicans on their websites in 2018, but no candidates used such rhetoric themselves on their websites. Since negative emotional responses to Trump's rhetoric appear to have been a powerful mobilizer for Democratic women, my exclusive focus on campaign websites is a limitation. Additionally, campaign websites may overrepresent policy-related rhetoric due to the dominance of the "Issues" page. The topics that candidates discuss in relation to women may also be limited by the typically rigid list-like structure of the "Issues" page. Future research should include a greater variety of sources of candidate rhetoric about women, including ads, speeches, debates, and interviews, to name a few. It may be more feasible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of candidates' rhetoric about women by selecting a few key races to focus on as

case studies. And experimental research can then be used to examine responses to this greater diversity of candidate rhetoric, including more inflammatory rhetoric about women.

Another limitation of the analysis in Chapter 3 is my decision to look at only the most explicit and unambiguous references to women on candidates' campaign websites. This approach may underrepresent much of Republican women's rhetoric about women. As my discussion about the abortion debate in Chapter 3 suggests, Republican women may not mention women explicitly, but they often invoke women's gendered caregiving roles in their advocacy for the unborn, for example. Additionally, Republican women may focus on their identities as mothers as a way of establishing their conservative credentials or expressing anger without violating conservative feminine norms or Republican party norms (Deckman 2016; Wineinger 2021). And as the opening to this chapter suggests, Republican women may not explicitly criticize Democrats' representation of women in the same way that Democrats offer explicit counterclaims to Republicans' representation of women. But Republican women's claims about the threats posed by Nancy Pelosi and "The Squad" are implicitly about gender, race, and ethnicity (see Dittmar 2021b). Future research should examine emotional responses to both implicit and explicit examples of candidate rhetoric about women and gender. For example, an experiment might examine whether two examples of candidate rhetoric yield similar emotional responses depending on whether the reference to women is implicit or explicit.

While my primary interest in this project has been women's responses to candidates' representation of women, it is also worthwhile for future research to consider

men's responses to women's representation. In the few instances where I was able to test for the effect of specific gendered factors on emotional responses toward candidates, I mostly found similar dynamics between women and men within the parties. For example, Democratic women *and* men who believed that it is important to elect more women were more likely to express pride toward Hillary Clinton in 2016—though women were more likely to hold this belief in the first place. And Democrats' and Republicans' beliefs about which party is better for women were associated with their feelings toward Mitt Romney, regardless of respondent gender.

The main difference I found between women and men co-partisans was in the effect of beliefs about sexual harassment on negative emotions toward George H. W. Bush in 1992. I suggest in Chapter 4 that the minimal gender differences I find among co-partisans may reflect the increasing polarization of the parties on gender norms and gender-linked issues (Winter 2010). As time goes on, these trends may lead men to further resemble their women co-partisans in their responses to candidates' representation of women.

The women activists I interviewed in 2018 did not identify the origins of their feelings toward Donald Trump and other Republicans, but their descriptions of the threats posed to women and other groups bore a significant resemblance to statements from Democratic women candidates and the 2017 Women's March mission statement. Future research should trace the lineage of this rhetoric to determine the extent to which in-party descriptive representatives and allied social movements contribute to the crystallization of women's perceptions of political threat and consequently spur gendered political mobilization among women citizens.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This project builds on research about the symbolic representation of women in US politics. The existing literature is motivated by a desire to examine some of the consequences of women's descriptive representation aside from their substantive contributions to women's policy interests. Over time, scholars who have studied the link between women's representation and engagement have found that this relationship depends on certain conditions such as party congruence (Reingold and Harrell 2010) or racial and ethnic congruence (Uhlener and Scola 2016). Because of these conditional and null findings (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Wolak 2015), some scholars have called for research to examine the specific contexts in which women citizens *are* mobilized by women's representation in politics (see Dolan 2006). I have tried to answer this call by incorporating the concept of rhetorical representation.

Studying politicians' rhetoric about women offers insight into additional ways that women candidates can symbolically represent women outside of their physical presence, as well as how men can symbolically represent women. An exclusive focus on women's physical presence in politics lends itself to the consideration of *positive* psychological mechanisms leading to women's political engagement. But a focus on rhetoric has allowed me to consider the impact of both positive *and* negative emotions as mobilizing forces. Like the existing symbolic representation framework, however, my findings are conditioned by women's partisan, racial, and ethnic identities.

The existing symbolic representation framework cannot explain Donald Trump's mobilization of women across the partisan divide. But I argue that such mobilization *can* be explained by his rhetoric about women and other groups, which was cited as a key

source of motivation by the women activists I interviewed in 2018. My research provides less clarity about how Trump's rhetoric mobilized women supporters compared to women opponents. But existing research suggests he appealed strongly to both women and men who hold attitudes related to sexism and racial resentment (Setzler and Yanus 2018). Moreover, 2020 Republican women candidates and grassroots organizations such as *Women for America First* have claimed to be motivated by Trump (Dittmar 2021b; Women for America First 2021). While Donald Trump presents an extreme example, his rhetorical strategies are not unique and have been increasingly adopted by Republican candidates (see Kelly 2020).

As women's descriptive representation among candidates increases, my research suggests that the rhetorical representation of women will increase as well. Moreover, as women candidates become more racially and ethnically diverse, a greater diversity of women citizens may see themselves represented in candidate rhetoric about women. I hope that future research can make stronger causal claims about the link between the rhetorical representation of women and women citizens' emotional responses to candidates. Still, the modest observational findings from this project suggest that such a relationship can emerge in electoral contexts in which gender is especially salient. My research also finds that women's emotional responses to candidates—when consistent with partisan expectations—are associated with increases in women's electoral interest and participation.

Current trends in US politics should make the symbolic representation of women increasingly relevant. In addition to growth in women's descriptive representation and Republican candidates' adoption of Trump's rhetorical strategies (CAWP 2021a; Kelly

2020), partisan polarization in political institutions and the electorate presents challenges to the substantive representation of women and encourages citizens to have stronger emotional responses to candidates. Increasing partisan polarization has produced legislative gridlock (Binder 2003; Lee 2009), making it more difficult to achieve policy outcomes that benefit women. Without being able to point to specific policy achievements on behalf of women, candidates and representatives may shift toward more purely symbolic messaging about women. At the same time, polarization in the electorate has led to increased dislike of the opposing party (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), making it likely that partisans will have even stronger feelings than they have in the past about who best represents them. The parties' polarization based on women's representation, gender norms, and gender-linked issues further suggests that as polarization increases, gender will be an increasingly relevant partisan consideration (Ondercin 2017; Winter 2010).

Advancements in communications technology and the rise of social media also mean that it is easier than ever for politicians to communicate with the public and target specific audiences (Straus and Glassman 2016; Goldschmidt and Ochreiter 2008). As these trends continue, my findings suggest that we should see greater mobilization among women citizens in response to candidates' descriptive and rhetorical representation of women. Greater political engagement among women ought to be seen as an inherently good democratic outcome, but my research also suggests grounds for caution.

To the extent that Trump's highly engaging inflammatory and antifeminist rhetoric about women and other historically marginalized groups continues to be echoed by Republican candidates (see Kelly 2020), out-party anger will continue to build on both

sides of the partisan divide. Such anger will likely further entrench partisan animosity and increasingly present obstacles to tangible political efforts to address feminist policy concerns. Additionally, if candidates' rhetoric about women tends to spark more negative emotions than positive emotions, then women of color may be underrepresented in the resulting mobilization of women. Such underrepresentation could result in a deprioritization of concerns impacting the most disadvantaged subgroups of women.

Democratic candidates—especially women of color—who evoke positive emotions such as pride because of their descriptive and rhetorical representation of women are likely to be the most effective at mobilizing Democratic women of color in the electorate through their descriptive presence and rhetoric. While the solutions to address partisan animosity may be unclear, recruiting and supporting more Democratic women of color candidates may help alleviate racial and ethnic disparities in women's political engagement that could follow from the contemporary dominance of partisan anger in US politics.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- What motivated you to volunteer today?
- Is this the first election cycle where you've volunteered, or have you done things like this in past election cycles too? Which ones?
- What made you decide to become politically active when you did?
- Has President Donald Trump ever made you feel any specific emotions? For example, enthusiasm, pride, anger, or fear?
- What about Donald Trump has made you feel that way?
- Has [candidate name] ever made you feel any specific emotions?
- What about [candidate name] has made you feel that way?
- Besides volunteering, in what other ways have you participated in politics in your life?
- There has been a lot of attention to the number of women running for office this year. Do you think that men and women do things differently as candidates and elected officials?
- Do you feel that your personal identities, whether it's gender, race, or some other identity, influence your political views, or do you feel that your personal identities don't really play a role?
- If I want to understand what gets people motivated to volunteer and become active in politics, is there anything else you think I should know—generally or from your personal experience?

APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER 3 TABLES

Table B.3.1 Effect of Party and Gender on Candidates' Rhetorical Representation of Women

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Count of Women Mentions on Website	
	2010 (1)	2018 (2)
D Women	1.550*** (0.181)	2.131*** (0.145)
R Women	1.108*** (0.212)	1.303*** (0.187)
D Men	0.496* (0.231)	1.176*** (0.219)
Obama Vote	0.008 (0.004)	
Clinton Vote		0.003 (0.003)
Incumbent	0.186 (0.136)	0.192 (0.111)
Men Mentions	0.239*** (0.044)	0.247*** (0.027)
Word Count	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	-1.479*** (0.312)	-1.027*** (0.206)
Observations	258	430
Log Likelihood	-459.749	-958.584
theta	2.200*** (0.398)	1.538*** (0.166)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	935.497	1,933.169
<i>Note:</i>		$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table B.3.2 Topics Mentioned when Discussing Women, 2010

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mentioned Biography (1)	Mentioned Health (2)	Mentioned Workplace (3)
	D Women	3.421*** (0.793)	0.997 (0.540)
R Women	-0.828 (1.054)	-0.598 (0.617)	-18.128 (1,093.276)
D Men	3.366*** (0.820)	-0.195 (0.680)	-1.282 (1.178)
Word Count	0.0002* (0.0001)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0003** (0.0001)
Constant	-3.522*** (0.811)	-2.624*** (0.574)	-3.078*** (0.705)
Observations	258	258	258
Log Likelihood	-110.507	-105.562	-63.079
Akaike Inf. Crit.	231.014	221.124	136.159
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table B.3.3 Topics Mentioned when Discussing Women, 2010

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mentioned Families (1)	Mentioned Violence (2)	Mentioned Intersectional (3)
	D Women	0.117 (0.662)	1.550 (0.836)
R Women	-1.165 (0.836)	-16.946 (1,124.758)	-17.710 (1,969.845)
D Men	-0.689 (0.921)	0.572 (1.000)	-17.719 (2,559.114)
Word Count	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0002)
Constant	-2.840*** (0.627)	-3.698*** (0.896)	-2.820*** (0.814)
Observations	258	258	258
Log Likelihood	-59.643	-57.681	-48.685
Akaike Inf. Crit.	129.286	125.362	107.369
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table B.3.4 Topics Mentioned when Discussing Women, 2018

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mentioned	Mentioned	Mentioned

	Biography (1)	Health (2)	Workplace (3)
D Women	2.328*** (0.627)	1.063* (0.419)	0.912* (0.436)
R Women	-0.695 (0.741)	-2.088*** (0.540)	-2.451*** (0.658)
D Men	2.174** (0.665)	-1.758** (0.600)	-0.853 (0.563)
Word Count	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0003*** (0.0001)
Constant	-2.610*** (0.629)	-1.525*** (0.420)	-1.623*** (0.435)
Observations	430	430	430
Log Likelihood	-209.011	-177.878	-185.852
Akaike Inf. Crit.	428.021	365.756	381.704

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table B.3.5 Topics Mentioned when Discussing Women, 2018

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Mentioned Families (1)	Mentioned Violence (2)	Mentioned Intersectional (3)
D Women	0.634 (0.414)	1.217* (0.604)	1.662** (0.637)
R Women	-2.365*** (0.599)	-1.088 (0.749)	-17.085 (900.160)
D Men	-1.534* (0.608)	-0.268 (0.753)	0.536 (0.729)
Word Count	0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0003*** (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)
Constant	-1.227** (0.409)	-2.893*** (0.612)	-2.783*** (0.646)
Observations	430	430	430
Log Likelihood	-189.557	-160.892	-156.452
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.114	331.785	322.903

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table B.3.6 Mentioning the President when Discussing Women, 2010 and 2018

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Mentioned the President	
	2010 (1)	2018 (2)
D Women	0.362 (1.020)	0.634 (0.638)
R Women	-2.455 (1.967)	-17.184 (906.661)
D Men	-0.022 (1.367)	-1.740 (1.178)
Word Count	0.0005*** (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.00004)
Constant	-4.596*** (1.038)	-2.520*** (0.618)
Observations	258	430
Log Likelihood	-26.275	-103.523
Akaike Inf. Crit.	62.549	217.046

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER 4 TABLES

PART 1 PARTICIPATION OUTCOMES

Table C.4.1 Effects of Emotions on Interest and Participation, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Campaign Interest <i>cumulative link</i>	Voting <i>logistic</i>	Non-Voting Participation <i>OLS</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Out-Anger	0.408*** (0.035)	0.071 (0.049)	0.149*** (0.020)
Out-Fear	0.423*** (0.034)	0.154** (0.049)	0.176*** (0.019)
In-Pride	0.513*** (0.036)	0.117* (0.050)	0.174*** (0.020)
In-Hope	0.367*** (0.041)	0.190*** (0.055)	0.002 (0.023)
In-Anger	0.125*** (0.036)	-0.001 (0.052)	0.080*** (0.020)
In-Fear	-0.115** (0.043)	-0.051 (0.061)	-0.045 (0.024)
Out-Pride	0.250*** (0.041)	0.136* (0.058)	-0.025 (0.023)
Out-Hope	0.020 (0.039)	-0.194*** (0.055)	-0.016 (0.022)
Women	-0.358*** (0.029)	0.087* (0.042)	-0.089*** (0.016)
White	-0.101** (0.035)	0.111* (0.048)	-0.007 (0.020)
Age	1.889*** (0.073)	1.799*** (0.104)	0.097* (0.040)
Education	1.305*** (0.060)	1.739*** (0.088)	0.378*** (0.033)
Income	0.274*** (0.057)	1.230*** (0.081)	0.166*** (0.032)
Unemployed	0.171* (0.069)	-0.169 (0.088)	0.159*** (0.039)
Religiosity	0.163*** (0.038)	0.654*** (0.056)	0.061** (0.021)
Party Strength	0.585*** (0.038)	0.670*** (0.055)	0.264*** (0.021)
Interest		1.461*** (0.063)	0.766*** (0.025)
1984	-0.042 (0.075)	0.092 (0.106)	-0.016 (0.043)
1988	0.187* (0.077)	-0.079 (0.107)	0.037 (0.044)
1992	0.437*** (0.074)	0.080 (0.104)	-0.017 (0.041)
1996	-0.206** (0.078)	-0.005 (0.110)	-0.098* (0.044)
2000	0.029 (0.080)	0.046 (0.115)	0.051 (0.046)
2004	0.246** (0.088)	0.127 (0.131)	0.184*** (0.050)
2008	0.532*** (0.088)	0.024 (0.127)	0.138** (0.049)
2012	0.227*** (0.066)	-0.232* (0.092)	0.001 (0.037)
2016	0.199** (0.072)	-0.195 (0.102)	-0.092* (0.040)
Constant		-2.520*** (0.120)	-0.417*** (0.047)
Observations	18,808	17,286	16,941
Log Likelihood	-17,119.890	-7,312.718	
Akaike Inf. Crit.		14,679.440	

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.2 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 1980 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.313* (0.123)	0.484* (0.190)	0.200 (0.162)	0.458* (0.191)
Out-Fear	0.440*** (0.132)	0.248 (0.202)	0.582*** (0.176)	0.204 (0.205)
In-Pride	0.249 (0.135)	0.364 (0.205)	0.188 (0.180)	0.331 (0.209)
In-Hope	0.182 (0.158)	0.142 (0.235)	0.248 (0.217)	0.104 (0.236)
In-Anger	0.069 (0.122)	0.164 (0.191)	0.004 (0.162)	0.139 (0.192)
In-Fear	0.177 (0.167)	0.080 (0.262)	0.257 (0.220)	0.054 (0.262)
Out-Pride	0.312* (0.149)	0.240 (0.233)	0.395* (0.195)	0.205 (0.235)
Out-Hope	0.161 (0.142)	0.146 (0.217)	0.173 (0.191)	0.164 (0.219)

Women	-0.266* (0.118)	-0.212 (0.311)		
White	-0.244 (0.165)	-0.232 (0.166)	-0.390 (0.223)	-0.016 (0.249)
Age	1.935*** (0.297)	1.917*** (0.299)	2.252*** (0.391)	1.437** (0.472)
Education	1.740*** (0.243)	1.755*** (0.244)	1.564*** (0.329)	1.951*** (0.368)
Income	0.220 (0.226)	0.217 (0.227)	0.326 (0.296)	0.077 (0.366)
Unemployed	-0.351 (0.298)	-0.341 (0.299)	-0.022 (0.371)	-0.958 (0.516)
Religiosity	0.410** (0.159)	0.409* (0.159)	0.335 (0.206)	0.509* (0.254)
Party Strength	0.663*** (0.164)	0.655*** (0.164)	0.457* (0.221)	0.947*** (0.249)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.296 (0.246)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.313 (0.263)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.190 (0.270)		
Women X In-Hope		0.100 (0.319)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.157 (0.249)		
Women X In-Fear		0.171 (0.341)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.147 (0.303)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.012 (0.286)		
Observations	1,144	1,144	659	485
Log Likelihood	-1,113.418	-1,111.607	-642.294	-465.434
Note:			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$	

Table C.4.3 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 1984 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.314** (0.104)	0.485** (0.156)	0.191 (0.141)	0.473** (0.155)
Out-Fear	0.345** (0.108)	0.297 (0.161)	0.396** (0.148)	0.275 (0.160)
In-Pride	0.548*** (0.117)	0.731*** (0.176)	0.433** (0.159)	0.708*** (0.176)
In-Hope	0.361** (0.135)	0.106 (0.198)	0.589** (0.187)	0.126 (0.197)
In-Anger	0.150 (0.118)	0.225 (0.176)	0.073 (0.161)	0.232 (0.176)
In-Fear	0.058 (0.170)	-0.161 (0.235)	0.278 (0.250)	-0.139 (0.233)
Out-Pride	0.292* (0.123)	0.199 (0.186)	0.368* (0.165)	0.216 (0.186)
Out-Hope	-0.005 (0.118)	0.223 (0.183)	-0.162 (0.157)	0.190 (0.183)
Women	-0.403*** (0.100)	-0.351 (0.249)		
White	-0.132 (0.132)	-0.109 (0.133)	-0.003 (0.172)	-0.268 (0.210)
Age	1.883*** (0.252)	1.872*** (0.253)	1.628*** (0.334)	2.239*** (0.394)
Education	1.852*** (0.211)	1.889*** (0.212)	1.838*** (0.292)	1.988*** (0.313)
Income	0.142 (0.197)	0.117 (0.198)	0.184 (0.257)	-0.028 (0.312)
Unemployed	0.149 (0.228)	0.158 (0.229)	0.336 (0.288)	-0.144 (0.380)
Religiosity	0.364** (0.136)	0.352* (0.137)	0.455* (0.180)	0.244 (0.211)
Party Strength	0.803*** (0.129)	0.814*** (0.130)	0.844*** (0.180)	0.803*** (0.189)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.294 (0.208)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.079 (0.216)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.316 (0.235)		
Women X In-Hope		0.467 (0.269)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.141 (0.236)		
Women X In-Fear		0.437 (0.340)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.176 (0.247)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.392 (0.240)		
Observations	1,667	1,667	927	740
Log Likelihood	-1,566.900	-1,562.005	-861.940	-696.433
Note:			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$	

Table C.4.4 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 1988 (Weighted)*Dependent variable:*

	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.442*** (0.114)	0.482** (0.170)	0.435** (0.156)	0.479** (0.171)
Out-Fear	0.570*** (0.122)	0.801*** (0.173)	0.298 (0.173)	0.804*** (0.174)
In-Pride	0.573*** (0.117)	0.588*** (0.172)	0.584*** (0.161)	0.556** (0.174)
In-Hope	0.281* (0.120)	0.363* (0.180)	0.187 (0.163)	0.387* (0.181)
In-Anger	0.275* (0.136)	0.280 (0.211)	0.266 (0.180)	0.266 (0.211)
In-Fear	0.066 (0.181)	-0.044 (0.258)	0.147 (0.259)	-0.066 (0.259)
Out-Pride	0.339* (0.153)	0.335 (0.234)	0.316 (0.204)	0.314 (0.235)
Out-Hope	0.093 (0.139)	0.289 (0.225)	-0.001 (0.180)	0.304 (0.225)
Women	-0.327** (0.106)	-0.023 (0.200)		
White	-0.073 (0.123)	-0.081 (0.124)	-0.085 (0.162)	-0.167 (0.197)
Age	1.268*** (0.260)	1.283*** (0.261)	2.131*** (0.356)	0.215 (0.390)
Education	1.518*** (0.204)	1.538*** (0.205)	1.924*** (0.290)	1.161*** (0.292)
Income	0.331 (0.210)	0.369 (0.210)	0.449 (0.270)	0.180 (0.344)
Unemployed	-0.017 (0.254)	-0.005 (0.254)	0.089 (0.312)	-0.200 (0.446)
Religiosity	0.421** (0.141)	0.413** (0.141)	0.263 (0.189)	0.619** (0.215)
Party Strength	0.495*** (0.132)	0.495*** (0.132)	0.455* (0.181)	0.494* (0.195)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.041 (0.228)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.469 (0.242)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.006 (0.232)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.164 (0.240)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.002 (0.276)		
Women X In-Fear		0.185 (0.365)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.014 (0.309)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.314 (0.286)		
Observations	1,553	1,553	883	670
Log Likelihood	-1,446.055	-1,442.765	-818.667	-615.545

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.5 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 1992 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable: Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.535*** (0.102)	0.768*** (0.150)	0.340* (0.140)	0.800*** (0.152)
Out-Fear	0.286** (0.101)	0.266 (0.149)	0.349* (0.138)	0.231 (0.151)
In-Pride	0.381*** (0.098)	0.400** (0.143)	0.366** (0.137)	0.414** (0.145)
In-Hope	0.406*** (0.112)	0.418** (0.160)	0.346* (0.159)	0.430** (0.162)
In-Anger	0.443*** (0.115)	0.515** (0.168)	0.361* (0.161)	0.559** (0.171)
In-Fear	0.122 (0.126)	0.098 (0.196)	0.129 (0.165)	0.056 (0.198)
Out-Pride	0.132 (0.111)	0.048 (0.165)	0.198 (0.152)	0.002 (0.168)
Out-Hope	-0.023 (0.111)	0.036 (0.165)	-0.036 (0.151)	0.080 (0.167)
Women	-0.266** (0.093)	0.014 (0.225)		
White	0.170 (0.112)	0.166 (0.113)	0.254 (0.155)	-0.010 (0.168)
Age	1.413*** (0.235)	1.380*** (0.237)	1.678*** (0.316)	0.983** (0.364)
Education	1.318*** (0.187)	1.310*** (0.188)	1.048*** (0.263)	1.565*** (0.271)
Income	0.397* (0.186)	0.398* (0.187)	0.848*** (0.247)	-0.119 (0.295)
Unemployed	-0.244 (0.210)	-0.237 (0.210)	-0.824** (0.274)	0.583 (0.341)
Religiosity	0.016 (0.115)	0.019 (0.116)	-0.024 (0.158)	0.059 (0.173)
Party Strength	0.645*** (0.121)	0.660*** (0.122)	0.635*** (0.167)	0.722*** (0.179)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.438* (0.203)		

Women X Out-Fear	0.042 (0.202)			
Women X In-Pride	-0.012 (0.196)			
Women X In-Hope	-0.049 (0.224)			
Women X In-Anger	-0.167 (0.231)			
Women X In-Fear	0.041 (0.254)			
Women X Out-Pride	0.150 (0.224)			
Women X Out-Hope	-0.104 (0.224)			
Observations	1,895	1,895	1,000	895
Log Likelihood	-1,714.685	-1,711.270	-919.049	-778.631

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.6 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 1996 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.545*** (0.121)	0.545** (0.178)	0.575*** (0.169)	0.516** (0.179)
Out-Fear	0.445*** (0.122)	0.299 (0.180)	0.552** (0.173)	0.274 (0.178)
In-Pride	0.355** (0.129)	0.426* (0.186)	0.226 (0.182)	0.419* (0.186)
In-Hope	0.289* (0.137)	0.215 (0.193)	0.467* (0.201)	0.216 (0.192)
In-Anger	0.033 (0.122)	0.274 (0.180)	-0.100 (0.169)	0.238 (0.179)
In-Fear	0.029 (0.150)	0.159 (0.223)	-0.071 (0.208)	0.128 (0.223)
Out-Pride	0.112 (0.132)	-0.110 (0.199)	0.277 (0.182)	-0.136 (0.197)
Out-Hope	0.101 (0.137)	0.183 (0.205)	0.040 (0.189)	0.174 (0.203)
Women	-0.301** (0.109)	-0.330 (0.250)		
White	-0.493*** (0.135)	-0.512*** (0.137)	-0.359 (0.184)	-0.672** (0.209)
Age	1.155*** (0.273)	1.157*** (0.274)	1.040** (0.378)	1.211** (0.402)
Education	1.028*** (0.223)	1.057*** (0.226)	0.855** (0.315)	1.172*** (0.328)
Income	0.188 (0.216)	0.189 (0.218)	-0.138 (0.284)	0.658 (0.345)
Unemployed	0.727* (0.317)	0.717* (0.320)	0.269 (0.469)	1.136* (0.448)
Religiosity	0.450** (0.142)	0.446** (0.143)	0.531** (0.200)	0.375 (0.208)
Party Strength	0.973*** (0.147)	0.968*** (0.147)	1.229*** (0.205)	0.767*** (0.217)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.015 (0.238)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.264 (0.245)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.168 (0.255)		
Women X In-Hope		0.189 (0.274)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.419 (0.243)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.245 (0.302)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.384 (0.267)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.146 (0.275)		
Observations	1,373	1,373	740	633
Log Likelihood	-1,269.930	-1,266.002	-663.742	-595.545

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.7 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 2000 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.438*** (0.132)	0.526** (0.190)	0.357 (0.188)	0.529** (0.190)
Out-Fear	0.682*** (0.138)	0.711*** (0.198)	0.648*** (0.195)	0.716*** (0.198)
In-Pride	0.525*** (0.136)	0.560** (0.191)	0.439* (0.197)	0.597** (0.192)
In-Hope	0.350* (0.145)	-0.036 (0.215)	0.656** (0.202)	-0.012 (0.214)
In-Anger	0.282 (0.168)	0.338 (0.245)	0.262 (0.235)	0.305 (0.244)

In-Fear	-0.087 (0.212)	-0.051 (0.310)	-0.101 (0.298)	-0.060 (0.309)
Out-Pride	0.354 (0.182)	0.626* (0.285)	0.227 (0.243)	0.605* (0.286)
Out-Hope	-0.149 (0.154)	-0.215 (0.229)	-0.106 (0.211)	-0.211 (0.228)
Women	-0.368** (0.116)	-0.664** (0.240)		
White	-0.335* (0.136)	-0.336* (0.137)	-0.497** (0.186)	-0.148 (0.205)
Age	2.210*** (0.303)	2.254*** (0.305)	2.482*** (0.419)	2.115*** (0.454)
Education	1.271*** (0.241)	1.234*** (0.242)	1.491*** (0.342)	0.981** (0.346)
Income	0.534* (0.235)	0.567* (0.236)	0.669* (0.318)	0.501 (0.357)
Unemployed	0.297 (0.300)	0.318 (0.302)	0.532 (0.412)	-0.001 (0.448)
Religiosity	0.426** (0.150)	0.414** (0.151)	0.478* (0.202)	0.369 (0.230)
Party Strength	0.548*** (0.151)	0.555*** (0.152)	0.809*** (0.213)	0.300 (0.218)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.180 (0.265)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.060 (0.274)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.090 (0.268)		
Women X In-Hope		0.703* (0.290)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.104 (0.336)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.073 (0.426)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.427 (0.372)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.098 (0.309)		
Observations	1,239	1,239	667	571
Log Likelihood	-1,083.792	-1,079.676	-571.581	-504.433

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.8 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 2004 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.331* (0.152)	0.471* (0.220)	0.159 (0.217)	0.449* (0.220)
Out-Fear	0.554*** (0.146)	0.887*** (0.213)	0.304 (0.209)	0.872*** (0.215)
In-Pride	0.330* (0.168)	0.301 (0.252)	0.387 (0.234)	0.286 (0.252)
In-Hope	0.926*** (0.199)	0.799** (0.266)	1.239*** (0.310)	0.768** (0.265)
In-Anger	0.334 (0.180)	0.428 (0.261)	0.172 (0.259)	0.430 (0.260)
In-Fear	-0.077 (0.215)	0.338 (0.367)	-0.345 (0.279)	0.375 (0.364)
Out-Pride	0.205 (0.168)	0.214 (0.245)	0.244 (0.238)	0.218 (0.243)
Out-Hope	-0.351* (0.179)	-0.545* (0.264)	-0.254 (0.253)	-0.497 (0.263)
Women	-0.563*** (0.140)	-0.355 (0.397)		
White	0.237 (0.154)	0.228 (0.155)	0.414 (0.219)	0.048 (0.221)
Age	1.656*** (0.349)	1.673*** (0.353)	1.680*** (0.487)	1.681** (0.526)
Education	1.337*** (0.278)	1.277*** (0.280)	1.604*** (0.413)	0.981* (0.388)
Income	0.182 (0.249)	0.205 (0.251)	-0.082 (0.356)	0.479 (0.359)
Unemployed	0.848* (0.388)	0.822* (0.394)	0.597 (0.553)	1.070 (0.561)
Religiosity	0.029 (0.180)	0.063 (0.181)	-0.023 (0.244)	0.219 (0.274)
Party Strength	0.450** (0.174)	0.406* (0.175)	0.331 (0.240)	0.492 (0.258)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.296 (0.306)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.631* (0.295)		
Women X In-Pride		0.053 (0.336)		
Women X In-Hope		0.397 (0.395)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.228 (0.362)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.639 (0.457)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.007 (0.338)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.330 (0.361)		
Observations	910	910	469	441

Log Likelihood	-803.163	-797.420	-418.015	-376.582
<i>Note:</i>				$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.9 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 2008 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.109 (0.157)	0.752** (0.246)	-0.244 (0.215)	0.736** (0.254)
Out-Fear	0.582*** (0.159)	-0.014 (0.247)	0.970*** (0.217)	-0.086 (0.252)
In-Pride	0.972*** (0.170)	0.934*** (0.242)	1.069*** (0.246)	0.942*** (0.246)
In-Hope	0.709*** (0.188)	0.301 (0.275)	1.039*** (0.270)	0.253 (0.277)
In-Anger	0.196 (0.196)	0.086 (0.298)	0.249 (0.270)	0.124 (0.300)
In-Fear	0.105 (0.203)	0.066 (0.332)	0.228 (0.264)	0.113 (0.338)
Out-Pride	0.425** (0.165)	0.245 (0.233)	0.566* (0.236)	0.305 (0.238)
Out-Hope	0.130 (0.169)	0.300 (0.254)	-0.133 (0.239)	0.299 (0.256)
Women	-0.601*** (0.142)	-1.265*** (0.372)		
White	-0.265 (0.166)	-0.287 (0.168)	-0.439 (0.234)	-0.088 (0.251)
Age	1.496*** (0.323)	1.645*** (0.330)	1.627*** (0.453)	1.637** (0.498)
Education	1.094*** (0.283)	1.140*** (0.286)	1.247** (0.399)	1.152** (0.422)
Income	0.221 (0.283)	0.196 (0.287)	0.868* (0.396)	-0.625 (0.428)
Unemployed	0.127 (0.334)	0.123 (0.339)	0.534 (0.478)	-0.294 (0.487)
Religiosity	0.039 (0.181)	0.047 (0.183)	0.036 (0.242)	0.105 (0.288)
Party Strength	1.077*** (0.175)	1.098*** (0.178)	0.659** (0.245)	1.637*** (0.271)
Women X Out-Anger		-1.019** (0.324)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.989** (0.326)		
Women X In-Pride		0.055 (0.334)		
Women X In-Hope		0.731 (0.380)		
Women X In-Anger		0.146 (0.401)		
Women X In-Fear		0.082 (0.422)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.310 (0.328)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.307 (0.345)		
Observations	934	934	508	426
Log Likelihood	-761.960	-751.393	-406.919	-334.940
<i>Note:</i>				$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.10 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 2012 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.541*** (0.073)	0.554*** (0.105)	0.583*** (0.103)	0.514*** (0.105)
Out-Fear	0.393*** (0.068)	0.366*** (0.099)	0.460*** (0.093)	0.328** (0.100)
In-Pride	0.541*** (0.076)	0.586*** (0.103)	0.499*** (0.114)	0.596*** (0.104)
In-Hope	0.517*** (0.094)	0.524*** (0.128)	0.536*** (0.141)	0.496*** (0.127)
In-Anger	0.151 (0.078)	0.305** (0.116)	0.027 (0.106)	0.303** (0.116)
In-Fear	-0.049 (0.103)	-0.133 (0.152)	-0.019 (0.142)	-0.122 (0.151)
Out-Pride	0.335*** (0.095)	0.145 (0.136)	0.548*** (0.136)	0.115 (0.135)
Out-Hope	0.063 (0.090)	0.127 (0.131)	0.016 (0.126)	0.114 (0.130)
Women	-0.389*** (0.059)	-0.303 (0.173)		
White	-0.234*** (0.070)	-0.237*** (0.070)	-0.407*** (0.097)	-0.064 (0.100)
Age	2.180*** (0.147)	2.175*** (0.148)	2.282*** (0.207)	2.079*** (0.213)
Education	0.899*** (0.122)	0.904*** (0.122)	0.598*** (0.170)	1.214*** (0.176)
Income	0.163 (0.114)	0.157 (0.114)	0.314* (0.156)	0.022 (0.168)
Unemployed	0.163 (0.130)	0.156 (0.130)	0.366 (0.197)	0.044 (0.174)

Religiosity	0.068 (0.074)	0.067 (0.075)	-0.011 (0.103)	0.145 (0.109)
Party Strength	0.543*** (0.077)	0.552*** (0.077)	0.463*** (0.109)	0.626*** (0.109)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.021 (0.144)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.048 (0.134)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.097 (0.150)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.021 (0.188)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.281 (0.156)		
Women X In-Fear		0.142 (0.206)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.362 (0.190)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.132 (0.180)		
Observations	4,674	4,674	2,407	2,267
Log Likelihood	-4,164.352	-4,160.546	-2,162.779	-1,985.958

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.11 Effects of Emotions on Campaign Interest, 2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Campaign Interest			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.199 (0.148)	0.496* (0.202)	-0.178 (0.218)	0.513* (0.203)
Out-Fear	0.248* (0.117)	0.130 (0.169)	0.409* (0.165)	0.129 (0.169)
In-Pride	0.534*** (0.114)	0.276 (0.159)	0.756*** (0.166)	0.341* (0.161)
In-Hope	0.093 (0.125)	0.430* (0.179)	-0.178 (0.176)	0.412* (0.180)
In-Anger	-0.112 (0.082)	0.113 (0.120)	-0.260* (0.112)	0.065 (0.122)
In-Fear	-0.445*** (0.082)	-0.572*** (0.119)	-0.339** (0.113)	-0.604*** (0.121)
Out-Pride	0.286* (0.117)	0.318* (0.162)	0.228 (0.172)	0.331* (0.163)
Out-Hope	-0.039 (0.106)	-0.307* (0.146)	0.242 (0.156)	-0.299* (0.147)
Women	-0.378*** (0.071)	0.142 (0.334)		
White	0.150 (0.078)	0.156* (0.078)	0.110 (0.108)	0.210 (0.115)
Age	2.536*** (0.173)	2.531*** (0.173)	2.563*** (0.240)	2.408*** (0.252)
Education	1.329*** (0.143)	1.309*** (0.143)	1.127*** (0.204)	1.517*** (0.204)
Income	0.290* (0.139)	0.324* (0.139)	0.202 (0.191)	0.563** (0.206)
Unemployed	0.304* (0.154)	0.279 (0.154)	0.195 (0.197)	0.393 (0.251)
Religiosity	-0.002 (0.091)	-0.006 (0.091)	-0.010 (0.123)	-0.020 (0.137)
Party Strength	0.373*** (0.090)	0.373*** (0.090)	0.566*** (0.125)	0.133 (0.132)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.694* (0.297)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.286 (0.236)		
Women X In-Pride		0.511* (0.228)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.620* (0.251)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.406* (0.163)		
Women X In-Fear		0.221 (0.164)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.091 (0.235)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.554** (0.214)		
Observations	3,419	3,419	1,787	1,632
Log Likelihood	-2,978.580	-2,963.200	-1,596.778	-1,359.572

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.12 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 1980 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.164 (0.181)	-0.103 (0.291)	0.334 (0.238)	-0.051 (0.294)

Out-Fear	0.240 (0.198)	0.379 (0.311)	0.121 (0.266)	0.445 (0.311)
In-Pride	-0.214 (0.201)	-0.169 (0.312)	-0.293 (0.269)	-0.091 (0.316)
In-Hope	0.023 (0.222)	-0.180 (0.348)	0.182 (0.298)	-0.078 (0.344)
In-Anger	-0.053 (0.179)	0.099 (0.291)	-0.163 (0.237)	0.184 (0.291)
In-Fear	-0.308 (0.243)	-0.544 (0.396)	-0.192 (0.319)	-0.528 (0.395)
Out-Pride	0.279 (0.221)	0.347 (0.359)	0.219 (0.289)	0.404 (0.361)
Out-Hope	-0.133 (0.210)	0.173 (0.330)	-0.371 (0.282)	0.182 (0.330)
Women	-0.011 (0.176)	-0.113 (0.437)		
White	0.297 (0.235)	0.308 (0.237)	0.436 (0.321)	0.132 (0.360)
Age	2.530*** (0.455)	2.483*** (0.459)	1.910** (0.593)	3.390*** (0.750)
Education	2.387*** (0.388)	2.414*** (0.391)	2.556*** (0.541)	2.321*** (0.576)
Income	0.879** (0.334)	0.873** (0.337)	0.556 (0.427)	1.457** (0.560)
Unemployed	-0.249 (0.407)	-0.230 (0.418)	-0.767 (0.520)	0.740 (0.703)
Religiosity	1.009*** (0.240)	1.019*** (0.242)	1.076*** (0.312)	1.014* (0.394)
Party Strength	0.460 (0.253)	0.459 (0.257)	0.703* (0.347)	0.167 (0.399)
Interest	1.949*** (0.260)	1.979*** (0.262)	2.419*** (0.356)	1.542*** (0.406)
Women X Out-Anger		0.435 (0.368)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.245 (0.403)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.101 (0.404)		
Women X In-Hope		0.371 (0.453)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.261 (0.370)		
Women X In-Fear		0.378 (0.502)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.079 (0.457)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.488 (0.427)		
Constant	-2.974*** (0.418)	-2.938*** (0.476)	-3.142*** (0.555)	-3.198*** (0.646)
Observations	1,013	1,013	577	436
Log Likelihood	-441.232	-438.465	-251.066	-182.509
Akaike Inf. Crit.	918.464	928.929	536.131	399.018

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.13 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 1984 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	-0.010 (0.152)	0.034 (0.230)	-0.051 (0.207)	-0.010 (0.233)
Out-Fear	0.086 (0.160)	0.012 (0.242)	0.090 (0.221)	0.073 (0.245)
In-Pride	0.051 (0.166)	0.336 (0.251)	-0.102 (0.229)	0.325 (0.254)
In-Hope	0.100 (0.184)	0.348 (0.269)	-0.216 (0.264)	0.442 (0.274)
In-Anger	-0.186 (0.167)	-0.497* (0.249)	0.074 (0.233)	-0.468 (0.253)
In-Fear	-0.090 (0.241)	0.315 (0.351)	-0.548 (0.341)	0.406 (0.350)
Out-Pride	-0.055 (0.176)	0.158 (0.272)	-0.192 (0.241)	0.219 (0.273)
Out-Hope	-0.197 (0.168)	-0.055 (0.265)	-0.338 (0.227)	-0.044 (0.267)
Women	-0.020 (0.145)	0.681* (0.339)		
White	0.287 (0.179)	0.278 (0.181)	0.112 (0.246)	0.359 (0.286)
Age	2.220*** (0.387)	2.295*** (0.392)	1.795*** (0.515)	3.025*** (0.625)
Education	2.059*** (0.324)	2.120*** (0.329)	2.638*** (0.469)	1.725*** (0.484)
Income	1.598*** (0.290)	1.563*** (0.293)	1.724*** (0.390)	1.464** (0.464)
Unemployed	0.322 (0.293)	0.316 (0.296)	-0.551 (0.375)	1.667** (0.532)
Religiosity	1.198*** (0.208)	1.181*** (0.210)	1.239*** (0.271)	1.133*** (0.339)
Party Strength	0.690*** (0.194)	0.680*** (0.196)	0.821** (0.274)	0.587* (0.290)
Interest	1.248*** (0.215)	1.247*** (0.217)	1.148*** (0.298)	1.478*** (0.328)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.081 (0.305)		

Women X Out-Fear	0.144 (0.323)			
Women X In-Pride	-0.449 (0.337)			
Women X In-Hope	-0.490 (0.369)			
Women X In-Anger	0.556 (0.337)			
Women X In-Fear	-0.759 (0.483)			
Women X Out-Pride	-0.362 (0.358)			
Women X Out-Hope	-0.238 (0.345)			
Constant	-2.825*** (0.326)	-3.212*** (0.370)	-2.437*** (0.422)	-3.472*** (0.515)
Observations	1,502	1,502	830	672
Log Likelihood	-647.229	-641.069	-350.745	-278.970
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,330.458	1,334.137	735.490	591.940

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.14 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 1988 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	-0.081 (0.171)	-0.138 (0.254)	-0.089 (0.233)	-0.147 (0.262)
Out-Fear	0.290 (0.189)	0.229 (0.263)	0.331 (0.276)	0.210 (0.269)
In-Pride	0.019 (0.174)	-0.295 (0.257)	0.275 (0.237)	-0.295 (0.263)
In-Hope	0.447** (0.170)	0.764** (0.261)	0.193 (0.228)	0.755** (0.265)
In-Anger	0.160 (0.210)	-0.010 (0.321)	0.236 (0.276)	-0.025 (0.324)
In-Fear	0.314 (0.280)	0.255 (0.402)	0.468 (0.396)	0.253 (0.407)
Out-Pride	-0.147 (0.226)	-0.390 (0.341)	-0.018 (0.303)	-0.475 (0.348)
Out-Hope	0.151 (0.205)	-0.083 (0.322)	0.289 (0.267)	-0.099 (0.327)
Women	0.009 (0.156)	-0.127 (0.273)		
White	0.031 (0.179)	-0.005 (0.181)	0.167 (0.232)	-0.273 (0.298)
Age	2.372*** (0.381)	2.385*** (0.385)	2.337*** (0.517)	2.414*** (0.585)
Education	2.126*** (0.317)	2.155*** (0.320)	2.095*** (0.446)	2.195*** (0.469)
Income	1.563*** (0.303)	1.571*** (0.305)	1.439*** (0.388)	1.734*** (0.502)
Unemployed	-0.354 (0.345)	-0.375 (0.346)	-0.443 (0.421)	-0.350 (0.632)
Religiosity	1.119*** (0.213)	1.110*** (0.215)	1.014*** (0.278)	1.251*** (0.347)
Party Strength	1.046*** (0.200)	1.056*** (0.201)	1.232*** (0.270)	0.869** (0.307)
Interest	1.847*** (0.233)	1.868*** (0.235)	1.727*** (0.307)	2.091*** (0.373)
Women X Out-Anger		0.044 (0.342)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.087 (0.381)		
Women X In-Pride		0.586 (0.345)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.581 (0.345)		
Women X In-Anger		0.258 (0.423)		
Women X In-Fear		0.208 (0.566)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.354 (0.456)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.361 (0.419)		
Constant	-3.681*** (0.325)	-3.579*** (0.353)	-3.726*** (0.397)	-3.507*** (0.515)
Observations	1,384	1,384	778	606
Log Likelihood	-587.097	-582.943	-335.919	-245.269
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,210.194	1,217.886	705.838	524.537

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.15 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)

Out-Anger	0.399** (0.153)	0.100 (0.224)	0.627** (0.214)	0.125 (0.226)
Out-Fear	0.104 (0.152)	0.503* (0.235)	-0.200 (0.208)	0.502* (0.237)
In-Pride	0.267 (0.148)	0.202 (0.215)	0.282 (0.208)	0.242 (0.218)
In-Hope	0.036 (0.163)	0.117 (0.231)	-0.057 (0.235)	0.108 (0.234)
In-Anger	-0.120 (0.177)	-0.204 (0.256)	0.006 (0.253)	-0.237 (0.258)
In-Fear	0.024 (0.190)	-0.281 (0.295)	0.241 (0.253)	-0.291 (0.299)
Out-Pride	0.138 (0.169)	0.296 (0.252)	-0.023 (0.235)	0.334 (0.254)
Out-Hope	0.085 (0.165)	0.007 (0.243)	0.227 (0.232)	-0.015 (0.244)
Women	0.154 (0.141)	0.139 (0.307)		
White	0.190 (0.161)	0.194 (0.162)	0.136 (0.223)	0.272 (0.241)
Age	2.397*** (0.362)	2.456*** (0.366)	2.308*** (0.488)	2.833*** (0.569)
Education	2.607*** (0.311)	2.641*** (0.313)	2.495*** (0.451)	2.793*** (0.441)
Income	1.602*** (0.274)	1.648*** (0.278)	1.964*** (0.379)	1.176** (0.424)
Unemployed	-0.182 (0.278)	-0.156 (0.281)	0.028 (0.370)	-0.576 (0.442)
Religiosity	0.474** (0.176)	0.491** (0.177)	0.397 (0.237)	0.622* (0.271)
Party Strength	0.581** (0.187)	0.586** (0.188)	0.950*** (0.262)	0.129 (0.275)
Interest	1.522*** (0.210)	1.536*** (0.211)	1.556*** (0.285)	1.581*** (0.323)
Women X Out-Anger		0.564 (0.308)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.676* (0.312)		
Women X In-Pride		0.112 (0.296)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.188 (0.328)		
Women X In-Anger		0.178 (0.355)		
Women X In-Fear		0.481 (0.384)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.319 (0.342)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.195 (0.334)		
Constant	-3.334*** (0.306)	-3.391*** (0.342)	-3.342*** (0.403)	-3.271*** (0.452)
Observations	1,742	1,742	921	821
Log Likelihood	-684.931	-680.367	-358.309	-318.155
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,405.862	1,412.734	750.618	670.311

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.16 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 1996 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	-0.128 (0.177)	-0.315 (0.267)	0.124 (0.243)	-0.355 (0.272)
Out-Fear	0.110 (0.188)	0.434 (0.284)	-0.084 (0.260)	0.487 (0.287)
In-Pride	-0.297 (0.191)	-0.225 (0.283)	-0.282 (0.267)	-0.222 (0.292)
In-Hope	0.386* (0.196)	0.244 (0.290)	0.358 (0.280)	0.338 (0.294)
In-Anger	-0.172 (0.183)	-0.283 (0.281)	-0.229 (0.247)	-0.283 (0.288)
In-Fear	-0.086 (0.222)	-0.301 (0.333)	0.091 (0.307)	-0.233 (0.346)
Out-Pride	0.244 (0.197)	0.903** (0.334)	-0.064 (0.257)	0.960** (0.340)
Out-Hope	-0.044 (0.202)	-0.737* (0.316)	0.420 (0.272)	-0.726* (0.321)
Women	0.098 (0.163)	-0.057 (0.356)		
White	0.167 (0.198)	0.177 (0.203)	-0.147 (0.270)	0.680* (0.319)
Age	2.829*** (0.423)	2.902*** (0.432)	2.956*** (0.573)	3.047*** (0.682)
Education	2.457*** (0.351)	2.489*** (0.357)	3.111*** (0.504)	1.706** (0.522)
Income	1.773*** (0.322)	1.758*** (0.327)	1.910*** (0.425)	1.523** (0.538)
Unemployed	-0.306 (0.534)	-0.402 (0.544)	-0.632 (0.678)	0.115 (0.931)
Religiosity	1.085*** (0.225)	1.123*** (0.230)	1.132*** (0.307)	1.087** (0.350)
Party Strength	0.886*** (0.227)	0.896*** (0.230)	1.088*** (0.309)	0.561 (0.357)
Interest	1.799*** (0.258)	1.892*** (0.264)	1.450*** (0.358)	2.523*** (0.406)

Women X Out-Anger		0.368 (0.356)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.561 (0.382)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.074 (0.379)		
Women X In-Hope		0.126 (0.398)		
Women X In-Anger		0.096 (0.367)		
Women X In-Fear		0.423 (0.448)		
Women X Out-Pride		-1.040* (0.421)		
Women X Out-Hope		1.141** (0.414)		
Constant	-3.605*** (0.360)	-3.572*** (0.408)	-3.691*** (0.464)	-3.710*** (0.545)
Observations	1,254	1,254	687	567
Log Likelihood	-508.483	-500.189	-284.690	-210.406
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,052.967	1,052.378	603.381	454.813

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.17 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 2000 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.189 (0.198)	0.147 (0.286)	0.179 (0.282)	0.165 (0.296)
Out-Fear	-0.004 (0.210)	0.275 (0.311)	-0.280 (0.289)	0.368 (0.323)
In-Pride	-0.068 (0.200)	-0.568 (0.292)	0.350 (0.286)	-0.559 (0.307)
In-Hope	0.358 (0.200)	0.716* (0.309)	0.037 (0.272)	0.674* (0.322)
In-Anger	-0.138 (0.243)	-0.365 (0.355)	0.142 (0.339)	-0.334 (0.367)
In-Fear	0.422 (0.330)	0.712 (0.555)	0.342 (0.424)	0.609 (0.566)
Out-Pride	0.975*** (0.291)	2.162*** (0.553)	0.186 (0.352)	2.453*** (0.590)
Out-Hope	-0.381 (0.226)	-0.976** (0.347)	0.085 (0.301)	-1.056** (0.365)
Women	0.010 (0.172)	0.071 (0.324)		
White	0.199 (0.196)	0.198 (0.200)	0.335 (0.258)	0.118 (0.326)
Age	1.635*** (0.431)	1.636*** (0.437)	0.748 (0.565)	2.914*** (0.729)
Education	2.291*** (0.360)	2.362*** (0.366)	2.080*** (0.484)	2.662*** (0.570)
Income	1.179*** (0.346)	1.211*** (0.353)	0.917* (0.450)	1.589** (0.586)
Unemployed	-0.034 (0.395)	-0.090 (0.397)	0.155 (0.523)	-0.506 (0.641)
Religiosity	0.633** (0.221)	0.635** (0.223)	0.687* (0.282)	0.563 (0.373)
Party Strength	0.779*** (0.224)	0.832*** (0.227)	0.757* (0.304)	0.888* (0.348)
Interest	1.505*** (0.286)	1.555*** (0.288)	1.864*** (0.379)	1.192** (0.450)
Women X Out-Anger		0.060 (0.403)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.543 (0.420)		
Women X In-Pride		0.914* (0.402)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.686 (0.413)		
Women X In-Anger		0.531 (0.491)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.321 (0.699)		
Women X Out-Pride		-1.909** (0.654)		
Women X Out-Hope		1.052* (0.457)		
Constant	-2.851*** (0.352)	-2.968*** (0.402)	-2.572*** (0.417)	-3.445*** (0.589)
Observations	1,106	1,106	597	509
Log Likelihood	-472.705	-464.152	-274.537	-184.771
Akaike Inf. Crit.	981.410	980.303	583.074	403.542

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.18 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 2004 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Voting for President			

	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.306 (0.232)	0.080 (0.320)	0.612 (0.357)	0.081 (0.326)
Out-Fear	-0.015 (0.237)	0.182 (0.325)	-0.224 (0.368)	0.253 (0.340)
In-Pride	0.026 (0.247)	0.493 (0.340)	-0.311 (0.377)	0.534 (0.350)
In-Hope	0.113 (0.283)	0.205 (0.363)	-0.109 (0.493)	0.294 (0.374)
In-Anger	-0.015 (0.287)	-0.020 (0.397)	0.114 (0.429)	0.061 (0.406)
In-Fear	0.349 (0.360)	0.778 (0.609)	0.090 (0.468)	0.756 (0.619)
Out-Pride	-0.280 (0.248)	-0.376 (0.347)	-0.081 (0.374)	-0.327 (0.353)
Out-Hope	0.203 (0.276)	0.728 (0.403)	-0.308 (0.396)	0.657 (0.412)
Women	0.372 (0.220)	1.208* (0.568)		
White	0.531* (0.229)	0.540* (0.234)	0.726* (0.359)	0.430 (0.317)
Age	0.772 (0.527)	0.889 (0.536)	0.090 (0.765)	1.835* (0.782)
Education	1.494*** (0.444)	1.495*** (0.452)	1.915** (0.708)	1.257* (0.606)
Income	1.424*** (0.397)	1.557*** (0.406)	0.782 (0.611)	2.150*** (0.554)
Unemployed	-0.583 (0.498)	-0.425 (0.510)	-0.414 (0.771)	-0.583 (0.711)
Religiosity	0.246 (0.285)	0.289 (0.292)	0.750 (0.419)	-0.199 (0.423)
Party Strength	0.963*** (0.284)	0.953*** (0.288)	1.628*** (0.423)	0.401 (0.403)
Interest	1.682*** (0.325)	1.663*** (0.331)	1.752*** (0.501)	1.585*** (0.454)
Women X Out-Anger		0.554 (0.476)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.412 (0.481)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.840 (0.505)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.191 (0.587)		
Women X In-Anger		0.137 (0.577)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.716 (0.762)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.201 (0.508)		
Women X Out-Hope		-1.070 (0.558)		
Constant	-2.506*** (0.417)	-3.082*** (0.516)	-2.156*** (0.600)	-3.118*** (0.622)
Observations	813	813	429	384
Log Likelihood	-296.232	-290.198	-134.957	-151.235
Akaike Inf. Crit.	628.463	632.395	303.914	336.471

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.19 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 2008 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Voting for President			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.176 (0.228)	0.437 (0.355)	0.065 (0.324)	0.445 (0.378)
Out-Fear	0.210 (0.233)	0.542 (0.356)	-0.193 (0.332)	0.416 (0.369)
In-Pride	0.616** (0.225)	0.569 (0.322)	0.588 (0.330)	0.612 (0.340)
In-Hope	0.030 (0.255)	-0.257 (0.371)	0.367 (0.365)	-0.241 (0.385)
In-Anger	0.589* (0.300)	0.393 (0.429)	0.655 (0.457)	0.407 (0.444)
In-Fear	-0.456 (0.281)	-1.246** (0.433)	0.350 (0.405)	-1.206** (0.463)
Out-Pride	0.228 (0.252)	0.521 (0.364)	-0.179 (0.372)	0.551 (0.380)
Out-Hope	-0.414 (0.243)	-0.672 (0.353)	-0.220 (0.370)	-0.701 (0.375)
Women	0.476* (0.205)	0.149 (0.482)		
White	-0.316 (0.240)	-0.384 (0.246)	-0.300 (0.344)	-0.319 (0.372)
Age	1.681*** (0.467)	1.667*** (0.487)	1.982** (0.697)	1.128 (0.718)
Education	2.534*** (0.440)	2.517*** (0.449)	1.924** (0.617)	3.757*** (0.739)
Income	0.533 (0.415)	0.760 (0.430)	1.316* (0.621)	-0.169 (0.635)
Unemployed	-0.653 (0.405)	-0.687 (0.423)	-1.143 (0.586)	-0.180 (0.633)
Religiosity	0.192 (0.272)	0.206 (0.277)	0.185 (0.376)	0.371 (0.434)
Party Strength	0.619* (0.264)	0.675* (0.272)	-0.148 (0.383)	1.844*** (0.434)

Interest	1.045*** (0.315)	1.073*** (0.322)	1.458** (0.479)	0.588 (0.465)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.513 (0.478)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.658 (0.482)		
Women X In-Pride		0.013 (0.454)		
Women X In-Hope		0.654 (0.514)		
Women X In-Anger		0.415 (0.627)		
Women X In-Fear		1.524** (0.590)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.689 (0.512)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.577 (0.503)		
Constant	-2.216*** (0.405)	-2.131*** (0.485)	-1.806*** (0.526)	-2.320*** (0.646)
Observations	804	804	446	358
Log Likelihood	-323.329	-315.150	-166.221	-138.415
Akaike Inf. Crit.	682.658	682.301	366.442	310.831

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.20 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 2012 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Voting for President			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.107 (0.093)	-0.076 (0.134)	0.290* (0.133)	-0.076 (0.134)
Out-Fear	0.093 (0.090)	0.221 (0.130)	-0.002 (0.125)	0.243 (0.131)
In-Pride	0.091 (0.099)	0.091 (0.133)	0.065 (0.150)	0.084 (0.134)
In-Hope	0.301** (0.114)	0.249 (0.154)	0.383* (0.172)	0.243 (0.155)
In-Anger	0.162 (0.104)	0.147 (0.150)	0.195 (0.147)	0.125 (0.151)
In-Fear	-0.103 (0.132)	-0.279 (0.188)	0.050 (0.189)	-0.275 (0.188)
Out-Pride	0.196 (0.127)	0.283 (0.179)	0.116 (0.184)	0.269 (0.179)
Out-Hope	-0.269* (0.114)	-0.451** (0.162)	-0.093 (0.163)	-0.448** (0.162)
Women	0.010 (0.078)	-0.277 (0.203)		
White	-0.017 (0.090)	-0.019 (0.090)	-0.024 (0.127)	-0.028 (0.129)
Age	1.668*** (0.194)	1.670*** (0.194)	1.908*** (0.274)	1.401*** (0.277)
Education	1.034*** (0.160)	1.032*** (0.161)	0.955*** (0.227)	1.108*** (0.230)
Income	0.921*** (0.147)	0.930*** (0.148)	1.244*** (0.207)	0.598** (0.214)
Unemployed	-0.091 (0.156)	-0.115 (0.157)	0.010 (0.243)	-0.222 (0.207)
Religiosity	0.456*** (0.100)	0.447*** (0.100)	0.514*** (0.141)	0.336* (0.144)
Party Strength	0.563*** (0.102)	0.567*** (0.102)	0.724*** (0.144)	0.392** (0.144)
Interest	1.202*** (0.115)	1.203*** (0.116)	1.014*** (0.165)	1.385*** (0.163)
Women X Out-Anger		0.355 (0.186)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.222 (0.178)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.029 (0.196)		
Women X In-Hope		0.117 (0.229)		
Women X In-Anger		0.045 (0.209)		
Women X In-Fear		0.311 (0.265)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.166 (0.255)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.354 (0.227)		
Constant	-1.910*** (0.169)	-1.768*** (0.191)	-2.243*** (0.237)	-1.538*** (0.233)
Observations	4,676	4,676	2,409	2,267
Log Likelihood	-2,024.822	-2,020.011	-1,017.638	-995.835
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,085.644	4,092.021	2,069.275	2,025.670

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.21 Effects of Emotions on Voting for President, 2016 (Weighted)*Dependent variable:*

Voting for President				
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	-0.549* (0.219)	-0.669* (0.313)	-0.454 (0.315)	-0.667* (0.312)
Out-Fear	0.661*** (0.158)	0.624** (0.225)	0.723** (0.230)	0.614** (0.224)
In-Pride	0.413** (0.157)	0.222 (0.217)	0.665** (0.234)	0.249 (0.218)
In-Hope	-0.228 (0.175)	0.243 (0.245)	-0.782** (0.264)	0.226 (0.244)
In-Anger	-0.067 (0.125)	-0.246 (0.177)	0.163 (0.179)	-0.256 (0.177)
In-Fear	-0.125 (0.124)	-0.127 (0.174)	-0.093 (0.179)	-0.135 (0.174)
Out-Pride	0.165 (0.170)	0.175 (0.231)	0.141 (0.254)	0.143 (0.230)
Out-Hope	-0.517*** (0.153)	-0.446* (0.208)	-0.594** (0.230)	-0.440* (0.207)
Women	0.203 (0.107)	0.224 (0.469)		
White	0.203 (0.114)	0.190 (0.115)	0.105 (0.166)	0.276 (0.160)
Age	1.619*** (0.257)	1.617*** (0.258)	1.584*** (0.369)	1.603*** (0.361)
Education	1.323*** (0.219)	1.329*** (0.220)	1.406*** (0.327)	1.228*** (0.299)
Income	1.295*** (0.202)	1.289*** (0.203)	1.510*** (0.292)	1.092*** (0.287)
Unemployed	-0.342 (0.200)	-0.348 (0.201)	-0.373 (0.261)	-0.321 (0.317)
Religiosity	0.674*** (0.143)	0.684*** (0.144)	0.811*** (0.206)	0.557** (0.204)
Party Strength	0.626*** (0.137)	0.619*** (0.137)	0.885*** (0.197)	0.378* (0.193)
Interest	1.436*** (0.152)	1.433*** (0.154)	1.380*** (0.219)	1.486*** (0.220)
Women X Out-Anger		0.244 (0.441)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.074 (0.319)		
Women X In-Pride		0.445 (0.314)		
Women X In-Hope		-1.021** (0.357)		
Women X In-Anger		0.396 (0.249)		
Women X In-Fear		0.016 (0.248)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.067 (0.341)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.147 (0.308)		
Constant	-2.119*** (0.298)	-2.121*** (0.373)	-2.120*** (0.431)	-1.887*** (0.410)
Observations	2,992	2,992	1,598	1,394
Log Likelihood	-1,184.572	-1,176.140	-567.508	-604.817
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,405.145	2,404.279	1,169.017	1,243.633

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.22 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 1980 (Weighted)

Dependent variable: Non-Voting Participation				
	Full Sample	Interaction	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Anger	0.227*** (0.059)	0.240** (0.091)	0.224** (0.078)	0.251** (0.092)
Out-Fear	0.244*** (0.063)	0.151 (0.095)	0.327*** (0.085)	0.162 (0.096)
In-Pride	0.172** (0.065)	0.141 (0.098)	0.231** (0.086)	0.107 (0.099)
In-Hope	-0.109 (0.075)	-0.094 (0.111)	-0.141 (0.102)	-0.098 (0.111)
In-Anger	0.008 (0.059)	0.142 (0.091)	-0.103 (0.078)	0.145 (0.092)
In-Fear	-0.066 (0.078)	-0.028 (0.120)	-0.136 (0.105)	-0.027 (0.120)
Out-Pride	0.062 (0.071)	0.239* (0.108)	-0.057 (0.094)	0.227* (0.109)
Out-Hope	0.019 (0.069)	-0.092 (0.102)	0.134 (0.093)	-0.099 (0.103)
Women	-0.066 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.147)		
White	0.220** (0.081)	0.225** (0.081)	0.112 (0.110)	0.354** (0.119)
Age	-0.352* (0.141)	-0.367** (0.142)	-0.310 (0.186)	-0.393 (0.221)
Education	0.170 (0.117)	0.165 (0.117)	0.289 (0.160)	0.065 (0.174)
Income	0.227* (0.110)	0.226* (0.110)	0.273 (0.142)	0.134 (0.177)
Unemployed	0.008 (0.148)	0.017 (0.149)	0.091 (0.184)	-0.131 (0.253)
Religiosity	0.168* (0.075)	0.152* (0.076)	0.037 (0.099)	0.318** (0.118)

Party Strength	0.296*** (0.079)	0.301*** (0.079)	0.226* (0.106)	0.395** (0.120)
Interest	0.615*** (0.082)	0.611*** (0.082)	0.550*** (0.108)	0.663*** (0.128)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.005 (0.118)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.173 (0.125)		
Women X In-Pride		0.072 (0.128)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.039 (0.150)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.225 (0.119)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.088 (0.159)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.307* (0.143)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.214 (0.137)		
Constant	-0.364** (0.133)	-0.384* (0.151)	-0.282 (0.175)	-0.513** (0.196)
Observations	1,004	1,004	571	433

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.23 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 1984 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Non-Voting Participation			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.186*** (0.054)	0.245** (0.080)	0.144* (0.066)	0.229* (0.089)
Out-Fear	0.145** (0.055)	0.117 (0.082)	0.172* (0.068)	0.116 (0.091)
In-Pride	0.061 (0.061)	0.080 (0.090)	0.054 (0.074)	0.060 (0.101)
In-Hope	0.009 (0.070)	0.032 (0.102)	0.001 (0.087)	0.014 (0.114)
In-Anger	0.017 (0.060)	-0.058 (0.088)	0.080 (0.075)	-0.041 (0.098)
In-Fear	-0.001 (0.087)	-0.028 (0.120)	0.051 (0.115)	-0.008 (0.134)
Out-Pride	-0.092 (0.064)	-0.095 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.077)	-0.104 (0.106)
Out-Hope	-0.011 (0.062)	0.018 (0.095)	-0.037 (0.073)	-0.016 (0.106)
Women	-0.145** (0.051)	-0.074 (0.128)		
White	0.033 (0.067)	0.033 (0.068)	0.157 (0.080)	-0.145 (0.117)
Age	-0.211 (0.130)	-0.205 (0.131)	-0.026 (0.156)	-0.422 (0.222)
Education	0.546*** (0.108)	0.553*** (0.109)	0.608*** (0.137)	0.518** (0.174)
Income	0.093 (0.102)	0.087 (0.103)	-0.009 (0.123)	0.222 (0.174)
Unemployed	0.147 (0.113)	0.141 (0.113)	0.066 (0.131)	0.343 (0.202)
Religiosity	0.004 (0.069)	-0.002 (0.070)	-0.075 (0.083)	0.082 (0.118)
Party Strength	0.348*** (0.066)	0.347*** (0.067)	0.296*** (0.083)	0.397*** (0.107)
Interest	0.674*** (0.077)	0.670*** (0.078)	0.578*** (0.096)	0.786*** (0.126)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.110 (0.107)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.057 (0.111)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.023 (0.121)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.057 (0.139)		
Women X In-Anger		0.144 (0.121)		
Women X In-Fear		0.074 (0.175)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.007 (0.127)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.047 (0.125)		
Constant	-0.271* (0.113)	-0.302* (0.129)	-0.420** (0.132)	-0.237 (0.184)
Observations	1,458	1,458	801	657

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.24 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 1988 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Non-Voting Participation			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)

Out-Anger	0.048 (0.061)	-0.040 (0.089)	0.121 (0.081)	-0.053 (0.094)
Out-Fear	0.153* (0.064)	0.172 (0.090)	0.137 (0.090)	0.172 (0.094)
In-Pride	0.102 (0.062)	0.123 (0.089)	0.070 (0.084)	0.119 (0.094)
In-Hope	-0.003 (0.064)	0.008 (0.096)	0.011 (0.085)	0.009 (0.100)
In-Anger	0.253*** (0.073)	0.294** (0.112)	0.218* (0.094)	0.283* (0.117)
In-Fear	-0.224* (0.096)	-0.395** (0.136)	-0.045 (0.134)	-0.405** (0.142)
Out-Pride	-0.102 (0.081)	-0.215 (0.127)	-0.015 (0.104)	-0.225 (0.132)
Out-Hope	-0.040 (0.074)	0.078 (0.116)	-0.120 (0.093)	0.085 (0.121)
Women	-0.103 (0.056)	-0.138 (0.106)		
White	-0.173* (0.067)	-0.182** (0.068)	-0.171* (0.085)	-0.217 (0.112)
Age	0.264 (0.136)	0.254 (0.136)	0.447* (0.182)	0.025 (0.210)
Education	0.634*** (0.106)	0.645*** (0.107)	0.735*** (0.146)	0.549*** (0.158)
Income	0.399*** (0.112)	0.402*** (0.112)	0.306* (0.139)	0.578** (0.190)
Unemployed	-0.002 (0.137)	-0.010 (0.138)	-0.036 (0.161)	0.068 (0.260)
Religiosity	0.082 (0.074)	0.084 (0.074)	0.061 (0.097)	0.109 (0.116)
Party Strength	0.192** (0.070)	0.196** (0.070)	0.184 (0.094)	0.206 (0.108)
Interest	0.621*** (0.082)	0.617*** (0.083)	0.575*** (0.108)	0.637*** (0.130)
Women X Out-Anger		0.159 (0.120)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.040 (0.128)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.054 (0.123)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.002 (0.129)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.077 (0.148)		
Women X In-Fear		0.343 (0.194)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.198 (0.165)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.203 (0.150)		
Constant	-0.332** (0.109)	-0.308* (0.122)	-0.486*** (0.127)	-0.268 (0.179)
Observations	1,379	1,379	775	604

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.25 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 1992 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable: Non-Voting Participation			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.123* (0.053)	0.091 (0.077)	0.133 (0.072)	0.097 (0.080)
Out-Fear	0.210*** (0.052)	0.289*** (0.077)	0.140* (0.070)	0.299*** (0.079)
In-Pride	0.146** (0.051)	0.174* (0.074)	0.147* (0.071)	0.186* (0.076)
In-Hope	0.060 (0.059)	0.188* (0.084)	-0.083 (0.083)	0.189* (0.086)
In-Anger	0.096 (0.058)	0.177* (0.083)	0.007 (0.081)	0.191* (0.086)
In-Fear	0.019 (0.064)	-0.010 (0.101)	0.018 (0.083)	0.009 (0.103)
Out-Pride	-0.033 (0.058)	0.109 (0.087)	-0.143 (0.077)	0.127 (0.089)
Out-Hope	0.002 (0.057)	-0.076 (0.085)	0.068 (0.077)	-0.088 (0.087)
Women	-0.118* (0.048)	0.187 (0.117)		
White	0.125* (0.059)	0.124* (0.060)	0.174* (0.080)	0.084 (0.089)
Age	-0.112 (0.121)	-0.087 (0.122)	-0.322* (0.161)	0.214 (0.188)
Education	0.421*** (0.097)	0.421*** (0.097)	0.468*** (0.135)	0.393** (0.141)
Income	0.117 (0.097)	0.133 (0.097)	0.124 (0.126)	0.091 (0.157)
Unemployed	0.048 (0.112)	0.046 (0.112)	0.006 (0.142)	0.094 (0.182)
Religiosity	0.053 (0.059)	0.050 (0.059)	0.054 (0.080)	0.059 (0.089)
Party Strength	0.133* (0.063)	0.135* (0.063)	0.162 (0.086)	0.093 (0.093)
Interest	0.700*** (0.075)	0.695*** (0.075)	0.691*** (0.099)	0.704*** (0.115)
Women X Out-Anger		0.054 (0.105)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.142 (0.104)		

Women X In-Pride		-0.031 (0.102)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.266* (0.118)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.164 (0.116)		
Women X In-Fear		0.046 (0.130)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.246* (0.117)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.151 (0.115)		
Constant	-0.376*** (0.104)	-0.548*** (0.119)	-0.326* (0.132)	-0.591*** (0.157)
Observations	1,737	1,737	919	818

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.26 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 1996 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
Non-Voting Participation				
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.121* (0.058)	0.238** (0.085)	0.043 (0.074)	0.225* (0.094)
Out-Fear	0.130* (0.060)	0.119 (0.086)	0.133 (0.077)	0.123 (0.093)
In-Pride	0.089 (0.063)	0.049 (0.090)	0.147 (0.081)	0.053 (0.099)
In-Hope	0.023 (0.068)	0.164 (0.095)	-0.104 (0.090)	0.167 (0.104)
In-Anger	0.099 (0.059)	0.204* (0.086)	0.005 (0.075)	0.203* (0.094)
In-Fear	-0.026 (0.074)	-0.087 (0.108)	0.020 (0.094)	-0.091 (0.119)
Out-Pride	0.083 (0.064)	0.165 (0.096)	0.007 (0.080)	0.158 (0.104)
Out-Hope	-0.071 (0.066)	0.061 (0.098)	-0.156 (0.083)	0.058 (0.107)
Women	-0.119* (0.053)	0.271* (0.124)		
White	0.049 (0.067)	0.057 (0.068)	0.035 (0.084)	0.060 (0.112)
Age	0.221 (0.131)	0.206 (0.131)	0.181 (0.164)	0.276 (0.212)
Education	0.291** (0.108)	0.272* (0.109)	0.357* (0.139)	0.137 (0.172)
Income	0.357*** (0.106)	0.347** (0.105)	0.214 (0.127)	0.543** (0.181)
Unemployed	-0.089 (0.171)	-0.061 (0.172)	-0.035 (0.207)	-0.062 (0.294)
Religiosity	0.134 (0.069)	0.137* (0.069)	0.019 (0.089)	0.267* (0.109)
Party Strength	0.144* (0.072)	0.127 (0.072)	0.193* (0.092)	0.060 (0.115)
Interest	0.655*** (0.082)	0.660*** (0.082)	0.624*** (0.107)	0.678*** (0.126)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.190 (0.114)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.007 (0.118)		
Women X In-Pride		0.083 (0.124)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.270* (0.135)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.205 (0.117)		
Women X In-Fear		0.115 (0.147)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.170 (0.128)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.229 (0.132)		
Constant	-0.485*** (0.107)	-0.683*** (0.123)	-0.350** (0.126)	-0.768*** (0.167)
Observations	1,253	1,253	687	566

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.27 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 2000 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
Non-Voting Participation				
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.030 (0.068)	-0.076 (0.095)	0.137 (0.089)	-0.103 (0.104)
Out-Fear	0.216** (0.070)	0.325** (0.100)	0.131 (0.090)	0.321** (0.108)
In-Pride	0.184** (0.070)	0.219* (0.098)	0.197* (0.093)	0.189 (0.107)
In-Hope	0.069 (0.075)	0.130 (0.112)	0.050 (0.094)	0.088 (0.122)
In-Anger	0.008 (0.084)	-0.010 (0.119)	0.015 (0.110)	0.004 (0.129)

In-Fear	-0.014 (0.105)	-0.124 (0.150)	0.056 (0.136)	-0.124 (0.162)
Out-Pride	-0.039 (0.093)	-0.129 (0.140)	0.019 (0.115)	-0.090 (0.153)
Out-Hope	-0.004 (0.080)	0.040 (0.117)	-0.061 (0.101)	0.058 (0.126)
Women	-0.064 (0.060)	-0.004 (0.124)		
White	0.114 (0.071)	0.117 (0.072)	0.059 (0.088)	0.204 (0.117)
Age	-0.039 (0.152)	-0.048 (0.153)	-0.031 (0.191)	-0.043 (0.245)
Education	0.158 (0.122)	0.166 (0.123)	0.367* (0.157)	-0.052 (0.191)
Income	0.419*** (0.120)	0.416*** (0.120)	0.405** (0.147)	0.433* (0.197)
Unemployed	0.025 (0.157)	-0.002 (0.158)	0.360 (0.192)	-0.497 (0.259)
Religiosity	0.021 (0.076)	0.024 (0.076)	0.076 (0.093)	-0.037 (0.124)
Party Strength	0.115 (0.077)	0.122 (0.077)	-0.028 (0.100)	0.270* (0.117)
Interest	0.605*** (0.098)	0.612*** (0.099)	0.431*** (0.124)	0.849*** (0.157)
Women X Out-Anger		0.228 (0.135)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.216 (0.138)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.076 (0.138)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.107 (0.150)		
Women X In-Anger		0.048 (0.167)		
Women X In-Fear		0.215 (0.210)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.151 (0.187)		
Women X Out-Hope		-0.067 (0.159)		
Constant	-0.240* (0.119)	-0.291* (0.137)	-0.264 (0.135)	-0.372* (0.188)
Observations	1,110	1,110	599	511

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.28 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 2004 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Non-Voting Participation			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.331*** (0.090)	0.389** (0.127)	0.252 (0.130)	0.432*** (0.127)
Out-Fear	0.144 (0.086)	0.184 (0.121)	0.137 (0.124)	0.184 (0.123)
In-Pride	0.267** (0.099)	0.217 (0.144)	0.314* (0.139)	0.285 (0.146)
In-Hope	-0.034 (0.119)	0.086 (0.156)	-0.306 (0.187)	0.129 (0.157)
In-Anger	0.052 (0.103)	0.056 (0.144)	0.034 (0.150)	0.098 (0.145)
In-Fear	-0.065 (0.128)	-0.046 (0.199)	-0.112 (0.172)	-0.036 (0.200)
Out-Pride	-0.134 (0.097)	-0.107 (0.137)	-0.147 (0.141)	-0.089 (0.137)
Out-Hope	0.228* (0.106)	0.256 (0.152)	0.209 (0.150)	0.208 (0.153)
Women	-0.067 (0.080)	0.220 (0.234)		
White	0.224* (0.091)	0.228* (0.092)	0.363** (0.134)	0.080 (0.127)
Age	-0.424* (0.196)	-0.404* (0.198)	-0.267 (0.275)	-0.425 (0.293)
Education	0.391* (0.159)	0.397* (0.161)	0.650** (0.239)	0.196 (0.221)
Income	0.183 (0.147)	0.185 (0.148)	0.210 (0.213)	0.149 (0.206)
Unemployed	0.255 (0.236)	0.279 (0.238)	0.424 (0.335)	0.159 (0.339)
Religiosity	0.116 (0.101)	0.121 (0.103)	0.261 (0.140)	-0.029 (0.151)
Party Strength	0.550*** (0.100)	0.542*** (0.101)	0.547*** (0.143)	0.536*** (0.143)
Interest	0.835*** (0.126)	0.832*** (0.127)	0.988*** (0.176)	0.635*** (0.183)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.110 (0.180)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.064 (0.171)		
Women X In-Pride		0.120 (0.196)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.282 (0.239)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.002 (0.206)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.039 (0.262)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.058 (0.196)		

Women X Out-Hope		-0.046 (0.212)		
Constant	-0.632*** (0.162)	-0.776*** (0.201)	-0.909*** (0.231)	-0.442 (0.227)
Observations	812	812	428	384

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.29 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 2008 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
Non-Voting Participation				
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.343*** (0.093)	0.404** (0.142)	0.240 (0.130)	0.414** (0.140)
Out-Fear	0.215* (0.096)	0.131 (0.145)	0.245 (0.136)	0.169 (0.141)
In-Pride	0.094 (0.107)	0.262 (0.150)	-0.110 (0.156)	0.303* (0.148)
In-Hope	-0.002 (0.119)	-0.048 (0.170)	0.053 (0.175)	-0.029 (0.165)
In-Anger	0.129 (0.116)	0.139 (0.170)	0.096 (0.166)	0.139 (0.165)
In-Fear	0.032 (0.123)	-0.109 (0.193)	0.174 (0.166)	-0.142 (0.190)
Out-Pride	0.065 (0.101)	0.287* (0.140)	-0.195 (0.148)	0.310* (0.137)
Out-Hope	0.023 (0.104)	-0.038 (0.152)	0.123 (0.152)	-0.015 (0.147)
Women	-0.015 (0.086)	0.150 (0.231)		
White	-0.215* (0.100)	-0.208* (0.100)	-0.215 (0.144)	-0.225 (0.142)
Age	0.403* (0.195)	0.410* (0.198)	0.507 (0.279)	0.348 (0.283)
Education	0.755*** (0.173)	0.741*** (0.173)	0.900*** (0.254)	0.532* (0.240)
Income	0.068 (0.174)	0.076 (0.175)	0.149 (0.254)	0.0002 (0.242)
Unemployed	0.059 (0.206)	0.064 (0.208)	0.070 (0.300)	-0.007 (0.288)
Religiosity	0.057 (0.109)	0.063 (0.109)	-0.007 (0.150)	0.160 (0.160)
Party Strength	0.269* (0.109)	0.278* (0.110)	0.462** (0.154)	0.072 (0.158)
Interest	0.654*** (0.143)	0.650*** (0.144)	0.748*** (0.205)	0.552** (0.205)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.121 (0.189)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.147 (0.194)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.335 (0.209)		
Women X In-Hope		0.140 (0.238)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.045 (0.234)		
Women X In-Fear		0.285 (0.251)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.445* (0.199)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.143 (0.211)		
Constant	-0.475** (0.173)	-0.585*** (0.215)	-0.617** (0.229)	-0.332 (0.257)
Observations	803	803	444	359

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.30 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 2012 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
Non-Voting Participation				
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	0.148*** (0.043)	0.205*** (0.061)	0.094 (0.058)	0.222*** (0.064)
Out-Fear	0.183*** (0.039)	0.185** (0.057)	0.160** (0.052)	0.173** (0.059)
In-Pride	0.251*** (0.045)	0.237*** (0.060)	0.277*** (0.064)	0.226*** (0.063)
In-Hope	-0.032 (0.055)	0.049 (0.074)	-0.145 (0.079)	0.067 (0.077)
In-Anger	0.157*** (0.044)	0.297*** (0.063)	-0.003 (0.059)	0.313*** (0.066)
In-Fear	0.072 (0.060)	0.036 (0.086)	0.113 (0.081)	0.027 (0.089)
Out-Pride	-0.039 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.078)	-0.047 (0.075)	-0.040 (0.081)
Out-Hope	-0.081 (0.052)	-0.126 (0.075)	-0.040 (0.070)	-0.125 (0.079)
Women	-0.088** (0.034)	0.162 (0.099)		
White	-0.125** (0.040)	-0.128** (0.040)	-0.156** (0.054)	-0.108 (0.059)

Age	0.510*** (0.084)	0.509*** (0.084)	0.528*** (0.114)	0.518*** (0.124)
Education	0.254*** (0.069)	0.253*** (0.069)	0.314*** (0.093)	0.218* (0.102)
Income	0.155* (0.066)	0.149* (0.065)	0.181* (0.087)	0.106 (0.098)
Unemployed	0.232** (0.075)	0.224** (0.075)	-0.104 (0.114)	0.452*** (0.101)
Religiosity	0.087* (0.042)	0.094* (0.042)	0.002 (0.057)	0.201** (0.063)
Party Strength	0.297*** (0.044)	0.300*** (0.044)	0.249*** (0.060)	0.357*** (0.064)
Interest	0.932*** (0.053)	0.928*** (0.053)	1.000*** (0.072)	0.856*** (0.079)
Women X Out-Anger		-0.110 (0.085)		
Women X Out-Fear		-0.014 (0.078)		
Women X In-Pride		0.036 (0.088)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.185 (0.110)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.283** (0.088)		
Women X In-Fear		0.065 (0.120)		
Women X Out-Pride		0.019 (0.110)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.077 (0.104)		
Constant	-0.591*** (0.075)	-0.699*** (0.086)	-0.524*** (0.101)	-0.728*** (0.107)
Observations	4,410	4,410	2,253	2,157

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.31 Effects of Emotions on Non-Voting Participation, 2016 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:			
	Non-Voting Participation			
	Full Sample (1)	Interaction (2)	Women (3)	Men (4)
Out-Anger	-0.026 (0.090)	-0.116 (0.126)	0.077 (0.124)	-0.105 (0.132)
Out-Fear	0.112 (0.070)	0.011 (0.099)	0.176 (0.096)	0.014 (0.104)
In-Pride	0.226** (0.070)	0.277** (0.096)	0.128 (0.098)	0.292** (0.101)
In-Hope	-0.022 (0.077)	0.013 (0.111)	-0.043 (0.104)	0.022 (0.116)
In-Anger	-0.001 (0.047)	0.014 (0.068)	-0.004 (0.062)	0.014 (0.071)
In-Fear	-0.124** (0.048)	-0.005 (0.069)	-0.220*** (0.064)	-0.033 (0.072)
Out-Pride	-0.040 (0.072)	-0.033 (0.099)	-0.040 (0.100)	-0.039 (0.104)
Out-Hope	0.009 (0.066)	0.009 (0.091)	0.011 (0.091)	0.004 (0.095)
Women	-0.108** (0.041)	-0.172 (0.200)		
White	0.043 (0.047)	0.052 (0.047)	0.007 (0.062)	0.104 (0.071)
Age	-0.081 (0.101)	-0.072 (0.101)	-0.029 (0.135)	-0.077 (0.150)
Education	0.384*** (0.083)	0.382*** (0.084)	0.516*** (0.116)	0.266* (0.122)
Income	-0.044 (0.081)	-0.060 (0.082)	-0.027 (0.108)	-0.108 (0.125)
Unemployed	0.230* (0.093)	0.234* (0.093)	0.314** (0.114)	0.111 (0.156)
Religiosity	0.021 (0.053)	0.024 (0.053)	-0.108 (0.070)	0.168* (0.081)
Party Strength	0.310*** (0.053)	0.313*** (0.053)	0.378*** (0.072)	0.242** (0.078)
Interest	0.770*** (0.065)	0.775*** (0.065)	0.890*** (0.085)	0.638*** (0.100)
Women X Out-Anger		0.190 (0.180)		
Women X Out-Fear		0.196 (0.141)		
Women X In-Pride		-0.125 (0.139)		
Women X In-Hope		-0.064 (0.155)		
Women X In-Anger		-0.035 (0.094)		
Women X In-Fear		-0.232* (0.095)		
Women X Out-Pride		-0.019 (0.144)		
Women X Out-Hope		0.006 (0.131)		
Constant	-0.106 (0.124)	-0.080 (0.157)	-0.386* (0.167)	0.055 (0.180)
Observations	2,975	2,975	1,589	1,386

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.32 Model for Figure 4.4 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Campaign Interest 1980-2016 (1)
Dem Women	-1.449** (0.492)
Women	
Out-Anger	-0.867** (0.325)
Out-Fear	0.664** (0.243)
In-Pride	0.458 (0.249)
In-Hope	0.047 (0.264)
In-Anger	-0.168 (0.180)
In-Fear	-0.978*** (0.176)
Out-Pride	0.491* (0.244)
Out-Hope	0.240 (0.234)
White	0.117 (0.118)
Age	2.561*** (0.242)
Education	1.164*** (0.209)
Income	0.205 (0.194)
Unemployed	0.182 (0.199)
Religiosity	0.011 (0.129)
Party Strength	0.555*** (0.126)
Dem Women X Out-Anger	1.382** (0.444)
Dem Women X Out-Fear	-0.407 (0.334)
Dem Women X In-Pride	0.654 (0.338)
Dem Women X In-Hope	-0.481 (0.359)
Dem Women X In-Anger	-0.207 (0.231)
Dem Women X In-Fear	1.122*** (0.233)
Dem Women X Out-Pride	-0.545 (0.350)
Dem Women X Out-Hope	0.008 (0.318)
Observations	1,787
Log Likelihood	-1,577.684
Akaike Inf. Crit.	
<i>Note:</i>	$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

PART 2 EMOTION OUTCOMES**Table C.4.33 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 1980 (Weighted)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats (1)	Democrats (2)	Democrats (3)	Democrats (4)
Out-Fear	0.980*** (0.194)		0.233 (0.222)	0.903*** (0.260)
Out-Anger		0.958*** (0.195)	0.785*** (0.223)	0.449 (0.266)
In-Pride	-0.471 (0.271)	-0.347 (0.272)	0.619* (0.279)	-0.513 (0.295)
In-Hope	-0.359 (0.233)	-0.959*** (0.241)	0.483* (0.245)	0.238 (0.268)
In-Anger	0.625** (0.197)	0.305 (0.196)	-0.709*** (0.207)	-0.275 (0.236)
In-Fear	0.123 (0.282)	1.494*** (0.296)	-0.815** (0.292)	-0.399 (0.316)
Out-Pride	0.806*** (0.224)	0.200 (0.223)		2.458*** (0.239)
Out-Hope	0.439 (0.262)	0.922*** (0.260)	2.466*** (0.239)	
Women	0.265 (0.191)	-0.368 (0.190)	0.449* (0.197)	0.073 (0.222)
White	-0.277 (0.230)	0.330 (0.231)	0.242 (0.246)	-0.329 (0.279)
Age	-0.139 (0.468)	-1.284** (0.470)	0.408 (0.503)	0.283 (0.564)
Education	0.748* (0.380)	1.324*** (0.380)	-0.126 (0.401)	0.726 (0.446)

Income	0.203 (0.362)	0.375 (0.369)	-0.808* (0.386)	-0.204 (0.425)
Unemployed	0.934* (0.406)	0.640 (0.395)	0.242 (0.451)	-0.935 (0.478)
Religiosity	-0.580* (0.256)	0.022 (0.257)	0.420 (0.271)	0.063 (0.301)
Party Strength	0.071 (0.264)	0.225 (0.267)	0.658* (0.278)	0.186 (0.316)
Constant	-2.389*** (0.450)	-2.321*** (0.451)	-2.169*** (0.466)	-0.361 (0.486)
Observations	693	693	693	693
Log Likelihood	-373.248	-367.977	-341.317	-283.063
Akaike Inf. Crit.	778.497	767.955	714.633	598.126

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.34 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 1980 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger Republicans (1)	Out-Fear Republicans (2)	In-Pride Republicans (3)	In-Hope Republicans (4)
Out-Fear	1.222*** (0.326)		0.291 (0.244)	0.954** (0.333)
Out-Anger		1.262*** (0.327)	1.014*** (0.295)	0.185 (0.316)
In-Pride	-0.972** (0.319)	-0.010 (0.280)	0.795** (0.285)	-0.612 (0.343)
In-Hope	-0.052 (0.313)	-1.025*** (0.272)	-0.078 (0.273)	0.574 (0.335)
In-Anger	0.608 (0.398)	0.565 (0.312)	-0.689* (0.324)	-0.210 (0.368)
In-Fear	0.121 (0.353)	0.758* (0.295)	-0.815** (0.302)	-0.572 (0.336)
Out-Pride	1.051*** (0.298)	0.280 (0.244)		2.274*** (0.337)
Out-Hope	0.153 (0.315)	0.913** (0.325)	2.305*** (0.339)	
Women	-0.005 (0.263)	0.117 (0.224)	-0.090 (0.229)	-0.127 (0.278)
White	0.985* (0.464)	0.115 (0.529)	-0.555 (0.486)	0.978 (0.513)
Age	-1.486* (0.634)	0.227 (0.551)	0.070 (0.558)	-0.407 (0.682)
Education	-0.262 (0.516)	0.796 (0.458)	-0.342 (0.470)	1.263* (0.555)
Income	0.361 (0.501)	1.006* (0.437)	0.020 (0.448)	0.160 (0.533)
Unemployed	-0.624 (0.890)	0.776 (0.725)	-0.626 (0.753)	0.754 (1.137)
Religiosity	-1.247*** (0.364)	0.380 (0.297)	0.754* (0.306)	0.040 (0.377)
Party Strength	-0.051 (0.358)	0.424 (0.290)	0.995*** (0.301)	0.384 (0.383)
Constant	0.983 (0.612)	-3.822*** (0.731)	-2.780*** (0.658)	-1.391* (0.696)
Observations	454	454	454	454
Log Likelihood	-196.307	-256.660	-247.189	-176.414
Akaike Inf. Crit.	424.614	545.319	526.378	384.828

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.35 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 1984 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger Democrats (1)	Out-Fear Democrats (2)	In-Pride Democrats (3)	In-Hope Democrats (4)
Out-Fear	1.230*** (0.191)		0.291 (0.178)	0.545** (0.202)
Out-Anger		1.218*** (0.191)	0.593** (0.186)	0.943*** (0.187)
In-Pride	-0.574** (0.194)	-0.742*** (0.192)	0.704*** (0.198)	-0.727*** (0.206)
In-Hope	0.018 (0.182)	-0.386* (0.178)	0.256 (0.181)	-0.441* (0.192)
In-Anger	1.169*** (0.248)	-0.103 (0.210)	-0.130 (0.217)	-0.382 (0.236)
In-Fear	-0.415 (0.309)	1.517*** (0.297)	-0.688* (0.326)	-0.570 (0.316)
Out-Pride	0.607** (0.189)	0.303 (0.177)		2.219*** (0.201)
Out-Hope	0.941*** (0.187)	0.552** (0.199)	2.188*** (0.200)	
Women	0.021 (0.167)	0.030 (0.162)	0.391* (0.164)	-0.065 (0.180)
White	0.510** (0.193)	0.009 (0.188)	-0.430* (0.191)	-0.009 (0.215)
Age	-0.654 (0.433)	-0.605 (0.420)	0.932* (0.434)	-0.252 (0.467)

Education	0.804* (0.346)	1.390*** (0.325)	-0.344 (0.333)	0.692 (0.374)
Income	-0.530 (0.337)	0.172 (0.322)	-0.551 (0.326)	0.182 (0.359)
Unemployed	0.538 (0.354)	-0.931** (0.343)	0.281 (0.330)	-0.200 (0.376)
Religiosity	0.137 (0.232)	-0.768*** (0.225)	0.022 (0.227)	0.815** (0.252)
Party Strength	-0.074 (0.228)	0.470* (0.214)	0.781*** (0.218)	0.497* (0.244)
Constant	-0.829* (0.340)	-2.051*** (0.356)	-2.721*** (0.374)	-1.238*** (0.372)
Observations	912	912	912	912
Log Likelihood	-476.411	-506.060	-487.977	-418.646
Akaike Inf. Crit.	984.821	1,044.120	1,007.953	869.292

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.36 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 1984 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	0.988*** (0.182)		0.854** (0.326)	0.333 (0.365)
Out-Anger		0.989*** (0.183)	0.882** (0.269)	1.183*** (0.323)
In-Pride	-0.396 (0.241)	-0.385 (0.281)	0.825* (0.381)	-0.312 (0.401)
In-Hope	-0.158 (0.241)	-0.743* (0.296)	-0.050 (0.344)	0.335 (0.392)
In-Anger	0.808*** (0.192)	-0.092 (0.205)	-0.624* (0.260)	-0.208 (0.292)
In-Fear	-0.748** (0.280)	0.344 (0.296)	0.268 (0.381)	-0.629 (0.382)
Out-Pride	0.840** (0.264)	0.876** (0.324)		2.554*** (0.272)
Out-Hope	1.099*** (0.314)	0.328 (0.362)	2.493*** (0.270)	
Women	-0.159 (0.166)	-0.152 (0.177)	0.101 (0.244)	0.246 (0.275)
White	0.436 (0.320)	1.218* (0.492)	0.206 (0.389)	0.314 (0.408)
Age	-0.095 (0.400)	0.638 (0.428)	-0.386 (0.574)	-1.395* (0.642)
Education	0.417 (0.367)	0.090 (0.395)	1.112* (0.512)	0.843 (0.569)
Income	-0.189 (0.347)	0.528 (0.377)	0.240 (0.489)	0.217 (0.566)
Unemployed	0.049 (0.481)	0.324 (0.514)	-0.919 (0.525)	0.038 (0.600)
Religiosity	-0.004 (0.223)	0.128 (0.236)	0.298 (0.333)	1.033** (0.389)
Party Strength	0.448* (0.207)	-0.143 (0.218)	0.630* (0.316)	0.399 (0.363)
Constant	-2.779*** (0.486)	-3.962*** (0.652)	-1.995*** (0.559)	-1.217* (0.593)
Observations	756	756	756	756
Log Likelihood	-454.797	-404.427	-248.971	-203.367
Akaike Inf. Crit.	941.594	840.854	529.942	438.734

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.37 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 1988 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	0.995*** (0.201)		0.426* (0.212)	0.910*** (0.262)
Out-Anger		1.006*** (0.200)	0.608** (0.195)	0.957*** (0.222)
In-Pride	-0.635* (0.266)	-0.829* (0.332)	1.318*** (0.271)	-0.509 (0.280)
In-Hope	-0.110 (0.238)	-0.785** (0.292)	0.071 (0.238)	0.141 (0.251)
In-Anger	1.240*** (0.215)	-0.051 (0.234)	-0.222 (0.222)	-0.090 (0.242)
In-Fear	-0.174 (0.312)	1.254*** (0.321)	-0.266 (0.325)	-0.976** (0.330)
Out-Pride	0.628** (0.195)	0.438* (0.212)		2.545*** (0.238)
Out-Hope	0.945*** (0.223)	0.830** (0.261)	2.538*** (0.236)	
Women	-0.498** (0.181)	-0.231 (0.193)	-0.006 (0.183)	0.126 (0.199)
White	0.067 (0.192)	-0.168 (0.209)	-0.240 (0.189)	-0.548** (0.207)

Age	0.578 (0.457)	-0.253 (0.503)	0.669 (0.454)	0.402 (0.483)
Education	1.722*** (0.338)	0.960** (0.367)	-0.008 (0.349)	1.086** (0.380)
Income	0.106 (0.361)	0.324 (0.397)	-1.042** (0.368)	0.536 (0.377)
Unemployed	0.591 (0.356)	0.030 (0.394)	0.103 (0.376)	-0.602 (0.371)
Religiosity	-0.112 (0.243)	-0.722** (0.269)	0.516* (0.245)	-0.420 (0.260)
Party Strength	0.707** (0.230)	-0.075 (0.244)	0.725** (0.226)	0.312 (0.251)
Constant	-3.116*** (0.372)	-2.290*** (0.389)	-2.923*** (0.383)	-0.929** (0.357)
Observations	828	828	828	828
Log Likelihood	-423.833	-367.099	-416.823	-378.162
Akaike Inf. Crit.	879.666	766.198	865.645	788.325

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.38 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 1988 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans (1)	Republicans (2)	Republicans (3)	Republicans (4)
Out-Fear	1.286*** (0.188)		0.359 (0.205)	0.503* (0.215)
Out-Anger		1.262*** (0.187)	0.486* (0.196)	0.831*** (0.202)
In-Pride	-1.110*** (0.287)	-0.340 (0.304)	1.333*** (0.293)	0.005 (0.288)
In-Hope	0.256 (0.249)	-0.779** (0.273)	-0.208 (0.259)	0.176 (0.265)
In-Anger	0.291 (0.253)	0.114 (0.264)	-0.653* (0.266)	-0.417 (0.264)
In-Fear	-0.426 (0.339)	1.438*** (0.342)	-0.643 (0.352)	-0.031 (0.347)
Out-Pride	0.473* (0.195)	0.366 (0.206)		1.850*** (0.191)
Out-Hope	0.830*** (0.201)	0.503* (0.216)	1.850*** (0.191)	
Women	0.404* (0.181)	-0.866*** (0.184)	0.045 (0.187)	-0.151 (0.192)
White	0.864** (0.330)	-0.036 (0.331)	0.177 (0.311)	0.445 (0.306)
Age	-1.231** (0.424)	0.196 (0.436)	-0.433 (0.437)	0.349 (0.444)
Education	0.215 (0.344)	0.831* (0.351)	-0.551 (0.359)	0.086 (0.366)
Income	0.117 (0.366)	0.294 (0.382)	0.581 (0.387)	-0.336 (0.396)
Unemployed	-0.999 (0.668)	0.458 (0.645)	-0.559 (0.577)	1.365* (0.684)
Religiosity	0.208 (0.238)	0.233 (0.246)	0.221 (0.249)	0.559* (0.254)
Party Strength	0.044 (0.222)	0.372 (0.228)	1.031*** (0.228)	0.454 (0.239)
Constant	-2.370*** (0.423)	-2.256*** (0.422)	-1.984*** (0.405)	-1.642*** (0.395)
Observations	728	728	728	728
Log Likelihood	-412.423	-389.431	-384.978	-372.398
Akaike Inf. Crit.	856.847	810.861	801.957	776.796

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.39 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats (1)	Democrats (2)	Democrats (3)	Democrats (4)
Out-Fear	1.095*** (0.152)		0.258 (0.154)	0.564** (0.181)
Out-Anger		1.087*** (0.151)	0.257 (0.166)	1.092*** (0.173)
In-Pride	-0.601*** (0.165)	-0.072 (0.157)	0.769*** (0.162)	-0.264 (0.190)
In-Hope	-0.158 (0.165)	-0.272 (0.158)	-0.031 (0.162)	0.114 (0.193)
In-Anger	0.703** (0.229)	0.223 (0.203)	-0.354 (0.213)	-0.407 (0.233)
In-Fear	-0.158 (0.234)	1.337*** (0.240)	0.281 (0.222)	-0.352 (0.258)
Out-Pride	0.305 (0.165)	0.268 (0.154)		2.361*** (0.252)
Out-Hope	1.117*** (0.173)	0.608*** (0.178)	2.407*** (0.255)	
Women	-0.131 (0.149)	0.549*** (0.139)	0.289* (0.145)	-0.238 (0.171)

White	0.174 (0.164)	-0.072 (0.157)	-0.442** (0.161)	0.294 (0.188)
Age	-0.326 (0.377)	-1.268*** (0.356)	0.737* (0.372)	0.100 (0.445)
Education	1.102*** (0.298)	0.683* (0.276)	-0.672* (0.291)	1.073** (0.346)
Income	0.001 (0.300)	-0.262 (0.283)	-0.540 (0.293)	-0.093 (0.342)
Unemployed	0.017 (0.317)	0.592 (0.312)	0.019 (0.309)	-0.018 (0.363)
Religiosity	-0.311 (0.186)	0.141 (0.176)	-0.006 (0.182)	0.029 (0.214)
Party Strength	0.535** (0.193)	0.052 (0.181)	0.870*** (0.186)	0.267 (0.224)
Constant	-1.164*** (0.310)	-1.366*** (0.302)	-3.130*** (0.371)	-0.803* (0.343)
Observations	1,085	1,085	1,085	1,085
Log Likelihood	-585.839	-640.005	-598.685	-460.674
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,203.678	1,312.010	1,229.371	953.347

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.40 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.627*** (0.174)		0.586* (0.253)	0.621** (0.203)
Out-Anger		1.626*** (0.174)	0.315 (0.242)	0.584** (0.199)
In-Pride	-0.625 (0.355)	-0.294 (0.349)	0.387 (0.392)	0.110 (0.341)
In-Hope	-0.647** (0.223)	-0.382 (0.222)	-0.330 (0.254)	0.363 (0.230)
In-Anger	0.993*** (0.187)	-0.322 (0.188)	-0.391 (0.227)	-0.139 (0.194)
In-Fear	-0.205 (0.205)	0.905*** (0.203)	-0.278 (0.245)	0.198 (0.216)
Out-Pride	0.313 (0.247)	0.611* (0.258)		1.583*** (0.212)
Out-Hope	0.580** (0.200)	0.610** (0.204)	1.581*** (0.212)	
Women	0.317 (0.172)	-0.185 (0.172)	-0.410 (0.215)	0.477** (0.182)
White	0.921** (0.284)	-0.513 (0.268)	0.708* (0.276)	0.566* (0.254)
Age	-0.961* (0.414)	0.003 (0.420)	-1.189* (0.496)	-0.178 (0.428)
Education	0.155 (0.339)	0.892** (0.340)	0.140 (0.415)	0.248 (0.351)
Income	0.305 (0.336)	0.182 (0.334)	0.479 (0.406)	-0.012 (0.351)
Unemployed	-0.067 (0.471)	-0.101 (0.473)	0.449 (0.503)	-0.870* (0.432)
Religiosity	0.287 (0.207)	0.110 (0.206)	0.180 (0.254)	0.422 (0.216)
Party Strength	0.381 (0.215)	0.281 (0.214)	0.968*** (0.281)	0.445 (0.228)
Constant	-2.974*** (0.436)	-2.434*** (0.421)	-0.275 (0.407)	-2.055*** (0.400)
Observations	813	813	813	813
Log Likelihood	-445.548	-444.980	-313.118	-416.853
Akaike Inf. Crit.	923.097	921.960	658.235	865.707

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.41 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 1996 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.253*** (0.177)		0.155 (0.216)	1.223*** (0.277)
Out-Anger		1.247*** (0.177)	0.674*** (0.203)	0.594* (0.232)
In-Pride	-0.001 (0.209)	-0.191 (0.221)	1.155*** (0.260)	-0.032 (0.270)
In-Hope	-0.436 (0.251)	-0.329 (0.265)	0.028 (0.289)	0.109 (0.305)
In-Anger	0.747*** (0.179)	0.477** (0.185)	0.169 (0.206)	-0.545* (0.231)
In-Fear	-0.280 (0.214)	0.872*** (0.214)	-0.079 (0.237)	0.488 (0.289)
Out-Pride	0.671*** (0.202)	0.195 (0.215)		2.135*** (0.218)
Out-Hope	0.579* (0.228)	1.159*** (0.270)	2.113*** (0.215)	

Women	-0.143 (0.169)	-0.100 (0.176)	-0.012 (0.186)	0.546** (0.204)
White	0.560** (0.191)	-0.074 (0.199)	-0.196 (0.213)	0.095 (0.234)
Age	0.105 (0.429)	0.833 (0.449)	-0.181 (0.483)	-0.305 (0.542)
Education	0.575 (0.345)	0.931** (0.361)	-1.361*** (0.378)	1.784*** (0.436)
Income	-0.144 (0.325)	-0.657 (0.343)	-0.410 (0.363)	0.464 (0.409)
Unemployed	0.348 (0.455)	0.110 (0.475)	-1.061* (0.450)	0.373 (0.546)
Religiosity	-0.326 (0.225)	0.047 (0.232)	0.471 (0.253)	-0.021 (0.284)
Party Strength	0.702** (0.223)	0.365 (0.231)	0.606* (0.247)	0.527 (0.280)
Constant	-2.610*** (0.367)	-3.258*** (0.407)	-0.749* (0.352)	-2.010*** (0.406)
Observations	808	808	808	808
Log Likelihood	-461.002	-432.858	-393.540	-319.131
Akaike Inf. Crit.	954.004	897.717	819.079	670.261

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.42 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 1996 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.685*** (0.272)		0.991*** (0.234)	0.776** (0.259)
Out-Anger		1.677*** (0.274)	0.787** (0.271)	0.766** (0.270)
In-Pride	-0.230 (0.267)	-0.665** (0.246)	0.375 (0.259)	-0.010 (0.270)
In-Hope	-0.327 (0.257)	-0.353 (0.229)	0.119 (0.249)	0.203 (0.260)
In-Anger	0.132 (0.299)	0.197 (0.254)	0.267 (0.278)	-0.578* (0.283)
In-Fear	0.658 (0.424)	1.276*** (0.351)	-0.498 (0.373)	-1.379*** (0.372)
Out-Pride	0.752** (0.268)	0.951*** (0.232)		1.657*** (0.242)
Out-Hope	0.860** (0.268)	0.806** (0.253)	1.674*** (0.241)	
Women	-0.235 (0.231)	0.108 (0.206)	0.407 (0.221)	0.246 (0.233)
White	0.562 (0.340)	0.030 (0.337)	0.212 (0.338)	0.101 (0.352)
Age	-1.036 (0.556)	-0.930 (0.491)	2.207*** (0.536)	1.497** (0.557)
Education	0.899 (0.461)	-0.496 (0.427)	0.920* (0.455)	-0.365 (0.479)
Income	0.469 (0.480)	-0.512 (0.428)	0.823 (0.461)	1.128* (0.492)
Unemployed	-0.368 (0.809)	0.773 (0.735)	-0.153 (0.902)	-0.414 (0.924)
Religiosity	-0.176 (0.298)	0.598* (0.260)	0.243 (0.282)	0.868** (0.295)
Party Strength	-0.212 (0.318)	0.400 (0.267)	0.749** (0.289)	0.924** (0.307)
Constant	-0.824 (0.453)	-2.076*** (0.470)	-4.535*** (0.554)	-2.738*** (0.512)
Observations	581	581	581	581
Log Likelihood	-247.912	-312.093	-288.436	-264.925
Akaike Inf. Crit.	527.823	656.185	608.872	561.849

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.43 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 2000 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.337*** (0.188)		0.205 (0.211)	0.836** (0.254)
Out-Anger		1.341*** (0.188)	0.649** (0.199)	0.757** (0.232)
In-Pride	-0.768* (0.308)	0.106 (0.325)	0.989** (0.306)	0.012 (0.337)
In-Hope	-0.357 (0.247)	-1.120*** (0.284)	0.041 (0.251)	0.555* (0.273)
In-Anger	0.316 (0.249)	0.670** (0.257)	0.130 (0.263)	-0.421 (0.279)
In-Fear	0.331 (0.355)	1.662*** (0.371)	0.338 (0.369)	-0.828* (0.400)
Out-Pride	0.677*** (0.201)	0.224 (0.214)		2.201*** (0.224)

Out-Hope	0.739** (0.225)	0.872*** (0.247)	2.244*** (0.228)	
Women	0.056 (0.178)	-0.203 (0.186)	0.012 (0.185)	-0.330 (0.199)
White	0.058 (0.198)	-0.138 (0.209)	0.120 (0.206)	0.140 (0.220)
Age	0.098 (0.464)	0.495 (0.485)	-0.278 (0.484)	1.219* (0.511)
Education	0.638 (0.358)	1.193** (0.377)	-0.235 (0.381)	0.847* (0.414)
Income	0.304 (0.358)	-0.413 (0.380)	-0.340 (0.375)	0.290 (0.406)
Unemployed	0.261 (0.453)	0.175 (0.481)	0.080 (0.468)	0.121 (0.508)
Religiosity	-0.277 (0.242)	-0.161 (0.252)	0.726** (0.252)	-0.438 (0.266)
Party Strength	0.240 (0.234)	0.135 (0.247)	1.147*** (0.236)	0.820** (0.262)
Constant	-2.305*** (0.361)	-2.544*** (0.379)	-2.791*** (0.381)	-1.682*** (0.378)
Observations	731	731	731	731
Log Likelihood	-394.014	-366.886	-377.070	-335.107
Akaike Inf. Crit.	820.028	765.773	786.140	702.213

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.44 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 2000 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.322*** (0.237)		0.669* (0.261)	1.218*** (0.341)
Out-Anger		1.331*** (0.237)	1.545*** (0.246)	0.637* (0.295)
In-Pride	-0.635 (0.331)	-1.039** (0.365)	1.891*** (0.359)	0.305 (0.388)
In-Hope	-0.657* (0.288)	-0.494 (0.305)	-0.315 (0.299)	0.487 (0.311)
In-Anger	1.165*** (0.349)	0.254 (0.345)	-0.283 (0.350)	-1.169*** (0.355)
In-Fear	0.160 (0.370)	1.171** (0.367)	-0.851* (0.381)	-0.714 (0.386)
Out-Pride	1.582*** (0.243)	0.695** (0.257)		1.772*** (0.300)
Out-Hope	0.513 (0.284)	1.198*** (0.333)	1.763*** (0.301)	
Women	-0.209 (0.217)	-0.141 (0.222)	0.121 (0.226)	-0.136 (0.249)
White	0.199 (0.320)	0.154 (0.332)	-0.484 (0.323)	0.537 (0.339)
Age	-0.133 (0.555)	0.321 (0.577)	0.590 (0.578)	0.077 (0.623)
Education	1.069* (0.457)	0.611 (0.473)	-0.817 (0.471)	-0.796 (0.495)
Income	-0.189 (0.437)	0.249 (0.452)	0.397 (0.459)	0.498 (0.511)
Unemployed	-0.380 (0.591)	1.657** (0.586)	0.234 (0.632)	-1.108 (0.610)
Religiosity	0.139 (0.277)	0.350 (0.282)	0.351 (0.289)	0.625* (0.318)
Party Strength	-0.300 (0.282)	-0.009 (0.282)	0.612* (0.289)	0.822* (0.338)
Constant	-2.175*** (0.502)	-3.497*** (0.570)	-2.438*** (0.516)	-0.855 (0.494)
Observations	539	539	539	539
Log Likelihood	-274.496	-259.118	-262.158	-220.710
Akaike Inf. Crit.	580.993	550.236	556.315	473.421

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.45 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 2004 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.418*** (0.288)		0.342 (0.261)	1.537*** (0.284)
Out-Anger		1.424*** (0.286)	1.269*** (0.311)	0.766* (0.313)
In-Pride	-0.947** (0.308)	-0.107 (0.261)	0.409 (0.259)	-0.167 (0.300)
In-Hope	-0.531 (0.324)	-0.625* (0.281)	0.207 (0.281)	0.509 (0.335)
In-Anger	0.906* (0.457)	-0.084 (0.349)	0.434 (0.352)	-0.669 (0.391)
In-Fear	0.124 (0.529)	0.267 (0.457)	-0.478 (0.431)	-0.020 (0.481)

Out-Pride	1.310*** (0.325)	0.365 (0.259)		2.004*** (0.299)
Out-Hope	0.755* (0.318)	1.550*** (0.285)	1.967*** (0.293)	
Women	0.286 (0.282)	0.407 (0.233)	-0.572* (0.230)	0.172 (0.274)
White	0.843** (0.297)	-0.370 (0.257)	-0.211 (0.243)	0.588* (0.289)
Age	-2.210** (0.722)	-1.136 (0.594)	2.727*** (0.588)	0.353 (0.711)
Education	0.911 (0.582)	0.749 (0.453)	-0.114 (0.451)	0.186 (0.564)
Income	-0.065 (0.516)	0.495 (0.418)	-0.036 (0.396)	-0.032 (0.477)
Unemployed	-0.054 (0.683)	-1.181* (0.544)	0.103 (0.507)	0.959 (0.675)
Religiosity	0.079 (0.390)	0.133 (0.321)	-0.232 (0.316)	0.237 (0.382)
Party Strength	0.573 (0.380)	-0.416 (0.302)	0.536 (0.278)	1.014** (0.364)
Constant	-0.637 (0.503)	-1.594*** (0.447)	-3.268*** (0.504)	-2.306*** (0.538)
Observations	513	513	513	513
Log Likelihood	-188.482	-249.922	-269.804	-196.571
Akaike Inf. Crit.	408.964	531.844	571.608	425.142

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.46 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 2004 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	0.956*** (0.236)		0.549 (0.494)	0.521 (0.472)
Out-Anger		0.960*** (0.235)	0.627 (0.491)	0.906* (0.443)
In-Pride	-0.563 (0.365)	0.502 (0.358)	0.970 (0.702)	-0.990 (0.517)
In-Hope	-0.565 (0.361)	-0.151 (0.359)	-0.938 (0.520)	0.032 (0.530)
In-Anger	0.760** (0.281)	-0.223 (0.269)	-0.042 (0.484)	-0.523 (0.449)
In-Fear	-0.484 (0.328)	0.660* (0.320)	-0.233 (0.505)	-0.543 (0.480)
Out-Pride	0.737 (0.473)	0.446 (0.476)		2.590*** (0.506)
Out-Hope	0.894* (0.438)	0.496 (0.445)	2.571*** (0.499)	
Women	-0.419 (0.235)	0.006 (0.228)	-0.764 (0.454)	1.252** (0.438)
White	0.629 (0.334)	-0.222 (0.321)	-0.647 (0.612)	0.494 (0.516)
Age	1.580** (0.597)	0.513 (0.580)	1.872 (1.117)	-2.433* (1.037)
Education	0.820 (0.477)	-1.170* (0.459)	-0.265 (0.873)	-0.231 (0.794)
Income	0.433 (0.433)	0.092 (0.427)	0.773 (0.764)	0.553 (0.732)
Unemployed	-0.405 (1.060)	0.398 (0.943)	-0.273 (1.137)	-0.021 (1.315)
Religiosity	0.217 (0.287)	0.268 (0.281)	-0.965 (0.568)	1.307* (0.530)
Party Strength	0.312 (0.291)	0.818** (0.288)	0.701 (0.583)	0.690 (0.541)
Constant	-3.646*** (0.701)	-1.851** (0.657)	0.356 (0.859)	-1.075 (0.813)
Observations	406	406	406	406
Log Likelihood	-243.784	-254.043	-90.253	-99.271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	519.567	540.087	212.505	230.541

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.47 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 2008 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.359*** (0.154)		0.707*** (0.186)	0.813*** (0.247)
Out-Anger		1.363*** (0.154)	0.833*** (0.183)	1.066*** (0.249)
In-Pride	-0.685*** (0.181)	-0.343 (0.181)	1.204*** (0.203)	-0.212 (0.241)
In-Hope	-0.402* (0.196)	-0.782*** (0.197)	-0.166 (0.201)	0.241 (0.243)
In-Anger	0.924*** (0.227)	0.103 (0.224)	-0.306 (0.241)	-0.517 (0.271)

In-Fear	-0.064 (0.220)	1.310*** (0.217)	-1.112*** (0.221)	-0.769** (0.252)
Out-Pride	0.843*** (0.183)	0.687*** (0.185)		1.820*** (0.216)
Out-Hope	1.068*** (0.245)	0.785** (0.239)	1.826*** (0.220)	
Women	-0.012 (0.153)	0.105 (0.153)	0.427** (0.164)	-0.403* (0.202)
White	0.668*** (0.171)	-0.089 (0.169)	-1.032*** (0.190)	-0.369 (0.229)
Age	-1.006** (0.383)	-0.132 (0.379)	-0.921* (0.404)	1.574** (0.490)
Education	0.565 (0.317)	1.338*** (0.313)	0.384 (0.347)	0.932* (0.432)
Income	-0.159 (0.317)	0.134 (0.311)	-1.000** (0.352)	1.062* (0.431)
Unemployed	0.317 (0.340)	-0.145 (0.345)	0.083 (0.372)	-0.683 (0.396)
Religiosity	0.079 (0.215)	-0.224 (0.212)	0.656** (0.233)	-0.353 (0.276)
Party Strength	0.669*** (0.186)	0.355 (0.185)	0.310 (0.200)	-0.191 (0.253)
Constant	-2.867*** (0.346)	-2.873*** (0.349)	-0.878** (0.331)	-0.381 (0.376)
Observations	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186
Log Likelihood	-528.879	-532.135	-458.783	-330.534
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,089.758	1,096.269	949.567	693.067

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.48 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 2008 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger Republicans (1)	Out-Fear Republicans (2)	In-Pride Republicans (3)	In-Hope Republicans (4)
Out-Fear	0.970*** (0.182)		1.509*** (0.307)	0.981*** (0.257)
Out-Anger		0.973*** (0.185)	0.174 (0.303)	1.128*** (0.252)
In-Pride	-0.165 (0.222)	-0.465* (0.231)	1.483*** (0.373)	-0.071 (0.296)
In-Hope	-0.532* (0.207)	-1.178*** (0.211)	-0.369 (0.301)	0.510 (0.268)
In-Anger	1.017*** (0.239)	0.271 (0.260)	-0.212 (0.350)	-0.631* (0.305)
In-Fear	0.104 (0.258)	1.744*** (0.325)	-0.205 (0.369)	-0.974** (0.329)
Out-Pride	0.324 (0.275)	1.540*** (0.289)		2.196*** (0.269)
Out-Hope	1.244*** (0.254)	0.989*** (0.258)	2.267*** (0.274)	
Women	0.231 (0.168)	0.009 (0.182)	-0.773** (0.262)	0.460* (0.231)
White	0.406 (0.293)	0.375 (0.310)	0.730* (0.363)	-0.177 (0.340)
Age	-0.626 (0.400)	0.117 (0.432)	1.166 (0.605)	1.420* (0.564)
Education	0.509 (0.349)	-0.046 (0.376)	2.309*** (0.519)	-0.289 (0.467)
Income	-0.090 (0.341)	-0.122 (0.366)	0.901 (0.493)	-0.029 (0.458)
Unemployed	-0.277 (0.534)	0.414 (0.612)	-0.026 (0.658)	-1.148 (0.599)
Religiosity	-0.664** (0.210)	0.503* (0.223)	0.761* (0.327)	0.411 (0.286)
Party Strength	0.518* (0.218)	0.370 (0.233)	0.709* (0.339)	0.351 (0.303)
Constant	-2.394*** (0.436)	-2.772*** (0.473)	-3.802*** (0.578)	-1.755*** (0.470)
Observations	582	582	582	582
Log Likelihood	-448.529	-395.440	-220.367	-277.568
Akaike Inf. Crit.	929.059	822.881	472.733	587.136

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.49 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 2012 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger Democrats (1)	Out-Fear Democrats (2)	In-Pride Democrats (3)	In-Hope Democrats (4)
Out-Fear	1.809*** (0.104)		0.511*** (0.149)	0.344 (0.181)
Out-Anger		1.801*** (0.104)	1.238*** (0.144)	0.499** (0.178)
In-Pride	0.030 (0.209)	-0.415* (0.199)	0.139 (0.257)	0.357 (0.303)
In-Hope	-0.670*** (0.168)	-0.174 (0.168)	0.230 (0.209)	-1.005*** (0.226)

In-Anger	1.048*** (0.136)	-0.008 (0.115)	-0.512** (0.156)	-0.172 (0.192)
In-Fear	-0.563** (0.177)	0.810*** (0.166)	-0.119 (0.210)	-0.461 (0.236)
Out-Pride	1.245*** (0.143)	0.569*** (0.148)		2.613*** (0.166)
Out-Hope	0.482** (0.171)	0.372* (0.180)	2.586*** (0.164)	
Women	0.193 (0.099)	0.065 (0.092)	0.075 (0.128)	0.001 (0.152)
White	0.279* (0.111)	0.168 (0.103)	-0.679*** (0.149)	-0.193 (0.175)
Age	-0.592* (0.246)	0.824*** (0.230)	-0.073 (0.315)	0.394 (0.374)
Education	0.241 (0.200)	0.871*** (0.186)	0.239 (0.259)	1.694*** (0.309)
Income	-0.059 (0.190)	0.073 (0.176)	0.409 (0.247)	0.232 (0.298)
Unemployed	-0.281 (0.196)	0.393* (0.185)	0.865** (0.325)	-0.217 (0.304)
Religiosity	-0.293* (0.137)	-0.171 (0.129)	0.042 (0.179)	-0.023 (0.204)
Party Strength	0.485*** (0.129)	0.430*** (0.119)	1.038*** (0.168)	0.002 (0.210)
Constant	-2.040*** (0.228)	-3.238*** (0.238)	-1.805*** (0.267)	-0.696* (0.290)
Observations	2,864	2,864	2,864	2,864
Log Likelihood	-1,172.024	-1,327.681	-782.847	-569.876
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,376.049	2,687.362	1,597.695	1,171.752

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.50 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 2012 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans (1)	Republicans (2)	Republicans (3)	Republicans (4)
Out-Fear	2.242*** (0.149)		0.930*** (0.130)	1.015*** (0.156)
Out-Anger		2.238*** (0.150)	0.484** (0.161)	0.761*** (0.162)
In-Pride	-0.666*** (0.168)	-0.393** (0.152)	0.555*** (0.155)	-0.190 (0.182)
In-Hope	-0.278 (0.165)	-0.670*** (0.148)	-0.043 (0.152)	0.080 (0.175)
In-Anger	0.657*** (0.196)	-0.109 (0.168)	-0.041 (0.166)	-0.814*** (0.185)
In-Fear	-0.100 (0.225)	1.029*** (0.213)	-0.694*** (0.200)	-0.582** (0.215)
Out-Pride	0.556*** (0.161)	0.940*** (0.130)		2.858*** (0.197)
Out-Hope	0.773*** (0.159)	1.003*** (0.154)	2.815*** (0.195)	
Women	-0.322* (0.135)	0.082 (0.116)	0.411*** (0.112)	0.098 (0.141)
White	0.225 (0.180)	0.462** (0.168)	0.214 (0.172)	-0.015 (0.192)
Age	0.480 (0.325)	-0.038 (0.276)	0.854** (0.267)	1.301*** (0.339)
Education	0.581* (0.272)	0.181 (0.236)	0.056 (0.230)	0.012 (0.289)
Income	0.566* (0.259)	-0.046 (0.226)	-0.208 (0.224)	0.868** (0.273)
Unemployed	-0.162 (0.323)	0.088 (0.291)	0.472 (0.299)	0.043 (0.331)
Religiosity	-0.064 (0.161)	0.213 (0.137)	0.354** (0.132)	0.199 (0.167)
Party Strength	0.344 (0.178)	-0.059 (0.147)	1.003*** (0.139)	0.247 (0.185)
Constant	-1.256*** (0.282)	-2.809*** (0.290)	-4.435*** (0.332)	-1.608*** (0.300)
Observations	1,859	1,859	1,859	1,859
Log Likelihood	-725.537	-960.812	-996.255	-667.943
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,483.074	1,953.624	2,024.509	1,367.886

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.51 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Democrats, 2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Democrats (1)	Democrats (2)	Democrats (3)	Democrats (4)
Out-Fear	2.196*** (0.238)		0.846** (0.263)	1.131*** (0.253)
Out-Anger		2.192*** (0.241)	0.568 (0.314)	0.522 (0.308)
In-Pride	-0.541 (0.339)	-0.922** (0.285)	0.806** (0.274)	-0.848** (0.280)

In-Hope	-0.512 (0.312)	-0.281 (0.265)	-0.658** (0.229)	-0.408 (0.255)
In-Anger	1.133*** (0.301)	0.401 (0.230)	-0.570** (0.214)	-0.041 (0.245)
In-Fear	-0.195 (0.291)	0.938*** (0.249)	-0.781*** (0.205)	-0.061 (0.240)
Out-Pride	0.770* (0.316)	1.013*** (0.259)		3.246*** (0.206)
Out-Hope	0.452 (0.315)	1.029*** (0.250)	3.169*** (0.202)	
Women	0.581* (0.226)	-0.192 (0.185)	0.256 (0.176)	-0.226 (0.192)
White	-0.266 (0.254)	-0.007 (0.203)	-0.442* (0.197)	0.291 (0.208)
Age	-0.565 (0.539)	0.964* (0.457)	0.998* (0.430)	0.359 (0.475)
Education	0.264 (0.462)	1.022** (0.376)	0.021 (0.364)	0.567 (0.404)
Income	1.149** (0.442)	0.194 (0.367)	-0.115 (0.353)	0.624 (0.387)
Unemployed	0.608 (0.447)	-0.251 (0.313)	-0.368 (0.325)	0.762 (0.390)
Religiosity	-0.263 (0.298)	-0.705** (0.246)	0.145 (0.256)	-0.123 (0.268)
Party Strength	0.635* (0.299)	0.110 (0.244)	0.915*** (0.225)	0.151 (0.259)
Constant	-0.843 (0.466)	-2.232*** (0.432)	-1.745*** (0.435)	-2.092*** (0.454)
Observations	1,810	1,810	1,810	1,810
Log Likelihood	-312.300	-469.345	-483.593	-411.353
Akaike Inf. Crit.	656.600	970.690	999.187	854.706

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.52 Effect of Gender on Expectancy-Confirming Emotions among Republicans, 2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Out-Anger	Out-Fear	In-Pride	In-Hope
	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans	Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Out-Fear	1.896*** (0.244)		0.560* (0.246)	1.042*** (0.251)
Out-Anger		1.888*** (0.243)	1.095*** (0.308)	0.598 (0.316)
In-Pride	-0.819** (0.311)	-0.650** (0.236)	0.230 (0.235)	-0.539* (0.256)
In-Hope	-0.692* (0.303)	-0.492* (0.234)	-0.596** (0.220)	0.102 (0.251)
In-Anger	1.560*** (0.295)	-0.328 (0.212)	-0.400 (0.213)	-0.851** (0.279)
In-Fear	-0.168 (0.289)	1.221*** (0.215)	-1.008*** (0.207)	-0.636* (0.256)
Out-Pride	1.244*** (0.305)	0.555* (0.246)		3.217*** (0.208)
Out-Hope	0.368 (0.320)	0.972*** (0.253)	3.237*** (0.210)	
Women	0.149 (0.238)	0.229 (0.177)	-0.059 (0.172)	-0.214 (0.200)
White	0.827** (0.261)	0.296 (0.215)	0.369 (0.221)	0.259 (0.242)
Age	-1.603** (0.548)	0.616 (0.420)	1.083** (0.392)	0.618 (0.461)
Education	-0.236 (0.455)	-0.623 (0.346)	-0.284 (0.339)	-0.315 (0.394)
Income	0.553 (0.438)	0.394 (0.332)	0.071 (0.338)	-0.291 (0.392)
Unemployed	-0.512 (0.498)	-0.096 (0.400)	0.024 (0.411)	0.758 (0.496)
Religiosity	-0.045 (0.297)	0.267 (0.221)	-0.168 (0.215)	0.521* (0.245)
Party Strength	0.268 (0.299)	0.331 (0.217)	0.519* (0.213)	0.096 (0.256)
Constant	-0.453 (0.550)	-1.620*** (0.452)	-2.386*** (0.492)	-0.531 (0.491)
Observations	1,619	1,619	1,619	1,619
Log Likelihood	-303.440	-498.102	-522.021	-378.933
Akaike Inf. Crit.	638.880	1,028.203	1,076.043	789.866

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.53 Effect of Beliefs about Electing Women on Feelings toward Hillary Clinton among Democrats, 2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Clinton Feeling Thermometer (Post-Election)		
	Women	Men	Interaction
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Elect Women	11.746*** (2.234)	13.402*** (2.372)	13.997*** (2.352)
Women			4.383* (2.095)

White	-3.756** (1.293)	-2.817* (1.393)	-3.251*** (0.947)
Age	0.596 (2.916)	2.884 (3.091)	1.611 (2.117)
Education	1.050 (2.521)	-3.080 (2.508)	-0.859 (1.781)
Income	3.374 (2.330)	1.300 (2.567)	2.578 (1.719)
Unemployed	1.965 (2.271)	1.512 (2.794)	1.798 (1.756)
Religiosity	-0.366 (1.645)	-1.569 (1.801)	-1.003 (1.213)
Party Strength	4.799** (1.628)	6.078*** (1.741)	5.460*** (1.188)
FT (Pre-Election)	0.653*** (0.027)	0.714*** (0.028)	0.683*** (0.019)
Elect Women X Women			-2.801 (3.008)
Constant	14.985*** (2.545)	9.122*** (2.636)	9.701*** (2.130)
Observations	917	644	1,561

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.54 Effect of Feelings about Geraldine Ferraro on Pride toward Walter Mondale among Democrats, 1984 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-Pride		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Ferraro FT	2.060*** (0.544)	3.421*** (0.759)	3.637*** (0.746)
Women			1.512* (0.671)
Out-Anger	0.637* (0.267)	0.296 (0.316)	0.442* (0.199)
Out-Fear	-0.085 (0.247)	0.611* (0.306)	0.204 (0.187)
In-Hope	2.178*** (0.291)	1.587*** (0.342)	1.883*** (0.214)
In-Anger	0.014 (0.298)	-0.199 (0.374)	-0.012 (0.229)
In-Fear	-0.464 (0.472)	-0.649 (0.508)	-0.443 (0.337)
Out-Pride	1.025*** (0.281)	0.684* (0.341)	0.773*** (0.209)
Out-Hope	0.091 (0.250)	0.463 (0.323)	0.243 (0.191)
White	-0.558* (0.266)	-0.100 (0.344)	-0.373 (0.206)
Age	1.063 (0.603)	1.095 (0.762)	1.090* (0.464)
Education	-0.088 (0.475)	-0.492 (0.569)	-0.312 (0.355)
Income	-1.336** (0.448)	0.382 (0.588)	-0.734* (0.344)
Unemployed	0.165 (0.508)	0.358 (0.604)	0.215 (0.369)
Religiosity	0.045 (0.310)	-0.092 (0.419)	0.015 (0.243)
Party Strength	0.211 (0.323)	1.393*** (0.365)	0.730** (0.234)
Ferraro FT X Women			-1.576 (0.897)
Constant	-3.151*** (0.618)	-5.681*** (0.820)	-4.975*** (0.652)
Observations	495	363	858
Log Likelihood	-256.822	-172.019	-439.126
Akaike Inf. Crit.	545.643	376.039	914.253

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.55 Effect of Feelings about Geraldine Ferraro on Hope toward Walter Mondale among Democrats, 1984 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-Hope		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Ferraro FT	2.690*** (0.582)	2.533*** (0.723)	2.364*** (0.694)
Women			-0.205 (0.606)
Out-Anger	0.587* (0.275)	1.319*** (0.305)	0.897*** (0.200)
Out-Fear	0.884** (0.295)	0.243 (0.324)	0.546* (0.213)
In-Pride	2.156*** (0.287)	1.644*** (0.342)	1.915*** (0.215)
In-Anger	0.069 (0.347)	-0.686 (0.377)	-0.220 (0.249)
In-Fear	-0.197 (0.483)	-0.439 (0.462)	-0.389 (0.328)

Out-Pride	-0.929** (0.292)	-0.404 (0.337)	-0.694** (0.215)
Out-Hope	-0.069 (0.277)	-0.821* (0.323)	-0.390 (0.203)
White	0.045 (0.317)	0.302 (0.354)	0.160 (0.229)
Age	-0.390 (0.680)	-0.460 (0.777)	-0.458 (0.498)
Education	-0.323 (0.573)	1.049 (0.594)	0.447 (0.398)
Income	0.077 (0.512)	0.557 (0.611)	0.134 (0.379)
Unemployed	-0.194 (0.574)	0.072 (0.639)	-0.060 (0.426)
Religiosity	0.660 (0.362)	1.173** (0.445)	0.769** (0.272)
Party Strength	0.546 (0.374)	0.336 (0.390)	0.342 (0.264)
Ferraro FT X Women			0.208 (0.880)
Constant	-2.561*** (0.656)	-3.364*** (0.767)	-2.575*** (0.582)
Observations	495	363	858
Log Likelihood	-202.868	-164.373	-376.154
Akaike Inf. Crit.	437.736	360.745	788.309

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.56 Effect of Feelings about Sarah Palin on Pride toward John McCain among Republicans, 2008 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Palin FT	1.205 (1.059)	1.795 (1.124)	1.247 (1.000)
Women			-1.383 (0.895)
Out-Anger	-0.858 (0.503)	1.054 (0.556)	0.021 (0.333)
Out-Fear	2.269*** (0.514)	0.149 (0.495)	1.244*** (0.333)
In-Hope	1.707** (0.562)	2.288** (0.699)	1.792*** (0.418)
In-Anger	-0.893 (0.513)	-1.091* (0.513)	-0.849* (0.342)
In-Fear	0.256 (0.571)	-0.838 (0.616)	-0.148 (0.398)
Out-Pride	-0.488 (0.546)	0.989 (0.787)	0.085 (0.424)
Out-Hope	2.603*** (0.491)	2.296*** (0.488)	2.325*** (0.333)
White	0.523 (0.628)	0.747 (0.631)	0.499 (0.417)
Age	1.748 (0.957)	1.442 (1.132)	1.312 (0.698)
Education	2.824*** (0.818)	2.232* (0.896)	2.510*** (0.566)
Income	1.148 (0.787)	0.953 (0.905)	0.921 (0.550)
Unemployed	0.795 (1.421)	-0.182 (1.349)	0.138 (0.940)
Religiosity	0.879 (0.477)	0.362 (0.623)	0.682 (0.360)
Party Strength	0.676 (0.538)	1.148 (0.614)	0.701 (0.368)
Palin FT X Women			0.257 (1.284)
Constant	-6.014*** (1.213)	-4.573*** (1.245)	-4.174*** (0.909)
Observations	272	251	523
Log Likelihood	-103.295	-73.675	-183.482
Akaike Inf. Crit.	238.590	179.350	402.964

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.57 Effect of Feelings about Sarah Palin on Hope toward John McCain among Republicans, 2008 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Palin FT	3.082** (1.042)	2.849*** (0.833)	2.729*** (0.801)
Women			0.443 (0.839)
Out-Anger	1.389** (0.460)	0.618 (0.371)	0.942*** (0.277)
Out-Fear	0.506 (0.469)	1.175** (0.377)	0.919** (0.285)

In-Pride	-1.035* (0.522)	0.003 (0.464)	-0.348 (0.329)
In-Anger	1.762** (0.558)	1.021* (0.438)	1.103*** (0.319)
In-Fear	-1.077 (0.559)	-0.497 (0.442)	-0.587 (0.334)
Out-Pride	-1.108 (0.567)	-1.110* (0.503)	-1.006** (0.360)
Out-Hope	2.709*** (0.506)	2.083*** (0.464)	2.159*** (0.315)
White	0.505 (0.627)	0.090 (0.532)	0.172 (0.387)
Age	1.677 (1.030)	0.312 (0.960)	0.995 (0.673)
Education	-2.149* (0.913)	-0.084 (0.712)	-0.774 (0.531)
Income	-0.757 (0.865)	-0.358 (0.751)	-0.423 (0.537)
Unemployed	-0.021 (1.408)	-1.369 (1.036)	-0.974 (0.799)
Religiosity	0.069 (0.530)	0.363 (0.456)	0.225 (0.332)
Party Strength	0.406 (0.576)	0.164 (0.454)	0.225 (0.340)
Palin FT X Women			0.086 (1.195)
Constant	-2.472* (1.038)	-3.255*** (0.946)	-2.972*** (0.776)
Observations	272	251	523
Log Likelihood	-94.191	-126.264	-225.270
Akaike Inf. Crit.	220.382	284.529	486.539

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.58 Effect of Exposure to Trump's Rhetoric on Feelings toward Donald Trump among Democrats, 2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Trump Feeling Thermometer (Post-Election)		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Heard Video	0.542 (2.700)	-3.896 (3.270)	-3.760 (2.995)
Women			-3.878 (3.938)
White	1.335 (1.266)	-0.811 (1.553)	0.402 (0.982)
Age	-1.445 (2.806)	4.015 (3.403)	1.261 (2.155)
Education	-11.676*** (2.451)	-11.271*** (2.822)	-11.552*** (1.849)
Income	-6.034** (2.296)	-1.645 (2.895)	-4.030* (1.795)
Unemployed	-0.967 (2.270)	-2.113 (3.157)	-1.389 (1.856)
Religiosity	1.695 (1.619)	3.170 (2.053)	2.251 (1.275)
Party Strength	-5.429*** (1.515)	-1.710 (1.807)	-3.705** (1.162)
FT (Pre-Election)	0.767*** (0.027)	0.723*** (0.030)	0.742*** (0.020)
Heard Video X Women			3.767 (4.047)
Constant	21.194*** (3.182)	20.758*** (3.931)	23.209*** (3.250)
Observations	917	654	1,571

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.59 Effect of Beliefs about the Parties' Representation of Women on Feelings toward Mitt Romney among Democrats, 2012 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Romney Feeling Thermometer (Post-Election)		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Dem Better	-11.795*** (1.246)	-8.894*** (1.274)	-9.034*** (1.259)
Rep Better	-6.448 (3.570)	17.416*** (4.038)	17.429*** (4.162)
Women			2.807 (1.493)
White	1.491 (1.043)	-0.283 (1.022)	0.623 (0.730)
Age	3.568 (2.295)	7.052** (2.336)	5.222** (1.639)
Education	-0.128 (1.851)	2.689 (1.846)	1.246 (1.309)
Income	1.991 (1.779)	-4.003* (1.812)	-0.675 (1.267)
Unemployed	-0.264 (2.201)	-0.246 (1.697)	-0.243 (1.352)
Religiosity	1.436 (1.238)	-0.602 (1.379)	0.543 (0.919)

Party Strength	-2.357 (1.240)	-4.314*** (1.198)	-3.360*** (0.862)
FT (Pre-Election)	0.591*** (0.022)	0.602*** (0.022)	0.598*** (0.015)
Dem Better X Women			-2.440 (1.664)
Rep Better X Women			-24.043*** (5.410)
Constant	20.851*** (1.989)	20.109*** (2.050)	18.846*** (1.634)
Observations	1,472	1,212	2,684

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.60 Effect of Beliefs about the Parties' Representation of Women on Feelings toward Mitt Romney among Republicans, 2012 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
Romney Feeling Thermometer (Post-Election)			
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Dem Better	-7.882*** (1.521)	-2.562 (1.389)	-1.980 (1.405)
Rep Better	3.429** (1.145)	5.307*** (1.017)	4.938*** (1.020)
Women			2.421** (0.865)
White	4.056** (1.498)	2.781* (1.340)	3.357*** (0.995)
Age	2.104 (2.381)	0.071 (2.071)	1.198 (1.553)
Education	1.797 (2.048)	3.322 (1.809)	2.455 (1.347)
Income	-0.064 (1.954)	-0.165 (1.750)	-0.035 (1.302)
Unemployed	-5.496* (2.665)	-2.549 (2.094)	-3.880* (1.650)
Religiosity	2.429* (1.219)	2.004 (1.041)	2.391** (0.788)
Party Strength	1.222 (1.275)	-0.826 (1.103)	0.062 (0.833)
FT (Pre-Election)	0.738*** (0.027)	0.695*** (0.023)	0.714*** (0.018)
Dem Better X Women			-6.367** (1.997)
Rep Better X Women			-0.950 (1.431)
Constant	11.090*** (2.663)	13.877*** (2.296)	11.518*** (1.778)
Observations	790	949	1,739

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.61 Effect of Beliefs about Sexual Harassment on Anger toward George H.W. Bush among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
Out-Anger			
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Sex Harass	0.530 (0.302)	-0.073 (0.329)	-0.253 (0.316)
Women			-0.649* (0.299)
Out-Fear	1.098*** (0.200)	1.092*** (0.247)	1.056*** (0.153)
In-Pride	0.489* (0.234)	0.041 (0.255)	0.266 (0.168)
In-Hope	0.968*** (0.239)	1.358*** (0.270)	1.129*** (0.175)
In-Anger	0.543 (0.286)	0.902* (0.410)	0.657** (0.229)
In-Fear	0.041 (0.296)	-0.528 (0.394)	-0.154 (0.235)
Out-Pride	-0.747** (0.229)	-0.516* (0.255)	-0.608*** (0.166)
Out-Hope	-0.170 (0.225)	-0.129 (0.256)	-0.157 (0.166)
White	0.178 (0.230)	0.234 (0.252)	0.182 (0.166)
Age	-0.735 (0.499)	0.524 (0.636)	-0.293 (0.383)
Education	0.539 (0.415)	1.632*** (0.457)	1.010*** (0.300)
Income	-0.223 (0.405)	0.741 (0.489)	0.097 (0.306)
Unemployed	-0.154 (0.410)	0.266 (0.514)	-0.008 (0.317)
Religiosity	-0.157 (0.254)	-0.500 (0.296)	-0.289 (0.188)
Party Strength	0.604* (0.260)	0.437 (0.310)	0.544** (0.194)
Sex Harass X Women			0.878* (0.430)
Constant	-1.116* (0.448)	-2.045*** (0.554)	-1.019** (0.369)

Observations	596	466	1,062
Log Likelihood	-319.384	-245.237	-573.243
Akaike Inf. Crit.	670.768	522.475	1,182.485
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.62 Effect of Beliefs about Sexual Harassment on Fear toward George H.W. Bush among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Out-Fear		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
Sex Harass	0.254 (0.284)	-0.110 (0.315)	-0.029 (0.302)
Women			0.382 (0.284)
Out-Anger	1.090*** (0.200)	1.075*** (0.244)	1.045*** (0.152)
In-Pride	-0.043 (0.217)	0.562* (0.235)	0.240 (0.156)
In-Hope	0.594* (0.238)	0.623* (0.286)	0.603*** (0.179)
In-Anger	0.160 (0.270)	0.245 (0.327)	0.232 (0.205)
In-Fear	1.149*** (0.305)	1.737*** (0.411)	1.376*** (0.242)
Out-Pride	0.084 (0.218)	-0.194 (0.238)	-0.077 (0.158)
Out-Hope	-0.150 (0.212)	-0.491* (0.248)	-0.274 (0.159)
White	-0.160 (0.217)	0.088 (0.244)	-0.058 (0.159)
Age	-0.856 (0.465)	-1.768** (0.586)	-1.245*** (0.361)
Education	0.996* (0.387)	0.192 (0.411)	0.649* (0.277)
Income	-0.243 (0.382)	-0.199 (0.463)	-0.221 (0.288)
Unemployed	0.635 (0.407)	0.604 (0.496)	0.591 (0.311)
Religiosity	0.207 (0.236)	0.124 (0.284)	0.171 (0.178)
Party Strength	0.268 (0.245)	-0.130 (0.283)	0.050 (0.183)
Sex Harass X Women			0.250 (0.407)
Constant	-1.308** (0.429)	-0.941 (0.519)	-1.336*** (0.358)
Observations	596	466	1,062
Log Likelihood	-352.973	-270.542	-628.911
Akaike Inf. Crit.	737.945	573.083	1,293.822
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.63 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Anger toward George H.W. Bush among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Out-Anger		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	0.176 (0.574)	0.088 (0.740)	-0.147 (0.692)
Women			-0.418 (0.559)
Out-Fear	1.121*** (0.207)	1.083*** (0.255)	1.058*** (0.158)
In-Pride	0.574* (0.243)	0.107 (0.264)	0.345* (0.175)
In-Hope	0.963*** (0.250)	1.333*** (0.281)	1.103*** (0.183)
In-Anger	0.627* (0.294)	1.042* (0.425)	0.753** (0.235)
In-Fear	0.179 (0.308)	-0.532 (0.393)	-0.089 (0.240)
Out-Pride	-0.808*** (0.234)	-0.423 (0.264)	-0.609*** (0.171)
Out-Hope	-0.161 (0.232)	-0.133 (0.261)	-0.160 (0.170)
White	0.184 (0.243)	0.220 (0.257)	0.189 (0.173)
Age	-0.659 (0.517)	0.690 (0.666)	-0.197 (0.397)
Education	0.514 (0.430)	1.767*** (0.465)	1.065*** (0.308)
Income	-0.315 (0.409)	0.357 (0.499)	-0.096 (0.311)
Unemployed	-0.069 (0.433)	0.089 (0.544)	0.010 (0.333)
Religiosity	-0.240 (0.259)	-0.425 (0.305)	-0.305 (0.193)

Party Strength	0.558* (0.272)	0.385 (0.322)	0.513* (0.203)
HC FT X Women			0.399 (0.855)
Constant	-0.876 (0.503)	-2.128** (0.655)	-1.035* (0.523)
Observations	566	445	1,011
Log Likelihood	-301.522	-234.194	-544.348
Akaike Inf. Crit.	635.044	500.388	1,124.695

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.64 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Fear toward George H.W. Bush among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Out-Fear		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	0.755 (0.538)	2.720*** (0.743)	2.382*** (0.677)
Women			1.507** (0.546)
Out-Anger	1.113*** (0.207)	1.062*** (0.252)	1.054*** (0.157)
In-Pride	-0.047 (0.225)	0.340 (0.246)	0.153 (0.163)
In-Hope	0.600* (0.252)	0.370 (0.297)	0.513** (0.189)
In-Anger	0.262 (0.278)	0.249 (0.332)	0.288 (0.209)
In-Fear	1.181*** (0.318)	1.770*** (0.415)	1.391*** (0.250)
Out-Pride	0.052 (0.225)	-0.104 (0.248)	-0.054 (0.164)
Out-Hope	-0.162 (0.221)	-0.489 (0.254)	-0.298 (0.164)
White	-0.135 (0.229)	0.165 (0.251)	-0.004 (0.166)
Age	-1.163* (0.482)	-2.337*** (0.628)	-1.619*** (0.377)
Education	0.951* (0.402)	0.017 (0.423)	0.542 (0.286)
Income	-0.242 (0.388)	-0.079 (0.476)	-0.164 (0.295)
Unemployed	0.718 (0.430)	0.271 (0.534)	0.522 (0.329)
Religiosity	0.224 (0.243)	0.162 (0.294)	0.192 (0.184)
Party Strength	0.313 (0.257)	-0.270 (0.299)	0.026 (0.192)
HC FT X Women			-1.504 (0.825)
Constant	-1.560** (0.492)	-2.229*** (0.625)	-2.648*** (0.523)
Observations	566	445	1,011
Log Likelihood	-330.407	-256.998	-592.594
Akaike Inf. Crit.	692.814	545.996	1,221.188

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.65 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Pride toward Bill Clinton among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	In-Pride		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	3.077*** (0.612)	3.067*** (0.768)	2.705*** (0.734)
Women			-0.061 (0.635)
Out-Anger	0.533* (0.245)	0.010 (0.267)	0.303 (0.176)
Out-Fear	-0.087 (0.227)	0.352 (0.247)	0.139 (0.164)
In-Hope	2.352*** (0.381)	1.985*** (0.402)	2.148*** (0.272)
In-Anger	-0.121 (0.294)	-0.551 (0.356)	-0.297 (0.221)
In-Fear	0.169 (0.315)	0.660 (0.361)	0.377 (0.232)
Out-Pride	1.062*** (0.241)	0.632* (0.259)	0.859*** (0.172)
Out-Hope	-0.252 (0.235)	0.066 (0.261)	-0.110 (0.171)
White	-0.485* (0.246)	-0.568* (0.251)	-0.505** (0.172)
Age	0.875 (0.527)	0.258 (0.654)	0.557 (0.399)
Education	-1.210** (0.444)	-0.575 (0.451)	-0.932** (0.309)

Income	-0.413 (0.422)	-0.442 (0.487)	-0.394 (0.310)
Unemployed	0.225 (0.444)	0.014 (0.533)	0.266 (0.332)
Religiosity	-0.259 (0.265)	0.435 (0.301)	0.034 (0.193)
Party Strength	1.115*** (0.273)	0.055 (0.307)	0.653** (0.199)
HC FT X Women			0.529 (0.932)
Constant	-4.673*** (0.642)	-4.127*** (0.711)	-4.371*** (0.595)
Observations	566	445	1,011
Log Likelihood	-288.217	-241.858	-540.992
Akaike Inf. Crit.	608.434	515.716	1,117.983

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.66 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Hope toward Bill Clinton among Democrats, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	In-Hope		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	1.272 (0.655)	1.708 (0.893)	1.346 (0.836)
Women			-0.099 (0.639)
Out-Anger	0.946*** (0.250)	1.343*** (0.285)	1.094*** (0.184)
Out-Fear	0.563* (0.255)	0.301 (0.301)	0.464* (0.192)
In-Pride	2.308*** (0.369)	1.969*** (0.400)	2.120*** (0.267)
In-Anger	-0.695* (0.307)	-0.084 (0.422)	-0.477* (0.239)
In-Fear	-0.551 (0.327)	0.409 (0.524)	-0.260 (0.269)
Out-Pride	-0.354 (0.284)	-0.164 (0.301)	-0.260 (0.202)
Out-Hope	0.179 (0.283)	0.096 (0.307)	0.119 (0.204)
White	0.381 (0.282)	0.168 (0.307)	0.286 (0.202)
Age	0.725 (0.633)	-0.760 (0.787)	0.222 (0.483)
Education	1.018 (0.520)	0.677 (0.536)	0.941** (0.365)
Income	-0.129 (0.483)	-0.623 (0.586)	-0.356 (0.365)
Unemployed	0.045 (0.502)	-0.258 (0.650)	-0.078 (0.392)
Religiosity	0.319 (0.308)	-0.354 (0.362)	0.056 (0.229)
Party Strength	-0.099 (0.335)	0.611 (0.367)	0.200 (0.242)
HC FT X Women			-0.036 (1.039)
Constant	-1.647** (0.585)	-1.115 (0.739)	-1.329* (0.613)
Observations	566	445	1,011
Log Likelihood	-223.869	-182.750	-413.400
Akaike Inf. Crit.	479.738	397.500	862.801

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.67 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Anger toward Bill Clinton among Republicans, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Out-Anger		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	-2.141** (0.661)	-3.576*** (0.675)	-3.201*** (0.639)
Women			-0.045 (0.420)
Out-Fear	1.262*** (0.278)	1.714*** (0.263)	1.397*** (0.184)
In-Pride	-1.503* (0.595)	0.466 (0.530)	-0.532 (0.383)
In-Hope	-0.796* (0.342)	-0.147 (0.362)	-0.381 (0.241)
In-Anger	0.855** (0.300)	1.248*** (0.275)	1.036*** (0.197)
In-Fear	0.043 (0.302)	-0.338 (0.316)	-0.086 (0.216)
Out-Pride	0.409 (0.370)	0.427 (0.388)	0.463 (0.263)
Out-Hope	0.544 (0.327)	0.551 (0.291)	0.512* (0.210)

White	1.553** (0.491)	0.344 (0.413)	0.805** (0.308)
Age	-1.740** (0.635)	-0.316 (0.672)	-0.882* (0.441)
Education	-0.108 (0.531)	0.508 (0.505)	0.143 (0.355)
Income	0.063 (0.495)	0.685 (0.550)	0.466 (0.356)
Unemployed	0.011 (0.740)	0.051 (0.913)	-0.066 (0.538)
Religiosity	0.200 (0.336)	-0.139 (0.311)	0.041 (0.220)
Party Strength	0.514 (0.351)	0.154 (0.315)	0.287 (0.227)
HC FT X Women			0.803 (0.870)
Constant	-1.629* (0.750)	-1.551* (0.736)	-1.493** (0.549)
Observations	357	414	771
Log Likelihood	-187.411	-206.744	-405.999
Akaike Inf. Crit.	406.822	445.487	847.997
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.68 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Fear toward Bill Clinton among Republicans, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Out-Fear		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	-2.770*** (0.656)	-1.475* (0.638)	-1.707** (0.595)
Women			0.071 (0.396)
Out-Anger	1.290*** (0.281)	1.729*** (0.263)	1.398*** (0.183)
In-Pride	0.370 (0.499)	-1.013 (0.590)	-0.196 (0.368)
In-Hope	0.199 (0.346)	-0.659 (0.345)	-0.263 (0.237)
In-Anger	-0.146 (0.298)	-0.577* (0.269)	-0.317 (0.194)
In-Fear	0.874** (0.304)	1.421*** (0.324)	1.032*** (0.214)
Out-Pride	0.511 (0.378)	0.631 (0.398)	0.566* (0.266)
Out-Hope	0.555 (0.333)	0.627* (0.283)	0.585** (0.210)
White	-0.767 (0.431)	-0.656 (0.402)	-0.620* (0.281)
Age	0.494 (0.634)	-0.122 (0.655)	0.050 (0.439)
Education	1.281* (0.524)	0.150 (0.489)	0.733* (0.348)
Income	0.644 (0.486)	-0.096 (0.532)	0.237 (0.348)
Unemployed	-0.167 (0.701)	-0.297 (0.797)	-0.109 (0.521)
Religiosity	-0.153 (0.329)	0.106 (0.298)	-0.004 (0.214)
Party Strength	0.497 (0.343)	0.089 (0.303)	0.273 (0.223)
HC FT X Women			-0.660 (0.826)
Constant	-1.711* (0.698)	-0.898 (0.714)	-1.363** (0.519)
Observations	357	414	771
Log Likelihood	-189.400	-217.930	-417.158
Akaike Inf. Crit.	410.799	467.860	870.315
<i>Note:</i>			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.69 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Pride toward George H.W. Bush among Republicans, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	In-Pride		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	0.448 (0.842)	0.620 (0.877)	0.730 (0.833)
Women			-0.356 (0.540)
Out-Anger	0.413 (0.359)	0.505 (0.398)	0.483 (0.261)
Out-Fear	0.567 (0.375)	0.617 (0.396)	0.577* (0.266)
In-Hope	0.551 (0.617)	0.629 (0.636)	0.536 (0.428)
In-Anger	-0.215 (0.390)	-0.482 (0.412)	-0.348 (0.272)

In-Fear	-0.437 (0.351)	-0.616 (0.340)	-0.514* (0.238)
Out-Pride	0.036 (0.358)	-0.703 (0.390)	-0.283 (0.257)
Out-Hope	1.729*** (0.309)	1.790*** (0.335)	1.685*** (0.222)
White	1.058* (0.423)	0.092 (0.461)	0.693* (0.296)
Age	-0.482 (0.733)	-1.547 (0.839)	-0.916 (0.534)
Education	-0.363 (0.639)	0.613 (0.615)	0.090 (0.435)
Income	0.586 (0.571)	0.115 (0.709)	0.316 (0.427)
Unemployed	0.252 (0.814)	0.995 (1.132)	0.717 (0.633)
Religiosity	0.389 (0.381)	-0.123 (0.397)	0.166 (0.267)
Party Strength	1.288** (0.431)	0.553 (0.418)	0.894** (0.294)
HC FT X Women			-0.350 (1.056)
Constant	-1.680* (0.754)	0.433 (0.794)	-0.529 (0.590)
Observations	357	414	771
Log Likelihood	-142.130	-139.229	-286.867
Akaike Inf. Crit.	316.261	310.459	609.734

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.70 Effect of Feelings about Hillary Clinton on Hope toward George H.W. Bush among Republicans, 1992 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Women (1)	Men (2)	Interaction (3)
HC FT	-0.926 (0.759)	0.060 (0.671)	-0.175 (0.625)
Women			0.679 (0.453)
Out-Anger	0.547 (0.321)	0.573* (0.289)	0.530* (0.210)
Out-Fear	0.572 (0.332)	0.588* (0.283)	0.580** (0.210)
In-Pride	0.436 (0.537)	-0.123 (0.504)	0.110 (0.360)
In-Anger	0.363 (0.362)	0.322 (0.345)	0.274 (0.241)
In-Fear	-0.609 (0.312)	0.182 (0.271)	-0.106 (0.200)
Out-Pride	0.309 (0.326)	0.229 (0.323)	0.221 (0.224)
Out-Hope	1.714*** (0.310)	1.816*** (0.342)	1.687*** (0.223)
White	0.283 (0.421)	0.974** (0.371)	0.613* (0.268)
Age	-0.208 (0.670)	-0.145 (0.646)	-0.286 (0.450)
Education	0.121 (0.573)	-0.019 (0.488)	0.134 (0.364)
Income	0.288 (0.515)	-0.040 (0.538)	0.079 (0.364)
Unemployed	-0.501 (0.681)	-1.015 (0.750)	-0.889 (0.484)
Religiosity	-0.310 (0.354)	0.963** (0.307)	0.446* (0.223)
Party Strength	0.285 (0.378)	0.693* (0.311)	0.490* (0.236)
HC FT X Women			-0.351 (0.883)
Constant	-0.502 (0.686)	-2.923*** (0.719)	-2.069*** (0.521)
Observations	357	414	771
Log Likelihood	-168.493	-214.552	-390.630
Akaike Inf. Crit.	368.986	461.105	817.260

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table C.4.71 Predicting Feelings toward Ferraro among Democrats and Palin among Republicans, 1984 and 2008 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ferraro FT Democrats (1)	Palin FT Republicans (2)
Women	0.030 (0.016)	0.018 (0.018)
White	-0.063*** (0.018)	0.051 (0.030)
Age	0.072 (0.041)	0.057 (0.044)

Education	0.054 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.037)
Income	0.0001 (0.032)	0.019 (0.036)
Unemployed	0.041 (0.033)	0.064 (0.056)
Religiosity	-0.004 (0.022)	0.079*** (0.022)
Party Strength	0.105*** (0.021)	0.133*** (0.022)
Constant	0.614*** (0.032)	0.540*** (0.041)
Observations	872	532
<i>Note:</i>		<i>p</i> <0.05; <i>p</i> <0.01; <i>p</i> <0.001

APPENDIX D SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER 5 TABLES

Table D.5.1 Effect of Party on Anger toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Out-Party Anger		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Fear	1.549*** (0.061)	1.577*** (0.154)	1.790*** (0.197)
In-Pride	0.301*** (0.068)	1.027*** (0.203)	0.680** (0.207)
In-Hope	0.767*** (0.077)	0.673** (0.213)	1.299*** (0.252)
In-Anger	0.349*** (0.072)	0.597** (0.197)	0.617* (0.245)
In-Fear	-0.333*** (0.086)	-0.281 (0.278)	-0.572* (0.287)
Out-Pride	-0.262*** (0.074)	-0.692** (0.231)	0.667* (0.262)
Out-Hope	-0.273*** (0.073)	0.120 (0.209)	-0.618* (0.245)
Republican	0.193** (0.059)	-0.592 (0.335)	-0.345 (0.204)
Age	-0.290* (0.138)	-1.566*** (0.385)	-0.655 (0.468)
Education	0.486*** (0.120)	0.484 (0.321)	0.830* (0.368)
Income	0.018 (0.112)	-0.314 (0.298)	0.406 (0.347)
Unemployed	0.189 (0.158)	-0.244 (0.242)	-0.425 (0.367)
Religiosity	-0.092 (0.074)	-0.152 (0.208)	-0.172 (0.237)
Party Strength	0.337*** (0.075)	0.714*** (0.202)	0.303 (0.239)
1984	0.339** (0.126)	1.875*** (0.378)	1.046 (0.619)
1988	-0.299* (0.132)	0.351 (0.363)	0.087 (0.621)
1992	0.135 (0.126)	1.490*** (0.375)	1.135 (0.592)
1996	0.204 (0.136)	-0.547 (0.403)	1.163 (0.597)
2000	-0.387** (0.143)	0.643 (0.406)	0.358 (0.630)
2004	0.338* (0.162)	2.586*** (0.494)	0.733 (0.654)
2008	-0.473*** (0.129)	0.223 (0.372)	0.071 (0.588)
2012	0.605*** (0.115)	0.927** (0.327)	1.503** (0.552)
2016	2.067*** (0.169)	2.227*** (0.409)	3.859*** (0.683)
Constant	-1.492*** (0.145)	-2.573*** (0.406)	-3.516*** (0.639)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,762.366	-604.104	-355.341
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,572.733	1,256.208	758.681

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.2 Effect of Party on Fear toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Out-Party Fear		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	1.534*** (0.061)	1.580*** (0.154)	1.762*** (0.196)
In-Pride	0.375*** (0.068)	0.258 (0.207)	0.533** (0.204)
In-Hope	0.705*** (0.083)	0.647** (0.225)	0.468 (0.243)
In-Anger	-0.144* (0.070)	0.409* (0.188)	0.149 (0.220)
In-Fear	0.863*** (0.085)	0.552* (0.279)	1.156*** (0.258)
Out-Pride	-0.179* (0.074)	-0.360 (0.237)	-0.358 (0.259)
Out-Hope	-0.567*** (0.074)	-0.444* (0.211)	-0.446 (0.243)
Republican	0.001 (0.058)	-0.390 (0.351)	0.121 (0.189)
Age	0.090 (0.135)	0.617 (0.370)	0.970* (0.438)
Education	0.927*** (0.117)	0.377 (0.305)	0.769* (0.340)
Income	0.116 (0.109)	0.924** (0.284)	-0.005 (0.329)
Unemployed	-0.048 (0.151)	0.175 (0.241)	0.211 (0.331)

Religiosity	0.079 (0.072)	-0.386 (0.201)	-0.036 (0.221)
Party Strength	0.266*** (0.072)	0.172 (0.199)	0.588** (0.227)
1984	-0.311* (0.130)	-0.720 (0.377)	-0.059 (0.657)
1988	-0.582*** (0.143)	-0.599 (0.373)	-0.453 (0.668)
1992	0.394** (0.129)	1.023** (0.360)	1.061 (0.615)
1996	0.011 (0.137)	-0.108 (0.388)	0.073 (0.629)
2000	-0.220 (0.150)	-0.086 (0.400)	-0.029 (0.673)
2004	0.286 (0.157)	1.611*** (0.451)	0.937 (0.663)
2008	0.476*** (0.131)	0.245 (0.365)	1.044 (0.616)
2012	0.476*** (0.115)	-0.077 (0.320)	-0.133 (0.585)
2016	1.679*** (0.141)	1.970*** (0.386)	1.506* (0.618)
Constant	-2.741*** (0.153)	-2.597*** (0.403)	-3.401*** (0.664)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,959.111	-630.429	-409.002
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,966.221	1,308.857	866.005

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.3 Effect of Party on Pride toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable:		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.258*** (0.068)	1.017*** (0.206)	0.664** (0.204)
Out-Fear	0.387*** (0.068)	0.275 (0.213)	0.555** (0.203)
In-Hope	2.499*** (0.075)	2.507*** (0.216)	1.987*** (0.198)
In-Anger	0.043 (0.073)	-0.165 (0.228)	-0.482* (0.218)
In-Fear	-0.472*** (0.084)	-0.265 (0.304)	-0.372 (0.244)
Out-Pride	0.324*** (0.080)	0.756** (0.260)	-0.117 (0.236)
Out-Hope	-0.333*** (0.076)	0.069 (0.233)	0.016 (0.220)
Republican	0.393*** (0.061)	-1.470*** (0.339)	-0.062 (0.187)
Age	0.529*** (0.143)	1.236** (0.459)	-0.257 (0.439)
Education	-0.043 (0.124)	-0.865* (0.389)	-0.202 (0.342)
Income	0.045 (0.116)	-0.527 (0.367)	0.062 (0.324)
Unemployed	0.040 (0.158)	0.280 (0.300)	-0.296 (0.340)
Religiosity	0.171* (0.078)	0.538* (0.253)	0.103 (0.221)
Party Strength	0.677*** (0.077)	0.651** (0.227)	0.773*** (0.220)
1984	0.187 (0.138)	-0.203 (0.391)	-0.237 (0.581)
1988	-0.294* (0.142)	-0.654 (0.366)	0.032 (0.568)
1992	-0.212 (0.134)	-1.126** (0.379)	-0.389 (0.559)
1996	0.335* (0.150)	1.071* (0.424)	-0.037 (0.564)
2000	-0.398** (0.152)	-0.413 (0.423)	0.055 (0.584)
2004	0.163 (0.176)	-1.626*** (0.452)	0.426 (0.628)
2008	0.511*** (0.145)	1.748*** (0.468)	0.327 (0.560)
2012	0.118 (0.123)	2.255*** (0.425)	0.458 (0.527)
2016	0.873*** (0.144)	1.315** (0.435)	0.433 (0.561)
Constant	-2.405*** (0.158)	-2.371*** (0.431)	-1.678** (0.578)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,634.121	-461.315	-420.360
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,316.242	970.630	888.719

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.4 Effect of Party on Hope toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

Dependent variable:

	In-Party Hope		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.738*** (0.079)	0.622** (0.214)	1.345*** (0.254)
Out-Fear	0.681*** (0.083)	0.646** (0.226)	0.507* (0.245)
In-Pride	2.488*** (0.075)	2.480*** (0.212)	2.013*** (0.198)
In-Anger	-0.457*** (0.085)	-0.049 (0.246)	-0.364 (0.259)
In-Fear	-0.573*** (0.096)	-0.119 (0.319)	0.216 (0.288)
Out-Pride	-0.354*** (0.089)	-0.287 (0.267)	-0.713** (0.258)
Out-Hope	0.059 (0.087)	-0.080 (0.242)	-0.091 (0.246)
Republican	-0.199** (0.072)	-0.495 (0.312)	-0.349 (0.205)
Age	0.486** (0.168)	0.320 (0.477)	0.503 (0.515)
Education	0.625*** (0.147)	1.375** (0.418)	0.876* (0.397)
Income	0.267 (0.137)	0.556 (0.384)	-0.551 (0.387)
Unemployed	-0.140 (0.178)	-0.055 (0.300)	0.840* (0.426)
Religiosity	0.189* (0.091)	-0.353 (0.260)	0.369 (0.251)
Party Strength	0.273** (0.095)	0.274 (0.244)	0.560* (0.262)
1984	-0.409* (0.161)	-0.454 (0.463)	-0.271 (0.679)
1988	-0.675*** (0.160)	-0.392 (0.429)	-0.322 (0.630)
1992	-0.222 (0.159)	-0.465 (0.453)	-1.132 (0.615)
1996	-0.395* (0.174)	-0.774 (0.479)	-0.531 (0.630)
2000	-0.346* (0.175)	-1.152* (0.472)	-0.776 (0.637)
2004	0.143 (0.226)	-0.810 (0.529)	-1.252 (0.681)
2008	-0.198 (0.171)	-0.871 (0.492)	-0.443 (0.629)
2012	-0.127 (0.148)	-0.194 (0.469)	0.048 (0.596)
2016	-0.335* (0.170)	-1.207* (0.488)	-1.406* (0.649)
Constant	-0.738*** (0.173)	-0.537 (0.467)	-0.487 (0.629)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-2,693.656	-424.302	-331.386
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,435.313	896.604	710.772

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.5 Effect of Party on Anger toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	Dependent variable: In-Party Anger		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.356*** (0.072)	0.587** (0.199)	0.666** (0.245)
Out-Fear	-0.147* (0.070)	0.397* (0.186)	0.172 (0.224)
In-Pride	0.038 (0.074)	-0.178 (0.229)	-0.475* (0.221)
In-Hope	-0.460*** (0.083)	0.029 (0.246)	-0.414 (0.247)
In-Fear	1.476*** (0.070)	1.639*** (0.217)	1.908*** (0.218)
Out-Pride	0.209** (0.075)	0.240 (0.244)	0.396 (0.265)
Out-Hope	0.632*** (0.073)	0.334 (0.217)	0.438 (0.251)
Republican	-0.313*** (0.059)	0.989** (0.307)	-0.063 (0.205)
Age	0.047 (0.139)	0.662 (0.406)	-1.705*** (0.477)
Education	0.286* (0.120)	0.671* (0.338)	-0.034 (0.367)
Income	0.059 (0.112)	0.646* (0.315)	0.185 (0.349)
Unemployed	0.022 (0.151)	-0.081 (0.270)	-0.100 (0.372)
Religiosity	0.044 (0.075)	-0.097 (0.220)	0.161 (0.233)
Party Strength	-0.387*** (0.075)	-0.203 (0.218)	-0.334 (0.243)
1984	-0.760*** (0.129)	-1.066** (0.381)	-2.052** (0.672)
1988	-0.988*** (0.141)	-0.899* (0.363)	-1.949** (0.651)
1992	-1.088*** (0.131)	-1.644*** (0.388)	-1.369* (0.541)
1996	-0.519*** (0.136)	-0.501 (0.375)	-0.519 (0.532)

2000	-1.503*** (0.170)	-1.690*** (0.480)	-1.361* (0.589)
2004	-0.846*** (0.166)	-3.195*** (0.683)	-1.730** (0.659)
2008	-1.331*** (0.140)	-1.540*** (0.408)	-2.144*** (0.592)
2012	-0.873*** (0.114)	-1.189*** (0.327)	-0.524 (0.489)
2016	0.599*** (0.122)	-0.806* (0.345)	-0.033 (0.515)
Constant	-0.554*** (0.141)	-1.732*** (0.407)	-0.215 (0.549)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,791.310	-573.245	-379.656
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,630.620	1,194.490	807.312
Note:			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.6 Effect of Party on Fear toward In-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	-0.290*** (0.088)	-0.410 (0.294)	-0.544 (0.293)
Out-Fear	0.918*** (0.087)	0.554 (0.285)	1.190*** (0.271)
In-Pride	-0.439*** (0.087)	-0.099 (0.318)	-0.306 (0.254)
In-Hope	-0.555*** (0.096)	0.164 (0.332)	0.174 (0.279)
In-Anger	1.459*** (0.071)	1.617*** (0.220)	1.887*** (0.221)
Out-Pride	0.360*** (0.086)	0.990*** (0.296)	0.708* (0.280)
Out-Hope	0.737*** (0.084)	1.010*** (0.264)	0.612* (0.273)
Republican	0.240*** (0.070)	0.598 (0.400)	0.193 (0.230)
Age	-0.485** (0.164)	-0.644 (0.575)	-0.021 (0.529)
Education	0.134 (0.142)	0.793 (0.488)	-0.119 (0.423)
Income	-0.179 (0.131)	-0.749 (0.456)	-0.609 (0.404)
Unemployed	0.053 (0.170)	-0.197 (0.384)	-0.298 (0.438)
Religiosity	0.105 (0.088)	-0.270 (0.305)	0.021 (0.271)
Party Strength	-0.419*** (0.088)	-0.164 (0.291)	-0.243 (0.279)
1984	-0.462* (0.186)	-0.783 (0.713)	1.110 (1.255)
1988	-0.355 (0.194)	-0.696 (0.687)	1.745 (1.176)
1992	0.666*** (0.159)	0.585 (0.586)	2.079 (1.125)
1996	0.283 (0.176)	0.813 (0.592)	2.048 (1.128)
2000	-0.354 (0.218)	-0.457 (0.836)	2.107 (1.151)
2004	0.460* (0.202)	0.103 (0.756)	1.964 (1.186)
2008	0.548*** (0.165)	0.398 (0.621)	2.319* (1.124)
2012	-0.033 (0.151)	0.233 (0.573)	1.527 (1.110)
2016	1.551*** (0.149)	1.538** (0.554)	2.808* (1.112)
Constant	-2.200*** (0.180)	-3.611*** (0.645)	-4.634*** (1.154)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-2,867.101	-312.755	-287.229
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,782.203	673.510	622.459
Note:			$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.7 Effect of Party on Pride toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	-0.217** (0.075)	-0.612** (0.236)	0.744** (0.261)
Out-Fear	-0.181* (0.075)	-0.295 (0.241)	-0.356 (0.255)
In-Pride	0.347*** (0.081)	0.785** (0.265)	-0.099 (0.241)

In-Hope	-0.344*** (0.089)	-0.425 (0.253)	-0.662* (0.261)
In-Anger	0.214** (0.075)	0.284 (0.245)	0.389 (0.268)
In-Fear	0.406*** (0.085)	0.991*** (0.285)	0.809** (0.280)
Out-Hope	2.265*** (0.066)	2.107*** (0.198)	2.744*** (0.218)
Republican	-0.272*** (0.065)	1.565*** (0.317)	0.332 (0.218)
Age	0.301* (0.153)	0.306 (0.493)	0.120 (0.536)
Education	0.227 (0.134)	-0.197 (0.439)	-0.260 (0.420)
Income	0.213 (0.124)	0.045 (0.417)	-0.290 (0.405)
Unemployed	0.012 (0.168)	-0.239 (0.346)	0.489 (0.411)
Religiosity	0.225** (0.083)	0.260 (0.288)	0.392 (0.271)
Party Strength	-0.241** (0.084)	-0.052 (0.260)	-0.0002 (0.280)
1984	0.208 (0.147)	0.466 (0.499)	-0.401 (0.690)
1988	-0.281 (0.163)	-0.003 (0.487)	-0.583 (0.691)
1992	0.219 (0.147)	0.695 (0.486)	-0.255 (0.652)
1996	0.488** (0.156)	-0.145 (0.527)	-1.012 (0.677)
2000	-0.243 (0.176)	-1.175 (0.671)	-1.077 (0.698)
2004	0.457* (0.183)	1.859*** (0.541)	0.922 (0.691)
2008	0.424** (0.149)	0.525 (0.490)	-0.111 (0.651)
2012	-0.094 (0.135)	-0.895 (0.503)	-1.119 (0.626)
2016	-0.259 (0.150)	-0.428 (0.519)	-0.825 (0.661)
Constant	-2.213*** (0.168)	-2.719*** (0.533)	-1.998** (0.682)
Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,219.523	-385.150	-281.428
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,487.046	818.299	610.857

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.8 Effect of Party on Hope toward Out-Party Presidential Candidates, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	-0.255*** (0.073)	0.213 (0.216)	-0.614* (0.244)
Out-Fear	-0.582*** (0.074)	-0.539* (0.219)	-0.507* (0.240)
In-Pride	-0.348*** (0.077)	0.064 (0.236)	-0.039 (0.222)
In-Hope	0.050 (0.087)	-0.024 (0.239)	-0.005 (0.247)
In-Anger	0.634*** (0.073)	0.283 (0.217)	0.443 (0.245)
In-Fear	0.752*** (0.083)	1.063*** (0.257)	0.663* (0.268)
Out-Pride	2.268*** (0.066)	2.133*** (0.198)	2.768*** (0.220)
Republican	0.243*** (0.065)	0.529 (0.303)	0.428* (0.203)
Age	-0.502*** (0.152)	0.721 (0.434)	1.389** (0.490)
Education	0.422** (0.133)	-0.707 (0.389)	0.879* (0.390)
Income	-0.293* (0.123)	-0.120 (0.369)	-0.370 (0.379)
Unemployed	0.212 (0.160)	-0.306 (0.317)	-0.078 (0.413)
Religiosity	0.347*** (0.081)	0.157 (0.252)	0.458 (0.251)
Party Strength	-0.518*** (0.082)	-0.553* (0.234)	-0.273 (0.256)
1984	-0.144 (0.141)	1.211* (0.507)	0.519 (0.638)
1988	-0.537*** (0.152)	1.045* (0.496)	-0.166 (0.631)
1992	-0.170 (0.140)	1.239* (0.502)	0.074 (0.603)
1996	-0.720*** (0.157)	0.483 (0.536)	0.096 (0.611)
2000	-0.447** (0.165)	1.171* (0.544)	0.786 (0.620)
2004	-0.478** (0.184)	0.653 (0.592)	-1.711* (0.737)
2008	-0.450** (0.147)	0.598 (0.525)	0.070 (0.611)
2012	-0.304* (0.129)	0.217 (0.501)	-0.347 (0.579)
2016	-0.731*** (0.146)	1.188* (0.507)	-0.467 (0.626)
Constant	-1.061*** (0.156)	-2.625*** (0.530)	-2.336*** (0.629)

Observations	7,385	1,651	1,174
Log Likelihood	-3,302.842	-457.488	-330.084
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,653.683	962.977	708.167

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.9 Effects of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Campaign Interest, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Campaign Interest		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.339*** (0.056)	0.409** (0.138)	0.203 (0.169)
Out-Fear	0.515*** (0.055)	0.470*** (0.135)	0.306 (0.164)
In-Pride	0.498*** (0.058)	0.376* (0.158)	0.491** (0.162)
In-Hope	0.444*** (0.068)	0.221 (0.169)	0.331 (0.183)
In-Anger	0.002 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.147)	0.198 (0.168)
In-Fear	-0.060 (0.066)	0.181 (0.204)	-0.163 (0.195)
Out-Pride	0.332*** (0.063)	0.605*** (0.183)	0.141 (0.201)
Out-Hope	0.028 (0.062)	-0.080 (0.164)	0.090 (0.188)
Age	2.189*** (0.116)	1.420*** (0.302)	1.610*** (0.347)
Education	1.304*** (0.098)	0.861*** (0.251)	1.165*** (0.270)
Income	0.485*** (0.091)	-0.158 (0.232)	0.486 (0.254)
Unemployed	0.248* (0.123)	-0.003 (0.189)	-0.218 (0.274)
Religiosity	0.163** (0.059)	0.156 (0.162)	0.098 (0.174)
Party Strength	0.580*** (0.061)	0.481** (0.160)	0.960*** (0.181)
1984	-0.038 (0.110)	-0.144 (0.306)	-0.400 (0.477)
1988	0.241* (0.115)	0.029 (0.290)	-0.285 (0.465)
1992	0.556*** (0.111)	-0.076 (0.300)	0.068 (0.453)
1996	-0.286* (0.118)	0.043 (0.309)	0.027 (0.455)
2000	-0.052 (0.122)	0.440 (0.319)	-0.217 (0.474)
2004	0.299* (0.137)	-0.277 (0.349)	-0.517 (0.498)
2008	0.362** (0.132)	0.855* (0.362)	0.215 (0.493)
2012	0.122 (0.098)	0.576* (0.268)	0.017 (0.423)
2016	0.242* (0.108)	0.091 (0.292)	0.238 (0.446)
Observations	7,390	1,293	914
Log Likelihood	-6,693.589	-1,198.644	-864.335

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.10 Effects of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Voting, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Voting for President		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.192* (0.081)	0.162 (0.197)	0.113 (0.229)
Out-Fear	-0.031 (0.082)	0.274 (0.194)	0.013 (0.222)
In-Pride	0.193* (0.084)	0.130 (0.220)	-0.101 (0.221)
In-Hope	0.016 (0.094)	0.049 (0.224)	0.432 (0.235)
In-Anger	0.051 (0.085)	-0.181 (0.212)	0.459 (0.239)
In-Fear	0.240* (0.100)	-0.310 (0.284)	-0.296 (0.272)
Out-Pride	-0.007 (0.093)	0.013 (0.256)	0.446 (0.285)
Out-Hope	-0.026 (0.090)	-0.126 (0.228)	-0.536* (0.258)
Age	1.882*** (0.169)	1.531*** (0.430)	1.893*** (0.480)
Education	2.026*** (0.152)	1.811*** (0.373)	1.056** (0.383)
Income	1.536*** (0.133)	1.222*** (0.346)	1.009** (0.349)
Unemployed	-0.368* (0.163)	-0.326 (0.240)	-0.304 (0.333)

Religiosity	0.682*** (0.090)	0.827*** (0.228)	0.768** (0.242)
Party Strength	0.838*** (0.093)	1.076*** (0.216)	1.004*** (0.247)
Interest	1.511*** (0.106)	1.210*** (0.235)	1.408*** (0.265)
1984	0.118 (0.158)	0.099 (0.401)	1.220 (0.681)
1988	-0.052 (0.163)	-0.193 (0.385)	1.234 (0.663)
1992	0.188 (0.161)	-0.004 (0.394)	1.049 (0.644)
1996	-0.044 (0.165)	-0.171 (0.408)	1.323* (0.663)
2000	0.080 (0.177)	0.200 (0.454)	0.809 (0.680)
2004	0.386 (0.227)	0.267 (0.519)	0.700 (0.697)
2008	0.209 (0.202)	0.289 (0.523)	1.273 (0.700)
2012	-0.306* (0.139)	-0.096 (0.351)	1.067 (0.605)
2016	-0.262 (0.159)	0.298 (0.400)	0.845 (0.633)
Constant	-2.718*** (0.180)	-2.475*** (0.427)	-3.432*** (0.690)
Observations	6,563	1,385	934
Log Likelihood	-2,728.283	-504.570	-355.688
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,506.565	1,059.139	761.375

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

Table D.5.11 Effects of Emotions toward Presidential Candidates on Non-Voting Participation, 1980-2016 (Weighted)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Non-Voting Participation		
	White Women (1)	Black Women (2)	Latinas (3)
Out-Anger	0.133*** (0.031)	0.190* (0.074)	0.166* (0.080)
Out-Fear	0.181*** (0.030)	0.131 (0.071)	0.054 (0.077)
In-Pride	0.166*** (0.032)	0.091 (0.087)	0.080 (0.079)
In-Hope	-0.056 (0.037)	-0.130 (0.092)	-0.040 (0.087)
In-Anger	0.022 (0.031)	0.021 (0.077)	-0.035 (0.080)
In-Fear	-0.059 (0.036)	0.052 (0.108)	0.139 (0.094)
Out-Pride	-0.106** (0.034)	0.072 (0.095)	0.009 (0.098)
Out-Hope	0.005 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.088)	-0.017 (0.090)
Age	0.114 (0.062)	0.026 (0.155)	0.186 (0.158)
Education	0.542*** (0.053)	0.080 (0.130)	0.272* (0.127)
Income	0.189*** (0.049)	0.309* (0.123)	0.036 (0.120)
Unemployed	0.175* (0.069)	-0.092 (0.099)	0.219 (0.127)
Religiosity	-0.059 (0.032)	0.296*** (0.084)	0.145 (0.081)
Party Strength	0.268*** (0.033)	0.227** (0.084)	0.078 (0.085)
Interest	0.778*** (0.040)	0.768*** (0.089)	0.703*** (0.092)
1984	-0.068 (0.061)	0.034 (0.162)	-0.207 (0.251)
1988	-0.061 (0.064)	0.191 (0.155)	-0.069 (0.244)
1992	-0.055 (0.060)	-0.047 (0.155)	-0.294 (0.239)
1996	-0.170** (0.065)	0.137 (0.165)	-0.450 (0.243)
2000	0.003 (0.068)	0.235 (0.176)	-0.256 (0.250)
2004	0.236** (0.076)	0.055 (0.188)	-0.099 (0.255)
2008	0.078 (0.072)	0.623*** (0.188)	-0.083 (0.253)
2012	-0.110* (0.054)	0.536*** (0.138)	-0.083 (0.225)
2016	-0.173** (0.059)	0.304* (0.151)	-0.144 (0.234)
Constant	-0.417*** (0.067)	-0.571*** (0.164)	-0.058 (0.245)
Observations	6,429	1,351	906

Note:

$p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$

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