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WOMEN AND POLITICS IN ALGERIA: ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

By

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Women and Politics in Algeria: Essays on Political Representation

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Gender and politics scholars have sought to determine whether there is a link between women's descriptive representation, operationalized as the proportion of seats held by women in a national legislature, and women's substantive representation, usually operationalized as laws that advance women's rights. But, except for a few studies, the Arab world has not received significant attention which is surprising because the region has experienced a significant increase in women's presence in politics. Further, most of this work has focused on democratic contexts, obscuring whether hypothesized links between women's descriptive and substantive representation work in the same way in authoritarian contexts. To fill these gaps in the literature, I focus on the case of Algeria, where women's presence in parliament increased from 8% to 31.6% after the adoption of a gender quota in 2012.

Drawing on in-depth interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, my research examines the backgrounds of women elected, constituency service priorities, legislative dynamics, and women's agency. I argue that the "authoritarian toolkit," i.e., the resources available to authoritarian governments to manage and control political outcomes, shapes women's descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation in

ways that are distinct from how these dynamics operate in more democratic contexts.

While women parliamentarians reject the notion that they have an obligation to introduce and pass women's rights laws, they invest time in helping their male and female constituents solve their everyday problems to challenge the notion that women do not belong in politics. Therefore, there may not be strong links between women's descriptive and substantive representation. However, the efforts of elected women on behalf of their male constituents may advance women's symbolic representation by demonstrating women's abilities in the political realm.

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Dedication

For my parents, Maida and Djamel, and my sister, Inaam.

And, my grandmothers, Bashtola and Zoulikha.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2020, the international community marked the 25th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women and the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which outlined 12 areas of critical concern and actions to be taken by governments to advance women's rights, including increasing women's presence in decision-making bodies. The international community continues to assert that "inclusive leadership can bring change for all women and girls" (UN Women 2020). Since 1995, women have achieved significant gains globally due to the adoption of gender quotas (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008). The global average increased from 11.3% in 1995 to 24.9% in 2020 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2020).

One of the most notable trends over this period has been a dramatic increase in women's representation in authoritarian contexts. The Nordic countries, who led the world in terms of women's presence in national legislatures in 1995, have been replaced by countries like Rwanda, Cuba, Bolivia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2020). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), authoritarian regimes in Morocco, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, and most recently the UAE have all adopted gender quotas, opening up electoral opportunities for women. Over the last decade, Algeria has been a leading country in the Arab world in this respect. Immediately after the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011, the proportion of seats held by women in the Algerian parliament increased from 8% to 31.6%, a level at which it has remained during the subsequent election (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2020).

The rising level of women's representation in authoritarian regimes raises questions about the meaning of these reforms in non-democratic contexts. What role do women play in authoritarian legislatures? Does their presence lead to change as the UN has declared? Do they represent women? What impact does their presence have on politics? While questions about women's political representation are well-studied in democratic contexts, a growing number of gender and politics scholars have started to pay attention to how authoritarianism affects the shape and impact of women's political representation.

One set of scholars have argued that women's presence matters in authoritarian regimes (Benstead 2016; Darhour 2012; Nanes 2015; Tripp 2001; Wang 2013). However, others have emphasized that authoritarian institutions prevent women from engaging in the substantive representation of women's issues (Burnet 2008; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Johnson 2016; Sater 2007; Shalaby 2016; Tamale 1999). Further, even when women do advocate on behalf of women in these contexts, they refrain from challenging the regime on other issues such as repression of opposition groups, which reinforces authoritarianism (Longman 2006).

While research on women's representation in authoritarian regimes in Africa is on the rise, this literature has largely focused on a handful of cases, like Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania (Bauer 2012, p. 376). The Arab world has only recently begun to receive closer attention (Benstead 2016; Darhour 2012; Nanes 2015; Sater 2007; Shalaby 2016). Additionally, except for a few studies (Benstead 2011; Burnet 2011), gender and politics scholars have tended to focus on descriptive, and to a lesser extent, substantive representation, overlooking interconnections with other dimensions of representation, like

symbolic representation. In her seminal book, Hanna Pitkin (1967) distinguished between four dimensions of political representation: formal representation, which refers to the formal institutions through which representatives are selected; descriptive representation, which refers to the extent to which representatives resemble the electorate in terms of race, gender, sexual orientation; substantive representation, which “... means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (p. 209); and symbolic representation, which refers to how the represented feel about their representatives and political institutions such as legislatures.

There are good reasons to think that dynamics of representation operate in distinct ways across democratic and authoritarian contexts. Scholars argue that because authoritarian regimes rely on patronage, i.e., rulers strengthen their power by distributing resources to elites in exchange for their support, women are not recruited to represent women citizens but to serve as loyalists of the regime, affecting the prospects for women’s substantive representation (Goetz 2003). While this may be true, other scholars point out that this does not preclude the potential for substantive representation to take place, particularly in contexts where there are strong women’s movements who forge alliances with women parliamentarians to introduce and pass gender equality policies (Tripp 2001). Moreover, even where there are few opportunities for substantive representation, links between descriptive and symbolic representation may exist in authoritarian regimes, with a positive impact on the lives of ordinary women (Burnet 2011). These contributions suggest that additional research is needed to adequately theorize and map potential interconnections among these dimensions of representation in authoritarian contexts.

A fuller understanding of these dynamics has been limited, however, by a lack of engagement between feminist research on women's representation in authoritarian contexts and non-feminist research on electoral authoritarian regimes. The latter define electoral authoritarian regimes as "neither clearly democratic nor fully authoritarian. They inhabit the wide and foggy zone between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism" (Schedler 2002, p. 37). Engaging with this body of literature is important because it highlights features of these regimes which have an impact on the potential role that women legislators can play in authoritarian contexts, which may differ from the dynamics at work in more democratic contexts.

More specifically, scholars argue that authoritarian regimes have an incentive to coopt ordinary citizens (for example, Chen et al. 2016; Lust-Okar 2006); make policy concessions to the opposition (Gandhi 2008; Tripp 2019); and maintain the support of their allies (Boix and Svobik 2013; Magaloni 2006). Moreover, particularly relevant to this study is the concept of "soft authoritarian toolkit" (Schatz 2009). As Schatz (2009) argues, authoritarian rulers rely on their allies to maintain power, but they also seek to persuade and recruit outsiders by employing a combination of tools without resorting to overt repression.

Bringing these different literatures together, I argue that these elements of the authoritarian toolkit are key to understanding what women elected in authoritarian contexts can achieve in terms of women's substantive representation and symbolic representation. To coopt ordinary citizens from different segments of society, for example, regimes may strategically recruit a diverse group of women to help the regime regain the trust of the broader population. Yet a diverse group of women may not be able to

work together to introduce and pass women's rights laws. However, such diversity may be good for symbolic representation, with women holding a range of occupations – and varying levels of prior political experience – helping to restore trust in state institutions through capable constituency service. This work on behalf of both men and women may not, in turn, result in tangible policy gains for women as a group – but it may contribute to broader transformations in views regarding women as leaders.

This account is bolstered by scholarship on women's agency in non-Western contexts, which argues that women outside the West contexts are not passive victims (Abu-Lughod 2013; Mohanty 1991). Feminist scholarship on women in the MENA region reveals that women express agency in different ways, sometimes making the strategic decision to work with authoritarian regimes to advance their rights (Pratt 2020; Stephan and Charrad 2020; Tripp 2019). Women in the MENA region have forged alliances with authoritarian regimes when there are internal threats to their rights, such as the rise of extremist groups; and when there are external threats, such as instability and wars due to global and regional geopolitics (Pratt 2020; Stephan and Charrad 2020; Tripp 2019). Taken together, this work highlights the ways in which women's lives are impacted by a combination of factors, including authoritarianism, militarism, extremism, and Western imperialism.

In sum, I argue that women who enter authoritarian legislatures in the Arab world may refrain from introducing and passing women's rights laws. This is not because they are coopted by authoritarian regimes or because they are non-feminists. Rather, they see themselves as representatives of the “people,” men and women, whose lives have been impacted by authoritarianism, imperialism, neoliberalism, extremism, and regional and

global geopolitics. As a result, they express agency by working to change perceptions of women leaders, creating opportunities for symbolic representation.

As Lombardo and Meier (2016) point out, gender and politics scholars have not adequately theorized symbolic representation. Gender and politics scholars usually measure symbolic representation by examining if there is a role model effect, i.e., whether an increase in women's presence in politics increases political participation among women citizens (for example, Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Other scholars ask whether there is a link between women's descriptive representation and greater confidence in political institutions (for example, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Zetterberg 2012). Lastly, other scholars find that exposure to women leaders changes perceptions of women leaders among male citizens (Beaman et al. 2012).

Instead, Lombardo and Meier (2016) stress that studying symbolic representation requires an examination of the "*construction of women and men as political symbols*" (7, emphasis in original). For example, they begin by noting that in Spain, the image of Defense Minister Carme Chacón inspecting Spanish troops while pregnant was interpreted differently by different actors. While feminist actors focused on the importance of women entering spaces historically dominated by men, conservative actors questioned the ability of a pregnant woman to lead an army (2-3). As Lombardo and Meier (2014) point out, feminist research reveals that women have historically been constructed as the reproducers of the nation and men as the defenders (22-26). So, the image of a pregnant woman inspecting troops disrupts the discourse on gender and what is appropriate for women and men. As Lombardo and Meier (2016) argue, "By standing for a principal [gender] the agent does something to the principal, and to a greater degree

than in the case of descriptive representation, where the resemblance is purely physical. In the case of symbolic representation, ‘standing for’ evokes meaning” (27).

But, while in both Western and non-Western contexts, women have historically been marginalized from formal politics, feminists in the latter did forge alliances with nationalist movements to liberate their countries from Western colonial powers (Jayawardena 1986). In countries like Algeria for example, women were expected to sacrifice their gendered interests for the sake of the nation (Lazreg 2019). As a result, one of the main findings of this dissertation is that women parliamentarians in Algeria rejected the notion that they have an obligation to substantively represent women (Chapter 3). Moreover, they also criticized the concept of “gender.” But, their presence in politics is important for women’s symbolic representation which I find takes place due to an improvement in men’s substantive representation (Chapter 4). I do not focus on how women’s descriptive representation shapes attitudes nor do I draw from survey data. But, as Lombardo and Meier (2016) highlight, “in the case of symbolic representation the content is what the symbol evokes” (27). So, like the image of the Spanish Defense Minister inspecting troops, the presence of women in parliamentarians in Algerian formal politics is important for challenging the notion that women do not belong in politics. As one of the women’s rights activist told me that while there are “bad” women politicians in Algeria, women’s presence in politics is still important “Because a political system where there are only men who speak, it is dangerous. We can never be equal.”¹ This is

¹ Women’s rights activist interview (04/2019)

especially important in Algeria where women have historically been silenced and empowered themselves in the private sphere (Lazreg 2019).

The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows: I begin by reviewing theoretical and empirical work on gender and political representation in democratic contexts. Next, I theorize how authoritarianism impacts women's political representation. I then introduce the case of Algeria, lay out the main argument of this project, outline the methods that I employed, and present overviews of each chapter.

Gender and Political Representation in Democratic Contexts

This project is situated within the large body of literature on gender and political representation. Gender and politics scholars have paid significant attention to exploring dynamics of women's political representation in democratic contexts, with a particular interest in understanding the links between descriptive and substantive representation. The main argument in this line of research is that women are more likely than men to represent women's interests due to their unique life experiences, for example sexual violence, child-bearing, and the sexual division of labor (Phillips 1995). In empirical studies, scholars tend to find that women do in fact prioritize women's interests and issues when they enter legislatures (for example, Carroll 2002; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Tamerius 1995). These issues include violence against women, reproductive rights, civil rights for women, equal pay, and sexual harassment policy (Schwindt-Bayer 2006, p. 571). However, tangible policy gains have been more difficult to achieve (for example, Childs 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Grey 2002). Less attention, in contrast, has been paid to symbolic representation and the interconnections among formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).

Theoretical Work on Political Representation

In *The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race*, Phillips (1995) identified four arguments for increasing women's presence in politics: the role model effect, which is that women's presence in politics challenges the notion that women do not belong in politics and encourages other women to participate in politics; the justice argument, which is that women's underrepresentation is unfair and undemocratic; the women's interests argument, which hypothesizes that due to their unique life experiences, women's interests and issues differ from men's and that women politicians are more likely to represent women's interests; and the resources argument, which proposes that women politicians would be less adversarial and more collaborative, which would have positive effect on politics (pp. 62-77). Phillips (1995) acknowledges that there are differences among women, but adds that due to their unique life experiences, such as sexual violence, child-bearing, and the sexual division of labor, women's interests and issues differ from men's (pp. 67-68). Moreover, as Beckwith (2011) argues, it is important to distinguish between women's interests, issues, and preferences. For example, women have an interest in protecting themselves from violence so they mobilize to place violence against women on the public agenda (pp. 425-426). Once violence against women becomes an issue, women's preferences or solutions for combatting against women may differ.

Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representatives play a crucial role in two contexts. First, in contexts of historical marginalization and low levels of trust between certain groups. The presence of descriptive representatives eliminates barriers to access that the marginalized group experienced before the arrival of descriptive

representatives. Second, descriptive representation is important in contexts where there are uncrystallized issues, such as women's issues. When these issues do arise, the presence of female representatives enhances deliberative democracy. Building on these arguments, Dovi (2002) argues that it is not sufficient to simply have descriptive representatives enter political office but that "Preferable descriptive representatives have strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups" (p. 729). According to Dovi, this is important due to the fact that scholars often dismiss within-group differences with the result being that a dominant subgroup silences other subgroups.

In sum, scholars who focus on gender and political representation in democratic contexts agree that descriptive representatives are more likely than other legislators to represent the interests of their groups. These scholars acknowledge that there are important differences among women but add that due their unique experiences, women are more likely than men to represent women's interests and issues.

Empirical Work on Women's Substantive Representation and Symbolic Representation

To test these theories, gender and politics scholars have explored whether there is in fact a link between descriptive and substantive representation. Some operationalize women's substantive representation as a process, examining women's attitudes and priorities, ties between women representatives and women's movements, and ties between women representatives and female citizens. Others measure substantive representation as an outcome, exploring links between the number of women in office and the rate of policy gains for women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). A third group focuses on the link between descriptive and symbolic representation, but these studies

have yielded inconsistent findings due to differences in the way that symbolic representation is operationalized (Franceschet et al. 2012).

In general, research finds support for women's impact on substantive representation as a process. Scholars find that in state legislatures in the United States, women are more likely than to introduce bills that deal with women's rights, children, and the family (for example, Carroll 2001; Thomas 1991). Carroll (2001) finds that even male legislators report that women's presence makes a difference, not just for women but also for other disadvantaged groups. Kathlene (2001) argues that in addition to being more likely to focus on women's policy concerns, women legislators employ a contextual approach to policymaking, i.e., women focus on the needs of individuals and how societies privilege certain groups, reject the notion that the private and public spheres are separate, and are more likely to rely on a variety of resources when initiating bills than their male counterparts who rely on "experts." In Latin America, women legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to introduce women's rights bills (Franceschet and Piscopo; Schwindt-Bayer 2006).

In different contexts, gender and politics scholars also find that there are also ties between women legislators and women's organizations (Carroll 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). According to Carroll (2006), "when women legislators are connected to women's groups and networks, their relationships with these organizations can provide legislators with ongoing access to a larger group perspective" (p. 361). Lastly, the presence of women increases the likelihood that female constituents approach their representatives (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2004).

Other scholars are more skeptical about the link between descriptive and substantive representation. For example, Tremblay and Pelletier (2000) argue that political party affiliation may be more important for substantive representation than gender. They conclude that electing feminists affiliated with leftist political parties, women or men, is more likely to lead to women's substantive representation than electing conservative women. On the other hand, Celis and Childs (2012) critique the notion that conservatives cannot substantively represent women, noting that conservatives can initiate both feminist and anti-feminist policies.

Additionally, there is less evidence for substantive representation when measured solely in terms of outcomes, with researchers finding that an increase in the presence of women does not necessarily lead to policy gains (Childs 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Grey 2002; Reingold 2000). This is due to combination of factors, including party discipline (Childs 2004); male leaders' control of the legislative process such as debates in committees and informal institutions such as old-boy networks which marginalize women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008); backlash as women's presence increases (Grey 2002); and diversity among women which prevents them from working together (Reingold 2000). There is also evidence that as countries experience democratic backsliding, women are less willing and able to substantively represent women (Walsh 2012).

These inconsistent findings have led scholars to call for employing new approaches to studying women's substantive representation which I will draw from in this project. First, Childs and Krook (2006) call for shifting the focus to critical actors, which they define as "those who initiate policy proposals on their own, even when

women form a small minority, and embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the proportion of female representatives” (p. 528). Critical actors can be women or men who advocate on behalf of women. Second, Celis et al. (2008) call for “abandoning questions like ‘Do women represent women?’ in favour of questions like ‘Who claims to act for women?’ and ‘Where, why, and how does SRW occur?’” (p. 104). Women’s substantive representation does not only take place in national legislatures, but also in civil society, local governments, women’s ministries, and political parties. Moreover, different actors can pursue women’s substantive representation for different reasons, including strategic motivations of male leaders who are not interested in gender equality but strengthening their power.

Empirical Work on Women’s Symbolic Representation

Gender and politics scholars have also sought to determine whether there is a link between women’s descriptive and symbolic representation. Findings have been inconsistent due to differences across contexts and the methods that scholars employ. For example, in the United States, there is a link between women’s descriptive representation and women’s political involvement, which means that women leaders do serve as role models for female citizens (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Moreover, in a cross-national study, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) find that as women’s presence in politics increases, both women’s and men’s confidence in political institution increases. Other scholars are more skeptical. Writing about Mexico, Zetterberg (2012) finds that neither women nor men perceive political institutions as more democratic after there is an increase in women’s presence in politics. This might be due to the fact that across Latin

America, there is distrust of political institutions due to rampant corruption and women are recruited as political parties attempt to restore trust in legislatures (Funk et al. 2021).

Other scholars explore how male elites react to women's descriptive representation (Meier 2012). In surveys of male and female politicians in Belgium, Meier (2012) finds that while women see women's exclusion from politics as a problem and argue that its causes are structural, including discrimination by political parties, male elites reject the notion that women face structural obstacles or see women's exclusion from politics as a problem. Other scholars find that exposure to female leaders changes perceptions of women leaders among men, but the presence of women leaders does not lead to autonomy for women in the private sphere (Beaman et al. 2012). According to Beaman et al. (2012), "In the case of India, women leaders pursue different and sometimes more effective policies from those of men. Villagers respond by being more willing to elect women" (p. 209).

Lombardo and Meier (2016) critique previous work on symbolic representation for not adequately theorizing symbolic representation, which they argue can be studied on its own without treating it as an effect of descriptive representation. Instead, Lombardo and Meier (2016) argue that a theory of symbolic representation requires "analyzing the symbolic representation of gender through the discursive construction of women and men as political symbols, in finding out how women and men are discursively constructed, and in how symbols stand for or symbolically represent gender" (p. 9). In particular, symbolic representation of gender has three functions, each of which impacts women's and men's lives: identity construction, legitimacy, and political control. First, policy discourses often reinforce the notion that women belong in the private

sphere. Second, discourses often legitimize some citizens and delegitimize others, whose rights are then restricted. Third, the symbolic representation of gender enables states to maintain political control. So, the main insight from this study is that scholars should not only focus on exploring the link between descriptive and symbolic representation, but to examine how policy discourses construct women and men and their impact on women's rights.

In sum, empirical studies on the link between women's descriptive and women's substantive representation and more recent work on symbolic representation generate several important insights that are relevant to the project. First, an increase in women's presence in politics does not necessarily lead to substantive representation. Second, critical actors, men and women, can advocate on behalf of women. Third, substantive representation is not limited to national parliaments. Fourth, there may be links worth exploring between descriptive and symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).

Gender and Political Representation in Authoritarian Regimes

Empirical work on women's representation in non-democratic countries has produced inconsistent findings. While some gender and politics scholars have highlighted the opportunities that exist for women's substantive representation to take place in these contexts (Benstead 2016; Darhour 2012; Nanes 2015; Tripp 2001), others have emphasized the constraints that women face (Burnet 2008; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Johnson 2016; Longman 2006; Sater 2007; Shalaby 2016; Tamale 1999). Except for a few studies (Benstead 2011; Burnet 2011), scholars have largely not examined the link between women's descriptive and symbolic representation in authoritarian contexts.

As Tripp (2001) argues, scholars have to move beyond the binary terms “cooptation” versus “autonomy” and explore the potential for women’s substantive representation to take place in contexts where there are strong women’s movements. Alliances between women’s movements and female critical actors in authoritarian legislatures can be critical to achieving women’s substantive representation (Tripp 2001). Moreover, Benstead (2016) argues that in authoritarian contexts, the presence of women politicians increases the likelihood that female citizens approach their representatives when they need access to resources or face personal problems. In these contexts, constituency service may be just as important as policy-making for responding to the needs of citizens.

Despite their interest in women’s political representation in authoritarian contexts, these scholars have not engaged extensively with the non-gender literature on electoral authoritarianism. In response to failed democratic transitions after the end of the Cold War, comparative politics scholars shifted their focus from studying democratization to studying regimes that combine a combination of democratic and authoritarian institutions (Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Zakaria 1997). In particular, existing research reveals that authoritarian regimes that establish multiparty elections and legislatures stay in power longer than authoritarian regimes without these institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).

Comparative politics scholars have further explored the specific mechanisms that explain the relationship between the presence of nominally democratic institutions and regime survival. For example, Lust-Okar (2006) argues that elections enable regimes to coopt ordinary citizens who are interested in gaining access to state resources and that

“the distribution of state resources trumps by far any role of elections as arenas for contests over the executive or critical policies” (p. 459). Other scholars have argued that regimes establish legislatures to coopt opposition groups (Gandhi 2008). Moreover, by giving some opposition parties the opportunity to participate in the policymaking process and excluding other parties, autocrats divide the opposition, reducing the chance that opposition parties would form united fronts and mobilize their supporters during crises (Lust-Okar 2005).

For other scholars, authoritarian regimes are more interested in maintaining the support of their allies and preventing elite defection to the opposition (Boix and Svobik 2013; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2006). Autocrats use hegemonic parties in order to achieve credible power-sharing deals with members of the ruling elite. Since the party in single-party regimes controls succession and guarantees members of the ruling elite a share of power over the long run, the regime avoids elite defections (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2006). Moreover, institutions allow allies to monitor the behavior of the autocrat and reduce uncertainty (Boix and Svobik 2013).

But, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. As Gandhi (2008) points out, the cooptation of opposition groups strengthens the relationship between the regime and its allies because the latter expect the regime to deal with threats as they arise (p. 75). Moreover, the cooptation of ordinary citizens strengthens the relationship between the regime and its allies and reduces the likelihood that the regime’s allies defect to the opposition (Magaloni 2006). Writing about authoritarianism in Mexico, Magaloni (2006) argues that “the pillar of a hegemonic-party regime is its monopoly of mass support, which in turn allows the regime to deter elite divisions” (p. 15). The mass electoral

support that the ruling party was able to maintain for seven decades sent a clear signal to elites within the ruling coalition that the only way to political office was through the party, preventing elites from defecting to the opposition. Magaloni (2006) argues that the regime was able to retain the support due to economic growth, patron-client relations, and voters' fear of potential instability (p. 80).

I draw from the contributions of these scholars to identify the opportunities and constraints that women politicians face when they enter authoritarian legislatures. Engaging with this body of literature is important because it sheds light on the strategies that authoritarian regimes employ to retain power. Scholars argue that authoritarian regimes are responsive to ordinary citizens, choosing to recruit both regime loyalists and opponents (for example, Malesky and Schuler 2010). Opponents use their access to political institutions to voice the concerns of ordinary citizens. Other scholars argue that electoral authoritarian regimes also make policy concessions to opposition political parties (Gandhi 2008). Boix and Svolik (2013) challenge these arguments, arguing instead that authoritarian regimes establish legislatures to share power with their allies.

However, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Below, I theorize how the cooptation of ordinary citizens shapes the link between women's descriptive and symbolic representation. I expect to find that women parliamentarians invest time and effort in constituency service which could contribute to women's symbolic representation. In regard to the link between descriptive and substantive representation, policy gains can take place when authoritarian regimes make policy concessions to opposition groups (Gandhi 2008; Tripp 2019). But, authoritarian regimes are also

constrained in what they can do because legislatures and other political institutions allow the autocrat's allies to monitor his behavior (Boix and Svobik 2013).

Electoral Authoritarianism and the Descriptive-Symbolic Link

One of the key differences between democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes is the absence of free and fair elections in the latter (Schedler 2002). Some scholars argue that voters do not participate in elections to hold their representatives accountable but to gain access to state resources (Lust-Okar 2006). Ordinary citizens vote for candidates who have ties to the regime because they are more capable of delivering resources. Consistent with these arguments, gender and politics scholars argue that authoritarian regimes recruit female loyalists who are not accountable to female citizens but to the ruler (Goetz 2003). Moreover, women may stay silent as the ruler employs repression against opposition groups (Longman 2006).

Yet other scholars argue that authoritarian regimes do not solely recruit loyalists but also opponents (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Reuter and Robertson 2015). For example, in Vietnam, Malesky and Schuler (2010) find that certain representatives are more likely than others to voice the concerns of their constituents and challenge the regime. In Russia, Reuter and Robertson (2015) find that the regime distributes leadership positions to opposition leaders to reduce the likelihood that they organize protests against the regime. Authoritarian regimes thus have an incentive to recruit a diverse group of representatives. The absence of free and fair elections does not preclude the potential for opponents to enter authoritarian legislatures.

Moreover, scholars argue that authoritarian regimes increasingly rely on constituency service to respond to the concerns of their citizens (Chen et al. 2016;

Distelhorst and Hou 2017; Magaloni 2006; Ong 2015). Gender and politics scholars argue that the presence of women parliamentarians increases the likelihood that female citizens contact parliamentarians (Benstead 2016). Moreover, there is evidence that gender quotas have a positive effect on perceptions of women leaders (Benstead 2011). I hypothesize that there is a link between women's descriptive and symbolic representation. The key mechanism that enables women to challenge conservative attitudes may be constituency service. This is especially important in the Arab world where women's presence in politics was questioned as women began to enter politics (Abou-Zeid 2006).

Electoral Authoritarianism and the Descriptive-Substantive Link

Under authoritarianism, women politicians face both opportunities and constraints, depending on the context and historical legacies. It is possible that women parliamentarians reject the notion that they have obligation to substantively represent women. This is not necessarily because they are regime loyalists as other scholars have argued, however (Goetz 2003). As Tripp (2001) notes, scholars should adopt a more critical perspective, moving beyond the binary terms "cooptation" and "autonomy" to consider more nuanced explanations of women's political agency in authoritarian regimes.

Historical research finds that women in post-colonial contexts have forged alliances with nationalist leaders because both women and men had an interest in liberating their countries from colonial rule (Jayawardena 1986). After independence, women in the Arab world were neither coopted nor autonomous (Pratt 2020). As Pratt (2020) argues, "women's activism should be viewed as an embodied geopolitics" (p. 3).

Moreover, she argues that “women’s activism may resist and comply with dominant power structures at different geopolitical scales simultaneously” (p. 7).

The existing literature suggests that women have forged alliances with authoritarian regimes under two conditions: internal threats such as the rise of extremists (Tripp 2019) and external threats to the country itself (Pratt 2020). For example, Maria Saaddeh (2020), a Christian woman who entered the Syrian parliament after the revolution, writes “I believed in defending my right and the right of the Syrian people to have freedom of expression and the freedom to determine our destiny” (p. 96). She also criticizes foreign actors for interfering in Syria and for “manufacturing” an opposition to the secular regime. Scholars argue that due to global and regional politics, especially after 9/11, an intersectional approach is thus needed to examine how women’s activism is impacted by authoritarianism, sectarianism, extremism, and terrorism (Al-Ali 2020).

Research also alludes to conditions under which authoritarian regimes make policy concessions to secular opposition groups. Authoritarian regimes may advance women’s rights to sideline conservative actors and “modernize” their countries (Htun 2003; Tripp 2019). In North Africa, state actors advanced women’s rights to sideline extremist groups and send a signal to the international community that their countries are “modern.” In the aftermath of 9/11, the incumbent regime in Algeria presented itself as a Western ally during the War on Terror (Werenfels 2007).

These explanations cannot account for why women’s rights are weaker in Algeria compared to Morocco and Tunisia (Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019). The work of Boix and Svulik (2013) suggests that authoritarian regimes have an incentive to maintain the support of their allies, and to do so, authoritarian regimes may establish legislatures and

other political institutions to share power with their allies, who can use their access to these institutions to monitor the behavior of the ruler.

Authoritarianism and Women's Representation in Algeria

Algeria offers a compelling case for studying these dynamics. The decision-makers are senior members of the People's National Army (PNA); leaders of the two main nationalist political parties, the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Rally for Democracy (RND); and a number of other political and economic elites (Ghanem 2018). Ghanem (2018) argues that the regime has been able to survive political and economic crises due to a combination of factors, including the cooptation of civil society organizations and opposition political parties, a somewhat free press, distribution of resources to the population such as public housing, better salaries for public employees, and loans to young entrepreneurs. However, "The real locus of power remains in the military, whose influence remains intact regardless of the façade of constitutionalism and pluralism" (Ghanem 2018). Moreover, intra-elite conflict remains a problem (Werenfels 2007). The regime is divided along ideological, ethnic, and regional lines but there is one thing that elites have in common: their ties to the Algerian War of Independence (Werenfels 2007).

Since independence, the regime has sought to reclaim the local culture after more than 100 years of French colonial rule which lasted from 1830 to 1962. Algeria experienced a brutal form of settler colonial rule that sought to make Algeria part of France and saw the veil and women as the symbol of Algeria's Islamic identity (Bradford 1999; Clancy-Smith 1996; Lazreg 1990; 2019). As Jenkins (1990) argues, Algeria was France's most important colony due to the presence of a million settlers (as cited in

Bradford 1999, p. 125). French generals even forced Algerian women to unveil in 1958 which has had a lasting impact on Algerian women and their rights (Lazreg 2019, pp. 127-129). As Lazreg (1990) argues, “The French chose Islam as the Algerians’ common denominator and as grounds on which to fight them. Likewise, Algerians responded by making Islam the bastion of their resistance to colonialism” (p. 759). As a result, women’s rights laws that challenge Islamic texts continue to be controversial (Lazreg 2019). This is consistent with Htun and Weldon’s (2010) argument that “doctrinal” policies that challenge the dominant and culture are controversial across contexts.

However, intriguingly, the regime has made policy concessions to the women’s movement, including some reforms to the Family Code in 2005, adoption of a gender quota in 2012, and the criminalization of domestic violence in 2015 (Tripp 2019). Additionally, the regime has sought to coopt ordinary citizens, especially in 2010-2011 as regimes throughout the Arab world were experiencing revolutions and protests (Ghanem 2018; Robbins 2014). As Tripp (2016) argues, as the regime sought to enact some political and economic reforms immediately after the Arab Spring, the women’s movement used the opportunity to pressure the regime to adopt the gender quota. President Bouteflika encouraged ordinary citizens to participate in the 2012 elections, arguing that the presence of women candidates was evidence that Algeria was democratizing (Benzenine 2013).

Two main historical moments that are crucial to understanding the origins and persistence of authoritarianism in Algeria and its impact on women: the anti-colonial struggle and the civil war of the 1990s, or commonly referred to as the Black Decade. Both of these historical moments have led to either advances or restrictions on women’s

rights, depending on the relationship between the regime and its allies, the extent to which the regime had an incentive to coopt ordinary citizens, and the relationship between the regime and the opposition.

Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)

During the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), a diverse group of male elites, including communists, Islamists, intellectuals, military officers, Arabs, Kabyles (non-Arab Algerians), conservative nationalists, and secular nationalists, came together to form the National Liberation Front (FLN) and officially declare war against France on November 1, 1954 (Derradji 2016; Quandt 1969). But, as Quandt (1969) argues, after independence, intra-elite power struggles became a key feature of state institutions. In particular, male leaders disagreed about the role of Islam in politics, Algeria's national identity, and the strategy that should be employed to reclaim the local culture after more than 100 years of French colonialism (Stone 1997).

Women's rights were particularly controversial because state actors sought to protect Algeria's Islamic identity (Lazreg 2019). This is because when French colonizers invaded Algeria in 1830, they were obsessed with Islam, which they saw as an obstacle to their missionary activity, and they treated the veil and women as the symbol of Islam (Bradford 1999; Clancy-Smith 1996; Lazreg 1990; 2019). As a result, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although the Constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex and guaranteed women's right to work and equal pay, the state did not pursue specific policies to improve women's status (Amrane-Minne 1999; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2001). So, in the post-independence period, intra-elite conflict was a barrier to women's rights.

In the 1980s, Algeria experienced an economic crisis that led ordinary citizens and opposition groups to protest against the state and its policies. The greatest threat that the regime faced was a growing Islamist movement. Islamists generally argue that the Islamization of society and the state would solve social, economic, and political problems (Munson 2001). To placate Islamist groups, the regime adopted a conservative family code in 1984 that institutionalized polygamy, repudiation, and inequality in inheritance (Charrad 2001).

Moreover, the regime enacted political and economic reforms, including the establishment of a multi-party system (Bouandel 2003). For the first time in Algeria's political history, the FLN, which had led the anti-colonial struggle, had to compete with other parties for seats in parliament and local and regional assemblies. This led to the legalization of Islamist political parties, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP or Hamas), and the Islamic Renaissance Movement (an-Nahda), and secular political parties such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), and the Workers' Party (PT) led by women's rights activist Louisa Hanoune. The RCD and FFS also represent Kabyle Algerians.

The Black Decade

In 1990-1991, the FIS emerged victorious in local and parliamentary elections. To prevent Islamists from controlling parliament and local and regional assemblies, the military canceled the second round of elections and banned the FIS. This led to a decade-long civil war between armed groups affiliated with the FIS and the regime. About 200,000 people died and several thousand disappeared.

The civil war further exacerbated intra-elite conflict. The regime was divided between those who supported the repression of Islamists and their exclusion from formal politics and those who argued that the regime should negotiate with Islamists (Werenfels 2007). Secular opposition parties were also divided on this issue (Roberts 2003).

In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected. He stayed in power until his removal from office after the 2019 Hirak protest movement. He negotiated an agreement with extremist groups which brought an end to the civil war but neither civil society actors nor opposition parties participated (MacQueen 2009). Bouteflika also advanced women's rights to sideline extremist groups and to signal to the international community that Algeria was a modern state (Tripp 2019). Important reforms included the criminalization of sexual harassment in 2004, reforms to the family and nationality codes in 2005, the adoption of a gender quota in 2012, and the criminalization of domestic violence in 2015. Scholars argue that these reforms took place due to pressure by the women's movement (Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020).

But, despite reforms, women's rights remain weaker in Algeria compared to Morocco and Tunisia (Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019). This is due to unresolved debates around the role of Islam, women's rights, and Algeria's identity (Lazreg 2019). Moreover, after the civil war, there were divisions among Islamist parties and among secularists (Ghanem 2014; Roberts 2003). For Islamist opposition parties, the key debate is over their relationship with the regime (Ghanem 2014). Their leaders have disagreed about whether they should try to enact reform by working within state institutions or oppose any collaboration. While some secular parties support the inclusion of Islamists, others argue that Islamist parties should be excluded from formal politics (Roberts 2003).

Due to these divisions, some Islamists and secular leaders decided to forge an alliance with the Bouteflika regime. For example, Khalida Toumi, a feminist who was an opponent of the regime in the 1980s and member of the secular Kabyle party, the RCD, became an ally of Bouteflika in the 2000s. Amar Ghoul, member of the Islamist party the MSP defected to the regime and created the Rally of Algerian Hope (TAJ), which became one of the four main parties in the Bouteflika alliance. Finally, Amara Benyouness, member of the secular opposition, also defected to the Bouteflika coalition.

So, the regime which was already divided along ideological, ethnic, and regional lines in the aftermath of independence became even more diverse under the leadership of Bouteflika. Bouteflika's allies included secularists such as Amara Benyouness and Khalida Toumi, and Islamists such as Amar Ghoul. So, intra-elite conflict is the key barrier to women's substantive representation. However, due to the persistence of authoritarianism and legitimacy crisis, the regime had to find a way to coopt ordinary citizens as the Arab world was experiencing revolutions. The regime adopted and implemented the gender quota to recruit a new group of parliamentarians.

Quota Adoption

In 2012, Algeria adopted and implemented a gender quota which led to a significant increase in the proportion of seats held by women from 8% to 31.6%, making Algeria the leader in the Arab world in terms of women's descriptive representation (Ould Ahmed 2012). Gender and politics scholars have argued that women's movements have played a crucial role in pressuring regimes in Africa to increase women's presence in politics (Tripp 2016; Kang and Tripp 2018). In her case study of quota adoption in Algeria, Tripp (2016) challenges the argument made by Ross (2008) who argued that in

oil-producing countries like Algeria, women's representation is lower due to economic underdevelopment and low levels of women's labor force participation.

Instead, Tripp argues that the presence of a strong women's movement played a key role in pressuring the regime to adopt and implement the gender quota in 2012. First, the women's movement became more active after the civil war ended in the early 2000s. Women's rights activists were particularly concerned with reforming the Family Code, criminalizing sexual harassment and domestic violence, and increasing women's representation in elected assemblies (Tripp 2016, pp. 393-394).

Moreover, to buy social peace, and appease opposition groups, as the Arab world was experiencing revolutions in 2010-2011, the regime enacted political and economic reforms (Ghanem 2018; Robbins 2014). The end of the civil war in 2001-2002 and the Arab Spring revolutions of 2010-2011 enabled the women's movement to demand reforms (Tripp 2016; 2019).

Methodology

This is a single-country case study of women's representation in a context that has not received significant attention in feminist research. Case studies are particularly useful for theory development and help scholars overcome some of the shortcomings of large-N research (George and Bennett 2005). Some of the strengths of case study research include uncovering of contextual and intervening variables that are overlooked in large-N research (George and Bennett 2005, 19-22).

I arrived to Algeria the end of January 2019 to start my dissertation fieldwork. I was particularly interested in telling the stories of women parliamentarians and Algerian

women in general. My goal was to interview about half of the 119 women parliamentarians elected after the 2017 parliamentary elections. A few weeks later, the Hirak protest movement started on February 22, 2019. Protesters took to the streets in large numbers to demand the resignation of President Bouteflika whose campaign for a fifth term was launched by the incumbent regime a couple of weeks earlier. The Hirak surprised everyone, the regime, ordinary Algerians, and the international community.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with women parliamentarians, women's rights activists, and male parliamentarians. As Leech (2002) explains, it is important to establish rapport and ask the right questions when interviewing elites. For example, she notes that "The interviewer should seem professional and generally knowledgeable, but less knowledgeable than the respondent on the particular topic of the interview" (p. 665). Moreover, she cautions against interrupting respondents even when they go off topic and the importance of asking for clarification to make sure that the interviewer does not misinterpret what the respondent said (667-668).

I interviewed a total of 30 women parliamentarians, 14 male parliamentarians, and 15 women's rights activists. Among the 30 women parliamentarians, 13 are affiliated with the FLN, the nationalist party that was established during the anti-colonial struggle. I also interviewed eight women affiliated with the RND, the pro-regime party that was established in 1997. Three women are affiliated with TAJ, the moderate Islamist party that became part of the Bouteflika regime, and one woman affiliated with Algerian Popular Movement (MPA), established by secular leader who forged an alliance with Bouteflika. I also interviewed five opposition women, 3 Islamists and 2 secularists. I also carried out participant observation in the marches that took place in Algiers on Tuesdays

and Fridays, parliament, and the headquarters of the main political party, FLN. Women's rights activists also invited me to attend their meetings and those of opposition parties.

To gain access to my interviewees, I first contacted women parliamentarians whom I met and interviewed in 2015 with the help of friends and family members. I also reached out to some women parliamentarians on Facebook who responded and invited me to parliament. There, I met the staff in the offices of the RND and the FLN who helped me throughout my research. The leaders at the headquarters of the FLN also helped me gain access to women party activists and parliamentarians. Family members also intervened on my behalf during weeks when it was difficult to enter parliament. I also sent messages to parliamentarians and women's rights activists on Facebook. Several people responded because they had already seen me in parliament or because we had a mutual friend. As I interviewed more and more parliamentarians and women's rights activists, it became easier to gain access to others.

The Hirak posed some challenges but overall my interviewees were interested in my project and shared key details. Several of the interviews with women parliamentarians lasted more than one or two hours. The shortest interview lasted for 10 minutes and the longest lasted for two hours and a half. 12 interviews were recorded and the rest were not recorded. But, even the women who were not comfortable with me recording the interview shared a lot of information with me. All of the interviews took place in-person except for one phone interview. Interviews took place either in parliament or headquarters of political parties, except for the phone interview and an in-person interview that took place in a parliamentarian's home.

Qualitative researchers have written about the advantages of being an insider (Unluer 2012). In particular, access to respondents and data is easier due to trust between the researcher and the respondents. This is important in a context like Algeria. Algerian leaders, ordinary citizens, and even the opposition tend to voice concerns about foreign interference, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the civil wars that took place in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. As a woman mayor told me, she was interviewed by a French female scholar but she did not trust her.²

Other qualitative researchers have challenged the binary “insider” vs “outsider,” arguing instead for a “space between” (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). Dwyer and Buckle (2009) argue that “Holding membership in a group does not denote complete sameness within that group. Likewise, not being a member of a group does not denote complete difference” (60). For example, Sherif (2001) writes about her experience as an Egyptian-American woman in Egypt. She explains that her “Egyptianness” was always questioned by Egyptians who did not think her Arabic was good enough or questioned why she did practice Islam (440-442).

My experience was different. My respondents knew that I left Algeria at a young age but because I spoke Algerian Arabic well, my respondents did not question my “Algerianness.” Also important are my own family ties to the anti-colonial struggle and the fact that my mother is Chaoui, an ethnic group found in eastern provinces such as Batna and Oum El Bouaghi. They are known for being conservative nationalists. This helped me develop rapport with my respondents. While there is extreme factionalism and

² Female mayor (10/2019)

political elites are divided along ideological, ethnic, and regional lines, they have what Werenfels (2007) calls “historical legitimacy,” meaning that they or their relatives participated in the Algerian War of Independence. Moreover, the FLN relied extensively on rural communities to win the war against France. My relatives, uncles and aunt, were combatants in Meskana, a small town in Oum El Bouaghi. Like my interviewees, I have historical legitimacy.

To gain access to women’s rights activists, I received help from a secular woman parliamentarian who had ties to the feminist movement and I attended a meeting that was organized by women’s rights activists in April 2019. Attending this meeting was important because it helped me identify potential interviewees who I then contacted via Facebook. During the Hirak, women’s rights activists relied on Facebook to forge ties among one another and organize for offline activism.

The interviews with the male parliamentarians helped me nuance my findings on constituency service (Chapter 4). These interviews were shorter than the interviews with the women interviews. They ranged between 10 and 30 minutes. All of these interviews except for one were in-person and they either took place in parliament or party headquarters.

The 2019 Hirak protest movement made it more challenging to conduct additional interviews, however. At one point, as calls intensified for the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, parliament became the symbol of crisis of representation. The state increased police presence in downtown Algiers and outside of parliament. But, participating in the marches on Fridays and Tuesdays, attending the headquarters of the FLN, interacting with constituents in the lobby of parliament, attending meetings

organized by women's rights activists and pro-democracy groups, talking to my family members, taxi drivers, and listening to conversations on the subway and tram helped me make sense of my findings. Moreover, I never stopped doing fieldwork. I am Facebook friends with several of my interviews, affiliated with the regime and the opposition.

Chapter Outline

I begin by my study by examining the impact of the gender quota on women's description representation. Gender and politics scholars have paid significant attention to explaining women's underrepresentation. Across contexts, there is evidence that political parties discriminate against women (for example, Bjarnegård 2013; Niven 1998). Due to their historical exclusion from politics, it is puzzling that male leaders have adopted gender quotas in more than 100 countries (Krook 2009). Scholars argue that gender quotas are adopted due to a combination of factors, including mobilization by women's movements, international norms, and strategic calculations of state actors (Krook 2009).

To build on the work of these scholars, I examine the implementation of the gender quota in Algeria in chapter 2. I was particularly interested in determining whether the regime recruited regime loyalists or a diverse group of women. I find that the regime strategically recruited women from different backgrounds. This had two effects. First, women parliamentarians were not able to work together inside parliament, even after the creation of a women's caucus. This was due to ideological divisions and disagreements about who was qualified to enter parliament. Women who were previously involved in political parties were critical of women deputies without previous political experience. On the other hand, female lawyers, doctors, and professors reported that they were qualified to be in parliament and that political experience should not be a criterion.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I focus on links between descriptive and substantive representation. For the analysis in Chapter 3, I first asked women parliamentarians if they feel responsible for representing women. Among the 30 women I interviewed, 22 rejected the notion that they have a responsibility to represent women. They stressed that they were elected to represent the Algerian people and rejected the notion that women have distinct interests. Moreover, both nationalist women affiliated with the regime and Islamist opposition women were very critical of the United Nations for imposing the concept of gender equality. They added that they do not support any laws that challenge the dominant religion. Even the secular women who are affiliated with the pro-government parties reported that Algerian society was too conservative to accept laws that ban polygamy or institutionalize equality in inheritance.

However, women parliamentarians stressed that they want to change perceptions of women leaders. I draw from scholarship on women's agency in postcolonial contexts to explain these findings (for example, Abu-Lughod 2013; Mahmood 2005; Mohanty 1991). These scholars challenge the notion that women in the Arab world are passive victims. Importantly, concepts such as "resistance" and "subordination" do not fully capture women's agency (Mahmood 2005). As Lazreg (2019) argues, women in Algeria have historically been complicit in their own silencing but employed creative strategies to empower themselves in the private sphere.

In Chapter 4, I focus on the strategies that women parliamentarians employ to change perceptions of women leaders. They report that they work hard to prove themselves and invest time and effort in constituency service, which according to them helps them change perceptions of women leaders. First, I find that female constituents

contact women parliamentarians when they need legal help with divorce procedures, when they experience sexual harassment in the workplace, or when they need access to public housing. Second, women parliamentarians reported that male citizens also contact them. They added that while women contact women parliamentarians because they feel comfortable talking to another woman about personal problems, male citizens contact women parliamentarians because they trust them. I find that due to their different backgrounds, female representatives have ties to men from different segments of society, including men from impoverished neighborhoods, local party members and leaders, and educated ordinary citizens who lost trust in political institutions.

Consequently, by recruiting women from different backgrounds, the regime was able to coopt citizens from different segments of society. According to women parliamentarians, their presence thus contributes to symbolic representation. They reported that even when they are not successful in helping ordinary citizens solve their problems or gain access to resources, ordinary citizens praise women parliamentarians for their hard work and their kindness. So, one of the main findings of this dissertation is there is a link between women's descriptive representation and men's substantive representation, which might contribute to women's symbolic representation.

In Chapter 5, I focus on substantive representation as outcome. Since women parliamentarians reject the notion that they have an obligation to represent women, I sought to determine how policy change occurs under these conditions. I conducted a case study of the 2015 violence against women law, which was adopted three years after women's presence in parliament increased. I find that the women's movement and a woman deputy affiliated with the ruling political party worked together to introduce a bill

in 2012. But, the Government did not place violence against women on the parliamentary agenda until 2015. I argue that after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika suffered a stroke in 2013, the political crisis led to an opening in the political opportunity structure. Bouteflika was the leader that was able to unite the various factions. His illness threatened the survival of the regime.

As a result, the regime placed violence against women on the agenda to signal that Bouteflika was still capable of making decisions, even though he was too ill to govern. Second, despite opposition to the law within the regime, public pressure after the murder of a woman in a small town, played a key role. But, for women's rights activists, the major issue that deserves attention is the conservative family code. Major reforms are unlikely because they would be opposed by the regime's allies. So, electoral authoritarian regimes do not adopt women's rights laws that would threaten their survival, but they do adopt laws that do not challenge the religion when there is a crisis in the state.

In Chapter 6, I summarize my findings and revisit the central claims made in this dissertation. I then discuss the implications of my findings. The main finding of this dissertation is that, in authoritarian regimes like Algeria, there is not a link between women's descriptive and substantive representation – but there is a link between descriptive and symbolic representation. In particular, women parliamentarians invest time in helping male citizens who need access to resources, not just women. Consequently, there is a link between women's descriptive and men's substantive representation, which might contribute to women's symbolic representation.

This study also contributes to research on electoral authoritarian regimes. In particular, the regime in Algeria has been able to survive due to a combination of factors,

including the cooptation of ordinary citizens, policy concession to opposition parties, and the support of its allies. But, as I finish writing this dissertation, the regime now employs a different strategy to weaken the 2019 anti-regime Hirak protest movement. Since 2020, the regime has repressed opposition parties, arresting and imprisoning hundreds of opposition figures, including journalists. Moreover, after the June 2021 elections, women's presence in parliament decreased from 119 to 35. This demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can restrict women's rights when they no longer serve their interests. The regime in Algeria now relies on repression. Policy concessions to opposition groups and reforms to maintain the support of ordinary citizens seem unlikely, which means the women's movement, women politicians and women's rights will be sidelined. As one of the women parliamentarians told me about male leaders in Algeria, "they use people and then throw them out."³

³ RN interview 7 (10/2019)

Chapter 2: Historical Legacies, Elite Calculations, and Women's Descriptive Representation in Algeria

Introduction

Women's descriptive representation, operationalized as the proportion of seats held by women, has received significant attention in feminist scholarship. There are four key questions that gender and politics have sought to answer: 1) Why are women underrepresented in politics? 2) Why is women's descriptive representation higher in some contexts than others? 3) Why do some governments adopt gender quota laws and what is the impact of these laws? And 4) Who are the women who enter national legislatures in the aftermath of quota adoption? These studies generate important insights that are relevant to this project.

Gender and politics scholars who focus on the link between formalistic and descriptive representation have sought to identify the factors that explain why women are underrepresented in politics. They build on a groundbreaking study, *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race, and Class in the British Parliament*, by Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995). Norris and Lovenduski (1995) pointed out that in studies of political recruitment, "The continuing puzzle is to understand *why* some are chosen over others" (9, emphasis in original). They distinguish between supply-side factors which determine why some individuals and not others decide to seek political office, such as education, experience, and political ambition; and demand-side factors which determine why selectors choose to nominate some candidates and not others. Since the publication of their seminal book, gender and politics have paid significant attention to demand-side factors, finding that

political parties discriminate against women (for example, Bjarnegård 2013; Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2006).

However, gender and politics scholars have also sought to explain why political parties and legislatures that are dominated by men have taken steps to improve women's descriptive representation (for example, Baldez 2004; Bruhn 2003; Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Towns 2012; Tripp 2016). These scholars provide different explanations as to why male elites adopt gender quotas, including mobilization by women's movements (for example Tripp 2016); electoral uncertainty and inter-party competition (for example, Baldez 2004); and international norms (Krook 2006).

Moreover, research on the implementation of gender quotas reveals that as political parties adopt gender quotas for strategic reasons but they may also employ certain strategies to undermine their impact (for example, Goetz 2003; Krook 2016; Mufti and Jalalzai 2021; Murray et al. 2012). As a result, gender quotas do not always lead to an increase in women's presence in politics (Krook 2009). Krook (2009; 2010) argues that the impact of gender quotas depends on how they interact with existing institutions. Additionally, Mackay (2014) develops the concept "nested newness" to examine how new institutions interact with existing institutions. She argues that "No institution – however new or radically reformed – is a blank slate: the capacity for new paths is profoundly shaped by its institutional environment no matter how seemingly dramatic the rupture with the past" (552).

These studies generate important insights that there are relevant to this study. First, political parties have historically discriminated against women. Second, due to a combination of factors, political parties and governments across contexts have taken steps

to increase women's descriptive representation, such as gender quotas. Third, male elites employ certain strategies to undermine the impact of gender quotas. These strategies have two effects on women's descriptive representation. In some contexts, the gender quota does not lead to an increase in women's presence in politics. In other contexts, political parties implement quotas, but recruit women who are loyal to the regime and/or have family ties to male politicians.

To contribute to this body of literature, I conducted a case study of political recruitment in Algeria after the adoption of the gender quota. The regime in Algeria adopted a gender quota in 2012 due to a combination of factors: mobilization by the women's movement; an opening in the political opportunity structure after the end of the civil war which allowed the women's movement to strengthen its ties to international and regional organizations; and a regime that had an incentive to appear more democratic as its neighbors in the region were experiencing revolutions in 2010-2011 (Tripp 2016).

The gender quota had a positive effect on women's descriptive presentation. Women held 31.6% of seats in parliament after the 2012 elections and 26% after the 2017 elections. Other important questions remain unaddressed, however, in the case of Algeria. More specifically, how did the regime implement the gender quota? What criteria did male elites employ in their recruitment of women? Did political parties employ certain strategies to undermine the impact of the gender quota? How did the gender quota interact with existing rules and norms of candidate selection?

I follow Krook (2009; 2010) who argues that the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation depends on how they interact with existing institutional conditions. Two particular features of the institutional environment in Algeria are relevant

to studying the implementation of the gender quota. First, since the Algerian War of Independence and the founding of the National Liberation Front (FLN), personal rivalries and fierce battles have characterized the regime (Quandt 1969; Werenfels 2007). FLN revolutionaries included liberals, left wing nationalists, communists, and conservative nationalists (Derradji 2016; Quandt 1969). After independence, elites continued to disagree about major issues, including Algeria's national identity, the role of Islam in politics, and the rights of Kabyle Algerians (Stone 1997). The civil war of the 1990s further exacerbated intra-elite conflict (Roberts 2003; Werenfels 2007). Due to the fact that Islamist groups formed armed groups and attacked civilians in a decade-long civil war, opposition parties disagreed about whether the state should repress all Islamists, even moderates, or whether the state should allow them to participate in formal politics (Roberts 2003; Werenfels 2007). Moreover, within the regime, elites disagreed about the strategy that the state should employ toward Islamists (Werenfels 2007). As a result, I expect to find divisions and rivalries *among* nationalist women who are affiliated with the main political parties, the FLN and the RND.

Second, in this context where there are various factions that compete for power, the People's National Army (ANP), whose predecessor the National Liberation Army (ALN) played a key role during the anti-colonial struggle, emerged as the most powerful actor in Algerian politics after independence (Cook 2007; Ghanem 2018; Quandt 1969). As Ghanem (2018) argues, the military regime has strategically allowed some reform to take place. For example, before the arrival of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999; the regime established multi-party elections for the first time in Algeria's political history (Bouandel 2003). Since the arrival of Bouteflika, the state has advanced women's rights to

sideline extremists (Tripp 2019). More specifically, the gender quota was adopted and implemented to help the military regime recruit a new group of parliamentarians as Algeria was becoming more authoritarian. Consistent with previous work on authoritarian contexts (for example, Malesky and Schuler 2010), I expect to find that women from diverse backgrounds were recruited to help the regime coopt ordinary citizens from different segments of society.

I draw from my interviews with women parliamentarians to examine the implementation of the gender quota. The questions I asked included: Why did you decide to get involved in politics? Did you receive encouragement from friends and family? Why were women underrepresented in politics before the gender quota? Do you collaborate with women from other political parties? Do women parliamentarians face any unique challenges or opportunities within parliament because they are women?¹

Women parliamentarians agreed that political parties discriminated against women and reported that the arrival of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the adoption of the gender quota played key roles in increasing women's presence in politics. They also reported that their families did not encourage them to get involved in politics. Instead, political parties played a key role in the recruitment of women.

However, women parliamentarians were also critical of each other. First, political parties recruited women who were previously involved in party politics and/or held positions in local or regional assemblies. Second, these women who had previous political experience questioned the presence of women who did not have political experience,

¹ I borrowed some of these questions from Carroll (2002) and Dittmar et al. 2018 in their work on Congresswomen.

reporting that these women were recruited to serve the interests of men. Women parliamentarians who entered politics without previous political experience reported that their education, several are professors, lawyers, and doctors, was the criterion that political parties employed when they recruited them.

As a result of these differences, women parliamentarians reported the absence of female solidarity; rivalries among women who belong to the same political party, in particular within the ruling political party, the FLN, and the other major political party affiliated with the regime, the National Rally for Democracy (RND); and battles over key leadership positions in parliament. The gender quota was thus nested in an institutional environment that has been characterized by extreme intra-conflict since the Algerian War of Independence, shaping its potential descriptive, substantive, and symbolic effects.

This chapter is organized as follows: In the first section, I review previous work on demand- and supply-side factors that shape women's access to political office. In the second section, I review previous work on quota adoption which explains why male elites adopt gender quotas and research on quota implementation. Next, I discuss new approaches which highlight the ways in which the institutional environment shapes the implementation of gender quotas. I then conduct a case study of quota implementation in Algeria and present my interview data.

The Supply and Demand Model

Feminist research on candidate selection builds on the work of Norris and Lovenduski (1995) who sought to explain the candidate selection process in Great Britain and how this impacted political representation of women and racial minorities. Scholars distinguish between supply-side factors which shape candidate emergence, such as

political ambition (Fox and Lawless 2004); and demand-side factors which shape candidate selection, such as discrimination against potential female candidates (Niven 1998). Gender and politics scholars critique these studies for focusing on either supply-side or demand-side factors and for not adequately theorizing how the interaction between the two is shaped by contextual factors (Krook 2010).

Gender and Political Recruitment

Norris and Lovenduski (1995) begin by noting that before scholars can explain the attitudes and behavior of legislators, they first have to explain how the candidate selection process unfolds, which means identifying the selectors (national party leaders, local leaders, or grassroots party members) to understand why some candidates are nominated while others are not (2-9). The major contribution that they make to research on political recruitment and women's representation is the supply and demand model. On the supply-side, the process and outcome of political recruitment is impacted by potential candidates' resources, such as time, money, education, experience, and political interest and ambition. On the demand-side, political recruitment is impacted by selectors' criteria when they make decisions about who to nominate (14-15).

Norris and Lovenduski distinguish between direct discrimination which takes place when selectors rely on judgements about a particular group when evaluating potential candidates, and imputed discrimination, which takes place when selectors refuse to nominate an individual due to concerns that she would not win votes (14). In their surveys of selectors, they do not find evidence for bias against women candidates (133-135). But, when they asked selectors to rank applicants, selectors favor candidates who are good speakers and most likely to win votes and they see women as less effective

campaigners than men (137-142). They conclude that “Perhaps members say they would like more women in office, but in practice when they evaluate interviewees they may see women in a slightly more negative light, as less effective campaigners” (141).

Research on women’s descriptive representation in the United States has sought to explain why women continue to be underrepresented. Writing about supply-side factors, Fox and Lawless (2004) argue that the key factor is women’s political ambition. Based on a survey of potential candidates, lawyers, educators, business leaders, and political activists, they find that women are less likely than men to consider running for political office, but when they do run, women do win. So, for Fox and Lawless (2004), the key difference between women and men takes place in the first stage, when potential candidates made the decision to run for political office. They conclude that additional research is needed to explain how traditional gender socialization impacts the first stage of candidate emergence.

Other scholars argue that the obstacle that women face is the presence of male party leaders who discriminate against women (Niven 1998). In a survey of party leaders and women local officeholders, Niven (1998) finds evidence that male party leaders discriminate against women due to the outgroup effect, i.e., male party leaders do not evaluate women based on their qualifications but treat all women as less politically capable than men. More recently, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) critique previous work for not accounting for the ways in which women’s pathways to political office differ from men’s. They argue that for women, the decision to run for political office is impacted by a combination of factors, including encouragement of others, such as party leaders, and family responsibilities. So, it is not that women lack political ambition but

their decisions are “relationally embedded” in their social and political environments.

Writing about other contexts, gender and politics scholars have paid significant attention to how demand-side factors such as how the electoral system impacts women’s descriptive representation. For example, women’s descriptive representation is higher in multimember proportional representation systems than single-member district systems (for example, Matland and Studlar 1996; Rule 1987; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). This is because in proportional representation systems, political parties can place women in electable positions without alienating powerful interests.

On the supply-side, empirical research reveals that in addition to political factors, economic development has a positive effect on women’s descriptive representation (Matland 1998). According to Matland (1998), this is because in developed countries, women have access to resources such as education and labor force participation that enables them to participate in politics. He concludes that in developing countries, “the forces aligned against female political activity are so great as to permit only token representation” (p. 120). Similarly, Ross (2008) argues that the presence of oil in certain countries in the Arab world hinders women’s labor force participation, which reduces the supply of women candidates.

Lastly, some scholars argue that women’s underrepresentation in some contexts is due to cultural factors (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Yoon 2003). In their cross-national study, Inglehart and Norris (2003) find that in Western countries, ordinary citizens are more likely than their counterparts in non-Western countries to express support for women political leaders (pp. 135-136). Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, Yoon (2004) finds that culture, operationalized as the prevalence of female genital mutilation, also

plays a role in hindering women's descriptive representation.

In sum, women's descriptive representation is shaped by a combination of factors. Both supply- and demand-side factors shape candidate emergence. Particularly relevant to this project is the role that political parties and male leaders play in the recruitment of women. As Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) find, women are more likely than men to cite the encouragement of their party as a critical factor in their decision to run for political office. Next, I review scholarship on gender quotas which has sought to explain why male leaders, who have historically excluded women from formal politics, adopt gender quotas.

Gender Quotas

In the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, governments and political parties were encouraged to take steps to increase women's descriptive representation, such as the adoption of gender quotas (United Nations 1995). Since then, more than 100 countries have adopted gender quotas (Krook 2009). These include reserved seats, which set aside a certain number of seats for women; legislative quotas, reforms to electoral laws which require all political parties to include a certain percentage of women in party lists; and party quotas, individual political parties take steps to increase the number of women candidates, common among left-wing parties in Western Europe (Krook 2009, 6-9).

Gender and politics scholars have paid significant attention to explaining why governments and political parties adopt gender quotas. Important factors include: women's mobilization (for example, Tripp 2016); strategic calculations of state actors (for example, Bruhn 2003); and international norms (Krook 2006). Second, gender and

politics scholars have examined the implementation of gender quotas (for example, Murray 2004; Gray 2003; Krook 2016). These studies reveal that gender quotas do not always lead to an increase in women's presence in politics. But as Krook (2009) argues, these explanations do not adequately theorize how gender quotas interact with other institutions.

Quota Adoption

Domestic factors such as mobilization by women's movements and women party activists have received significant attention (for example, Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006; Tripp 2016; Kang and Tripp 2018; Vojvodić 2021). In Mexico, Bruhn (2003) finds that women party activists worked across party lines to strategize about increasing the number of women candidates. In Africa, Tripp (2016) argues that autonomous women's movements played a crucial role in the adoption of gender quotas. More recently, Kang and Tripp (2018) argue that in Africa, women's coalitions were vital to the adoption of gender quotas, even in authoritarian contexts. The rise of women's coalitions sent an important signal to male elites that women from different ethnic and ideological backgrounds support gender quotas (Kang and Tripp 2018, 75-76).

Still, the adoption of gender quotas by male politicians is puzzling considering that male-dominated political parties have historically discriminated against women. For this reason, gender and politics scholars identify strategic calculations by male politicians as an important factor (for example, Baldez 2004; Murray et al. 2012). For example, in the case of Mexico, Baldez (2004) argues that as Latin American countries experienced democratic transitions and political parties faced electoral uncertainty, male leaders had an incentive to democratize the candidate selection process via either the adoption of

gender quotas or primary elections. Political parties chose the former because it allowed political parties to maintain control over the nomination process. But, Baldez (2004) also notes that the Supreme Court ruled against opponents who argued that gender quotas are unconstitutional and that the collaboration of women across partisan lines pressured political parties across the political spectrum to adopt gender quotas.

Other domestic factors include ideology and culture. For example, Caul (2001) finds that leftist parties are more likely to adopt gender quotas than right-wing parties. Leftist parties are also more likely to have a higher number of women activists in decision-making bodies. Other scholars focus on cultural differences. For example, in interviews with politicians in Germany and Norway, Inhetveen (1999) finds that Norwegian politicians placed greater emphasis on the importance of group representation, arguing that women and men have different interests and perspectives and that both groups need to be present in politics to achieve balanced outcomes.

A third group of scholars focus on the role that international norms and actors play in the adoption of gender quotas (Bush 2011; Krook 2006; Towns 2012). Krook (2006) critiques previous work for paying more attention to domestic factors. Instead, she points out that the timing of policies that political parties and governments adopted during the 1990s and 2000s, after the UN World Conferences, indicates that international and transnational actors played a key role. Krook (2006) explains that quota adoption can take place due to “international imposition,” “transnational emulation,” “international tipping,” and “international blockage.”

First, in some contexts, international actors such as the United Nations push leaders to adopt gender quotas. Second, women’s rights activists may learn from the

strategies of their counterparts in other contexts who successfully pressured state actors to adopt gender quotas. Third, women's rights activists in some contexts such as Latin America spent years advocating for gender quotas, but after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995, they gained leverage vis-à-vis their opponents who could no longer question the importance of gender quotas. Lastly, in some contexts, international actors oppose quota policies.

Towns (2012) argues that state actors in the Global South are more likely than their counterparts in the West to adopt quota policies. Towns (2012) makes an important contribution because she draws a connection between the rise of new policies such as quota laws and social hierarchies. In particular, states that are low in global rankings adopt laws to improve women's descriptive representation to appear "modern" and improve their standing in the international community. Towns (2012) traces the first quota debates to women's rights activists in Latin America who primarily relied on democratic justice arguments, framing women's underrepresentation as undemocratic (192). On the other hand, international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank placed less emphasis on democratic representation and instead argued that women's descriptive representation would lead to good governance, defined by these organizations as the ability of states to become capitalist democracies. As a consequence, "much of the quota debates' drive across the world derives from efforts to move away from 'tradition' and its associated practices" (194).

In sum, gender quotas are adopted due to a combination of factors (Krook 2009). Krook (2009) argues that "most policies are the result of a combination of normative and pragmatic motivations, pursued by varied but multiple groups of actors who may support

reform for various and often conflicting reasons” (32). The key actors tend to include women in civil society, individuals within state institutions, and international actors.

Quota Implementation

Not all gender quotas lead to an increase in women’s descriptive representation. Some scholars explain this in terms of the design of the policies, finding that the presence of placement mandates and sanctions for non-compliance are important for increasing women’s descriptive representation (for example, Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Other scholars argue that the effect of gender quotas depends on other factors, such as in countries that use a proportional representation closed list system (for example, Gray 2003). Lastly, gender and politics scholar argue that there is resistance to gender quotas before, during, and after elections (Krook 2016). Before an election takes to place, political parties focus on delegitimizing quotas, arguing that gender quotas are unconstitutional. During elections, male leaders focus on undermining the impact of gender quotas, such as by placing men on the top of party lists, or by nominating women who are related to male elites. After elections, women who are elected via quotas are labelled as “unqualified” (Krook 2016; 273-279).

Scholars have also examined the qualifications of women elected via quotas. In a recent contribution, Franceschet et al. (2012) note that instead of focusing on the number of women that are elected via gender quotas, researchers have to focus on “what kinds of women benefit from quotas” (13, emphasis in original). Scholars find that across contexts, women elected via quotas have previous political experience and tend to be more educated than their male counterparts (Franceschet and Piscopo 2012; O’Brien 2012; Sater 2012). Moreover, scholars find that political parties recruit women who have

family ties to male politicians (Mufti and Jalalzai 2021).

In sum, studies on quota adoption and implementation generate important insights. First, a combination of actors, women's movements, international actors, and state actors, shape the debates and outcomes of quota policies. Second, not all quota policies are effective. Their design, other institutional factors, and strategies of political parties all shape the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation.

While these scholars make important contributions, they have not paid significant attention to how gender quotas interact with existing institutions. As Krook (2009) points out, scholars tend to privilege a single institution, such as electoral system, over the wider institutional environment. To overcome some of these shortcomings, scholars employ a feminist institutionalist approach to examining candidate selection after quota adoption (Krook 2009; 2010).

Rethinking Candidate Selection and Women's Descriptive Representation

Scholars have not adequately theorized how gender norms shape candidate selection; the interconnections among various institutions; and the impact that informal institutions such as ideas, beliefs, identities, and discourses have on women's descriptive representation (Krook 2009). To overcome these shortcomings, gender and politics scholars combine insights from feminist and non-feminist research on institutions (Krook and Mackay 2011). Feminist institutionalists place gender at the center of their analyses, examine how new institutions such as gender quotas interact with other institutions, consider the impact of historical legacies, explore the potential for change and stability, and shed light on the ways in which informal institutions shape women's access to political office (Bjarnegård 2013; Funk et al. 2021; Kenny 2013; Krook 2009; Mackay

2014; Valdini 2019; Waylen 2009).

Feminist Institutionalism

Institutionalism is an approach that “without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, posits a more independent role for political institutions (March and Olsen 1989, 17). Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” and include both formal and informal rules (North 1994, p. 360). Informal institutions are informal rules “created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 725). Corruption is an informal institution, defined as the “misuse of public power for private or political gain” (Rose-Ackerman 2006, 290). Relatedly, clientelism is defined as an “informal relationship between two actors enjoying asymmetrical socioeconomic power where the patron has the upper hand because he or she controls the kind of resources that his or her clients pursue but often cannot receive otherwise” (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 953).

Institutionalists agree that institutions matter but there are important differences between historical institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Rational-choice institutionalists treat preferences as exogenous and provide functionalist explanations. For example, scholars have argued that authoritarian regimes establish nominally democratic institutions to enhance their survival prospects (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).

Historical institutionalists, in contrast, pay particular attention to the historical origins of institutions, informal institutions, and address asymmetrical power relations (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999). Historical institutionalists have developed two

critical concepts: “critical junctures,” defined as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348), and “path dependence,” “in which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce themselves” (Pierson 2004, 11). Other scholars have sought to overcome the weaknesses of path dependent arguments by placing greater emphasis on agency and the potential for gradual change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Finally, discursive institutionalism accounts for the role of ideas and discourse to explain institutional change (Schmidt 2008).

Feminist institutionalism overcomes the shortcomings of these schools by placing gender and power at the center of institutional analysis (Krook and Mackay 2011). Feminist scholarship focuses on how gender shapes institutions and how institutions reproduce gender norms (Acker 1992; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Kenney 1996; Puwar 2004). These scholars argue that women are treated as “space invaders” when they enter organizations historically dominated by men (Puwar 2004).

Gender and politics increasingly combine insights from feminist and non-feminist research on institutions to theorize how moments of institutional innovation shape women’s access to political office. For example, Krook (2009) distinguishes between three different types of institutions that interact to shape women’s descriptive representation after the adoption of gender quotas: systemic institutions, the formal features of political systems; practical institutions, formal and informal practices that shape the candidate selection process; and normative institutions, formal and informal principles that shape candidate selection (44-46). Krook (2009) distinguishes between “harmonizing” and “disjointed” sequences of reform. In harmonizing sequences,

systemic, practical, and normative institutions all undergo reform (52-53). Gender quotas lead to an increase in women's descriptive representation when all three types of institutions undergo reform.

Also relevant to this project is the concept of “nested newness” developed by Mackay (2014). She rightly points out that “No institution- however new or radically reformed – is a blank state: the capacity for new paths is profoundly shaped by its institutional environment no matter how seemingly dramatic the rupture with the past” (p. 552). In her case study of the Scottish parliament, Mackay (2014) finds that political actors retained practices and informal rules associated with the British parliament, including strong party discipline and adversarial political culture.

Scholars have also debated whether informal institutions hinder women's descriptive representation. Bjarnegård (2013) explores the relationship between clientelism and male dominance in national legislatures. She develops the concept of homosocial capital to explain how male-dominated networks are particularly problematic in contexts where clientelistic practices such as vote buying are common. First, because men are more likely than women to have access to resources, they are more likely to be invited into the network. Second, because vote buying and other illegal activities are commonly used to win elections, outsiders such as women are not seen as trustworthy. As a result, political parties recruit “those with connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to finance corrupt behavior, and those who are already influential in society” (Bjarnegård 2013; 37).

However, recent studies find that political parties nominate women in contexts where corruption is prevalent to restore trust in political institutions (Funk et al. 2021;

Valdini 2019). Valdini (2019) employs rational choice theory to argue that “male elites should only have an interest in including more women in the public sphere if it somehow contributes to helping the male elites either maintain or increase their own power” (6). In particular, she argues that men increase women’s presence in politics in contexts where male elites face a legitimacy crisis after a corruption scandal and in hybrid regimes that restrict the rights of citizens (9).

As a result, opportunities may arise for an increase in women’s presence in politics in contexts where corruption is prevalent. Moreover, scholars find that in different contexts, authoritarian regimes do not solely recruit their supporters but also nominate opposition leaders to key leadership positions at the national and sub-national levels to fragment and weaken the opposition (Arriola et al. 2021; Reuter and Robertson 2015). The cooptation of potential challengers and outsiders may enable women, who are excluded from male- dominated networks, to gain access to political office.

In sum, feminist institutionalism offers useful tools and concepts for examining gender and political recruitment. The impact of gender quotas on women’s descriptive representation depends on the wider institutional environment. Moreover, political actors retain informal rules and practices during periods of institutional innovation which may limit the potential for change. Lastly, informal institutions such as corruption and clientelism may not always hinder women’s descriptive representation. Their impact depends on contextual factors, which I will examine in my case study of quota implementation in Algeria.

Case Study of Quota Implementation in Algeria

I draw from feminist institutionalism to examine the implementation of the 2012

gender quota in Algeria. As I noted briefly in Chapter 1, the gender quota was adopted in 2012 due to a combination of factors: mobilization by the women's movement; concessions by the regime after the Arab Spring to placate the opposition and signal to ordinary citizens that democratization was taking place, and international norms (Tripp 2016). Moreover, the gender quota had a positive effect on women's descriptive representation in both the 2012 and 2017 parliamentary elections. This is because all three types of institutions, normative, practical, and systemic, underwent reform.

However, it is also notable that the regime strategically advanced women's political rights as it became more authoritarian. First, in the 2008 Constitution, the state added Article 31 which states "The State shall work for the promotion of political rights of women by increasing their chances of access to representation in elected assemblies" (Official Journal of the Republic 2008). However, Parliament also voted for a constitutional amendment that removed presidential term limits, which was a major setback for democracy (Aghrout and Zoubir 2009). As Aghrout and Zoubir (2009) point out, before this constitutional amendment, Algeria was the only country in the Arab world where no president had served more than two terms. As one of the opposition women parliamentarians told me: "In 2008, the Constitution was modified to allow the president to run for a third term. So, they said, we took away something but we will give you this. So, they included article that promotes women's representation in elected assemblies."²

In 2012, as the Arab world was experienced uprisings and revolutions in several countries, women's rights activists pressured the regime to adopt a gender quota law,

² RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

which included both a legislative quota and reserved seats (Tripp 2016). In the 2012 electoral law, Article 2 requires all political parties to have a certain percentage of women candidates depending on the number of seats in the district: 20% for districts with 4 seats; 30% for districts with 5 or more seats; 35% for districts with 14 or more seats; 40% for districts with 32 or more seats; and 50% for the diaspora (Official Journal of the Algerian Republic 2012).

Article 3 further stipulates that “The seats are distributed according to the number of votes obtained by each list. The proportions fixed in Article 2 above must be reserved for women candidates according to their ranking in the lists.” Lastly, Article 5 states that lists that do not meet the quota requirement are rejected and Article 7 states that political parties would receive state funding depending on the number of women candidates who are elected. As a result, due to sanctions for noncompliance and the potential to receive state funding, political parties could not undermine the gender quota, which led to a dramatic increase in women’s presence in parliament from 8% to 31.6%. After the 2017 elections, women held 26% of seats in parliament.

The key questions that remain unaddressed are: What kinds of women did political parties recruit? How did the gender quota interact with other institutions, such as clientelism, corruption, and extreme intra-elite conflict? I argue that the gender quota was nested in an institutional environment that has three main features. First, the elite has been divided along ideological, ethnic, regional, and class lines since the Algerian War of Independence. Key debates over Algeria’s identity and culture have been unresolved, including the role of Islam in politics, the status of non-Arab Algerians (Kabyles), and the rights of women (Lazreg 2019; Stone 1997).

Second, in this context where there is intra elite conflict, the military emerged as the most powerful institution (Cook 2007; Ghanem 2018). As Ghanem (2018) argues, the military regime allows some reforms to take place to signal that Algeria is democratizing but in reality these reforms enable the regime to placate the international community, opposition groups, and ordinary citizens.

Third, corruption and clientelist networks flourished under the leadership of Bouteflika from 1999 to 2019 (Werenfels 2007). Algerians commonly refer to parliament as “parlement ta3 chkara” (the parliament of the bag of money) and point out that it is full of incompetent legislators who make laws. Werenfels (2007) finds that after the civil war, male parliamentarians from wealthy families were placed high on party lists (p. 88). After the removal of Bouteflika and his allies from power in 2019, more evidence emerged that parliamentarians did buy their seats in parliament (Tlemcani 2019).

In terms of how these dynamics affected quota implementation, I find evidence that the interaction between demand-side and supply-side factors shaped the recruitment of women and that there was both institutional continuity and innovation. The gender quota changed the calculations of male party leaders who were required by law to recruit women. I find that the regime recruited women who have family ties to the Algerian War of Independence or like their male counterparts, they have what Werenfels (2007) calls “historical legitimacy,” i.e., they have family members who participated in the anti-colonial struggle.

On the other hand, the military has a reputation for allowing some change to take place while maintaining the democratic façade (Ghanem 2018). So, political parties strategically recruited a second group of women parliamentarians who do not have family

ties to the Algerian War of Independence and/or were not party activists in the two main nationalist parties, the FLN and the RND. Instead, this second group of women parliamentarians was recruited after they had built their reputations in their local communities, such as after organizing workers strikes or helping poor people in their communities. Other women parliamentarians reported that they were recruited by political parties because they were educated. This group included professors, lawyers, and doctors.

I find that due to their different backgrounds, nationalist women were very critical of one another and disagreed about who was qualified to be in parliament. Women parliamentarians who had political experience before entering parliament reported that political parties strategically recruited women who did not have political experience to protect their interests. On the other hand, women who did not have political experience reported that they were qualified to be in parliament due to their education. As a result, women parliamentarians reported an absence of female solidarity, rivalries, and fierce battles over key positions in parliament.

FLN Women

Between 1962 and 1987, Algeria had a hegemonic single-party system led by the National Liberation Front (Storm 2014). The revolutionaries officially declared war against France on November 1, 1954. In 1956, Abane Ramdane, the leader of the revolutionary forces at the time, organized a Congress to bring together the revolutionary forces, which led to the adoption of a platform that granted more power to civilian leaders over army officers and democratized decision-making (Quandt 1969, 99-101). But, only a year later, as the FLN was facing repression, with several of its leaders imprisoned and

army officers gaining more power, the principles of the 1956 Congress had to be reconsidered (Quandt 1969, 129-132).

In 1958, the FLN announced that Abane Ramdane died after suffering wounds in a battle but members of the elite, scholars, journalists, and the Algerian people treat his death as an assassination by army officers who saw him as a threat (Quandt 1969, 131-132; Nadir 2019). As Algerian journalists argue, the Algerian people continue to make a connection between the death of Ramdane and the military regime that has ruled Algeria since independence (Nadir 2019). One of the main slogans of the uprisings in 2019-2021 is “A civilian state, not a military state,” (Boudina 2021; Nadir 2019).

Since the death of Ramdane, the FLN has remained a tool of the state (Storm 2014, p. 133). Moreover, The FLN was the organization that brought together a diverse group of elites who needed to forge an alliance to liberate Algeria from French rule, including liberals, left wing nationalists, communists, and Islamist nationalists (Derradji 2016; Quandt 1969). After independence, these elites disagreed about important issues, including the role of Islam in politics, the status of non-Arab Algerians, women’s rights, and the strategy that the state should employ to reclaim the local culture after more than 100 years of French colonial (Lazreg 2019; Storm 1997). But, despite internal conflict, the FLN’s durability can be explained by its historical origins. As Levitsky and Way (2012) argue in their case studies of ruling political parties in Africa, “the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically- driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion- and durability- in party-based authoritarian regimes” (870).

Consistent with these features of the FLN, I find that the FLN recruited women

who have historical legitimacy, i.e., they have family members who participated in the anticolonial struggle.³ The FLN women reported that male party leaders had discriminated against them in the past even though they had historical legitimacy and credited Bouteflika for imposing the gender quota. As one of the nationalist women told me, “My father and uncle participated in the war. I grew up in the FLN. Many of us were candidates before but did not win. But, the President of the Republic decided to impose the quota and he said that women have to participate in the political arena.”⁴

Therefore, the pressure placed by President Bouteflika was identified by women deputies as the key factor that led to an improvement in women’s descriptive representation. Bouteflika was an important actor because for the first time in Algeria’s political history, the military faced a powerful president (Werenfels 2007). Additionally, there is evidence that, as Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) argue, women’s decision to run for office is “relationally embedded.” For example, one of the FLN women reported that she ran for office after she got a divorce.⁵ Other women reported that their family members did not encourage them to run for office, but added that it was party leaders who recruited them.⁶

Moreover, the rise of Bouteflika to power did not only change the calculations of male elites. It also impacted the supply of women. One of the women parliamentarians told me that, for her, Bouteflika was an agent of agent after Algeria had experienced a decade- long civil war and that his arrival was an opportunity to enact change from

³ FLN Interviews: 1 (02/2019), 3 (02/2019), 4 (02/2019), 6 (03/2019), 7 (03/2019), 9 (04/2019), 10 (04/2019), 11 (04/2019)

⁴ FLN interview 10 (04/2019)

⁵ FLN interview 2 (02/2019)

⁶ FLN interviews 4 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019)

within state institutions.⁷ Another woman parliamentarian added that she had experienced hogra (coined by ordinary Algerians to describe state-society relations and the contempt of elites, bureaucrats, and the policy toward ordinary citizens) when a bureaucrat asked for a bribe when she tried to complete the necessary paperwork for her father's retirement. She said, "Since then, I put it in my head that being employed is not enough. I was a teacher. I had to be in government to solve my own problems and the problems of citizens."⁸

Like their male colleagues, women affiliated with the FLN reported the absence of female solidarity. They shared ties to the Algerian War of Independence but disagreed on who was qualified to be in parliament. As one of the women parliamentarians told me, she joined the FLN because her father participated in the anti-colonial struggle but she did not have much in common with other FLN women. She said, "There are deputies of hair salons and there are deputies of the field."⁹ Women parliamentarians who have political experience argued that women who entered parliament without political experience were recruited to serve the interests of men.¹⁰ As one of the party activists said, "In party lists, they prefer housewives over women who are activists because the woman activist competes against him and can take his place."¹¹

Another one of her colleagues added that political parties recruited women from small towns who were not used to interacting with men and that after they entered parliament, they were too "shy" to participate in debates and "defend their ideas."¹² A

⁷ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

⁸ FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

⁹ FLN interview 1 (02/2019)

¹⁰ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 9 (04/2019); 11 (04/2019); 13 (11/2019); FLN interview 9 (04/2019)

¹¹ FLN interview 9 (04/2019)

¹² FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

woman doctor who did not have political experience and came from a small town told me that she struggled when she tried to participate in debates, but she criticized women parliamentarians for not helping her. She said, “Even in the party, there is jealousy. We are all different. For example, I have expertise in medicine, another woman has political experience. But, they [women with political experience] want to make themselves visible.”¹³ She added that when the United Nations and other international organizations organize workshops, women who have political experience hide the information from her.

RND Women

The other nationalist political party affiliated with the regime is the National Rally for Democracy (RND). The RND was established in 1997 after the reforms of 1988 which marked the transition from a single-party to multiparty system (Bouandel 2003). Scholars argue that the military established the RND in 1997 to weaken the FLN (Storm 2014, pp. 144-145). The military began to question the loyalty of the FLN after it joined opposition parties in Rome in 1994-1995 to discuss an end to the civil war. By the end of the Rome summits, the FLN and opposition parties, including the Islamist party the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the secular parties, the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), declared their commitment to democratization. The Rome summits posed a major threat to the survival of the military regime because they brought together nationalists, Islamists, and Kabyle secularists. In response, the RND was established to strengthen the military. The leader of the opposition party FFS, Hocine Aït Ahmed, called the RND the “Rally for the new dictatorship” (Tahi 1997, as cited in

¹³ FLN interview 3 (02/2019)

Storm 2014, p. 145). The RND became a major actor after the civil war under the leadership of Ahmed Ouyahia, key ally of Bouteflika. He was later imprisoned for corruption after the 2019 uprising.

In my interviews, there were some notable differences between the RND and the FLN women. First, the women parliamentarians affiliated with the RND distinguished their party from the FLN.¹⁴ Although both are pro-government parties, the RND women argued that their party was more democratic and not as prone to conflict as the FLN. One of the RND women told me that she left the FLN and joined the RND because in the FLN, male leaders “manipulate women and use them to reach their goals.”¹⁵ Another woman parliamentarian reported that both political parties recruited her but she did not want to join the FLN because their members “break each other.”¹⁶

RND male leaders also wanted to distinguish themselves from the FLN. As one of the women parliamentarians told me, the RND recruited her to restore trust in parliament. She said,

They were looking for someone good in my province. During a long period, the RND did not have a woman parliamentarian from my province. They were all from the FLN. Leaders were concerned about the image of parliament. The one before was called the parliament of hairdressers. They wanted someone good to represent the province.¹⁷

Another woman parliamentarian added that she was recruited by the RND after she built a reputation in her local community for working on the environment and for helping ordinary citizens.¹⁸ The RND also recruited a woman after she led a workers

¹⁴ RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 2 (02/2019); 4 (04/2019); 5 (04/2019); 6 (04/2019); RPR (former RND) interview 1 (04/2019)

¹⁵ RND interview 4 (04/2019)

¹⁶ RPR (former RND) interview 1 (04/2019)

¹⁷ RND interview 6 (04/2019)

¹⁸ RND interview 1 (02/2019)

strike in her community.¹⁹ That woman said that several political parties contacted her but she joined the RND. In explaining her decision, she said that RND leaders told her that they were looking for good people with “principles,” i.e., parliamentarians who do not engage in corruption and work on behalf of ordinary citizens and grassroots party members. She added that a male candidate offered her money in exchange for her seat.

These patterns are consistent with previous research on male parliamentarians in Algeria (Werenfels 2007). Male parliamentarians interviewed by Werenfels (2007) reported that political parties recruited them because they come from wealthy families who are influential in their local communities (p. 88). However, after the 2019 Hirak, more evidence emerged that male parliamentarians bought their seats (Tlemcani 2019). Ordinary Algerians refer to parliament as “parlement ta3 chkara” (parliament of the bag of money).

Consequently, political parties employed a different strategy when they recruited women, choosing to recruit women who were not corrupt, women who built their reputations for helping people, and women who led workers’ strikes. One possible explanation is that the RND sought to restore trust in political institutions that have been dominated by the FLN since independence.

All the same, the RND was not very different from the FLN. Disagreements about who was qualified to be in parliament also took place among RND women. One of the women parliamentarians who did not have political experience argued, “Activism is one thing and parliamentary work is another thing. Those of us who are intellectuals find it sometimes difficult to work in parliament. So, it is worse for women who are not

¹⁹ RPR (former RND) interview 1 (04/2019)

educated. She is used as a décor. She is not free.”²⁰ On the other hand, an RND woman who was a party activist and was involved in local politics before entering parliament reported that male leaders led a campaign against her in parliament to prevent her from becoming vice-president of parliament.²¹ She said that they pushed parliamentarians to vote for an “incompetent” woman instead of her. These debates over who is qualified to enter state institutions have existed since the anti-colonial struggle (Quandt 1969). Like male politicians, women engaged in these power struggles.

TAJ Women

The third political party that was affiliated with the Bouteflika regime is the Rally of Algerian Hope (TAJ), a moderate nationalist-Islamist party. Amar Ghoul, an Islamist who was affiliated with the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), established TAJ in 2012 and became one of Bouteflika’s key allies (Ghanem 2014). Women affiliated with (TAJ) reported that they joined TAJ because they believed and trusted the vision of Amar Ghoul.²² One of the women reported that she used to be affiliated with the RND and that it was difficult for her to trust political parties again because leaders of the RND sidelined party activists during elections, but added that after TAJ recruited her and she interacted with Amar Ghoul, she trusted him because “he is different from Ouyahia [leader of the RND]”.²³ She reported that Ghoul was modest and that he wanted to work with party activists. The two other women affiliated with TAJ, a professor and a doctor, reported that they joined TAJ to change politics from within.²⁴ The woman doctor explained, “As

²⁰ RND interview 6 (04/2019)

²¹ RND interview 7 (10/2019)

²² TAJ interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (03/2019); 3 (03/2019)

²³ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

²⁴ TAJ interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (03/2019)

a doctor, I was helpless. I saw that the Algerian people suffer a lot. I thought that politicians could do something.”²⁵

Amar Ghouh also sought to distinguish himself and his party from the FLN and the RND. One of the women deputies said, “Dr. Ghouh told us to stay simple, not to change our phone numbers, not to move to bigger apartments.”²⁶ The receptionist at the party headquarters was also very supportive of Ghouh and the party. She told me that Ghouh helped her and her kids. But, after the uprising, Amar Ghouh was also arrested for corruption.

In sum, each of the three pro-government political parties recruited a diverse group of women. As a result, women parliamentarians were critical of one another, engaged in power struggles, and were not able to transcend their differences even after the creation of a women’s caucus. Moreover, while leaders of the RND strategically used the gender quota to convey that they were different from the RND, TAJ sought to distinguish itself instead from the RND.

Opposition Women

In contrast to the FLN, RND, and TAJ, none of the Islamist and secular opposition women discussed their family ties nor did they report that their political parties recruited them.²⁷ Instead, Islamist women talked about their previous involvement in civil society and being interested in “general welfare.”²⁸ This is consistent with previous work on Islamist parties which finds that after the civil war, the MSP became

²⁵ TAJ interview 2 (03/2019)

²⁶ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

²⁷ MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019); PT interview 1 (02/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

²⁸ MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019), 2 (04/2019)

more involved in the associational sphere, creating their own associations, but also becoming more increasingly involved in universities and the Algerian Muslim Scouts (Sakthivel 2017). On the other hand, the secular opposition women talked about their involvement in trade unions and human rights organizations.²⁹ As one of them explained, she was first interested in defending human rights then became involved in women's rights.³⁰

Female Solidarity

Neither the Islamist women nor the secular women reported the absence of female solidarity within their parties, but did see it as a problem for women in other parties. Islamist women, for example, reported that some of the nationalist women had personally told them that they were not “free” in their parties due to party discipline.³¹ Islamist women reported that they are more autonomous than nationalist women who cannot challenge the party. The secular opposition women, in contrast, were critical of both the nationalists and Islamists. As one of the secular women told me, “Most of the women represent their parties. We have to introduce gender to parliament.”³²

These differences even led to the failure of the women's caucus to unite women parliamentarians. One of the women parliamentarians reported that she worked with UN Women to launch the women's caucus but said that a power struggle over who would be the leader divided the women. She said,

Unfortunately, the women who entered were coopted. They did not liberate themselves from the games of the men. They are the type of women who have to have men behind them in order to be able to exist. They said that because I was vice-president [of parliament] I could not also be president of the caucus. They

²⁹ PT interview 1 (02/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

³⁰ RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

³¹ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019)

³² RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

said it would make me more powerful.³³

Conclusion

Existing research on women's descriptive research finds that across contexts political parties play an important role in candidate selection (for example, Bjarnegård 2013; Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Even after the adoption of gender quotas, male leaders employ certain strategies to undermine the impact of gender quotas (Krook 2016). To contribute to the literature, I conducted a case study of quota implementation in Algeria. I found that although the gender quota had a positive impact on women's descriptive representation due to the design of the gender quota, political parties strategically recruited a diverse group of women parliamentarians. I argued that the gender quota was nested in an institutional environment that is characterized by power struggles since the Algerian War of Independence. Nationalist women parliamentarians, like their male colleagues, engaged in power struggles for leadership positions, failed to unite even after the creation of a women's caucus, and questioned one another's qualifications. Women parliamentarians who had prior political experience reported that political parties recruited "incompetent" women to undermine them. On the other hand, women parliamentarians who did not have prior political experience reported that political parties recruited them to improve the image of parliament, which is referred to by Algerians as "parlement ta3 chkara" (parliament of the bag of money).

Moreover, I found that each pro-government political party sought to distinguish itself from the other parties. The RND was established in 1997 by the regime to weaken the FLN. The RND women that their party was different from the FLN in explaining their

³³ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

decision to join the RND. But, in 2012, TAJ was established, joining the FLN and the RND, as the main pro-government parties. The leader of TAJ sought to distinguish himself from Ouyahia, the leader of the RND. However, after the 2019 Hirak, evidence emerged that male leaders affiliated with both the RND and TAJ were involved in corruption scandals. The case of Algeria thus demonstrates that authoritarian regimes employ institutional innovation to strengthen their rule.

Chapter 3: Do Women Represent Women? Women Parliamentarians' Attitudes and Priorities

Introduction

Gender and politics scholars point out that there is an important difference between women's substantive representation as *process* and substantive representation as *outcome* (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Substantive representation as process occurs when women legislators introduce women's rights bills, forge alliances with women's organizations, interact with their female constituents, and collaborate with one another. On the other hand, substantive representation as outcome occurs when women legislators achieve policy outcomes. As Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) point out, it is important to distinguish between these two aspects of substantive representation because women legislators may prioritize women's issues but it is more difficult to achieve policy success due to contextual factors.

In regard to substantive representation as process, findings from different parts of the world reveal that women are more likely than men to prioritize women's issues (for example, Carroll 2001; Clayton et al. 2017; Darhour 2012; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Tamerius 1995; Thomas 1991; Tremblay 1998). In the United States, for example, existing research finds that women are more likely than men to sponsor and cosponsor women's rights bills (Tamerius 1995). In Argentina, women are also more likely to introduce women's rights bills than men (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Even in authoritarian contexts like Uganda and Rwanda, women parliamentarians invested time in placing women's issues on the legislative agenda (Clayton et al. 2017; Devlin and Elgie 2008).

Other scholars find that women do not prioritize women's issues due to contextual factors such as authoritarianism (Franceschet 2011). For example, in Chile, Franceschet (2011) finds that even feminists in the legislature are hesitant to introduce legislation to decriminalize abortion. She argues that this is because the stability of the political system depends on conflict avoidance and consensus seeking, which means that even leftists refrain from introducing women's rights bills that would be opposed by conservatives. Moreover, as Beckwith (2011) points out, it is important to distinguish between women's interests, issues, and preferences. Women have an interest in ensuring that their voices are heard but they might employ different strategies to achieve their empowerment.

In regard to authoritarian regimes, the evidence is mixed. For example, Tripp (2001) distinguishes between African countries where there are autonomous women's movements and others where they do not exist. She argues that in contexts where there are autonomous women's movements, women representatives affiliated with the regime may forge alliances with women's movements and advocate on behalf of women. On the other hand, Goetz and Hassim (2003) draw a distinction between democratic South Africa and authoritarian Uganda to argue that while both countries experienced improvements in women's descriptive representation, authoritarianism, patronage, and male party leaders prevent women from substantively representing women in Uganda.

Goetz and Hassim (2003) explore the impact of women in politics by studying their "effectiveness," which they define as "the capacity of women politicians to mobilize support in their parties and in civil society for their policy agendas" (2). Goetz (2003) argues that in Uganda, which at the time was described as a "consultative democracy" but was beginning to lean more toward authoritarianism, women politicians were not recruited

to represent women (Goetz 2003; Tamale 1999). As Tamale (1999) finds, “Most women MPs view the affirmative action policy as a favor (as opposed to a right) and view the NRM [ruling party] as a critical factor in not only the initial enactment of the policy but also its continuation” (104).

Except for a few studies (Darhour 2012; Sater 2007; Shalaby 2016), the attitudes and priorities of Arab women representatives has not received significant attention. This is because they only recently entered Arab parliaments (IPU 2020). Women’s descriptive representation first improved in Morocco after the adoption of a gender quota in 2002. While Darhour (2012) finds that women parliamentarians prioritized women’s issues, Sater (2007) argues that women parliamentarians did not bring a gender perspective to the legislative agenda. In a comparison of Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, Shalaby (2016) finds that women representatives do not prioritize women’s issues in parliamentary sessions.

However, these scholars have not engaged with feminist scholarship on women’s agency in post-colonial contexts. Women of color argue that women in post-colonial contexts are not powerless victims and that it is important to account for differences across contexts (Mohanty 1991). For example, in the Arab world, women express a kind of agency that does not seek to challenge hegemonic gender norms but instead to ensure that their voices are heard in Islamic movements that are dominated by men (Mahmood 2005). I incorporate insights from this literature into my analysis, drawing on insights regarding European colonialism, the alliance between feminists and anticolonial nationalist leaders, women’s agency, and the impact of political Islam on women’s activism. These factors help explain why women parliamentarians may not prioritize women’s issues in certain

authoritarian regimes, which is not because they are loyal to authoritarian regimes, but because their lives are impacted by multiple systems of oppression.

To contribute to scholarship on women's substantive representation as process, I asked Algerian women parliamentarians: Do you feel responsible for representing women? Out of the 30 women I interviewed, only six nationalist women reported that they feel responsible for representing women. Most of the women parliamentarians rejected the notion that they have obligation to substantively represent women. But, they emphasized that they want to change perceptions of women leaders. On the basis of these responses, I conclude that women parliamentarians are strategic actors who are less interested than the literature anticipates in achieving women's substantive representation, largely due to historical and political factors. Drawing from feminist scholarship on women's agency in the Arab world, I argue that women parliamentarians in Algeria are instead strategic actors who seek to make their voices heard without challenging Islamic teachings.

Women's Agency in the Middle East and North Africa

Feminist scholarship on non-Western contexts offers important insights into how women's lives have been impacted by European colonialism (for example, Lazreg 2019); the alliance between feminists and male national leaders during anti-colonial struggles (for example, Badran 1995; Jayawardena 1986); the relationship between secular women's movements and the state (for example, Al-Ali 2000); and the rise of Islamic feminism (Mahmood 2005). More recent work traces women's activism to anti-colonial struggles and argues that women in the Arab world employ different strategies depending on the

presence of internal threats, such as the rise of extremists, or external threats, such as Western interference in the region (Pratt 2020; Stephan and Charrad 2020; Tripp 2019).

These studies offer important insights that help explain how women's activism has evolved in the Third World and why women's agency in non-Western contexts differs from the type of agency that is associated with Western feminism. Women's lives in non-Western contexts have been shaped by multiple systems of oppression including colonialism, authoritarianism, extremism, sectarianism, and neocolonialism. As a result, women parliamentarians must forge alliances with authoritarian regimes, may not prioritize women's issues once they enter politics, and may instead use terminology that is gender-neutral such as "the people," "citizens," and "poor" people in their discourse.

Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World

In her review of scholarship on gender and politics in the MENA region, Charrad (2001) notes that "If one theme constitutes the core of the field in unifying scholars of gender in the Middle East, it is a critique of Orientalism and its legacy" (419). In his groundbreaking book *Orientalism*, Edward Said (1978) explains how European scholars, colonial officials, and travelers characterized the Orient as "backward" to justify European colonialism. In particular, colonizers were obsessed with Indian and Arab women and their bodies (Lazreg 2019; Spivak 1988).

Western feminists also portrayed women of color as powerless victims (Liddle and Rai 1998; Mohanty 1991). As Liddle and Rai (1998) point out, American women writers such as Katherine Mayo wrote in the early part of the 20th century to justify and protect European colonialism from rising nationalist movements. For example, they note that

Mayo criticizes practices such as child marriage but does not mention the fact that Indian women formed their own organizations to end these practices, which further reinforces the notion that Western women are agents of change while silencing women of color and their resistance (504-505).

Women in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East had an interest to protect themselves from colonial rule so they forged alliances with nationalist movement. In an important book, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, Jayawardena (1986) compares the alliances between feminism and nationalism in countries that seem different – Egypt, Iran, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia – but share one important factor: they have either been colonized or experienced decline due to interference by Western powers (1).

Jayawardena (1986) points out that while male nationalist leaders in these countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, were primarily interested in liberating their countries from Western imperialism, they were impressed with the “freedom” of Western women and drew a connection between women’s subordination and “Oriental backwardness” and pushed for “new woman” who would play a role in making her country “modern” (10-13). In particular, the education of women was seen as crucial to achieving modernity, but only female relatives of elite men had access to it and women were taught to be good wives and mothers (16-19).

While feminists in post-colonial contexts faced similar constraints, however, there are important differences. In particular, feminist consciousness emerged earlier in some contexts than in others, which challenges the notion that feminism is something that was imported to non-Western contexts. An example of a country where a feminist movement

emerged before independence is Egypt (Badran 1995). Badran (1995) traces the origins of feminism in Egypt to pioneers such as Huda Sha'rawi and Nabawiyah Musa, who developed a feminist consciousness in their early years. For example, Huda Sha'rawi wrote about the preferential treatment that her brother received, which she saw as a consequence of gender inequality (33-34). As they entered public spaces, feminists in Egypt espoused the notion of the "new woman" as part of their anti-colonial strategy (48). They were the first to establish philanthropic associations that were not affiliated with religious institutions, which helped women form ties amongst themselves as they entered spaces in the early part of the twentieth century (50-52).

Moreover, Egyptian feminists had begun to organize lectures by women, even inviting European women to give talks about women's lives (52-53). But, as women began to enter public spaces, conservative Egyptian women wrote about the importance of enhancing family relations and having educated mothers who would help build a nation (62-64). Feminists such as Huda Sha'rawi, Nabawiyah Musa, and Bahithat al-Badiyah responded by publishing books and articles and gave public lectures where they declared that gender roles are socially constructed and even employed a strategic approach to veiling, declaring that it was not a religious obligation but a tool that allowed women to gain access to public spaces, noting that it would eventually become unnecessary (65-67).

After independence, women's rights advanced in countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia as secular states sought to modernize their countries (Ali-Ali 2002; Charrad 2001; Hatem 1992). In Tunisia, the state adopted a liberal family to weaken tribal groups and conservative leaders. In Egypt, the state advanced women's economic rights and

enacted some reforms to family law, although scholars argue these reforms were enacted without the input of secular women's organizations (Al-Ali 2002; Hatem 1992).

Muslim and Islamist Feminists

The rise of political Islam and women's participation in Islamist movements and parties led gender and politics scholars to incorporate the experiences and perspectives of these women into their research on women's activism in the Arab world (Badran 2005; Mahmood 2005; Moghadam 2002). Starting with the Iranian Revolution in the 1970s, political Islam has had a significant impact on the MENA region. Political Islam first emerged in Egypt when Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Al-Banna and his followers called for the Islamization of politics and societies and they argued that the literal interpretation of the Quran would solve problems such as poverty, corruption, and neocolonialism (Munson 2001).

Islamists gained power in several countries, including clerics in Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won elections in Algeria but the military staged a coup to prevent them from gaining power. Several countries have experienced Islamization. In countries like Egypt and Algeria, there was an increase in the number of women who wear hijab, men with beards and traditional white robes, mosque attendance increased, and women's and men's participation in lectures on Islamic texts (for example, Lazreg 2019; Mahmood 2005). Relatedly, as authoritarian regimes throughout the regime began to allow political liberalization to take place, Islamist political parties began to enter formal politics (Schwedler 2006).

As a result, gender and politics researchers have focused on the role that women played in these movements and parties. For example, Clark and Schwedler (2003) argue that as Islamist parties in Yemen and Jordan began to debate whether the Quran should be interpreted literally or adapted to address contemporary concerns, women's presence increased in party structures. Moreover, other scholars focus on the role that women play in helping Islamist parties win elections (Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009).

Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between Islamist feminists and Muslim feminists (Karam 1998). Islamist feminists argue that women's oppression in the MENA region is a consequence of neocolonialism, capitalism, poverty, authoritarianism, and the absence of Islamic principles in politics. They call for the Islamization of Arab states to deal with women's oppression and other social and economic problems. In contrast, Muslim feminists are not affiliated with Islamist political parties. Moreover, they are less critical of the West and instead make the argument that Islamic texts and international women's rights documents such as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action can both be employed to advance women's rights. Yet unlike secular feminists, they do not call for a separation between Islam and politics. As Karam (1998) argues, "Muslim feminists try to steer a middle course between interpretations of sociopolitical and cultural realities according to Islam and a human rights discourse" (11).

In the aftermath of 9/11, gender and politics scholars have sought to challenge the notion that Muslim women are powerless victims (Abu-Lughod 2013; Mahmood 2005). After 9/11, the notion that Muslim women are "oppressed" and "need to be saved by the West" dominated Western discourse (Abu-Lughod 2013; Young 2003). The Bush administration argued that Afghan women needed to be saved as it sought to build support

for the US invasion of Afghanistan (Young 2003). Young (2003) argues that 9/11 led to the emergence of a security state that portrayed itself as “protector of innocent citizens and liberator of women and children to justify consolidating and centralizing executive power at home and dominative war abroad” (10). The notion that women in Afghanistan needed to be saved by the United States was even taken up by Laura Bush who made a radio address to the nation on November 17, 2001, highlighting the violence that Afghan women experienced under the rule of the Taliban (Young 2003, 17). Ever since, the images of Afghan women in *burqa* were used by various actors, including some feminists in the West, to create the category “Muslim woman.”

Similarly, in the *Politics of Piety*, Saba Mahmood (2005) critiques scholars, both feminist and non-feminist, for employing the binary concepts “resistance” and “subordination” when studying agency. This includes work on the use of “everyday forms of resistance” by Scott (1985) and feminist scholarship which argues that women in the MENA region engage in resistance (for example, Abu-Lughod 1986). Mahmood (2005) argues that this type of scholarship misrepresents what women in the region are in reality doing. Instead, in her case study of the Egyptian women’s mosque movement, she argues that women are interested in helping their society become more pious, which is a different form of agency.

For example, she finds that men are no longer the only ones who are reading and interpreting the Quran and the *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet). One particular woman, Hajja Faiza, who led lessons in the mosque, did not give specific instructions or her own opinion when other women asked about what Islam says about female genital mutilation. Instead, she said that the Hadith that has been used to justify female circumcision is weak,

meaning that the Prophet did not actually support female circumcision, but she concluded by saying that it is up to individuals to decide and that they should speak to a doctor (85-6). Another example that Mahmood gives is the decision by Hajja Faiza to lead prayer, which is usually done by men in mosques. After receiving criticism by both women and men for this act, Hajja Faiza does not justify her action in terms of gender equality or women's rights but instead says that male scholars disagree about whether women can lead prayer (88).

These contributions suggest that women in the Arab world have an interest in making their voices heard, but they do not necessarily prioritize women's issues and rights. Below, I explain how women in Algeria have historically expressed agency. I draw from the work of Lazreg (2019) who argues that women in Algeria employed creative strategies to empower themselves, especially in the private sphere. I also draw from my interviews with women's rights activists and participant observation in the 2019 Hirak protest movement to add that women sought to reclaim access to public spaces.

As Hasso and Salime (2016) argue, scholars have to beyond focusing on whether revolutions in the Arab world lead to the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. Instead, they argue that the revolutions that took place in the Arab world in 2010-2011 transformed public spaces because "Women and girls widely and insistently claimed cities, streets, neighborhoods, and cyberspace in a historically unprecedented manner" (5). While Algeria did not experience a revolution in 2010-2011, participating in the 2019 Hirak protest movement allowed me to observe and speak to women protesters.

Algerian Exceptionalism

Like its counterparts in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Algeria experienced

colonialism, the rise of a nationalist movement in the early part of the twentieth century, and a socialist regime that came to power after independence. However, there are important differences between Algeria and other countries. For example, unlike Egypt, where feminists established their own organizations before independence, a feminist movement did not emerge in Algeria until the 1980s (Moghadam 2001).

In the seminal text on women and politics in Algeria, *The Eloquence of Silence*, Marnia Lazreg (1994) writes about the silencing of Algerian women during and after French colonial rule and the strategies that women employed. In particular, women empowered themselves in the private sphere, which was a space where women could protect themselves from both French colonial rule and their patriarchal society. After independence, women did not challenge the state nor did they establish women's organizations.

I draw from the work of Lazreg (2019), interviews with women's rights activists, and participant observation that I carried out in the 2019 Hirak to theorize how women have historically expressed agency. In the following section, I present my findings on how women parliamentarians express agency. Like ordinary women, women parliamentarians do not engage in resistance nor are they subordinated. Instead, they employ a different strategy to represent women, emphasizing that their goal is to change perceptions of women leaders.

Colonialism

In *The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question*, Lazreg (2019) argues that Algerian women's lives changed after colonialism. Before the French occupation, women had more autonomy, had access to public spaces such as hammam (public bath),

and saints' mausoleums, and cemeteries where women could gather on Fridays to speak about their problems and help one another (Lazreg 2019, 25). In rural Algeria, the practice of veiling was not common and women had more autonomy before the French occupation (Lazreg 2019, 28- 9). For example, as Lazreg (2019) points out, women of the Ouled Nail tribe in the south of Algiers, Nailiyat, had sexual autonomy; often left their tribes to go to nearby towns to dance and find a marriage partner; and if they got pregnant, they kept their children and were accepted by their families and communities (29). The communities did not see women as prostitutes, until the French occupied Algeria in 1830 and transformed women's lives.

Lazreg (2019) argues that the silencing of Algerian women started with the French occupation in 1830. Algerian women were described by the French as "soulless" because they were not Christian. They were raped, stripped of their social and economic status, and because Algerian women wore gold jewelry, "Colonial troops were known to have cut off women's ears and hands as a quick way of getting their earrings and bracelets when they seized Algiers" (42).

During colonial rule, Algerian women developed various tactics to empower themselves in the private sphere. After the occupation of Algeria, the veil "acquired a new significance as a symbol of not only cultural difference, but also protection from and resistance to colonial-qua-Christian domination" (Lazreg 2019, 53). Further, as Lazreg (1994) points out, "the French government was more interested in selective education for boys rather than girls" (60). Because women were illiterate, they had to come up with their own strategies to overcome the silencing done by the French colonists and the patriarchy of Algerian society.

For example, when men are present, women rely on eye contact and body language to communicate with one another (Lazreg 2019, 100). This is something that has persisted in all Algerian homes, where women communicate with one another using eye contact. Even as someone who grew up in the United States, my own mother does this in front of my father when she wants to tell us something without him knowing. I think that this also has to do with the notion that there is a particular type of Algerian masculinity that is considered more toxic than Moroccan and Tunisian masculinities, for example. Algerian women often say that Tunisian and Moroccan men are nicer while Algerian men have a temper.

When women sought to make their voices heard, however, French colonizers attempted to silence them. For example, during the Algerian War of Independence, French colonial rulers felt threatened when so many Algerian women joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the anti-colonial struggle. The FLN and the support that it had among the Algerian people was the greatest threat that the French faced since the invasion of Algeria in 1830. So, in 1958, four years after the start of War of Independence, French generals organized a demonstration in Algeria and forced Algerian women to remove their veils (Lazreg 2019, 127). Lazreg (2019) argues that this had a significant impact on women and their rights. The presence of women in the FLN as combatants should have led to a transformation of gender norms but instead women and the veil were caught in the middle of a battle between colonizers and nationalists.

Political Islam

The obsession with the veil returned with the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1980s. Before the rise of Islamists, older women wore haik (a traditional

white robe) and veiling was not practiced by many young women in the 1970s. But, in the 1980s and 1990s, the obsession with the veil resurfaced with the rise of the FIS. For women's rights activists, the political Islam that emerged in Algeria in the 1980s came from the Middle East, in particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.¹ This is not unique to Algeria. In Tunisia, since the rise of Islamists after the Arab Spring, secularists have relied on social media to depict women in hijab and men in beards as "aliens" and as colonizers (Benyousseff 2016, 65-70). Moreover, for leftists in Tunisia, these Islamists are not only allies of Gulf countries but also the United States due to its close ties to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (69). So, interestingly, secularists in Tunisia see the veil as a symbol of Western imperialism. In 2019, a group of women organized a social media campaign using the hashtag "prisoners of the hijab in Algeria" (Chémali 2019).

Nonetheless, Algerian women were still able to express agency as Algeria became more conservative. Since the 1980s, the mosque has become the place where women gather to empower themselves (Lazreg 2019, 216-217). Women come together in mosques to pray, discuss their lives, and Islamic teachings. During the month of Ramadan, women have more freedom to go out at night. Young women tell their parents that they will go pray taraweeh, the prayers that take place throughout the night after everyone breaks their fast. Instead of going to the mosque, many women use the opportunity to go out with their friends or meet their partners. But, conservatives in certain neighborhoods heard about this and started guarding the doors, not allowing women to leave the mosque until the imam finished the two-hour prayer.

¹ Women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

Moreover, one of the women told me, women who wear niqab are the ones who challenge traditional gender roles.² She reported that her brother is akhina (a man who has a beard and wears white robes to express his religiosity publicly) but his wife is strategic in how she interacts with him in the home. She said that, for example, she taught him how to wash clothes and blankets and makes him hang the clothes to dry in the balcony. She justifies it by saying that she should not go out to the balcony and risks being seen by the neighbors without her niqab.

Marriage and Divorce

Algerian women have also employed creative strategies to empower themselves in marriage. Marriage is treated as a sacred institution by Algerians. Parents are particularly insistent on making sure that their daughters get married. As a women's rights activist told me, "Algerian women want to get married. They have this in the head. They have to get married. I do not know why. They have to get married. This is normal?"³ There is also pressure on mothers to make sure that their daughters find a marriage partner. As one of the women's rights activists told me, "You can be a lawyer, a judge, minister, if your mother goes to the party and they tell her 'is your daughter married?' She says not yet, they tell her "meskina" (unfortunate). Even if you are a pilot or I don't know."⁴ She added that women's rights activists who are married and have children are more visible than feminists who are not married. The latter are silenced. She said, "I can talk about maybe 80% of topics and persuade. Why? Because I have a social status. A woman with her house, she has a husband, she has children and she educated them. I can

² Participant observation (04/2019)

³ women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

⁴ Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

defend. A woman who is for example single, she is not visible. We can say the same thing. They listen to me, they do not listen to her.”

But, Algerians often say that things are changing. Young people who get married end up getting a divorce soon after they get married. People say “gateaux fi seef et bougatou fi shta” (cookies in the summer and lawyer in the winter). In 2018, the number of divorces reached a record of 68,000 (TSA 2019). As one of the women’s rights activists told me, “Before women put up with everything, they used to shut up. Today, women decided to not put up with it anymore.”⁵

Moreover, while repudiation still exists in the Family Code, khul’ (women can divorce their husbands if they return the dowry that they received during the marriage contract) is becoming more common. Women buy back their freedom from their husbands. One of the women’s rights activists explained to me that it has always existed since the time of the Prophet who argued that women can divorce their husbands without justifying their decision. But, it has become more common in the last several years. For women’s rights activists, khul’ allows women to win their freedom back, but it is problematic because they have to return the dowry that they received. As one of the women’s rights activists told me,

So, khul’ is not a great thing. It is like he had bought you and you give him back the amount of the purchase. For women, you become an object of pleasure for a man. The idea of khul is not something that should make us happy for women. But it has served us well because thanks to khul we can divorce. If not, we cannot divorce.⁶

Reclaiming Public and Private Spaces

⁵ Women’s rights activist interview (10/2019)

⁶ women’s rights activist interview (05/2019)

The most significant development that took place after the civil war is that women have reclaimed both public and private spaces. In the public sphere, women are present in malls, souks (outdoor markets), beaches, restaurants and coffee shops, universities, hospitals, and on freeways as record numbers of women drive in Algeria. And, since 2019, women's presence in the Hirak protests has transformed public spaces.

First, after the civil war ended, women reclaimed their access to private spaces. The civil war caused disruptions to women's strategies and their use of time in the private sphere. As Lazreg (2019) argues, Algerian women have historically treated private spaces and their time as tools of empowerment (100-101). During the civil war, even private spaces and women's time were targeted by terrorists. One of the women told me that she lived in Eucalyptus, a small town on the outskirts of Algiers that was known for its extremism and the presence of terrorists in certain neighborhoods. She told me about an incident where she and her sisters-in-law were drinking tea and talking and laughing in the night until a rock was thrown warning them that their conversations could be heard.⁷ Homes became dangerous spaces in the night. I remember being afraid anytime we lost power because terrorists were known for cutting power off before attacking neighborhoods in the night. Some of the worst atrocities took place in Bentalha and Rais in 1997. Moreover, weddings, for example, were targeted. Just like the French colonizers, terrorists kidnapped, raped, and targeted women for their gold jewelry.

However, after the civil war, women have reclaimed their time. For example, women who go on hajj or umra (pilgrimage to Mecca) host parties after they come back. On social media, young women post pictures of pajama parties that bring cousins and

⁷ participant observation (04/2019)

friends together. Funerals have also become occasions for women to gather and talk about their lives and problems. It is common for Algerians to say that funerals have now become like weddings because the relatives of the deceased often cook a lot of food, serve coffee and tea with cookies. What is interesting is that even the clothing of women who attend the funerals has changed. Women wear makeup, jeans, and heels when they go to the deceased's person home. Moreover, these gatherings have helped women who work in the informal economy, who bake desserts at home and sell them. Other women design wedding dresses and sell them to brides. Moreover, in many buildings in downtown Algiers, the women get together and hire a woman to clean the building once a week. But, women's participation in the labor force remains very low, and despite high levels of education, it has never reached 20% in Algeria's history (Lazreg 1994, 150-55).

Television is also important for women in Algeria who are known for scheduling their daily activities based on television programs (Lazreg 1994, 167-8). Turkish soap operas have become especially popular since about 2008 when Algerians and Arabs in general watched *Noor*, which was so popular that Arab tourism to Turkey has increased significantly (Balli et al. 2013). But, more than tourism, scholars have argued that Turkish soap operas might have a positive impact in conservative contexts and “operate as a means to break socially normative behaviours by allowing discussion and expression of the taboo that would not be ordinarily acceptable outside the confines of the soap opera” (Yalkin and Veer 2018, 1150-1151). Arab audiences in particular were inspired by the series *Noor* broadcast on the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC) (Salamandra 2012). The heroine, *Noor*, is an independent woman who marries *Muhannad*, a supportive husband who comes from a wealthy family. Unlike Syrian and

Egyptian soap operas which were watched by families throughout the region, premarital sex, alcohol, and abortion were part of the storyline.

But, Salamandra (2012) argues that conservatives were reacting to what she calls “Muhannad effect” which “engendered a vibrant discourse about the male body and female longing. This is crucial in Arab societies, where censorship restricts discussion of sensitive issues like sexuality in non-fictional media” (69). Unlike Egyptian and Syrian shows which are popular in the region and usually highlight Arab women’s appearances, Turkish shows center male bodies. So, conservatives were threatened by women’s sexual desire. In Algeria, for example, kissing in public spaces, parks in particular, is becoming more common. But, conservatives have posted Youtube videos showing how they force couples to leave and even post signs that say “couples not allowed.” A women’s rights activist recently posted pictures of these signs on her Facebook page.

The 2019 Hirak

In 2019, the Hirak protest movement emerged to demand a “free and democratic” Algeria. The Hirak started on February 22, 2019, but women waited until March 8, International Women’s Day, to take to the streets in large numbers. After the first two marches on February 22 and March 1 were peaceful, women marched in Algiers. Women were concerned that the protests would turn violent and so waited until the third week of the protests to participate. Interestingly, because the state expected that many women would take to the streets in celebration of International Women’s Day, there was an increase in the number of female police officers. Moreover, the organizers of the marches on Fridays and Tuesdays took steps to ensure that the movement was nonviolent. I noticed that there were young men whose job was to monitor the behavior of the protesters.

What was also fascinating about the protests was that women from different segments of society participated. There were students, teachers, lawyers, doctors. I also saw housewives who wore niqab, women who wore hijab and loose clothing, and women who wore hijab and jeans. There were also feminists, current and former female politicians, and of course moudjahidat (women fighters who participated in the Algerian War of Independence), such as Djamila Bouhired and Zohra Drif who remained heroic figures after independence. Moreover, women's rights activists gathered in the front entrance of the University of Algiers. They called it the "Feminist Square." This was the space where the women's movement gathered every Friday to assert that Algeria cannot be democratic unless women's voices and rights are included were targeted. They were accused of causing division within the Hirak. When I attended a meeting that brought together various women's organizations, women's rights activists, academics, and young students, the goal was clear: to not be excluded from the democratic transition.⁸

However, the notion that Bouteflika advanced women's rights led some protesters to question women's presence in the marches. As one of the women's rights activists told me,

In the Hirak, we were marching, we women, there were some who came to us and said, 'You women, why are you out? Why are you talking? Why? Bouteflika gave you all of the rights.' I said, 'He did not give us rights. What rights did he give us?' For them, we have all of the rights. It is not true.⁹

Women's presence in the Hirak was met with hostility because of advancements in women's rights such as reforms to the Family Code in 2005, the 2012 gender quota, and the 2015 law that criminalized domestic violence. Particularly problematic for women's

⁸ Participant observation (04/2019)

⁹ women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

rights activists is the claim that “Bouteflika gave women their rights.”¹⁰ This might explain why the regime decreased women’s presence in parliament after the removal of Bouteflika and his replacement, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, came to power. After the participation of large numbers of youth in the 2019 Hirak, the regime had an incentive to appease youth and as a result the 2021 parliamentary elections were used to recruit young candidates, which led to the election of 140 parliamentarians younger than 40 (APS 2021).

Still, even though there was some backlash against women for these gains, it was remarkable to witness that young men from the impoverished neighborhoods of El Harrach and Bab El Oued marched alongside young women. This was important because young women often report that they feel unsafe walking on the streets of Algiers and other cities. They report being followed, sexually harassed, and some have even been killed. For example, in 2015, Razika Cherif was killed by a man after she refused to talk to him. The Hirak protest movement thus brought together young men who were seen as dangerous and young women who before the Hirak had not fully reclaimed public spaces.

The marches also took place on Fridays, a day of the week when women organize their time around the mid-day Friday prayers. Women usually spend the mornings cleaning and cooking so that their husbands and other male relatives find a meal prepared after they finish the prayers. It is very rare to see women go out on Fridays unless they go to other women’s homes. They even do their grocery shopping and run errands on Thursday. But, the Hirak was revolutionary because women reclaimed access to public spaces on the holiest day of the week for Muslims and Algerians especially. Unlike

¹⁰ women’s rights activists 1 (04/2019); 2 (04/2019); 3 (04/2019); 4 (04/2019); 6 (05/2019); 7 (05/2019); 8 (05/2019); 9 (05/2019); 10 (05/2019); 11 (10/2019); 12 (10/2019); 15 (11/2019)

Morocco and Tunisia, for example, weekends in Algeria start on Friday. The Hirak has allowed women to reclaim access to public spaces.

I met women from different backgrounds and generations. They stressed that they were not there as women but, like their male counterparts, they had an interest in overthrowing authoritarianism. Moreover, ordinary women were critical of the state and the women's movement. When I asked about women deputies, both young students and older women did not even know about the gender quota and said that they are not familiar with the work of women parliamentarians, except for a couple who received attention in the media, like Naima Salhi, the woman deputy who said that she would kill her daughter if she spoke Tamazight, the language spoken by Kabyle Algerians.

Second, ordinary women, were critical of the state and like their male counterparts, took to the streets on Fridays and Tuesdays to demand the overthrow of the regime. But, unlike women's rights activists who created the Feminist Square, they rejected the notion that the Family Code should be abolished. As one of the women I met told me, "I am against that. Inheritance, equality that is about religion. So, we should not touch this. It is true that there are rights that we should defend. Yes. But, inheritance, everything that has to do with religion, it is sacred. Don't touch."¹¹ Another added, speaking about women's organizations, "They want to copy the feminist movement of Tunisia. We are a Muslim country."¹² Moreover, the women I met added that they would not vote for an Islamist party if free and fair elections were to take place. One of the teachers said, "We are a Muslim country. That is true. We practice our religion. We do everything that God has asked. I do not need an Islamist party to practice. We are a

¹¹ participant observation (04/2019)

¹² participant observation (04/2019)

country that is 99% Muslim. We do not need an Islamist party.”¹³

Why Women Parliamentarians Do Not Prioritize Women’s Issues

In this section, I draw from interviews with women parliamentarians to examine the link between descriptive and substantive representation as process. I asked the following questions: Do you feel responsible for representing women? In what ways has the situation of Algerian women changed? Are there particular issues that deserve priority? What role do women’s organizations play in representing women? What role do international organizations like the United Nations play in representing women? In my analysis, I also draw from my interviews with women’s rights activists to incorporate their perspectives.

Three main findings emerged from the interviews. First, among the 30 women parliamentarians I interviewed, only six nationalist women reported that they have an obligation to represent women. Most of the women rejected the notion that they have a responsibility to represent women specifically. The reasons given by interviewees suggest that this is not because women are “coopted” by the regime, but because they are concerned about foreign interference in Algeria. In particular, women parliamentarians were critical of the United Nations for introducing the concept of gender, adding that they do not support any laws that would challenge Islamic teachings. The barrier to women’s substantive representation, therefore, does not appear to be cooptation by the regime, but rather, the lasting impact of French colonial rule which treated women and the veil as the cultural symbols of Islam. However, women parliamentarians reported that they want to change perceptions of women leaders, suggesting that the presence of more women in

¹³ participant observation (04/2019)

politics can have gender-related effects apart from policy change.

Responsibility to Represent Women

Out of the 30 women I interviewed, only six nationalist women reported that they have an obligation to substantively represent women.¹⁴ Among these six women, only two FLN women reported that they have an obligation to represent women.¹⁵ In explaining their decision, one of the FLN women said, “I found myself defending women because I did not see anyone doing it.”¹⁶ But, even these nationalist women were strategic. None of them placed controversial issues such as inheritance or polygamy on the agenda. Instead, two of the RND women focused on less controversial issues, such as Article 66 in the Family Code, which states that if a divorced woman remarries, she loses custody of her children.¹⁷ As one of the RND women explained, “Like inheritance, you can’t touch because it is clear in the Quran.”¹⁸ One of the secular opposition women added that pro-government and Islamist women agreed with her on certain issues, such as Article 66, and they started to work across party lines in 2017-2018.¹⁹ Both secular opposition women reported that they have obligation to represent women but they added they cannot do much on their own because nationalist and Islamist women represent their parties.²⁰

Responsibility to Represent the People

Most of the nationalist and Islamist women rejected the notion that they have an obligation to represent women.²¹ Instead, they argued that they have a responsibility to

¹⁴ FLN interviews 9 (04/2019); 10 (04/2019); RND interviews 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 4 (04/2019); TAJ interview 2 (03/2019)

¹⁵ FLN interviews 9 (04/2019); 10 (04/2019)

¹⁶ FLN interview 9 (04/2019)

¹⁷ RND interviews 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019)

¹⁸ RND interview 4 (04/2019)

¹⁹ RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

²⁰ RCD interview 1 (03/2019); PT interview 1 (02/2019)

²¹ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 6 (03/2019); 7

represent the “people,” “youth,” and “workers.” For example, one of the RND women noted that due to Algeria’s experience with terrorism and civil war, she focuses on security issues.²² Moreover, I got the sense that some of the women parliamentarians did not like this question, even voicing in some cases that they did not like that I asked this question.²³ As one of the FLN women told me, “I do not like this question. You assume that I am different. Did you ask the men if they feel responsible for representing men? I work hard to give back to the people who elected me.”²⁴

Moreover, Islamist women rejected the notion that they have an obligation to represent women, reporting that they represent different segments of society.²⁵ Yet they still expressed their support for women’s presence in politics. Islamist women argued that equality between women and men is one of the key principles of Islam and that the gender quota was necessary to help women overcome cultural barriers. As one of them said, “It is important for women to be present everywhere, not just in schools and hospitals. But we do not legislate for women. We legislate for the people. The quota was necessary because of the mentality of the Algerian people.”²⁶

For example, she said that she was told to “go bake bread” while on the campaign trail. This is because, in general, families encourage their daughters to work as teachers or doctors but politics is seen as too corrupt for women. Moreover, in general, men silence women (Lazreg 2019). For example, after women get married, husbands do not speak

(03/2019); 8 (03/2019); 11 (04/2019); 12 (05/2019); 13 (11/2019); RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 5 (04/2019); 6 (04/2019); 7 (10/2019); RPR interview 1 (former RND) (04/2019); MPA interview 1 (02/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019); TAJ interviews 1 (03/2019); 3 (03/2019)

²² RND interview 1 (02/2019)

²³ FLN interviews 11 (04/2019); 13 (11/2019)

²⁴ FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

²⁵ MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019)

²⁶ MSP interview 1 (02/2019)

about their wives in public. It is common for Algerian men to say “daar” (the house) when talking about their wives. Some political parties have even posted pictures of male candidates but hide the faces of women candidates. As one of the women deputies told me, “In my province, people could not accept that my picture was posted. I had to fight for my picture to be posted. I come from a conservative province. As other candidates were trying to compete for votes, I was fighting so that my picture could be posted. But, they eventually accepted it.”²⁷

As a result of this resistance, women parliamentarians sought to prove that they were qualified to be in politics and they that are not just experts on women’s issues. As Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) argue, gender quotas can lead to “label” effects, i.e., women elected via quotas may refrain from advocating on behalf of women to prove that they are qualified. For example, the RND woman who focuses on security issues said, “Journalists tried to ruin our reputation but we proved that we were competent. I returned for a second term because the party placed me high on the list. This encouraged me to work harder this term.”²⁸ One of the Islamist women added, “In my party, I wanted to prove that women know about many issues not just social issues.”²⁹ In particular, the parliament of 2012-2017 was referred to as the “parliament of the hairdressers.” Several of the women parliamentarians argued that the media sought to undermine them.³⁰ As one of the women parliamentarians said, “The men have been in power since 1962 [year of independence] but no one says that they are useless. We were judged before we arrived

²⁷ FLN interview 3 (02/2019)

²⁸ RND interview 1 (02/2019)

²⁹ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

³⁰ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 11 (04/2019); 12 (05/2019); RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 7 (10/2019)

to parliament.”³¹

In addition to label effects, nationalist and Islamist women reported that they do not support ideas introduced by the United Nations in workshops organized for women parliamentarians because they challenge Islamic texts.³² As one of the FLN women told me,

For me, I defend women’s rights as long as they do not go against Sharia. We are an Islamic state, not a secular one. Article 2 of the Constitution says that Islam is the religion of the state. Algeria signed CEDAW but there are reservations. We are not going to go against our religion.³³

One of the Islamist women added, “They even brought us gender. But, Islam is the religion of the state. Many of my colleagues agreed with me. They did not accept their ideas.”³⁴

While this Islamist woman said that nationalist women agreed with her, some of the nationalist women were critical of the Islamization that has taken place in Algeria since the 1990s.³⁵ Moreover, the secular FLN woman who worked with UN Women to establish the women’s caucus added that while she is not religious, the Algerian people are religious and that they are not ready for the reforms that feminists are asking for. She said,

The feminists are ahead. Earlier we were talking about when we do not agree on everything, we look for the things that unite us. But, they set the bar very high. When you talk about the Family Code and inheritance, you automatically talk about religion. It is a very sensitive topic. But, even in Tunisia, there is debate when it comes to inheritance. I hope that one day we will be able to arrive there. It is too early to talk about that. Because we have feminists and the rest of Algeria that refuses their ideas. If you talk to anyone on the street, they would tell you

³¹ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

³² FLN interviews 3 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 9 (04/2019); 11 (04/2019); RND interview 6 (04/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019)

³³ FLN interview 3 (02/2019)

³⁴ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

³⁵ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 12 (05/2019)

‘God decided that a woman takes a certain amount and a man takes a certain amount. I am a person. I do not have the right to change that.’³⁶

Another explanation as to why women do not substantively represent women is the claim that there is a “foreign hand” that seeks to destabilize Algeria and that the military is the only actor capable of protecting the country from terrorism.³⁷ As one of the women affiliated with TAJ said, “Algeria is giving other countries solutions, even America learned from us. We do not have terrorism.”³⁸ Concerns about foreign interference also played a role in preventing women from working together to propose women’s rights bills. The woman parliamentarian who established the women’s caucus reported that nationalist women in her party do not trust women who work with international organizations. She said, “I know what they say about me, ‘She works with foreigners.’ I speak five languages. When I speak to people, it is easy for me. They say, ‘She works against Algeria and the state.’”³⁹

Symbolic Representation

While women parliamentarians do not prioritize women’s issues, they did report that they perceived a responsibility to change perceptions of women leaders.⁴⁰ In particular, one of the RND women reported that women parliamentarians are different from women’s rights activists and that Algerian society is more accepting of some women and not others. She said,

³⁶ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

³⁷ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

³⁸ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

³⁹ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

⁴⁰ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 11 (04/2019); 12 (05/2019); 13 (11/2019); RND interviews 6 (04/2019); 7 (10/2019)

Our priority as women parliamentarians is to change the image that society has so that they can trust women. People are surprised when they see me. We are different from the women in feminist women's organizations. They are women who were rejected by society. Most of them are divorced or widowed women. I do not judge them but society judges them. But, when people see women like me, they accept us.⁴¹

As I explained above, Algerian women have not engaged in “resistance” but are strategic in the ways they have engaged with questions of gender. In this instance, women parliamentarians chose not to pursue gendered policy reforms, but instead, to focus on changing perceptions of women leaders. Moreover, while women parliamentarians report that they are not feminists, they espouse feminist ideas. For example, one of the women affiliated with TAJ, the nationalist Islamist party, said “I am not a feminist,” but later in the interview added, “Women believe that they are free but we are not really free. We are the ones who cook, drive the children to school, clean. We do everything. We have the freedom to work but we have paid for this freedom.”⁴²

This strategy to focus on changing attitudes toward women is particularly important in Algeria. As I noted above, men do not refer to their wives in public. They say “daar” (the house). Women are always being silenced and rendered invisible even when they are present. Even after women entered parliament, they were called “hairdressers” by the media. Hair salons are private spaces where women gather to speak about their problems and give one another advice. Thus, by calling women parliamentarians “hairdressers,” the media sought to silence women and undermine the gender quota. It is therefore not surprising that the women parliamentarians who were elected in 2017 sought to challenge this labeling. As one of the women parliamentarians

⁴¹ RND interview 6 (04/2019)

⁴² TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

said,

I feel responsible for being an activist to show that being a woman is not a handicap. Women can contribute as much as men, not to say better than men but the same as men. Unfortunately, women very often are afraid to make themselves visible. They are afraid of both women and men.⁴³

Conclusion

Existing research on the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation finds that across contexts, women legislators prioritize women's issues (for example, Carroll 2002; Darhour 2012; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). To build on the work of these scholars, I sought to determine if women parliamentarians in Algeria feel a responsibility to represent women. Most of the nationalist and Islamist women rejected the notion that they have a responsibility to represent women. In their explanations, women parliamentarians reported that problems such as security and terrorism also deserve attention and that they wanted to convey that they can be experts on various issues, not just women's issues. I also found that women parliamentarians are concerned about foreign interference and ideas that challenge Islamic texts.

However, women parliamentarians also reported that they want to change perceptions of women leaders. This suggests that, like ordinary women, women parliamentarians do not engage in either "resistance" nor are they "oppressed." Instead, they employ other strategies to empower themselves. So, how do women parliamentarians change perceptions of women leaders? In the next chapter, I find that constituency service enables women to challenge the notion that women do not belong in politics.

⁴³ FLN interview 11 (04/2019)

Chapter 4: Gender, Constituency Service, and Women's Symbolic Representation

Introduction

Research on constituency service in democratic contexts has received significant attention (for example Cain et al. 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 2004). Fenno (1987) argues that “members of Congress go home to win the accolade: ‘he’s a good man,’ ‘she’s a good woman’” (55.) Even in contexts where political parties control the reelection prospects of legislators such as in New Zealand and Sweden, representatives still rank constituency service as important (Heitshusen et al. 2005; Taylor 1992).

Existing research on constituency service in the United States also finds that women representatives in state legislatures and city councils receive more requests than their male counterparts (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992). Moreover, scholars find that in different contexts, women advocate on behalf of their female constituents (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2004; Lowande et al. 2019).

Scholars who focus on gender and constituency service in authoritarian contexts also find that women are responsive to female constituents (Benstead 2016; Koyuncu and Sumbas 2016; Tamale 1990). Moreover, Abdel-Samad and Benstead (2016) find that Islamist parties and Islamist women in particular are responsive to female constituents. However, other scholars are more skeptical. Johnson (2016) argues that in Russia, women are recruited to serve as “political cleaners” in regions where there is corruption (652). Moreover, due to clientelism, defined as “an informal relationship between two actors enjoying asymmetrical socioeconomic power where the patron has the upper hand because he or she controls the kind of resources that his or her clients pursue but often cannot receive otherwise” (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 953), women are excluded from

male dominated networks (Benstead 2019; Bjarnegård 2013; Daby 2020; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014).

For example, Benstead (2019) finds that in Tunisia, male citizens approach women when they face a personal problem but they approach men when they need electricity, water, and roads. Moreover, Franceschet and Piscopo (2014) argue that even in contexts like Argentina where women's presence in legislatures has increased, it is governors, mayors, and ministers who control resources. They find that women are less likely than men to hold these positions. However, there is the potential for women to express agency. As Tripp (2001) argues, women have an incentive to challenge corruption and clientelism "because of gendered divisions of labor, gendered organizational modes and the general exclusion of women from political arenas, women have tended to have a different relationship to the state, to power, and to patronage" (35). So, for Tripp (2001), it is not that women are less likely to engage in corruption, but due to their exclusion from male-dominated networks, they have an incentive to challenge corruption and clientelism.

Additionally, opportunities may arise in contexts where corruption is prevalent because male leaders recruit women to restore trust in political institutions (Funk et al. 2021; Valdini 2019). Derichs et al. (2006) argue that in Asian countries where corruption is prevalent, women politicians rely on their "moral capital," defined as a "specific political value of virtue that inclines others to bestow (ethical) prestige, respect, loyalty, and authority on a political actor or the representative of an institution" (245-246). Derichs et al. (2006) find that women politicians present themselves as different from male politicians. Similarly, Shalaby (2020) finds that in Lebanon ordinary citizens who identify corruption as a problem in their country are more likely to support gender quotas. Women

are perceived as less corrupt than men in Lebanon. However, in Jordan and Tunisia, Benstead and Lust (2018) find that ordinary citizens perceive both women and men as corrupt. These findings could be due to differences across these contexts.

To theorize the potential for women parliamentarians' agency in authoritarian contexts, I draw from research on electoral authoritarian regimes which argues that authoritarian regimes rely on constituency service to maintain the support of ordinary citizens (Chen et al. 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2017; Magaloni 2006; Ong 2015). As my interview data demonstrated in Chapter 2, the three pro-regime parties in Algeria recruited a diverse group of women. Women party activists reported that political parties recruited women who did not have prior experience to undermine them.

Nonetheless, due to their diversity, opportunities may arise for women to engage in constituency service and challenge the notion that they do not belong in politics. This is because authoritarian regimes increasingly rely on constituency service to maintain the support of ordinary citizens. The diversity of the women allows the regime to coopt ordinary citizens from different segments of society. As Lowande et al. (2019) argue in their study of constituency service in the United States, women, Black representatives, and veterans are more likely than others to represent their groups due to shared experiences.

I also draw from research on symbolic representation which finds that attitudes toward women leaders start to change among male citizens who live in settings where women leaders are present (Beaman et al. 2009). I expect that women parliamentarians will not only receive requests from women but also from male citizens. Building on Benstead's (2016) finding that Algerian men are more likely than women to contact parliamentarians to gain access to resources, I theorize that there might be a link between

women's descriptive representation and *men's* substantive representation, which might, in turn, contribute to symbolic representation by transforming public attitudes about women leaders.

In my interviews with women and male parliamentarians, 16 out of the 30 women reported that they receive about an equal number of requests from men and women, although they refrained from giving exact numbers.¹ Consistent with previous work on constituency service in democratic contexts (for example, Richardson and Freeman 1995), women parliamentarians I spoke with felt that ordinary citizens approach women because they trust them and because women care about their communities. Moreover, out of the 30 women I interviewed, 13 specifically mentioned that they receive requests from men who face community problems.²

However, not all women deputies reported that they were successful in helping citizens gain access to state resources. Instead, I found differences among women from the same political party. Among the pro-government women, 11 reported that they are successful in helping citizens solve their problems.³ Among the Islamist opposition women, only one reported that she has had success.⁴ But, these findings should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size. Moreover, as the women

¹ FLN interviews 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 8 (03/2019); RND interviews 2 (02/2019); 5 (04/2019); 6 (04/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019); TAJ interview 3 (03/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019); PT interview 1 (02/2019); RPR (former RND) interview 1 (04/2019)

² FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 7 (10/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019); TAJ interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (03/2019); 3 (03/2019)

³ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 13 (11/2019); RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 7 (10/2019); TAJ interviews 2 (03/2019); 3 (03/2019)

⁴ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

parliamentarians reported, their ability to help citizens gain access to resources depends on how much help they receive from governors. As one of the women parliamentarians said, “The problem in Algeria is not the ministers but the governors. They are corrupt.”⁵

My interviews with male deputies presents an opportunity to compare their responses with the responses of women. I find that Islamist men are more likely to receive requests from female citizens than nationalist and secular men. But, consistent with previous work (Childs 2004), female citizens who experience personal problems such as sexual harassment in the workplace prefer to speak to women deputies. However, if there is another type of issue such as finding a job, women citizens may go to male deputies who have built reputations for helping people. As a woman parliamentarian told me, “You cannot just say that women go to women and men go to men.”⁶ She also added that it depends on the constituents and how much research they have done. Some citizens find out about a particular parliamentarian from their friends, neighbors, or family members. As one of the women deputies said about men whom she helped, “Their attitudes depend on how you treat them. If you treated him with respect, he goes back and tells others. This has happened to me.”⁷

The remainder of this chapter begins by reviewing previous work on constituency service in democratic contexts. Next, I review research on clientelism, constituency service, and gender in authoritarian contexts. Scholars tend to argue that clientelism poses barriers to women, even after they enter politics because they are excluded from male-dominated networks (for example, Benstead 2019). However, because authoritarian

⁵ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

⁶ TAJ interview 1 (2nd interview, 10/2019)

⁷ FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

regimes have an incentive to coopt ordinary citizens (for example, Chen et al. 2016), opportunities may arise for women parliamentarians to help ordinary citizens solve their problems. Existing research also finds that women's presence can contribute to women's symbolic representation (Beaman et al. 2009). I then present my findings on gender and constituency service in Algeria.

Constituency Service

Research on constituency service in the United States and Great Britain has received significant attention (for example, Cain et al. 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 2004). These scholars argue that representatives invest in constituency service to enhance their reelection prospects. But, even in contexts with closed-list proportional representation systems, representatives invest time in constituency service (Heitshusen et al. 2005; Taylor 1992). Some researchers have sought to determine if there are differences between women and men (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2004; Lowande et al. 2019; Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992; Thomsen and Sanders 2020). Particularly relevant to this study is the recent finding that women who represent conservative districts rely on constituency service to enhance their reelection prospects (Thomsen and Sanders 2020).

Cain et al. (1987) argue that representatives have an incentive to develop personal ties with their constituents which enables representatives to act independently from their parties during the policy-making process. They develop the concept of "personal vote," which "refers to that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (9). Mayhew (2004) also focuses on the activities that members of Congress engage in, which include advertising;

“any effort to disseminate one’s name among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content” (49). For example, Mayhew (2004) notes that one member of Congress was known for showing up to wedding anniversaries (51).

Another activity is credit claiming, “defined as acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable” (52-53). He adds that this is more about the representative and what she accomplishes when in office rather than what the party or government does and that an important component of this is “particularized benefits” which can be given to an individual or a group (53-54). Finally, members of Congress engage in position taking, “defined as the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors” (61). Here, the representative does not have to do anything but only speak on a certain issue (62).

Even in contexts where political parties control the reelection prospects of legislators, such as in New Zealand and Costa Rica, representatives still rank constituency service as important (Heitshusen et al. 2005; Taylor 1992). In her research on Costa Rica, Taylor (1992) sought to determine why deputies engage in constituency service. She argues that it is because political parties push legislators to engage in constituency service which then improves the image of the political party and deputies are rewarded by positions in the executive branch.

Gender and Constituency Service

Scholars have also sought to determine if there are differences among women and

men legislators. Existing research on constituency service in the United States finds that women representatives in state legislatures and city councils receive more requests than their male counterparts (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992). Moreover, scholars find that in different contexts, women representatives are more responsive to their female constituents (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2004; Lowande et al. 2019). Lowande et al. (2019) argue that women, Black representatives, and veterans advocate on behalf of their groups due to shared experiences. On the other hand, Thomsen and Sanders (2020) argue that women invest time in constituency service to enhance their reelection prospects. For example, they find that women who represent conservative districts invest more time in constituency service.

Clientelism and Constituency Service in Authoritarian Contexts

Scholars who focus on authoritarian regimes have given different explanations as to how these regimes attempt to coopt ordinary citizens. Some scholars argue that ordinary citizens vote in elections in exchange for resources from the regime (Blaydes 2006; Lust- Okar 2006). However, de Miguel et al. (2015) find that ordinary citizens who trust the regime and approve the government's handling of the economy also turn out to vote. As a result, authoritarian regimes seek to coopt ordinary citizens from different segments of society. Moreover, authoritarian regimes invest in constituency service to gather information about grievances, prevent rebellion, and strengthen the ruling party (Chen et al. 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2017; Magaloni 2006; Ong 2015). I expect to find that, under these conditions, opportunities arise for women parliamentarians to invest in constituency service.

Clientelism

Clientelism is defined as “an informal relationship between two actors enjoying asymmetrical socioeconomic power where the patron has the upper hand because he or she controls the kind of resources that his or her clients pursue but often cannot receive otherwise” (Manzetti and Wilson 2007, 953). As Benstead (2016) argues, clientelism is “distributed informally and does not foster accountability or substantive representation. Yet, without it, the poor and marginalized have few avenues for protection from corruption or access to services” (187). In the Arab world, ordinary citizens rely on connections (*ma'rifa* in Algeria) to gain access to resources, including clean water, health care, electricity, good schools, roads, stadiums, and parks. To further reinforce the dependence of ordinary citizens on the regime, rulers allow elections to take place to coopt their citizens into expressing support for the existing regime (Blaydes 2006; Lust-Okar 2006).

Scholars have also debated who participates in these elections and benefits from clientelism. Blaydes (2006) finds that poor people are more likely to turn out to vote. More recently, de Miguel et al. (2015) find that citizens from different segments of society turn out to vote in the Arab world. They argue that high-income individuals also have an incentive to vote due to their ties to the state. Consequently, both poor voters and high-income people vote in elections. Poor voters, including women, sell their votes (Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009). High-income voters also benefit from business deals, access to governors, ministers, and local officials.

Moreover, scholars argue that authoritarian regimes also invest in constituency service to obtain electoral support and prevent their allies from defecting to the opposition. The Mexican case provides insight into how elections matter for the survival

of authoritarian regimes. Magaloni (2006) argues that elections play an important role in sustaining hegemonic-party autocracies. Elections allow the regime to send a clear message to elites within the ruling coalition that the party has mass electoral support. The fact that the ruling party had mass electoral support meant that the only way to political office was through the party, thereby preventing elites from defecting to the opposition. Potential challengers knew that forming a new party would not lead to political success since opposition parties were not able to garner high levels of electoral support.

In Mexico, the regime's success in obtaining mass electoral support is explained by three factors: economic growth, patronage, and voters' fear of potential instability (p. 80). In particular, elections allowed the regime to gather information about its supporters and opponents. Using data gathered on PRONASOL, a poverty relief program implemented by the ruling party, Magaloni (2006) finds evidence that vote buying played an important role in bring about electoral support for the PRI, especially among the poor (pp. 144-150). But, the ruling party also invested in constituency service. It withdrew funds from municipalities led by an opposition party and from municipalities that it expected to win. The regime instead distributed resources to municipalities where the opposition did well in the previous elections but did not defeat the ruling party. This strategy allowed the ruling party to punish its opponents and to discourage potential defection among its supporters.

Recent work on other authoritarian regimes focuses on identifying the conditions under which elected officials respond to citizens' requests. Chen et al. (2016) find that at the subnational level in China, officials respond to ordinary citizens when they threaten to engage in protest if their concerns are not addressed and when they threaten to complain

to high-ranking officials, but not when they are loyal members of the Chinese Communist Party. This suggests that authoritarian regimes are more likely to respond to citizens who risk becoming opponents of the regime than loyal supporters. In Singapore, the regime invests in constituency service to gather information about grievances and adopt public policies to address the concerns of ordinary citizens (Ong 2015).

In sum, existing research on electoral authoritarian regimes demonstrates that authoritarian regimes rely on different strategies to strengthen their rule. Both poor voters and high-income voters have an incentive to participate in elections in exchange for their support. Moreover, authoritarian regimes rely on constituency service to prevent ordinary citizens from defecting to the opposition and to gather information about grievances.

Gender and Clientelism

Gender and politics scholars have specifically focused on gendering informal institutions such as clientelism and corruption. While some gender and politics scholars have focused on the opportunities that exist for women in contexts where clientelism and corruption are prevalent (Benstead 2016, 2019; Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009; Shalaby 2020; Tripp 2001), other scholars have focused on the constraints that women face (Beck 2003; Bjarnegård 2013; Daby 2020; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014).

Tripp (2001) found that in African countries, the years immediately after independence were characterized by the inclusion of women's organizations in patronage politics. By the 1990s, however, autonomous women's organizations emerged and challenged corruption and clientelism as countries experienced economic crises and ruling regimes faced legitimacy crises. Later work has either specifically focused on the opportunities that exist for women voters (Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009), or the role that

women deputies play in helping citizens gain access to resources (Benstead 2016, 2019).

Benstead (2016) finds that in Morocco and Algeria, women deputies receive more requests than male deputies from female citizens, reducing the gender gap in service provision. More recently, Benstead (2019) has focused on the incentives of ordinary citizens. In a survey of 3,600 Tunisians in 2015, she finds that female citizens are more likely to contact female councilors and male citizens are more likely to contact male councilors when they are concerned about a community problem. Interestingly, Benstead (2019) also finds that male citizens are more likely to contact female councilors when they face a personal problem such as obtaining government documents. This “suggests that female councilors are more welcoming to female citizens than male councilors, and that to a significant extent they have heterosocial networks that include male citizens” (Benstead 2019, 112). In contrast, when male citizens face a community problem, they are more likely to approach male councilors.

Other scholars are more skeptical. Bjarnegård (2013) focuses on explaining men’s overrepresentation in national legislatures. She employs the concept of homosociality, which behavior “associated with seeking, enjoying, and preferring the company of the same sex” (22). Bjarnegard (2013) argues that in contexts where patron-client relations are prevalent, women are not even recruited by political parties because they are excluded from male-dominated networks. Beck (2003) argues that even when women enter politics in African countries, “these women have not challenged patronage politics in Senegal but instead have sought to improve their access, and by extension the access of their clients, to the hidden public” (Beck 2003, 165-166).

Research on the case of Argentina also finds that women are underrepresented in

leadership positions that control access to resources (Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). As a result, female brokers, even when they help citizens solve their problems or gain access to resources, are less successful than male brokers in mobilizing voters – and, consequently, are not rewarded by male party leaders (Daby 2020). Daby (2020) finds that female brokers work in soup kitchens and come in contact with parents and children, groups who are unlikely to vote and who women brokers refrain from punishing even when the parents vote for another political party.

Opportunities for Women in Clientelistic Contexts

While women tend to be excluded from male-dominated networks in clientelistic contexts, legitimacy crises and corruption scandals can lead political parties to recruit women precisely because they are “outsiders” (Derichs et al. 2006; Funk et al. 2021; Valdini 2019). Johnson (2016) argues that this means that women are recruited to serve as “political cleaners” and to represent women’s interests. My research suggests that expanded political opportunities for women in these contexts are not simply limited to descriptive and substantive representation, but might also lead to symbolic representation by transforming public attitudes about women leaders.

Existing research on non-Western contexts explores potential links between women’s descriptive and symbolic representation (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Beaman et al. 2009; Benstead 2011; Burnet 2011; Koyuncu and Sumbas 2016; Zetterberg 2012). Scholars employ different methods to measure symbolic representation, however, which explains the inconsistent findings (Franceschet et al. 2012). For example, writing about Turkey, Koyuncu and Sumbas (2016) find that female mayors are role models for Turkish women. In Rwanda, Burnet (2011) finds that after the gender quota, ordinary

women felt empowered to make their voices heard in their communities.

However, neither women nor men report greater confidence in political institutions in Rwanda and Mexico after there is an increase in women's presence in politics (Burnet 2012; Zetterberg 2012). Ordinary citizens in Rwanda, for example, perceive both women and men as corrupt (Burnet 2012, 203-204). Other scholars focus on the attitudes of ordinary citizens and male politicians. In India, Beaman et al. (2009) find that while initially men are biased against women leaders, the presence of women leaders and their effective policies can lead to changes in attitudes among men. However, in Belgium, Meier (2012) finds that gender quotas do not lead to changes among male politicians who report that women do not face structural barriers. Women in Belgium are more likely to report that they face challenges in politics.

I draw from the work of Beaman et al. (2009) to hypothesize that there is a link between women's descriptive and symbolic representation. I do not expect to find a "role model" effect. As I argued in Chapter 3, ordinary women in Algeria did not even know about the gender quota. But, I expect to find that due to their diversity (Chapter 2), women parliamentarians interact with men from different segments of society, which might contribute to symbolic representation.

Findings

To examine the impact of women's presence on constituency service, I asked female and male parliamentarians: Do women citizens reach out to you when they face a particular problem? Do you receive more requests from men or women? Out of the 30 women I interviewed, 16 reported that they receive about an equal number of requests from women and men. Women parliamentarians reported that women approach them

because they feel more comfortable to talk to another woman, while male citizens approach women parliamentarians because they trust them.

I also found that women parliamentarians do more than just help citizens who face personal and community problems. They added that they are “therapists,” i.e., women and men come see them even to ask for personal advice and talk about their personal problems. Moreover, while some women parliamentarians reported that they are not always successful in helping citizens solve their everyday problems, other women reported that they are able to help citizens. Lastly, some of the women parliamentarians reported that male citizens approach them when they face a community problem. Some of the male citizens I spoke to reported that women are more helpful than men.

Men who are affiliated with Islamist parties are more likely to receive requests from women citizens than both nationalist and secular women. Islamist parliamentarians reported that people “trust” them and that they have built a reputation for helping ordinary citizens. This is consistent with previous research on Islamist parties (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016).

Representatives of Women and Men

More than half of the women deputies reported that they receive about an equal number of requests from men and women.⁸ Interviewees suggested that men approach women because they trust them, while women citizens approach women deputies because of their shared gender. As one of the women parliamentarians said, “I get both women

⁸ FLN interview 2 (02/2019); FLN interview 3 (02/2019); FLN interview 4 (02/2019); FLN interview 5 (02/2019); FLN interview 7 (03/2019); FLN interview 8 (03/2019); RND interview 2 (02/2019); RND interview 5 (04/2019); RND interview 6 (04/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 1 (03/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019); TAJ interview 3 (03/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019); PT interview 1 (02/2019); RPR (former RND) interview 1 (04/2019)

and men. Women tell me, ‘You can feel our pain.’ Men approach me because they trust us. Many men send me messages on Facebook. They say that women are honest and do not ask for bribes.”⁹ An RND woman added, “It is not only women. Men trust women more than they trust men. We have proved our competence on the field.”¹⁰

Women parliamentarians also reported that unlike their male colleagues, they do not ask for anything in exchange for helping citizens.¹¹ This might explain why men approach women. Women also approach women due to gender segregation, especially in small towns. As one of the women parliamentarians told me, women who come from small towns are not used to interacting with men who are not their family members.¹²

Women parliamentarians added that they are like “therapists” and that their constituents talk to them about their personal problems when they visit their offices.¹³ As one of the women parliamentarians said, “Sometimes I am a therapist. I tell women to spend more time with their husbands, go to dinner.”¹⁴ One of the Islamist women added that a young couple came to see her about public housing and that by the end of the conversation, she found herself giving them advice about marriage. She said, “Even if I do not solve their problems, they leave feeling better because at least I listened to them.”¹⁵ Another woman parliamentarian said “I welcome them with a smile. They say, ‘Even if you cannot get our problem solved, we are satisfied.’”¹⁶

⁹ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

¹⁰ RND interview 6 (04/2019)

¹¹ FLN interviews 3 (02/2019); 13 (02/2019); RND interview 7 (10/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

¹² FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

¹³ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); TAJ interview 3 (03/2019); FLN interview 10 (04/2019)

¹⁴ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

¹⁵ MSP interview 1 (02/2019)

¹⁶ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

Some women parliamentarians also added that they try to interact with ordinary citizens on a daily basis.¹⁷ As one woman parliamentarian said, “I use public transportation. I try to show to people that I am just like them.”¹⁸ An RND woman added that she interacts on a daily basis with her neighbors, helps them clean the building, talks to ordinary Algerians when buying her groceries, and that her daughter uses public transportation. She also added that she once told Ouyahia, secretary general of the RND, “I do not live in Club des Pins [gated neighborhood where generals, party leaders, and other elites live] like you.”¹⁹

Another woman parliamentarian with a background in academia reported that after the uprising started in 2019 and even as protests intensified in October 2019, her neighbors told her that they were opposed to the regime but stated “You are different.”²⁰ This is because it is common for Algerians to say that parliamentarians are opportunists and that they just raise their hand to vote for laws that serve the interests of the regime. Corruption also increased in the past few elections. As I noted in Chapter 2, ordinary citizens refer to parliament as “parlement ta3 chkara” (parliament of the bag of the money).

As a result, women parliamentarians, due to their gender and positive interactions with ordinary citizens, seem to be perceived as “different” from male politicians who engage in corruption. In the 2019 Hirak, one of the main slogans was “you thieves, you ate the country” As one of the women parliamentarians said, “Algeria won’t succeed until women reach leadership positions. We have seen that men love the chair and the power

¹⁷ FLN interview 2 (02/2019); RND interview 7 (10/2019); TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

¹⁸ FLN interview 2 (02/2019)

¹⁹ RND interview 7 (10/2019)

²⁰ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

and the money that comes with it. Men are selfish. Women think about others, their families, their society.”²¹

Critical Actors and Women’s Substantive Representation

I also find that there are “critical actors,” men or women who advocate on behalf of women (Childs and Krook 2006). There are some female critical actors who are more active in doing constituency service on behalf of female citizens, particularly on issues related to gender equality.²² Parliamentarians with a background in law, for example, work with women going through a divorce.²³ One of the women does not have a background in law so she hired a lawyer who takes on the cases of divorced women.²⁴ Women who held leadership positions in local and regional assemblies reported that they are still in contact with women citizens who they helped in the past.²⁵

Even the security guards in parliament know who the critical actors are. A woman with a background in academia affiliated with TAJ said that a security guard approached her when a divorced woman with two children went to parliament asking for help. She said,

The security guards know that I see everyone. They do not even have to make an appointment. A lot of the time, if the husband does not work, he can kick her out. The other problem is that parents tell their daughters, ‘You can come but leave your kids with their father.’ I investigated and I found out that her husband lived with his family and did not work. The law does not help her. For now, she is in an apartment. I had to go to the governor of Algiers. She also has a job.²⁶

This particular woman parliamentarian, and others, noted that constituency

²¹ FLN interview 9 (04/2019)

²² RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 4 (04/2019); FLN interviews 3 (02/2019); 4 (02/2019); 6 (03/2019); 7 (03/2019); 9 (04/2019); 10 (04/2019); 12 (05/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019); TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

²³ FLN interview 6 (03/2019); RND interview 4 (04/2019); RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

²⁴ RND interview 1 (02/2019)

²⁵ FLN interview 9 (04/2019); RND interview 3 (02/2019)

²⁶ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

service is not sufficient on its own. She noted that Algeria needs more laws to protect marginalized groups, especially divorced women.²⁷ Due to unemployment and a housing crisis, it is common for women to live with their husband's family. But, as this example illustrates, if a husband divorces his wife and he does not have a stable income, the law does not protect women.²⁸ An RND woman with a background in law also said that she proposed the establishment of publicly funded centers for women who get married to someone who lives in another province and then have to complete the divorce proceedings in their husband's province.²⁹

Women citizens also contact women parliamentarians when they experience sexual harassment in the workplace.³⁰ Women parliamentarians reported that they have had to intervene on behalf of women by writing letters to directors if the women complain about their colleagues or report the problem to government officials if the abuser is a director.

Further, women deputies reported intervening on behalf of women who needed access to public housing. One of the women deputies told me "I have helped a lot of women get housing. I contact authorities and ask that they give special consideration to women who are not employed, single, divorced, and women whose parents died. We give them priority."³¹ Lastly, one of the FLN women reported that she confronted the Minister of Women's Affairs after she marginalized the female staff.³²

Men's Substantive Representation and Women's Symbolic Representation

²⁷ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

²⁸ RCD interview 1 (03/2019); Women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

²⁹ RND interview 4 (04/2019)

³⁰ FLN interviews 3 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 12 (05/2019); RND interview 3 (02/2019)

³¹ FLN interview 4 (02/2019)

³² FLN interview 10 (04/2019)

The findings that I have presented above are consistent with previous work (for example, Benstead 2016; 2019; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Childs 2004; Lowande et al. 2019), which finds that female representatives are more responsive to female constituents than male representatives. However, based on surveys that she carried out in Tunisia, Benstead (2019) finds that women local councilors are less likely to receive requests from male citizens who need access to community resources such as electricity, roads, transportation, and water (Benstead 2019, pp. 107-108). She argues that this might be because “men are more likely to have professional competencies and networks in the construction and industrial sectors, greater political clout, and denser political networks needed” (p. 108). My research nuances this conclusion. I found that there are women who receive requests from men when they face community problems.³³ Problems that affect local communities include floods, access to electricity and heat, and the poor condition of hospitals, roads, and schools.

According to the women parliamentarians, their presence on the “field” is important for changing perceptions of women leaders. As one of the women deputies told me, the principal of a school in a remote area was surprised to see her when she showed up wearing boots and pants.³⁴ She distinguished between herself and other women. She said, “There are deputies of hair salons and there are deputies of the field.” A female mayor told me that she works on weekends and holidays to help with trash pickup and that people are surprised to see a mayor cleaning.³⁵ The women deputies work hard to

³³ FLN interviews 1 (02/2019); 2 (02/2019); 3 (02/2019); 5 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); RND interviews 1 (02/2019); 7 (10/2019); TAJ interview 1 (03/2019); MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019); TAJ interviews 2 (03/2019); 3 (03/2019)

³⁴ FLN interview 1 (02/2019)

³⁵ Front Moustakbal interview 1 (10/2019)

gain the respect of the Algerian people.

There are also differences among women parliamentarians depending on their background. For example, a woman deputy who was a party activist before entering parliament told me that she helped men and local party leaders in her province and that by helping them, she restores confidence in the party and changes perceptions of women leaders. She said, “Women who are competent can represent the party and women.”³⁶

Women parliamentarians also help men who come from impoverished neighborhoods. One of the RND women explained to me that she works with men from conservative towns and they contact her anytime there is a problem.³⁷ She called two of them and told them to tell me about their experience. One man said, “I first went to her to ask for heat and blankets. She helped 20 families in my neighborhood. In Algeria, one woman is better than 1000 men.”³⁸ Another male constituent I spoke to on the phone said, “Women do not forget about the people after the elections. The men do not help us after the election is over.”³⁹ This RND woman emphasized that she works with men from conservative towns.

As we were talking, she showed me the messages that she had received from people who wanted to register to vote and support her party’s candidate in the presidential election. I saw not only voter identification cards of individuals but also of entire families. One other woman deputy also told me that citizens she helped in the past contacted her to ask who they should vote for.⁴⁰ One woman affiliated with TAJ

³⁶ FLN interview 7 (03/2019)

³⁷ RND interview 7 (10/2019)

³⁸ male constituent phone conversation (10/2019)

³⁹ male constituent phone conversation (10/2019)

⁴⁰ FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

mentioned that poor people vote in elections but she did not specifically say that voters contact her.⁴¹ One of the women deputies reported that even parliamentarians ask for her help.⁴² She said, “They think that because I am the president of an important committee, I can intervene.”⁴³ But, she added that she would rather spend her time helping the people who elected her.

Moreover, I found that women parliamentarians who do not have political experience interact with constituents from their own professions.⁴⁴ One of the female doctors affiliated with the FLN said,

a group of doctors experienced a problem and went on strike. They contacted me and we were able to find a solution. With dialogue we can find solutions. I spoke to them then I spoke to the governor of the province. I organized a meeting between them and they reached an agreement.⁴⁵

Moreover, a female professor who is affiliated with TAJ reported that she invited university students to parliament.⁴⁶ She said that they even got to attend the committee meetings. She said that she introduced them to both male and female deputies who work hard. She even added that the group was so large that the head of security was worried and was checking in on her. And, that after they spent the whole day in parliament, they were impressed.

Islamist opposition women also receive requests when there is a community problem.⁴⁷ One stated, however, that she cannot help citizens solve their problems because the regime does not want Islamist parties to build a reputation for helping

⁴¹ TAJ interview 3 (03/2019)

⁴² FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

⁴³ FLN interview 13 (11/2019)

⁴⁴ FLN interviews 3 (02/2019); TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

⁴⁵ FLN interview 3 (02/2019)

⁴⁶ TAJ interview 1 (2nd interview, 10/2019)

⁴⁷ MSP interview 1 (02/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interviews 1 (03/2019); 2 (04/2019)

ordinary citizens.⁴⁸ She said, “I receive requests from many citizens. But, because I am affiliated with an Islamist party, ministers and governors refuse to help me. The regime does not want people to receive help from Islamist parties.” But, her colleague reported that it depends on the parliamentarian and her strategies.⁴⁹ She said that the regime tries to sabotage women parliamentarians affiliated with the opposition but she resists. She said, “When the prime minister was in parliament, I was scheduled to address my colleagues. The FLN decided to reschedule me for a very late time slot. My colleague left but I stayed and made my statement. I drove home alone very late and I live far from Algiers.” This particular Islamist woman said that when ordinary citizens contact her about a community problem, she voices their concerns in parliamentary sessions when ministers are in parliament.

Islamist Parties and Women’s Substantive Representation

Lastly, Islamist men reported receiving more requests from female citizens than nationalist and secular men. In general, all male deputies were uncomfortable when I asked whether they receive requests from female citizens. They emphasized that their doors are open to all citizens, men and women. Only four specifically reported that they receive more requests from men than women.⁵⁰ The other male deputies refrained from really answering the question. One of the male deputies said, “People know who the competent deputies are. They talk to one another and say, ‘go see that deputy.’”⁵¹

Secular men appear to be less likely to receive requests from female citizens than

⁴⁸ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 1 (03/2019)

⁴⁹ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (04/2019)

⁵⁰ MSP interview 2 (10/2019); FLN interview 1 (10/2019); RND interview 1 (10/2019); RCD interview 1 (11/2019)

⁵¹ TAJ interview 1 (11/2019)

Islamist men.⁵² This might be because the secular opposition women have a background in law, so women who experience personal problems in the family approach secular opposition women. Islamist men reported that women citizens contact them because of their reputation, but that when it comes to issues such as sexual harassment, female citizens approach women representatives.⁵³ As one of the Islamist men said, “We work with women and men. As evidence, you are here with us today. We do not distinguish between women and men. We work harder to defend women. I do not have exact numbers. But, I see a lot of messages from both women and men.”⁵⁴ Islamist parties have several pages on Facebook, and many of their parliamentarians also have private and public Facebook accounts. I contacted them on Facebook to request interviews, suggesting that this is a useful channel for communication with the broader public.

Perspectives of Ordinary Citizens

As I was waiting for my interviewees in the lobby of parliament or the headquarters of the ruling party, I spoke to men and women who told me that they participated in the Hirak on Fridays but during the week, they had to come to parliament to receive help from deputies. I also noticed that ordinary citizens from different backgrounds approached deputies and male party leaders. In one instance, a single mother came in with her son to the headquarters of the FLN and father to speak to one of the national party leaders about social housing. The leader immediately called someone he knew and told her that she had an appointment the next day.

I met a young man who comes from a wealthy family but had encountered

⁵² RCD interviews 1 (11/2019); 2 (11/2019)

⁵³ MSP interview 1 (11/2019); MSP interview 4 (11/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 1 (10/2019); NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 2 (10/2019)

⁵⁴ NAHDA-ADALA-BINA interview 1 (10/2019)

problems after his father passed away. He talked to me about the hogra that he had experienced and the fact that his paternal uncles had taken property that belongs to him and his siblings because the uncles had connections. The man had an appointment with a woman parliamentarian. I also met a man who had been waiting for subsidized housing since the 1990s and was hoping that the female vice-president of the housing committee would help him. Someone else I met was a young man who was in parliament to request permission to use the money that the government gave him to build a house in a small town in Algeria to pay for his father's medical expenses. Another man came in without appointment to speak to a deputy. The security guards did not let him but he kept insisting that he had to speak to someone. He said that the dominant tribe in his town had threatened him but they were protected by the state.

All of these ordinary citizens recognize that there is corruption, injustice, and undemocratic practices. They were all critical of the regime but they were still there, in parliament or in the headquarters of the ruling party, to ask for help. This is because in Algeria access to resources requires having *ma'rifa* (connections). My analysis suggests that the presence of women parliamentarians may close the gap between the powerful and marginalized groups.

Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter are consistent with previous work on gender and constituency service. Women parliamentarians reported that male citizens contact them because they trust them while women citizens approach women parliamentarians because they feel more comfortable discussing their personal problems with women. Moreover, women parliamentarians reported that they sometimes act as

“therapists.” This is consistent with research on gender and constituency service which argues that women invest time in constituency service due to sex role socialization (for example, Freeman and Richardson 1995). Moreover, I drew from Childs and Krook (2006) who call for shifting the focus from women to “critical actors,” women or men who advocate on behalf of women. I found that for example women with a background in law help women who go through a divorce. On the other hand, there are female critical actors who focus on helping men from impoverished neighborhoods, local party leaders, and doctors. These findings are also consistent with previous work on authoritarian regimes. The case of Algerian demonstrates that authoritarian regimes coopt ordinary citizens from different segments of society. In particular, the presence of women from different backgrounds allows them to do that.

Consequently, while women parliamentarians are divided (Chapter 2), and reject the notion that they have an obligation to introduce and pass women’s rights laws (Chapter 3), they express agency by working to challenge the notion that women do not belong in politics. This is particularly important in the Arab world where women’s presence in political institutions is questioned (Abou-Zeid 2006).

These findings beg the question of how substantive representation, operationalized as policy gains, takes place under these conditions. Who are the critical actors who pressure the regime to adopt women’s rights laws? Are there female critical actors in parliament who work with women’s rights activists? In the next chapter, I conduct a case study of the 2015 violence against women law to examine the conditions under which authoritarian regimes advance women’s rights.

Chapter 5: Case Study of 2015 Violence Against Women Law

Introduction

One of the central debates that has taken place in the gender and politics literature on the link between descriptive and substantive representation is whether once women hold a certain proportion of seats in a legislature, a “critical mass,” policy gains that further women’s interests will take place. Empirical research on critical mass in elected assemblies can be traced to sociological research on women in corporations (Kanter 1977) and women in political institutions (Dahlerup 1988). In their review of these seminal works and later research, Childs and Krook (2008) describe later work as “critical mass theory.” In particular, these empirical studies have tended to focus on policy outcomes and found that an increase in women’s presence in politics does not necessarily to legislative gains for women (for example, Childs 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Johnson 2016; Nechemias 1994; Reingold 2000).

As Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) point out, there is a difference between substantive representation as *process* and substantive representation as *outcome*, i.e., policy gains. Gender and politics scholars find that different factors prevent women from achieving policy gains, including party identity (Childs 2004); male leaders’ control of the legislative process such as debates in committees and informal institutions such as old-boy networks which marginalize women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008); and backlash as women enter spaces historically dominated by men (Puwar 2004).

Others have found that other factors need to be taken into account instead of just focusing on the proportion of seats held by women. For example, Childs and Krook

(2006) argue that *critical actors*, or “those who initiate policy proposals on their own, even when women form a small minority, and embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the proportion of female representatives,” can play an important role (p. 528). Moreover, Celis et al. (2008) call for “abandoning questions like ‘Do women represent women?’ in favour of questions like ‘Who claims to act for women?’ and ‘Where, why, and how does SRW occur?’” (p. 104). These critical actors include women’s movements (Weldon 2002), or alliances between women representatives and women’s movements (Carroll 2006; Tripp 2001). Critical actors may also include women’s caucuses which help women work together and with women’s movements and male legislators (Allen and Childs 2019; Johnson and Josefsson 2016; Sawer 2012; Thomas 1991; Wang 2013).

Writing about authoritarian regimes, scholars have tended to argue that having support of the ruling political party is more important for achieving legislative gains that advance women’s rights than women’s descriptive representation (Burnet 2008; Goetz 2003; Tamale 1999). Moreover, there is evidence that women parliamentarians help authoritarian regimes strengthen their power by supporting laws that repress opposition groups (Longman 2006). At the same time, there is evidence that women parliamentarians are more likely to achieve success when they forge alliances with women’s movements (Tripp 2001). Moreover, “non-doctrinal” policies that do not challenge the dominant religion such as violence against women are more likely to receive support than “doctrinal policies” (Htun and Weldon 2010). For example, writing about Jordan, Forester (2019) argues that the regime adopted a law to combat domestic violence to portray the King as the protector of women and the state when terrorism posed a threat to stability and security.

But, while these scholars have made important contributions, they have not engaged with other bodies of literature. As Mazur (2002) points out, there are different approaches to studying feminist policies, two of which are relevant to this study: state feminism, which is defined as the extent to which to state is willing to adopt women-friendly policies (Hernes 1987); and feminist approaches that do not solely focus on explaining policy success but the framing of problems, or what Bacchi (1999) calls “what’s the problem” approach.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), gender and politics argue that the state has not historically been women-friendly due to the presence of powerful tribal groups in Morocco and Algeria. The exception is Tunisia where the state advanced women’s rights to weaken tribal and conservative groups (Charrad 2001). Moreover, after independence, male leaders were merely interested in imposing top-down policies to advance their own interests in Egypt (Hatem 1992). This is consistent with the argument made by Jayawardena (1986) who argues that male leaders in post-colonial contexts employed the concept “new woman” but this was linked to capitalism and their incentives to exploit women’s cheap labor.

More recently, state actors in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco advanced women’s rights to sideline extremist Islamist groups and signal that their countries are “modern” (Tripp 2019). However, women’s rights remain weaker in Algeria compared to Morocco and Tunisia (Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019). To build on the study by Tripp (2019), I focus on the criminalization of domestic violence in 2015 because it was adopted three years after women’s descriptive representation had reached a critical mass. According to the secular opposition woman politician I interviewed, women parliamentarians discussed other issues such as placing more restrictions on polygamy and eliminating Article 66 of the Family

Code which states that divorced women who remarry lose custody of their children, but noother bills were proposed.¹

A case study of the violence against law allows me to further explore whether there is a link between women's descriptive representation and women's substantive representation as outcome. I seek answers to the following questions: What role did women parliamentarians play in the passage of the violence against women law? Did women parliamentarians collaborate with the women's movement? Did women forge alliances with men in parliament and other state institutions? What role did the President play? Was there opposition to the law? What other factors explain the passage of the law?

I draw from existing approaches to feminist policy to explain why and how the regime placed violence against women on the decision agenda, seeking to identify the main actors involved, as well as the factors that played a role in the passage of the law. The regime in Algeria placed violence against women on the decision agenda, but refrained from placing doctrinal policies that could improve women's status in the family, such as inheritance, polygamy, custody of children if divorced women remarry, and the male guardian clause which states that a woman has to have a male guardian present for the marriage contract to be valid (Lazreg 2019). Particularly problematic for women's status in Algeria is the Article in the Family Code which that states that women have to have a male guardian present, even though he does not have to be a male relative, for the marriage contract to be valid (Beaugé 2005).

This chapter is organized as follows: First, I present my theoretical framework. I

¹ RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

draw from scholarship on international norms, women's movements and state feminism, and feminist and non-feminist policy studies. These bodies of literature explain how gender equality and violence against women in particular first received international attention and the domestic factors that explain their passage. Second, I give a genealogy of women's rights in Algeria, drawing from previous work which explains how the state and later the women's movement shaped the content of public policy (Charrad 2001; Cherif 2006; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2003; Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020).

In the third section, I present my case study findings. I find that a combination of actors and factors played a role in the passage of the violence against women law. The women's movement first formed a coalition which allowed women's rights activists to gather data on violence against women. The women's coalition then worked with a woman critical actor in parliament who introduced a bill. However, the Government, which controls the parliamentary agenda, silenced the efforts of the women's movement and the woman parliamentarian and instead introduced its own bill in March 2015. Despite opposition, a majority in both parliament and the Senate voted for the bill in December 2015.

Why did both chambers vote for the bill despite opposition? I find that two crucial factors explain the criminalization of domestic violence. First, this particular law allowed the regime to portray President Bouteflika as the protector of women and leader of Algeria during a time when he was ill and had disappeared from the public arena since he suffered a stroke in 2013. Second, the murder of a woman in a small town in Algeria in 2015 was the catalyst that got the Senate to finally vote for the bill several months after the vote in parliament.

Before I conclude, I briefly discuss the current situation, a new electoral law and electoral fraud that led to a dramatic decline in women's descriptive representation from 119 women to 35 women, and the challenges that authoritarianism poses to women's rights. After the most recent elections that were held in June 2021, women now hold 8% of seats in parliament, which means that Algeria now ranks among the lowest in the MENA region, joining Qatar, Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Kuwait, and Yemen (IPU 2021). These developments illustrate that authoritarian regimes can restrict women's rights, soon after they advanced them.

International Norms

Scholarship on international norms helps explain how gender equality policies spread globally (for example, Keck and Sikkink 1998; Krook 2006; Krook and True 2012; Towns 2012). Particularly relevant to this study is the argument that states in the Global South are the ones mostly likely to adopt gender equality policies to improve their reputation in the international community (Towns 2012). Second, as Krook and True (2012) argue, the meaning of a gender equality norm changes across contexts and time. As a result, gender equality policies are often coopted by non-feminist state actors who advance women's rights to achieve another goal, such as to delegitimize opponents (Tripp 2019).

At the 1995 UN World Conference in Beijing, 189 governments adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which included 12 areas of critical concern to advance women's rights, including poverty, health, armed conflict, violence against women, education, and power and decision-making (UN 1995). Since then, there has been

a global diffusion of policies that increase women's representation, criminalize violence against women, and advance women's economic rights (Ellerby 2017). Most UN member states have at least some policies that address violence against women (Ellerby 2017, pp. 31-32). What explains the diffusion of these policies?

Since about the 1980s, international relations scholars began to pay increasing attention to how norms, defined as standards of appropriate behavior, spread across states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) introduce the "life cycle" approach, which includes "norm emergence," which takes place due to the work of norm entrepreneurs. Crucial to their theory is what happens between norm emergence and the second stage, "norm cascades." They argue that once a critical mass of states, about one-third, accept a norm, this produces a "tipping" point. Then, the rest of states accept the norm without domestic pressure due to international "peer pressure" and the desire to enhance their reputation in the international community.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) also make an important contribution in their study of transnational advocacy networks and "boomerang patterns." They argue that when a state fails to act on a particular issue, such as human rights, domestic non-governmental organizations look for allies in transnational advocacy networks, which include international intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and activists in other states, who then pressure states to respect human rights. Building on the theory developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse and Sikkink (1999) introduce the "spiral model" to explain why some states institutionalize international norms while others do not. In particular, they argue that while transnational advocacy networks play an

important role in the early stages, when a state engages in repression and tactical concessions, domestic opposition groups play an important role in later stages to ensure that the state becomes fully committed to the norm.

However, as Krook and True (2012) argue, the meaning of a norm may change across time and contexts. They propose to treat norms as processes, meaning that norms are “subject to ongoing attempts to reconstitute their meanings, even as they exert effects on patterns of social behaviour” (p. 109). Moreover, Krook and True (2012) argue that the meaning of a norm may change due to internal debates and the external environment. As a result, gender equality norms often become strategic tools as states seek to rebuild after a civil war and/or achieve economic growth.

Ellerby (2017) argues that the global campaign for gender equality is really “add-gender-and-stir” campaign focused on women’s representation, women’s economic rights, and violence against women, that has failed to lead to meaningful change. She argues that “More radical discussions by critical feminists of dismantling neoliberal capitalism have been artfully silenced or marginalized through state and international organizations’ recognition of liberal feminist efforts to reform sexist institutions” (p. 22). This means that states in the Global South are often the ones who feel the pressure to advance women’s rights to appear as if they are “modern” (Towns 2012).

In sum, the key insight is that local actors do not always reject international norms but employ creative strategies as they translate them domestically. The key questions that remain unaddressed are: Who are the critical actors who translate international gender equality norms into domestic policies? What explains the timing of these policies? How do supporters and opponents frame the problem? Why do governments adopt some

women's rights laws but not others? Below, I draw from feminist scholarship on the interaction between women's movements and state actors, feminist policy formation, and how authoritarianism further complicates policy formation. These works offer important insights into how domestic actors translate gender equality norms into their domestic policies.

Women's Movements, States, and Gender Equality Policies

State Feminism

Gender and politics scholars have debated whether states can play a role in promoting women-friendly policies. Radical feminists argue that "the state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender" (MacKinnon 1989, pp. 161-2). In contrast, other scholars have theorized about the potential for alliances between women's movements and Western states which has led to the adoption of women-friendly policies (Hernes 1987). For example, in Australia, scholars explain that feminists, called "femocrats," chose to enter the bureaucracy to promote gender equality (Chappell 2000). As a result of these insights, gender and politics scholars have shifted the focus to structures such as commissions, ministries, agencies, and advisory bodies that deal with women's issues, exploring the extent to which these structures allow women's movements to influence the policy process (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995).

Feminist Policy Studies

Another approach to feminist policy studies sheds light on the policy process,

including the relevant actors, the discourse, and issues that are left unaddressed (Bacchi 1999; Htun and Weldon 2010; Lombardo et al. 2009). These scholars build on non-feminist theories of policy formation such as the theory developed by Kingdon (1984). Kingdon (1984) focuses on how certain issues “came to be issues in the first place” (p. 2) and distinguishes between “the governmental agenda, the list of subjects that are getting attention, and the decision agenda, or the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision” (p. 4, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Kingdon (1984) argues that the policy-making process unfolds once a particular problem gets attention, actors inside and outside of the state introduce policy proposals, and events such as shift in public opinion or political crisis occur (Kingdon 1984, pp. 92-3). He adds that “If one of the three elements is missing- if a solution is not available, a problem cannot be found or is not sufficiently compelling, or support is not forthcoming from the political stream – then the subject’s place on the decision agenda is fleeting.” (p. 187).

As Bacchi (1999) notes, “we need to shift our analysis from policies as attempted ‘solutions’ to ‘problems,’ to policies as constituting competing interpretations or representations of political issues” (p. 2). Such an approach is useful for identifying “the interconnections between policy areas, and to reflect upon which issues remain unaddressed or undiscussed because of the ways certain ‘problems’ are represented” (p. 2). Moreover, gender and politics scholars argue that the meaning of “gender equality” changes across national contexts (Lombardo et al. 2009). Lombardo et al. (2009) argue that the meaning of gender equality can be fixed, when gender equality becomes institutionalized in states’ legal documents; shrunk, which takes places when states adopt policies in one area, such as gender quotas to address women’s underrepresentation, but

fail to address other problems; stretched, which takes place when gender inequality is linked to other types of inequality; and bent, which they argue is more problematic because the goal is no longer gender equality but states strategically employ the concept to achieve some other goal, such as stability, security, and/or economic growth.

In sum, theories of gender equality policies are useful for understanding how domestic factors shape gender equality policies. But, these scholars have tended to focus on democratic contexts. What role do states play in non-democratic contexts? What role do women's movements play in authoritarian contexts? Under what conditions do authoritarian regimes adopt gender equality policies? And, what happens after the adoption of these policies? I turn to feminist scholarship on women's rights in authoritarian regimes to answer these questions.

Women's Rights in Authoritarian Contexts

Gender and politics scholars have sought to explain why authoritarian regimes advance women's rights. For example, in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Htun (2003) finds that military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s expanded women's property rights and legalized divorce despite the fact that they were led by socially conservative leaders. To explain this puzzle, she argues that as military regimes wanted to modernize their economies and legal systems, they established commissions tasked with modernizing civil laws. As a result, "issue networks," made up of feminists, male lawyers, legal scholars, and state officials, took advantage of an opening in the political opportunity to expand women's property rights.

Moreover, Tripp (2019) finds that state actors in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

have taken important steps to advance women's rights in areas such as sexual harassment in the workplace, domestic violence, women's political representation, and family law (Tripp 2019). Tripp (2019) argues that state actors in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia made policy concessions to secular women's rights activists to sideline extremist Islamist groups. In her study, she identifies the key actors that have shaped these gender equality policies: women's movements, intra-regional organizations, and male allies in the state who had an incentive to sideline extremist groups to strengthen their power.

In sum, these findings from Latin America and the MENA region demonstrate that authoritarian regimes advance women's rights not because they are feminists but due to strategic motivations. There is evidence that the concept gender equality is bent, i.e., authoritarian regimes are not interested in transforming power relations between women and men but in achieving economic growth, stability, security, and "modernity." Moreover, conflict between authoritarian regimes and non-state actors, such as the Church in Latin America and Islamist movements in the MENA region, can create an opening for women's rights activists to advance women's rights. Lastly, there is evidence that the concept of gender equality is also shrunk. Authoritarian regimes are more likely to adopt gender quotas and criminalize violence against women but they are less likely to enact meaningful reform when it comes to doctrinal issues such as polygamy, inheritance, repudiation, and male guardianship (Lazreg 2019).

Women's Rights in Algeria

Building on these contributions, I focus on the case of Algeria where the state restricted women's rights between the 1960s and 1990s and then advanced women's

rights after the end of the civil war and the arrival of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999 (Tripp 2019). I first develop a historical genealogy of women's rights in Algeria. Until the arrival of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999, the state was the main actor that shaped policy outcomes. After the end of the civil war and the arrival of Bouteflika who linked women's rights to stability and security, the women's movement finally found an ally (Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020). Important reforms include the criminalization of sexual harassment in the workplace in 2004, reforms to the Family Code in 2005, adoption of a gender quota in 2012, and the criminalization of domestic violence in 2015 (Tripp 2019). Nonetheless, women's rights remain weaker in Algeria compared to Tunisia and Morocco (Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019). For women's rights activists, these reforms were not enough because by preserving the male guardianship system in the Family Code, the state sends a strong signal that it continues to treat women as minors (Beaugé 2005).

In my case study of the violence against women law, I find that an alliance between the women's movement and a female critical actor in parliament led to the introduction of a bill in 2012. But, the regime ended up designing a policy without the input of the women's movement. A major weakness of the law is that the perpetrator can evade punishment if he is pardoned by the victim. Second, the sentencing of the perpetrator depends on a medical certificate that states the extent of the injuries caused to the victim. If the victim is unable to work for more than 15 days, the perpetrator faces two to five years in prison, 10 to 20 years if the attack causes permanent damage such as amputation, and a life sentence if the victim dies as a result of the attack (Official Journal of the Republic 2015).

What explains passage of the law despite opposition to it? I argue that women's substantive representation as a policy outcome can take place when the state faces a crisis and when it faces public pressure to act. First, in 2013, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika suffered a stroke and was too ill to lead the state. Even though he occasionally made appearances, he was in a wheelchair and was visibly very ill. His brother, Said Bouteflika, took over decision-making and ruled with army generals. The illness of Bouteflika exacerbated intra-elite conflict. Since his rise to power in 1999, Bouteflika was able to unite the country and had allies within both the opposition and the regime.

Bouteflika came to power as Algeria had experienced a deadly civil war and was facing great challenges. He had the support of Algerians, even though there was disagreement about his national reconciliation plan. His illness in 2013 caused major disruption in the regime because, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, the regime in Algeria has been characterized by extreme factionalism since the war of liberation. Bouteflika was the leader that united all of the factions. Since his illness in 2013, Bouteflika was too ill to deliver speeches and make public appearances. As the crisis continued to deepen in 2015, the violence against women law was strategically used by the regime to signal that Bouteflika was still in charge. Additionally, public pressure after the murder of a woman in a small town forced the regime to adopt the law. A vote did not take place in the Senate until December 2015, several months after parliament voted for the draft law.

Women's rights in Algeria have been affected by a combination of factors. First, French colonialism had a negative impact on women's autonomy, status, and relations

between women and men (Lazreg 1990; 2019). For example, in some regions women had more sexual autonomy before the French invasion and veiling was less common in rural areas (Lazreg 2019). After the French invasion, women's access to the public sphere was restricted and veiling became more common as women sought to protect themselves from French violence (Lazreg 2019). When French colonizers invaded Algeria in 1830, they were obsessed with Islam, which they saw as an obstacle to their missionary activity, and they treated the veil as the symbol of Islam (Bradford 1999; Clancy-Smith 1996; Lazreg 1990; 2019).

Algerians responded by turning to Islam to resist French colonial rule, which has had a lasting impact on women's rights in Algeria (Lazreg 1990; 2019). As I argued in Chapter 3, the politicization of Islam during the anti-colonial struggle had a lasting impact on gender and politics in Algeria. Both women parliamentarians and ordinary women reported that they oppose any laws that challenge Islam (Chapter 3). Women parliamentarians rejected the notion that they have an obligation to introduce and pass women's rights laws (Chapter 3). But, they reported that they want to change perceptions of women leaders, which they do via constituency service and men's substantive representation (Chapter 4).

In such a context, how does women's substantive representation as outcome, i.e., policy gains, take place? Who are the critical actors who introduce women's rights bills? What role does the state play in these debates? What role does the women's movement? Who shapes the outcomes? Do gender equality policies include the input of the women's movement? And, how does Algeria compare to other countries in the MENA region?

Based on my research, I find that two critical actors have shaped the debate around women's rights in Algeria: the state and women's rights activists. During the anti-colonial struggle, which lasted from 1954 to 1962, and immediately after independence, the state was the main actor. Although women had participated in the war of liberation and played an important role in helping the FLN defeat France, they were sidelined by the state after independence (Amrane-Minne 1999; Lazreg 2019).

It was not until the 1980s that women's rights activists established women's organizations and placed women's rights on the agenda (Moghadam 2001). Since then, women's rights activists have pressured the state to adopt gender equality policies, such as reform of family law, violence against women, and gender quotas (Engelcke 2018; Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020). But, women's rights activists and secular parties were sidelined when the regime began to work on reforming the Family Code (Engelcke 2018, pp. 317-320). So, women's rights activists are the ones who place pressure on the state to act, but the state shapes policy content.

During and after the anti-colonial struggle, state actors did not place women's rights on the agenda (Amrane-Minne 1999; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2001). This is due to a combination of factors. First, women who participated in the war of liberation did not establish women's organizations, except for the National Union of Algerian Women (UNFA) which was established by the FLN after independence. As one of the women fighters said, "In my view, we the militants made a mistake when we did not try to explain to young people what the war of liberation was about. We gave them nothing to make them appreciate our achievements (qtd. in Amrane-Minne 1999, p. 68).

The participation of women in the war of liberation as combatants and the critical role that they played in helping the FLN defeat France was unprecedented in the Arab world (Amrane-Minne 1999; Lazreg 1994). The critical role that women played in helping the FLN and its armed wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN), is one of the most important lessons from the film *The Battle of Algiers*. Only a minority of women were combatants. The majority were nurses and helped the male fighters hide from the French military. Still, the participation of women in the ALN is important for understanding the Algerian context, where women fought alongside men, unlike other countries in the Arab world where nationalist leaders espoused the notion of “female modesty” to exclude women from politics (Pratt 2020).

So, why did women fighters affiliated with the FLN refrain from pressuring the state to act after independence? First, women affiliated with the FLN did not place women’s rights on the agenda because like their male counterparts, they were primarily interested in defeating France. Second, their bodies were used as pawns in a war between colonizers who were obsessed with “French Algeria” and nationalist leaders and ordinary Algerians who turned to Islam to defeat France (Lazreg 2019, pp. 130-132). As I argued in Chapter 3, Algeria experienced a brutal form of settler colonial rule that sought to make Algeria part of France and saw the veil as the symbol of Algeria’s Islamic identity (Bradford 1999; Clancy-Smith 1996; Lazreg 1990; 2019). As Lazreg (1990) points out, “The French chose Islam as the Algerians’ common denominator and as grounds on which to fight them. Likewise, Algerians responded by making Islam the bastion of their resistance to colonialism” (p. 759).

However, what is interesting is that during the anti-colonial struggle, well-known women fighters such as Djamila Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Zohra Driff did not wear the veil. The crucial event that politicized the veil was the forced unveiling of Algerian women in a demonstration organized by French generals in 1958 as they sang “Long Live French Algeria” (Lazreg 2019, pp. 127-129). As Lazreg (2019) argues, “the event of May 16, 1958 did lasting harm to Algerian women. It brought home to Algerian women their vulnerability, at a time when many of them thought they were making history and imposing themselves on men’s consciousness as more than mere sex symbols” (p. 127).

After independence, state actors argued that socialism would help ordinary Algerians recover from decades of colonial rule, but they silenced women and their experiences, opting instead to talk about the experiences of the “masses” and “workers” (Lazreg 2019). In 1963, the state, led by Ahmed Ben Bella, asked women to donate their gold to help the National Bank build its reserves (Lazreg 1994, p. 138). As Lazreg (2019) argues, “Women, as a group, were seen as necessary to the building of the state, but as contributors, not participants. Sacrifice, not duty complemented by right, was the cornerstone of the new state’s view of women” (p. 138).

Moreover, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although the Constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex and guaranteed women’s right to work and equal pay, the state did not pursue specific policies to improve women’s status (Amrane-Minne 1999; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2001). Ben Bella was replaced by Houari Boumediene in 1965 which marked a transition from secular socialist to Islamic socialist policies. Like

his predecessor, Boumediene was primarily interested in building a powerful socialist state, but he espoused conservative and religious values. Important decisions made by Boumediene include the Arabization of education, which led to the emergence of a new generation of elites taught by conservative teachers from Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries (Werenfels 2007, p. 86).

Moreover, the state was opposed to birth control, except for mothers who had at least four children (Knauss 1987, as cited in Moghadam 2001, p. 135). By the 1990s, women only made up 8 percent of the labor force, the lowest in North Africa (Moghadam 2001, p. 135). But, state-sponsored education led to the emergence of a group of young women in the 1980s and 1990s who established autonomous women's organizations (Moghadam 2001). Feminists who established autonomous organizations in the 1980s and 1990s call themselves "the daughters of Hassiba Ben Bouali [female fighter]." Even in the 2019 Hirak, I saw women and girls carrying slogans about Hassiba Ben Bouali, well-known female fighter who played a critical role in the FLN's urban battles against France.

Feminist Movement

In the 1980s, Algeria experienced an economic crisis due to a decline in oil prices. An Islamist movement, led by Ali Ben Hadj and Abassi Madani, used the worsening economic situation to mobilize against the state. They attracted widespread support among ordinary Algerians who were angry that the state had failed to build a strong economy after independence. Like their predecessors in other countries in the MENA region, Islamists in Algeria argued that the elimination of poverty, corruption, and

unemployment required the establishment of laws that follow the Quran, Haadith (practices and teachings of the Prophet), and other Islamic sources.

To placate Islamists, state actors began the process of codifying family law (Charrad 2001; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2001; Turshen 2002). Independent women's rights activists, along with former women fighters affiliated with the FLN, organized demonstrations, met with male leaders, and drafted petitions to pressure the state to protect women's rights but a conservative family code was adopted in 1984. Article 7 increased the age of marriage for women from 16 to 18 (Official Journal of the Republic June 1984). However, women's rights activists were opposed to Article 8 which institutionalized polygamy by stating "It is permitted to contract marriage with more than one wife within the limits of Shari'a [four wives]."

Moreover, also problematic for women's status and the relationship between women and the state is Article 11, which stated "The conclusion of the marriage contract for the woman rests with her matrimonial guardian who is either her father or one of her male relatives." For women's rights activists, the notion that a male guardian has to be present for the marriage contract to be valid means that the state treats women as minors (Beaugé 2005). Articles 48 and 51 institutionalized repudiation for men who divorce their wives by saying "I divorce you" three times, but Article 49 stated that repudiation had to be recognized by a judge. Article 54 institutionalized khul' (a woman's request for divorce is granted by a judge if she returns her dowry), but Article 39 required wives to obey their husbands and respect his parents and close relatives.

Since then, the women's movement has become the critical actor that pressured

the state to adopt gender equality policies (Cheref 2006; Engelcke 2018; Lazreg 2019; Moghadam 2001; Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020). Autonomous women's organizations were first established in the 1980s and 1990s in opposition to 1984 family code, including L'Association pour l'Egalite des Droits entre les Femmes et les Hommes (Association for Equality of Rights between Women and Men) in May 1985. But, as one of the leading figures in the women's movement reported, women's organizations did not collaborate in the 1990s.²

The civil war of the 1990s, known as the Black Decade, exacerbated conflict within the women's movement (Cheref 2006; Engelcke 2018). The civil war broke out after the Islamist party, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), won local and regional elections in 1990, marking the first time that the ruling political party, FLN, faced a threat to its power. To prevent Islamists from winning legislative elections, the military staged a coup, canceled elections, and banned the FIS. Their leaders even issued fatwas (decrees by religious scholars on issues not explicitly mentioned in the Quran or Haadith) declaring that it was permissible to kill women who do not wear hijab (Turshen 2002).

Although women's organizations had an incentive to form a united front against the state and insurgent groups, they did not work together in the 1990s due to lack of experience and a leadership problem, because "each organization wanted to appear like it was better."³ Moreover, she added that leaders and members of women's organizations that were established in the 1980s and 1980s were affiliated with secular opposition

² Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

³ Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

parties, such as the FFS and RCD, and the ruling political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which prevented women from forging solidarity.

As I have argued in this dissertation, since the anti-colonial struggle, extreme factionalism has characterized the Algerian state (Quandt 1969). The FLN was made up of various elites divided along ethnic, ideological, linguistic, and class lines (Quandt 1969). The civil war further exacerbated intra-elite conflict because secular opposition political parties disagreed about whether or not Islamists should be allowed to participate in formal politics (Roberts 2003; Werenfels 2007). The fact that Islamists targeted civilians and killed thousands of Algerians in a decade-long civil war tainted their reputation.

The civil war also divided the women's movement. Cheref (2006) distinguishes between women's rights activists such as Louisa Hanoune, who wanted the state to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward Islamists, and Khalida Messaoudi, who wanted the state to marginalize all Islamists. In particular, some women's rights activists forged an alliance with the state and supported the state's repression against extremists. Women such as Khalida Messaoudi, who began their activism as staunch opponents of the regime, became its allies, even turning against Kabyle secular political parties that they used to be affiliated with. Khalida Messaoudi was one of the founding members of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), a political party that is secular and was established to represent the interests of the Kabyle minority, non-Arab Algerians. However, she eventually became one of Bouteflika's closest allies, even campaigning for him (Cheref 2006).

Bouteflika sought to placate both moderate Islamists, conservatives in the regime, and secular elites (Catalano 2012; Tripp 2019). Bouteflika is controversial for several reasons (Chikhi 2019). He was a fighter during the War of Independence and then became Minister of Foreign Affairs in his twenties in the Boumediene regime. In the post- independence period, he was well-respected among postcolonial leaders, known for his support of anti-colonial struggles everywhere, even welcoming Nelson Mandela who received military training in Algeria and Eldrige Cleaver who stayed a safe house in Algiers while on the run from U.S. police (Chikhi 2019). After the death of President Boumediene in 1978, Bouteflika wanted to seize power, but disagreements within the FLN about Boumediene's replacement eventually led the military to intervene and choose Chadli Bendjedid as Algeria's next president. Bouteflika left Algeria and did not come back until 1999.

Even though negotiations between the regime and insurgents took place without the inclusion of civil society actors, women's rights activists, opposition parties, and ordinary Algerians (MacQueen 2009), Bouteflika took some steps to democratize Algeria and turn the state into an arena where various groups, including women's organizations, could enter to influence policy outcomes (Catalano 2012; Tripp 2019). Particularly important for women's organizations was the entrance of Kabyle elites, and secular political parties such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), into state institutions (Tripp 2019; Werenfels 2007). Bouteflika sought to improve the relationship between Kabyles, non-Arab Algerians who had experienced decades of marginalization, including violence when security forces killed protesters in 2001, and the state (Tripp 2019; Werenfels 2007). This is important because Kabyle elites affiliated with secular

parties tend to be more supportive of women's rights than other elites in Algeria (Tripp 2019).

Under the leadership of Bouteflika, women's organizations pressured the state to advance women's rights (Tripp 2019). As Tripp (2019) argues, state actors in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have advanced women's rights to sideline extremist Islamist groups who first emerged in Algeria, but also posed a threat to Morocco, where terrorist attacks took place in 2003. Moreover, these reforms took place due to the presence of regional organizations such as Collectif Maghreb-Égalité 95 (Collective for Equality in the Maghreb 95), which was established by women's rights activists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria in 1991 to prepare for the 1995 UN World Conference in Beijing (Tripp 2019, pp. 50-51).

This collaboration led to the adoption of several laws in all three countries, including the adoption of gender quotas and comprehensive violence against women laws, reforms to family codes which expanded women's rights in the family, and reforms to nationality codes which allowed women to transfer citizenship to their children (Tripp 2019). In Algeria, the state eliminated Article 39 which had previously stated that women have to obey their husbands (Code de la Famille 2005). The age of marriage is now 19 for both women and men (Article 7). Mutual consent is institutionalized (Article 9). Polygamy is maintained, but requires consent of both spouses and approval by a judge (Article 8).

However, as Lazreg (2019) argues, "Although some improvements were made, the new amended code falls short of women's demands for gender equality in marriage,

divorce, child custody as well as inheritance. The new code upholds a number of principles of of shari'a" (p. 149). Previously, Article 11 stated that a woman had to have either her father or close male relative present for the marriage contract to be valid. In 2005, the only change that the state made was to allow women to choose their male guardian, which meant that it did not have to be the father or close male relative. Still, for women's rights activists, the notion that a male guardian has to be present for the marriage contract to be valid means that the state still treats women as minors (Beaugé 2005). As one of the founding members of the women's movement told me, "in my opinion it [the family code] is the only battle that we must try to win. You know that it is unconstitutional because the Constitution proclaims equal rights between men and women."⁴

Case Study of 2015 VAW Law: Critical Actors, Crisis in the State, and Societal Pressure

After the adoption and implementation of a gender quota in 2012, the proportion of seats held by women increased from 8% to 31.6%. Women parliamentarians rejected the notion that they have an obligation to introduce and pass women's rights (Chapter 3) but they added that they want to change perceptions of women leaders, which they are working toward achieving via constituency service (Chapter 4).

But, given theoretical and empirical work on gender equality policies, are there nonetheless women critical actors who introduce and pass women's rights laws? Three years after the increase in women's presence in parliament, Algeria criminalized

⁴ women's rights activist interview (04/2019)

domestic violence and sexual harassment in public spaces in 2015 (Tripp 2019). There was also discussion about expanding women's rights in the family, but except for a 2014 law that established a public fund for widows, issues such as inheritance and polygamy remained on the governmental agenda, i.e., there was discussion but no decisions were made (Tripp 2019). As one of the women parliamentarians told me, nationalist, Islamist, and secular women discussed eliminating Article 66 which states that a divorced woman who remarries loses custody of her children and placing more restrictions on polygamy.⁵

So, why and how did violence against women move from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda in 2015? I draw from my interviews with women parliamentarians and women's rights activists to explore how and why violence against women was placed on the decision agenda, identify the actors who shaped the debate and outcome, determine whether the state empowered or marginalized women's rights activists, identify the actors who opposed the law, and finally whether societal pressure forced the state to act.

Creation of a Women's Coalition and Naming a Problem

After the arrival of Bouteflika and the opening in the political opportunity structure which incentivized women's organizations to work together, women's groups identified certain problems that had to be addressed for the status of women to improve (Engelcke 2018; Tripp 2019; Youssef 2020). Despite reforms, the Family Code was

⁵ RCD interview 1 (03/2019)

adopted without the input of women's rights activists, which continues to restrict women's rights, primarily because the regime had to appease both moderate Islamists and women's rights activists (Catalano 2012; Engelcke 2018; Lazreg 2019; Tripp 2019). As it grew in strength in the early 2000s, the women's movement brought attention to other problems, such as violence against women. All of the leading figures in the women's movement stressed that all of the policies adopted under the leadership of Bouteflika were interrelated and all took place due to women's activism.⁶ As one of the women's rights activists told me, women members of the trade union affiliated with the FLN were the ones who pressured the regime to criminalize sexual harassment."⁷

This violence against women law was an important advancement for women's rights because it marked the first time that the state addressed sexual harassment in the work place, paving the way for women's rights activists to pursue more reforms, including the criminalization of sexual harassment in public spaces and domestic violence. The first major step was the creation of a coalition of women's organizations led by Soumia Salhi, one of the leading figures in the women's movement.⁸ This was an important step due to the internal divisions that the women's movement experienced in the 1990s. As Tripp and Kang (2018) recently found, women's coalitions played an important role in the adoption of gender quotas in Africa.

⁶ women's rights activists 1 (04/2019); 2 (04/2019); 3 (04/2019); 4 (04/2019); 6 (05/2019); 7 (05/2019); 8 (05/2019); 9 (05/2019); 10 (05/2019); 11 (10/2019); 12 (10/2019); 15 (11/2019)

⁷ Women's rights activist interview (04/2019)

⁸ Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

The women's coalition then examined all of the laws and sought to find the gaps.⁹ A meeting took place in parliament that brought together women's organizations, researchers, academics, and parliamentarians. The coalition of women's organizations introduced a proposal to criminalize violence against women, and during this moment, a woman parliamentarian stepped in and said that she would propose the law. As the leader of the women's coalition said about the woman deputy, "she kept her promise. She helped us."¹⁰ According to Article 136 of the Constitution, deputies can propose laws if they receive the endorsement of 20 deputies. The proposed law was endorsed by 40 deputies in 2012.¹¹

However, the Government decided to reject the text proposed by the women's organization and introduced by the woman deputy. According to the leader of the women's coalition, "The response that we got was that, rather than accept our proposal, the government was preparing to amend the penal code to introduce articles that would criminalize violence against women."¹²

The woman deputy who introduced it to parliament and collected 40 signatures had participated in the War of Independence and was among the few women who entered parliament before the gender quota. As I argued above, even though women fighters affiliated with the FLN were not able to pressure the state to amend the Family Code, their presence in state institutions is still important due to the fact that while not always

⁹ Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

¹⁰ Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

¹¹ I was going to interview the woman parliamentarian who proposed the law but we did not meet. We spoke on Facebook for about 20 minutes but she did not give me details about the proposal of the bill and what happened after.

¹² Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

successful, they rely on the contributions that they made during the war to make their voices heard (Lazreg 2019).

In 2013, a meeting took place that brought together women parliamentarians, feminists, and former women fighters affiliated with the FLN.¹³ Well-known attendees included Louiza Hanoune and Khalida Toumi, who established the first autonomous organization in May 1985, and Zohra Drif, a woman fighter affiliated with the FLN. According to one of the leading figures in the women's movement, violence against women was the issue that brought all of these women together. She added that "What was unbelievable was there were deputies who spoke and they were in tears. When it is someone educated, you say it is not possible."¹⁴ She noted that it was surprising to find out that regardless of level of education or occupation, women experienced violence, including women who were in politics.

Crisis in the State

The Minister of Justice finally proposed the bill and parliament debated and voted on the law in March 2015. Why 2015? What explains the gap between the time when the woman deputy affiliated with the FLN introduced the bill in 2012 and the Government's decision to place violence against women on the decision agenda three years later? My fieldwork suggests that, after the illness of Bouteflika, the regime faced a crisis. Bouteflika was the leader who was able to unite various factions. To signal that he was still the individual in charge, the regime placed violence against women on the agenda.

¹³ Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

¹⁴ Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

Interestingly, the women parliamentarians affiliated with the four major political parties credited Bouteflika with the major reforms that took place since he came to power.¹⁵ Women's rights activists emphasized that they had done the most important work, did the necessary research, lobbied parliament, and looked for allies among women deputies. Nonetheless, they agreed on the importance of political will and that Bouteflika himself played an important role in responding to them. In particular, Bouteflika's exposure to women who had faced personal problems was mentioned by both women parliamentarians and women's rights activists. As one of the leaders of the women's movement said,

He never got married. He preferred to have a totally free life in this sense. So, he is an emancipated man, for sure. Like in 2005, there were amendments to the Family Code. Here too, we can say thanks to Bouteflika, yes because I think he had a friend who was a woman senator. The problem that posed itself was the nationality of a child of someone whom he knew personally.¹⁶

However, other women's rights activists pointed to the importance of international norms, noting that Algeria had ratified international treaties such as CEDAW and that the state had to finally act because state actors in both Morocco and Tunisia were advancing women's rights. One of the women's rights activists said,

No, Bouteflika did not improve anything. Bouteflika was obligated to take the train that was marching because we stayed last in the Maghreb. There was a necessity to improve a little bit the laws. If it is him or someone else, I think that it was an obligation, a political agenda. And he was obligated to give something to women politically. He could not stay behind.¹⁷

¹⁵ FLN interviews 2 (02/2019); 7 (03/2019); 11 (04/2019); 12 (05/2019); RND interview 1 (02/2019)

¹⁶ Women's rights activist interview (04/2019)

¹⁷ Women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

As Towns (2012) argues, state actors in the Global South advance women's rights to signal to the international community that they have completed the transition to "modernity." The regime in Algeria felt pressured to act because the King in Morocco had taken steps to advance women's rights in the family (Engelcke 2018). As Engelcke (2018) argues, "The proximity of the Moroccan and Algerian reforms illustrates the influence of regional politics and indicates Algeria's fear of being isolated as the only country in the Maghreb that did not reform its family code" (p. 321).

Societal Pressure

In my research, perhaps the most revealing interview was with the leader of the women's coalition who said that it was societal pressure that led to the state to act. The leader of the women's coalition concluded that there were many factors but she pointed out that more than 65% of those who hold university degrees are women.¹⁸ She noted that the state had to act because women emerged as an important segment of society.

She also added that societal pressure helped the women's movement and women deputies overcome opposition by conservatives in the FLN and Islamists in the opposition. For example, some women deputies affiliated with the two main political parties, the FLN and the RND, played an important role in shaping the discourse.¹⁹ Their appearances on television were important because as nationalist women their voices helped strengthen the campaign led by the women's movement.

¹⁸ Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

¹⁹ FLN interview 9 (04/2019); RND interview 7 (10/2019)

As a women's rights activist told me, the Islamists and conservatives said that the law would produce fitna (conflict within the Muslim community).²⁰ Islamists argued that the law would "break up the family" and that it was introduced due to pressure from foreign actors (El Watan 2015). The Minister of Justice responded by saying that Algeria was sovereign and that the law was not introduced due to pressure by foreign actors but that it was based on research by organizations, police, and hospitals which identified violence against women as a problem (El Watan 2015). But, there were also conservative women and men in the FLN who opposed the law.²¹ Even though they tend to be anti-Islamist due to Algeria's experience with civil war and terrorism in the 1990s, nationalists in the FLN are concerned about foreign interference which they see as a threat to Algeria (Werenfels 2007, pp. 95-98).

The National Assembly voted on the law in March 2015 but it was not until December 2015 that Senators voted in favor of the law. The Senate finally acted due to societal pressure after a woman, Razika Cherif, was killed by someone who had harassed her. According to the leader of the women's coalition, the protests that took place in the town where the young woman was murdered sent a signal to the state that the Algerian people perceive violence against women to be a problem.²² She said, "This was very powerful. Magra [small town where Razika Cherif was murdered] is not Didouche [a street in Downtown Algiers whose residents are more liberal]. It is a powerful signal that the society authorizes the right of Razika to go out and that no one has the right to her

²⁰ Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

²¹ RND interview 7 (10/2019)

²² Women's rights activist interview (11/2019)

life.” The protests that took place in Magra sent a strong signal to the state that even conservative Algerians view violence against women as a problem. After the murder of Razika Cherif, domestic violence and sexual harassment in public spaces were both criminalized in December 2015 (Official Journal of the Republic 2015).

Challenges and the Future of Women’s Rights in Algeria

The present moment is a critical period for women’s rights in Algeria. Since the 2019 Hirak, the country is facing a political crisis that pits the protesters against the military, which as of now, refuses to negotiate a transition. President Tebboune dissolved parliament and scheduled elections which took place in June 2021. The number of women parliamentarians is now 35. The new electoral law which was adopted in 2021 stipulated that women have to make up 50 percent of candidates but unlike the previous law, there are no reserved seats for women (Official Journal of the Republic 2021).

Moreover, the women’s movement participated in the protests since they started in 2019 and, like the Algerian people, they question the legitimacy of President Tebboune, the government, and parliament. So, additional research is needed to determine who will advocate on behalf of women under these conditions. Furthermore, the dramatic use of repression by the state since the election of President Tebboune in December 2019 is particularly concerning (Serres 2021). The Minister of Justice recently proposed a law that would strip Algerians in the diaspora of their citizenship if they commit acts against the interests of the state. Opposition leaders have stressed that this is a major violation of human rights.

Even if there is a democratic transition, doctrinal issues such as family law will still be controversial. As women's rights activists told me, the notion of equality between women and men is not wholeheartedly supported even by pro-democracy leaders. One of them said, "Even the democrats are not convinced 100% in regard to the cause of women."²³ Pro-democracy groups are mainly interested in recruiting more supporters and due to prevalence of conservatism in Algerian society, they refrain from advocating on behalf of women when it comes to issues such as inheritance, polygamy, and repudiation.

The next challenge is making sure that the violence against women law is implemented fully (Ghanem 2021). One of the women's rights activists told me that women's organizations are now focused on working with women police officers and commissioners to help victims.²⁴ As Tripp (2015) notes, Algeria has one of the highest number of women police commissioners in the Arab world. But, for the most part, women's rights activists, while acknowledging that the criminalization of domestic violence was an important gain, place great emphasis on the fact that Algeria continues to have a conservative family code.

Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter are consistent with previous work that finds that governments are more likely to address violence against women than other types of issues such as inheritance, land rights, and family law (Burnet 2008; Forester 2019). In Rwanda, women MPs were strategic in how they framed issues that affect women when

²³ Women's rights activist interview (05/2019)

²⁴ Women's rights activist interview (10/2019)

they sought support from their male colleagues, framing violence against women as a problem that affects their mothers and daughters (Powley and Pearson 2007). Writing on the case of Jordan, for example, Forester (2019) argues that there is a connection between internal and external security threats, militarism, and policies on violence against women that reinforce the notion that the state is the protector of women.

In the case of Algeria, the regime criminalized violence against women when it faced a crisis. The illness of Bouteflika posed a threat to the survival of the political system because it marked the first time, since the civil war, that the regime had to find someone to replace Bouteflika. The violence against women law was adopted because it allowed the regime to signal that Bouteflika was in charge, even though his was too ill to govern.

But, in the aftermath of the 2019 Hirak and the rise of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, women's representation decreased to levels witnessed before the adoption of a gender quota. Future research will have to focus on the role that women parliamentarians play once their numbers decrease. Moreover, the women's movement will face challenges, especially with mounting repression against pro-democracy activists.

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the current political situation and what it means for women's rights. Due to the complex nature of Algerian politics, it is hard to predict what will take place and how it will impact women's rights. But, one possibility is that women's rights activists will employ other strategies. As Pratt (2020) argues, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, women's rights activists may turn their attention toward

other issues, such as sexual harassment. Additional interviews with women's rights activists will be necessary to examine women's rights in Algeria.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

Women's representation is one of the most studied topics among gender and politics scholars, but researchers have tended to focus primarily on women's representation in democratic contexts. There is a growing body of literature on women's representation in authoritarian contexts, but these scholars have mainly focused on women's descriptive representation and not adequately theorized how authoritarianism impacts links between descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. In this dissertation, I set out to explain how the authoritarian toolkit (cooptation of ordinary citizens, policy concessions to opposition groups, and intra-elite conflict) impacted women's substantive and symbolic representation in Algeria after the adoption of a gender quota in 2012 and a significant increase in women's presence in the national legislature that resulted from this policy.

Being an insider helped me gain access to my interviewees, but I eventually realized that I was approaching my project from a Western perspective. For example, some of my interview questions confused my interviewees, especially when I asked women parliamentarians if they feel responsible for representing women. But, even though women parliamentarians do not prioritize women's rights laws, they still feel responsible for changing perceptions of women leaders (Chapter 3). Moreover, while there are critical actors who substantively represent women, women deputies invest time in constituency service which enables them to work toward eliminating male bias by substantively representing men (Chapter 4). So, in Algeria, there is a link between women's descriptive and *men's* substantive representation, which may eliminate bias among male citizens, contributing to overall improvements women's symbolic representation in the longer term.

Argument and Main Findings

Building on the insights of research on women's representation in authoritarian contexts and non-feminist research on electoral authoritarian regimes, I argued that the authoritarian toolkit (cooptation of ordinary citizens, policy concessions to the opposition, and successful power-sharing with allies), shapes the link between descriptive and substantive representation and the link between descriptive and symbolic representation. Authoritarian regimes have an incentive to restrict women's substantive representation to maintain the support of their allies, but they allow symbolic representation to take place because it helps them coopt ordinary citizens. Policy gains take place when there is a crisis within the state and public pressure which forces the regime to take a stand and adopt a women's rights law.

First, to restore trust in political institutions, the incumbent regime in Algeria strategically recruited a diverse group of women. However, due to their diversity, women parliamentarians did not work together even after the creation of a women's caucus. Women parliamentarians who have prior political experience reported that political parties strategically recruited "incompetent" women to sideline them. On the other hand, women parliamentarians who did not have prior experience reported that political parties recruited them because they were educated or because they built reputations in their local communities. Due to these divisions, women parliamentarians engaged in power struggles. For example, after the creation of the women's caucus, nationalist women did not want one of the senior members of parliament to lead the caucus because she was vice-president of

parliament. The FLN woman who established the caucus reported that her colleagues were concerned that she would become too powerful.

Most of the women who I interviewed emphasized that they see themselves as representatives of the masses and that they want to change perceptions of women leaders. Women deputies distinguished between themselves and women's rights activists who are too radical for Algerian society. Moreover, women parliamentarians are concerned about the "foreign hand." They were critical of the United Nations for imposing ideas that challenge Islamic texts. But, even the Islamist women who said that they are not feminists espouse feminist ideas. One of the TAJ women criticized Algerian parents for favoring their sons. She said, "My mother used to give my brothers the big pieces of meat. I asked her, 'Why do you like them more than me?'"¹

Next, I focused on constituency service. I found that women deputies receive requests from both male and female citizens. Moreover, due to their diversity, women deputies interact with citizens from different segments of society. Women who are educated but do not have political experience helped their colleagues solve their problems. Women who have political experience help poor voters and local party leaders, helping the regime coopt citizens from different of segments of society. Finally, I found that while some women are successful in helping citizens gain access to resources, others are not. There are even differences among the opposition women. While Islamist oppositionwomen receive requests from men who face community problems, the secular opposition women receive more requests from women citizens who face personal problems. More recently, the secular opposition woman who I interviewed has invested time in helping men

¹ TAJ interview 1 (03/2019)

and women who were arrested and imprisoned by the regime in 2020-2021 for their participation in the Hirak 2019 protest movement.²

In Chapter 5, I conducted a case study of the 2015 violence against women law. I argued that the law was introduced and adopted due to a combination of three factors. First, the women's movement was able to overcome divisions and form a women's coalition. Next, the women's coalition collaborated with a woman deputy who introduced the bill in 2012. But, it was not until 2015 that the Government placed violence against women on the parliamentary agenda. Consistent with previous work (Forester 2019), I argued that the regime used violence against women to present Bouteflika as the protector of women during a moment of crisis. Public pressure also played a crucial role in pressuring the Senate to vote on the law. This is consistent with new research that finds that policy concessions are made by authoritarian regimes despite intra-elite conflict due to public pressure.

Significance of Findings

The main finding of this dissertation is that women parliamentarians rejected the notion that they have an obligation to represent women. Nonetheless, they stressed that they want to change perceptions of women leaders. I found that they invest time in constituency service, and while there are critical actors who advocate on behalf of women, women parliamentarians also receive requests from men who face community problems.

² Facebook page

So, there is a link between women's descriptive representation and men's substantive representation, which might contribute to women's symbolic representation.

Rethinking Descriptive, Substantive, and Symbolic Representation: Why Women Represent Men

My study adds to existing theoretical work on women's representation. Gender and politics scholars argue that women's interests have been overlooked and due their shared gender, women are more likely to represent women (Phillips 1995). This is especially important in contexts where there is a history of mistrust and uncrystallized issues (Mansbridge 1999). But, as Lombardo and Meier (2016) point out, symbolic representation has not received significant attention, which they argue is just as important as substantive representation, because certain acts, such as when Defense Minister Carme Chacón inspected Spanish troops while pregnant, can be just as powerful, if not more powerful, than the introduction of laws.

Since completing fieldwork, I have been following the social media accounts of women parliamentarians. They rarely post pictures of their female constituents. Instead, they are surrounded by men in their local communities or in their offices. I noticed that even the secular opposition women who are lawyers rarely post pictures with ordinary women or women's rights activists. As repression has increased in the past year, the only woman deputy who has ties to the women's movement has defended multiple male journalists and pro-democracy activists. Does this mean that women do not represent women? No, women deputies represent women by advocating on behalf of men and according to them they can change perceptions of women leaders among men in the electorate. So, in Algeria, the increase in women's presence in politics did not lead to

women's substantive representation, but it did lead to an improvement in men's substantive representation and women's symbolic representation. Moreover, I treat symbolic representation as an effect of descriptive representation and men's substantive representation.

On the other hand, ordinary women rejected claims made on their behalf by the women's movement and the regime. They could only name a few women politicians. They distinguished between themselves and feminists who they criticized for challenging Islamic texts. Since colonialism and after independence, ordinary Algerian women occupied private spaces, which are important sites of women's empowerment (Lazreg 2019). After the civil war, they have reclaimed access to private spaces and are increasingly occupying public spaces, especially during the 2019 Hirak. However, they rejected claims made on their behalf by the regime and the women's movement.

Democratic vs Authoritarian Regimes

My findings from Algeria illustrate that there are differences and similarities between authoritarian and democratic regimes. First, unlike democratic regimes, parliamentarians in authoritarian regimes are not as involved in the policy-making process, investing time in constituency service instead (Benstead 2008). So, I expected to find that the presence of female parliamentarians reduces the gender gap in service provision (Benstead 2016). I found that while women parliamentarians advocated on behalf of women, they also invested time in helping male citizens solve their personal and community problems.

Moreover, the biggest challenge that the women's movement faces in advancing women's rights is the presence of extreme factionalism. Within the regime, there are conservatives who would block any effort to repeal the Family Code. Of course, conservative women are also opposed to laws that challenge Islam. So, because the authoritarian regime has an incentive to coopt ordinary citizens, it allowed women's symbolic representation to take place. But, it also cannot survive without the support of its allies, so doctrinal issues such as the Family Code are less likely to receive attention.

Still, it is important to not exaggerate the differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Gender and politics scholars have found that an increase in women's presence in politics does not necessarily lead to policy outcomes that advance women's rights (for example, Childs 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). This is because as Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) point out, there is an important difference between substantive representation as a *process* vs an *outcome*. So, even though women may introduce women's rights bills, policy gains are less likely to take place (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). In Argentina, for example, because male leaders control the legislative agenda and political parties enforce party discipline, it is more difficult for women to achieve policy success.

Moreover, scholars argue formal and informal institutions are gendered (Krook and Mackay 2011) and that women and racial minorities are treated as *space invaders* (Puwar 2004). In 2016, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) launched the #NotTheCost campaign to lead the global effort to combat violence that women face after they enter political spaces. Gender and politics scholars emphasize that the problem is *violence against women in politics* (VAWIP) and that it is a "distinct phenomenon involving a broad

range of harms to attack and undermine women as political actors. Its central motivation is to exclude women as a group from public life” (Krook 2020, 4).

Ellerby (2017) argues that the global campaign for gender equality is really “add-gender-and-stir” campaign focused on women’s representation, women’s economic rights, and violence against women, that has failed to lead to meaningful change. Post-colonial feminists have always been skeptical of this global campaign, described as “global theatre” (Spivak 1996, 2). Spivak (1996) questioned whether the UN World Conferences and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action would empower women in the Global South.

Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

This study also contributes to the growing body of literature on electoral authoritarian regimes. First, I critique previous work for offering functionalist explanations. Instead, building on the study by Levitsky and Way (2012), I argue that authoritarian regimes with origins in revolutionary conflict are more likely to survive crises than other regimes. The case of Algeria is unique in the Arab world due to the presence of various factions within the regime. As Werenfels (2007) argues, labels such as “nationalist,” “Islamist,” and “secular,” do not account for the fact that there are subgroups within each camp. As I find in Chapter 2, nationalist women do not agree on everything.

Moreover, a combination of factors explains regime survival. In Algeria, the regime has made policy concessions to the opposition. First, in 1988, it legalized political parties, marking the transition from single-party to multi-party rule. Then, after the arrival of Bouteflika in 1999, the regime has allowed some reform to take place to placate opposition parties and ordinary citizens. After Bouteflika suffered a stroke in 2013, the regime faced

a crisis that eventually led to the 2019 Hirak and its aftermath. Bouteflika was able to coopt ordinary citizens, placate the opposition, and maintain the support of his allies. Both secular and Islamist leaders who were key figures in opposition parties defected to the Bouteflika regime.

This study also contributes to a growing body of literature on policymaking in authoritarian regimes. Comparative politics scholars are paying more attention to policymaking in authoritarian regimes (Williamson and Magaloni 2020). I find that the regime adopted a violence against women law in 2015, despite opposition from within the regime, due to public pressure. But, issues such as the Family Code are less likely to receive attention because they would threaten the survival of the regime. Since the Algerian War of Independence, the regime has presented itself as the protector of Algeria's Islamic identity (Lazreg 2019). The case of Algeria thus demonstrates that authoritarian regimes have to engage in a balancing act.

Gender and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa

Finally, this study also contributes to the large body of literature on women's rights in the Arab world. This is a critical period for women in the MENA region, but despite instability and violence, women continue to resist all forms of oppression. In 2010-2011, the participation of women in the Arab Spring uprisings received significant attention in Western media. Women reclaimed access to public spaces (Hasso and Salime 2016). But Stephan and Charrad (2020) point out that "the world had not paid attention to Arab women protesting, voting, running for office, and leading organizations since the 1920s. The events of the Arab Spring, period during which women's activism intensified, were only a

historical marker that brought women's activism to the forefront" (1). For example, in Egypt, women led workers' strikes in the decade before the 2011 revolution (Naber 2020). They add that a "social revolution" has taken place since the Arab Spring which "has made women more self-assured of their collective power to fight exclusion, silence, and oppression" (2).

Importantly, women from different segments of society have risen to resist both authoritarian regimes and Western discourse which has misrepresented the lives and experiences of Arab women. Women's participation in the protests and revolutions that swept through the MENA region has also "resulted in their increased participation in public life, increased representation in decision making, and emboldened leadership of women's organizations" (6). Additionally, women's rights activists have taken a leading role in pressuring Arab states to pass women's rights reforms, such as the criminalization of violence against women in Tunisia, the right to drive in Saudi Arabia, and increases in women's representation in national and local assemblies in several countries.

As Pratt argues, "women's activism should be viewed as an embodied geopolitics," recognizing that women's lives have been shaped by colonialism, neocolonialism, US imperialism, and authoritarianism. Moreover, she argues that "women's activism may resist *and* comply with dominant power structures at different geopolitical scales simultaneously" (7). As Al-Ali (2020) argues in her case study of the women's movement in Iraq, an intersectional approach is also necessary to understanding the status of women.

But, despite this climate of fear and instability, women find ways to resist (El-Ashmawy 2017; Pratt 2020). In Egypt, women are resisting sexual violence (El-

Ashmawy 2017). In Syria, while some women have chosen to employ nonviolence to protest against the Assad regime (Kahf 2020), other women have forged an alliance with the Assad regime (Saadeh 2020). Alsalah (2020) criticizes some women for forging an alliance with the regime. Palestinian women prisoners engage in hunger strikes to reclaim their bodies from patriarchy and the Israeli occupation (Shwaikh 2020).

In Algeria, women legislators, women's rights activists, and ordinary women are all contributing to their collective empowerment. Ordinary women first empowered themselves in the private sphere and then they have reclaimed access to public spaces. Since the 1980s, women's rights activists pressured the regime to reform the family code but due to Algeria's political history, major reform is unlikely. Women legislators focus on changing attitudes toward women leaders.

Future Research

This study has limitations, however. The current political situation in Algeria calls for further research. The 2019 Hirak protest movement led to the resignation of President Bouteflika and the arrests of his allies for corruption. The regime's new slogan is "new Algeria" after the removal of the "gang" (coined by Algerians in the 2019 Hirak to refer to Bouteflika, Ouyahia, Ghoul, and others who engaged in corruption). However, the Hirak does not represent all of Algeria. Further, as the protest movement's slogans started to target generals, the regime resorted to repression. Particularly interesting is the protesters' declaration that Algeria never won independence from France, referencing the impact of neocolonialism. Other powerful slogans are "neither Islamist nor secular" and

“civilian not military.” These developments are interesting from a gender perspective since, as I noted in Chapter 3, ordinary women reject Islamists, secular parties, and the state.

To dissuade protesters from taking to the streets, the regime resorted to repression (Serres 2021). In an interview with Thomas Serres (2021), one of the leading opposition figures said, “The regime was born in violence and has always managed this country through violence.” Bouteflika tried to enact some reforms but even under his leadership, the military remained the most powerful actor (Ghanem 2018). The difference now is that since the removal of Bouteflika, the regime employs repression. The United Nations condemned the regime for arrests of opposition leaders and journalists (UN 2021).

There has also been a backlash against women’s rights. After the June 2021 elections, the number of women parliamentarians decreased from 119 to 35, which means that women now hold the same proportion of seats that they held before the 2012 gender quota. What role will these women parliamentarians play? What kinds of women did political parties recruit? What impact will this have on constituency service? Who are the critical actors who will advocate on behalf of women? It is unlikely that women’s rights activists will work with the regime in the future.

Lastly, the claim that there is a “foreign hand” that destabilizes Algeria will likely pose a barrier to women’s rights. Most recently, the regime cut diplomatic ties with Morocco. According to state actors, Morocco and Israel are working together to destabilize Algeria and that they are doing that by supporting two radical groups which the regime has labeled terrorist organizations, the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (MAK) and Rachad (an Islamist movement) (Allouche 2021; Makedhi 2021). Under these conditions, it seems unlikely that the regime will advance women’s rights. The widespread

use of repression, failing health care system, economic crisis, and major political crisis that began with the illness of Bouteflika in 2013 will impact not just women, but all Algerians for years to come.

Appendix 1: List of interviews with women parliamentarians

1. Interview with FLN woman MP from Kabyle region. In person. February 2019.
2. Interview with FLN woman MP from west. In person. February 2019.
3. Interview with FLN woman MP from east. In person. February 2019.
4. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. February 2019.
5. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. February 2019.
6. Interview with FLN woman MP from east. In person. March 2019.
7. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. March 2019.
8. Interview with FLN woman MP from west. Phone. March 2019.
9. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. April 2019.
10. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. April 2019.
11. Interview with FLN woman MP from north. In person. April 2019.
12. Interview with FLN woman MP from Kabyle region. In person. May 2019.
13. Interview with FLN woman MP from south. In person. November 2019.
14. Interview with RND woman MP from east. In person. February 2019.
15. Interview with RND woman MP from central region. In person. February 2019.
16. Interview with RND woman MP from north. In person. February 2019.
17. Interview with RND woman MP from central. In person. April 2019.
18. Interview with RND woman MP from north. In person. April 2019.
19. Interview with RND woman MP from west. In person. April 2019.
20. Interview with former RND woman MP from Kabyle region. In person. April 2019.

21. Interview with RND woman MP from north. In person. October 2019.
22. Interview with MPA woman MP from north. In person. April 2019.
23. Interview with TAJ woman MP from north. In person. March 2019.
24. Interview with TAJ woman MP from west. In person. March 2019.
25. Interview with TAJ woman MP from north. In person. March 2019.
26. Interview with MSP woman MP from north. In person. February 2019.
27. Interview with NAHDA-ADALA-BINA woman MP from north. In person.
March 2019.
28. Interview with NAHDA-ADALA-BINA woman MP from north. In person. April
2019.
29. Interview with PT woman MP from north. In person. February 2019.
30. Interview with RCD woman MP from north. In person. March 2019.

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