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CITIZENS' MILITIAS AND ARMED MASCULINITY:

THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER IDEAL AND GENDER

IN THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION

by

REBECCA CLAIRE SNYDER

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-New Brunswick

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of





Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Political Science

written under the direction of

Professor Benjamin R. Barber

and approved by

New Brunswick, New Jersey

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Citizens' Militias and *Armed Masculinity*:  
The Citizen-Soldier Ideal and Gender  
in the Civic Republican Tradition

by REBECCA CLAIRE SNYDER

Dissertation Director:  
Professor Benjamin R. Barber

The Citizen-Soldier ideal in civic republicanism embodies a set of practices that produce the necessary foundation for republican self-rule: The civic and martial practices constitutive of the Citizen-Soldier produce patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue, the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good. The Citizen-Soldier forms a normative ideal that links military service to participatory citizenship. However, while these practices produce virtuous citizen-soldiers, they also generate chauvinism, exclusion, and conformity. Moreover, because masculinity has historically been conflated with

soldiering, the Citizen-Soldier ideal also fuses *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship.

The Citizen-Soldier tradition offers a *citizenship of civic practices*, a model of citizenship in which individuals become citizens only as they engage together in civic and martial practices. Building on the work of contemporary democratic, feminist, and postmodernist theories, I argue that civic identity, like gender identity, is performatively constructed. That is to say, "men," "women," and "citizens" are not pre-political categories. Instead, individuals actually become men, women, and citizens only as they engage in masculine, feminine, and civic practices, respectively. One of the main questions I ask in the dissertation is: What happens in a tradition that links citizenship to soldiering when women become citizens? What happens when "women" begin to engage in the practices constitutive of masculine republican citizen-soldiering?

I conclude with five recommendations for reconstituting the Citizen-Soldier tradition in contemporary America, including realizing the democratic potential for *subversive transgender performances* inherent in the *citizenship of civic practices* in order to expand republican citizenship to include all people. Despite the vices inherent in the Citizen-Soldier tradition, I want to rework the tradition, rather than reject it *in toto*. Because we have moved beyond

the grand foundationalist fictions of modernity and into a postmodern era -- for better or for worse -- it becomes harder for us to ground our normative claims. For this reason, it is useful to work within an already existing tradition, and despite its many risks, the Citizen-Soldier tradition contains many democratic elements, the revival of which could greatly improve citizenship and democracy in America.

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In finishing the project that simply marks the beginning of my career as a political theorist, I have been reflecting a lot on my years at Rutgers University -- years that account for the bulk of my adult life. I am so grateful that I had the opportunity to spend most of my twenties in the Rutgers Political Science Department and that the Department was so generous to me. I particularly want to thank the Political Theory and Women & Politics faculties for providing me with an excellent education that has greatly enriched my life. In addition, I would also like to express my appreciation to the Kettering Foundation, the Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis, and most of all to the Walt Whitman Center for the Culture and Politics of Democracy for their generous support over the years.

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benefited my thinking enormously. Allison was also kind enough to have actually read the entire manuscript. I am truly grateful that I had the opportunity to share this time of my life with her and look forward to our life together.

*Brooklyn, New York*

*November 1996*



## Dedication

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*For my family, old and new:  
Lee and Anne Snyder,  
Tim Snyder,  
and Allison Turkel*

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## Introduction

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What happens in a tradition that links citizenship with soldiering when women become citizens? This question becomes increasingly important today as political theorists and practitioners across the political spectrum are advocating more civic republican forms of democracy in which citizens attend to the common good rather than pursuing only their own individual interests. In arguing for a more substantive notion of citizenship as a remedy to the ills of liberal democracy, civic republicans on both the Left and the Right call upon a tradition that has historically contained the masculinist ideal of the Citizen-Soldier as a central category. Interestingly, democratic theorists who would resurrect that discourse in an attempt to revive a strong notion of citizenship, generally ignore the question of the Citizen-Soldier. Consequently, they side-step a related question, namely whether women can be incorporated into a discourse that has been historically masculinist.

Overlooking the tradition of the Citizen-Soldier also allows democratic theorists to refrain from taking the military seriously as a part of democratic society. Indeed, one of the distinctive characteristics of the Citizen-Soldier tradition is that it places the military at the very center of the democratic project, rather than seeing it as a hopelessly anti-democratic but unfortunately necessary

institution appropriately relegated to society's margins. The refusal to interrogate the military from the perspective of democratic theory allows us to dismiss the military's sexual politics, from the Tailhook scandal of 1991 to the refusal of publicly funded military academies to admit women to the recent exposure of the widespread existence of sexual harassment and rape at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, as the inevitable result of inserting women into an essentially masculine warrior culture. It allows us to exempt the military from the standards of democratic society.

This dissertation uses the mythos of the Citizen-Soldier as a prism through which to view a variety of issues of concern to democratic and feminist theorists, including not only the role of the military in democratic society, but also the nature of citizenship and the constitution of gender. In my discussion I intervene in and refocus current feminist debates over citizenship. Until now the question for feminists has been either how to expand the conventional understanding of citizenship to include the activities in which women have traditionally engaged and/or how to demonstrate that the historical traditions of citizenship are inherently masculine and so can never be extended to women. In these debates the categories of "men," "women," and "citizens" are generally treated as pre-political. That is, we assume there are "men," "women," and "citizens" who then enter politics. Even social constructionists like Wendy Brown make this assumption. For example, when she

argues that "manhood constructs politics," she is arguing that pre-political, cultural understandings of "manhood" directly affect the shaping of politics because men make politics.<sup>1</sup>

Instead of viewing "men," "women," and "citizens" as pre-political categories, however, I investigate the ways in which civic and gender identities are actually constituted through political practices. In making this argument, I build on Judith Butler's *performativity theory* of gender identity as laid out in her book *Gender Trouble*. That is, I reread civic republican theory and practice, using the idea that civic identity -- like gender identity -- is performatively constructed.

Butler begins by radicalizing the sex/gender split: "If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from sex in any one way."<sup>2</sup> Certainly, many different configurations of gender exist among different cultures and even within a single society. "If there is something right in Beauvoir's claim that one is not born, but rather *becomes* a woman," Butler reasons, "it follows that *woman* itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end."<sup>3</sup> In other words, gender identity is never finally and securely achieved. Instead, it must be continually reconstructed through the repetition of gender appropriate behaviors. To use Butler's words, "gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts

. . . that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being."<sup>4</sup> That is, what appears to be gender identity must continually be produced and re-produced through the performance of gender appropriate behaviors. "Men" and "women" are constantly becoming gendered as they participate in behaviors required by cultural norms of masculinity and femininity.

Building on Butler's work, I argue that within the Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism, civic identity is also performatively constructed. That is to say, "citizen" should not be viewed as a pre-political category. There are not pre-existing citizens who then choose whether to engage in political action or not. To the contrary, within the Citizen-Soldier tradition, individuals become citizens only as they engage together in civic practices. Thus, civic republicanism presents what I call a *citizenship of civic practices*: In order to become a citizen, an individual must actually engage with others in civic practices, traditionally including service in the civic militia.

What this means is that the identity of the citizen is never finally consolidated. Instead, citizens must be constantly produced and re-produced through the repetition of civic actions. In order to be a citizen, one must constantly act as a citizen; citizenship is never finally secured. In other words, individuals never finally become a citizens in the sense that they will always think and act in

terms of the common good. It is only within the context of republican institutions which require them to behave as citizens, that they will act and think as citizens. Hence, the process of becoming a citizen is never finished. Citizens must be constantly re-produced through engagement in civic practices.

The Citizen-Soldier ideal in civic republicanism embodies a set of practices that produce the necessary foundation for republican self-rule: The civic and martial practices constitutive of the Citizen-Soldier produce patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue, the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good. However, while these practices produce virtuous citizen-soldiers, they also generate chauvinism, exclusion, and conformity. Moreover, because masculinity has historically been conflated with soldiering, the Citizen-Soldier ideal also fuses *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship. While any version of the *citizenship of civic practices* will produce vices as well as virtues, when military service forms the primary civic practice constitutive of citizenship, the vices are more prominent.

The Citizen-Soldier tradition links military service to participatory citizenship and to universalizable republican ideals. Normative rather than empirical, the Citizen-Soldier ideal necessarily entails a commitment to a set of republican political principles, including liberty, equality, camaraderie, the rule of law, the common good,

civic virtue, and participatory citizenship. The Citizen-Soldier ideal cannot be reduced to universal military service. Instead, this universal service must be connected to substantive participation in the processes of self-government. Citizen-soldiers serve in the military in order to protect their ability to govern themselves for the common good.

In its ideal form, the *citizenship of civic practices* contrasts with two other conceptions of citizenship: *citizenship of land* and *citizenship of blood*. A *citizenship of land* defines citizens as any group of individuals living on a particular piece of land, while a *citizenship of blood* restricts citizenship to members of a particular ascribed group. In contrast to these two conceptions, a *citizenship of civic practices* requires engagement in civic and martial practices. It is not enough to live within particular borders, such as those of the United States. Nor is it enough to have a particular type of blood -- for instance Aryan blood. On the contrary, to be a citizen within the civic republican paradigm, one must engage with others in civic practices; the category of "citizen" is never finally achieved.

The Citizen-Soldier ideal functions as a social and political fantasy that calls for male individuals to engage in the civic and martial practices constitutive of citizen-soldiers. Teresa de Lauretis discusses the importance of fantasy in the constitution of subjectivity. Focusing on



gender identity, she demonstrates the key role fantasy plays in the subject's internalization of cultural gender norms.<sup>5</sup> If we expand her argument, we can begin to consider the role fantasy plays in linking a variety of ideological imperatives to individual subjectivities. This deepens our understanding of the importance of the Citizen-Soldier ideal in civic republicanism. The Citizen-Soldier ideal constitutes a social and political fantasy that leads male individuals to engage in civic and martial practices. To put this in Butlerian terms, male individuals are called upon to "imitate" the "phantasmatic ideal" of the Citizen-Soldier, and in so doing, they engage in practices constitutive of both republican citizenship and *armed masculinity*. With the help of fantasy, the male individual comes to identify with and desire to be like the Citizen-Soldier.

While masculine citizens are traditionally constituted through engagement in civic practices, however, feminine subjects are traditionally constituted through the exclusion from civic practices. If this is the case, then what would happen if "women" began to engage in the civic practices constitutive of masculine republican citizen-soldiers? Butler argues, "when the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and a *woman* and *feminine* a male body as

easily as a female one." If Butler is right then "women's" engagement in civic practices defined as productive of masculinity, such as military service, should lead to the "troubling" of contemporary constructions of gender. That is to say, the *subversive transgender performances* of "women" acting "like men" could work to highlight the artificiality of normative constructions of gender identity and so undermine the sexism such constructions generate.

If gender identity is performatively constructed, rather than rooted in nature, this means that gender identity is malleable rather than fixed. Because gender is constructed, it can be reconstructed in a way that does not advantage one particular gender over another. In Butler's words, "through the mobilization, subversive confusion, and proliferation of precisely those constitutive categories that seek to keep gender in its place by posturing as the foundational illusions of identity" societally mandated configurations of gender can be reworked and "gender trouble" can be made.<sup>6</sup> Put differently, if "men" and "women" are constantly becoming gendered as they participate in behaviors required by cultural norms of masculinity and femininity, then their transgressive engagement in counter-hegemonic gender behavior should alter the social construction of gender and the sexism it generates.

I believe that these changes could allow for the reconfiguration of republican citizenship so that it can accommodate all people. I am interested in reconstructing

republican citizenship so that all individuals, regardless of gender, can be included as republican citizens. Thus I do not want to argue that because the discourse of civic republicanism historically contained the masculinist ideal of the Citizen-Soldier that the entire democratic republican tradition can never be reworked to include women. However, I ultimately argue that the reconfiguration of republican citizenship to include "women" must also entail the reconfiguration of gender, of "women" and "men" as social categories.

That is to say, historically "masculine" categories, such as "citizen" and "soldier," cannot simply be expanded to include "women" but otherwise remain unaltered. For example, the *armed masculinity* of contemporary soldiers is a precarious social construct constituted in hostile opposition to "femininity," whether located in "women" or within the "men" themselves. Simply inserting "women" into a misogynistic warrior culture does not eliminate the conflation of soldiering with "masculinity," but rather produces sexual harassment and rape, as evidenced by a broad array of recent scandals. Because of traditional dichotomous constructions of gender, female individuals are viewed not as "soldiers" but rather as "women."

Thus, in order to render our supposedly democratic military inclusive of all people, we must begin to "trouble" and then reconfigure our understandings of gender. We need to move away from the idea that male individuals are

"masculine" and female individuals are "feminine" and begin to see "masculinity" and "femininity" as particular sets of practices in which all individuals engage at various times. Reviving the Citizen-Soldier tradition cannot simply consist of reattaching *armed masculinity* onto a resuscitated republican citizenship. Instead, we must reform the type of masculinity constructed within our military, so that it does not require the hostile denigration of "femininity."

But why even try to resuscitate the Citizen-Soldier tradition, rather than just rejecting it wholesale? First of all, this tradition provides us with a democratic legacy through which we can strive to reform the military and purge it of misogyny and homophobia -- neither of which is essential to military effectiveness. Instead of simply ignoring the military realm, the Citizen-Soldier tradition places military institutions at the center of the democratic project.

Second, to reject the Citizen-Soldier tradition in its entirety would be to give up on the American tradition that anchors our calls for a more participatory form of citizenship -- civic republicanism. The ideal of substantive popular sovereignty comes directly out of the civic republican tradition, which has at its center the Citizen-Soldier ideal. Because we have moved beyond the grand foundationalist fictions of modernity and into a postmodern era, it becomes harder for us to ground our normative claims. For this reason, it is useful to work

within an already existing tradition. Despite its many risks, the Citizen-Soldier tradition contains democratic elements, the revival of which could greatly improve citizenship and democracy in America.

I want to rework the Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism because it presents us with a tradition of participatory citizenship and a commitment to universalizable principles. Right now in America, we are sorely lacking the idea that we should have government for the common good. We do not have the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good -- patriotism, camaraderie, and civic virtue -- because we do not engage together in civic practices. Within the historic tradition of civic republicanism, diverse individuals -- not diverse by today's standards, but each self-interested and unique in his own way -- became citizens as they engaged together in civic practices. And while multicultural America presents more of a challenge, I believe it would be productive to consider the ways in which engagement together in civic practices today might constitute our diverse peoples as American citizens in a substantive, participatory republican sense.

In arguing for the reconstitution of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, one of the changes I call for involves a shift from military service to military service. Traditionally, military service played a key role in the constitution of republican citizenship because it was

military service that instilled in individuals the virtues necessary for self-government for the common good -- selflessness, courage, camaraderie, patriotism, and civic virtue. What I am advocating is a shift from the military part of this idea to the service part. On this point I join other democratic theorists, such as Benjamin R. Barber and Charles Moskos who advocate the expansion of the Citizen-Soldier tradition to include national or civic service. "Universal citizen service," Barber argues, "could offer many of the undisputed virtues of military service: fellowship and camaraderie, common activity, teamwork, service for and with others, and a sense of community." But while citizen service would offer the virtues of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, it would also minimize its corresponding vices: "In place of military hierarchy, it could offer equality; in place of obedience, cooperation; and in place of us/them conflict of the kind generated by parochial participation, a sense of mutuality and national interdependence."<sup>7</sup> Replacing military service with a broader vision of civic service would facilitate the inclusion of all Americans in the practices constitutive of republican citizenship and would downplay the risks of fusion, homogeneity, and construction of a totalizing identity.

Moreover, shifting from an emphasis on military to an emphasis on service supports a rearticulation of citizenship as a set of practices rather than a category of identity.

Nationalistic military service requires the constitution of a deep sense of civic identity. To wage war, one must strongly identify as a member of a "people." Civic service does not require the same depth of identification. Participation in a wide variety of civic practices as one part of one's life produces a lighter, less totalizing form of identity that simply sits on top of other more deeply rooted, particular identities. Engagement in civic practices could constitute individuals as American citizens but not as purely American and nothing else.<sup>8</sup>

Any version of the *citizenship of civic practices* produces an interrelated package of virtues and vices. In order to get a strong notion of citizenship and the benefits of patriotism, camaraderie, and civic virtue, we risk creating the vices of chauvinism, exclusivity, and homogeneity. However, without the risks we cannot have a *citizenship of civic practices* and government aimed at the common good. The puzzle for democratic theorists is how to augment the virtues while minimizing the corresponding vices.

My rereading of civic republican theory through the lens of contemporary feminist theory strives to shift away from the idea of citizenship as an identity and toward a reconceptualization of citizenship as a set of practices. As I show throughout the dissertation, any *citizenship of civic practices* involves the idea that diverse individuals actually become citizens as they engage together in civic

practices. And while engagement in these practices will eventually produce the appearance of a coherent civic identity, keeping the focus on common practices rather than on the constitution of a common identity helps minimize the vices inherent in any *citizenship of civic practices*.

In contemporary America, such a large degree of diversity exists that we can certainly risk attempting to create civic bonds. As Barber puts it,

the fragmentation and pluralism of most contemporary liberal democratic societies would seem to leave ample room for a safe infusion of communitarian values. . . . Neighborhood ties and the affective bonds that emerge out of common activity are obviously less risky than patriotism, which in modern times has often meant chauvinism or jingoism, and less dangerous than civil religion, which has often spawned a style of fundamentalism zealotry incompatible with the separation of church and state and with genuine pluralism.<sup>9</sup>

The *citizenship of civic practices* inherent in the Citizen-Soldier tradition requires that individuals participate together in civic practices, if they want to become citizens. Only acting together can instill in us the affective bonds that form the necessary prerequisite for attending to what we have in common rather than what divides us.

Chapter One, "Machiavelli and the *Citizenship of Civic Practices*," begins with an examination of the Citizen-Soldier ideal in the work of Niccolo Machiavelli, the first modern theorist of civic republicanism. The chapter argues that within Machiavelli's oeuvre, the Citizen-Soldier functions as a dialectical ideal that embodies the linkages



between the civic realm and the militia, participatory citizenship and *armed masculinity*, civic virtue and *virtu*, republican ideals and militarism. In the end, I conclude that because Machiavelli unifies his citizenry in opposition to the threat of external enemies, he ends up moving away from the virtue of the civic militia as a defensive force and toward the vice of conquest.

Chapter Two, "'Jean-Jacques ... You are a Genevan': Civic Festivals, Martial Practices, and the Production of Civic Identity" examines the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Although Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier tradition parallels Machiavelli's to some extent, it also differs from Machiavelli's in several interesting ways. The chapter argues that the Citizen-Soldier stands at the very center of Rousseau's theoretical framework because it embodies a set of practices that produce the necessary foundation for republican self-rule: The civic and martial practices constitutive of the Citizen-Soldier also produce patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue, as well as the *general will* itself, the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good. At the same time, however, the practices of the Citizen-Soldier tradition also produce a set of vices that form the flip-sides of those same virtues: patriotism can produce nationalism, fraternity can produce fusion, civic virtue can produce a totalizing civic identity, and the *general will* can produce homogeneity. While these interrelated virtues and vices are always inextricably

linked, Rousseau's version of the Citizen-Soldier actually exacerbates the vicious side of this tradition because he creates unity through an all-encompassing set of civic and martial practices, the channeling of all passion toward the fatherland, and the production of a totalizing civic identity that replaces all others. That is to say, while he avoids the problems associated with the creation of unity through opposition to an external enemy -- Machiavelli's vice -- Rousseau creates unity by forging versions of fraternity, patriotism, and civic identity that are so strong that they slip easily into fusion, nationalism, and homogeneity.

Chapter Three, "The Citizen-Soldier as Political Fantasy: Civic and Martial Practices in American Political History," examines the Citizen-Soldier ideal within the context of American history. I argue that a strong tradition of civic republicanism existed in America through the nineteenth century that featured the Citizen-Soldier ideal as a central category. I demonstrate that the myth of the Citizen-Soldier constituted a social ideal that was more important for the production of masculine citizens than for actual military effectiveness. And once again, we see that within the Citizen-Soldier tradition virtues and vices are inextricably linked. While civic and martial practices create citizen-soldiers and instill in them patriotism, civic virtue, and fraternal solidarity, these same practices can also yield xenophobia, racism, violence, and

homogeneity. In the American context, the civic identity forged through participation in the civic militia was created in opposition to denigrated Others. Thus the *citizenship of civic practices* has undemocratic as well as democratic potential. And these two oppositional impulses are intricately connected.

The chapter traces the history of the civic militia in American political history and concludes that by the time the Selective Service Act of 1917 established the principle of universal military service for all American males, the Citizen-Soldier ideal was already dead. Normative rather than empirical, the Citizen-Soldier ideal necessarily entails not only military service but also participatory citizenship. Thus, the Citizen-Soldier died at the end of the nineteenth century along with participatory republican citizenship.

Chapter Four, "Citizen-Soldiers, Blood Brothers, and the New Militias: Interrogating the Republican Discourse of the American Right," examines the New Militia movement in contemporary America. Presenting a reactionary, anti-democratic "identity politics" for angry white men, the New Militia movement feeds on a broad-scale crisis of legitimacy, real or imagined economic insecurity, a fear of multiculturalism, and the instability of gender in the age of feminism and lesbian/gay rights. In the face of real or imagined economic and political impotence, the angry white militiamen choose to engage in martial practices in an

attempt to reconstitute themselves as masculine subjects. Although the movement uses the rhetoric of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, it originated in the proto-fascist fringes of American politics and remains inextricably linked to its roots. Consequently, I conclude that the New Militia movement cannot legitimately claim to stand within the Citizen-Soldier tradition, because its advocacy of Aryan Christian supremacy fundamentally contradicts some of the essential components of the civic republican tradition.

Finally, Chapter Five, "Troubling Armed Masculinity: Military Academies, Hazing Rituals, and the Reconstitution of the Citizen-Soldier," focuses on the struggle of women for admission into the Citadel and VMI. I examine the role of misogynistic and homophobic hazing in the military academies and conclude that this unnecessary and undemocratic method of creating soldiers must be replaced with a program of civic education. I conclude with five recommendations for reconstituting the Citizen-Soldier tradition in contemporary America, including realizing the democratic potential for *subversive transgender performances* inherent in the *citizenship of civic practices* in order to expand republican citizenship to include all people.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Wendy Brown, *Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> The entire quote is as follows: "If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of 'men' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that 'women' will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question), there is not reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two. The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and a *woman* and *feminine* a male body as easily as a female one." Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Teresa de Lauretis, *The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

<sup>6</sup> Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 34.

<sup>7</sup> Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 302. For a realistic and detailed plan for the "reconstruction of the citizen-soldier," see Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> For an interesting discussion of this idea, see Michael Walzer, *What It Means To Be an American: Essays on the American Experience* (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1996). I am also indebted to Linda Zerilli for this point. Personal conversation, 28 October 1996.

<sup>9</sup> Barber, *Strong Democracy*, 243.

## Chapter One

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### **Machiavelli and the *Citizenship of Civic Practices***

"There cannot be good laws where armies are not good, and where there are good armies, there must be good laws."

----- Machiavelli, *The Prince*<sup>1</sup>

Niccolo Machiavelli's work forms a quintessential example of the Citizen-Soldier ideal in civic republicanism. Within the civic republican tradition, the Citizen-Soldier ideal is absolutely central for several reasons. In the first place, it links the two realms in which a republic must remain free and autonomous: It links the civic realm in which republican citizens govern themselves for the common good with the civic militia through which citizen-soldiers protect their liberty and autonomy from the threat of external enemies. As we shall see, the Citizen-Soldier constitutes a normative ideal that necessarily entails a commitment to a set of republican political principles, including liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.

The Citizen-Soldier ideal forms the centerpiece of what I call a *citizenship of civic practices*. According to this model, individuals actually become citizens as they participate together in civic practices, traditionally including those of the civic militia. More specifically,

within the civic republican tradition, "citizen" is not a pre-political identity. Individuals are not "citizens" simply by virtue of the fact that they live within certain borders (*citizenship of land*) or because they have a particular class or ethnic heritage (*citizenship of blood*). Instead, engagement in civic practices produces a common civic identity; it constitutes diverse individuals as citizens. Never finally achieved, citizenship must be constantly constructed and reconstructed through engagement in civic practices. And traditionally, participation in the civic militia formed the main practice through which citizenship was constructed.

Both virtues and vices characterize the *citizenship of civic practices*. On the one hand, through participation in the civic militia, individuals become citizen-soldiers, as they learn patriotism, selflessness, and fraternity, all of which coalesce into civic virtue. On the other hand, these same martial practices teach citizen-soldiers the vices which form the flip-sides of these virtues: Patriotism becomes conquest, selflessness conformity, and fraternity chauvinism. And instead of civic virtue, we get the other half of Machiavellian *virtu*: a combative *armed masculinity*. As we shall see, within the Citizen-Soldier tradition, the creation of participatory citizenship historically entails both an enemy and the denigration of femininity. While any version of the *citizenship of civic practices* will produce vices as well as virtues, when service in the civic militia

forms the primary civic practice constitutive of citizenship, the vices are more prominent. Because of the centrality of the Citizen-Soldier ideal to Machiavelli's vision, his republican virtues are inextricably linked to a corresponding set of vices.

### **The Republican Reading of Machiavelli**

The argument that the Citizen-Soldier ideal stands at the very center of Machiavelli's theoretical framework depends upon a republican reading of Machiavelli. However, not all political theorists see Machiavelli as a republican theorist.<sup>2</sup> The debate over the political orientation of Machiavelli's work grows out of the apparent contradiction between the autocracy of the *Prince* and the republicanism of the *Discourses*. Those who focus primarily on the *Prince* doubt Machiavelli's commitment to republicanism. For example, Leo Strauss and Harvey Mansfield consider Machiavelli a "teacher of evil."<sup>3</sup> Other scholars see Machiavelli as an advocate of imperialism and conquest<sup>4</sup> and/or as a proto-fascist.<sup>5</sup> Many great German thinkers, such as Fichte, Hegel,<sup>6</sup> Herder, Ranke, and Meinecke, stress the role the *Prince* played -- for better or for worse -- in the emergence of nationalism during the nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup> Often critics of Machiavelli bolster their claims by summoning up the long history of outrage over Machiavelli's work.<sup>8</sup> Still another school of thought stresses that



regardless of his intent, Machiavelli divorced politics from morality and so in this way ended up justifying pure power politics, *realpolitik*.<sup>9</sup> Some believe Machiavelli did not actually advocate power politics, but simply presented a technical study of how politics work.<sup>10</sup> Others argue that he was in fact tortured over the necessity of doing evil for the sake of good.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, in opposition to these views of Machiavelli, an increasingly huge body of scholarship emphasizes the strong republican themes present in Machiavelli's oeuvre, particularly in the *Discourses*.<sup>12</sup> These readers of Machiavelli explain the *Prince* in a variety of ways.<sup>13</sup> The fact that Machiavelli was a life-long advocate of civic republicanism in practice provides additional evidence for many republican readings of his theoretical work.

My reading of Machiavelli builds on the large body of scholarship that portrays him as a republican theorist, and this chapter discusses Machiavelli's republican ideals in depth. My focus on the Citizen-Soldier ideal in Machiavelli's work bolsters arguments that see the *Prince* as providing instructions that, if followed, would lay the groundwork for the transition from a monarchy to a republic.<sup>14</sup> This reading relies upon the famous last chapter of the *Prince*, in which Machiavelli states the following:

If then, your glorious family resolves to follow the excellent men I have named who redeemed their countries, she must before all other things, as the true foundation of every undertaking, provide herself with her own armies, because there cannot be more faithful or truer or better soldiers. And though each one of them is good,

they will become better if united, when they see themselves commanded by their own prince and by him honored and maintained. It is necessary, therefore, for her to prepare such armies in order with Italian might to defend herself against foreigners.<sup>15</sup>

Here Machiavelli advises the prince to arm his subjects. In so doing, he advises the prince to lay the foundation for a republic because -- as we shall soon see -- Machiavelli considered engagement in martial practices as constitutive of republican citizenship and thus as the foundation for a republic.

My ultimate claim is that Machiavelli presents a dialectical vision, in which republican ideals and the heroic ethic are reconciled in the figure of the Citizen-Soldier. That is to say, while ostensibly contradictory, Machiavelli's republican citizenship and his emphasis on the heroic ethic -- glory, grandeur, and conquest -- come together in the figure of the Citizen-Soldier and form a package of interconnected virtues and vices. My reading builds on the work of Mark Hulliung who begins to get at this dialectic in his book *Citizen Machiavelli*:

If, as we have argued, a Machiavellian potentiality always inhered in the republican tradition, the secondary literature errs in dwelling solely on the 'idealism' of civic humanism and in contrasting it with the so-called 'realism' of Machiavelli.<sup>16</sup>

According to Hulliung's rendition, the civic humanists were always champions of the heroic ethic of glory.<sup>17</sup> Hulliung seems to be proffering a dialectical reading when he argues that Machiavelli insisted "that republics and conquest go hand in hand." Criticizing the republican readings of the Florentine, Hulliung argues that

it is not enough to bridge the gap between *The Prince* and the *Discourses* or to point to Machiavelli's republican progeny in order to make a case for an un-Machiavellian Machiavelli. At this point the standard interpretation of Machiavelli ends when it is precisely at this point that it should begin. Why did Machiavelli favor republics over monarchies? If the answer may be phrased in terms of liberty, it may equally well be phrased in terms of power, for his constant principle is that the greatest triumphs of power politics are the monopoly of free, republican communities. The standard scholarly interpretation of Machiavelli is therefore revisionist; it deletes all that is most striking and shocking in his thought; it is Machiavelli expurgated.<sup>18</sup>

However, Hulliung backs away from a dialectical reading. That is, while Hulliung rightly restores the heroic ethic of heroism, glory, and conquest to the center of Machiavelli's work, in so doing he shortchanges the civic republican aspects which I will argue are equally central.<sup>19</sup> What Hulliung ultimately does is subordinate Machiavelli's advocacy of republicanism to his desire for *grandezza* and *gloria*. What I am suggesting, on the other hand, that for Machiavelli the two sets of ideals are equally important and that he synthesizes them through his articulation of the Citizen-Soldier.

Within Machiavelli's *oeuvre* the heroic ethic and the commitment to civic republican principles -- liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship -- come together in the figure of the Citizen-Soldier. That is to say, the benefits of republicanism can only be obtained for citizens of a particular republic, and these individuals must constitute themselves as citizens in opposition to an enemy against which they prepare to fight. In other words, to the extent that the Citizen-Soldier ideal forms the foundation

of civic republicanism, this tradition presents a framework in which its virtues -- including patriotism, selflessness, fraternity, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship -- are intertwined with its vices -- conquest, conformity, chauvinism, *armed masculinity*, and exclusion. Thus Hannah Pitkin is correct when she states that Machiavelli is "both a republican and something like a protofascist."<sup>20</sup> While the interconnection of virtues and vices always exists within civic republicanism, it exists to a much greater extent, when martial practices are privileged over other possible forms of civic practices.

### **Uniting the Republic in Theory**

The ideal of the Citizen-Soldier stands at the very center of Machiavelli's republican theory because it unifies his political understanding, which in Pitkin's words, "consists of a set of syntheses holding in tension seemingly incompatible truths along several dimensions." The figure of the Citizen-Soldier embodies the linkages between the civic realm and the militia, citizenship and *armed masculinity*, civic virtue and *virtu*, republican ideals and militarism. Pitkin argues that many of the apparent contradictions in Machiavelli's thought come from the unraveling of these syntheses. However, "even when he loses the syntheses," she argues, "he is a better teacher than many a more consistent theorist, because he refuses to

abandon for very long any of the aspects of the truth he sees."<sup>21</sup> The Citizen-Soldier forms the linchpin in Machiavelli's dialectical edifice.

Firstly and most democratically, the Citizen-Soldier fuses the militia to the civic realm of republican self-rule. The Soldier who risks his life to defend the republic is also the Citizen who participates in forming laws for the common good. Both halves of the Citizen-Soldier ideal are equally important: Citizen-soldiers fight to defend their ability to govern themselves for the common good through the rule of law. In other words, the Citizen-Soldier ideal does not mean simply that citizens comprise the military. Normative rather than empirical, the Citizen-Soldier embodies a commitment to civic republicanism, complete with all its ideals: liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.

Secondly, the Citizen-Soldier ideal represents the fusion of *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship. That is to say, service in the civic militia plays a key role not only in the constitution of republican citizenship but also in the construction of *armed masculinity*, of what it means to be a man. Through engagement in martial practices, individuals become citizen-soldiers, as they acquire *virtu*, a central concept in Machiavelli's work and one that crystallizes the traditional fusion of masculinity onto citizenship within civic republican tradition. *Virtu*

has two meanings in Machiavelli's oeuvre. In the first place, it means civic virtue, the placing of the common good before individual self-interest, a necessary pre-requisite to republican self-rule. At the same time, however, *virtu* means the virile action necessary to the domination of *fortuna*, action which, as we will see, constitutes a combative form of *armed masculinity* formed in opposition to a denigrated femininity. Service in the militia teaches *virtu* in both its senses.

Thirdly, the Citizen-Soldier, exemplar of *virtu*, embraces a form of citizenship that is simultaneously republican and militaristic. The republican Citizen is also the Soldier, and every Soldier requires an enemy against which he must prepare to fight. The militarism inherent in the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier plays a key role in unifying the republic, as it prepares to defend itself against external enemies, and consequently helps prevent the emergence of internal factions. It provides a venue through which citizens of superior ability can serve the republic. And it plays a vital role in the production of *armed masculinity*.

## Linking "Good Laws and Good Armies"

The Citizen-Soldier ideal connects the civic realm of legislation to the civic militia, a connection Machiavelli emphasizes in his famous demand for both "good laws and good armies." Both "good laws" -- aimed at the common good and created through the participation of citizens -- and "good armies" -- made up of all citizens and organized as a civic militia -- are necessary to the creation and maintenance of a republic. In both the *Prince* and the *Discourses* Machiavelli stresses that "good laws and good armies" are "the principal foundations of all states" -- princedoms as well as republics: "And because there cannot be good laws where armies are not good, and where there are good armies, there must be good laws, I shall omit talking of laws and shall speak of armies."<sup>22</sup> While I want to argue that civic participation in legislation is no less important to Machiavelli's republicanism than is participation in the civic militia, taking Machiavelli at his word I begin with his discussion of the necessity of good armies.

Machiavelli emphasizes the need for good armies for several reasons. In the first place, the continued existence of a republic depends quite directly on good armies. That is to say, every state needs good armies because -- at least in Machiavelli's world -- all states are vulnerable to attack from competing states.<sup>23</sup> Machiavelli knew very well that a republic is a very fragile entity that

must be carefully nurtured and defended. Although for the first third of the fifteenth century "Florence was a genuine republic" -- albeit one that restricted citizenship to an elite group of wealthy, powerful men<sup>24</sup> -- by the time Machiavelli wrote his political theory of republicanism, the Florentine republic was merely a memory.<sup>25</sup> Thus, he recognized the precariousness of republican government and its vulnerability to both external and internal threats. Only an armed state can protect itself from foreign conquest and thus maintain its republican ideals.

In fact, many scholars emphasize that military threats from northern Italy and France played a key role in the re-emergence of the theory of civic republicanism during the fifteenth century. Although Florence had a tradition of self-government, it was not until the fifteenth century that theoretical justification of republicanism began to emerge. By that point the Florentine republic was being threatened by princedoms and dukedoms to the north. As Hans Baron has demonstrated, around the year 1400 this threat to their way of life led Florentines to begin to think self-consciously about their political practices and to define themselves in connection with the ancient republics rather than with the Empire.<sup>26</sup> In other words, civic republicanism's re-emergence as a theory came out of Florence's attempt to solidify her identity in the face of the threat of external enemies.



Secondly, for Machiavelli good military organization means a civic militia made up of all citizens: "An army evidently cannot be good if it is not trained, and it cannot be trained if it is not made up of your subjects. Because a country is not always at war and cannot be, she must therefore train her army in times of peace, and she cannot apply this training to others than subjects, on account of the expense."<sup>27</sup> History reveals, he argues, that disarming the people leaves states vulnerable to conquest.<sup>28</sup> And border guards are not enough. States that "make some little resistance on their boundaries" have "no recourse" when

an enemy has passed them. . . . And they do not see that such a way of proceeding is opposed to every good method. The heart and the vital parts of a body should be kept armored, and not the extremities. For without the latter it lives, but when the former is injured, it dies; and these states keep their hearts unarmored and their hands and feet armored. What this error has done to Florence has been seen and is seen every day; and when an army passes her boundaries and comes within them close to her heart, she has no further resource.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, the defense of the republic absolutely requires an armed populace.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, a civic militia made up of all citizens helps maintain peace, preserve liberty, and minimize the possibility of tyranny. Hired mercenaries or foreign auxiliary armies cannot be trusted to protect a state of any type: "mercenary forces never do anything but harm."<sup>31</sup> In the first place, Machiavelli argues that a civic militia has no interest in unnecessarily continuing a war. Professional soldiers do. They "are obliged either to hope that there will be no peace, or to become so rich in time of war that

in peace they can support themselves."<sup>32</sup> Because they are not professionals, citizen-soldiers do not expect anything from war, "except labor, peril, and fame." Instead of wanting to remain at war, they wish "to come home and live by their profession." In Machiavelli's words, the citizen-soldier "when he was not soldiering, was willing to be a soldier, and when he was soldiering, wanted to be dismissed" (576). A citizen-soldier "will gladly make war in order to have peace," but "will not seek to disturb the peace in order to have war" (578). Thus the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier should decrease the chances of war not increase them.

The use of professional soldiers also puts the republic at risk of being tyrannized by them. When wars are finished, mercenaries and auxiliaries exist by "exact[ing] money from the cities and plundering the country" (574). On the other hand, Machiavelli argues,

no great citizen ever presumed . . . to retain power in time of peace, so as to break the laws, plunder the provinces, usurp and tyrannize over his native land and in every way gain wealth for himself. Nor did anybody of low estate dream of violating his oath, forming parties with private citizens, ceasing to fear the Senate, or carrying out any tyrannical injury in order to live at all times by means of warfare as a profession. (575-576)

Moreover, when professional soldiers become tyrants, an unarmed citizenry has no recourse.

Furthermore, not only do mercenaries and auxiliary armies pose the threat of plunder, tyranny, and perpetual war, but they also make bad soldiers because the only true inspiration for fighting is the protection of one's own

liberty. Mercenaries and auxiliaries "are useless and dangerous; . . . they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal." While mercenaries are "valiant among friends, among enemies [they are] cowardly." Consequently,

in peace you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies. The reason for this is that they have no love for you nor any cause that can keep them in the field other than a little pay, which is not enough to make them risk death for you. They are eager indeed to be your soldiers as long as you are not carrying on war, but when war comes, eager to run away or to leave.<sup>33</sup>

There is a tremendous difference, Machiavelli argues, between "an army that is satisfied and fights for its own glory and an army that is ill disposed and fights for some leader's ambition."<sup>34</sup> Men will willingly and courageously risk their lives only to defend their own liberty:

Nothing made it harder for the Romans to conquer the people around them and part of the lands at a distance than the love that in those times many peoples had for their freedom, which they defended so stubbornly that never except by the utmost vigor could they be subjugated. We learn from many instances in what perils they put themselves in order to maintain or regain that freedom, and what revenge they wreaked on those who took it from them.<sup>35</sup>

Pocock puts it nicely when he says, "the paradox developed in Machiavelli's argument is that only a part-time soldier can be trusted to possess a full-time commitment to the war and its purposes."<sup>36</sup> Thus only a civic militia can be relied upon to defend a republic.

It is important to note here that when citizen-soldiers fight to defend their republic and their ability to govern themselves through the formation of man-made laws, they fight for a secular political order. Civic republicanism emerged in the fifteenth century in direct opposition to a Christian worldview and political order.<sup>37</sup> As Pocock

explains, the revival of Aristotelianism and the revaluation of history led to a break with the medieval Christian "scholastic-customary" framework and a rediscovery of citizenship. The reemphasis on the importance of time and the deliberative and creative powers of the human mind in both the intellectual movement of civic humanism and the political movement of civic republicanism constituted an attack on the medieval Christian worldview with its traditional, hierarchic view of society and on the structures of monarchy and aristocracy it justified: Citizenship requires liberty, rather than subjection to tradition; equality, rather than hierarchy and rank; fraternity, rather than paternity and filiality; and autonomy, rather than obedience to natural God-given law and dependence upon natural superiors. Pocock states it baldly: "Machiavelli unequivocally prefers the republic to revealed religion."<sup>38</sup> Citizen-soldiers fight to protect their secular political order and civic ideals. They do not fight for God and His revealed Truth.

### **Creating Virtù: A Common Good for Masculine Citizen-Soldiers**

Besides being necessary to the continual existence of a republic, the practices of the civic militia are absolutely essential to Machiavelli's *citizenship of civic practices* because they play a key role in the creation of masculine

citizen-soldiers out of male individuals. That is to say, for Machiavelli, masculinity requires soldiering, and soldiering must be linked to citizenship. Participation in martial practices simultaneously constructs all three characteristics. The interrelated constructions of masculinity, soldiering, and citizenship come together in Machiavelli's concept of *virtu*, which is directly produced by engagement in martial practices.

The Citizen-Soldier ideal embodies Machiavelli's concept of *virtu*, a concept which connects the civic realm to the civic militia and fuses *armed masculinity* to citizenship. *Virtu* has a dual meaning in Machiavelli's work, and citizen-soldiers must possess *virtu* in both senses.<sup>39</sup> In the first place, civic republicanism requires a sense of civic virtue defined as the characteristic whereby individuals place the common good ahead of individual self-interest.<sup>40</sup> In Quentin Skinner's words,

a self-governing republic can only be kept in being . . . if its citizens cultivate that crucial quality which Cicero had described as *virtus*, which the Italian theorists later rendered as *virtu*, and which the English republicans translated as civic virtue or public-spiritedness. The term is thus used to denote the range of capacities that each one of us as a citizen most needs to possess: the capacities that enable us willingly to serve the common good, thereby to uphold the freedom of our community, and in consequence to ensure its rise to greatness as well as our own individual liberty.<sup>41</sup>

This is not to say that the common good stands opposed to individual interests. To the contrary, by definition, the common good includes the good of each individual.<sup>42</sup> However, government for the common good does constitute an

alternative both to a system of rule based on balancing individual interests (such as liberalism) and to rule based on one particular interest that stands opposed to the common good (such as tyranny).

Within the Citizen-Soldier tradition, service in the civic militia plays a key role in the creation of civic virtue, a necessary prerequisite to the willingness to make laws aimed at the common good. According to Skinner, "a leading theme of Book II of Machiavelli's *Discorsi*" is that "the martial virtues" including "courage and determination to defend [the] community against the threat of conquest and enslavement by external enemies" constitute the capacities citizens need to possess in order to uphold the common good, ensure greatness, and protect the liberty of both the community and the individuals who comprise it.<sup>43</sup> Participation in the civic militia requires soldiers to act together for the common good and to sacrifice particular goods to universal ends. In this way military service forms a type of civic education that teaches individuals to act together for the common good during civic legislation. In this way civic and martial virtue are interconnected. As Pocock explains, "it may be through military discipline that one learns to be a citizen and to display civic virtue."<sup>44</sup> In other words, soldiering privileges certain virtues that become attached to citizenship -- among them courage, selflessness, fraternity, and patriotism. These virtues force the citizen to rise above his own particular interests

and think of the good of the community as a whole. Thus, within the Citizen-Soldier tradition in general and in Machiavelli's work in particular, martial virtue plays a central role in the construction of civic virtue.

But while civic virtue grows out of martial virtue, martial virtue necessarily presupposes civic virtue: The willingness to self-sacrifice presupposes an identification with the republic. As Pocock argues, the citizen's desire to defend his life in the republic guarantees he will be virtuous in battle.<sup>45</sup> Citizen-soldiers fight to defend their liberty, equality, fraternity, their laws aimed at the common good, and their participatory citizenship. Only the love for one's *patria* and the ideals it represents allows for the possibility of self-sacrifice. Thus, for Machiavelli, the civic militia with its martial virtue is inextricably linked to the realm of civic legislation with its civic virtue by the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier.

The second meaning of *virtu* in Machiavelli's work is virile political action, which is directly related to traditional understandings of masculinity. As Pitkin explains, *virtu* means "energy, effectiveness, virtuosity" and "derives from the Latin *virtus*, and thus from *vir*, which means 'man.' *Virtu* is thus manliness, those qualities found in a 'real man.'"<sup>46</sup> Machiavellian *virtu* connotes a form of *armed masculinity* that stands opposed to "*effeminato* (effeminate) . . . one of his most frequent and scathing epithets."<sup>47</sup> The republican citizen characterized by *armed*

*masculinity* acquires *virtu* as he battles *fortuna*, a concept Machiavelli understood as feminine.<sup>48</sup> To quote Machiavelli:

I conclude then (with Fortune varying and men remaining stubborn in their ways) that men are successful while they are in close harmony with Fortune, and when they are out of harmony, they are unsuccessful. As for me, I believe this: it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortune is a woman and it is necessary, in order to keep her under, to cuff and maul her. She more often lets herself be overcome by men using such methods than by those who proceed coldly; therefore always, like a woman, she is a friend of young men, because they are less cautious, more spirited, and with more boldness master her.<sup>49</sup>

Feminine fortune can only be mastered by an *armed masculine virtu*.

For Machiavelli, engagement in virile martial practices is necessary for the construction of *armed masculinity*. In other words, *armed masculinity* does not naturally exist in male individuals. Instead, it must be produced. "Pondering, then, why it can be that in those ancient times people were greater lovers of freedom than in" his times, Machiavelli concludes that the difference comes "from the same cause that makes men now less hardy." That is to say, "this [Christian] way of living, then, has made the world weak and . . . effeminate." Christians are effeminate because they do not engage in virile martial practices. On the other hand, pagans were manly because they were "fiercer in their actions" than the Christian males. Pagan sacrifices were "magnificent, . . . full of blood and ferocity. . . . [And] this terrible sight made the men resemble it." In contrast to this, Christianity has made men effeminate by "glorif[ying] humble and



contemplative men rather than active ones."<sup>50</sup> Clearly, Machiavelli did not consider *armed masculinity* a naturally occurring characteristic of male individuals. To the contrary, it must be constructed through participation in the fierce, bloody, and magnificent actions required during military service.

Furthermore, Machiavelli constructs his manly *virtu* not only through struggle against a *fortuna* considered feminine but also in opposition to a Christianity also considered feminine. In other words, *virtu* is both manly and secular. As Hulliung puts it,

arrayed on one side are the pagan virtues: *virtus*, glory, grandeur, magnificence, ferocity, exuberance, action, health, and manliness; on the other side are the Christian virtues, humility, abjectness, contempt for human things, withdrawal, inaction, suffering, and disease -- and the upshot of these Christian 'virtues,' he concludes, is the womanish mankind of postclassical times, whose histories are as ignoble as Rome's was noble.<sup>51</sup>

In Bonnie Honig's words,

Machiavelli seek[s] in *virtu* a manly alternative to what [he] describes as the feminizing, enfeebling and immobilizing virtue of Christianity. . . . *Virtu* for Machiavelli is a political excellence, connected with the greatest of all worldly rewards, glory. . . . Machiavelli criticizes virtue because its otherworldliness turns men away from the grandest of human worldly endeavors and sabotages the enterprise of politics.<sup>52</sup>

In short, the second meaning of Machiavellian *virtu* is a combative, secular *armed masculinity*, constructed in fierce opposition to femininity.

In laying out the dual meaning of the term *virtu* in Machiavelli's *oeuvre*, I want to suggest that there is not one "civic *virtu* of Machiavelli's *Discourses* -- the excellence of a citizen in a republic" -- and a "rather

different princely *virtu* of *The Prince*," as Honig asserts,<sup>53</sup> but rather that the two meanings are unified by the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. The civic virtue of the citizen and the combatively masculine action of the soldier come together in a figure that exhibits both characteristics at once. Put differently, engagement in the martial practices of the civic militia simultaneously creates citizens with civic virtue, soldiers who display manly *virtu*, and men who acquire their *armed masculinity* in opposition to a denigrated femininity. Consequently, Machiavelli's Citizen-Soldier ideal fuses masculinity onto citizenship.

Because "masculinity" is socially constructed rather than rooted in nature, it can never be finally secured. As a consequence, "femininity" -- masculinity's "excess and remainder"<sup>54</sup> -- always poses a threat to republican citizen-soldiers. Pitkin lays out four reasons for this. First, the seductive power of young women as sex objects "threatens a man's self-control, his mastery of his own passions." Second, women's erotic power "threatens to infect him with feminine softness." Third, men often succumb to the temptation to violate the chastity of another man's woman, which is one sure way to create political opposition and division. As Machiavelli says, men will tolerate most things as long as they 'are not deprived of either property or honor,' and, for him, women constitute both. And fourth, women threaten republican citizenship by "weaken[ing] the manly self-control of citizens . . . [which] tends to

privatize the republican citizen, drawing him out of the public square and into the bedroom."<sup>55</sup> In other words, femininity threatens the masculine citizen-soldier's ability to govern himself through legislation aimed at the common good, because it fuels his passions, privatizes him, and disrupts his ability to unite with other men, all of which interfere with the creation of civic virtue. Furthermore, these three things plus the stimulation of feminine softness within him hinder his cultivation of the martial virtues.

Because the Citizen-Soldier constitutes himself in opposition to "femininity," Machiavelli's normative republican vision requires the exclusion of feminine individuals, that is, women.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, it demands that citizen-soldiers stomp out any so-called "feminine" feelings that might exist within themselves. Consequently, as Pitkin argues, Machiavelli

juxtapose[s] men, autonomy, adulthood, relations of mutuality, politics, the *vivere civile*, human agency in history, and humanness itself, on the one side, to women, childhood, dependence, relations of domination, nature, the power of environment and circumstance, instinct, the body, and animality, on the other. Human autonomy and civility are male constructs painfully won from and continually threatened by corrosive feminine power. Male ambition and human sexuality, however, play ambiguous roles in this struggle, sometimes aiding and sometimes threatening the men. Indeed, the men themselves are ambivalent about the struggle; . . . feminine power seems to be in some sense inside the men themselves. Only ferocious discipline and terrifying punishments can secure them in the male enterprise of becoming human and autonomous.<sup>57</sup>

"Masculinity" is never a *fait accompli*; it must be continually constructed and reconstructed through ferocious military discipline and virile actions. And because of the combative nature of the Citizen-Soldier's masculinity, as

Wendy Brown rightly argues, his "construction of manliness . . . entails not mere opposition to but conquest of woman."<sup>58</sup> "Femininity" constitutes a profound danger to a tenuously constructed, *armed masculinity*. Only continual engagement in martial practices can ward off the feminine threat that exists not only outside men but within them as well. In short, the entire structure of Machiavelli's civic republicanism is erected upon the denigration of femininity in all its manifestations.

Soldiering plays a key role in the creation of both *armed masculinity* and citizenship in Machiavelli's work; it is the solder that fuses *armed masculinity* onto citizenship. However, soldiering, Machiavelli tells us, does not come naturally either to men or to citizens. Instead, good soldiers must be created through the right institutional context; discipline and training are absolutely essential to this process. Princes and republics that lack their own soldiers "ought to be ashamed," he argues. Using the example of Tullus, Machiavelli argues that a lack of soldiers "comes not from a lack of men fit for warfare but from their own error, because they have failed to make their men soldierly."<sup>59</sup> Tullus' ability was "so great" that

under his direction he immediately made [his men] into very excellent soldiers. So it is truer than any other truth that if where there are men there are not soldiers, the cause is a deficiency in the prince and not a deficiency in the position or nature of the country.

Warriors, he concludes, are not born only in certain places, "but in every . . . region where men are born, if only there

is someone who can direct them toward soldiership."<sup>60</sup> In the *Art of War* Machiavelli says that "ancient examples show that in every country training can produce good soldiers, because where nature fails, the lack can be supplied by ingenuity, which in this case is more important than nature."<sup>61</sup>

Likewise, in the *Prince* Machiavelli argues that

if, in so many convulsions in this land and in so much warfare, Italy's military vigor always seems extinct, . . . the cause is that her old institutions were not good, and no one has been wise enough to devise new ones; and . . . in Italy there is no lack of matter on which to impose any form; there is great power in the limbs, if only it were not wanting in the heads.<sup>62</sup>

The practices of the civic militia play a central role in the production of soldiers.

Soldiering, however, must be connected to citizenship. Machiavelli directly connects the civic militia to the sphere of civic realm in which republican citizens form good laws, when he emphasizes that liberty is the primary underpinning for good armies. "Wherever there are good soldiers," he argues, "there must be good government."<sup>63</sup> This is true because soldiers can only be good when they are protecting their liberty which can only be established and maintained through good government. That is to say, Machiavelli believes that liberty must be created through and nurtured in a context of good laws. Good laws both produce and protect liberty by limiting arbitrary power: "To republics, indeed, harm is done by magistrates that set themselves up and by power obtained in unlawful ways, not by

power that comes in lawful ways" (I-34, 267). Good armies require good laws.

Machiavelli argues that only within the context of republican institutions, such as the civic militia and the rule of citizen-authored law, can individuals become citizens. That is to say, when Machiavelli states that "laws make [men] good" (I-3, 201), he argues that outside of the context of law, men can easily slip back into their baser selves.

As is demonstrated by all those who discuss life in a well-ordered state -- and history is full of examples -- it is necessary for him who lays out a state and arranges laws for it to presuppose that all men are evil and that they are always going to act according to the wickedness of their spirits whenever they have free scope. (I-3, 201, emphasis mine)

That is why Machiavelli favors the rule of law over the rule of men: "Absolute authority in a very short time corrupts the matter and makes itself friends and partisans" (I-35, 270). For this reason Machiavelli cautions against the long-term delegation of power from the citizens to a magistrate. Although republics should empower a group of citizens to make executive decisions when quick decisions are needed, and so the necessarily slow deliberative process cannot be used, republics must be careful not to delegate this power for long periods of time because "when free authority is given for a long time -- that is, for a year or more -- it will always be dangerous and will produce good or bad effects according as those to whom it is given are bad or good" (I-34, 268). And of course whether they are bad or

good depends on whether they are able to use power to advance their own particular interests at the expense of the republic.

Partisanship within a republic is problematic because it causes individuals to place private ambition over public good and so compromises the process of legislation for the common good. Citizens in a republic must rule "wholly for the benefit of the state and [should] not in any respect regard private ambition" (III-22, 482). Public citizenship means ruling for the common good, and ruling for the common good constitutes public citizenship. Both are only possible in a republic:

Without doubt this common good is thought important only in republics, because everything that advances it they act upon, and however much harm results to this or that private citizen, those benefited by the said common good are so many that they are able to press it on against the inclination of those few who are injured by its pursuit. The opposite happens when there is a prince; then what benefits him usually injures the city, and what benefits the city injures him. (II-2, 329)

Not ruling for the common good causes great disorder, while doing so leads to greatness and increased wealth for the republic (I-49, 296).

Machiavelli believes that given the right republican institutional context, human beings can rise above their own narrowly defined self-interests and rule themselves for the common good.<sup>64</sup> Although he holds a cynical view of human nature, as a whole his writings reveal his belief that republican institutions and civic participation can successfully transform selfish individuals into citizens.

While he frequently refers to "the nature of men" as "ambitious and suspicious," as unable to "know how to set a limit to its own fortune,"<sup>65</sup> as "insatiable" and therefore always discontented,<sup>66</sup> as short-sighted, vengeful and ungrateful, he believes that in the context of the rule of law these self-interested men can become republican citizens. Arguing "against the common opinion" that insists on the need for princely rule because "the people, when they are rulers, are variable, changeable, and ungrateful," Machiavelli argues that in the context of the rule of law, the people can rule themselves better than a prince: "A people that commands and is well organized will be just as stable, prudent, and grateful as a prince, or will be more so than a prince, even though he is thought wise." Moreover, "a prince set loose from the laws will be more ungrateful, variable and imprudent than a people. . . . The variation in their actions," he argues, "comes not from a different nature -- because that is the same in all men, and if there is any superiority, it is with the people -- but from having more or less respect for the laws under which both of them live."<sup>67</sup> Thus, for Machiavelli the key determinant of how men will behave is the context of political institutions within which they live; men's actions are not necessarily driven by "human nature." While without the rule of law, men will only interact on the basis of power and self-interest, under the rule of law, men are



capable of governing themselves in accordance with the common good.

In fact, Sebastian de Grazia argues that Machiavelli's contention that naturally selfish individuals can still govern themselves for the common good marks his break with ancient philosophy:

In our philosopher's world men do not have an inherent impulse toward the common good. Quite the reverse. These wicked and unruly men are not just a few: they comprise mankind. . . . This is Niccolo's third major contribution to political philosophy: the vision of a world in which rational brutes must reach the common good. Binding a permanent, state-prone, or political and social, human nature to the end of a good-in-association, or the common good, was a triumph of ancient political philosophy. Niccolo snaps the link of nature and end. The common good is still the goal but no longer do men reach it naturally.<sup>68</sup>

Born rational brutes, (male) individuals are capable of governing themselves for the common good, but only in the context of participatory republican institutions.

On this point my reading differs from the one presented by Wendy Brown in *Manhood and Politics*. That is to say, in contradistinction to Brown, who stresses that Machiavelli's work emphasizes the "immutable characteristics of man,"<sup>69</sup> I would argue that for Machiavelli, man's "second nature" is much more important than any essential human nature. While Brown declares that "Machiavelli harbors no illusions about the usefulness of a political theory based upon 'men as they might be' rather than men as they are or can be," I would argue that Machiavelli does in fact offer a vision of how men could be given the right republican institutions. More

specifically, Brown uses the following passage to emphasize the "animality" Machiavelli attributes to human nature:

What great difficulty a people accustomed to living under a prince has later in preserving its liberty, if by any accident it gains it. . . . And such difficulty is reasonable because that people is none other than a brute beast which, though of a fierce and savage nature, has always been cared for in prison and slavery. Then if by chance it is left free in a field, since it is not used to feeding itself and does not know the places where it can take refuge, it becomes the prey of the first one who tries to chain it.<sup>70</sup>

In opposition to Brown's usage, I would stress that this passage emphasizes not man's "immutable" human nature but rather the importance of political institutions in reconstructing the "nature" of man. That is to say, "people accustomed to living under a prince" have not been transformed into citizens capable of ruling themselves through participation in civic and martial practices. For Machiavelli these practices are critically important, precisely because only they can construct citizens out of ambitious, self-interested individuals.

In other words, Machiavelli espouses a *citizenship of civic practices* in which a man never finally becomes a citizen, in the sense that he will always think and act in terms of the common good. Outside of republican institutions -- such as the rule of citizen-authored law and the civic militia -- which require him to behave as a citizen, he will cease to be one. Hence, the process of becoming a citizen is never finished. Citizens must be constantly re-produced through engagement in civic practices. For Machiavelli, participation in the twin

practices of civic republicanism -- in both the civic militia and civic legislation -- actually produces masculine citizen-soldiers out of male individuals. That is why only a republic contains citizens.

This *citizenship of civic practices* contrasts with two other conceptions of citizenship: *citizenship of blood* and *citizenship of land*. A *citizenship of blood* restricts citizenship to members of a particular ascribed group. With his positive appeal to the integration of new people into a republic -- whether by choice or by force -- Machiavelli clearly rejects the idea that citizenship should be based on common blood. He is not interested in securing citizenship only for those with Italian blood or noble blood. On the other hand, Machiavelli does not define citizens as any group of individuals living in the same location. For instance, individuals living within particular borders but under the rule of a prince are called subjects not citizens. A *citizenship of civic practices* requires participation in self-rule and in the civic militia. To be a citizen in a civic republic, one must constantly act as a citizen; the category of "citizen" is never finally consolidated.

So what I am arguing is that gender and citizenship are not pre-political categories. That is to say, there are not "men," "women," and "citizens" who then choose to engage in political action or not. When Brown argues that "manhood constructs politics," she is arguing that pre-political, cultural understandings of "manhood" directly affect the

shaping of politics because men make politics."<sup>71</sup> In this configuration, manhood pre-exists politics. What I want to argue, however, is slightly different. Instead of viewing "men," "women," and "citizens" as pre-political categories, my contention is that both citizenship and gender itself are constructed through engagement in a set of practices. In the latter case, participation in civic and martial practices constitutes masculinity, while exclusion from the practices constitutive of masculinity contributes to the construction of femininity. So it is not simply the case, as Jean Bethke Elshtain argues, that "Machiavelli's politics eliminates women by definition from the most important field of citizen involvement, military exploits."<sup>72</sup> This assumes that gender, masculinity and femininity, pre-exist the political context. What I am arguing, is that the civic militia provides a set of practices through which masculinity is actually created. To turn Brown on her head: politics constructs manhood.

Ironically, despite Machiavelli's masculinist construction of republican citizenship, his *citizenship of civic practices* actually allows us to imagine the possibility of including female individuals as citizens. That is to say, if men were essentially more capable of autonomy and mutuality than women, then the possibility of women ever becoming autonomous republican citizens would be profoundly problematized. However, this is not Machiavelli's argument. As I have demonstrated, Machiavelli

does not argue that men are naturally autonomous and capable of mutuality. In fact, Machiavelli repeatedly stresses that it is only within a carefully constructed context of always fragile republican institutions that men are able to transcend their ambitious, power-seeking, self-interested behavior and learn to become autonomous republican citizens capable of mutuality. And although many scholars have shown that Machiavelli considered only men capable of achieving autonomy and political mutuality, he did not argue that men are naturally that way. On the contrary, as I have shown, Machiavelli argues that men only become citizens capable of autonomy and mutuality through participation in civic and martial practices. Furthermore, this constitution of masculine citizens is never completed because once the civic republican context is ruptured, men revert back to being self-interested, power-seekers. And outside of the practices which produce republican masculinity, "men" become effeminate.<sup>73</sup>

What I would like to suggest is that if men's natures are subject to social construction through political practice, then so are women's. Women are not essentially more dependent, natural, and corporeal than men. To the contrary, they remain that way -- partly at least -- because of exclusion from civic and martial practices. Consequently, the *citizenship of civic practices* contains the democratic potential of including female individuals in republican citizenship: Perhaps female individuals could

become republican citizens alongside "men" if they began to engage in the same civic and martial practices. At the same time, however, the democratic potential of the *citizenship of civic practices* is undermined when the primary civic practice constitutive of citizenship is service in the civic militia, because the martial practices inherent in the civic militia produce a particularly combative form of *armed masculinity* that ultimately undermines the mutuality entailed in the idea of republican citizenship.

### **Identity Out of Diversity**

One of the most democratic aspects of the *citizenship of civic practices* is the construction of politically equal citizens out of diverse individuals. The practices of citizenship assume a certain amount of political equality among those to which it is extended. That is to say, ideally, all citizens should be included in the process of self-rule. In Rome, Machiavelli tells us,

a Tribune, and any other citizen whatever, had the right to propose a law to the people; on this every citizen was permitted to speak, either for or against, before it was decided. This custom was good when the citizens were good, because it has always been desirable that each one who thinks of something of benefit to the public should be permitted to state his opinion on it, in order that the people, having heard each, may choose the better.

Political equality is essential to civic legislation because power imbalances compromise the possibility of ruling for the common good. In Rome, Machiavelli continues, "when the

citizens became wicked" and thus concerned only with their own self-interest, civic legislation

became very bad, because only the powerful proposed laws, not for the common liberty but for their own power, and for fear of such men no one dared to speak against those laws. Thus the people were either deceived or forced into decreeing their own ruin. (I-18, 242)

Thus, without political equality civic legislation cannot occur, and without civic legislation there can be no citizenship.

Machiavelli argues that republican self-rule is superior to autocracy. In comparing the rule of the people to the rule of princes, Machiavelli argues that

as to judging things, very seldom does it happen, when a people hears two men orating who pull in opposite directions, that if the two are of equal ability, the people does not accept the better opinion and does not understand the truth it hears. And if in matters relating to courage or that seem profitable, as we said above, it errs, many times a prince too errs as a result of his own passions, which are many more than those of the people. It also appears that in choosing magistrates a people makes far better choices than a prince, nor will a people ever be persuaded that it is wise to put into high places a man of bad repute and of corrupt habits -- something a prince can be persuaded to do easily and in a thousand ways. (I-58, 316)

Citizens are more likely to rule for the common good and appoint qualified magistrates and less likely to govern according to passion and whim than are princes.

While Machiavelli stresses the need for political equality, however, he does not call for the elimination of all differences. In fact, not only does diversity exist, but it constitutes one of the benefits of republican government:

Thence it comes that a republic, being able to adapt herself, by means of the diversity among her body of citizens, to a diversity of temporal conditions better than a prince can, is of greater

duration than a princedom and has good fortune longer. (III-9, 453)

There exist, Machiavelli argues, in every republic "two opposed factions, that of the people and that of the rich" (I-3, 203). He goes on to insist, moreover, that it was precisely the differences that existed in Rome between the nobility and the people that formed "a first cause" in keeping "Rome free." That is to say, although noisy, he argues, "those dissensions" brought "good effects" (I-3, 202). More specifically, those dissensions in Rome did not cause "bloodshed" and were not "injurious" because of "honorable conduct" rooted in "good education" which was rooted

in good laws; good laws in those dissensions that many thoughtlessly condemn. For anyone who will properly examine [the outcome of these dissensions] will not find that they produced any exile or violence damaging to the common good, but rather laws and institutions conducive to public liberty. (I-4, 203)

In other words, the diversity of views considered when all citizens participate leads to the creation of good laws. And the process of participating in the formation of these laws contributes to the constitution of republican citizens out of diverse individuals. Thus, Machiavelli envisions political equality that allows for diversity.<sup>74</sup>

Moreover, governing for the common good does not annihilate individuality, but to the contrary actually creates citizens out of diverse individuals. Sebastian de Grazia argues that Machiavelli's conception of the common good locates "the benefit not on the community considered as an abstract whole, but on its members as individuals (each



one) or as superior numerically (the most)."<sup>75</sup> Pitkin too stresses that Machiavelli's common good require neither "a selfless merging" nor "submission to . . . repressive discipline." Instead, his republic

offers each Citizen, each class of Citizens, the genuine possibility of fulfilling individual needs, pursuing separate interests, expressing real passions; it does not depend on sacrifice, either voluntary or enforced. Yet the selfish and partial needs, interests, and passions brought into contact with the conflicting needs, interests, and passions of other Citizens and ultimately redefined collectively in relation to the common good -- a common good that emerges only out of the political interaction of the Citizens.<sup>76</sup>

The Citizen, she argues, can develop *virtu* only in the "actual experience of citizen participation. Only in crisis and political struggle are people forced to enlarge their understandings of themselves and their interests."<sup>77</sup> Participation in the process of legislating for the common good leads not only to good laws but also constitutes diverse individuals as citizens.

The important point here is that while in Machiavelli's world, republican citizenship was in fact restricted to an elite group of men, within this group differences existed. In other words, while from the outside the group seems very homogeneous -- especially from a late twentieth century perspective -- class differences existed and, moreover, the people included in the group no doubt believed themselves to be a diverse group of unique individuals with often conflicting desires. This view of civic republicanism offers us the possibility of imagining the creation of political equality out of a much greater diversity of individuals and

the forging of a *citizenship of civic practices* that does not annihilate differences.

Nevertheless, while Machiavelli insists that differences among citizens contribute to a well-governed republic, he also cautions that these differences can be destructive when they lead to the formation of factions. Because of natural inequalities of ability some men will achieve greater reputations than others. Unless harnessed to serve the public good, men of superior ability could destroy a republic. Reputation should be regulated, so that "citizens will get repute from popularity that aids and does not injure the city and her liberty."<sup>78</sup> In other words, reputation should be gained and honors given for deeds that benefit the common good. Reputations "gained in private ways" -- by "conferring . . . benefits on various private persons, by lending them money, marrying off their daughters, protecting them from the magistrates, and doing them similar private favors" -- "are very dangerous and altogether injurious" because these acts "make partisans of their benefactors and give the man they follow courage to think he can corrupt the public and violate the laws."<sup>79</sup> Large differences of wealth and power can destroy a republic. In sum, while diversity and natural inequalities in ability can contribute to the health of a republic, these differences can become divisive and lead a republic to ruin. To stave off this possibility, there must be political equality among citizens and publicly acclaimed ways for men

with superior abilities to serve the common good. There must also be political equality established and maintained through the rule of law to prevent individuals from exercising arbitrary power.

That is to say, the struggle of diverse individuals to act together for the common good both invigorates and threatens the existence of a civic republic. Honig emphasizes this in her discussion of Machiavelli. As she explains it, Machiavelli stressed that insatiable human desires "cannot be extirpated but they can be held in a creative and productive tension." Only the "perpetuity of [the] struggle" between the nobles and the people "and the institutional obstacles to its resolution, prevent any one party from dominating and closing the public space of law, liberty, and *virtu*."<sup>80</sup> Republicanism necessarily entails struggle and dissension as diverse individuals act together. While this always involves risk, it also keeps a republic vibrant.

### **Republican Ideals and Militaristic Conquest**

Machiavelli argues that preparing for war helps unify citizens for the common good: "The disunion of republics usually results from idleness and peace; the cause of union is fear and war."<sup>81</sup> War facilitates civic republicanism in three ways. In the first place, as I have been arguing, participation in the civic militia creates citizen-soldiers

out of diverse individuals. In other words, by serving together in the civic militia, individual males achieve a sense of patriotism, selflessness, and fraternity, and they gain a common civic identity. Preparing for war provides a venue through which individuals can act together for the common good and so become citizens. And the existence of a common enemy helps prevent the formation of factions within a republic. Put differently, preparing for war keeps the focus on what citizens have in common and places the enemy outside of the republic's borders rather than within them.

Secondly, being at war allows men of superior ability both to serve the republic and achieve personal glory as military officers. Republics, Machiavelli tells us, tend to "show this defect":

They pay slight attention to capable men in quiet times. This condition makes men feel injured in two ways: first, they fail to attain their proper rank; second, they are obliged to have as associates and superiors men who are unworthy and of less ability than themselves. This abuse in republic has produced much turmoil, because those citizens who see themselves undeservedly rejected, and know that they can be neglected only in times that are easy and not perilous, make an effort to disturb them by stirring up new wars to the damage of the republic. When I consider possible remedies, I find two: the first is to keep the citizens poor, so that, when without goodness and wisdom, they cannot corrupt themselves or others with riches; the second is to arrange that such republics will continually make war, and therefore always will need citizens of high repute, like the Romans in their early days.<sup>82</sup>

As Honig puts it,

if a republic's energies are not expended in war, they turn inward. If legitimate, institutional avenues of expression are not available, instincts and ambitions will seek other avenues of expression, and the result will be destabilizing conspiracies and the eventual overthrow of the regime.<sup>83</sup>

A civic militia constantly preparing for war helps republics maintain unity by providing a way of rewarding talented men in accordance with the common good. Thus, militarism channels the constant struggle that both invigorates and threatens the republic into service for the common good.

And thirdly, the waging of war is necessary to the construction of Machiavelli's *armed masculinity*. In his words, "were heaven so benign that a city had not to make war, it would happen that indolence would make [the city] either effeminate or divisive, which two things together, or each by itself, would be the cause of its ruin."<sup>84</sup> Soldiering is essential to the constitution of *armed masculinity* for Machiavelli. Soldiering simultaneously produces *armed masculinity* and republican citizenship and melds the two into one.

At first glance, Machiavelli's suggestion that "republics [should] continually make war" seems to contradict one of his main justifications for the Citizen-Soldier ideal. That is to say, as we discussed above, Machiavelli argues that one of the important characteristics of the civic militia is that citizen-soldiers are less likely to wage war than professional soldiers and that men of superior ability can cause problems for a republic by "stirring up new wars." Now we see that he also advocates continual preparation for war as a way of preventing the latter problem and unifying the republic: "Because a country is not always at war and cannot be, she must

therefore train her army in times of peace."<sup>85</sup> Although citizen-soldiers "will not seek to disturb the peace in order to have war,"<sup>86</sup> they must constantly prepare for war.

In the face of this paradox, I would argue, the Citizen-Soldier forms a dialectical ideal in Machiavelli's framework that actually reconciles republican citizenship with militarism. Preparing to fight external enemies imbues citizen-soldiers with patriotism, selflessness, fraternity, civic virtue, and civic participation, as well as *armed masculinity*. Unfortunately, along with these virtues come the vices of conquest, conformity, chauvinism, combativeness, and exclusion. Machiavelli's republican citizens need to prepare for war. With his Citizen-Soldier, Machiavelli attempts to balance republican ideals with the heroic ethic. He does not subordinate one to the other. So while Hulliung mistakenly argues that Machiavelli puts republicanism in the service of conquest, Grazia also errs when he argues that our theorist places conquest in the service of republican ideals.<sup>87</sup> Grazia might be right that "Niccolo is not a militarist at heart," but his Citizen-Soldier is both republican citizen and militaristic soldier. Embodying *virtu* in both senses -- civic virtue and *armed masculinity* -- the Citizen-Soldier synthesizes a variety of oppositional ideals in Machiavelli's work, including civic republicanism and militarism.

Machiavelli values the heroic ideal. That is why, as Hulliung points out,

of all republics past and present to choose from, it was the world-conquering Roman republic that arrested Machiavelli's attention. The ancient model he admired and hoped to reproduce in modern times was none other than that singularly expansionary, singularly successful Roman republic whose way of life had been the fulfillment of *virtus*, and ethic of glory, grandeur, and heroism.<sup>88</sup>

But at the same time, as Pocock explains, the continued existence of the republic also requires an internal commitment to republican ideals:

The republic can dominate *fortuna* only by integrating its citizens in a self-sufficient *universitas*, but this in turn depends on the freely participating and morally assenting citizen. The decay of citizenship leads to the decline of the republic and the ascendancy of *fortuna*.<sup>89</sup>

That is, it would mean the end of both republican ideals and the heroic ethic. One of the reasons Machiavelli supported republicanism and the civic militia is because it allowed for the greatest development of *virtu* -- in both its senses.

As is often the case, however, Machiavelli's dialectical synthesis did not withstand *realpolitik*. His work gave birth to the idea of *raison d'etat* and so played a key role in the emergence of nationalism. In this case, the republican ideals dropped out but the militarism did not. Friedrich Meinecke explains this phenomenon as follows:

It has been the fate of Machiavelli, as of so many great thinkers, that only one part of his system of thought has been able to influence historical life. . . . His ideal of *virtu* soon faded . . . and with that too the ethical aim of his statecraft. . . . Generally speaking he was seen first and foremost as having prepared the poison of autocracy; as such, he was publicly condemned and secretly made use of. . . . The chief thing was, however, that the idea of political regeneration was altogether beyond the capabilities and the wishes of the peoples and the rulers of the time, and hence it fell to the ground. . . . Machiavelli's ancient heathen idealism of the State was no longer understood by the men of the Counter-Reformation period. . . . But they very well understood the ancient heathen realism of his statecraft.<sup>90</sup>

Meinecke traces the evolution of Machiavelli's politics as it slowly transformed into a justification for German nationalism in the early twentieth century.<sup>91</sup>

In an attempt to defend Machiavelli against the charges that his theory played into the emergence of nationalism, Maurizio Viroli argues that Machiavelli advocated patriotism rather than nationalism. Viroli defines patriotism as the love of the political institutions, laws, and way of life that sustains the common liberty of the people. Political in orientation, it involves a charitable love of the republic. Nationalism, on the other hand, posits a spiritual unity, a cultural and linguistic oneness or homogeneity among the people. It requires unconditional loyalty and mixes love with pride and fear.<sup>92</sup> But while Viroli rightly distinguishes between patriotism and nationalism, he wishes away the slippage that easily occurs between the two tendencies: Machiavelli theorized patriotism but spawned nationalism. And this is no accident. So while I share Viroli's desire to foster patriotism while condemning nationalism, my understanding of Machiavelli's project reveals that the two go hand-in-hand. Moreover, when Machiavelli made martial practices the foundation for his republican citizenship, he exacerbated the vicious flip-sides of the virtues he was primarily trying to create.

Nevertheless, because of the dialectical nature of his theory, Machiavelli's legacy is appropriately dual. On the



one hand his theory did indeed undergo what Meinecke calls a "sinister development" as its dialectical edifice collapsed into Machiavellism and then evolved into nationalism<sup>93</sup> -- complete with its own virtues and vices. On the other hand, however, Machiavelli's theoretical vision also forms the origins of what Pocock refers to as "the Atlantic republican tradition" that culminated in the American and French Revolutions. This tradition retains Machiavelli's commitment to the cluster of republican ideals: liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of man-made law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship. And we will soon see to what extent the traditional vices continue to live on within this tradition as well. So the dialectical nature of Machiavelli's thought produces two divergent traditions -- one more virtuous and one more vicious -- each of which entails its own interrelated sets of virtues and vices.

I end with two conclusions and two questions. First of all, I am arguing finally is that to the extent that the *citizenship of civic practices* privileges martial practices over other possible forms of civic action, the vices of this tradition will be amplified. Due to its militaristic nature, the Citizen-Soldier ideal has two major flaws. In the first place, it requires the presence of an enemy. As Brown puts it, Machiavellian "politics is utterly dependent upon the presence of an enemy, it is at all times a fight, and dissolves when opposition is not present or is too weak

to inspire consolidated struggle."<sup>94</sup> The invocation of an enemy for the purposes of fostering republican citizenship brings out the vicious side of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. Constant preparation for combat against an enemy does indeed facilitate the creation of republican citizenship but at an undemocratic price. Preparing for war renders citizen-soldiers patriotic, as it fuels their desire for conquest. Citizen-soldiers selflessly serve the republic, but the cause of war exerts pressure on them to conform. Military service necessarily requires both feelings of fraternity and feelings of superiority toward the enemy -- chauvinism. So, to the extent that the militaristic practices comprise the civic practices constitutive of citizenship, the vices of civic republicanism will be strengthened. Question number one: Would a broader, less combative variety of civic practices produce the virtues of republican citizenship, while minimizing its related vices?

Secondly, as we have seen in our discussion of Machiavelli, martial practices play a key role in the constitution of both *armed masculinity* and republican citizenship within the Citizen-Soldier tradition; soldiering forms the link that fuses masculinity onto citizenship. Moreover, the combative nature of the *armed masculinity* produced by this tradition results in the denigration of femininity and all the values traditionally associated with it. At the same time, however, because within the

*citizenship of civic practices*, both masculinity and citizenship are politically and socially constructed, this leaves open the possibility of reconstructing traditional configuration of gender and citizenship. This leaves us with our second question: What would happen if women began to engage in civic practices that produce masculine citizen-soldiers? In the next chapter we will begin to answer these two questions as we must examine the eighteenth century's most important theorist of the Citizen-Soldier ideal: Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> All Machiavelli citations are from *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, trans. A. Gilbert (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965) and are cited by work and page number. *Prince*, ch. 12, 47.

<sup>2</sup> All Machiavelli citations are from *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, trans. <sup>2</sup> For a good recent overview of the debates, see Mark Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), ch. 1. Three good older surveys are Hans Baron, "Machiavelli: Republican Citizen and Author of the *Prince*," *English Historical Review* 76 (1961), 217-253; Richard C. Clark, "Machiavelli: Bibliographic Spectrum," *Review of National Literatures* 1 (1970), 93-135; Eric Cochrane, "Machiavelli: 1940-1960," *Journal of Modern History* 33 (1961), 113-136; and John H. Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies Since 1969," *Journal of History of Ideas* 37 (1976) 351-368.

<sup>3</sup> For Leo Strauss's original argument see his *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958). For a defense of Strauss, see Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Strauss's Machiavelli," *Political Theory* 3 (1975), 372-384. For J. G. A. Pocock's criticism see "A Comment on Mansfield's 'Strauss's Machiavelli,'" *Political Theory* 3 (1975), 385-401.

<sup>4</sup> Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*.

<sup>5</sup> Alfred von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance* (New York, 1963), 65-70.

<sup>6</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Political Writings*, 219-29. See Shlomo Avineri's commentary in *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 53-4.

<sup>7</sup> For overviews of these interpretations, see Baron, "Machiavelli," 219; Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), 121-125; and Clark, "Machiavelli," 101. See Meinecke's discussion of Hegel, Fichte, and Ranke in *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'etat and Its Place in Modern History*, tr. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 343-391.

<sup>8</sup> For discussions of sixteenth and seventeenth century condemnations of Machiavelli and its more favorable eighteenth century reception, see Baron, "Machiavelli," 217-221; Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, 116; and Clark, "Machiavelli," 98-101.

<sup>9</sup> For examples, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 92-99; Max Lerner, introduction to *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950); and Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli's Virtue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

<sup>10</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*.

<sup>11</sup> See Benedetto Croce, *Politics and morals*, tr. J. Castiglione (New York, 1945) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "A Note on Machiavelli," in *Signs*, tr. R. C. McCleary (Evanston, IL, 1964), 211-223.

<sup>12</sup> Important republican readings of Machiavelli's work include Sebastian de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University

of California Press, 1984); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). For a recent discussion of various aspects of Machiavelli's republicanism, see *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, eds. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>13</sup> For example, Baron argues that "instead of looking at the *Prince* and the *Discourses* as two complementary parts of one harmonious whole, we would indeed do better to reconsider what to earlier generations had seemed to be so manifest: that Machiavelli's two major works are in basic aspects different and that the *Discourses* have a message of their own." See "Machiavelli," 217-53. Allan H. Gilbert sees the *Prince* as a *realpolitikal* means to a republican end. See his *Machiavelli's Prince and Its Forerunners* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1938) and his introduction to *The Prince and Other Works*. Meinecke argues that "the contrast between the monarchist bias in the *Principe* and the republican tinge of the *Discorsi* is only apparent. The quantity of *virtu*, which existed in a people, was the factor that decided whether a monarchy or a republic was the more suitable." See *Machiavellism*, 43.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Grazia argues that "a staunch republican, [Machiavelli] is convinced that the times require extraordinary measures taken by one man alone. His republicanism has no theoretical problem accommodating one-generation, one-alone leadership if it will lend life to the republic." See *Machiavelli in Hell*, 240. Meinecke argues that Machiavelli's "republican ideal therefore contained a strain of monarchism, in so far as he believed that even republics could not come into existence without the help of great individual ruling personalities and organizers. He had learnt from Polybius the theory that the fortunes of every State are repeated in a cycle, and that the golden age of a republic is bound to be followed by its decline and fall. And so he saw that, in order to restore the necessary quantum of *virtu* which a republic had lost by sinking to such a low point, and thus raise up the State once again, there was only one means to be adopted; namely, that the creative *virtu* of one individual, of one *mano regia*, one *podesta quasi regia* (*Disc.*, I, 18 and 55), should take the State in hand and revive it. Indeed he went so far as to believe that for republics which were completely corrupt and no longer capable of regeneration, monarchy was the only possible form of government. Thus his concept of *virtu* formed a close link between republican and monarchical tendencies, and, after the collapse of the Florentine Republic, enabled him without inconsistency to set his hopes on the rule of the Medicis, and to write for them the *Book of the Prince*. In the same way it made it possible for him immediately afterwards to take up again in the *Discorsi* the strain of republicanism, and to weigh republic and monarchy against one another." See *Machiavellism*, 31-3.

<sup>15</sup> *The Prince*, ch. 26, 95, emphasis mine.

<sup>16</sup> Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, 25.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 5, emphasis mine.

<sup>19</sup> Hulliung begins by arguing that "'civic humanism,' as formulated by contemporary scholars, errs in de-emphasizing or even expurgating the vital notions of *grandezza* and *gloria* from the republican tradition" -- values that he suggests were always there. But he ends by attacking the commitment to republican ideals in Machiavelli's thought: "the political significance of speech and rhetoric has been overemphasized"

in republican readings of Machiavelli and so now needs to "suffer a certain demotion in contemporary scholarship." Ibid., 21.

<sup>20</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>22</sup> Machiavelli, *Prince*, ch. 12, 47.

<sup>23</sup> "War is inescapable. . . . The need for a common defense against other men . . . arises at the dawn of mankind and remains day and night." Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 166.

<sup>24</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 14.

<sup>25</sup> See Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment* and Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman* for a more detailed history.

<sup>26</sup> Hans Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance*, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

<sup>27</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, III-31, 500.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., II-30, 410.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., II-30, 410-411.

<sup>30</sup> For an historical discussion of Machiavelli's practical attempts to organize a militia, see C.C. Bayley, *War and Society in Renaissance Florence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 240-267.

<sup>31</sup> Machiavelli, *Prince*, ch. 12, 48.

<sup>32</sup> Machiavelli, *Art of War*, I, 574.

<sup>33</sup> Machiavelli, *Prince*, ch. 12, 47. Machiavelli also argues in *Discourses* I-43 (286) that mercenaries are "useless" because they have "no other reason that holds them firm than the little pay you give them. This reason is not and cannot be enough to make them faithful or so much your friends that they are willing to die for you."

<sup>34</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-43, 286.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., II-2, 328.

<sup>36</sup> Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 200-201.

<sup>37</sup> See Ibid., 51-52.

<sup>38</sup> Pocock, "A Comment on Mansfield's 'Strauss's Machiavelli,'" 390. See also Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 216. Cassirer agrees: "In [Machiavelli's] theory all the previous theocratic ideas and ideals are eradicated root and branch." However, despite his rejection of Christianity, Cassirer argues, Machiavelli "never meant . . . to separate politics from religion. He was an opponent of the Church but he was no enemy of religion. He was, on the contrary, convinced that religion is one of the necessary elements of man's social life. But in his system this element cannot claim any absolute, independent, and dogmatic truth. Its worth and validity depend entirely on its influence on political life. By this standard, however, Christianity occupies the lowest place. For it is in strict opposition to all real political virtue. . . . A merely passive religion, a religion that flees the world instead of organizing it, has proved to be the ruin of many kingdoms and states." *The Myth of the State*, 138.

<sup>39</sup> Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 157, 193.

<sup>40</sup> For an oppositional discussion of virtue in Machiavelli, see Mansfield, *Machiavelli's Virtue*, 6-52. For example, Mansfield asserts the "classical republican interpretation[s] . . . understand Machiavelli's virtue admiringly as self-sacrifice for the common good of the republic. That it is not" (xv).

<sup>41</sup> Quentin Skinner, "The republican ideal of political liberty," in *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, 303, emphasis mine.

<sup>42</sup> Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 176.

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- <sup>43</sup> Skinner, "The republican ideal of political liberty," 303.
- <sup>44</sup> Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 201
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., 203.
- <sup>46</sup> Most scholars agree with this derivation of the term *virtu*. For an oppositional view, see Mansfield who denies that Machiavelli's virtue comes from ancient or Roman understandings of manliness. *Machiavelli's Virtue*, 36-7.
- <sup>47</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 25. For a similar arguments see Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, 29. and Wendy Brown, *Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), 90.
- <sup>48</sup> For a in-depth and nuanced exploration of this issue, see Pitkin, *Fortune is a Woman*.
- <sup>49</sup> Machiavelli, *Prince*, ch. 25, 92.
- <sup>50</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, II-2, 330-1, emphases mine.
- <sup>51</sup> Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, 68.
- <sup>52</sup> Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 68-9.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 230.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 3.
- <sup>55</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 117-118.
- <sup>56</sup> Brown makes a similar argument in *Manhood and Politics*.
- <sup>57</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 136, emphasis mine.
- <sup>58</sup> Brown, *Manhood and Politics*, 88.
- <sup>59</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-21, 246, emphasis mine.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., I-21, 247, emphasis mine.
- <sup>61</sup> Machiavelli, *Art of War*, I, 581, emphasis mine.
- <sup>62</sup> Machiavelli, *Prince*, ch. 26, 94.
- <sup>63</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-4, 202.
- <sup>64</sup> See Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 193.
- <sup>65</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-29, 257.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., II-1, 323.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., I-58, 315.
- <sup>68</sup> Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 269-70.
- <sup>69</sup> Brown, *Manhood and Politics*, 73.
- <sup>70</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-16, 235, emphasis mine. Also see Brown, *Manhood and Politics*, 74.
- <sup>71</sup> Brown, *Manhood and Politics*.
- <sup>72</sup> Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman*, 98.
- <sup>73</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I-21, 247; III-36, 510.
- <sup>74</sup> Pitkin stresses this point in *Fortune Is a Woman*, ch. 4.
- <sup>75</sup> Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 192.
- <sup>76</sup> Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman*, 93.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., 96.
- <sup>78</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, III-28, 492.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid., III-28, 493.
- <sup>80</sup> Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, 70. See Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 2. Preface; I.vi. and "Homer's Contest," 36-7.
- <sup>81</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, II-25, 399.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., III-16, 469.

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<sup>83</sup> Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, 71. See also Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, 26.

<sup>84</sup> Machiavelli, *Florentine Histories*.

<sup>85</sup> Machiavelli, *Discourses*, III-31, 500, emphasis mine.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., I, 578.

<sup>87</sup> Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, 36. Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, 172.

<sup>88</sup> Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*.

<sup>89</sup> Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, 56. Hulliung argues similarly: "While the individual excellence of the prince may be admirable, the greatest feats of heroism are collective and popular in nature. In its democratic form, *virtus* taps the potential greatness of the common man, his willingness to fight and die for his country, and can claim as its due meed of glory the conquest of all other republics." *Citizen Machiavelli*, 5-6.

<sup>90</sup> Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 44-45.

<sup>91</sup> See also Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, 140-1.

<sup>92</sup> Maurizio Viroli, "The Meaning of Patriotism," paper presented at the Walt Whitman Seminar, Rutgers University, 1 February 1994.

<sup>93</sup> Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 410.

<sup>94</sup> Brown, *Manhood and Politics*, 115.



## Chapter Two

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### **'Jean-Jacques ... You are a Genevan': Civic Festivals, Martial Practices, and the Production of Civic Identity**

"Your true republican is a man who . . . has eyes only for  
the fatherland."

--- Rousseau, *Government of Poland*<sup>1</sup>

Rousseau's political theory presents us with the best articulated eighteenth century version of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. Although Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier tradition parallels Machiavelli's to some extent, it also differs from Machiavelli's in several interesting ways. This chapter argues that the Citizen-Soldier stands at the very center of Rousseau's theoretical framework because it embodies a set of practices that produce the necessary foundation for republican self-rule: The civic and martial practices constitutive of the Citizen-Soldier also produce patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue, as well as the *general will* itself, the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good. At the same time, however, the practices of the Citizen-Soldier tradition also produce a set of vices that form the flipsides of those same virtues: patriotism can produce nationalism, fraternity can produce fusion, civic virtue can produce homogeneity, and the *general will* can produce a totalizing civic identity.

While these interrelated virtues and vices are always inextricably linked, Rousseau's version of the Citizen-Soldier actually exacerbates the vicious side of this tradition because he creates unity through an all-encompassing set of civic and martial practices, the channeling of all passion toward the fatherland, and the production of a totalizing civic identity that replaces all others. That is to say, while he avoids the problems associated with the creation of unity through opposition to an external enemy -- Machiavelli's vice -- Rousseau creates unity by forging versions of fraternity, patriotism, and civic identity that are so strong that they slip easily into fusion, nationalism, and homogeneity.

Dialectical in nature, Rousseau's theoretical legacy is appropriately dual. His ideas were used to bolster both nationalism and popular sovereignty. At the end of the chapter, we will see how Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier contributed during the era of the French Revolution to both the emergence of nationalism and as well as to the emergence of the radical democratic concept of popular sovereignty that underwrote both the French and the American Revolutions. The chapter concludes with an examination of the transgressive struggle of *La Societe des Citoyennes Republicaines Revolutionnaires* to occupy the position of the Citizen-Soldier.

## Rousseau and Machiavelli

At first glance, Rousseau's argument for the civic militia parallels Machiavelli's in several ways. Like Machiavelli, Rousseau argues that a civic militia made up of all citizens forms the best mode of defense for a republic because soldiers fight most effectively when defending their own liberty: "people always fight better in defense of their own than in defense of what belongs to others" (81). Consequently, citizens make the best soldiers. Secondly, like Machiavelli, Rousseau emphasizes the importance of a civic militia as a bulwark against tyranny. And while Rousseau, writing in the eighteenth century, primarily feared a tyranny imposed by the King's standing army rather than by mercenaries, his point is the same:

Regular armies have been the scourge and ruin of Europe. They are good for only two things: attacking and conquering neighbors, and fettering and enslaving citizens. . . . The state's true defenders are its individual citizens, no one of whom should be a professional soldier, but each of whom should serve as a soldier as duty requires (80-81).

The protection of the republic from tyranny requires "a good militia" -- "a genuine, well-trained militia" -- "be ready at all times to serve the republic" (81). And third, like Machiavelli, Rousseau says that only defensive military forces are needed in a republic. Because a republic is fundamentally concerned with protecting liberty, "offensive power is incompatible with [a republican] form of government. Those who will freedom must not will conquest

as well"(80). Furthermore, "he who tries to take away the freedom of others nearly always ends up losing his own"(85). According to this traditional argument, the civic militia is the best defense against both tyranny and war.

And like Machiavelli -- or any theorist of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, for that matter -- Rousseau presents a model of citizenship which I have named the *citizenship of civic practices*. According to this paradigm, "citizens" are not pre-existing entities who then choose whether or not to engage in political action. Instead, citizens are actually produced through engagement in civic and martial practices. One is not born but rather becomes a citizen, as one engages with others in civic practices, in particular those of the civic militia. And while the Citizen-Soldier tradition requires both participation in legislation for the common good and service in the militia, it is the latter that forms the pre-requisite for the willingness to do the former.

And as with Machiavelli, Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier constitutes a normative ideal that links military service to participatory citizenship. Citizen-soldiers fight to defend their right to self-govern and the corresponding republican ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship. Because of this connection, both halves of the Citizen-Soldier are equally important. In other words, the Citizen-Soldier ideal cannot be equated simply with

universal conscription. Instead, it links universal conscription with participatory citizenship.

And finally, Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier ideal, like Machiavelli's, fuses *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship. As we shall soon see, for Rousseau, being a man means being a soldier. The two identities are interconnected and mutually constituted through engagement in martial practices. The ideal of the Citizen-Soldier then fuses this performatively constructed *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship. As with Machiavelli, Rousseau's male individuals become masculine republican citizen-soldiers as they engage in the civic and martial practices prescribed by the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier.

Despite these similarities, however, Rousseau's version of the Citizen-Soldier tradition differs significantly from Machiavelli's. That is to say, Rousseau's *citizenship of civic practices* includes a much broader array of civic practices than does Machiavelli's. While Machiavelli focuses almost exclusively on martial practices as creating the necessary prerequisites to self-government aimed at the common good, Rousseau sees citizenship as constituted not only through martial practices but also through the wide variety of civic practices comprising the civic festival. Martial practices play a central but not an exclusive role in Rousseau's vision.

Machiavelli and Rousseau create civic unity in profoundly different ways and so present us with different

dangers. Machiavelli imagines a unitary citizenry formed in opposition to an external enemy, and this emphasis ends up leading Machiavelli away from his claim about the defensive nature of the civic militia and towards the valorization of conquest. Rousseau, on the other hand, resists using the threat of an external enemy to unify his citizenry. And while Rousseau does make some use of the existence of internal enemies -- particularity and femininity -- for the most part he creates civic unity by envisioning an all-encompassing set of civic and martial practices that produce not only a totalizing civic identity that leaves no room for particularity, but also versions of civic virtue, fraternity, and patriotism so strong that they easily slip over into homogeneity, fusion, and nationalism.

### **Rousseau's *Citizenship of Civic Practices***

In keeping with the Citizen-Soldier tradition, Rousseau presents us with a *citizenship of civic practices* in which individuals become citizens only as they engage together in civic and martial practices. For example, in *On the Social Contract* Rousseau defines citizenship as civic participation: "As for the associates, they collectively take the name *people*; and individually are called *Citizens* as participants in the sovereign authority, and *Subjects* as subject to the laws of the State." Individuals are only citizens to the extent that they participate in sovereign

authority, that is, in the civic practices of self-government. In other words, "citizens" are not pre-existing entities who then decide whether to engage in politics or not. Instead, the category of "citizen" is constituted only through engagement in civic and martial practices. Put differently, the founding of a republic creates the possibility of citizenship because it provides individuals with the opportunity to become citizens as they participate in the political process.

Rousseau's social contract reconciles the individual and the community. Although the social contract transforms "private person[s]" into a "moral and collective body" of citizens, these citizens do not lose their standing as individuals within the republic: "In addition to the public person, we have to consider the private persons who compose it and whose life and freedom are naturally independent of it."<sup>3</sup> In addition to maintaining "life and freedom" outside of the body politic, the individual also retains his own individual voice within the republic. As Rousseau puts it, the "moral and collective body" created by the social contract is "composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly."<sup>4</sup> Here having a voice in the assembly defines citizenship for Rousseau. In other words, Rousseau constructs a dialectic between the individual and the community. One does not stand opposed to the other.

Participatory citizenship is essential to Rousseau's vision. The people must take an active role in governing

themselves: "If the people promises simply to obey, it dissolves itself by that act; it loses the status of a people."<sup>5</sup> Citizenship -- and even the concept of "the people" -- requires civic participation. Unlike Kant's *categorical imperative*, Rousseau's *general will* cannot be determined in the abstract.<sup>6</sup> It requires hard political work. The "pluses and minuses" of particular wills "which cancel each other out" can only be known in practice.<sup>7</sup> No one individual alone can do the work required of citizens. And moreover, outside of the context of political participation, there are no citizens because citizenship must be constantly constructed and reconstructed through engagement in civic practices.

Moreover, participation in civic practices actually produces a new civic identity that replaces other more particularistic identities.<sup>8</sup> That is to say, because identity is performatively constructed, as the individual participates in civic republican practices, he undergoes a change of identity. "In place of the private person" stands the citizen, an identity "produce[d]" through civic practices, such as participation in political assemblies and service in the civic militia.<sup>9</sup> And for Rousseau, particular identities are not simply supplemented by the new civic identity, but instead are replaced. Rousseau's vision has no room for multiple identities. One cannot be, for example, both a citizen and a Roman Catholic because such split identities would divide the republic and "everything



that destroys social unity is worthless."<sup>10</sup> Or as Rousseau remarks in the *Government of Poland*, the Polish citizen should be "purely Polish." The new civic identity does not synthesize a multiplicity of particular identities, for Rousseau. Instead, civic identity replaces other identities.

Particular interests as well as particular identities must be discarded in order to discover the *general will*. That is to say, the *general will* by definition includes only what citizens share in common: "There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter considers only the common interest; the former considers private interest, and is only a sum of private wills" (61). The *general will* concerns what citizens share in common and excludes what differentiates them from each other.

Essentially, what Rousseau does is create unity out of diversity, albeit by focusing only on what individuals share in common. That is to say, Rousseau begins with the reality of diversity of individuals -- not diverse by today's standards, granted, but diverse in the sense that each individual has his own unique desires, interests, and will. Put differently, the political process as articulated by Rousseau allows for a certain degree of heterogeneity, in that he assumes there will be a multiplicity of conflicting particular interests among citizens. In Rousseau's words, men "may be unequal in force or in genius" (58).

Differences of wealth and rank may continue to exist within a republic without being incompatible with political equality. The important point is that these differences should not affect citizenship in that all men, regardless of particularities, can and should be transformed into citizens through engagement in civic practices, such as soldiering. Precisely because a certain degree of heterogeneity necessarily exists within any republic, engaging together in civic practices is essential to the constitution of republican citizenship.

Again the critical point here is that citizenship must be a relationship of political equality in the face of individual differences. For Rousseau, the formation of the social contract actually creates political equality:

The fundamental compact . . . substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality nature may have placed between men, and that although they may be unequal in force or in genius, they all become equal through convention and by right. (58, emphasis mine)

The rule of law within the community, self-given law, assures the political equality of all citizens:

The social pact establishes equality among the citizens in that they all pledge themselves under the same conditions and must all enjoy the same rights. Hence by the nature of the compact, every act of sovereignty, that is, every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally, so that the sovereign recognizes only the whole body of the nation and makes no distinction between any of the members who compose it. (76)

Republican citizenship necessarily entails political equality.

Nevertheless, Iris Marion Young and Joan Landes rightly argue that Rousseau's political equality and *general will*

come at the expense of particularity and difference. They criticize Rousseau's version of the common good for excluding everything not held in common from political deliberations.<sup>11</sup> In other words, Rousseau's *general will* does not allow room for serious dissension and debate. As Rousseau explains:

As long as several men together consider themselves to be a single body, they have only a single will, which relates to their common preservation and the general welfare. Then all the mechanisms of the state are vigorous and simple, its maxims are clear and luminous, it has no tangled, contradictory interests; the common good is clearly apparent everywhere, and requires only good sense to be perceived. . . . But when the social tie begins to slacken and the State to grow weak; when private interests start to make themselves felt and small societies to influence the large one, the common interest changes and is faced with opponents; unanimity no longer prevails in the votes; the general will is no longer the will of all; contradictions and debates arise and the best advice is not accepted without disputes.<sup>12</sup>

Rousseau does not imagine a *general will* that is created out of real political deliberation among diverse individuals with (initially) very different agendas. Instead, his *general will* requires the elimination of particularity from the political discussion. Only with this done, can citizens focus on what they share in common. Rousseau may create unity out of diversity, but only at the expense of diversity.

As Young and Landes argue, because the *general will* "considers only the common interest," it cannot address the particular issues that concern only certain sectors of the population. That is, Rousseau's political process cannot include so-called "women's issues" because these issues are seen as particular rather than universal. Thus, Young and

Landes conclude, the usefulness of Rousseau's concept of the *general will* for contemporary American politics is limited. And on this point they are right: A conception of the common good that cannot accommodate real debate and that on principle cannot address political issues of concern only to particular sectors of the citizenry, such as women, African-Americans, lesbians, or gay men, should not be incorporated into contemporary American politics. Nevertheless, despite the limitations of Rousseau's *general will*, this does not mean, I would argue, that every rendition of the common good has to be exclusionary, as Young and Landes imply. However, as with other aspects of Rousseau's theoretical vision, his *general will* overemphasizes unity and so ends up becoming exclusionary and thus undemocratic -- a point we will address more fully below.

These problems notwithstanding, however, Rousseau's restriction of the *general will* to what citizens share in common prevents his political theory from becoming totalitarian. The *general will* itself is not a totalitarian concept. As Rousseau emphasizes, the *general will* does allow room for personal freedoms, for the pursuit of "particular desires, needs, and interests" and for "personal satisfaction" -- outside of the body politic; the individual maintains "life and freedom . . . independent of" the body politic. That is to say, "each person alienates through the social compact only that part of his power, goods, and freedom whose use matters to the community." He does not

abandon everything. And while "the sovereign alone is the judge of what matters, . . . the sovereign, for its part, cannot impose on the subjects any burden that is useless to the community."<sup>13</sup> And of course, we must remember here that for Rousseau the sovereign is nothing other than the body politic made up of all citizens. Consequently, Rousseau can plead innocent to the charges of "totalitarianism" as leveled by J. L. Talmon.<sup>14</sup>

### **Civic Festivals: Creating the Foundation for the *General Will***

Rousseau begins *On the Social Contract* by puzzling over how to reconcile individual freedom with civil society and the rule of law:

"Find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.' This is the fundamental problem which is solved by the social contract."<sup>15</sup>

Rousseau's reconciliation of individual freedom with a civil society governed by the rule of law depends upon his definition of freedom. Rousseau defines freedom, not as the absence of law, but rather as obedience only to one's own will: When an individual obeys only himself, he is free. Working from this definition, Rousseau reasons that if freedom is obedience only to one's own will, then an individual remains free when he obeys self-willed law: "Obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is

freedom."<sup>16</sup> In this way, Rousseau reconciles freedom with obedience to the law.

This solution leads Rousseau to another puzzle, however: What guarantees that a man will obey the law he gives to himself? As Rousseau phrases this question (in a different text): "By what means are we to move men's hearts and bring them to love their fatherland and its laws?"<sup>17</sup> The cursory answer he presents in *On the Social Contract* is that "mores, customs, and especially . . . opinion -- a part of the laws unknown to our political theorists, but on which the success or all the others depends" -- play a key role in creating the foundation for republican self-rule. This "fourth" and "most important" type of law -- mores, customs, and opinion -- is

not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of the citizens; which is the true constitution of the state; which gains fresh force each day; which, when other laws age or die out, revives or replaces them, preserves a people in the spirit of its institution, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority.<sup>18</sup>

In other words, the existence of common mores, customs, and opinions forms the foundation for the existence of the *general will* and for the willingness to obey its laws.

The Citizen-Soldier stands at the very center of Rousseau's entire theoretical framework because this figure embodies the practices that produce the necessary foundation for the existence of a *general will* and obedience to the laws it generates. More specifically, the willingness of the citizen to obey self-given laws depends upon the

existence of patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue -- all of which are created through engagement in civic and martial practices. Patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue are not natural attributes of men. Instead, they must be created within the right institutional context. The "spiritual vigor" and "patriotic zeal" characteristic of the ancients are "unknown to us moderns," Rousseau tells us, only because we do not use our political institutions to construct these qualities as a second nature. "What prevents us from being the kind of men [the ancients] were?" Rousseau asks. His answer: "The prejudices, the base philosophy, and the passions of narrow self-interest which, along with indifference to the welfare of others, have been inculcated in all our hearts by ill-devised institutions."<sup>19</sup> The institutional context is the primary determinant of how men will behave. Only engaging together in civic practices will transform self-interested individuals into republican citizens, who have a *general will* and will consider it rather than just their own narrowly defined interests. For this reason, institutionalized arenas for civic action are critical to Rousseau's vision: Without them we will have not citizens obedient to the *general will* but rather self-interested individuals.

Civic festivals play an important role in the creation of patriotism, which forms a necessary pre-condition for obedience to the law. "By what means," Rousseau asks,

are we to move men's hearts and bring them to love their fatherland and its laws? Dare I say? Through the games they play as children, through institutions that, though superficial man would deem them pointless, develop habits that abide and attachments that nothing can dissolve.<sup>20</sup>

Civic-oriented games teach children patriotism by teaching them to love and respect the principles of civic republicanism. Playing together in public gets children "accustomed, from an early moment, to rules, to equality, to fraternity, to competitions, to living with the eyes of their fellow-citizens upon them, and to seeking public approbation."<sup>21</sup> In this way, it prepares them for republican citizenship. Participation in civic practices -- in public play as children and in the civic militia as men -- creates patriotism.

Civic festivals also play a key role in the constitution of republican citizens because they help create fraternal bonds among individuals, which form a necessary pre-requisite for the *general will*. "These festivals," Rousseau tells us, "serve many useful purposes which would make of them an important component of the training in law and order and good morals [manners]."<sup>22</sup> At the civic festivals, Rousseau argues, "each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united."<sup>23</sup> Its purposes include

bring[ing] people together not so much for a public entertainment as for the gathering of a big family, and from the bosom of joy and pleasures would be born the preservation, the concord, and the prosperity of the republic.<sup>24</sup>



Participating in civic festivities together creates a sense of fraternity that underlies the existence of the *general will*.

Moreover, civic festivals contribute to the constitution of a common civic identity among diverse individuals. As Mona Ozouf argues, one of the "great mythical experiences" of the eighteenth century was "the individual who is rebaptized as citizen in the festival." In the Enlightenment world of the eighteenth century, "men were individuals, in theory all identical, all equal, but solitary." However, "through the festival [a] new social bond was to be made manifest, eternal, and untouchable." Echoing Rousseau, she explains that "the festival was an indispensable complement to the legislative system, for although the legislator makes the laws for the people, festivals make the people for the laws."<sup>25</sup> Individuals could become citizens -- become a people -- only as they participated together in civic practices, such as those comprising the festivals.

In fact, civic festivals played a key role in the construction of Rousseau's own civic identity. In his famous footnote in *The Letter to D'Alembert*, Rousseau recounts an early experience with a civic festival as a formative incident in the creation of his own civic identity: "I remember having been struck in my childhood by a rather simple entertainment, the impression of which has nevertheless always stayed with me in spite of time and

variety of experience." Rousseau's father explicitly spelled out the meaning of the civic festival to the young man:

"Jean-Jacques," he said to me, "love your country. Do you see these good Genevans? They are all friends, they are all brothers; joy and concord reign in their midst. You are a Genevan; one day you will see other peoples; but even if you should travel as much as your father, you will not find their likes."<sup>26</sup>

Clearly, for the young Rousseau, witnessing the civic festivities of his community played an essential role in the constitution of his civic identity. He essentially became a Genevan as he participated in civic festivals with other Genevans.

The practices of the civic militia form the centerpiece of the civic festival as both described and prescribed by Rousseau:

The regiment of Saint-Gervais had done its exercises, and, according to the custom, they had supped by companies; most of those who formed them gathered after supper in the St. Gervais square and started dancing all together, officers and soldiers, around the fountain, to the basin of which the drummers, the fifers and the torch bearers had mounted."<sup>27</sup>

The spectacle of these martial practices instilled in the young Rousseau a passionate allegiance to Geneva:

A dance of men, cheered by a long meal, would seem to present nothing very interesting to see; however, the harmony of five or six hundred men in uniform, holding one another by the hand and forming a long ribbon which wound around, serpent-like, in cadence and without confusion, with countless turns and returns, countless sorts of figured evolutions, the excellence of the tunes which animated them, the sound of the drums, the glare of the torches, a certain military pomp in the midst of pleasure, all this created a very lively sensation that could not be experienced coldly. . . . There resulted from all this a general emotion that I could not describe but which, in universal gaiety, is quite naturally felt in the midst of all that is dear to us.<sup>28</sup>

As this passage demonstrates, participation in civic festivals produces a civic identity, feelings of fraternity,

and a passionate patriotism, all of which undergird civic participation, military service, and the *general will* itself.

The martial practices that form the centerpiece of the Rousseauian civic festival also play a key role in the creation of civic virtue. Engagement in martial practices creates the "strength and vigor" of the body necessary for both the ability and the willingness to defend republican liberty:

What view of hunger, thirst, fatigues, dangers, and death can men have if they are crushed by the smallest need and rebuffed by the least difficulty? Where will soldiers find the courage to bear excessive work to which they are totally unaccustomed?<sup>29</sup>

Rousseau argues that the aristocratic armies of his day pale in comparison to the more vigorous ancients:

If the strength of the men of antiquity is compared to that of the men of today, no sort of equality can be found. Our gentlemen's exercises are children's games next to those of ancient gymnastic; rackets (*la paume*) has been abandoned as too fatiguing, and we can no longer travel by horseback. I say nothing of our troops. The marches of the Greek and Roman armies can no longer be conceived. Just to read of the length of march, the work, and the burden of the Roman soldier is tiring and overwhelms the imagination. . . . We are fallen in everything.<sup>30</sup>

Rigorous martial practices are necessary to produce soldiers physically capable of defending republican liberty.

According to Rousseau, the creation of a vigorous and healthy body forms the necessary prerequisite for the existence of civic virtue -- the willingness to obey the *general will*. Rejecting the Cartesian mind/body split, Rousseau sees a direct connection between the will of the soul -- a combination of heart and mind -- and the vigor of the body. Martial practices are essential to the production

of citizens because they provide the foundation for the existence of virtue -- defined as "strength and vigor of the soul" -- which is the necessary prerequisite for government in accordance with the *general will*. Martial practices do this by providing virtue's necessary foundation: "strength and vigor of the body."<sup>31</sup> "Military exercise" makes men virtuous by making them "vigorous and warlike" in both body and soul (54). That is why, "the ancient Greek republics . . . forbade their citizens the practice of those tranquil and sedentary occupations which, by weighing down and corrupting the body, soon enervate the vigor of the soul" (55). When in Rome "military discipline was neglected," Rousseau tells us, "virtue . . . was lost" (45). A weak body falls prey to the appetites. Only a robust body can place virtue over desire and particularity.

Rousseau valorizes the ancients -- particularly, the Spartans and the Roman republicans -- because they understood the ways in which engagement in martial practices contributed to the constitution of citizens. More specifically, the ancients used their military institutions to create the virtues which are the necessary foundation of patriotism and fraternity -- all necessary characteristics of republican citizenship. That is to say, Rousseau argues that military exercises produce the "moral qualities" necessary to patriotism: They create "magnanimity, equity, temperance, humanity, [and] courage" without which "that sweet name fatherland will never strike [man's] ear," will

be "forgotten," or at least "disdainfully" dismissed (56, 50, 45). And without a sense of patriotism, "unity" will disintegrate and "sects" will be "embraced" (45). Consequently, the republic will cease to exist, and we will "no longer have citizens" (59). Thus, Rousseau praised the ancients because their military practices created the moral virtues, patriotism, and fraternity -- all qualities necessary for the republic and its citizen-soldiers.

Thus, the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier stands at the center of Rousseau's entire theoretical vision. This figure represents the integration of a variety of civic practices, all of which are essential for republican citizenship. Both halves of the Citizen-Soldier are equally important. Citizen-soldiers acquire a common civic identity and learn patriotism, fraternity and civic virtue through engagement in civic practices, including but not limited to military service. And it is the acquisition of these characteristics which undergirds the willingness of citizen-soldiers both to govern themselves in accordance with the *general will* and to risk their lives to defend the republic through participation in the civic militia. Citizen-soldiers make laws for themselves and are willing to defend their ability to do so.

## "In a Republic, Men Are Needed."

The figure of the Citizen-Soldier fuses *armed masculinity* onto republican citizenship. That is to say, the practices productive of citizen-soldiering within the civic republican tradition also construct *armed masculinity*. For example, soldiering is central both to what it means to be a citizen and to what it means to be a man. We can see the conflation of the three identities -- man, soldier, and citizen -- in the following passage:

In Switzerland, every bridegroom must have his uniform (it forthwith becomes the suit he wears on feast-days), his regulation rifle, and the full equipment of a foot-soldier. He is at once enrolled in the local company of the militia. In the summertime, on Sundays and on feast-days, he and his fellows are put through drills in accordance with the schedules for the several rosters.<sup>32</sup>

In order to participate in the institution of marriage, an essential rite of passage into manhood, a male individual must wear a military uniform and bear arms: He must become a soldier. Secondly, becoming a soldier requires active participation in the civic militia which links soldiering to citizenship. And finally, the manly citizen-soldier must wear his uniform and participate in martial "drills" as part of the civic festivities of his community held "in the summertime, on Sundays and on feast-days." To be a man, he must be a soldier, and to be a soldier, he must also be a citizen. In sum, soldiering is central both to what it means to be a man and what it means to be a citizen. Man, soldier, and citizen are one and the same. Thus, Rousseau

presents participation in the civic militia as central to masculinity, to citizenship, and to civic life in general.

In arguing that the same practices simultaneously produce citizenship and masculinity, my analysis differs from Judith Shklar's classic republican interpretation of Rousseau's work, *Men & Citizens*.<sup>33</sup> In that work, Shklar argues that Rousseau presents two competing and mutually exclusive models of society, one for men and one for citizens: "One model was a Spartan city, the other a tranquil household, and the two were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other."<sup>34</sup> Men have to choose one or the other ideal, she argues; they cannot use both.<sup>35</sup> Texts such as the *New Heloise* and the *Emile* present a model of society for men, Shklar argues, while the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, the *Government of Poland*, and the *Social Contract* present a political society for citizens. In opposition to that argument, I show in this chapter that the texts Shklar designates as examples of the citizen model are as much about masculinity as they are about citizenship.

Citizenship and masculinity are profoundly interconnected for Rousseau because both identities are performatively constructed through the same set of civic and martial practices. And because they are performatively constructed, they can never be permanently achieved. As Linda Zerilli demonstrates, for Rousseau "sexual desire and gender difference emerge in society; they are not natural facts but performative enactments."<sup>36</sup> Likewise, Elizabeth

Wingrove argues that Rousseau made the "realization that gender is an assumed identity. . . . Becoming a man means correctly performing a role." Consequently, for Rousseau "the ontological and psychic status of 'maleness' becomes as problematic as that of the citizen. [Thus,] it would seem that both the man and the citizen need to be produced"<sup>37</sup> -- and produced simultaneously. In other words, because of the performative nature, both masculinity and republican citizenship must be continually constructed and reconstructed through engagement in civic and martial practices.

Rousseau sees martial practices as essential to the construction of *armed masculinity*, which is central to his version of republican citizenship. As he puts it, "the first Romans lived like men and found in their constant [military] exercises the vigor that nature had refused them."<sup>38</sup> Not masculine by nature, the Romans were men only because they "lived like men." Moreover, because one is not born but rather becomes a man -- to expand upon Simone de Beauvoir's famous insight (and Judith Butler's interpretation of it) -- the acquisition of masculinity is a process that can never be finally finished.<sup>39</sup> As Rousseau says, the Romans became masculine only through "constant exercise." Only continual engagement in martial practices prevents the emergence of a "softness of character"<sup>40</sup> -- of femininity -- that always threatens to disrupt the constitution of *armed masculinity*. For example, Rousseau



condemns his contemporary males for losing their masculine "vigour . . . in the indolent and soft life to which our dependence on women reduces us." Because gender is performatively constructed, males become like women when they "live like them."<sup>41</sup> To prevent this dissolution of masculinity, Rousseau advocates military exercises to teach participants "what they ought to do as men."<sup>42</sup> He wants "military discipline" to produce the manly "military virtues." Otherwise "effeminate customs" will replace "heroic actions."<sup>43</sup> Rousseau wants to remember the important role of martial practices in the production of manly citizen-soldiers.

Since masculinity is always constructed in opposition to femininity, "women" must be excluded from the practices constitutive of masculinity. Women do not participate in the martial practices that are central to republican citizenship. Nor can they join in the civic deliberations of the male-only *circles*. And at civic festivals, married women serve as spectators only. So while girls do participate in the civic festivals, the lessons they learn there differ markedly from those of the boys. In Wingrove's words, "it is around and through sexual roles that the festival itself is organized. . . . Its central focus is to make [people] unequal as it makes them men and women, as it makes them ruler and ruled."<sup>44</sup> While boys participate in civic festivals as a preparation for citizenship, girls participate in order to meet a husband. Marriage for boys

forms the gateway into civic life. For girls, it marks a final exit.

Since gender identity is performatively constructed -- engagement in "masculine" practices produces "men" and engagement in "feminine" practices produces "women" -- Rousseau envisions very different roles for boys and girls who participate in civic festivals. For example, Rousseau wishes

that every year, at the last ball, the young girl, who during the preceding one has comported herself most decently, most modestly, and has most pleased everyone . . . be honored with a crown . . . and the title of Queen of the Ball.<sup>45</sup>

Participation in the feminine civic practices during the festivals teaches young girls decency, modesty, and charm. Ultimately, femininity will require the continual exclusion from civic practices.

At the same time, however, engagement in masculine civic practices prepares young boys to become masculine citizen-soldiers. For example, Rousseau wants contemporary boys be "rustically raised," as they were in his time. During that utopic era,

the fathers took the [boys] with them on the hunt, in the country, to all their exercises, in every society. Timid and modest before aged people, [the boys] were hardy, proud, and quarrelsome among themselves. They had no hairdo to preserve; they challenged one another at wrestling, running, and boxing. They fought in good earnest, hurt one another sometimes, and then embraced in their tears. They went home sweating, out of breath, and with their clothes torn; they were real scamps, but these scamps made men who have zeal for the service of the country in their hearts and blood to spill for it.<sup>46</sup>

The games boys play as children prepare them for participation in the civic and martial practices

constitutive of masculine citizen-soldiering. On the other hand, the games girls play as children prepare them for the exclusion from civic and martial practices that constitutes femininity.

While Rousseau's vision requires the participation of women as spectators in civic festivals, they must not be included in the practices constitutive of *armed masculinity* and republican citizenship. So during the ideal martial festival of Rousseau's youth, when "five or six hundred men in uniform, [held] one another by the hand and form[ed] a long ribbon which wound around, serpent-like, in cadence and without confusion," at least as Rousseau tells it, "the women were in bed." Undisturbed, the citizen-soldiers of Rousseau's republic exuberantly engaged in homosocial martial practices that constituted them as masculine republican citizen-soldiers.

As soon as they realized the festival had begun, however, the women "came down" to the public square -- perhaps wishing to engage in the civic practices that would constitute them as republican citizens alongside men. Nevertheless, the arrival of the women disrupted the dance of republican citizenship. When the women arrived on the scene, Rousseau tells us, "the dance was suspended." And although the men "wanted to pick up the dance again, . . . it was impossible; they did not know what they were doing any more; all heads were spinning with a drunkenness sweeter than that of wine."<sup>47</sup> As Zerilli explains it, "the presence

of the women who came down to join the men (each woman joins her husband) guards against another threat: the manly dance that might very well have transgressed itself into homoerotic ecstasy."<sup>48</sup> The masculine practice of the soldiers' dance must not accommodate the participation of women, but their absent presence was necessary to keep men's focus off each other, so that it can remain on the fatherland -- a point we will explore more completely in a moment.

What would happen if women began to engage in the practices constitutive of masculine citizenship? Since gender is performatively constructed rather than rooted in nature, it can never be permanently secured. In Zerilli's words,

what Rousseau teaches and fears is that natural man and woman are pedagogical constructions and highly unstable ones at that. There is a profound sense in his writings that gender boundaries must be carefully fabricated and maintained because they have no solid foundation in nature. . . . For what haunts the writer Rousseau above all else is the . . . fear that, if the code of gender difference is not strictly adhered to at each and every moment, all is lost.<sup>49</sup>

So if "women" began to engage in the practices constitutive of masculinity, then two things might happen. First of all, "women" might become "masculine" -- which is scary enough. But even more frighteningly, "men" might become "feminine." Zerilli emphasizes this latter fear: What contemporary man fears is "the similitude of his sexual other"; he dreads "becoming woman." In other words, he dreads the femininity lurking inside himself. And as we recall, Hannah Pitkin

came to a similar conclusion in her study of masculinity in the work of Machiavelli. As Pitkin puts it, "feminine power seems to be in some sense inside . . . men themselves."<sup>50</sup>

Traditionally, martial practices have functioned to construct a masculinity defined in direct opposition to femininity and to keep the feminine threat inside men at bay. As we recall, Pitkin emphasizes this in her discussion of Machiavelli's stress on military service in the militia: "only ferocious discipline and terrifying punishments" can prevent men from becoming feminine.<sup>51</sup> Likewise, Zerilli argues that in order to remain a masculine republican citizen, Rousseau's individual must not forgo "active participation in the public duties and ceremonies that alone safeguard against the feminine threat: military service . . . and the 'periodic assemblies.'"<sup>52</sup> Masculinity requires constant engagement in civic and martial practices.

And the same practices constitutive of masculinity also constitute republican citizenship. The republic depends upon constant civic and martial participation. In Rousseau's words,

as soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocketbooks rather than with their persons, the State is already close to ruin. Is it necessary to march to battle? They pay troops and stay home. Is it necessary to attend council? They name deputies and stay home. By dint of laziness and money, they finally have soldiers to enslave the country and representatives to sell it.<sup>53</sup>

For Rousseau, both republican citizenship and *armed masculinity* require continual participation in the civic and

martial practices embodied by the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier.

### **Producing Republican Desire**

One of the most important insights of the civic republican tradition -- and one we should remember today -- is that self-government aimed at the common good requires a passionate attachment to the community created through participation in civic practices. As I have argued, the figure of the Citizen-Soldier stands at the center of Rousseau's entire theoretical vision because the martial practices through which he is constituted create the *general will* and instill in individuals the characteristics that undergird their willingness to obey laws they give to themselves. In other words, while the *general will* yields legitimate laws which men respect on the basis of reason, this is not enough to ensure that men will obey the law. Men must also be moved to obey the law through a passionate connection to the republic and his fellow citizens, in other words, through patriotism, fraternity, and a common civic identity, all of which are created through engagement in civic and martial practices. Consequently, we can see in Rousseau's work that a citizenship of civic practices engages individuals both at the level of reason as they make laws for themselves and at the level of passion as they participate in the civic militia and its attendant communal

festivities. In short, passion plays just as important a role in Rousseau's republican theory as does reason.

The centrality of passion and the body to Rousseau's project -- and to the Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism in general -- is often overlooked by feminist theorists. For example, both Landes and Young accuse Rousseau of constructing a public sphere based on reason that requires the exclusion of passion. In Young's words, Rousseau (among others)

instituted a moral division of labor between reason and sentiment, identifying masculinity with reason and femininity with sentiment and desire. . . . By assuming that reason stands opposed to desire, affectivity and the body, the civic public must exclude bodily and affective aspects of human existence.

This dichotomy profoundly affects citizenship, she continues, because it results in the exclusion "from the public [of] those individuals and groups that do not fit the model of the rational citizen who can transcend body and sentiment."<sup>54</sup> Landes makes a similar argument in her analysis of the Rousseauian "public sphere."<sup>55</sup>

What both Young and Landes fail to recognize, however, is that within Rousseau's theory -- and we can see this in the civic republican tradition in general -- citizenship engages passion and the body as well as reason and the mind. Citizens do not "transcend" affectivity and desire, but rather direct their emotions and passions toward the republic. That is, citizenship requires not only rational self-rule but also a passionate commitment to the republic, instilled in citizens as they engage together in civic and

martial practices. Again, within Rousseau's work in particular and civic republicanism in general, citizenship engages individuals both at the level of reason and at the level of passion.<sup>56</sup>

However, while Rousseau recognized the centrality of passion to republican citizenship, he also realized the dangerous potential of passion to disrupt the fragilely constructed unity of the republic. That is, while passion could unify the republic if converted into patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue, it could also disrupt the republic by fracturing the *general will* and drawing the citizen into the private realm where he can focus on fulfilling his own personal desires.

Rousseau's proposed solution to this puzzle entails the channeling of all desire toward the republic. For example, in the *Government of Poland*, Rousseau argues as follows:

The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying day should behold nothing else. Your true republican is a man who imbibed love of the fatherland, which is to say love of the laws and of liberty, with his mother's milk. That love makes up his entire existence; he has eyes only for the fatherland, lives only for his fatherland; the moment he is alone, he is a mere cipher; the moment he has no fatherland, he is no more; if not dead, he is worse-off than if he were dead.<sup>57</sup>

From the moment he is born until the day he dies, the passion of the citizen must be directed toward the fatherland.

Rousseau praises Lycurgus for accomplishing this feat with the Spartans:

He saw to it that the image of the fatherland was constantly before their eyes -- in their laws, in their games, in their



homes, in their mating, in their feasts. He saw to it that they never had an instant of free time that they could call their own. And out of this ceaseless constraint, made noble by the purpose it served, was born that burning love of country which was always the strongest -- or rather the only -- passion of the Spartans, and which transformed them into beings more than merely human.<sup>58</sup>

The fatherland should be the only passion of the republican citizen.

One of the keys to producing the fatherland as the central object of desire involves constant engagement in the civic and martial practices constitutive of masculine republican citizenship. So while the *general will* is not totalitarian in that it reserves plenty of space for the individual outside the purview of the "state," Rousseau wants the individual to choose to spend all his free time participating in civic practices. In other words, the civic practices constitutive of the *general will* and republican citizenship are so time-consuming and all-encompassing that they leave little room to explore the particularistic, private interests excluded from the *general will*. In Rousseau's vision almost all of the individual's "particular desires, needs, and interests" should be aimed at the fatherland: "The better constituted the State, the more public affairs dominate private ones in the minds of the citizens."<sup>59</sup> The "life and freedom" the citizen maintains "independent" of "the body politic" should be absorbed with the civic practices constitutive of love of the fatherland.

Spending all his time participating in civic and martial practices, the individual develops a very strong civic identity that replaces all others. The citizen does

not maintain or develop any more particular identities that could compete with his civic identity. Instead, each citizen "gives his entire self" (53). He must not be torn by dual allegiances because "everything that destroys social unity is worthless" (128). Making the fatherland the primary object of desire and citizenship the only form of identification ensures republican unity.

The elimination of all competing identities and the elevation of the fatherland to the ultimate object of desire creates a very strong fusion among Rousseau's citizens. Since the citizen's

alienation is made without reservation, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything further to claim. . . . Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole. (53)

The comprehensive set of civic practices Rousseau advocates creates not only a *general will* but also an extremely tight fusion of individuals into an "indivisible" union.

Despite Rousseau's democratic motivations, such a high degree of fusion is ultimately undemocratic because it requires the annihilation of difference and the neglect of particular concerns. As Benjamin R. Barber puts it, "the more effective such affective institutions are, the less need there will be for democratic politics, and the more likely it is that a community will take on the suffocating unitary characteristics of totalistic states."<sup>60</sup> In fact, Rousseau exhibits three central characteristics of what Barber terms "unitary democracy." First, Rousseau conceives

of citizens as "brothers" rather than "neighbors."<sup>61</sup> Civic bonds are so strong for Rousseau that civic festivities are like "the gathering of a big family."<sup>62</sup> Second, the identity of citizen is the only permissible one. And third, the "ideal ground" of the community is "common beliefs, values, ends, identity (substantive consensus)" -- the unity of the *general will*. But while Rousseau incorporates these characteristics into the hidden foundation of his *general will*, he does not embrace another key characteristic of "unitary democracy": the *citizenship of blood*.<sup>63</sup> We will discuss this point more fully below.

### **The Fantasy of Woman in Rousseau's Civic Imaginary**

Rousseau's totalizing civic identity and "perfect" fusion depend upon the exclusion of women because his plan to channel all desire toward the fatherland depends upon the fantasmatic construction of Woman in his work -- what Zerilli calls "that celestial object." Maintaining the fantasy of Woman requires women's exclusion from the civic and martial practices constitutive of masculine republican citizenship because if "women" participated in these practices, the fragile performative construction of gender identity would be undermined and with it the fantasy of Woman.

According to Zerilli, Rousseau constructs a fantasmatic Woman who demands virtue in men. This fantasy performs

three important political functions. In the first place, the fantasy transforms men's sexual desire for women into a desire for virtue. That is, if women are sexually attracted only to men of virtue, men must become virtuous republican citizens, if they hope to gain the love of their sexual objects. As Lord Bomston says to Saint-Preux in *Julie*: "Do you know what has always made you love virtue? In your eyes it has taken on the form of that lovely woman who typifies it so well, and so dear an image could hardly let you lose the inclination for it."<sup>64</sup> Carol Blum and Elizabeth Wingrove concur with Zerilli: Rousseau eroticizes virtue as a way of enticing men to act like men.<sup>65</sup> Women on stage exercise power over men, Rousseau reasons, so why not use men's desire to be under the spell of women for the good of the republic? Rousseau wants republican festivals to replace the actress as object of men's scopic desires. "So 'magnificent' is this [republican] spectacle of men," Zerilli tells us, "that it will extinguish man's fatal desire to gaze at that other blazing magnificence: the sumptuous body of the salonniere or the actress."<sup>66</sup> Or as Wingrove puts it, "Rousseau's strategy is to nourish desires whose satisfaction consists in the fulfillment of republican duty."<sup>67</sup> In this way, Rousseau tries to put sexual passion into the service of the fatherland.

Secondly, Zerilli argues that Rousseau constructs a fantasy of the virtuous Woman to help protect men from their desire for actual women. That way, when a woman does not

live up to the fantasy in a man's head, he will no longer desire her. In Zerilli's words, "that celestial object, that magnificent fetish, the imperious and mute woman of the male imaginary . . . protects man against that other sort of woman and all her sex, against the speaking woman of the theater and the salon."<sup>68</sup> As Rousseau himself says, "by providing the imaginary object, . . . I easily prevent my young man from having illusions about real objects."<sup>69</sup> That is to say,

it is unimportant whether the object [the fantasy of Woman] I depict for him [Emile] is imaginary; it suffices that it make him disgusted with those that could tempt him; it suffices that he everywhere find comparisons which make him prefer his chimera to the real objects that strike his eye. And what is true love itself if it is not chimera, lie, and illusion? We love the image we make for ourselves far more than we love the object to which we apply it.<sup>70</sup>

In love with the fantasy of Woman, men can reject any woman who falls short of demanding republican virtue in him. The fantasy of Woman becomes the device Rousseau uses in his scheme to channel passion into the service of the republic.

And finally, Zerilli argues that the fantasy of Woman who demands manly republican virtue in men protects man against his own feminine desires which would soften his martial virtue and hinder his ability to become a citizen-soldier.<sup>71</sup> As Rousseau tells an Emile on the brink of manhood: "A new enemy is arising which you have not learned to conquer and from which I can no longer save you. This enemy is yourself."<sup>72</sup> The enemy is inside Emile: It is not only "the desire for a woman" but also the desire "to be at

the feet of woman, if not to be a woman."<sup>73</sup> The fantasy of the virtuous Woman demands that men act like masculine republican citizen-soldiers and so helps prevent men from submitting to feminine desires.

In other words, not only does Rousseau's fantasy of Woman help eroticize the civic practices constitutive of citizen-soldiering, but the presence of the fantasy as an object of men's desires helps prevent the civic passion expressed in male-only groups from slipping into explicit homoeroticism. If men started focusing on homoerotic desire, two things would happen, both of which would lead to the collapse of the republic. First of all, explicit homoerotic desire could disrupt the unity of the republic, by creating divisions among men. Secondly, if men gave into "feminine" desires, the fragile performative construction of gender identity would begin to break down. And without "masculinity" there could be no "republican citizenship." If masculinity is constructed in opposition to femininity, then to give over to feminine desires in oneself would be to abandon masculinity, which would be to abandon republican citizenship, since the two are linked in Rousseau's thought via the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier.

But while Rousseau's recognition of the precariousness of performatively constructed categories of civic and gender identity led him into a "quick retreat into a rigid conception of sexual difference,"<sup>74</sup> his *citizenship of civic practices* actually leaves open the radical possibility of

expanding republican citizenship to include "women." As we have seen so far, engagement in martial practices constitutes *armed masculinity*, which is then fused onto republican citizenship through the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. *Armed masculinity* -- or any type of masculinity for that matter -- is not a natural attribute of male individuals. Instead, it is an always precarious artifice that must be constantly constructed and reconstructed through engagement in masculine practices. Civic republican citizenship has been masculinized by its connection to soldiering which has been masculinized by its cultural conflation with masculinity.

But if masculinity is not a natural attribute of male individuals, but instead is constructed through a series of performances, then what would happen if "women" began to engage in the practices constitutive of masculinity? Throughout his work, Rousseau vehemently insists that women be denied access to participation in the practices constitutive of republican citizenship and *armed masculinity* -- such as the soldiers' dance discussed above. So while masculine republican citizens have been constituted through engagement in civic and martial practices, feminine subjects have been (partially) constituted through the exclusion from these same practices. If this is the case, then what would happen if "women" began to engage in the practices constitutive of both *armed masculinity* and republican

citizenship? Could women's transgressive engagement in these practices make them citizen-soldiers?

The *performativity theory* of identity inherent in Rousseau's vision leaves open the possibility of *subversive transgender performances*.<sup>75</sup> In other words, if gender does not flow naturally from biological sex, then there is no guarantee that a biological male will become a *masculine man* and a biological female a *feminine woman*. For example, Blum argues that, in his fantasies, Rousseau often identified as a woman: "He began imagining himself to be alternately Julie, Claire, and Saint-Preux. . . . In his ecstasy Rousseau could move easily back and forth between subject and object, male and female, lover and beloved."<sup>76</sup> Moreover, the culturally constructed imperative that "men" must become "masculine" and "women" become "feminine" does not always succeed<sup>77</sup> -- a fact of which Rousseau was well aware and commented on often. What I am suggesting here is that the possibility of transgender identification highlights the artificiality of supposedly "natural" categories of gender.<sup>78</sup>

Politically, this means that "women's" participation in the civic and martial practices culturally deemed "masculine" could radically undermine the traditional dichotomous construction of gender and the sexism it generates.<sup>79</sup> In other words, "women's" transgressive performance of the behaviors constitutive of citizen-soldiers should work to undermine the idea that "men" and "women" must be restricted by the cultural imperatives of



"masculinity" and "femininity" respectively. Moving beyond restrictive gender norms will allow all individuals the freedom to live as they choose and the opportunity to become republican citizens. The movement beyond the traditional dichotomous constructions of gender not only undermines sexism, but could also allow full civic subjectivity for "women." That is, it could open up the possibility of "women" becoming republican citizens on an equal basis with "men."

Nevertheless, despite the possibility of *subversive transgender performances* inherent in the *citizenship of civic practices*, Rousseau's particular rendition of the civic republican tradition truncates the radical possibility of extending republican citizenship to "women." That is to say, in constructing his version of civic unity, Rousseau uses the fantasy of Woman as a way of channeling all passion toward the fatherland. And as I have argued, this fantasy requires the exclusion of biological females from the civic and martial practices. "Women" must be excluded because their exclusion plays a key role in the performative construction of gender difference that underlies the possibility of the fantasmatic Woman. Without gender difference, there can be no fantasy of Woman to help men channel their erotic desires toward the fatherland. And, more mundanely, men could not continue to maintain unrealistic fantasies about women, if they were interacting with them as equals in the political and military spheres.

"Women" cannot be included in Rousseau's version of republican citizenship, not because his civic and martial practices are inherently "masculine," but rather because he uses the fantasy of Woman in his (futile) attempt to channel sexual desire toward the fatherland, and this attempt to create a "perfect" fusion among his citizens requires the continuation of traditional configuration of gender.

Rousseau does not primarily rely on the real or imagined threat of an external enemy to unify his citizenry,<sup>80</sup> but instead unifies his citizenry to some extent by having each man struggle against two internal enemies present within everyone: particularity and femininity. Both Hannah Arendt<sup>81</sup> and Linda Zerilli<sup>82</sup> discuss the role of internal enemies in Rousseau's system. Rousseau's citizen-soldiers must purge all particularity and femininity from themselves in order to maintain civic unity. However, while Rousseau does make some use of the idea of "internal enemies," for the most part he creates civic unity by envisioning an all-encompassing set of civic and martial practices that produce not only a totalizing civic identity that leaves no room for particularity, but also versions of the *general will*, fraternity, and patriotism so strong that they easily slip over into homogeneity, fusion, and, as we shall see momentarily, nationalism.

## Rousseau's Citizen-Soldier and the Problem of Nationalism

Finally, Rousseau's vision of republican unity, constructed through a time-filling set of civic and martial practices, includes a version of patriotism so strong that it easily slips toward nationalism. Rousseau rightly recognizes that a strong passionate attachment to the fatherland and its people cannot be endlessly inclusive. Opposing cosmopolitanism, Rousseau argues for the virtue of the small republic. A vast empire cannot engender the feelings of patriotism and fraternity necessary to republican self-government because a person cannot be attached to the whole world: "The people has less affection . . . for the homeland which is like the whole world in its eyes, and for its fellow citizens, most of whom are foreigners to it."<sup>83</sup> On this point Rousseau again stands outside of the rationalist paradigm. A politics based on rational discourse can be infinitely expanded -- that's one of its primary virtues. Civic republican politics cannot be, however, because of the role it gives to passion in the creation of citizenship.

So while Rousseau's overemphasis on commonality among citizens produces fusion, a totalizing civic identity, and homogeneity out of fraternity, civic virtue, and the *general will*, his overemphasis on the particularity of different peoples produces nationalism out of patriotism. Rousseau

begins by arguing that the existence of a distinctive civic identity underlies the possibility of masculine citizen-soldiering:

There is one rampart, however, that will always be readied for its defense, and that no army can possibly breach; and that is the virtue of its citizens, their patriotic zeal, in the distinctive cast that national institutions are capable of impressing upon their souls. See to it that every Pole is incapable of becoming a Russian, and I answer for it that Russia will never subjugate Poland.<sup>84</sup>

Bemoaning the fact that "there is no such thing nowadays as Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishmen -- only Europeans," Rousseau argues that "*national institutions*" are needed to give "form to the genius, the character, the tastes, and the customs of a people" (11). According to Rousseau, the existence of the republic, its laws, and its liberty depends upon a particular people developing a distinctive civic identity.

Rousseau's advocacy of a distinctive civic identity, however, can easily yield the chauvinism and xenophobia characteristic of nationalism. For example, Rousseau wanted the Poles to be "purely Polish." He wanted to "endear Poland to its citizens and develop in them an instinctive distaste for mingling with the peoples of other countries." A particular set of Polish civic practices must make "life in Poland . . . more fun than life in any other country, but not the same kind of fun" (14). That is,

give a different bent to the passions of the Poles; in doing so, you will shape their minds and hearts in a national pattern that will set them apart from other peoples, that will keep them from being absorbed by other peoples, or finding contentment among them, or allying themselves with them (12).

Rousseau praises Moses who by determining

that his people should never be absorbed by other peoples, . . . devised for them customs and practices that could not be blended into those of other nations and weighted them down with rites and peculiar ceremonies. . . . Each fraternal bond that he established among the individual members of his republic became a further barrier, separating them from their neighbors and keeping them from becoming one with those neighbors. (6)

The strong sense of particularity and the distinctive and all-encompassing civic identity that Rousseau advocates unfortunately laid the groundwork for the emergence of nationalism and its imagined spiritual unity.

Nevertheless, while Rousseau's emphasis on "*national institutions*" as essential to creating particular peoples with particular genius, character, tastes, and customs, who are themselves "rather than other people," and who have an "ardent love of fatherland" (11) certainly could lead to chauvinism, xenophobia, and nationalism,<sup>85</sup> his emphasis on civic institutions and practices as absolutely necessary to the production of citizens indicates his advocacy of a *citizenship of civic practices*, rather than a *citizenship of blood*. That is, Rousseau does not argue that Poles should be citizens because they have Polish blood. Instead he argues that without engaging in civic practices, they will not be citizens at all. Thus, he also rejects a *citizenship of land*: Poles are not citizens by virtue of residence, but again, only as they engage in civic practices. Moreover, while Rousseau lays the groundwork for nineteenth century nationalistic developments, he does stop short of actually positing the spiritual unity of different peoples -- an

essential characteristic of nationalism and its progeny, fascism.

Rousseau recognizes that the virtue of patriotism and the vice of nationalism are inextricably linked. As he says, without distinctive national institutions, "national hatreds will die out, but so will love of country."<sup>86</sup> The problem for democratic theorists is always how to maintain the virtue while minimizing the vice. Rousseau avoids the slide toward conquest that comes out of Machiavelli's version of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. However, despite his best efforts, Rousseau ends up shoring up the other side of nationalism's foundation -- the distinctiveness of different peoples.

As we saw with Machiavelli, despite the theorist's best efforts at constructing a dialectical theory of civic republican citizenship, in the realm of *realpolitik*, the theoretical dialectic often breaks down. Rousseau's synthesis of the individual and the community at first inspired the democratic French Revolution, but the dialectic broke down under the pressure of war. An excellent example of the disintegrative effects of *realpolitik* on dialectical ideas is the transformation of the famous *levee en masse* during the course of the French Revolution. The *levee en masse* began as a republican ideal that directly emerged out of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. As originally formulated the *levee en masse* linked military service to participatory citizenship. R. R. Palmer explains that although "the term

levee en masse has become frozen to signify the universal military service of the Revolution, a conscription conducted by government and designed to expel foreign invaders . . . in its origin the term meant much more."<sup>87</sup> Literally translated as *mass rising*, the term originally connoted not just universal military service, but also included the

general rising of the people for any purpose, with or without the assistance of official persons who did not command much public confidence. It could be a swarming of citizen soldiers to defy the regular armies of Prussia and Austria. It could be a rising of the sections of Paris against the Convention or some of its members. It could be an armed insurrection or an unarmed demonstration in the streets.<sup>88</sup>

In 1793, the levee en masse included civic actions of all kinds including both participation in assemblies and the bearing of arms.

The levee en masse linked military service with participatory citizenship. During the Revolution political enfranchisement and military conscription advanced hand-in-hand. In order to recruit men to fight in the war, the government extended democracy to the popular masses.<sup>89</sup> However, during the course of the Revolution, military service and participatory citizenship became decoupled. Although universal conscription of men continued throughout the war, resulting by 1794 in an army of almost a million, the other essential half of this Citizen-Soldier pairing, participatory citizenship, was increasingly undermined. The Citizen-Soldier ideal was reduced to its less democratic half: universal conscription.

## **Popular Sovereignty and Subversive Transgender Performances**

But while Rousseau's theory of the Citizen-Soldier fed directly into the nationalism ushered in by the French Revolution -- complete with its own set of virtues and vices -- Rousseau's theory of the *general will* forms the foundation for the radical democratic idea of popular sovereignty, an ideal that animated the democratic strands of both the French and the American Revolutions.<sup>90</sup> The radical republicans of the French Revolution -- the *sans-culottes* -- clearly understood citizenship as requiring engagement in civic and martial practices as embodied by the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. Citizenship meant both to act and to fight.<sup>91</sup> The *sans-culottes*, men as well as women, had a very concrete idea of both popular sovereignty and republican citizenship: They both meant "deliberating in . . . section assemblies, bearing arms, [and] sitting on the Revolutionary Tribunal." The radical republicans understood citizenship as entailing the direct participation of all citizens in political assemblies, the accountability of elected representatives to the citizenry, and the ability of citizens to enforce the law and to revolt if the law was violated by its delegates. Thus the "second" Revolution of 1792 clearly represents the Citizen-Soldier tradition at its most radical: Radical republican men and women embraced a notion of republican citizenship that required participation



in both legislation for the common good and service in the civic militia.<sup>92</sup>

The armed processions during the spring of 1792 that paved the way for the *levee en masse* mark the beginning of the most radical phase of women's struggle to inhabit the category of the Citizen-Soldier. Recent scholarship shows that women unofficially engaged in the practices of masculine republican citizen-soldiering, including both participation in political assemblies and the bearing of arms. Radical republican women actually bore arms throughout the Revolution, lobbied the National Assembly for permission to form a Women's National Guard, donned the attire that signified male republican citizenship, and unofficially voted on the Constitution of the Year I, sending word to the male leadership that they approved. For these women the right to bear arms to defend the republic was absolutely central to their struggle for equal citizenship.<sup>93</sup>

Even before the radical republican "second" Revolution began in full, "women of the people" understood the centrality of arms to republican citizenship. As Pauline Leon barricaded the streets of Paris alongside men on July 14, 1789, she armed herself with the pike just as they did. And of course there is the famous "Women's March on Versailles" that marked "a transitional moment in the transformation of subjects into a militant citizenry identifying itself as the sovereign nation." During this

march women's engagement in civic practices including the bearing of arms helped bolster "remarkably broad demands for the political and military status and rights of female citizenship."<sup>94</sup> Women clearly hoped to attain the status of republican citizenship through their engagement in masculinist civic and martial practices.

The "women of the people" clearly recognized that if they were to be republican citizens, they must be allowed to bear arms alongside men. On March 6, 1791 Pauline Leon presented a petition with over 300 signatures to the National Assembly claiming the right to bear arms in defense of the republic. A lengthy excerpt from her speech follows:

Patriotic women come before you to claim the right which any individual has to defend his life and liberty. . . . Yes, Gentlemen, we need arms, and we come to ask your permission to procure them. May our weakness be no obstacle; courage and intrepidity will supplant it, and the love of the fatherland and hatred of tyrants will allow us to brave all dangers with ease. Do not believe, however, that our plan is to abandon the care of our families and home, always dear to our hearts, to run to meet the enemy. No, Gentlemen. We wish only to defend ourselves the same as you; you cannot refuse us, and society cannot deny the right nature gives us, unless you pretend the Declaration of Rights does not apply to women, and that they should let their throats be cut like lambs, without the right to defend themselves. For can you believe the tyrants would spare us? No, no -- they remember October 5 and 6, 1789. . . . Why then not terrorize aristocracy and tyranny with all the resources of civic effort (civisme) and the purest zeal, zeal which is only the natural result of a heart burning with love for the public weal? . . . The rages and plots of aristocrats . . . will not succeed in vanquishing a whole people of united brothers armed to defend their rights. We also demand only the honor of sharing their exhaustion and glorious labors and of making tyrants see that women also have blood to shed for the service of the fatherland in danger. . . . We hope to obtain . . . permission to procure pikes, pistols, and sabres (even muskets for those who are strong enough to use them), within police regulations . . . [and] permission to assemble on festival days and Sundays on the Champ de la Federation, or in other suitable places, to practice maneuvers with these arms.<sup>95</sup>

Clearly participation in martial as well as civic practices was viewed by these women as central to achieving republican citizenship.

Despite Leon's reference to motherhood, I want to suggest that her struggle for citizenship was not simply motivated by the desire to fulfill her traditional familial duties more effectively. Much of the traditional scholarship on the French Revolution has stressed that women's activism during the Revolution was in fact centered around typical feminine domestic issues such as subsistence. In this way women's activism is seen as merely an extension of women's responsibility for the domestic sphere. While this may be true to some extent, more recent historical analysis stresses the political nature of women's activism. For example, Dominique Godineau argues that the women who engaged in the practices of militant republican citizenship were motivated by political demands as well as subsistence concerns: Women of the people wanted 'Bread, but not at the price of liberty'; 'Bread and the Constitution of 1793.' As Godineau explains:

If women of the people did not occupy center stage when the subsistence question was secondary, that does not in any sense signal their absence. They simply merged into the larger whole of the popular masses; they were present not as collectivities of women, but rather as individuals of the feminine sex.<sup>96</sup>

Women engaged in political action alongside men and had the same understanding of republican citizenship as they did: participatory citizenship and service in the civic militia. Since both sets of practices were necessary to the

constitution of the republican Citizen-Soldier, women knew that they too must engage in martial as well as civic practices, if they were to become republican citizens.

The struggle of women to gain republican citizenship on an equal basis with men through engagement in civic and martial practices culminated in the founding in 1793 of *La Societe des Citoyennes Republicaines Revolutionnaires* by Pauline Leon and Claire Lacombe. Its regulations stated that the *Societe* was a "family of sisters" in which "no member can be denied the right to speak" in its deliberative proceedings and that its "purpose is to be armed to rush to the defense of the Fatherland."<sup>97</sup> Not only did these radical women claim the right to engage in masculine civic and martial practices but they also assumed male attire -- pantaloons and the red liberty cap -- and strode armed through the streets of Paris enforcing the revolutionary mandate that all women wear the tricolor cockade and the male liberty cap -- emblems of republican citizenship.

This transgressive engagement in masculine practices posed a threat to the always fragile social constructions of femininity and masculinity. Many revolutionary republicans -- female as well as male -- found women's assumption of male attire particularly disturbing. For example, one citizenne was recorded as saying that she told two women wearing *les bonnets rouges*, "Off with *les bonnets rouges* {red caps}, because they are only for men to wear."<sup>98</sup> According to another document, "all [the market] women were

in agreement that violence and threats would not make them dress in a costume [which] they respected but which they believed was intended for men."<sup>99</sup> In the words of Commune president Chaumette,

it is contrary to all the laws of nature for a woman to want to make herself a man. The Council must recall that some time ago these denatured women, these *viragos*, wandered through the markets with the red cap to sully that badge of liberty and wanted to force all women to take off the modest headdress that is appropriate for them. The place where people's magistrates deliberate must be forbidden to every person who insults nature.<sup>100</sup>

Implicit in this statement is some understanding of the importance of "performativity" in the constitution of gender identity.

The specter of women assuming men's attire seemed to be particularly threatening to many of the revolutionaries -- women as well as men. In fact, not long after this radical assumption of masculine attire, all women's associations were banned. In purging women from the revolutionary republic, very strong appeals were made to gender difference and women's natural place as virtuous republican mothers.<sup>101</sup> This is an interesting phenomenon in light of our discussion of Rousseau and some recent theoretical work on cross-dressing. For instance, Judith Butler conceptualizes "drag" as demonstrating "the mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn, and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and approximation."<sup>102</sup> Thus, cross-dressing highlights the precariousness of naturalized dichotomous constructions of gender. Similarly, Marjorie Garber argues that the

appearance of the "transvestite" in culture signals a 'category crisis' which she defines as "a failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable, that permits of border crossings from one (apparently distinct) category to another: black/white, Jews/Christian, noble/bourgeois, master/servant, master/slave."<sup>103</sup> Cross-dressing thus challenges "easy notions of binarity, putting into question the categories of 'female' and 'male,' whether they are considered essential or constructed, biological or cultural."<sup>104</sup>

The image of radical republican women in "drag" called into question the naturalness of gender difference and thus the justification for excluding "women" from republican citizenship. Thus, the case of political struggle of *la Societe des Citoyennes Republicaines Revolutionnaires* for republican citizenship during the French Revolution constitutes a historical moment through which we can begin to imagine the possibility of *subversive transgender performances* opening up the category of republican citizenship to all people as well as transforming the traditional configurations of gender that historically underwrote "women's" exclusion from citizenship. This possibility offers hope to feminists who want to conceptualize a citizenship that can be truly inclusive and yet do not want to give up on the discourse of civic republicanism because it bolsters calls for a strong notion

of participatory citizenship, popular sovereignty, and government for the good of all.

In conclusion, Rousseau's version of the Citizen-Soldier tradition presents a package of interconnected virtues and vices. But while his work took a conceptual giant step toward nationalism -- complete with its own set of virtues and vices -- he also theorized the radical ideal of popular sovereignty that animated the most democratic aspects of the French Revolution, including women's transgressive struggle to occupy the category of "republican citizen-soldier." While those women's efforts ultimately failed, the potential for *subversive transgender performances* still remains inherent in a *citizenship of civic practices* that roots identity in practices rather than nature.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland*, tr. Willmoore Kendall (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), 19.

<sup>2</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, ed. Roger D. Masters, tr. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 54, emphasis mine.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>4</sup> "Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life, and its will." Ibid., 53-54, emphasis mine.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>6</sup> On this point I disagree with Iris Marion Young who criticizes Rousseau's citizen for being an "impartial moral reasoner . . . who stands outside of and above the situation about which he or she reasons, with no stake in it, or is supposed to adopt an attitude toward a situation as though he or she were outside and above it" (60). With this accusation, Young not only confuses Rousseau with Kant, but also misses Rousseau's *citizenship of civic practices*. That is to say, Rousseau's citizen cannot stand outside or above politics because he is only constituted through engagement political practices. See Iris Marion Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," in *Feminism as Critique*, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Walzer makes this point in *What It Means To Be an American: Essays on the American Experience* (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1996), 13.

<sup>9</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Ibid., 53-54, emphasis mine.

<sup>10</sup> The entire quote reads: "There is a third, more bizarre, type of religion [Roman Catholicism] which, by giving men two legislative systems, two leaders, and two homelands, subjects them to contradictory duties, and prevents them from being simultaneously devout men and citizens. . . . The third is so manifestly bad that it is a waste of time to amuse oneself by proving it. Everything that destroys social unity is worthless. All institutions that put man in contradiction with himself are worthless." Ibid., 128.

<sup>11</sup> See Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public" and Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

<sup>12</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 108.

<sup>13</sup> Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," 62.

<sup>14</sup> J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>17</sup> Rousseau, *Government of Poland*, 4.

<sup>18</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 77.

<sup>19</sup> Rousseau, *Government of Poland*, 5, emphasis mine.



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- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 4.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 22.
- <sup>22</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre*. Tr. Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 130.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., 126.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., 131, emphasis mine.
- <sup>25</sup> Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, tr. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 9.
- <sup>26</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. d'Alembert*, 135, emphasis mine.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., emphasis mine.
- <sup>29</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (First Discourse)*, ed. Roger D. Masters, tr. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 55.
- <sup>30</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. d'Alembert*, 102.
- <sup>31</sup> Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 37.
- <sup>32</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. d'Alembert*, 82.
- <sup>33</sup> Judith Shklar, *Men & Citizens: A study of Rousseau's social theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). My analysis builds on Linda Zerilli's departure from Shklar's classic interpretation: "Contesting the critical consensus that Rousseau presents us with the choice of making either a man or a citizen (since one cannot make both at once), I show that to be the latter one must, in the first place, be the former, and that to be a man is to be no more a product of nature than is to be a citizen to be a denatured man." See *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 18.
- <sup>34</sup> Shklar, *Men & Citizens*, 3.
- <sup>35</sup> "The wish to play a public role, to develop one's civic capacities, to belong to a purposeful order, to take part in an organized drama, is as much a part of a morally adult life as the desire to be a self-sufficient whole, united only with those whom one loves and independent of all that interferes with one's real needs. Choose, however, one must, or rather ought, even though one never does." Ibid., 32.
- <sup>36</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 28, emphasis mine.
- <sup>37</sup> Elizabeth Wingrove, "Sexual Performance as Political Performance," *Political Theory* (1996), 588, underlining mine.
- <sup>38</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. d'Alembert*, 102-3, emphasis mine.
- <sup>39</sup> See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990). See the introduction to this dissertation for my discussion of Butler's theory of gender identity.
- <sup>40</sup> Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 36.
- <sup>41</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. d'Alembert*, 103, emphasis mine.
- <sup>42</sup> Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 57, emphasis mine.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., 45, 43.
- <sup>44</sup> Wingrove, "Sexual Performance as Political Performance," 609.
- <sup>45</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. D'Alembert*, 130.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 112.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 135-6.
- <sup>48</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 38.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>50</sup> Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, *Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1984), 136.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 57.

<sup>53</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 101-2, emphasis mine.

<sup>54</sup> Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," 66.

<sup>55</sup> See Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*.

<sup>56</sup> One of the reasons both Landes and Young overlook this point is because they both wrongly conflate Rousseau's work with Jurgen Habermas's. But Rousseau and Habermas stand within very different traditions: Habermas stands within the German Idealist tradition, the origins of which lay with Kant. And while Habermas improves on Kant by switching from monological to dialogical reason, he does not accept Rousseau's belief that passion is just as critical to citizenship as is reason. In fact, I would argue that one of the key characteristics that separates civic republicanism from German Idealism (and liberalism too for that matter) is the emphasis on bringing passion as well as reason into the service of the republic.

<sup>57</sup> Rousseau, *Government of Poland*, 19, emphasis mine.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 7, emphasis mine.

<sup>59</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 102.

<sup>60</sup> Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 243.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>62</sup> Rousseau, *Letter to M. D'Alembert*, 131.

<sup>63</sup> Barber, *Strong Democracy*, 219.

<sup>64</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *La Nouvelle Heloise: Julie, or the New Eloise*. Translated and abridged by Judith H. McDowell (University Park: Penn State Press, 1968), 343.

<sup>65</sup> See Carol Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), ch. 5; Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, ch. 2; and Wingrove, "Sexual Performance as Political Performance."

<sup>66</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 37.

<sup>67</sup> Wingrove, "Sexual Performance as Political Performance," 596-7.

<sup>68</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 18.

<sup>69</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile; or, On Education*, ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic, 1979), 329.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 18.

<sup>72</sup> *Emile*, 431.

<sup>73</sup> Zerilli, *Signifying Woman*, 40.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>75</sup> To quote Judith Butler: "If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of 'men' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that 'women' will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question), there is not reason to assume that genders

ought also to remain as two. The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and a *woman* and *feminine* a male body as easily as a female one." Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 6.

<sup>76</sup> Blum, *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue*, 61-2.

<sup>77</sup> "The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by which they are generated." Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 145.

<sup>78</sup> Butler advocates the "parodic proliferation and subversive play of gendered meanings." She begins the "effort to think through the possibility of subverting and displaying those naturalized and reified notions of gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power, to make gender trouble, not through the strategies that figure a utopian beyond, but through the mobilization, subversive confusion, and proliferation of precisely those constitutive categories that seek to keep gender in its place by posturing as the foundational illusions of identity." *Ibid.*, 33-34.

<sup>79</sup> "The site of a dissonant and denaturalized performance that reveals the performative status of the natural itself. . . . The loss of gender norms would have the effect of proliferating gender configurations, destabilizing substantive identity, and depriving the naturalizing narratives of compulsory heterosexuality of their central protagonists: 'man' and 'woman.' . . . The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them." *Ibid.*, 146-47.

<sup>80</sup> Hannah Arendt argues to the contrary: "Politically speaking, [Rousseau] presupposed the existence and relied upon the unifying power of the common national enemy. Only in the presence of the enemy can such a thing as *la nation une et indivisible*, the ideal of French and of all other nationalism, come to pass." See *On Revolution* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1963), 77.

<sup>81</sup> Arendt argues that Rousseau "wished to discover a unifying principle within the nation itself that would be valid for domestic politics as well. Thus, his problem was where to detect a common enemy outside the range of foreign affairs, and his solution was that such an enemy existed within the breast of each citizen, namely, in his particular will and interest; the point of the matter was that this hidden, particular enemy could rise to the rank of a common enemy -- unifying the nation from within -- if one only added up all particular wills and interests. The common enemy within the nation is the sum total of the particular interests. . . . In Rousseau's construction, the nation need not wait for an enemy to threaten its borders in order to rise 'like one man' and to bring about the *union sacree*; the oneness of the nation is guaranteed in so far as each citizen carries within himself the common enemy as well as the general interest which the common enemy brings into existence; for the common enemy is the particular interest or the particular will of each man." See *On Revolution*, 77-78.

<sup>82</sup> Zerilli notes that Rousseau tells Emile: "Dear Emile, it is in vain that I have dipped your soul in the Styx; I was not able to make it

everywhere invulnerable. A new enemy is arising which you have not learned to conquer and from which I can no longer save you. This enemy is yourself." (431). Building on this quote, Zerilli argues that Rousseau "prepare[s] the child for battle with 'the enemy' who will appear in Book V: the desire for a woman, to be at the feet of woman, if not to be a woman." See *Signifying Woman*, 40.

<sup>83</sup> Rousseau, *Social Contract*, 72.

<sup>84</sup> Rousseau, *Government of Poland*, 11, emphasis mine.

<sup>85</sup> A point emphasized by Shklar.

<sup>86</sup> Rousseau, *First Discourse*, 38.

<sup>87</sup> R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, vol. 2: *The Struggle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 103.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 104.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>90</sup> See R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 & 1964).

<sup>91</sup> In the following passage, historian R. R. Palmer interweaves descriptions of participatory citizenship with descriptions of the bearing of arms. These two sets of practices are linked by the sans-culottes because they are linked within the larger Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism within which the "popular democrats" were situated: "The sans-culottes were in effect popular democrats. In the crisis and breakdown of 1792 they represented an enormous wave of citizen self-help. They applied the great concepts of liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people to themselves and the concrete circumstances with which they were personally familiar. They believed that they themselves were sovereign, in face-to-face contact in their section meetings; and that distant elected persons were only their delegates, often not to be trusted. They favored what a later generation in America would know as referendum and recall. 'Consent of the people' meant their consent in their own assemblies. The right to bear arms meant that they should carry pikes in their own streets. The judgment of the people meant that they should denounce their own neighbors for suspicious behavior or unsuitable sentiments, and that their own committees should put them under arrest. They resisted attempts at control of their activities by the Convention and its Committee of Public Safety in 1793.

"If they presumed to exercise sovereignty, they accepted the corresponding responsibilities; they were ready to give their time, to act and to fight. The younger ones were gradually absorbed into the army. They spent long hours at meetings, and in the work of committees, or on the exposure of suspects, or on errands and missions and patrols about the city, or in exchange of delegations with sister groups, or in semi-military formations in which men from the city went into rural areas to procure food from the peasants, or bring patriotic pressure to bear in other communities." See R. R. Palmer, *Age of the Democratic Revolution: The Struggle*, 46-47.

<sup>92</sup> See Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Darline Levy and Harriet B. Applewhite, "Women and Militant Citizenship in Revolutionary Paris," in *Rebel Daughters: Women and the French Revolution*, eds. Sara E. Mezler and Leslie W. Rabine (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and "Women, Radicalization and the Fall of the French Monarchy," in *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*, eds., Harriet B. Applewhite and Darline Levy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993). Also Dominique Godineau, "Masculine and Feminine Political Practice during

the French Revolution, 1793-Year III," in *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*.

<sup>94</sup> Levy and Applewhite, "Women and Militant Citizenship in Revolutionary Paris," 85.

<sup>95</sup> Cited in Darline Levy, Harriet Branson Applewhite, and Mary Durham Johnson, eds. and trans., *Women in Revolutionary Paris 1789-1795: Selected Documents* (Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 72-74, emphasis mine.

<sup>96</sup> Godineau, "Masculine and Feminine Political Practice," 65. According to Godineau, "the originality of women's political practices seems . . . to rest far more on the importance of the idea of popular sovereignty than on the subsistence question. The *sans-culottes*, men as well as women, had a very concrete idea of this concept: the Sovereign People deliberating in its section assemblies, bearing arms, sitting on the Revolutionary Tribunal. . . . Women of the people identified themselves as belonging to the Sovereign, and no one thought of denying that the Sovereign People was composed of both citizens and *citoyennes*. But women were legally excluded from the body politic and possessed none of the attributes of sovereignty (voting rights, the right to deliberate in the general assemblies of the sections, the right to organize in an armed body and sit on the Revolutionary Tribunal, etc.). Their status was ambiguous -- that of *citoyennes* without citizenship. On the other hand, in case of popular insurrection, when the sovereign People made its voice audible to mandatories whom it judged unfaithful, women constituted an integral portion of the Sovereign -- although such insurrection was not included within the structures of *sans-culotte* organization. In this paradoxical situation, women were fully recognized as members of the Sovereign only in times of insurrection, when the people attempted to reclaim its rights, rights that women, as women, did not enjoy." (68)

<sup>97</sup> Levy, Applewhite, and Johnson, eds., *Women in Revolutionary Paris*, 161-165.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 205.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 221, emphasis mine.

<sup>101</sup> Levy and Applewhite, "Women and Militant Citizenship in Revolutionary Paris" and "Women, Radicalization and the Fall of the French Monarchy."

<sup>102</sup> Butler, "Imitation and Gender Insubordination," 21.

<sup>103</sup> Marjorie Garber, *Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 16.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 10.

## Chapter Three

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### **The Citizen-Soldier as Political Fantasy: Civic and Martial Practices in American Political History**

For years political theorists have presented competing narratives about the nature of American history and politics. How should we understand our heritage? Has there been a "liberal consensus" in American politics, as Louis Hartz argues?<sup>1</sup> Or are the "republican revisionists" and communitarians correct in stressing the vital importance of civic republicanism in early America?<sup>2</sup> Is America a nation of self-interested individuals or of virtuous citizens concerned about the public good? Is the "public good" simply the sum of individual goods? Or is it something that arises out of the transcendence of individuals interests? Who are we as American citizens?

These questions are not just academic. The story we tell about our past directly affects the kind of politics we make in the present. As Benjamin R. Barber argues, "the historian uncovers in history the justification he seeks for his own time."<sup>3</sup> This is not to say that the historian or political theorist simply subordinates standards of scholarship to a particular political agenda. Instead, every scholar of American history and politics attempts to make sense out of the "confusing compound of political

traditions and civic rhetorics" that constitute the era of the American Founding. In so doing, each ends up constructing a particular narrative about our American heritage. That is to say, political historiography involves the interpretation and evaluation of facts:

Every interpretation is admissible, none sovereign. . . . American history would seem to be a fable not agreed upon, a fable told and retold by historians with distinctive visions not of the past or even of the present, but of a future that might be.<sup>4</sup>

How we narrate the story of American history directly affects the possibilities we see for American citizenship today.

On the one hand, stressing the Lockean origins of American politics produces a liberal picture of contemporary American politics. If we begin as liberalism does with the assumption of "atomistic social freedom," we will end up with an inadequate account of citizenship. While liberalism can justify the proliferation of "rights" which serve to protect the freedom of atomistic individuals from the infringement of others, it has a harder time articulating a notion of citizenship which entails civic obligations to other members of the community.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, remembering the centrality of civic republican ideals to the creation of the American republic helps legitimize contemporary attempts to resuscitate the ideals of participatory citizenship, civic virtue, and government aimed at the common good.

## **Founding the Citizen-Soldier Tradition in America**

Civic republicanism profoundly shaped the ways in which early Americans conceptualized politics. In fact, according to J. R. Pole, a republican consensus existed among early Americans. On both sides of the debate over the Constitution, he tells us, "the men of Philadelphia enjoyed the advantage of a pervasive consensus of principles." No one argued for monarchy or aristocracy because "all subscribed in one form or another" to "republican principles."<sup>6</sup> And this is clear from the writings of both federalists and anti-federalists, whose arguments are peppered with appeals for "liberty" and "virtue" and against "tyranny" and "corruption" -- all concepts central to the historic discourse of civic republicanism -- as well as explicit and/or implicit references to the Roman Republic, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.<sup>7</sup> Early Americans understood themselves as heirs of what J. G. A. Pocock has termed "the Atlantic Republican Tradition," which began with the work of Niccolo Machiavelli. And Gordon S. Wood concurs with this interpretation: "For Americans the mid-eighteenth century was truly a neo-classical age."<sup>8</sup> This neo-classical understanding of politics is evidenced by the frequent use of the names of ancient republican heroes by colonial and early American citizens and by the "classical references and



allusions" that ran "through much of the colonists' writings, both public and private." In fact, "it was a rare newspaper essayist who did not use a Greek or Latin phrase to enhance an argument or embellish a point and who did not employ a classical signature."<sup>9</sup>

The early American allegiance to the ideals of civic republicanism included a commitment to the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. The more civic republican anti-federalists feared the emergence of a standing army. In order to ensure the protection of republican liberty and self-rule from tyranny, the anti-federalists embraced the Citizen-Soldier tradition as previously articulated by Machiavelli and Rousseau. For example, one civic republican, known only as "a Farmer," explained that "a *standing army*, in our present unsettled circumstances . . . would wield us into despotism in a moment, and we have surely had throat-cutting enough in our day."<sup>10</sup> A citizen called "Brutus" argued that "keeping up a standing army, would be in the highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the community," and so "the general government ought not have authority to do it; for no government should be empowered to do that which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty."<sup>11</sup> And Patrick Henry added that without arms, the people will not be able to "punish tyrants."<sup>12</sup> In short, the anti-federalists maintained that "a free republic will never keep a standing

army to execute its laws. It must depend upon the support of its citizens."<sup>13</sup> In so doing, they laid claim to the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier.

In keeping with the civic republican tradition, early Americans viewed the polity as dialectically reconciling the common good with individual interests. So while communitarian scholars such as Michael Sandel and Gordon Wood stress that the "Bill of Rights," in its origins and prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, aimed at securing the rights of the states vis-à-vis the federal government, rather than ensuring the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the community,<sup>14</sup> at the same time, we must recognize that early Americans viewed the "common good" of the community as including the interests of each individual citizen. As Wood himself concedes, "since everyone in the community was linked organically to everyone else, what was good for the whole community was ultimately good for all the parts."<sup>15</sup> Thus, the common good was not seen as standing opposed to individual interests.

The Second Amendment grew out of this dialectical understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community. In the Second Amendment "the armed citizen and the militia existed as distinct, yet dynamically interrelated elements within American thought; it was perfectly reasonable to provide for both within the same

amendment to the Constitution."<sup>16</sup> In other words, like the First Amendment, the Second Amendment constitutionally protects the ability of individuals to engage in the civic and martial practices constitutive of republican citizenship. Early American civic republicans understood the individual and the community as forming a dialectic.

The Citizen-Soldier tradition constitutes the overall context in which early Americans imagined their civil-military relations. This tradition was institutionalized by the Second Amendment and the Militia Act of 1792.<sup>17</sup> While the Second Amendment constitutionally protected the right of citizens to form militias, the Militia Act fixed the principle of a universal military obligation in the statutory law of the new government. It required the enrollment of every free, white, able-bodied male citizen between eighteen and forty-five in the militia of his state and required each man to provide his own weapons.<sup>18</sup>

In *The Soldier and the State* Samuel P. Huntington delineates "three strands of American militarism," two of which relate directly to the Citizen-Soldier tradition. "The popular strand" explicitly includes the civic militia. However, the "technicism" strand also grows out of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. As Huntington explains, within the "technicism" strand

the officer was expert in one of several technical specialties, competence in which separated him from other officers trained in

different specialties and at the same time fostered close bonds with civilians practicing his specialty outside the military forces. The officer corps, in other words, was divided into subgroups, some more important than the rest, but each likely to be more closely tied with a segment of civilian society than with other segments of the corps.<sup>19</sup>

That is, "technicism" reinforces the blurring of the distinctions between the military and civil society and so hinders the emergence of a distinctive military professionalism, one of the goals of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. Thomas Jefferson, the key figure within the "technicism" school, condemned "the distinction 'between the civil and military, which it is for the happiness of both to obliterate.'"<sup>20</sup> Jefferson favored a strong civic militia system with universal military obligation and wanted to make military training a key part of college education. His founding of West Point in 1802 profoundly influenced American military education.<sup>21</sup> My interpretation of the "technicism" strand as part of the Citizen-Soldier tradition makes sense of Jefferson's simultaneous advocacy of the Citizen-Soldier ideal and his founding of West Point.<sup>22</sup>

### **American Civil Society and the *Citizenship of Civic Practices***

In the eighteenth and nineteenth century America, a strong civil society existed, in which American individuals became citizens as they engaged together in civic practices.<sup>23</sup> During the nineteenth century American "society

not only reflected but helped codify the three-celled model" of market, civil society, and the state that

we have lost in this century. In that era when (as Tocqueville suggested) liberty was local and civic activity more prevalent, a modest governmental sphere and an unassuming private sector were overshadowed by an extensive civil society tied together by school, church, town and voluntary associations.<sup>24</sup>

This was the era when civic practices took a central place in American political life.

In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville comments on the role of civic practices traditionally played in creating citizens who are committed to the republic:

The native of New England is attached to his township because it is independent and free: this co-operation in its affairs insures his attachment to its interest; the well-being it affords him secures his affection; and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future exertions.<sup>25</sup>

The concern with the common good that constitutes citizenship is constructed through the practices of self-government. "Patriotism," he argues, "is strengthened by ritual observance," by engagement in the practices of citizenship required in a system that "divides local authority among so many citizens, [and] does not scruple to multiply the functions of the town officers" (61). New England is "thoroughly democratic and republican" (46).

Tocqueville argues that, absent participation in self-rule, republican citizenship cannot exist. In making this argument he contrasts the civic action of the American citizen to the apathy of the European subject. "There are countries in Europe," he explains, "where the natives consider themselves as a kind of settlers, indifferent to

the fate of the spot which they inhabit." Their indifference arises from the fact that "the greatest changes are affected there without their concurrence." Because the European subject views government as "unconnected with himself," it does "not concern him." Even if "his own safety or that of his children is at last endangered," he does not act but instead

folds his arms, and wait[s] till the whole nation comes to his aid. . . . When a nation has arrived at this state, it must either change its customs or its laws, or perish; for the source of public virtues is dried up; and though it may contain subjects, it has no citizens (68-69).

Without civic participation, patriotism and civic virtue cannot exist and so neither can republican citizenship.

In opposition to the European subject, Tocqueville argues, the American citizen does not look to the state to solve his problems. Instead, American citizens solve their own problems through the process of civic deliberation and civic action:

When a private individual meditates an undertaking, however directly connected it may be to the welfare of society, he never thinks of soliciting the co-operation of the government; but he publishes his plan, offers to execute it, courts the assistance of other individuals, and struggles manfully against all obstacles (70).

For example,

if a stoppage occurs in a thoroughfare, and the circulation of vehicles is hindered, the neighbors immediately form themselves into a deliberative body; and this extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power, which remedies the inconvenience before anybody has thought of recurring to a pre-existing authority superior to that of the persons immediately concerned. (95)

In fact, civic deliberation is such a central part of American life that "no sooner do you set foot upon American

ground, than you are stunned by a kind of tumult; a confused clamor is heard on every side; and a thousand simultaneous voices demand the satisfaction of their social wants" (108). The interaction of diverse perspectives is productive: "He is canvassed by a multitude of applicants, and, in seeking to deceive him in a thousand ways, they really enlighten him" (110). In fact, "the cares of politics engross a prominent place in the occupations of a citizen in the United States" (109). In this way, early American citizens exercised "the most natural privilege of man, [which] next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow-creatures, and acting in common with them" (98). In Tocqueville's estimation at least, a strong civil society, a key component of civic republicanism, existed during the early years of American history.

Tocqueville, however, was not uncritical of American civil society. First of all, Tocqueville feared that the existence of (what he saw as) equality of condition could eventually lead to radical individualism and the erosion of society. As he explains, democratic society lacks the hierarchical organization that in aristocratic society ensures bonds of obligation and dependency between men.

Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king: democracy breaks that chain, and severs every link. . . . Thus, not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart. (194)

Thrown back on himself alone, democratic man develops a sense of individualism

which disposes [him] to sever himself from the mass of his fellows, and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. . . . Individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run, it attacks and destroys all others, and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness.

In a non-hierarchical, democratic society, "the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed" (193). Each man becomes concerned only with the interests of himself and his close circle of family and friends.

For Tocqueville only participation in civic practices can counteract the fragmentation of democratic society. "It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the state," Tocqueville reasons, "because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the state can have upon his own lot." However, once a man takes action at a local level to achieve his own self-interest, he begins to see the connection between his private interest and the public good.

Thus, far more may be done by intrusting to the citizens the administration of minor affairs than by surrendering to them the control of important ones, towards interesting them in the public welfare, and convincing them that they constantly stand in need one of another in order to provide for it.

Furthermore, through engagement in civic practices at the local level the man becomes the citizen who cares for the public good. The need for common action "perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities which sever them." As a result "a great



number of citizens [learn] to value the affection of their neighbors and of their kindred" (196). While men "attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards [they do it] by choice" (197). Civic participation creates citizens and instills in them a sense of patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue.

Secondly, Tocqueville fears that democratic civil society can lead to a "tyranny of the majority." That is, Tocqueville argues that because all power in a democracy derives from the people, no standard of judgment exists outside the decisions of the majority: "When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress?" All political institutions represent the majority in one way or another (115). Absolute sovereignty of the community means that there are no independent standards by which community decisions can be judged. Consequently, the interests of minority groups could easily be overrun by the decisions of the majority, and there would be no appeal. This overwhelming power of the majority could lead to tyranny: "Unlimited power" -- even of the people in a democracy -- "is in itself a bad and dangerous thing," Tocqueville cautions us, because "human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion" as is God (115).

Carrying his critique even further, Tocqueville argues that the power of the majority could also hinder the very formation of dissenting opinions, thus truncating political

debate. That is to say, in America "the majority possesses a power which is physical and moral at the same time, which acts upon the will as much as upon the actions, and represses not only all contest, but all controversy." Tocqueville insists that he knows "of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America" (117). While the process of civic deliberation Tocqueville praises can produce a synthesis of individual interests into a common good, it can also exert a pressure on participants to conform to the majority opinion.

Finally, while Tocqueville addresses problems of equality in civil society, I would add that the existence of a strong civil society also entails problems of social inequality. The deleterious effects of social inequalities on the possibility of full citizenship for disadvantaged groups often spurs those on the Left to call for state intervention to eradicate those social inequalities. After all, the key institutions of civil society -- schools, churches, and voluntary organizations -- are often less than bastions of equality, inclusivity, and/or diversity. While many reasons exist for wanting to nurture an active civil society and protect it from state incursions, we cannot ignore the fact that very real social inequalities will take a toll on interactions within civil society.

We must remember that while the civic republican ideal of an active civil society, in which diverse individuals become citizens as they engage together in civic practices

contains vices as well as virtues. The *citizenship of civic practices* can be exclusionary. For example, as we shall see, historically, American civil society was strongest when it was most homogeneous, that is, when its citizens were predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant men. And African-American men were not welcomed to participate once they gained citizenship. In fact, as I will argue, it was precisely the increasing diversity of the American populace that (in part) fueled the attack on civil society and the *citizenship of civic practices* that ultimately resulted in the emergence of the "professional politics paradigm." So while a strong civil society constitutes a democratic ideal, if its existence depends upon the exclusion of certain groups of people, than the ideal functions in an undemocratic and hypocritical way. In other words, it is not enough for the process to be democratic in theory. Real democracy entails the commitment to and actualization of certain principles as well, such as inclusivity and social equality. Whether strong republican citizens can be created out of very diverse individuals remains one of the primary challenges for democratic theorists and practitioners today.

Nevertheless, despite its exclusions, this American version of the *citizenship of civic practices* allows room for a lot more diversity and dissension than does Rousseau's. As we saw in Chapter Two, Rousseau emphasized a unitary *general will* constructed through civic and martial practices that did not allow for dissension. In contrast to

this, Tocqueville describes an American *citizenship of civic practices* that does allow room for disagreement and debate. The American version of the *citizenship of civic practices* does not require the elimination of divisive issues from political deliberations. Instead, it presents a model of civic deliberation that aims to forge a common good out of a diversity of different opinions.<sup>26</sup>

### **The Fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier**

Tocqueville paints a clear picture of the *citizenship of civic practices* in early America. However, while he discusses in length the civic practices through which early Americans became citizens, he overlooks the martial practices that also played a key role in the constitution of republican citizenship. The Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism entails a *citizenship of civic practices* in which individuals become citizens as they engage together in both civic and martial practices. The Citizen-Soldier ideal links participatory citizenship to service in the militia. Both halves of this ideal are equally important.

The strong tradition of civic republicanism that existed in America through the nineteenth century featured the Citizen-Soldier ideal as a central category.<sup>27</sup> Although not always actualized in practice, the normative ideal of the Citizen-Soldier existed in American political discourse and played a key role in early republican society. In fact

I would argue, the myth of the Citizen-Soldier constituted a "phantasmatic" social ideal that was more important for the production of masculine citizens than for actual military effectiveness.<sup>28</sup> Participation in the civic militia was one of the key components in the construction of masculine republican citizenship in early America. Individuals became masculine republican citizen-soldiers as they participated in the rituals required by the fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier.

Many scholars stress the military inadequacies of the civic militia. While the civic militia had formed the basis of colonial defense, during the American Revolution -- the supposedly quintessential example of citizen-soldiery at its finest -- the militia "proved ineffective."<sup>29</sup> As one historian argues, the early American "glorification of the militia -- the myth of the citizen-soldier" --

developed in the face of considerable evidence of its inadequacies. . . . Time and experience revealed the distance between ideal and reality. In their ideology, the regular army was 'only ancillary to the revolution.' The reality was quite different; a regular force had been essential to victory."<sup>30</sup>

In another historian's words,

the impulse to glorify the revolutionary effort led to exaggerated claims of success and helps to explain the significance accorded the militia by Americans in the 1780's. The popular interpretation of victory in the Revolution ignored the role played by the regular army and reinstated the people's militia as the vital pillar of American virtue and essential to the preservation of the nation's unique republican character."<sup>31</sup>

So even though "by 1790 the militia had lost its status as a viable military institution," it continued to exist as a symbol of republican liberties.<sup>32</sup>

The Citizen-Soldier ideal functioned in early America as both a normative ideal entailing a commitment to liberty, equality, autonomy, and participatory citizenship (for those included) and as an ideological construct in the Althusserian sense. For Louis Althusser, ideology represents "not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live."<sup>33</sup> That is, "all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects."<sup>34</sup> Ideology works by mandating certain sets of practices, the engagement in which produces particular subjects.<sup>35</sup> The belief in the ideological fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier required male individuals to engage in the practices of the civic militia, which functioned to constitute them as masculine citizen-soldiers. Or to put it in Judith Butler's terms, the Citizen-Soldier constituted a "phantasmatic ideal," the "imitation" of which resulted in performatively constructed masculine citizen-soldiers.

What I am arguing is that the Citizen-Soldier ideal functions as a social and political fantasy that calls for male individuals to engage in the twin practices of the civic militia and participatory citizenship. Teresa de Lauretis stresses the importance of fantasy in the constitution of subjectivity. Focusing on gender identity, she demonstrates the key role fantasy plays in the subject's internalization of cultural gender norms. If we expand her

argument, we can begin to consider the role fantasy plays in linking a variety of ideological imperatives to individual subjectivities. This deepens our understanding of the importance of the Citizen-Soldier ideal in civic republicanism: The Citizen-Soldier ideal constitutes a social and political fantasy that leads male individuals to want to engage in the civic and martial practices that will produce them as citizen-soldiers.

Thus, scholars who stress the civic militia's lack of military efficacy miss the important role that civic and martial practices played in the constitution of masculine republican citizenship in eighteenth and nineteenth century America. Take, for example, one military scholar's contemptuous portrayal of early American citizen-soldiers:

The men thus enrolled *en masse* by statute were far more interested in somehow demonstrating a constitutional right to bear arms than they were concerned about ever using those arms for national defense or anything else. For the purpose of effecting this demonstration, as well as to engage in strutting display and to gain pseudosocial recognition among some of their equally shortsighted neighbors, the militiamen in various villages and towns were periodically gathered together in company-sized groups for drill and training, according to law.<sup>36</sup>

The argument continues:

Almost from the beginning and thereafter throughout the next 150 years, until abolished when the National Guard was established by the Dick Act of 1903, American *nonvolunteer* militia units were essentially social in nature, incapable of serious military functioning, and more avoided by the regular army than welcomed.<sup>37</sup>

What arguments such as this one fail to recognize is that the civic militia fulfilled an important social and political function in republican America because its practices played an important role in the constitution of

patriotism, fraternity, civic virtue, citizenship, and masculinity. Participating together in martial rituals, white male individuals came to constitute a fraternity of manly citizens who loved their community and so were willing to think of the common good, rather than just their own individuals interests.

For example, the practices of the civic militia traditionally played a key role in the creation of fraternity in early American politics. This role was so important that when the common militia tradition of universal and obligatory service deteriorated during the early nineteenth century, the volunteer militia tradition "emerged, partially filling the military void."<sup>38</sup> These "volunteer units satisfied the sort of public demand that sports were to fulfill later on" and kept "the martial spirit alive in regions more and more remote from immediate danger."<sup>39</sup> Individuals became a fraternity of manly citizen-soldiers as they participated in the practices of the civic militia.

The civic and martial practices embodied in the figure of the Citizen-Soldier animated American politics during the nineteenth century and were central to what Michael E. McGerr calls "spectacular politics," which began in the 1820s and 1830s and reached their height during the American third party system (1850s to early 1890s). During this period the political parties regularly sponsored civic festivals that had martial practices at their center:



For presidential contests, and occasionally those state contests charged with national issues, Democrats and Republicans used the traditional elements of political display more extensively than ever before and added the uniformed marching company to create an intense, enveloping partisan experience. . . . Men may have paraded in uniform occasionally during Jacksonian elections, but the military company became the trademark of spectacle in the third party system."<sup>40</sup>

In nineteenth century America, political parties sponsored civic festivals like the ones Rousseau advocated.

In fact, John Mahon stresses, in his *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, that military uniforms played a key role in stimulating participation in civic festivals:

In some of the people, the martial spirit combined with a love of colorful uniforms, military ceremonials, and martial music was ever present. Such props appealed to the vanity of many persons and to the noble instinct of others, and through them citizens of all sorts sought to escape being ordinary. . . . The opportunity to wear a uniform attracted some men, the gaudier the uniform the better. . . . As uniforms enlarged the self-respect of the wearers, so also did they stir those persons who saw them. . . . Festivals would have been drab without the volunteer militia, the units of which were easy to involve in public appearances. . . . They also conducted target shoots, and marched with much ceremony to visit neighboring units. The encampments occasioned by these visits involved themselves and the host communities in gargantuan feasts, much fancy drill, and sham battles."<sup>41</sup>

Thus, the martial practices of the civic militia served a vital function in nineteenth century America, because they helped stimulate the civic participation through which masculine citizens would be constituted.

Civic and martial practices were interconnected during the era of strong parties. "Spectacular campaigns," McGerr tells us,

mingled the intellectual stimulation of an open-air, hour-long oration on the tariff with the military nostalgia of the uniformed company. Partisan display combined the exertion of long marches with the delights of a fireworks show. Transforming communities into partisan tableaux, spectacle fused martial dreams,

intellectual endeavor, leisure enjoyment, and hard labor in the service of politics.<sup>42</sup>

Both halves of the Citizen-Soldier ideal, participatory citizenship and service in the militias, were important during this period. "Together the clubs and [marching] companies created a partisan spectacle that engulfed Northern communities for the three months before election day" (26). Individuals became citizens as they engaged in the civic and martial practices prescribed by the fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier.

Participation in the political process is important to the constitution of citizens within the civic republican tradition because it requires that individuals work together to govern themselves for the common good, rather than simply pursuing their own interests. From McGerr's description of nineteenth century civil society, we can discern the existence of high levels of civic deliberation. That is, we can assume, given the centrality of party newspapers, partisan issues, and political speeches in this era of "spectacular politics," that individuals throughout the community were actively engaged in civic deliberation in both formal and informal ways. Certainly political speeches were a central part of "spectacular politics": "Unable to find seats inside [to hear visiting party heroes speak], thousands of people often stood in the streets to hear orators speak from makeshift platforms" (27). Despite the popularity of "party heroes" during this period, campaigns were waged on the basis of issues, not personalities; the

actual presidential candidates played a limited role in their own campaigns. All candidates were expected to do was accept the nomination and endorse the party platform. In fact, campaigning vigorously on one's own behalf was considered to be in poor taste.

My theorization of the *citizenship of civic practices* -- that individuals become citizens only as they participate in civic and martial practices -- augments McGerr's analysis of why there was a strong positive correlation between "spectacular politics" and voting. In answering this question McGerr argues that, in the first place, political parties stimulated voting by drawing people into the political process. More importantly, however,

the significance of political spectacle and party journalism lay not so much in their effect on voting at this or that presidential election as in their influence on the habits of the generations of men voting at all elections, local as well as national, in the nineteenth century.

Spectacular campaigns "captivated" and "initiated" young boys into politics (40). In other words, engagement in civic and martial practices actually constituted them as citizens.

That is to say, partisanship became an important aspect of civic identity:

Through participation in spectacular campaigns, Northerners revealed their belief not merely in the legitimacy of party commitment, but also in the necessity of demonstrating that commitment in public before the community. Like the party press, political spectacle made partisanship appear an integral element of men's identity and outlook. (37-38, emphasis mine)

More pointedly, partisanship was central to civic identity because it caused men to engage in civic action and only

through that action could they become citizens. In other words, *citizen* was not a pre-political identity in nineteenth century America, but rather an identity constructed through civic practice.

The fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier, enacted by the marching companies, played a key role in the constitution of masculine republican citizenship. Theorizing the role of fantasy in American politics, Lauren Berlant argues that "participation in national celebration connects the citizen to a collective subjectivity constituted by synchronous participation in the same national rituals, the same discursive system."<sup>43</sup> The martial rituals and civic festivals characteristic of the Citizen-Soldier tradition functioned to connect individuals to a collective subjectivity -- that is, to the republic. Citizenship was actually constructed through synchronous participation in civic and martial rituals. However, while Berlant focuses on the role the Statue of Liberty played in the creation of American nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century, the fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier required participation in the states' militias, and thus helped constitute state citizenship to a greater extent than national citizenship. And in fact, the emergence of American nationalism corresponded to a decline in the centrality of the Citizen-Soldier ideal to American politics.

Many scholars dismiss the importance of civic practices in nineteenth century American politics. For example,

attacking valorizations of the highly attended Lincoln-Douglas debates as examples of civic participation and deliberation *par excellence*, Michael Schudson maintains that while "it is true" that many people attended the debates, "it is not at all apparent what in those debates they attended to. It is true that they participated, but it is not clear that they were 'interested in issues of transcendent importance.'" Political campaigns in the nineteenth century, Schudson argues, were more "religious revivals and popular entertainments than settings for rational-critical discussion."<sup>44</sup> Recalling his own experience in the 1960s, Schudson insists that "there is a big difference between attending a rally and actually listening to the speeches." He concludes that "the idea that a public sphere of rational-critical discourse flourished in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century, at least in the American instance, is an inadequate, if not incoherent, notion."<sup>45</sup> For Schudson, only rational discourse counts as politics.

While "a public sphere of rational-critical discourse" might not have ever existed in America, Schudson is missing the important point: Nineteenth century America was characterized by a vibrant civil society in which individuals became citizens as they engaged together in civic practices. It was through engagement in these practices that individuals developed the passionate connection to their communities -- the feelings of

patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue -- that underwrote their interest in self-government. Thus, the important question is not whether people actually listened to the arguments made in political debates and deliberated about the issues -- although, given the context, it is hard to believe that nineteenth century Americans did not do this. What matters more is the fact that individuals were being transformed into republican citizens, as they attended rallies, gathered in the streets, sang songs, picnicked, wore uniforms in strutting display, and demonstrated their constitutional right to bear arms in celebratory parades.

Furthermore, Schudson, like many other "public sphere" advocates, misunderstands what constitutes citizenship within the civic republican tradition. That is to say, in a direct attack on McGerr's scholarship, Schudson argues that "spectacular politics" was

more a communal ritual than an act of individual or group involvement in rational-critical discussion. . . . It was organized much less with the rational choice of the individual voter in mind. The voter, in a sense, was not conceived of as an individual but as an entity enveloped in and defined by social circumstance and party affiliation.<sup>46</sup>

And this is exactly the point: The civic republican citizen-soldier was indeed an enveloped entity constituted through engagement in civic and martial practices.

As I have been arguing, the civic republican tradition does not conceptualize citizens as pre-political entities -- rational individual voters -- who then choose whether or not to engage in political discourse or patriotic martial

rituals. Instead, the individual actually becomes a citizen as he participates in civic and martial practices. In other words, for civic republicanism, citizenship should be understood as a set of practices that eventually produce a civic identity, rather than as a pre-political category established through residence on a particular piece of land (*citizenship of land*) -- or through having a particular race or ethnicity (*citizenship of blood*). While those allowed to participate in the practices constitutive of republican citizenship may in fact have the same race or ethnicity, civic republicanism does not restrict citizenship in this way as a matter of principle.

In sum, up through the end of the nineteenth century, the Citizen-Soldier ideal played a central role in the constitution of masculine republican citizenship in America. This ideal represented the linkage between participatory citizenship and military service -- at least at the level of ideology. The fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier led male individuals to engage in the civic and martial practices through which they would be transformed into masculine citizen-soldiers. These practices produced feelings of patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue as well as a common civic identity -- all of which provide the necessary foundation for republican self-government aimed at the common good. Male individuals became masculine republican citizen-soldiers as they participated in martial rituals and civic festivities organized by the political parties.

## **Policing the Borders of the Civic Republic: The Vices of the Citizen-Soldier Tradition**

Vices as well as virtues characterize the Citizen-Soldier tradition, however. While civic and martial practices create citizen-soldiers and instill in them patriotism, fraternity, civic virtue, and a common civic identity, these same practices can also yield chauvinism, racism, violence, and homogeneity. In nineteenth century America, participation in civic and martial practices did indeed create virtues that underwrote participatory citizenship, but it also produced a set of undemocratic vices. The citizen-soldier identity was forged in opposition to denigrated Others. The question for democratic theorists is whether we can augment the virtues of the Citizen-Soldier ideal while down-playing its vices.

The Citizen-Soldier tradition that was so essential to the constitution of republican citizenship in America produces a package of interconnected virtues and vices. Richard Moser agrees on the importance of the Citizen-Soldier tradition to American political culture. However, in his study of the role of soldiering in American history and historiography, Moser argues that there are actually two important and conflicting soldier ideals in American culture: the Citizen-Soldier and the Fighter. Moser concludes that "the American soldier ideal is defined by the



tension between [these] two opposing historical traditions, each with its own meanings and myths."<sup>47</sup> But while Moser provides important insights into the role of the Citizen-Soldier ideal in American culture and on the constitution of *armed masculinity* with the U.S. military -- a topic we will discuss more fully in Chapter Five -- I disagree with his differentiation between the Citizen-Soldier and the Fighter. In essence, Moser locates all of the virtues of the Citizen-Soldier tradition in the former figure and all the vices in the latter. But as we shall soon see, the Citizen-Soldier ideal itself contains both virtues and vices, which exist in dialectical tension.

It is not simply the case that the Citizen-Soldier tradition is democratic in theory but not actualized in practice. Instead, as we have seen in Chapters One and Two, even at the level of theory, the Citizen-Soldier tradition produces vices as well as virtues. We want to create patriotism, fraternity, civic virtue, and a common civic identity, but we risk producing chauvinism, racism, violence, and homogeneity. If we want a strong version of participatory citizenship, we must engage in civic practices that produce both virtues and vices.

For example, individuals became republican citizen-soldiers as they waged war on the Native Americans. In fact, one of the earliest and most important reasons for maintaining a militia system was to engage in a war to contain Native Americans that in time became genocide.<sup>48</sup>

During the Jacksonian period of American democracy, removal of the eastern Indians to areas west of the Mississippi was a major project. The Black Hawk War during the early 1830s "showed the citizen soldiery at its worst." For example, "many of the short-term irregulars considered these redmen to be animals, much lower on the life scale than man. They wanted this animal out of the way and welcomed the chance to kill it." Hatred of the Sauk and Fox Indians "grew among the citizen soldiery. . . . Some of them, finding a few Indian women furrowing in the river bank to hide, shot them and especially relished watching them jerk as they died." The Indians "became the active enemy of the militia, both standing and volunteer, during the decades following the War of 1812."<sup>49</sup> White Americans constructed their civic identity through violent martial practices that annihilated Native American populations.

American citizen-soldiers likewise constituted their identity in opposition to the Mexicans, as they patrolled America's southern border. During the Mexican War in the 1840s, many of the volunteer citizen-soldiers "considered the Roman Catholic Mexican peasants as being on a low rung of the life ladder, no higher than the North American Indians." More than once the regular army soldiers intervened to save "native Mexicans from rape, pillage, and death at the hands of the volunteers" of the militias. One regular soldier wrote that he saw the volunteer militiamen 'fighting over their victims like dogs, and the place

resounded with horrid oaths and the groans and shrieks of the raped' (93). Once again we see civic identity constructed in opposition to denigrated "others."

In his history of the civic militia, Mahon argues that the amateurism and disorderliness of the citizen-soldiers actually increased the cruelty of both the annihilation of the Native Americans and the conquest of the Mexicans (94). Driven by the passions of patriotism, citizen-soldiers often acted without restraint. Despite this reality, the performance of the citizen-soldiers in the Mexican War was seen by the American people as a great triumph, "a magnificent conquest. . . . The war had shown that the martial spirit was very much alive in the nation, a spirit essential to the mood of Manifest Destiny abroad in the land." The citizen-soldiers "vindicated the national honor" -- but at the expense of the Mexican people (94).

Not only did the citizen-soldiers define themselves in violent opposition to denigrated "others," but they also functioned best as a militia unit when membership was most homogeneous. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the militia were "most effective in New England . . . perhaps [in part because of its] considerable ethnic and cultural homogeneity."<sup>50</sup> Since citizenship was linked to compulsory service in the militia, as American citizenship was expanded in the early nineteenth century to include poor and working class white men, the militias became increasingly heterogeneous. Along with this increasing

diversity, we see the emergence of a movement in opposition to compulsory participation in the militias. Urban middle and upper class men in the North began to oppose militia duty, while the urban press began to ridicule the newly inclusive militia, calling it "'rabble' or 'scarecrow militia,' engaged in a parody of military drill, many without weapons or uniforms. The militia-training days, critics argued, had degenerated into loafing and insobriety."<sup>51</sup> During the period of Jacksonian democracy, the old common militia made up of all citizens were replaced by volunteer militia companies "composed of like-minded men from the same town or ethnic group who enjoyed the pomp and camaraderie of a military brotherhood." These new militia units called themselves the "National Guard," partially in order "to distinguish themselves from the disreputable general or common militia."<sup>52</sup>

The South, on the other hand, continued to support mandatory militia training for all white men because the southern civic militia played a vital role in the maintenance of white supremacy, patrolling the southern plantations and suppressing slave insurrections.<sup>53</sup> In fact, in addition to militia duty, every able-bodied man had the obligation periodically to join in nocturnal neighborhood [slave] patrols," in the "extralegal and semimilitary organizations" emerged to "supplement the state militias and sheriffs' posses which the law sanctioned."<sup>54</sup> Service in the

slave patrol was in essence an extension of the white man's civic militia duty.<sup>55</sup>

With millions of Afro-Americans in the region, most southern whites viewed the local militia and slave patrol as essential instruments of race control. Adroitly, southern leaders emphasized that the militia encouraged martial skills and virtues, highly prized among rural residents, and also forged a bond among white males.<sup>56</sup>

The militia was "the corporate embodiment of white male political fraternity."<sup>57</sup> This was true to some extent even in the North where the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 brought work to the militia units, which were involved in roundups of runaway slaves.<sup>58</sup>

Militia service in the South simultaneously bolstered both fraternity and racism. In fact, militia service played such an important role in the maintenance of white supremacy in the South that after the Civil War the Republican party denied the ex-Confederate states the right to form militias.<sup>59</sup> Bulwarks of white supremacy, the Southern militias would not act to suppress widespread violence by whites against African-Americans. One could say they saw violence as necessary for the common good. To the Republican party, "a militia composed in large part of the very white men who were engaged in lawlessness, or were sympathetic with it, seemed worse than useless."<sup>60</sup> However, because of the constitutional protection of the militias by the Second Amendment and because the regular army needed assistance in their occupation of the South, Congress reinstated militias in the South, but restricted membership

to African-Americans and white Unionists. Needless to say, the arming of African-Americans in militia units was "intolerable to the southern whites."<sup>61</sup> The specter of the long-feared "race war" threatened in their minds. Southern whites viewed the African-American citizen-soldiers as an "obnoxious" bunch of "swaggering bullies" and feared that the African-American militias would become 'a standing army of negro soldiers.'<sup>62</sup>

With African-Americans in the official militias, white Southerners had no intention of abandoning their traditional martial practices. Vowing "to use unbridled violence if necessary," white men across the South began to form "white rifle companies" to replace the dissolved state militias.<sup>63</sup> In fact, the Ku Klux Klan emerged as a part of this white martial reaction to the enfranchisement of African-Americans.<sup>64</sup>

Although they lacked official sanction, these companies had behind them the determination of the society to establish white supremacy at all costs. . . . White riflemen ambushed and killed black officers and white supporters of the Negro militia. These assassinations often took place in broad daylight with witnesses, but prosecutions were nonexistent.

As a consequence,

the leadership that supported the black militia was either killed or intimidated. When the Democrats returned to power in state after state of the ex-Confederacy, they terminated the black militia, disarmed the blacks, and excluded them from any role in the militia.<sup>65</sup>

The white rifle companies played a key role in overthrowing Reconstruction.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, an increase of and changes in immigration over the latter half of the nineteenth century contributed to the changing composition of a

formerly White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant America. In the 1840s with the immigration of large numbers of Irish Roman Catholics, we see the beginning of a shift in immigration patterns that resulted in increased numbers of Jews and Catholics in the American populace and contributed to the growth of cities, which came to be seen as centers of discontent that "seemed to threaten an America that had been dominated by a homogeneous rural or small-town Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture."<sup>67</sup> By 1893 the majority of immigrants would be arriving from southern and eastern Europe (Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Poland, Greece and the Balkans) and from Asia (China and Japan), rather than from northern and western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia) as had been the case prior to the 1890s. The fact that many of these newcomers were working class created further anxiety. As the heterogeneity of the citizenry increased, so did discrimination and bigotry of all kinds: racism, nativism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and fear of social democracy.<sup>68</sup>

These changes affected the militia in three ways. First of all, new immigrant groups, such as the Irish, began forming their own homogeneous, ethnic militias. Martial practices facilitated fraternal bonding and a common civic identity among participants. Part of civil society, these ethnic militia units were not organized by the state governments, but rather were "created by social forces,"<sup>69</sup> that is, "by various ethnic and status groups, subsidized by

the federal government, and fused with state and local party politics through ties of patronage."<sup>70</sup> New immigrants engaged in martial practices and in this way forged a sense of fraternity within their communities and a patriotic connection to the larger American republic.

Secondly, the proliferation of ethnic militia groups created fear in the hearts of WASP America and so fed the emergence of American nativism. "The growth of nativist and anti-Catholic sentiment . . . raised public fears about the loyalty and reliability of such ethnic National Guard units in a society increasingly divided along ethnic, religious, and class lines." Consequently,

in the 1850s, nativists seeking to create a 'pure American' militia, demanded the exclusion of immigrants from the National Guard. In response, the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut confiscated the weapons of all so-called 'foreign militia' and ordered the dissolution of militia companies composed primarily of Irish Catholics.<sup>71</sup>

Engagement in martial practices produced a sense of fraternity and a common identity among new immigrants and this created fear among white Americans who occupied a position of dominance.

Thirdly, the increasing diversity of class, race, and ethnicity in American society created fear on the part of the white, property owning classes of the dark, urban proletariat gathering in the cities and led to calls for the building of a modern, professional army. As "swarms of immigrants entered the United States from southeastern Europe . . . [and] crowded into industrial cities,"



xenophobia and the fear of social democracy augmented each other. In the words of one General: 'It is idle to close our eyes to the fact that there now exists in certain localities an element, mostly imported from abroad, fraught with danger to order and well being unless firmly and wisely controlled.'<sup>72</sup> In the discursive battle against the threat of social democracy, strikes were portrayed as "un-American," and the homogenized National Guard was called upon protect private property from the increasingly heterogeneous people. In the words of one Guard leader, physical force was the only way to keep down the 'savage elements of the society.' In fact, the editor of the *National Guard* wrote that the laws the Guard upheld with its weapons were 'enacted by the people before this fair country was overrun by the outcasts of Europe . . . villains from all parts of the Old World.'<sup>73</sup> Doubt emerged about whether citizens' militias would protect private property from working people.

In fact, according to Stephen Skowronek, industrial strife was the main cause of calls for the replacement of the civic militias with a modern, American army.<sup>74</sup> America's unparalleled labor violence caused reformers to call for "a well-trained internal police force." In addition, America during this period was "an expanding commercial power, [that,] no matter how favored geographically, required an international military capacity to protect its worldwide economic interests."<sup>75</sup>

The increasing heterogeneity of the American populus and the changes wrought by industrialization scared white, property owning Americans and fueled an attack on both participatory citizenship and the civic militia -- on both halves of the traditional Citizen-Soldier ideal. During the Progressive era, a transition occurred from the active, community-based *citizenship of civic practices* we have been exploring to a passive, individualistic, consumerist version of "citizenship" characteristic of contemporary America. Ultimately, the *citizenship of civic practices* gave way to the "professional politics paradigm" -- the belief that we need "professionals" to govern for us -- which accompanied the building of the "new American state." One of the key elements that enabled this transition was the attack on the mass political parties whose practices traditionally played a key role in transforming individuals into citizens. The changes begun during the latter part of the nineteenth century and consolidated in the early twentieth century ultimately put an end to both the participatory citizenship and the civic militia characteristic of the Citizen-Soldier tradition.<sup>76</sup>

### **Citizen-Soldiers and Working People**

Between 1877 and 1900 a struggle ensued between those who favored the creation of a modern, professional military, namely northern industrialists and military reformers, and

those who stood with the long-standing American tradition of the Citizen-Soldier. The "new ideals of nationalism, expertise, and professionalism" ran up against "the deeply rooted traditions of volunteerism, federalism, and republicanism embodied in the institution of the state militia."<sup>77</sup> On the one hand, the Northern Republicans feared labor unrest, and did not trust the citizens' militias to protect the private property of the few. Consequently, Northern industrialists and their Republican Party favored the creation of a professional military they could trust to protect them from the threat of social democracy. On the other hand, Southern Democrats, who had returned to power during the 1870s, harbored "unveiled hatred for troops that had not only occupied the South but openly colluded with the Radicals to impose the Republican party and the Negro on southern politics" (98). Southern fears of a standing army were very real, and so they opposed the professionalization of the American military. Ultimately, the push for a modern, professionalized military was stymied by the long-standing American tradition of the Citizen-Soldier (91).

When the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 erupted, citizen-soldiers were called upon to defend private property against working people -- sometimes their own neighbors.

During the early days of the strike, the old republican faith in citizen-soldiers appeared to threaten capitulation to the mob. Militia units faltered badly in actions at Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. There were no organized militia units on hand when the strike reached Indiana and Missouri. Most fearful of all were reports of fraternization between militia men

and strikers in West Virginia, New York, and Ohio. The specter of a militia collapse drew anxious appeals for federal troops. (99)

Despite the fears of industrialists, "in general, the Guardsmen on duty in 1877 carried out their orders even when their sympathies lay with the strikers."<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, there was no guarantee that the citizen-soldiers would always act to repress their working neighbors for the benefit of the few.

Within the Citizen-Soldier tradition, the civic militia made up of all citizens stands ready to defend the people against tyranny. A professional army is feared because it can be used to advance particular interests against the common interests of the people. Thus it makes sense that as working people threatened the particular interests of industrial capital, calls for a professional army increased. For example, the corporate sponsored *Chicago Tribune*

avored the development of the regulars into a 'national police force,' because the citizen-soldiers had proven too much a part of the society that now had to be controlled. Unlike the amateur, the regular 'has no politics, no affiliations, no connections with trade unions or corporations.' The regulars were the independent strong arm of the state.<sup>79</sup>

In Samuel Gompers' words, "standing armies are always used to exercise tyranny over people."<sup>80</sup>

Industrial capitalists and their supporters feared that citizen-soldiers might very well side with social democracy. In the words of then Secretary of War McCrary:

As our country increases in population and wealth, and as great cities become numerous it must be clearly seen that there may be great danger of uprisings of large masses of people for the redress of grievances, real or fancied; and it is a well known fact that such uprisings enlist in greater or lesser degree the sympathies of the communities in which they occur. This fact along renders the militia unreliable in such an emergency.<sup>81</sup>

Even though the National Guard did indeed break up strikes and even fired on the strikers on several occasions, the possibility still existed that citizen-soldiers would not act against working people.<sup>82</sup> McCrary called for a cool, steady, and obedient military ready to stand firm against participatory popular sovereignty.<sup>83</sup>

Nevertheless, the Citizen-Soldier tradition was so rooted in American political culture that it could not be so easily dislodged. Despite the needs of Northern industrialists and the desires of military reformers, as Skowronek demonstrates, entrenched traditions, institutions, and interests prevented the emergence of a modern, professional army at the end of the nineteenth century. The state militia system could be reformed, but not replaced by a professional army. However, states reformed their militias in accordance with their "internal politics" and "need for an internal police." For example, the South reformed its militias in a way that served Southern racism.<sup>84</sup> Officially, the South said it would revive its militias in order "to replace federal troops in the control of racial disturbances, lynchings, and vigilantism." In actuality, southern states did very little to strengthen their militias. In the North, on the other hand, the "primary function" of a revived militia was to serve as "a state police employed in the control of labor disturbances." Consequently, northern "states with large working-class populations took the lead in the militia revival."<sup>85</sup>

Dominant forces within society influenced state government to reform militias in ways that would serve their interests. The civic militia no longer existed to protect the interests of "the people" against state-imposed tyranny.

### **Universal Military Service and the Death of the Citizen-Soldier Tradition**

The beginning of the twentieth century ushered in a series of military reform acts that ultimately federalized the civic militias. The Dick Act of 1903 repealed the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 which had mandated "general enrollment and personal weapons provisions." Henceforth, "the whole military manpower potential of the country" would be called the "reserve militia," rather than the old term, "unorganized militia," and the National Guard would be called the "organized militia."<sup>86</sup> In addition, the Dick Act gave the federal government the power to dictate how often National Guard units would drill and to inspect them. While National Guard units continued to be the military of first resort, before volunteers, once National Guard units were enlisted in federal service, they became part of the federal volunteer army and their integrity could not be guaranteed.<sup>87</sup> Then in 1908, a new militia bill expanded federal control over the National Guard units and established that they could be used outside of the United States.<sup>88</sup>

The National Defense Act of 1916 consolidated and extended federal power over the Guard. "The most comprehensive piece of military legislation ever passed by Congress," it enlarged the peacetime regular army and authorized the President "to institute a draft in wartime to fill out the ranks of the regular army." The National Guard maintained its position as the first-line offensive reserve, but lost its connection to local politics and came under greater federal control. "A dual oath to the state and federal governments was required of all guardsmen so as to allow them to serve outside the United States."<sup>89</sup>

And finally, the Selective Service Act of 1917 required registration of all male citizens for a national draft. Although it allowed for certain exceptions, the Act was "based upon the principle of a universal obligation to service on the part of all male citizens."<sup>90</sup> And it did so by drafting them into federal service as individuals -- rather than as local militia units.<sup>91</sup>

Although the Selective Service Act of 1917 established military service as a civic obligation for all male citizens, this Act does not represent the epitome of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. To the contrary, the Selective Service Act exists as part and parcel of the new American state, the building of which essentially killed the American Citizen-Soldier ideal. That is to say, as I have argued throughout this study, the Citizen-Soldier constitutes a normative ideal that links military service to participatory

citizenship. It is not an empirical description of those who are both citizens and soldiers. And although the citizen-soldier serves in the military only temporarily, this temporariness is not the definitive characteristic of the ideal.<sup>92</sup> Consequently, minus the connection between military service and participatory citizenship, no Citizen-Soldier ideal exists. And by the time of the Selective Service Act, participatory citizenship had been fully eclipsed.

The Citizen-Soldier ideal occupies an important place in American political history. In the first place, this tradition forms the context in which Americans conceptualize their civil-military relations. In fact, our idea that the military should be subordinate to civil authorities comes directly out of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. Secondly, the Citizen-Soldier tradition entails a *citizenship of civic practices*, a model of citizenship that shaped American politics through the nineteenth century. And finally, the Citizen-Soldier functioned as an important ideological fantasy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that mandated that male individuals engage in a set of civic and martial practices constitutive of republican citizenship. While the Citizen-Soldier died in the battles of the nineteenth century, its ghost still inhabits the political imagination of America and -- as we shall see in the next chapter -- is transmuting into a sinister new form.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1955).

<sup>2</sup> For the foundational works of the republican revision, see Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). For an important recent communitarian contribution to the republican school, see Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Benjamin R. Barber, "Unscrambling the Founding Fathers," *The New York Times Book Review*, January 13, 1985, 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>5</sup> As Barber explains, liberal democracy is "linked in a single circle of reasoning that begins as it ends in the natural and negative liberty of men and women as atoms of self-interest, as persons whose every step into social relations, whose every foray into the world of Others, cries out for an apology, a legitimation, a justification." What all strands of liberalism share is "a belief in the fundamental inability of the human beast to live at close quarters with members of its own species." Consequently, liberalism seeks "to structure human relations by keeping men apart rather than by bringing them together. It is their mutual incompatibility that turns men into reluctant citizens and their aggressive solitude that makes them into wary neighbors." Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 20-21.

<sup>6</sup> J. R. Pole, *The American Constitution For and Against: The Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 14.

<sup>7</sup> See *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 49-50. However, what early Americans saw was "the classical past as the Western world since the Renaissance had seen it" (50).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>10</sup> Pole, *American Constitution*, 84.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>13</sup> *Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate Over the Ratification of the Constitution*, eds. John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler (Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers, 1989), 12.

<sup>14</sup> Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent*, 28-39; Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 60.

<sup>15</sup> Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, 58.

<sup>16</sup> Robert E. Shalhope, "The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 49 (Fall 1986), 139. Shalhope convincingly argues that eighteenth century Americans understood the right to bear arms as both an individual and a civic obligation.

<sup>17</sup> For criticisms of the military effectiveness of the Militia Act of 1792 see Reuben Elmore Stivers, *Privates and Volunteers: The Men and*

*Women of Our Reserve Naval Forces: 1766 to 1866* (Annapolis: Naval Press Institute, 1975), 173; and Theodore J. Crackel, *Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801-1809* (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 10. For a defense of the Act, see Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 94.

<sup>18</sup> Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 93, emphasis mine.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA and London, England: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 195.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 196-198.

<sup>22</sup> Crackel argues that these positions are contradictory. Jefferson's "creation of a military school at West Point -- the quintessence of that regular army he supposedly detested -- cannot be made to fit this [Citizen-Soldier] mold." Crackel, *Mr. Jefferson's Army*, 1. Crackel argues that Jefferson created a military school in order to teach military officers to support republican ideals. While this may be true, however, Jefferson did not simply rely on filling his army with individual supporters of republicanism. Instead, he helped establish a new version of the Citizen-Soldier tradition at the structural level. Because "technicism" strand of American military theory disrupted the unity of the officer corps, it served on of the key goals of the Citizen-Soldier tradition: It prevented the emergence of a professional military.

<sup>23</sup> "Civil society occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector. It is the space we occupy when we are engaged neither in government (voting, jury service, paying taxes) nor in commerce (working, producing, shopping, consuming). And it is a space defined by such activities as attending church or synagogue, doing community service, participating in a voluntary association, contributing to a charity, assuming responsibility in a PTA or a neighborhood crime watch or a hospital fund-raising society. Civil society shares with government a sense of publicity and a regard for the general good and the common weal, but unlike government it makes no claims to exercising a monopoly on legitimate coercion. Rather, it is a voluntary and in this sense "private" realm devoted to public goods. It shares with the private sector the gift of liberty: it is voluntary and is constituted by freely associated individuals and groups; but unlike the private sector, it aims at common ground and consensual (that is, integrative and collaborative) modes of action. Civil society is thus public without being coercive, voluntary without being privatized." Benjamin R. Barber, "An American Civic Forum: Civil Society between Market Individuals and the Political Community" (paper prepared for the SPPC Conference on "Community, Individual and the State," Palo Alto, CA, 1994), 6, emphasis mine.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>25</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: New American Library, 1956), 61, emphasis mine.

<sup>26</sup> Michael J. Sandel makes this point in *Democracy's Discontent*, 320.

<sup>27</sup> The existence of the Citizen-Soldier tradition in America is well documented. For instance, see John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: The Free Press, 1987); Lawrence Cress, *Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and*

the *National Guard* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1983); Allan R. Millett & Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1984); and J. G. A. Pocock, "The Americanization of Virtue," in *Machiavellian Moment*.

<sup>28</sup> For a theoretical discussion of this concept, see the introduction to this dissertation. My discussion builds on Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Teresa de Lauretis, *The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). Charles Moskos also argues that by the early eighteenth century, civic militias "took on a more of a social character than a military one." See *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 14.

<sup>29</sup> Shalhope, "Armed Citizen," 139.

<sup>30</sup> Crackel, *Mr. Jefferson's Army*, 5.

<sup>31</sup> Shalhope, "Armed Citizen," 140.

<sup>32</sup> Crackel, *Mr. Jefferson's Army*, 8; Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 10.

<sup>33</sup> Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in *Lenin and Philosophy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 165.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>35</sup> "Where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which we derive the ideas of that subject . . . Ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief." *Ibid.*, 158-9.

<sup>36</sup> Stivers, *Privates and Volunteers*, 173.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 173. See also Millett & Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 5.

<sup>38</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 5-6.

<sup>39</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 83-4; Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 5-6.

<sup>40</sup> Michael E. McGerr, *The Decline of Popular Politics: The American North, 1865-1928* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 23, emphasis mine.

<sup>41</sup> Mahon, 83-85, emphasis mine.

<sup>42</sup> McGerr, *Decline of Popular Politics*, 30.

<sup>43</sup> Lauren Berlant, *The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 34.

<sup>44</sup> Michael Schudson, "Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the American Case," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 145.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>47</sup> Richard R. Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 18.

<sup>48</sup> See Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 15; and Mahon, *History of the Militia*, ch. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 86-7.

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- <sup>50</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 15.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., 37.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 38.
- <sup>53</sup> See Ibid., 15; and Mahon, *History of the Militia*, ch. 2.
- <sup>54</sup> Allen W. Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), xlii.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., xlii. See also John Hope Franklin, *The Militant South* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), 72-73.
- <sup>56</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 37.
- <sup>57</sup> David Osher, untitled paper presented at the AHA conference, 3.
- <sup>58</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 85.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., 109; Trelease, *White Terror*, xliv.
- <sup>60</sup> Trelease, *White Terror*, xxxiv.
- <sup>61</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 109.
- <sup>62</sup> Trelease, *White Terror*, xxxv.
- <sup>63</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 109; Trelease, *White Terror*, xlv.
- <sup>64</sup> Trelease, *White Terror*, xlv.
- <sup>65</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 109; Trelease, *White Terror*, xxxv.
- <sup>66</sup> Trelease, *White Terror*, xlv.
- <sup>67</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II, *Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era 1890-1920*, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 1-6.
- <sup>68</sup> For a thorough discussion of these trends, see Ibid.
- <sup>69</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 38.
- <sup>70</sup> Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 86.
- <sup>71</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 38.
- <sup>72</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 87.
- <sup>73</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 116.
- <sup>74</sup> "The demand for a military revival [between 1877 and 1900] was rooted in increasing class conflict and international capital expansion." Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 87.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., 88.
- <sup>76</sup> For a fuller discussion of this transition, see R. Claire Snyder, "Shutting the Public Out of Politics: Civic Republicanism, Professional Politics, and the Eclipse of Civil Society," *A Kettering Occasional Paper*, forthcoming 1996.
- <sup>77</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 93, 91.
- <sup>78</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 118.
- <sup>79</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 100, emphasis mine.
- <sup>80</sup> Quoted in Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 282.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., 101-2, emphasis mine.
- <sup>82</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 116-118.
- <sup>83</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 101-2, emphasis mine.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid., 104.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid., 105. For an oppositional view, see Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 282.
- <sup>86</sup> Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 321.

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<sup>87</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 208; and Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 139. For a full discussion of the Dick Act, see Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 320-324.

<sup>88</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 218; Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 139; Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 324.

<sup>89</sup> Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 232.

<sup>90</sup> Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 357.

<sup>91</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia*, 155-6.

<sup>92</sup> "From the original obligation to train and serve briefly in the colonial or state militia for local defense when necessary, Americans eventually derived the concept of temporary national wartime armies composed largely of amateur citizen-soldiers. . . . What the ideal of the citizen-soldier meant to Americans in practice was that every young adult male citizen or declarant alien might be *liable* to the military obligation for temporary service in what was agreed by public authorities to be an emergency. Initially and briefly, this service was in the colonial militia; by the 20th century, it was in a national wartime army." Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 266.

## Chapter Four

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### **Citizen-Soldiers, Blood Brothers, and the New Militias: Interrogating the Republican Discourse of the American Right**

A new social movement is emerging in America from the proto-fascist fringes of the American Right. Launched by the federal government's attack on the Weaver family in Ruby Ridge and on the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas and fueled by the passage of the Brady Bill, the New Militias are organizing to defend themselves against what they see as the increasing tyranny of the American federal government. These New Militias envision a future of war, martial law, and one-world dictatorship. While the outrageously paranoid conspiracy theories advanced by these groups have received wide-spread media coverage, what is even more puzzling to me is their use of the traditionally democratic discourse of the Citizen-Soldier to bolster their claims. That is to say, the New Militias are increasingly focusing not just on the individual's right to bear arms, but are also reviving traditional civic republican concerns about the dangers of a standing army -- anti-federalist arguments that emphasized the importance of a civic militia in defending republican liberty.

And of course these concerns should not be dismissed lightly. We might not in fact want the government to have a

monopoly on the bearing of arms. So it is not their insistence on the importance of the Second Amendment that puzzles me. Instead it is the use of a traditionally democratic discourse -- the discourse of the civic militia -- for the purpose of advancing the neo-Nazi and white supremacist agenda that underlies much of the New Militia movement. While not every supporter of the New Militias supports racism and anti-Semitism, the New Militia movement grows directly out of the proto-fascist fringe groups on the American Right and is inextricably linked to its roots. The fact that the New Militias are deliberately using moderate sounding code language to appeal to more mainstream angry white males who are scared, economically threatened, and feel shut out of the American political process should not delude us.

What I want to suggest is that those of us who are concerned about democracy in America should not simply ignore the New Militias. We should not dismiss them as paranoid "weirdoes." We should not fail to recognize their underlying agenda. And we should not underestimate their ability to appeal to the American public at large. Instead what we need to do is engage them in democratic discourse. While the hard-core proto-fascist leaders of the New Militia movement may reject the basis of rational discourse, many of their followers are joining the militias not because of a commitment to proto-fascist ideology, but rather because they have legitimate political concerns and seek a movement

that will give them a sense of agency, a revitalized masculinity, and a feeling of belonging to a community.

### **A Crisis of Legitimacy**

American is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. The major changes of at least the last thirty years are undermining the trust Americans used to have in their political institutions. Three major trends fuel this crisis. The first is a fear on the part of many white Americans of the democratic reforms gained through the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the increasing multiculturalism of American society. Second, these fears are exacerbated by the real or imagined economic insecurity caused by market readjustments. And third, because we no longer have a model of participatory citizenship in this country, large numbers of American citizens feel alienated, angry, and powerless over the changes and conflicts that we are undergoing -- changes and conflicts inherent in any democratic society. As a result, America is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy as manifested by our deepening distrust of our democratic institutions -- our police, our court system, our public schools, and our elected officials, to name just a few.

This broad-scale crisis of legitimacy has produced many things. One of the things that has happened is that the proto-fascist fringe groups on the edge of American politics



-- the neo-Nazis who have always been marginalized and the Ku Klux Klan that used to be a central political player -- have been able to build support for their agenda. The New Militia movement constitutes their attempt to build a coalition among various groups of angry white men and their supporters. While the New Militia movement uses the supposedly democratic discourse of the Citizen-Soldier to bolster its claims, the movement remains closely tied to its proto-fascist roots.

### **Proto-Fascist Origins of the New Militia Movement**

The New Militia movement originates in the proto-fascist fringes of American politics. Originating groups include neo-Nazi organizations, such as Aryan Nations, the National Alliance, and the Order; white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan; and a variety of Aryan Christian organizations, such as Christian Identity and the survivalist group, the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.<sup>1</sup> Despite their differences, all these groups share a white supremacist, anti-Semitic, Aryan Christian worldview, and all stand opposed to the liberal democracy that brought us a large federal government, the social welfare state, and civil rights for African-Americans, women, lesbians, and gay men. These groups are anti-democratic advocates of racism and violence.<sup>2</sup>

Since the nineteenth century America has become an increasingly multicultural society, and those on the proto-proto-fascist Right fear and oppose the changes and conflicts inherent in this evolution. Moreover, they carry their opposition to the point of condemning democracy *in toto*. And for some reason, "Jews" are to blame -- once again. This is how the National Alliance explains it:

Jews come into any homogeneous society -- and such was America at the beginning of this century -- as outsiders, as strangers. . . . To make way for themselves, to open up possibilities for penetration and control, they must break down the structure of the society, corrupt its institutions, undermine its solidarity, weaken its sense of identity, obliterate its traditions, destroy its homogeneity. Thus they inevitably will be in favor of democracy, of permissiveness, of every form of self-indulgence and indiscipline. They will be proponents of cosmopolitanism, of egalitarianism, of multiculturalism. They will oppose patriotism (except when they are inciting their hosts to fight a war on behalf of Jewish interests). They will agitate endlessly for change, change, change, and they will call it progress.<sup>3</sup>

Democratic reforms are condemned because they undermine tradition, increase heterogeneity, and fragment the society. In another passage, the National Alliance condemns democracy even more explicitly:

With the growth of mass democracy (the abolition of poll taxes and other qualifications for voters, the enfranchisement of women and of non-Whites), the rise in the influence of the mass media on public opinion, and the insinuation of the Jews into a position of control over the media, the U.S. government was gradually transformed into the malignant monster it is today: the single most dangerous and destructive enemy our race has ever known. Many patriots look back fondly at the government as it was in its first phase, when it was less democratic and less intrusive in the lives of citizens.<sup>4</sup>

This "Jewish conspiracy" has been very successful. Because of the Jews, the American people

are presented with a single view of the world -- a world in which every voice proclaims the equality of the races, the inerrant nature of the Jewish "Holocaust" tale, the wickedness of attempting to halt a flood of non-White aliens from pouring across

our borders, the danger of permitting citizens to keep and bear arms, the moral equivalence of all sexual orientations, and the desirability of a "pluralistic," cosmopolitan society rather than a homogeneous one.<sup>5</sup>

Aryan groups reject multiculturalism, condemn democracy, and, for some reason, the Jews signify both.

Aryan groups arm themselves in opposition to democratic reforms, often focusing specifically on institutions many Americans now distrust or consider illegitimate:

While posing as a public-spirited 'civil rights' group, [the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith] have been working for decades to disarm law-abiding Americans, to control our sources of news and other information, and enslave us under a totalitarian world government which many have come to call the "New World Order." They do this through overt and covert propaganda, the creation of humanitarian-sounding front groups secretly controlled by the ADL, by the conducting of brainwashing sessions called "sensitivity-training" for members of our police forces, by the production and introduction into the public schools of ADL propaganda as "textbooks" or "resource material for teachers," and by their cozy relationship with the controlled media, which routinely print and broadcast ADL propaganda releases as so-called "news."<sup>6</sup>

Another piece of National Alliance propaganda features a picture of a beautiful blond-haired, blue-eyed little boy underneath which is the following caption: "MISSING: A Future for White Children in America. Description: blonde, brown, or red hair, clear eyes, intelligent, inquisitive, healthy, playful. Future abducted by hateful minorities and corrupt politicians."<sup>7</sup> These Aryan Americans share an increasingly widespread belief that our democratic institutions -- our police forces, our public schools, and our elected officials -- have become illegitimate.

The proto-fascist founders of the New Militia movement want to recreate their imagined homogeneous America. To accomplish their goal, they hope to create a movement for

white ethnic nationalism. For example, the leader of Aryan Nations, Richard Butler moved

to Idaho to be with white people like himself. "Race" to Butler meant "nation," and he told his followers that no race of people could survive without a territory of its own. Other races and ethnic groups had nations in which to propagate. . . . He aspired to a nation-state for whites. . . . In time, Butler formulated the goal of Aryan Nations: to establish a state representing the voice and will of the white Aryan race as a divinely ordained, sovereign, independent people, separate from all alien, mongrel people in every sphere of their individual and national life.<sup>8</sup>

The National Alliance embraces a similar plan of action:

An essential element of the National Alliance message is . . . : We White Americans can pull ourselves up from the gutter of moral depravity and 'multiculturalism' only after we have regained control of our news and entertainment media. . . . We must build a new government, based on racial principles and answerable only to White Americans, which provides real leadership instead of pandering to every racial minority, organized perversion, and special interest.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, the proto-fascist right opposes every element of democracy.

The Aryan solution to the problems of a multicultural democracy includes three key elements that stand in direct opposition to American political traditions. First, the Aryan Right opposes individualism because it fragments efforts on behalf of the race. For example, the National Alliance specifically states that their philosophy "is in contrast to the attitude of the individualists, who do not recognize a responsibility to anyone but themselves; and to that of the humanists, who eschew their racial responsibility."<sup>10</sup> This critique of individualism runs directly counter to the strongest philosophical tradition in America: liberalism -- and to civic republicanism as well.

Second, the Aryan Right favors a *citizenship of blood* over the liberal *citizenship of land* and the civic republican *citizenship of civic practices*. As we recall from Chapter One, in a *citizenship of land* individuals are "citizens" simply by virtue of the fact that they live within certain borders. In a *citizenship of civic practices* -- the focus of this study -- diverse individuals become citizens only as they engage together in civic practices. In opposition to both of these democratic forms of citizenship, a *citizenship of blood* restricts citizenship to people who have a particular class, ethnic, or racial heritage -- a particular type of blood. The far Right clearly favors the latter: "If the White race is to survive we must unite our people on the basis of common blood."<sup>11</sup> Needless to say, this Aryan *citizenship of blood* stands directly opposed to the conception of citizenship characteristic of the Citizen-Soldier tradition: the *citizenship of civic practices*.

And finally, the Aryan solution to what they consider to be the evils of democracy requires the creation of a strong state:

Perhaps the time will come when we can afford to have a minimal government once again, but that time lies in the remote future. The fact is that we need a strong, centralized government spanning several continents to coordinate many important tasks during the first few decades of a White world: the racial cleansing of the land, the rooting out of racially destructive institutions, and the reorganization of society on a new basis.<sup>12</sup>

This proto-fascist worldview clearly runs directly counter to basic American political principles.

Fortunately for those of us who favor democracy, the proto-fascist rhetoric of the far Right does not appeal to mainstream Americans who are individualistic and suspicious of a powerful national state. Unfortunately for proponents of fascism, this problematizes the building of a mass movement among American whites. Consequently, in order to broaden their appeal, the American proto-fascist groups that gave birth to the New Militia movement decided to use two discourses more in keeping with American political traditions: identity politics and the Citizen-Soldier tradition.

**"Red Neck, White Skin, and Blue Collar":  
Building the New Militia Movement**

One of the ways in which proto-fascist groups appeal to mainstream Americans who also fear multiculturalism is through the articulation of an identity politics for angry white males. Many white males on the Right see themselves as "targets of all other empowerment movements, from women's liberation to black power to gay pride" -- targets of identity politics -- and so they offer their own version of identity politics.<sup>13</sup> That is to say, in response to the use of identity politics on the Left -- by African-Americans, women, lesbians, and gay men, for example -- the far Right has rearticulated classically proto-fascistic claims about race in terms of identity politics. For example, Bob

Mathews, founder and leader of the Order, an off-shoot of Aryan Nations, "gradually ... accepted racism not as a doctrine of hate for races but as a matter of pride and love for his white race. Blacks, browns, and others celebrated their racial identity, so it couldn't be wrong, he considered, for whites to feel good about their race as well."<sup>14</sup> Like others on the Right, Mathews wanted "to radicalize" the "latent racism in a great mass of the white middle class."<sup>15</sup> He wanted to build a movement out of various groups of whites who "distrust the government," including "Klansmen, neo-Nazis, survivalists, tax protesters, militant farmers, Identity churches, and other groups." They would be "the new 'red, white, and blue' -- red neck, white skin, and blue collar."<sup>16</sup>

Importantly, this right-wing version of identity politics is not a democratic movement but rather a backlash reaction against democracy. That is to say, white men are not beginning to see themselves as one particular identity among the many that make up multicultural America. Instead, they are trying to reclaim the privileges and entitlements they enjoyed prior to the (ostensibly) full enfranchisement of women and minorities. For example, participants in an Aryan study group on the World Wide Web begin by identifying as "European-Americans."<sup>17</sup> But instead of simply exploring the cultural traditions of their particular people, the group quickly notes that they are "angry at the United States Government and at the costs and disadvantages it

imposes on European-Americans. The legal and economic burdens fall predominantly on the young and politically weak; those seeking college admission, first time job seekers, and entrepreneurs starting up businesses." These "European-Americans" do not see themselves as one important part of a multicultural society, but rather as its victims. Because of "racial quotas," they argue, white European-American males are being forced out of the public sector. As a consequence the "public sector bureaucracies will become overwhelmingly black, brown and female over the next 20 years. . . . Every contact with government will become contact with non-Europeans over the next 20 years." These European-Americans fear a multiculturally diverse, democratic government.<sup>18</sup>

The second important characteristically American discourse used by the proto-fascist Right is the Citizen-Soldier tradition. While identity politics politicizes the particular location of white males within our democratic society, the Citizen-Soldier tradition helps form these disparate individuals into a coherent movement. In essence, the New Militia movement mobilizes to advance the interests of this newly politicized identity group, Angry White Males. And that is why, for the most part, economically threatened white men comprise the New Militias.<sup>19</sup>

Although the New Militia movement began in earnest in 1993 with a call for a return to "the Unorganized Militia of the United States of America"<sup>20</sup> which traditionally included



all able-bodied American males, and grew so quickly that by "the spring of 1994 the new militias appeared spontaneously and simultaneously from coast to coast,"<sup>21</sup> the first militia groups actually formed during the 1960s. For example, a secret group called the Minutemen organized during the 1960s to ward off what they saw as the Communist threat and "to promote their position that whites should arm themselves, practice urban combat and otherwise prepare for a dismal future that promised extensive race riots at best and all-out thermonuclear war at worst."<sup>22</sup> In keeping with the Citizen-Soldier tradition, these men armed themselves to protect their Republic from real or imagined enemies:

An extensive investigation should be made as to the loyalty of all the officials in government, defense industry, tax free foundations, labor unions, the communications industry, news media and similar fields vital to the nations internal security, such investigations being made for the most part by Grand Juries composed of private citizens of substance and good repute. . . . These investigations should include not only the Departments of State, Defense, Health, Education, and Welfare, Agriculture and Labor but also the Treasury, the Justice Department, the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.<sup>23</sup>

The Minutemen were not only anti-Communist but were also a part of the right-wing reaction to the passage of civil rights legislation and the Great Society.<sup>24</sup>

Like the New Militia movement today, the Minutemen believed that the American government -- and specifically the courts -- had become illegitimate. "Where evidence of treason is found," they argued,

those suspected of such acts should be tried before civilian courts but if it is found that the courts themselves have been infiltrated to such an extent as to make the conviction of traitors impossible, then the Constitution should be amended to allow such persons to be tried before military courts or before

new federal judges especially appointed for that purpose. . . .  
 [Moreover,] all the present members of the Supreme Court should be removed from office.<sup>25</sup>

And like the militia members today, these self-proclaimed citizen-soldiers condemn America's participation in the United Nations<sup>26</sup> and want to strengthen "our nation's Christian heritage."<sup>27</sup> While the Minutemen advocate a very activist version of popular sovereignty, they tie this ideal to the creation of some sort of Christian nationalism. And indeed, the Minutemen were anti-Semitic and white supremacist, as well as anti-Communist.<sup>28</sup>

The other early example of the use of the rhetoric of the Citizen-Soldier ideal by the far Right is the Posse Comitatus, founded in 1969. Claiming to be a democratic movement, the Posse Comitatus shares the belief that our American institutions have become illegitimate:

Since the formulation of our Republic, the local County has always been the seat of government for the people. A county government is the highest authority of government in our Republic as it is closest to the people, who are in fact, the government. The county Sheriff is the only legal law enforcement officer in the United States of America. He is elected by the people and is directly responsible for law enforcement in his County. It is his responsibility to protect the people of his County from unlawful acts on the part of anyone, including officials of government. . . . The Sheriff is accountable and responsible only to the citizens who are the inhabitants of his County.<sup>29</sup>

The Sheriff must protect all citizens and "this protection extends to Citizens who are being subjected to unlawful acts even by officials of government, whether these be judges or courts or Federal or State agents of any kind whatsoever."<sup>30</sup> Again we see the belief that our democratic government has become illegitimate and tyrannical.

The Posse Comitatus justifies itself in terms of the Second Amendment and claims to be the same as the traditional Unorganized Militia: "The Posse and the Militia have essentially the same purpose; they are men who act in the execution of the law."<sup>31</sup> That is to say,

the Sheriff can mobilize all men between the ages of 18 and 45 who are in good health and not in the federal military service. OTHERS CAN VOLUNTEER! This body of citizens is the Sheriff's Posse. Each must serve when called by the Sheriff. The title of this body is the Posse Comitatus. The Posse is the entire body of those inhabitants who may be summoned by the Sheriff, or who may volunteer, to preserve the public peace or execute any lawful precept that is opposed. Since the Sheriff is the servant of the citizens who are inhabitants of the County, it is not his choice as to whether or not the Posse is organized and brought into being. It is only his choice as to whether or not he wishes to use it.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, while the discourse of the Citizen-Soldier has been used for many years, only recently has it begun to resonate with increasing numbers of mainstream Americans. The Posse Comitatus still exists and has expanded to become the "Counties Movement," a central component of the New Militia movement. They still insist that their members are not subject to any authority higher than the County Sheriff.

Emerging in the 1960s, both the Minutemen and its ideological heirs, the Posse Comitatus, were primarily concerned about resisting racial integration which was being imposed by the federal government and courts.<sup>33</sup> Today, however, the Posse's concerns have expanded to issues of concern to working people threatened by environmental regulations. Thus, the Posse now "insists that county sheriffs have the right to arrest federal land managers who fail to respect the 'customs and culture' of logging, mining

and grazing on public lands."<sup>34</sup> From the 1960s through the 1990s, the rhetoric of the Citizen-Soldier tradition has been used by angry white males who see the institutionalization of democratic reforms that threaten their way of life as a form of tyranny.

The discourse of the Citizen-Soldier fulfills two purposes for the proto-fascist Right. First, the Citizen-Soldier ideal conveniently provides the Right with a constitutionally protected way to arm its followers. Secondly, the discourse of the Citizen-Soldier has proven to be an effective way of building support for the far Right. In other words, using the rhetoric of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, the founders of the New Militia movement have found a way of masking their real agenda so that it is more appealing to economically threatened and politically alienated mainstream Americans, particularly angry white males. As a former Idaho priest who once had his house bombed by neo-Nazis puts it, the New Militia movement is "using oppressive big government as the come-on. . . . It's a new hook, a new way to recruit people and get attention."<sup>35</sup> According to the *Nation*, watchers of the Right in America "all generally agree" that the explicitly racist and anti-Semitic programs of the "early militias acted as automatic checks on their growth. . . . but in the past few years, against a general background of economic uncertainty and alienation from the political system, the militias have made a radical turn toward the mainstream."<sup>36</sup> But while more

moderate Americans are joining the New Militia movement, so are extremists. According to Joe Roy of Klanwatch, "the militia phenomenon that's sweeping the country. . . . [is] soaking up a lot of potential Klan members."<sup>37</sup> Thus, the New Militia movement appeals to a broad range of angry white males, from right-wing Republicans to hard-line proto-fascists.

One of the ways the proto-fascist leadership of the New Militia movement appeals to the more moderate Americans is by hiding its real agenda behind code language. For instance, many in the New Militias talk about a conspiracy of "international bankers" rather than "Jews." Alternately, many advocates of the "common-law courts" movement deny the legitimacy of any amendment added after the Bill of Rights, without acknowledging the connection of this denial with Christian Identity theology -- a movement that views the Declaration of Independence, U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights as divinely revealed Truth and every amendment after the Tenth as a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the white race.<sup>38</sup> In the words of one observer, "instead of openly caviling against Jews, blacks and other targets, Populist literature employs code words linked to powerful themes that also can be heard in the American political mainstream, such as questioning the wisdom of spending billions on foreign aid (especially the aid to Israel) when America's own farmers are going bankrupt in record numbers because they can't repay federal loans."<sup>39</sup> As another observer puts it, "most

of the conspiracy theories that whirl about the militia movement see the same evil cabal of bankers, politicians, and the media -- but without reference to ZOG [the Zionist Occupation Government] or Jewish control. Many in the militia movement who believe these theories appear to be unaware that they were first put forth by white supremacists."<sup>40</sup> In other words, proto-fascistic ideas have begun to make their way into mainstream debates within American politics and are gaining support.

In fact, proto-fascist groups have been so successful at reframing their ideas for mainstream political debates that the New Militia movement's political platform now simply looks like a more extreme version of the Republican Party platform. For example, neo-Nazi groups traditionally advocate a *citizenship of blood* and so demand that we should "make citizenship a proud privilege to be earned, not a right carelessly awarded simply by birth in a certain geographical area."<sup>41</sup> This demand is unconstitutional, runs counter to the traditional American views of citizenship, and used to be considered an extremist position outside of mainstream political debate. But now we are hearing similar arguments from the mainstream Republican party. That is to say, at their 1996 National Convention, the GOP decided that we should rescind the part of the Fourteenth Amendment that says, "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside" (Section

1), in order to prevent the children of illegal aliens from reaping the benefits of American society. This demand chips away at the *citizenship of land* and lays the groundwork for a *citizenship of blood*. Furthermore, David Duke's proto-proto-fascist "Populist Party" platform from 1984 looks remarkably similar to much of the current Republican Party platform.<sup>42</sup> Or, to be more specific, Duke's platform is the version of the Republican platform Pat Buchanan ran on in the 1996 primaries and from which Bob Dole (sometimes) tried to distance himself.

But while the New Militia movement has repackaged proto-fascist demands for mainstream consumption, it has also radicalized mainstream Republican beliefs. For example, many moderate Republicans (and others) believe that states should have more power vis-à-vis a federal government that is bloated and out of control. Pushing this belief further Right, the New Militia movement proclaims that the federal government has become so large that it has overstepped its constitutional authority.<sup>43</sup> And in even more extreme terms, the New Militia movement goes so far as to argue that the U.S. federal government is a tyranny conspiring with various other entities to take away the traditional freedoms of the American people. While the milder version of this claim -- that states should have more rights -- has resulted in attacks on large sectors of the federal government, the harsher version has fueled not only the "counties movement" but also the "common-law courts"

movement which "rejects state and Federal statutes and all constitutional amendments except the Bill of Rights" -- once again a Christian Identity belief. In fact, this latter movement, now operating in 40 states -- and supported by people such as the recently infamous Montana Freemen -- constitutes "the fastest growing sector of the far right Patriot movement," according to "law-enforcement officials and human rights organizations."<sup>44</sup> Far Right views obviously resonate with increasing numbers of American citizens.

The beauty of the New Militia movement is that it has been able to form a coalition among various sectors of the American Right.<sup>45</sup> White supremacists and neo-Nazis now bear arms alongside other ostensibly less reactionary right-wing men who are concerned about a broad range of conservative Republican party concerns, including opposition to the federal government, environmentalism, illegal immigration, taxes, foreign aid, welfare, affirmative action, crime, abortion choice, secular humanism, feminism, lesbian/gay rights, and, of course, gun control. According to a recent article in *The Nation*, observers of the American Right "all generally agree" that "the militias are a movement that for some time has been waiting to happen, born in the backlashes against civil rights, environmentalism, gay rights, the pro-choice movement, and gun control."<sup>46</sup> Thus, the New Militia movement actually brings together many diverse groups of angry white males and their supporters.



For all its faults, the New Militia movement speaks to Americans who have legitimate political and economic grievances. The economic woes of New Militia supporters are very real. Many New Militia supporters are working class men and farmers, two constituencies that were seriously hurt by the tax cuts and military spending of the Reagan administration.<sup>47</sup> As another author puts it, "smack-dab in the middle of the American continent is a group of people who really are being driven into poverty by a system under which outside bankers foreclose on their government loans, force them to sell their hard-earned property at public auction, then drive them off their land jobless, penniless and unwanted by their equally beleaguered neighbors."<sup>48</sup> The New Militia movement has been very successful at capitalizing on the economic hardships of angry white males.

Among bankrupt farmers and displaced workers, the racist Right, which had been in decline since the end of the large scale struggle against integration led by George Wallace and his supporters, was able to find many supporters for its racist explanation for market readjustments and democratic reforms.<sup>49</sup> "The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith views the Populist Party's campaign to exploit the farm crisis as the most sophisticated political move by the anti-Semitic right in recent memory."<sup>50</sup> Unfortunately, the American Left has not done a very good job of speaking to those brought into the rank and file of the New Militia movement.

Nevertheless, as the author of one study of the New Militia movement writes: "It is important to note that not all militia members believe the far-out conspiracy theories. . . . Many militia members represent . . . mainstream discontent . . . , and others are active because of a more narrowly defined concern about gun control. It's easy to dismiss the paranoid extremists, but the discontent driving the militia movement is real and extends far beyond the membership of citizens' militias."<sup>51</sup> Supporters of the New Militia movement, like supporters of European fascism at the beginning of this century, are not all hard core ideologues. Unfortunately, European fascism spread throughout the populous under conditions of "widespread unemployment, an impoverished middle class, a terrorized petite bourgeoisie" -- conditions that exists in sectors of the United States today.<sup>52</sup>

But while not all members of the New Militias support racism and anti-Semitism, it is also important to acknowledge that the movement grew directly out of the proto-fascist Right and remains inextricably linked to its roots. For example, the Militia of Montana (MO.M.) -- also known as the 'Mother of All Militias' -- which played a key role in stimulating the emergence of militias throughout the country was founded by John Trochmann, a well-known advocate of the racist, anti-Semitic, Christian Identity movement.<sup>53</sup> In order to expand his base of support, Trochmann and other militia members have

"cooled it on the religious fervor side and upped the heat on the political diatribe side." Trochmann had been trying to get a political movement going ever since his onetime friend Randy Weaver had his deadly showdown with federal authorities in August 1992. With the militia movement he found a way to attract a wider audience for his conspiracy theories; he just needed to, in his words, "leave religion at the door."<sup>54</sup>

Although many of the militias try to distinguish themselves from hate groups and the Klan, as *Time* magazine concluded, "such distinctions . . . are not always apparent."<sup>55</sup> The *New York Times* cites a federal investigator on this point: "All these groups, if you put them in a bag and shook them out, you couldn't tell one from the other."<sup>56</sup> Again, the New Militia movement constitutes a repackaging of proto-fascist ideals for American consumption.

Even the more reasonable sounding Michigan militia, in which members took an oath to 'defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic' and which sees itself as "a public, uniformed brigade of citizen soldiers," espouses coded versions of typical proto-fascist conspiracy theories.<sup>57</sup> For example, "Mark from Michigan," who "was one of the first to aggressively encourage the formation of citizens' militias" spins the following tale of conspiracy and tyranny:

Elements within the U.S. government are working with foreign leaders to turn the United States into a dictatorship under the leadership of the United Nations. The battle to create this U.N. dictatorship, known as the new world order, is already well under way. Foreign troops are already training on American soil for a planned attack on Americans who resist; a network of forty-three detention centers has been set up throughout the country to serve as concentration camps for the resisters; plans have been readied to control the population through microchips to be implanted in newborn babies and through radio boxes already in place in automobiles made after 1985.<sup>58</sup>

This fantasy sounds very similar to the one presented in the favorite proto-fascist novel of the new militiamen, *The Turner Diaries*. Although Mark from Michigan's narrative elides all explicit references to Jews and African-Americans, it would obviously appeal to the same sorts of people as would proto-fascist tales.

Let's compare Mark's narrative to the following one: "The U.S. government has been taken over by a conspiracy of Jewish bankers and nebulous other dark forces who plan to bleed the country dry, then bring a nuclear attack down upon the withered shell."<sup>59</sup> In the meantime the Jews, in conjunction with the United Nations, are engaging in "mind-control tactics to force white American men to work at slavish menial jobs while making sure, through the income tax and affirmative action laws, that they [cannot] earn enough money to better themselves, even as the government [is] helping African Americans get better jobs and more training."<sup>60</sup> And of course the federal government is attempting to disarm American "patriots" so that they cannot defend themselves against this impending tyranny. Many sundry versions of such conspiracy theories have been exposed by the media in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.

While both of these conspiracy fantasies seem patently absurd, compare them to the National Alliance's semi-rational interpretation of American politics:

For many years the power elite have pursued a purposeful policy of turning America into a non-white nation. By changing our immigration laws to allow an ever increasing flow of non-whites from the Third World. By turning a blind eye to the illegal flow of millions more across our borders. By instituting programs such as the Orwellian-sounding affirmative action and other forms of anti-white job and education discrimination. By taxing hard working, honest white workers and farmers to support the growth of the criminal underclass in American's urban jungle. By twisting our social welfare laws which were supposed to help honest workers who were down on their luck into a scheme for promoting the never ending maternity of millions of unmarried and unemployable, non-white welfare mothers, while encouraging pregnant white girls to see the next generation of white babies as a problem which needs to be solved by the abortionist's knife. By permitting and then encouraging inter-racial sex through the use of change agents in our churches, in our schools and in our mass media. And, by the planned promotion of homosexuality and other forms of sexual perversion. By all these efforts and many more, the enemies of our people have worked for decades to destroy the American we loved. And always, whenever patriotic Americans have banded together to restore our nation, the controlled media and anti-American pressure groups like the foreign-controlled ADL, have tried to frighten away as many people as possible by shrinking and spitting and calling the patriots anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi, racists, etc., etc., etc., ad infinitum, ad nauseam.<sup>61</sup>

Here, the National Alliance knits together a host of typical Republican Party issues with a yarn about racist conspiracy. In short, whether coded, semi-rational, or completely outrageous, all these conspiracy theories advance the same agenda: the proto-fascist agenda.

Moreover, certain proto-fascist ideals permeate the New Militia movement, such as a rejection of Communism, internationalism, and pacifism, as well as a hostility to many aspects of liberal democracy -- in particular the ones that brought us a large federal government, the welfare state, environmentalism, civil rights legislation, affirmative action, and so on, all coupled with the valorization of revolutionary violence and heroism. Thus, although the New Militias use the traditional American rhetoric of the Citizen-Soldier ideal, the movement was

founded by white supremacists and anti-Semites on the extreme Right.<sup>62</sup> The New Militia movement is inextricably connected to the proto-fascist constituencies that gave birth to it.

And finally, the success of the New Militia movement is illustrated by Pat Buchanan's strong showing early in the 1996 presidential primaries. Buchanan explicitly targeted the New Militias in his campaign. Sounding many of the themes indicative of New Militia supporters, Buchanan proclaims the loss of U.S. sovereignty to internationalist organizations: "GATT . . . say[s] that the control over world trade is transferred from the Congress of the United States, where our own founding fathers placed responsibility, to a global institution in Geneva called a World Trade Organization, where . . . our American vote can be canceled out by Fidel Castro." Moreover, Buchanan believes the federal government has overstepped its bounds: "People ask me, what is our campaign all about, and could you sum it up in a couple of words? And, I said, my campaign is about restoring the Constitutional Republic. . . . In this Constitution, certain responsibilities and duties are given to the Federal Government and the rest belong to the states respectively, and to the people." And, not surprisingly, in response to these supposed violations of the Constitution, Buchanan appeals to both identity politics and the Citizen-Soldier tradition. He claims to speak for the angry white males mobilized by the New Militia movement

-- "unemployed, angry white male, may seek Presidency," he quips.<sup>63</sup> And he explicitly refers to the Citizen-Soldier tradition: "People say, What does sovereignty mean, Pat? I say go down to the village green in Lexington. Go down and stand there, where 17-year-old boys stopped the greatest army in the world."

While these campaign themes might not sound outrageous, Pat Buchanan, like the New Militia movement itself, is inextricably tied to his proto-fascist progenitors. That is, Buchanan has taken up the agenda of David Duke, who founded the National Association for the Advancement of White People and who ran as a candidate of the Populist party, which was founded by the anti-Semitic Liberty Lobby in an attempt to unite white supremacists and neo-Nazis.<sup>64</sup> Duke and other far Right leaders align themselves with the Buchanan campaign -- a fact that supposedly caused the candidate quite a bit of embarrassment.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, American proto-fascist groups are quite proud of the fact that, "Vladimir Zhirinovsky . . . said he and Buchanan could work together to deport Jews from American and Russia. He called Buchanan a 'brother in arms.'"<sup>66</sup> So while Aryan Nations and other far Right groups arm themselves to defend white interests in the coming race war against ZOG (the Zionist Occupation Government) -- the U.S. federal government -- under the guise of the Citizens' Militias, Pat Buchanan, heir of the racist Right, advocates a reactionary identity

politics for angry white males in the electoral arena and has found quite a few supporters.

### **Performing White Masculinity**

But what we have discussed so far is not the whole story. As we recall from previous chapters, the Citizen-Soldier ideal traditionally played a key role in the construction of masculinity. Thus, it is no accident, I want to suggest, that these economically threatened, angry white males have chosen to deal with their problems by engaging together in the martial practices traditionally constitutive of *armed masculinity*. Consider that many of these angry white males are economically threatened and thus unable to provide adequately for their families. One could say they have been rendered economically impotent -- emasculated. Thus, they are attracted to the practices traditionally productive of masculinity. In other words, they are -- in a sense -- re-constructing themselves as masculine subjects as they bear arms in the New Militias.

In fact, the New Militia movement can be put in the context of a broad-scale "remasculinization of America" after the humiliating loss in Vietnam -- the emasculation of America -- not to mention the full-force assault on white masculinity perpetrated by newly politicized movements of Blacks, women, lesbians, and gays. Susan Jeffords argues that after the war, "the male Vietnam veteran -- primarily



the white male -- was used as an emblem for a fallen and emasculated American male, one who had been falsely scorned by society and unjustly victimized by his own government."<sup>67</sup> That is to say, in reaction to the "new social movements" of the 1960s and '70s, the American Right began to use the image of the Vietnam vet in its effort to create an identity politics for angry white males. Through the deployment of this image,

masculinity [began] to place itself in the category of a social group in need of special consideration. No longer the oppressor, men came to be seen, primarily through the imagery of the Vietnam veteran, as themselves oppressed. It was not then difficult to insert this characterization into an already formulated cultural attitude toward the victimized that had been established in relation to civil rights and women's movement, to the point that hiring quotas and organizations like NOW were seen as depriving men of their "rights."<sup>68</sup>

And indeed, Vietnam vets are a key constituency of the New Militia and its reactionary identity politics for angry white males.

But more than just constituting a new identity politics, the deployment of the image of the victimized Vietnam vet played a central role in the attack on the federal government. As Jeffords explains it,

the final step in this process was to transfer the accumulated negative features of the feminine to the government itself, the primary vehicle for legislated and enforced changes in civil rights. From this vantage point, not only could individual men cite discrimination (Jim Baake), but all men as a group could also declare their suffering at the hands of a government biased toward and operating under the aegis of the feminine.<sup>69</sup>

Consequently, not only did the image of the Vietnam vet

became the springboard for a general remasculinization of American culture that is evidenced in the popularity of figures like Ronald Reagan, Oliver North, and J.R. Ewing,

men who show open disregard for government legislation and legal decisions and favor images of strength and firmness with an independence that smacks of Rambo and confirms their faith in a separate culture based on a mythos of masculinity.<sup>70</sup>

Moreover, the image helped lay the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the New Militia movement.

Participants in the New Militia movement engage in martial practices in an effort to reconstitute a white masculinity that is threatened by democratic movements and by a government that is quickly becoming "female" -- not to mention "black [and] brown." In fact, some militia supporters actually make direct references to masculinity in their rhetoric. For example, Identity Christian, Klansman, and neo-Nazi author David Lane asserts that the Jews have used the mass media "to insult and emasculate the White man while depicting non-white males to be heroes so White women would desert their Race by the millions."<sup>71</sup> Aryan Nations leader Richard Butler states: 'You don't have anybody today who is a man, who has stood up for his race.'<sup>72</sup> And Bob Mathews, founder of the Order, modeled after the group portrayed in the neo-Nazi, white supremacist book, the *Turner Diaries*, said, "when it became obvious that we were going to do more than just talk," -- that is engage in murder and bank robberies -- "most of the men started backing out and turning their backs to those of us who have retained our manhood and our Aryan pride. . . . I know what future awaits our children unless I stand up like a man and fight."<sup>73</sup> Alternately, he states, "I have no choice. I must

stand up like a White man and do battle."<sup>74</sup> Clearly for Mathews, to be a man requires action: he must "stand up like a man and fight." And again, at a neo-Nazi National Alliance convention Mathews reiterated his point: "So stand up like men, and drive the enemy into the sea! Stand up like men, and swear . . . that you will reclaim what *our* forefathers discovered, explored, conquered, settled, built and died for! Stand up like men and reclaim our soil!"<sup>75</sup> Mathews founded a paramilitary group to advance his interests as an Aryan man.

His phrasing is interesting because it implies that to be a man, one must act like a man -- the point I have been making throughout this study. As Judith Butler explains in *Gender Trouble*, "the articulation 'I feel like a woman' by a female or 'I feel like a man' by a male presupposes that in neither case is the claim meaninglessly redundant. Although it might appear unproblematic to be a given anatomy . . . , the experience of a gendered psychic disposition or cultural identity is considered an achievement."<sup>76</sup> In other words, since gender is performatively constructed rather than rooted in nature, there is no essential masculinity outside of that constructed through engagement in masculinist practices. To be a man, one must constantly act like a man.

Traditionally, martial practices have functioned to construct a masculinity defined in direct opposition to femininity and to keep the feminine threat inside men at bay. Pitkin emphasizes this in her discussion of

Machiavelli's stress on military service in the militia: "only ferocious discipline and terrifying punishments" can prevent men from becoming feminine."<sup>77</sup> Linda Zerilli argues that contemporary man fears the breakdown of gender identity; he fears that "if the code of gender difference is not strictly adhered to at each and every moment, all is lost."<sup>78</sup> Klaus Theweleit finds an extreme version of the same phenomenon in his examination of the erotic writings of the Freikorpsmen who became Nazi SA officers. "What fascism promised men was . . . dominance of the hostile 'female' element within themselves."<sup>79</sup> In the introduction to his second volume, Jessica Benjamin and Anson Rabinbach tell us that Theweleit criticizes the traditional Frankfurt School analysis of fascism for neglecting the "attraction of fascism itself" -- its "passionate celebration of violence."<sup>80</sup> They then go on to summarize his argument as follows: "Indeed, it is Theweleit's insistence on the primacy of violence -- originating in the fear and hatred of the feminine -- that distinguishes his approach from the older social-psychological models. . . . The crucial element of fascism is its explicit sexual language. . . . this fascist symbolization creates a particular kind of psychic economy which places sexuality in the service of destruction."<sup>81</sup> Martial practices produce an *armed masculinity* constituted in direct opposition to femininity, and fascism simply exaggerates this process.

To the extent that the New Militia incorporates fascist elements into its worldview, using Theweleit's research makes sense. What I want to underline here is that pleasure exists in military discipline and violence. In fact, Nancy Hartsock has argued that in Western culture "hostility and domination . . . are central to sexual excitement. . . . What is sexually exciting in Western culture is hostility, violence and domination, especially but not necessarily directed against women."<sup>82</sup> We should not overlook the pleasure involved in martial practices. As William James notes, war-making is a "thrill."<sup>83</sup> Running around in the woods wearing camouflage and shooting guns is a whole lot of fun.

The precariousness of performatively constructed masculinity explains -- at least in part -- the urgency of the right-wing man's opposition to feminism, lesbian and gay rights, and even the welfare state. The militiamen stand opposed to women's struggle to control their own reproductive capacities, to welfare benefits that provide subsistence for women who choose to live outside the bounds of marriage, and of course to legal protections for lesbians and gay men<sup>84</sup> because these liberal agenda items undercut traditional configurations of gender.<sup>85</sup> As the National Alliance puts it, "we see the products of this system all around us: too many weak, indecisive men and too many unfeminine women."<sup>86</sup> Only the denial of equal rights to gays, lesbians, and heterosexual women, the denial to them

of full citizenship, or even better, the purging of femininity and homosexuality from the public sphere and the military -- the two traditional realms of citizenship -- helps secure an always unstable masculinity.

Thus, one of the phenomena fueling the New Militia movement is instability of gender in an age of feminism, lesbian/gay rights, and a real or imagined economic impotence among white men. The militiamen are advancing their agenda through an attack on the federal government. Interestingly, in wanting to shore up states' rights, they are returning to a fantasy that traditionally contributed to the constitution of state-based civic identity. A fantasy that functioned best in the age before the Fourteenth Amendment.

### **Citizen-Soldiers or Blood Brothers?: Evaluating the New Militia Movement**

The New Militia movement constitutes an increasingly successful effort by proto-fascist fringe groups to create a coalition among very different groups of angry white males. Using the Second Amendment as a springboard, the New Militia movement has been able to lay claim to the Citizen-Soldier tradition in America. And clearly their rhetoric speaks to many Americans. But why? Why has the New Militia movement been so successful in their appeals to the American public? What does the Citizen-Soldier ideal signify to people?

Apparently, the Citizen-Soldier ideal remains firmly entrenched in the American political imaginary. As we saw in Chapter Three, the Citizen-Soldier ideal used to exist as a political fantasy that played a key role in the constitution of masculine republican citizens. Although the Citizen-Soldier in its classic form essentially died during the combat of the nineteenth century, for some reason the ideal still resonates with white American men. The Citizen-Soldier ideal constitutes a powerful symbol for a white male America in crisis -- for five reasons.

First of all, the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier remains in the American political imaginary as the signifier of participatory citizenship. In a time of seemingly unprecedented change and conflict, people want to have some control over the institutions that are supposed to serve their interests. Yet all around them, citizens from across the political spectrum see decisions being made with which they do not agree. And they feel powerless to do anything about it. How did the head of the Haitian secret police accidentally slip into the United States? How could a jury acquit the police officers who beat Rodney King? Is police brutality so routine that it reasonable for an innocent man to run from the police in certain areas of town? Did the CIA deliberately introduce crack cocaine into inner city neighborhoods? Was O.J. framed by the L.A.P.D.? How could jurors acquit O.J. after he brutally killed his ex-wife? Why is the government funding studies to see how fast

ketchup runs? Why are the schools distributing condoms? Why are our children reading *Heather Has Two Mommies*? Why is the government putting tracking devices in our money? Did the U.S. Navy really shoot down TWA flight 800? Many people no longer feel that their democratic institutions are accountable to the citizenry. And they feel powerless to do anything about it. The Citizen-Soldier ideal appeals to many people because it represents an active form of popular sovereignty that will force our ostensibly democratic institutions to act responsibly and correctly.

Second, the Citizen-Soldier ideal appeals to people because it signifies the idea of legitimacy, during the current crisis of legitimacy we are experiencing as a nation. Many people believe they are being subjected to laws and policies to which they never consented. And because they feel shut out of the political process, they feel they have no recourse. Within American political mythology, the Citizen-Soldier represents the resistance of the American people to illegitimate rule. And that is why a lot of Americans are joining the New Militia movement

Third, the Citizen-Soldier ideal recalls a time when American society was supposedly homogeneous, when it was not plagued with the conflicts engendered by multiculturalism. The Citizen-Soldier signifies a time when citizenship was restricted to white men. Thus, it is no accident that the Citizen-Soldier ideal appeals particularly to white men who



feel threatened by the democratic reforms encapsulated in the ideal of multiculturalism.

Fourth, the Citizen-Soldier embodies traditional gender norms, a time when men were soldiers fighting to protect wives and children as well as citizens governing in the best interests of their family and community. This vision of the proper ordering of society nicely accompanies the myth of the patriarchal nuclear family with the male breadwinner and the female housewife and full-time mother. In short, the Citizen-Soldier represents a time when men were men and women were women. Consequently, it appeals to more traditional Americans who see their way of life threatened by feminism and the lesbian/gay rights movement, as well as by the state that serves those interests. And finally, the Citizen-Soldier symbolizes potent masculinity in a time where this ideal is threatened from a variety of angles.

Calling themselves "Patriots," members of the New Militia movement claim to stand within the civic republican heritage of the American Revolution -- the Citizen-Soldier tradition. "The patriots of two centuries ago fought a government in London that they believed imposed unreasonable taxes, trampled their rights, and was unresponsive to their needs. Today's self-styled patriots shake their fists at the government in Washington, D.C., which they believe imposes unreasonable taxes, tramples on individual freedom, and is unresponsive to their needs."<sup>87</sup> But are these two movements comparable?

How does the New Militia Movement stand vis-à-vis the Citizen-Soldier tradition? At first glance we can see that the New Militias seem to be following directly in the footsteps of the nineteenth century militia tradition at its worst. For example, the New Militia movement could be seen as an extension of the white supremacist militias of the Old South. And the New Militias offer the traditional vices of the Citizen-Soldier tradition: xenophobia, racism, violence, and homogeneity. However, as in the nineteenth century, these vices are interconnected with a corresponding set of virtues. So while the New Militias do indeed offer xenophobia, racism, violence, and homogeneity, at the same time, they also offer patriotism, fraternity, devotion to a common good, and common identity -- to those they include in their membership.

Members of the racist Right come to think of themselves as white people -- take on the identity of white people -- as they engage together in communal practices, such as preparing for the race war and worshipping at Christian Identity churches. The festivals and rituals of the Right function in a way similar to the civic practices of early republican America, in terms of their role in the constitution of identities. However, the results are very different: Aryan Christian practices produce white supremacists and anti-Semites rather than republican citizens. Consider the following example:

The sounds of children at play rose from the swing set and jungle gym at the base of the guard tower, while the adults listened to calls for war against the Jews. Many of the women felt comforted by talk of the men laying down their lives to protect their families, and values. Some of the women cut locks of their hair, tied them with ribbons, and presented them to their men, so that they could carry them into battle. . . . [The Aryan Nations camp] took on a jamboree flavor during [Butler's] congresses. The grounds were covered with tents, trailers, and pickups with camper shells, and people walked among them to socialize.

Men wore blue uniforms and bore arms.<sup>88</sup> These individuals came to think of themselves as Aryan Christians and to love their community, as they participated together in the Aryan Nations congress. In short, engagement in Aryan practices produces Aryan identities.

So like the Citizen-Soldier tradition, the New Militia movement offers a love of community instilled through participation with others in common actions. It offers its members the chance to be included in something larger than themselves. It offers fraternity to those who are allowed to participate -- a blood brotherhood for Aryan Christian men. And the New Militia movement offers economically threatened white males a masculinity revitalized through engagement in martial practices. Once again, we can see that the virtues and the vices of the Citizen-Soldier tradition are inextricably linked.

In some senses the New Militias and the Aryan Christian Right call upon the vicious, undemocratic aspects of the Citizen-Soldier tradition and in so doing also reap the virtues of the tradition as well, because the virtues and vices are inextricably linked. They are creating fraternity

along with racism, patriotism along with xenophobia, and community action along with violence.

Nevertheless, the Aryan Christian Militia movement ultimately does not fall within the historical tradition of the Citizen-Soldier because it violates its basic foundation in three major ways. In the first place, while the Aryan Christian movement embraces martial practices, it does not view them as necessarily wedded to democratic republican ideals such as liberty, equality, the rule of law, and participatory citizenship. They do not accept the Citizen half of the Citizen-Soldier ideal. But the tradition of civic republicanism requires that these two halves be linked. Consequently, Aryan Warriors cannot be Citizen-Soldiers.

Secondly, while the New Militias pay a lot of lip service to the traditions of the American founding, the Aryan Christian movement accepts the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the American Constitution, and the Bill of Rights not as civic republican or even liberal documents, but as the revealed word of God.<sup>89</sup> This violates the secular nature of the Citizen-Soldier tradition which emerged in direct opposition to a Christian worldview. As noted in Chapter One, in its fifteenth century origins, the political movement of civic republicanism constituted an attack on the medieval Christian worldview with its traditional, hierarchic view of society. Then in the eighteenth century, as noted in

Chapter Two, civic republicanism again forged itself in opposition to monarchical and aristocratic rule. Citizenship requires liberty, rather than subjection to tradition; equality, rather than hierarchy and rank; fraternity, rather than paternity and filiality; and autonomy, rather than obedience to natural God-given law and dependence on natural superiors. Civic republicanism requires that citizens govern themselves for the common good through the rule of man-made law. It cannot accommodate the idea of a revealed Truth which "citizens" must not question.

And finally, the Aryan Christian militia vision of the far Right violates the Citizen-Soldier tradition because it rejects the *citizenship of civic practices* for a *citizenship of blood*. For example, Aryan Nations leader "Butler told [his] assemblage that granting citizenship to non-Christians and nonwhites was part of a Zionist plot to adulterate Aryan purity."<sup>90</sup> While the civic republican tradition may have actually included only a homogeneous group of men, it explicitly rejected on principle the idea that citizenship should only be extended to people with a particular type of blood -- such as Aryan blood. Civic republicanism entails a commitment to universalizable principles. While these principles may be violated in practice, they cannot be violated on principle.

Therefore, the New Militia movement cannot legitimately claim to stand within the civic republican tradition because although it embraces elements of the Citizen-Soldier

tradition, including some of the more vicious ones, it combines these elements with an advocacy of Aryan Christian supremacy which fundamentally contradicts some of the essential components of the civic republican tradition. The New Militia movement does not remain within the bounds of that tradition, as long as they also align themselves with the Aryan Christian Right.

### **Remembering the Citizen-Soldier Tradition**

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that those of us who are concerned about democracy in America should not simply ignore the New Militias. We should not dismiss them as paranoid weirdoes. We should not fail to recognize their underlying agenda. And we should not underestimate their ability to appeal to the American public at large. Instead what we need to do is engage them in democratic discourse. While the hard-core proto-fascist elements of the New Militia movement may reject the basis of rational discourse, many of its followers join the militias because they have legitimate political concerns and seek a movement that will give them both a sense of individual agency and a feeling of belonging to a community. So if those on the far Right want to reinvigorate the civic militia tradition, those of us concerned with fostering democracy in America must not concede to them the ideal of the civic militia. Instead, we need to reach out to more moderate members of the New

Militias and engage them in discourse about the militia tradition in America, in order to nurture whatever democratic seeds are present in what seems to be a less than democratic movement.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Sternhell differentiates Nazism from fascism: "The basis of Nazism was racism in its most extreme sense, and the fight against the Jews, against 'inferior races,' played a more preponderant role in it than the struggle against communism. . . . In fact, racial determinism was not present in all varieties of fascism. . . . Racism was thus not a necessary condition for the existence of fascism." Zeev Sternhell with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*, tr. by David Maisel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4-5. For an opposing view see Ernst Nolte, *The Three Faces of Fascism*, Leila Vennewitz, tr. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> Sternhell argues that two key characteristics of fascism are "on the one hand, a rejection of democracy, Marxism, liberalism, the so-called bourgeois values, the eighteenth century heritage, internationalism, and pacifism, on the other hand, a cult of heroism, vitalism, and violence." See *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 32.

<sup>3</sup> National Vanguard, "By Way of Deception Thou Shalt Do War," *Race and Reason* 1 (Jan/Feb. 1993), 10.

<sup>4</sup> National Alliance, "National Alliance Goals," National Alliance Main Page.

<sup>5</sup> National Vanguard Books staff, *Who Rules America?* (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1993), 3.

<sup>6</sup> American Dissident Voices. "ADL: America's Greatest Enemy." ADV Directory//National Alliance Main Page, Program of 29 May, 1993, emphasis mine.

<sup>7</sup> National Alliance poster, emphasis mine.

<sup>8</sup> Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood: The Chilling Inside Story of America's Violent Anti-Government Militia Movement* (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1995), 75-6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>10</sup> National Alliance, "What is the National Alliance," National Alliance Main Page.

<sup>11</sup> National Alliance, "The Saga of White Will," *New World Order Comix* #1 (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1993).

<sup>12</sup> National Alliance, "National Alliance Goals."

<sup>13</sup> Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 23.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>17</sup> "Demographics and Revolt," <http://www.io.com/~wlp/aryan-page/y04.html>, 2/17/96, 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> This is a well-documented fact. For example, see Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*; Jill Smolowe, "Enemies of the State," *Time* 8 May 1995, 58-65; and Joseph P. Shapiro, "An Epidemic of Fear and Loathing: Bar Codes, Black Helicopters and Martial Law," *U.S. News and World Report*, 8 May 1995, 37-44.

<sup>20</sup> Jonathan Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms: The Rise of America's New Militias* (New York: HarperPaperbacks, 1995), 34.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 44.



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- <sup>22</sup> James Coates, *Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 110.
- <sup>23</sup> Robert B. DePugh, "Political Platform of the Patriotic Party." In *Extremism in America*, Lyman Tower Sargent, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 95.
- <sup>24</sup> Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 110.
- <sup>25</sup> "This nation should immediately withdraw from the United Nations." DePugh, "Political Platform." In *Extremism*, 95, emphasis mine.
- <sup>26</sup> "This nation should immediately withdraw from the United Nations." Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 101.
- <sup>28</sup> See Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 110 and Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 114.
- <sup>29</sup> The Posse Comitatus, "It is the Duty of Government to Prevent Injustice -- Not to Promote It," in *Extremism*, 345-6, emphasis mine.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 346.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 344.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 345.
- <sup>33</sup> See James Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 110 and Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 114.
- <sup>34</sup> Marc Cooper, "A Visit with MOM: Montana's Mother of All Militias," *The Nation* 22 May 1995, 722.
- <sup>35</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 115.
- <sup>36</sup> Cooper, "A Visit with MOM," 716.
- <sup>37</sup> "Old List of Klan Members Recalls Racist Past in an Indiana City," *The New York Times*, 1995.
- <sup>38</sup> Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 83-4.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 14.
- <sup>40</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 115.
- <sup>41</sup> See "American Program," in *Extremism*, 132.
- <sup>42</sup> See "The Populist Party of the United States Platform 1984" in *Extremism*, 18-25. In short, the Populist Party wants to restrict immigration, abolish 'affirmative action' and racial quotas, reform the welfare system, crack down on crime, reduce federal income taxes, protect American farmers and workers, place America's interests first, reform Wall Street, establish the strongest defense in the World, and bring down interest rates.
- <sup>43</sup> Smolowe, "Enemies of the State."
- <sup>44</sup> "Home-Grown Courts Spring Up As Judicial Arm of the Far Right," *New York Times*, 17 April 1996.
- <sup>45</sup> "In Montana and throughout the country the militias forged a new alliance between the old-line white supremacist groups and the newer anti-tax organizations, property rights organizations and Wise Use anti-enviro activists . . . , Christian conservatives, anti-abortion militants, Perotista constitutionalists, gun-owner associations and thousands of individual representatives of that newly categorized political species, the Angry White Male." Cooper, "A Visit with MOM," 718-9.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 714-722, 716.
- <sup>47</sup> Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 257-8.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid., 13.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 257-8.

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- <sup>50</sup> Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 13.
- <sup>51</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 109. Interestingly, Karl cites the 1991 Kettering Foundation study as evidence for the political discontent of the public.
- <sup>52</sup> Sternhell.
- <sup>53</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 53; and Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 83-4.
- <sup>54</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 57.
- <sup>55</sup> Smolowe, "Enemies of the State," 66.
- <sup>56</sup> "Bomb Suspect Felt at Home Riding the Gun-Show Circuit," *New York Times*, 5 July 1995.
- <sup>57</sup> Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 44.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.
- <sup>59</sup> Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 9.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, vii.
- <sup>61</sup> National Alliance and National Vanguard Books phone message, (216) 846-1045, 25 October 1993, underlining mine.
- <sup>62</sup> Cooper, "A Visit with MOM," 714-722, 716.
- <sup>63</sup> "Excerpts From Buchanan Campaign Speech," *The New York Times*, 2/22/96, emphasis mine.
- <sup>64</sup> Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 273 and 261.
- <sup>65</sup> "Buchanan Drawing Extremist Support, and Problems, Too," *The New York Times*, 23 February 1996.
- <sup>66</sup> "Thunderbolts," Stormfront White Nationalist Resource Page, 1. See also "Russian Backer for Buchanan," *The New York Times*, 23 February 1996.
- <sup>67</sup> Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 168-169.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 169.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>71</sup> Quoted in Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 89.
- <sup>72</sup> Quoted in Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 77.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 153, emphasis mine.
- <sup>74</sup> Quoted in Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*, 52.
- <sup>75</sup> Quoted in Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 122.
- <sup>76</sup> Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 22.
- <sup>77</sup> Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1984), 136.
- <sup>78</sup> Linda Zerilli, *Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 18.
- <sup>79</sup> Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies, Volume 1: women, floods, bodies, history*, tr. Stephen Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 434.
- <sup>80</sup> From the German edition, not included in the English edition, 534.
- <sup>81</sup> Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies, Volume 2: male bodies: psychoanalyzing the white terror*, tr. Stephen Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), xii.

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<sup>82</sup> Nancy Hartsock, *Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), 157, 166.

<sup>83</sup> William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Education for Democracy*, eds., Benjamin R. Barber and Richard Battistoni (Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1993), 94.

<sup>84</sup> See Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*.

<sup>85</sup> On 26 February 1996, the *New York Times* reported that members of right-wing paramilitary groups rallied behind the cause of a doctor who engaged in a six-day stand-off with the F.B.I. after failing to appear at a hearing on charges of failing to pay \$70,000 in back child support. Here again, the militia groups oppose measures that would aid women who choose to live outside the bounds of marriage.

<sup>86</sup> National Alliance, "National Alliance Goals."

<sup>87</sup> Jonathan Karl, *The Right to Bear Arms*, 3-4.

<sup>88</sup> Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 116-117.

<sup>89</sup> According to Christian Identity theology, "after settling the New World, the true Promised Land, America's founding fathers were inspired by God to write the sacred documents we know as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. The amendments that followed, according to Identity, are Satanic additions dictated through today's Jews to undermine the white race." Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 72. Also see Coates, *Armed and Dangerous*.

<sup>90</sup> Flynn and Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 83.

## Chapter Five

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### **Troubling *Armed Masculinity*: Military Academies, Hazing Rituals, and the Reconstitution of the Citizen-Soldier**

"One of Virginia's educational institutions is military in character. Are women to be admitted on an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be taught to bear arms?"

--- Virginia Military Institute spokesman<sup>1</sup>

"We know how to train young men how to be men. We don't know how to train young women to be men."

--- The Citadel public relations director<sup>2</sup>

The Citizen-Soldier tradition places military service at the center of its vision of civic education. According to traditional arguments, military service teaches individuals the virtues necessary for republican citizenship: selflessness, courage, fraternity, patriotism, and civic virtue -- the willingness to put the common good ahead of individual self-interest, including sacrificing one's life, if necessary. The Citizen-Soldier represents a model of citizenship in which these martial virtues become attached to citizenship. Historically, this has meant that only men could become republican citizens because only men were allowed to be soldiers. But now that women are supposed to be full citizens, we have to ask: What happens in a tradition that links citizenship to soldiering, when women become citizens? If military service forms a central part of republican citizenship, then if women want to become

republican citizens, they must engage in military service alongside men. And indeed, at various points in history, women have fought for the right to bear arms in defense of the republic and have actually served in the military disguised as men.<sup>3</sup> These women saw military service as essential to their full citizenship.

But can women become citizen-soldiers alongside men? As we have seen so far, within the civic republican tradition, engagement in martial practices constitutes *armed masculinity*, which is then fused onto republican citizenship through the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. *Armed masculinity* -- or any type of masculinity for that matter -- is not a natural attribute of male individuals. Instead, it is an always precarious artifice that must be constantly constructed and reconstructed through engagement in masculine practices, such as military service. Civic republican citizenship has been masculinized by its connection to soldiering which has been masculinized by its cultural conflation with masculinity.

But if masculinity is not a natural attribute of male individuals, but instead is constructed through a series of performances, then what would happen if "women" began to engage in the practices constitutive of masculinity? Throughout the tradition of civic republicanism, women have been denied access to participation in the practices constitutive of republican citizenship and *armed masculinity*. So while masculine republican citizens have

been constituted through engagement in civic and martial practices, feminine subjects have been (partially) constituted through the exclusion from these same practices. If this is the case, then what would happen if "women" began to engage in the practices constitutive of both *armed masculinity* and republican citizenship? Could women's transgressive engagement in these practices make them citizen-soldiers?

The *performativity theory* of identity that I have been using throughout this study leaves open the possibility of *subversive transgender performances*. To quote Judith Butler at length:

If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. . . . When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and a *woman* and *feminine* a male body as easily as a female one.<sup>4</sup>

In other words, if gender does not flow naturally from biological sex, then there is no guarantee that a biological male will become a *masculine man* and a biological female a *feminine woman*. In fact, the culturally constructed imperative that "men" must become "masculine" and "women" become "feminine" does not always succeed.<sup>5</sup> But in today's society -- although less so now than in the recent past -- feminine men and masculine women are considered unintelligible, unnatural, or undesirable by many. But what

Butler suggests is that the existence of such individuals highlights the artificiality of supposedly "natural" categories of gender.<sup>6</sup>

Politically, this means that not only is there no reason for "women" not to participate in civic and martial practices culturally deemed "masculine," but in fact, such participation could radically undermine the traditional dichotomous construction of gender and the sexism it generates.<sup>7</sup> Butler terms this strategy "subversive repetition."<sup>8</sup> In other words, "women's" transgressive performance of the behaviors constitutive of citizen-soldiers should work to undermine the idea that "men" and "women" must be restricted by the cultural imperatives of "masculinity" and "femininity" respectively. Moving beyond restrictive gender norms will allow all individuals the freedom to live as they desire. The movement beyond the traditional dichotomous constructions of gender clears the way for a "proliferation of gender."<sup>9</sup> This will not only undermine sexism, but could also allow full civic subjectivity for "women." That is, it could open up the possibility of "women" becoming republican citizens on an equal basis with "men."

In beginning our exploration of the possibility of "women" occupying the category of the Citizen-Soldier, we must first note that military service no longer attaches to citizenship within the American context. As I argued in Chapter Three, by the time the Selective Service Act of

1917, participatory citizenship had been disconnected from military service and had in fact been seriously undermined by the emergence of the "professional politics paradigm." In other words, while all male citizens were required to serve in the military, this service was not coupled with the possibility of substantive participation in self-government -- that is, with republican citizenship. Moreover, after the Vietnam War, mandatory service in the military was eliminated as a requirement of citizenship. We now have an All Volunteer Force of professional soldiers officially subordinate to civilian elected officials. Despite these changes, engagement in martial practices within the U.S. military still produces *armed masculinity*; it's just not explicitly linked to citizenship.

Nevertheless, the Citizen-Soldier tradition remains our historical legacy and so still forms the overall democratic context within which America imagines its civil-military relations being situated. In other words, despite the historic divorce of the Soldier from the Citizen documented in Chapter Three, the fantasy of the Citizen-Soldier ideal still lurks in the American political unconscious. This partially explains why many Americans on the Right fixate on the fact the President Clinton did not serve in Vietnam. ("Slick Willy Draft Dodger Beer" T-shirts are still for sale in the back of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine.)<sup>10</sup> And it also helps explain why many women, gay men, and lesbians view military service as central to their acceptance as full



citizens. Building on Cynthia Enloe's contention that *armed masculinity* must be understood in its cultural particularity, I would like to suggest that American *armed masculinity* must be understood as developing within the context of our particular cultural version of the Citizen-Soldier ideal, replete with its interwoven set of virtues and vices.<sup>11</sup> Thus, we must approach the question of whether "women" can become citizen-soldiers by examining the contemporary practices constitutive of *armed masculinity* within this broader context of civil-military relations in America -- the Citizen-Soldier tradition.

### **Feminists Theorize the Military**

Most discussions of women and the military do not consider the Citizen-Soldier tradition. And most discussions of women and the military, even among feminist theorists, do not understand gender identity as performatively constituted through a series of performances. Instead, most theorists consider gender to be a core identity that pre-exists a person's relationship to the military. There are two basic versions of this idea. The first approach assumes that there are entities called *men* and *women* who then relate to the military in a variety of ways. Judith Hicks Stiehm's award-winning book, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* forms an excellent example of this first approach. The book studies "America's most unknown soldiers

-- enlisted women in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines" in order to represent their experiences and make policy recommendations about how to make the military more equitable for women.<sup>12</sup> By assuming the existence of *men and women*, Stiehm does not examine the ways in which the military actually produces armed masculinity -- how it makes men -- or how women's exclusion from military practices contributes to the production of femininity.

In contrast, the *gender difference approach* is more theoretically sophisticated. It assumes there are social constructs called "masculinity" and "femininity" that directly affect and are affected by the military and militarism. One version of this approach begins with the assumption of differential gender identities and explores the ways in which culturally constructed configurations of masculinity have shaped the military. Betty Reardon's classic book, *Sexism and the War System*, represents this school of thought. Building on the work of Carol Gilligan,<sup>13</sup> Reardon posits the existence of masculine and feminine values that flow from men's and women's core gender identities. Connecting masculine values to militarism, she argues that "the structures of violence that constitute the war system are . . . influenced by the attributes we use to guide the development of masculine identity and by masculine modes of public decision making."<sup>14</sup> In short, masculinity produces militarism. Consequently, "the feminine values, which nurture life and acknowledge the need for transcending

competition and violence, are needed to guide policy formation to avoid or abolish war."<sup>15</sup> Understanding masculinity and femininity to be core identities rather than performative constructions, Reardon does not believe that women will lose their feminine values if they begin to engage in martial practices, such as making military policy. While Reardon provides a lot of important insights into militarism and its connection to sexism, she presents a static view of gender identity that reifies the traditional association of men with war and women with peace, thus playing right into sexism and militarism. She does not explore the ways in which martial practices actually create *armed masculinity* and how exclusion from these practices produces *peaceful femininity*.

Cynthia Enloe exemplifies the second version of the *gender difference approach*.<sup>16</sup> Presenting a much more nuanced understanding of gender, Enloe argues that militarization relies on "varieties of masculinity and femininity," not just on one monolithic version of each. She argues that the military uses ideological ideals of masculinity to manipulate men and women into serving the needs of the military.<sup>17</sup> "Ignore gender -- the social constructions of 'femininity' and 'masculinity' and the relations between them," she argues, "and it becomes impossible adequately to explain how military forces have managed to capture and control so much of society's imagination and resources."<sup>18</sup> Coming close to a performativity theory of gender, Enloe

argues that "militarization is a gendered process . . . that won't 'work' unless men will accept certain norms of masculinity and women will abide by certain strictures of femininity."<sup>19</sup> That is to say, "militaries need women -- but they need women to behave as *the gender 'women'.*"<sup>20</sup> Here Enloe seems to suggest that gender is constructed and maintained through engagement in particular sets of gendered practices.

However, while Enloe presents a sophisticated, nuanced discussion of the multiple ways in which culturally constructed masculinities and femininities serve the needs of militarism, she does not recognize the possibility of *subversive transgender performances* and their potential to undermine traditional conceptions of gender. For example, in analyzing the role of the female soldier, Enloe does not consider the possibility that this type of counter-hegemonic behavior could work to undermine the sex/gender system. For Enloe, the female soldier does not at all trouble our conflation of soldiering with masculinity with biological males. Instead, the female soldier simply exemplifies the "militarization of femininity."<sup>21</sup> Women will always be feminine, she implies, even if they engage in masculinist practices; they will just be feminine in different ways. Thus, Enloe theorizes a totalizing system that successfully co-opts every possibility of "subversive repetition."

Performativity theory adds two elements to these feminist approaches. First, it sees gender identity as

something that can never be finally achieved; gender identity requires that one constantly perform one's gender. Second, performativity theory allows for the possibility of *subversive transgender performances*. The spectacle of "men" acting like "women" and "women" acting like "men," highlights the artificiality of supposedly natural manifestations of gender and, in this way, undermines the foundations of the sex/gender system and the sexism it generates. Performativity theory strives to "challenge to a dyadic gender system and . . . is also implicitly a challenge to those feminist positions that maintain sexual difference as irreducible, and which seek to give expression to the distinctively feminine side of that binary opposition."<sup>22</sup> Performativity feminism seeks to facilitate "the release of gender from its binary restrictions" by engaging in "the cultural struggle to renovate gender relations as we know them."<sup>23</sup>

Jean Bethke Elshtain's work on women and the military hints at but does not develop the possibility of *subversive transgender performances*. Unlike Enloe and others who explore the global process of militarization in all its cultural particularities, Elshtain focuses on gender and military service within the Western tradition of political thought and specifically within her reading of "armed civic virtue" -- of the Citizen-Soldier tradition.<sup>24</sup> "We in the West," Elshtain argues, "are the heirs of a tradition that assumes an affinity between women and peace, between men and

war, a tradition that consists of culturally constructed and transmitted myths and memories."<sup>25</sup> Indeed, the cultural constructs of *armed masculinity* and *pacific femininity* -- or the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul as she calls them -- are deeply rooted in our Western tradition and so are not easily dislodged.

Approaching a performativity theory of gender identity, Elshtain argues that the normative masculine ideal of the Just Warrior and the feminine ideal of the Beautiful Soul require actual male and female individuals to behave in gender appropriate ways. The gendered cultural ideals inherent in the Western tradition, she explains, require that "in time of war, real men and women . . . take on, in cultural memory and narrative, the personas of Just Warriors and Beautiful Souls." The ideals of the Just Warrior -- "man construed as violent, whether eagerly and inevitably or reluctantly and tragically" -- and the Beautiful Soul -- "woman [construed] as nonviolent, offering succor and compassion" -- that Elshtain articulates operate like our Citizen-Soldier ideal: Each entails a set of practices, the participation in which constitutes biological males and females as masculine and feminine -- as "men" and "women." In Elshtain's words, these ideals "do not denote what men and women *really* are in time of war, but function instead to re-create and secure women's location as noncombatants and men's as warriors."<sup>26</sup> The Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul, like the Citizen-Soldier, are normative ideological

ideals that require biological males and females to act like "men" and "women" -- and consequently, to become men and women.

Although in some ways less nuanced than Enloe's, Elshtain's analysis of *armed masculinity* actually surpasses Enloe's to the extent that it leaves open the possibility of the kind of *subversive transgender performances* theorized by Butler. Confessing her own transgendered fantasies -- as a child, Elshtain dreamed of "swashbuckling . . . danger . . . handsome heroes and beautiful women" but she "gets to be a hero in those dreams, a woman in disguise, the greatest swordsman of them all" -- Elshtain recognizes that males and females do not always identify in the normatively prescribed ways.<sup>27</sup> In her words, "these paradigmatic linkages [between men and war, and women and peace] dangerously overshadow other voices, other stories: of pacific males; of bellicose women; . . . of martial fervor at odds -- or so we choose to believe -- with maternalism in women." Since *armed masculinity* and *pacific femininity* are cultural constructs rather than natural facts, there is no guarantee that men will become Just Warriors and women Beautiful Souls. Moreover, Elshtain seems to suggest that the continuation of normatively correct gender identification is not a sure thing: "No conscious bargain was struck by our collective foremothers and fathers to ensure [the traditional] outcome. Rather, sedimented lore -- stories of male war fighters and women home keepers and designated weepers over war's

inevitable tragedies -- have spilled over from one epoch to the next." Our tradition of "sedimented lore" exerts a powerful influence on us. Nevertheless, because it is cultural rather than natural, it cannot ensure that biological males will always identify with the Just Warrior rather than with the Beautiful Soul and biological females with the Beautiful Soul and never with the Just Warrior.

That military officials also recognize, whether consciously or unconsciously, the possibility of *subversive transgender performances* is evidenced by the anxiety expressed in official military policies aimed at artificially maintaining gender difference. Why else would the U.S. Marine Corps require female soldiers to "tweeze their eyebrows in a regulation arch"? Why else would the caption under an Army recruitment poster featuring "a pretty woman smiling out from under a camouflaged combat helmet" read 'Some of the best soldiers wear lipstick'?"<sup>28</sup> Why else would the Army make "a policy that defines the carrying of umbrellas as 'unmanly'?"<sup>29</sup> Why else would West Point, upon becoming co-educational, decide to eliminate "running events in which cadets carry weapons?"<sup>30</sup> Why else would it modify "regulations relating to uniforms, hair length and jewelry?"<sup>31</sup> And why else would Citadel officials, after repeatedly threatening to shave Shannon Faulkner's head, suddenly reverse themselves as soon as the young woman said she didn't care?<sup>32</sup>



## Hazing the Citizen-Soldier

As we have seen in our previous chapters, the Citizen-Soldier ideal entails four key democratic elements. First of all, the Citizen-Soldier ideal embodies a set of practices that produce the necessary foundation for republican self-rule: The civic and martial practices constitutive of the Citizen-Soldier also produce patriotism, fraternity, civic virtue, and a common civic identity, the essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good. Second, the Citizen-Soldier represents the idea that the soldiers who serve in the military are also the citizens who control the military -- in short, that the civil should control the military. Third, the reason citizen-soldiers serve in the military is to defend their ability to govern themselves for the common good through the rule of law. And finally, the Citizen-Soldier constitutes a normative ideal. It means more than the fact that citizens comprise the military. Instead, the Citizen-Soldier embodies a commitment to civic republicanism, complete with all its ideals: liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship. Thus, the Citizen-Soldier ideal represents the linkage between participatory citizenship and military service.

One of the ways in which military service supposedly facilitates republican citizenship is by creating a sense of fraternity and common identity among previously diverse

individuals. This fraternity entails a strong degree of bonding among its members, a bonding that is constituted through the rejection of previous identities and the acquisition of a new common identity: the Masculine Soldier. The feelings of fraternity and identification with the group that occur during military training lay the foundation for the emergence of martial virtues, such as selflessness, courage, heroism, and patriotism -- which includes the willingness to risk one's life for the good of one's state or country. Through engagement together in martial practices, diverse individuals become a fraternity of patriotic masculine soldiers.

While the *armed masculinity* created in this way traditionally got fused onto republican citizenship, as stressed above, this is no longer the case. Today, military practices still produce *armed masculinity*, but it is not linked to participatory citizenship -- a form of citizenship that, in any event, has been eclipsed. Consequently, the remainder of this section will focus just on the creation of *armed masculinity* by contemporary military institutions.

Contemporary military practices still emphasize the creation of a common identity among previously diverse individuals. While the new identity of the Masculine Soldier could supplement and enrich the previous identities of each individual, traditional military academies strive instead to break down and annihilate the previous identities. Sanford M. Dornbusch explains how this process

works: "Successfully completing the steps in an Academy career . . . requires that there be a loss of identity in terms of pre-existing statuses. . . . This complete isolation [of the new cadet] helps to produce a unified group of swabs, rather than a heterogeneous collection of persons of high and low status. . . . The role of the cadet must supersede other roles the individual has been accustomed to play."<sup>33</sup> The cadet does not add his new identity onto his old. He does not become, for example, a cadet at the Virginia Military Academy (VMI) in addition to being John Doe, a white, middle class, Southern Baptist boy from Charlottesville, Virginia. Instead, he loses his previous identity: He is no longer John Doe, a white, middle class, Southern Baptist boy from Charlottesville. He is now simply a cadet at VMI. The identity of cadet -- of Masculine Soldier -- replaces other categories of identification; it does not merely supplement them -- at least according to the traditional method outlined by Dornbush.

This method of unifying the group aims to create a sense of fusion among members. Cadets are supposed to be one and the same. Because of this overemphasis on fusion and homogeneity, the appearance of heterogeneity becomes a problem. As Dornbusch notes, writing in 1955, "it is clear that the existence of minority-group status on the part of some cadets would tend to break down this desired equality."<sup>34</sup> Indeed, whenever a group of people who appear

to be different wants to be integrated into the military, the desired fusion and homogeneity are believed to be threatened. Nevertheless, although the military vehemently resisted the integration of African-Americans into its ranks, arguing that their presence would impede the process of creating fraternity and a common group identity, the military has very successfully overcome this challenge.<sup>35</sup> Will the same happen with women and gays/lesbians?

Traditionally, violent hazing practices have facilitated the creation of a common identity within military academies. Dornbusch cites the important role hazing plays in the development of solidarity among cadets: "As a consequence of undergoing this very unpleasant experience together, the swab class develops remarkable unity." That is why hazing, although "forbidden by the regulations . . . is a hallowed tradition of the [military] Academy."<sup>36</sup> In a recent case, the all-male Virginia Military Institute argued in court that women should not be admitted because their presence would interfere with traditional hazing rituals -- which is what happened when women entered West Point.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, although it did not say so in court, the Citadel must agree that hazing plays an essential role in military education, since it is notorious for not enforcing its official anti-hazing prohibitions.<sup>38</sup> Hazing remains an integral part of military education because it facilitates the creation of fraternal bonding.

The Virginia Military Institute sees hazing as central to its "unique" method of producing "citizen-soldiers." VMI employs what it calls an "adversative method" which they say is "intended to break down individualism and to instill the uniform values espoused by the institution."<sup>39</sup> According to the *U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia* case record, "Colonel N. Michael Bissell, the Commandant of Cadets at VMI, summarized the educational process at VMI as follows: 'I like to think VMI literally dissects the young student that comes in there, kind of pulls him apart.'"<sup>40</sup> Living in the barracks, a VMI cadet "is totally removed from his social background."<sup>41</sup> The Citadel uses a comparable method.<sup>42</sup> It also strives "to 'strip' each young recruit of his original identity and remold him" -- into a citizen-soldier.<sup>43</sup> Any identity the cadet had prior to entering the military academy must not remain intact.

Central to VMI's "adversative method" is the famous "rat line." According to court records, "entering students at VMI are called 'rats' because the rat is 'probably the lowest animal on earth.' In general, the rats are treated miserably for the first seven months of college. . . . The rat line is sufficiently rigorous and stressful that those who complete it feel both a sense of accomplishment and a bonding to their fellow sufferers and former tormentors."<sup>44</sup> The rat line consists of "indoctrination, minute regulation of individual behavior, frequent punishments, rigorous physical education, and military drills."<sup>45</sup> Unrelenting

subjection to the rat line "strips away cadets' old values and behaviors." After that, the "class system" uses peer pressure to teach and reinforce "the values and behaviors that VMI exists to promote."<sup>46</sup> The Citadel uses a similar process. As one young Citadel "knob" told Susan Faludi during her visit there: 'We're all suffering together. It's how we bond.'<sup>47</sup> The methods used at these two all-male public military academies instill in cadets a sense of "loyalty to one's brother rats"<sup>48</sup> or "knobs" -- a sense of fraternity that underwrites the development of martial virtues.

Young male cadets at VMI and the Citadel become citizen-soldiers through a process that teaches them not only fraternity, but also equality among peers, selflessness, and even a type of civic virtue -- the willingness to put the good of the group ahead of one's own particular interest. "The VMI experience promotes . . . the belief that you must subordinate your own personal desires and well-being to the good of the whole unit."<sup>49</sup> Cadets learn a sense of selflessness by being subjected to "a total lack of privacy" and by being "never free from scrutiny." While at VMI "a cadet cannot go to the bathroom or go to take a shower without being observed by everyone in that quadrangle on all levels."<sup>50</sup> And at the Citadel, Faludi tells us, "the sharing of the stall-less showers and stall-less toilets is 'at the heart of the Citadel experience,' according to more than one cadet." As one young man put it,

'I know it sounds trivial, but all of us in one shower, it's like we're all the same.'<sup>51</sup> All these ordeals produce "graduates who are prepared to be citizen-soldiers."<sup>52</sup>

VMI believes that the presence of women would interfere with its ability to create citizen-soldiers. Although recently overruled by the United States Supreme Court, the United States District Court originally agreed with VMI, stating: "'The mission of the Virginia Military Institute [is] to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, . . . and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national peril.' . . . Excluding women is substantially related to this mission."<sup>53</sup> Why?

One of the reasons women must be excluded is because military institutions often use misogynistic and homophobic methods in constructing the Masculine Soldier.<sup>54</sup> The presence of women (and lesbians and gays) would problematize the use of these methods. While not essential to the production of soldiers, I would argue, misogynistic and homophobic hazing often plays a role in military education at both military academies and in boot camps. Many scholars have documented the ways in which *armed masculinity* is explicitly constructed in opposition to femininity and homosexuality. For example, citing vivid examples from oral histories, Richard Moser documents the role of misogyny and homophobia in the constitution of the Masculine Soldier identity. At boot camp, "the military's central socializing

experience," Moser tells us, "violence and denigration were used as the introduction to the world of the soldier. . . . Violence and intimidation were mixed with strident and persistent appeals to sexual identity." Moser quotes ex-marine Jess Jesperson: "Especially in the earlier stages of boot-camp, when people are real confused and real disorganized, they always said, 'Girls -- you cunts -- pussies.'" Based on his interview data, Moser concludes that

in boot camp sexist and homophobic appeals were used to train and discipline soldiers. In the exclusive all-male environment of boot camp, women were used as a negative example and positioned as the common "other." . . . Machismo, misogyny, and homophobia were employed both as exemplary ideals and as weapons to destroy competing forms of masculinity. . . . Both gay and feminine sexuality were used as threats and negative examples.<sup>55</sup>

Having women or lesbians and gays physically present problematizes the process of turning them into the denigrated "other" and/or results in sexual harassment, rape, and other forms of violence.

Boot camps use methods similar to those of the military academies, as described by Dornbush, Faludi, and VMI/Citadel students and officials. As Jesperson tells Moser: "It started when you went into boot camp. . . . There's a psychological terror . . . and physical torture. First, they dehumanize you, totally take away your identity, and then remake you . . . into what they want -- just a fighter."<sup>56</sup> Boot camp, VMI, and the Citadel share a similar method of producing *armed masculinity*. Interestingly, VMI claims its "rat line" is even "more dramatic and more



stressful than Army boot camp or Army basic training. . . . It is comparable to Marine Corps boot camp in terms of both the physical rigor and mental stress of the experience."<sup>57</sup> Thus, we can surmise that if boot camps routinely use misogyny and homophobia in constructing *armed masculinity*, then so does VMI, although no references were made to such tactics during its court cases.<sup>58</sup>

The Citadel, on the other hand, is notorious for its misogynistic and homophobic hazing. Faludi compiles plenty of evidence in her article. For example: 'They called you a "pussy" all the time,' [a young man who attended the Citadel in 1991] recalled. 'Or a "fucking little girl."' Faludi continues: "It started the very first day, when the upper-classmen stood around and taunted, 'Oh, you going to get your little girlie locks cut off?'" According to the former cadet's report, "virtually every taunt equated him with a woman: whenever he showed fear, they would say, 'You look like you're having an abortion,' or 'Are you menstruating?'"<sup>59</sup> These young "citizen-soldiers" forge their masculine identities in direct opposition to a denigrated femininity.

Using misogynistic and homophobic methods to construct fraternal bonds among soldiers creates a particularly unstable masculine identity predicated on the denigration of femininity and homoeroticism. While masculinity always forms in opposition to femininity, the type of *armed masculinity* created through the use of misogynistic and

homophobic hazing defines itself as hostile toward what it perceives as the homoerotic and the feminine. This type of *armed masculinity* not only yields a hatred and fear of women, gay men, and lesbians, but also requires that soldiers strongly repress the "feminine" parts of themselves, as well as any homoerotic desire they might feel. Consequently, *armed masculinity* is a particularly precarious form of masculinity that always threatens to dissolve. Because *armed masculinity* can never be finally secured, the Masculine Soldier must constantly engage in the practices constitutive of *armed masculinity*: He must constantly reestablish his masculinity by expressing his opposition to femininity and homoeroticism in himself and others.<sup>60</sup>

The anger, hostility, and aggressiveness produced in the process of constituting *armed masculinity* get channeled into a desire for combat against the enemy. As Moser found in his research, "machismo was employed as a gateway to other forms of domination and dehumanization. Once a sense of male superiority was achieved, then other forms of dominating behavior were introduced. . . . Dominance and manhood were equated with combat and opposition to the 'other.' This other was usually a 'pussy' and then a 'gook,' sometimes a 'commie,' but always a potential victim."<sup>61</sup> *Armed masculinity* serves militarism well.

Although the use of misogynistic and homophobic practices hurts and degrades people in the process of

creating masculine soldiers out of individual civilians, the process is not completely devoid of pleasure -- which of course is one of the reasons for its long-standing existence. In the first place, becoming part of something larger than oneself can be very pleasurable, even if the process involves pain. Secondly, many people enjoy dominating others, and those subjected to violent rituals will presumably get their chance to be on top in the future. And finally, some military men actually enjoy being subjected to painful and degrading rituals. For example, several of the sailors interviewed by Stephen Zeeland in *Sailors and Sexual Identity* reportedly enjoyed the "crossing the line ceremony" and similar rituals, even when they were the recipients of what many would consider unpleasant treatment. One man explains his experience as follows:

I thought I was going to hate [the crossing the line ceremony], but I had fun. Some people quit, the people who couldn't take it anymore, men who were crying . . . it's really degrading. I had food all over me. I had Crisco oil poured on my face. I couldn't breathe, I got all this stuff in my lungs and in my eyes. [. . .] I liked it so much. [. . .] I just had a blast. Everyone thought I was going to break down. Everyone. [. . .] Some people were getting hit; the people who weren't liked very much were getting hit a lot. It got really disgusting. People were peeing in jars and saving it for weeks and pouring it on top of us. [. . .] I was on all fours, like a dog, and someone would be behind me actually hitting me with their dick like they were having sex with me. [. . .] I was laughing.<sup>62</sup>

A variety of pleasures exist in military discipline and violence, a reality we should not overlook, if we want to understand our topic fully.

The intense nature of the fraternal bonding experience required for the creation of soldiers necessarily entails a

certain amount of homoeroticism, even if unrecognized or explicitly denied by participants and others. While I am certainly not arguing that all soldiers are repressed homosexuals -- a claim that would require an appeal to some sort of essential sexuality -- I am suggesting that a repressed homoerotic tension inheres in many traditional military practices, and that this repressed sexual tension helps create both the bonding and the combativeness necessary for war-making. As Wilhelm Reich theorizes, "the goal of sexual suppression is that of producing an individual who is adjusted to the authoritarian order and who will submit to it in spite of all the misery and degradation. The suppression of natural sexual gratification leads to various kinds of substitute gratifications. Natural aggression becomes brutal sadism which then is an essential mass-psychological factor in imperialistic wars."<sup>63</sup> The suppression and denigration of homoerotic desire and of any "feminine" aspects of the male's psyche plays a key role in the process of constructing the Masculine Soldier.

The rituals involved in breaking down previous identities and reconstituting the individuals as a fraternity of masculine soldiers are often obviously homoerotic. For example, Zeeland describes "Navy initiation rituals involving cross-dressing, spanking, simulated oral and anal sex, simulated ejaculation, nipple piercing, and anal penetration with objects or fingers,"

such as the famous "crossing the line ceremony."<sup>64</sup> Similarly, many long-standing Citadel rituals are clearly homoerotic, such as "'Senior Rip-Off Day,' a spring rite in which three hundred seniors literally rip each other's clothes off, burn them in a bonfire, and hug and wrestle on the ground, . . . the birthday ritual, in which the birthday boy is stripped, tied to a chair, and covered with shaving cream, while his groin is coated in liquid shoe polish,"<sup>65</sup> and 'Bananarama' during which "an unpeeled banana [is] produced -- and shoved into a cadet's anus."<sup>66</sup> Homoeroticism plays a long-standing part in the military bonding process.

However, despite the homoeroticism of many traditional military practices, they are also clearly homophobic. Faludi provides an excellent example of this phenomenon: "Knobs told me that they were forced to run through the showers while the upperclassmen 'guards' knocked the soap out of their hands and, when the knobs leaned over to retrieve it, the upperclassmen would unzip their pants and yell, 'Don't pick it up, don't pick it up! We'll use you like we used those girls!'"<sup>67</sup> Submission to aggressive homoerotic hazing plays a central role in the process of degrading the individual, ripping apart his previous identity, and reconstituting him as part of a fraternity of masculine soldiers. Homoerotic desire must not be explicitly acknowledged. Instead, it must be repressed and

channeled into aggression against the "other" -- homosexuals, women, and "the enemy."

While the above cited hazing rituals are clearly erotic, Zeeland argues that homoerotic desire exists even in military practices that are not explicitly sexual. As he explains it,

homosexuality comes in many flavors, some known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a natural part of military life. A desire to be in close quarters with other military men in a tightly knit brotherhood might be homosexual. . . . An officer's love for his men might be homosexual. The intimate buddy relationships men form in barracks, aboard ship, and most especially in combat -- often described as being a love greater than between man and woman -- might be homosexual -- whether or not penetration and ejaculation ever occur.<sup>68</sup>

Zeeland proffers that the Pentagon opposes the presence of gay men in the military because it wants "to protect homoerotic military rituals, homosocial lifestyles, and covert military male-male sex from the taint of sexual suspicion [and]. . . . to maintain the illusion that there is not homosexuality in the military. This is the function of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell': for boys to play with boys -- and not get called queers, and not get called girls."<sup>69</sup>

Needless to say, military effectiveness requires that soldiers develop a sense of solidarity, feelings of affection for each other, and a recognition of their need for interdependency. Soldiers who are to go into battle together must learn to trust and depend on one another. And military academies know that. At the Citadel cadets learn interdependency in a variety of ways, including the "Citadel shirt tuck" which requires cadets to help each

other dress. Many of Faludi's interviews with Citadel students and officials contain the theme of "manly nurturance." Even within the context of rigorous training, cadets nurture each other. Men at the Citadel hug and kiss each other. In fact one Citadel professor refers to the relationship between cadets as "like a true marriage. There's an affectionate intimacy that you will find between cadets. With this security they can, without being defensive, project tenderness to each other.'"<sup>70</sup> Through this bonding process individuals become a fraternity of masculine soldiers fit for military service.

Let me be clear here. A certain degree of (homo)eroticism, whether consciously recognized or not, must play a role in the creation of an effective combat unit. As one of the naval lieutenant interviewed by Zeeland put it:

One thing I learned from being a really well-respected officer on-board ship is that there is a part of good military leadership that is inherently homosexual in nature. And that is love for your fellow man. . . . I think the Spartans understood that. It's only in our twentieth century conservative Judeo-Christian mindset that we find it so incompatible with military service when in actual practice today -- we don't call it homosexuality, but I think every good leader feels something of that. A yearning for his men. Not that it's consecrated physically, but it's everything short of that, and the feelings are the same.<sup>71</sup>

Feelings of (homo)erotic desire will necessarily arise in the intimate interactions of the military. But, as the lieutenant implies, these feelings of desire must also be repressed to some extent, so that soldiers can focus on their mission rather than on their personal pleasures.

However, when the military chooses to use misogynistic and homophobic tactics as a way of repressing homoerotic feelings that may arise, it produces an *armed masculinity* that is very precariously constructed against, as well as being hostile toward, femininity and homoeroticism. In that kind of military, women and gays must be excluded -- a situation that is unacceptable in a democratic country.

The presence of women and/or gays in the military functions to highlight the homoerotic aspects of necessary military practices. When biological women are present, traditional military education and training practices suddenly appear sexualized. "The adversative method which pits male against male . . . would not produce the same results when a male is set against a female," argues VMI.<sup>72</sup> "Cross-sexual confrontation and interaction introduces additional elements of stress and distraction which are not accommodated by VMI's methodology."<sup>73</sup> And they are right. The tenor of "the adversative method" changes when women participate. Imagine if an upper-class man treated a female "rat" in the same aggressive, misogynistic, and homophobic way he treats a male "rat." He would look a lot like a sexual harasser -- at best. Now imagine if an upper-class woman treated a male "rat" in the traditional way. She would look a lot like a dominatrix. Without the physical presence of biological women, military men can pretend that sexual desire plays no role in their practices. As VMI argues, "at an all-male college,



adolescent males benefit from being able to focus exclusively on the work at hand, without the intrusion of any sexual tension."<sup>74</sup> In any event, some traditional military practices look significantly different when the group is sexually mixed.

Routine military practices begin to look like sexual harassment when women are involved. Lieutenant Colonel T. Nugent Courvoisie, former assistant commandant at the Citadel told his wife that women should not be admitted because if they are, "there's going to be sexual harassment." In response, his wife aptly quipped, "Oh, honey, those cadets are harassing each other right now, all the time." The lieutenant colonel fired right back: "That's different. That's standard operating procedure."<sup>75</sup> And it is.

Now it is plausible that one might argue that despite their sexually harassing nature, many of the traditional military educational strategies are necessary to create the intense kind of bonding required in a combat situation. This is not my argument, but it is plausible. However, other practices commonly used at the Citadel are completely indefensible. For example, an English professor at the Citadel argues that "if Shannon were in my class, I'd be fired by March for sexual harassment. . . . I've dealt with young men all my life. I know how to play with them. I have the freedom here to imply things I couldn't with women. I don't want to have to watch what I say."<sup>76</sup> What

does he mean? Well, this professor likes to chastise his students for using the passive voice, by way of the following: "Never use the passive voice -- it leads to effeminacy and homosexuality. . . . Next time you use the passive voice I'm going to make you lift up your limp wrist."<sup>77</sup> This pedagogical method clearly serves no necessary military function.

Although the process the military academies use to produce masculine citizen-soldiers requires the repression and exclusion of femininity, it also needs femininity. Femininity must exist so that it can be excluded and repressed. Because no biological women can be present, however, men must take turns standing in for the absent women. For example, one of the sailors interviewed by Zeeland says that while out at sea, he played the "Sea Bitch": "I was called the sea bitch. That's just someone who -- I think it's just a way for straight men who have gay tendencies to let some of their frustration out. Because if they're saying stuff toward me, it's nothing serious, 'cause I'm the sea bitch, right? And if there was no sea bitch then they couldn't say it. . . . People would come up to me and say, 'I'm gonna fuck you tonight. I'll pay a visit to your rack.'"<sup>78</sup> Masculine soldiers can establish their aggressive domination over women by menacing the "sea bitch." A Citadel alumnus told Faludi that the traditional indoctrination processes used at the Citadel entail "a submerged gender battle, a bitter but definitely fixed

contest between the sexes, concealed from view by the fact that men played both parts. The beaten knobs were the women, 'stripped' and humiliated, and the predatory upperclassmen were the men, who bullied and pillaged. . . . [They cast] the male knobs in all the subservient feminine roles."<sup>79</sup>

The process productive of *armed masculinity*, as we have been describing it, gives rise to both the valorization of the fantasy of Woman and the vilification of actual women. Both Faludi and Moser discovered this dual view of women in their interviews with military men. For example, Moser found that "the sexual strategy of boot camp portrayed conventional feminine stereotypes as the polar opposite of the fighter-spirit" and that these stereotypes remain "abstract ideals."<sup>80</sup> However, actual women -- "girlfriends, wives, and mothers were commonly presented as sexually perverse. Woman soldiers too were stereotyped as 'whores or lesbians.'"<sup>81</sup> Likewise, Faludi learned that "the acknowledged policy [of the Citadel] is that women are to be kept at a distance so they can be 'respected' as ladies." As senior regimental commander, Norman Doucet explains, "the absence of women makes us understand them better." However, as Faludi documents, "women at less of a remove fare less well." Citing examples of disrespectfulness, sexual harassment, threats, and overt violence, Faludi concludes that "the Citadel men's approach to women seems to toggle between extremes of gentility and fury."<sup>82</sup> And, of course,

"Tailhook" can be seen as a quintessential example of what *armed masculinity* yields.

### **Reconstituting the Citizen-Soldier**

The kind of *armed masculinity* we have been discussing presents a danger to women gay men, and lesbians, as well as to democratic citizenship. Clearly, we do not want to reinvigorate the Citizen-Soldier tradition in this country, if it means reattaching a destructive, misogynistic, and homophobic, *armed masculinity* onto citizenship.

Nevertheless, there are two reasons why we should not reject the Citizen-Soldier tradition *in toto*. First of all, this tradition provides us with a democratic legacy through which we can strive to reform the military and purge it of misogyny and homophobia -- neither of which is essential to military effectiveness. Second, to reject the Citizen-Soldier tradition in its entirety would be to give up on the American tradition that anchors our calls for a more participatory form of citizenship -- civic republicanism. The ideal of substantive popular sovereignty, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three, comes directly out of the civic republican tradition, which has at its center the Citizen-Soldier ideal. Because we have moved beyond the grand foundationalist fictions of modernity and into a postmodern era, it becomes harder for us to ground our normative claims. For this reason, it is useful to work within an

already existing tradition. Despite its many risks, the Citizen-Soldier tradition contains democratic elements, the revival of which could greatly improve citizenship and democracy in America.

I want to rework the Citizen-Soldier tradition of civic republicanism because it presents us with a tradition of participatory citizenship and a commitment to universalizable principles. Right now in America, we are sorely lacking the idea that we should have government for the common good. We no longer have a common civic identity or a commitment to the commonweal. We do not have these essential prerequisites for government aimed at the common good because we do not engage together in civic practices. Within the historic tradition of civic republicanism, as we have seen, diverse individuals -- not diverse by today's standards, but each self-interested and unique in his own way -- became citizens as they engaged together in civic practices. And while multicultural America presents more of a challenge, I believe it would be productive to consider the ways in which engagement together in civic practices today might constitute our diverse peoples as American citizens in a substantive, participatory republican sense.

Although the Citizen-Soldier tradition contains both virtues and vices, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, I believe we can reconfigure the tradition in order to benefit from its virtues, while simultaneously minimizing its vices. This reworking entails five key

elements. First we need to rid the military of misogynistic and homophobic hazing. The production of effective soldiers does not require such tactics. Camaraderie -- a non-gendered version of fraternity -- can be constructed without falling back on simple yet undemocratic and ultimately destructive methods. For example, many women's sports teams achieve the camaraderie and common identity necessary for effective functioning without resorting to misogyny and homophobia.

Moreover, in the military of a democratic country, we cannot permit the identity of Soldier to be constituted in hostile opposition to the majority of citizens. The American military is supposed to be subordinate to civilian officials who are supposed to be accountable to the citizens of this country -- including women, gay men, and lesbians. Consequently, we cannot permit the military to instill or bolster misogyny and homophobia.

And finally, in a country founded on a commitment to universalizable principles, we cannot bar certain groups of citizens from participating fully in defense of their homeland and way of life. VMI and the Citadel are right that the admission of women to their institutions would destroy their long-standing traditions. And that is a good thing. While a single-sex publicly funded military education may or may not be beneficial for those it serves, such exclusionary institutions are simply unacceptable in a democracy.

One of the major risks of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, as we have seen both in this chapter and in our discussion in Chapter Two, is an overemphasis on fusion, homogeneity, and the construction of a totalizing common identity that replaces all more particularistic identities. One easy way men fuse with each other and forge a unitary and totalizing identity is through the exclusion of women. While we can never completely eliminate the risk posed by the vicious side of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, we do not have to engage in practices meant to encourage these vices. And that is what misogynistic and homophobic hazing practices do: They facilitate the creation of the worst vices of the Citizen-Soldier tradition -- fusion, homogeneity, and a totalizing identity.

The second element necessary to the reconstitution of the Citizen-Soldier tradition involves a shift from military service to military service. Traditionally, military service played a key role in the constitution of republican citizenship because it was military service that instilled in individuals the virtues necessary for self-government for the common good -- selflessness, courage, camaraderie, patriotism, and civic virtue. What I am advocating is a shift from the military part of this idea to the service part. On this point I join other democratic theorists, such as Benjamin R. Barber and Charles Moskos who advocate the expansion of the Citizen-Soldier tradition to include national or civic service. "Universal citizen service,"

Barber argues, "could offer many of the undisputed virtues of military service: fellowship and camaraderie, common activity, teamwork, service for and with others, and a sense of community." But while citizen service would offer the virtues of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, it would also minimize its corresponding vices: "Yet in place of military hierarchy, it could offer equality; in place of obedience, cooperation; and in place of us/them conflict of the kind generated by parochial participation, a sense of mutuality and national interdependence."<sup>83</sup> Building on Barber's work, Moskos presents a realistic and detailed plan for the "reconstruction of the citizen-soldier."<sup>84</sup> Replacing military service with a broader vision of civic service would facilitate the inclusion of all Americans in the practices constitutive of republican citizenship and would downplay the risks of fusion, homogeneity, and construction of a totalizing identity.

Moreover, shifting from an emphasis on military to an emphasis on service supports a rearticulation of citizenship as a set of practices rather than a category of identity. Nationalistic military service requires the constitution of a deep sense of civic identity. To wage war, one must strongly identify as a member of a "people." Civic service does not require the same depth of identification. Participation in a wide variety of civic practices as one part of one's life produces a lighter, less totalizing form of identity that simply sits on top of other more deeply



rooted, particular identities. Engagement in civic practices could constitute individuals as American citizens but not as purely American and nothing else.<sup>85</sup>

The third element in my plan to reconstitute the Citizen-Soldier tradition requires instituting a program of civic education in all military training. Instead of military service being the primary form of civic education, civic education should become a primary part of military service. If individuals want to bear arms in defense of America, they need to know exactly what they are defending, exactly what America stands for. While a lot of debate exists around this question, I join a whole host of democratic theorists who underline the centrality of universalizable principles, democratic republican ideals, and the concept of popular sovereignty to what America means.

The fourth element involves remembering the view of civil-military relations inherent in the ideal of the Citizen-Soldier. Traditionally, this ideal fused the militia onto the civic realm of republican self-rule. The Soldier who risked his life to defend the republic was also the Citizen who participated in forming laws for the common good. Both halves of the Citizen-Soldier ideal were equally important: Citizen-soldiers fought to defend their ability to govern themselves for the common good through the rule of law. In other words, the Citizen-Soldier ideal does not mean simply that citizens comprise the military. Normative

rather than empirical, the Citizen-Soldier embodies a commitment to civic republicanism, complete with all its ideals: liberty, equality, fraternity, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.

While the realities of contemporary politics have necessitated a move away from a reliance on a system of citizens' militias and toward a professionalized, technologically trained military, we have not abandoned the American understanding of the Citizen-Soldier tradition: that the military should be subordinate to elected civilian officials who should be accountable to the American citizenry. Within this context, I am advocating a resuscitation of American citizenship to include more substantive participation in government. Whether or not we wage war or send troops to participate in U.N. peace-keeping projects should be decided through civic deliberation among citizens. This is the true spirit of the Citizen-Soldier tradition. That is why Moser rightly argues that the Vietnam war resisters were the real citizen-soldiers of that era because they advocated citizen control over military decision-making. They wanted to reattach participatory citizenship to military service.<sup>86</sup>

My final suggestion for reconstituting the Citizen-Soldier tradition entails seizing the radical opportunities for "gender trouble" presented by a tradition that contains a performative understanding of civic and gender identity. In order to do this, we must, first, replace *armed*

*masculinity* with a new form of *civic masculinity*, and second, make "gender trouble" by encouraging biological females to engage in the practices constitutive of *civic masculinity*. Simultaneously, we should encourage biological males to participate in the practices of a revitalized *robust femininity*. In this way we can realize the radical democratic potential for troubling the sex/gender system inherent in the civic republican tradition as I have reread it in this study.

What I am suggesting is that "masculinity" and "femininity" are sets of practices rather than embodied identities. Therefore, any individual could engage in either masculine or feminine practices, and that, moreover, engagement in transgender practices contributes to the "troubling" of hegemonic gender ideals. While we may eventually move beyond the use of these gendered terms, I am holding onto them for now in order to highlight the "gender trouble" aspect of my project. That is to say, I am calling for "women" to engage in civic practices that have historically been considered "masculine" in order to foreground the constructedness of gender. Labeling civic republican practices in a non-gendered way would eliminate the possibility of *subversive transgender performances* -- and would also simply gloss over the fact that certain practices have been gendered "masculine" for thousands of years.

The Citizen-Soldier is constituted through engagement in civic and martial practices. Historically, these practices have also been constitutive of masculinity, and so women did not participate in them. However, if masculinity is a cultural construct, rather than a natural attribute of biological males, theoretically female individuals should be able to participate in these practices and become citizen-soldiers alongside men. "Women's" transgressive engagement in traditional "masculine" practices would highlight the artificiality of gender and thus undermine the idea that "masculinity" and "femininity" are natural attributes of biological males and females respectively, the idea which underlies the sex/gender system and the sexism it generates. In Butler's words, "a dissonant and denaturalized performance . . . reveals the performative status of the natural itself." Instead of being restricted by sexist societal imperatives, individuals would be free to perform whatever gender identity they might desire. "The loss of gender norms would have the effect of proliferating gender configurations, destabilizing substantive identity, and depriving the naturalizing narratives of compulsory heterosexuality of their central protagonists: 'man' and 'woman.'"<sup>87</sup> In other words, a radical democratic moment exists in "women" acting "like men" (and vice versa).

However, this radical democratic possibility of gender trouble cannot be realized when the practices constitutive of masculine soldiers are inherently misogynistic and

homophobic. Women, gay men, and lesbians cannot be included in an *armed masculinity* constituted through the denigration of femininity and homoeroticism. This forms yet another reason to eliminate misogynistic and homophobic hazing practices from the military and lift the combat exclusion: so that we can make gender trouble.

So, instead of continuing to create *armed masculinity* and trying to re-attach it to a resuscitated participatory citizenship, we should strive to create a new form of masculinity, called *civic masculinity*, which all people, male and female, can perform. Again, maintaining the term "masculine" and calling for the participation of female individuals in its practices highlights the destabilization of gender ideals that have historically prevented "women's" participation in republican citizenship. Eliminating the terms "masculine" and "feminine" altogether, while eventually the goal, at this point would truncate the radical democratic potential to make "gender trouble" in a tradition that entails a performative theory of civic identity.

As I am imagining it, *civic masculinity* would entail the virtues, capacities, and pleasures traditionally associated with citizenship and the political sphere -- where ideally all citizens would participate in the forming of political judgments within a context of universalizable republican principles, such as liberty, equality, and the rule of law. As a counterpart to this, I imagine a *robust*

*femininity* that encompasses the virtues, capacities, and pleasures traditionally associated with the personal, domestic, and erotic spheres -- such as, nurturance, love, reproduction, spirituality, eroticism, playfulness, and the special attachments we reserve for particular people -- all of which should be protected from political incursions. All people, both male and female, would become both *civically masculine* and *robustly feminine*, as all would participate as citizens in political rule and in the personal realm with those with whom they choose to make their lives. This radical reconfiguration of the sex/gender system would undermine the idea that female individuals should not participate fully in civic practices, as well as the idea that male individuals do not have to participate fully in domestic affairs.

### **Reentering the Civic Public**

Between the political sphere of participatory citizenship and the personal sphere of individual autonomy sits civil society. Partly public and partly private, civil society constitutes the realm in which individuals engage in the civic practices that produce both the common civic identity and the virtues which form the foundation of republican self-rule -- as well as in other practices related to their other more particular identities. I want to stress that I am not advocating a common civic identity

to replace all other identities. We should not have to renounce our particular affiliations as a prerequisite to participation in civic practices. We should not have to abstract from our particularities and participate as a non-gendered, non-raced, non-classed Citizen. Instead, we must enter the civic process from where we stand. It is only through actually engaging with others that can we participate in the construction of a shared vision. In other words, I am suggesting that we shift away from the idea of citizenship as an identity and begin to reconceptualize it instead as participation in a set of civic practices.

While I obviously want to maintain many of the ideals of modernity -- such as, universalizable principles, rational laws, a neutral state, and a private sphere of personal autonomy free from government incursion -- I also want to avoid a radical dichotomy between reason/emotion and public/private. That is to say, while we probably want to be governed by rational laws, we need to be able to consider emotions when making reasonable political judgments. Some emotions should be considered in political discussions and given moral weight, such as feelings of sympathy, compassion, generosity, and mercy, for example. Even potentially dangerous emotions, such as feelings of fear, anger, outrage, and resentment, should weigh into political discussions, so that they can be tempered by reasoned deliberation. The emotions cannot and must not be

completely discounted in politics. However, they must be interrogated via reasoned conversation, reflected upon, and evaluated within the parameters of a commitment to universalizable republican principles. Furthermore, while I want to maintain a private sphere of personal autonomy, I do not want to ban all so-called "private" or "personal" issues from the political conversation -- issues concerning sexual harassment, rape, and incest, for example. These political problems must be deliberated upon, just like any other political issues.

One of the virtues of the civic republican tradition, as I have shown throughout this study, is that it gives the passions a constructive role to play in politics. That is to say, in order to be able to govern for the common good, a person must become emotionally attached to his (or her) community. On this point, I would argue, Iris Marion Young and Joan Landes misunderstand the civic republican tradition. In her discussion of the civic public, Young criticizes Jean-Jacques Rousseau and by extension the civic republican tradition for "instituting a moral division of labor between reason and sentiment, identifying masculinity with reason and femininity with sentiment and desire. . . . By assuming that reason stands opposed to desire, affectivity and the body, the civic public must exclude bodily and affective aspects of human existence." This dichotomy profoundly affects citizenship, she continues, because it results in the exclusion "from the public [of]



those individuals and groups that do not fit the model of the rational citizen who can transcend body and sentiment."<sup>88</sup> Landes makes a similar argument in her analysis of the Rousseauian "public sphere."<sup>89</sup> In opposition to these faulty characterizations of the civic republican tradition, I have demonstrated, particularly in Chapter Two, that passion, pleasure, and desire are not in fact purged from the civic public sphere. Instead, they play a key role in civic republicanism: they are channeled into the civic virtues of patriotism, fraternity, and concern for the common good; these feelings underwrite the willingness and ability of individuals to govern themselves in accordance with the common good.

I also disagree with Landes and Young on the issue of whether the civic republican concept of the "public sphere" or "civic public" are inherently masculine constructs. Landes argues that in its inception the "public sphere" -- the sphere in which citizens engage in civic deliberation -- was formed against and not just without women. While this is undoubtedly true historically, as I myself have argued in previous chapters, I disagree with Landes's conclusion: That the public sphere requires women's exclusion. In her words, a public sphere based on "reason was counterposed to femininity, if by the latter we mean (as contemporaries did) pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style, politesse, refined facades, and particularity."<sup>90</sup> Because the public sphere excludes "femininity," Landes argues, it can never

include women; it is essentially masculine. Taking issue with those who argue that previously masculine categories can now be extended to include previously excluded groups, she states that "the claim that the 'modernity' inaugurated in part by the French Revolution has 'not yet' exhausted its liberatory potential is ... suspect. In the historically oriented critique of the public sphere here projected, this claim can never be redeemed, for the women's movement cannot 'take possession' of a public sphere that has been enduringly reconstructed along masculinist lines."<sup>91</sup> And Young agrees."<sup>92</sup>

Both Landes and Young argue that the civic republican tradition necessarily excludes women -- even in the late twentieth century -- because its very categories are constructed against women and not just without them. But this seems to imply some sort of essentialist thinking about gender. That is, while both Landes and Young clearly understand the constructedness of gender -- and demonstrate the ways in which gender is constructed -- they seem to imply that biological males and females are inextricably bound to particular historical constructions of masculinity and femininity respectively. For example, when Landes argues that concept of the *public sphere* was constructed against femininity and by extension against women, and that therefore the public sphere can never encompass women, she implies that women are inextricably linked to a "femininity" defined as "pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style,

politesse, refined facades, and particularity." While she convincingly argues that the eighteenth century public sphere was in fact constructed against and not just without a culturally defined femininity, this does not mean, I would argue, that therefore biological females can never be included in the public sphere. To the contrary, the idea of social construction means that what is constructed can be reconstructed -- a point both Landes and Young would surely have to concede on the basis of their own arguments about the constructedness of gender. Therefore, the socially constructed linkages of "woman" with a "femininity" defined as the private, the particular, and the passionate and of "man" with a "masculinity" defined as the public, the universal, and the reasonable, while undoubtedly strong ones in our culture, can, nevertheless, be broken. That is to say, if gender is culturally constructed then "women" are not inextricably bound to any particular historically constructed articulation of "femininity" -- no matter how entrenched.

The cultural meaning of "femininity" as "pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style, politesse, refined facades, and particularity" does not follow automatically from biological female sex. Instead, as I have been arguing, it is the engagement in feminine practices and the lack of engagement in masculine practices that actually produces "women" whose existence then confirms the "naturalness" of this cultural construction. Likewise, the

engagement of biological males in civic and martial practices actually produces masculine citizen-soldiers. This understanding of the performative construction of categories of identity, such as "men," "women," and "citizen-soldier," opens up a space in which these constructions can be contested and transformed.

In a tradition that conflates masculinity and citizenship, the attempts of "women" to engage in civic practices constitutes transgressive behavior. It is my contention that the culturally constructed categories of "femininity" and "masculinity" can be contested and (at least partially) transformed through the transgressive behavior and performance of non-normative gender roles -- by *subversive transgender performances*. If "masculinity" is defined as what is appropriate to the political sphere -- as Landes demonstrates it was at the dawn of modernity -- and "femininity" is defined as what is excluded from the political sphere, this does not mean that biological females must necessarily be excluded from the political sphere. Instead, it means that we must sever the link between biological males and "masculinity" and between biological females and "femininity." In order for this to happen, all people need to engage in the practices of our new configurations of *civic masculinity* and *robust femininity*.

Again, the reason I want to hold onto the term "masculine" when referring to civic virtues, capacities, and pleasures is because doing so allows room for the *subversive*

*transgender performances* that will undermine the sex/gender system and the sexism it generates. This means that biological females should be encouraged to participate in the democratically reformed military I have advocated above. As an additional benefit, this should help the country get the best military personnel it can. As Elshtain argues in *Women and War*, allowing full female participation in the military by lifting the combat restriction -- and eliminating misogynistic and homophobic practices -- is "one way to relocate male and female selves to provide for a freer play of individual and civic capacities."<sup>93</sup> One of the things Elshtain wants is to "free up identities, offering men and women the opportunity to share risks as citizens," and, if they want, "to take up non-violence as a choice, not a given" based on their biology.<sup>94</sup> Like Elshtain, I want all individuals -- "men" and "women" -- to participate equally in civic practices. However, unlike Elshtain, I would not consider this vision of "women's" participation one of the "several ways to occupy the category *woman*."<sup>95</sup> Instead, I would consider it a way to blow apart the categories of *woman* and *man* and thus clear the way for the "proliferation of gender" and the participation of all people, as citizens, in the civic republican dream of liberty, equality, camaraderie, the rule of law, the common good, civic virtue, and participatory citizenship.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in *United State v. Commonwealth of Virginia* 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1410.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in "'Save the Males' Becomes Battle Cry in Citadel's Defense Against Woman," *New York Times*, 23 May 1994.

<sup>3</sup> For women's struggle to bear arms, see Darline Levy and Harriet B. Applewhite, "Women and Militant Citizenship in Revolutionary Paris," in *Rebel Daughters: Women and the French Revolution*, eds. Sara E. Mezler and Leslie W. Rabine (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); "Women, Radicalization and the Fall of the French Monarchy," in *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*, eds., Harriet B. Applewhite and Darline Levy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993); and Dominique Godineau, "Masculine and Feminine Political Practice during the French Revolution, 1793-Year III," in *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*. For women who dressed as men to serve in the military, see Julie Wheelwright, *Amazons and Military Maids: Women Who Dressed as Men in Pursuit of Life, Liberty and Happiness* (London: Pandora Press, 1989). Also see Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 120.

<sup>4</sup> The entire quote is as follows: "If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of 'men' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that 'women' will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question), there is not reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two. The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that *man* and *masculine* might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and a *woman* and *feminine* a male body as easily as a female one." Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc., 1990), 6.

<sup>5</sup> "The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by which they are generated." *Ibid.*, 145.

<sup>6</sup> Butler advocates the "parodic proliferation and subversive play of gendered meanings." She begins the "effort to think through the possibility of subverting and displaying those naturalized and reified notions of gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power, to make gender trouble, not through the strategies that figure a utopian beyond, but through the mobilization, subversive confusion, and proliferation of precisely those constitutive categories that seek to keep gender in its place by posturing as the foundational illusions of identity." *Ibid.*, 33-34.

<sup>7</sup> "The site of a dissonant and denaturalized performance that reveals the performative status of the natural itself. . . . The loss of gender norms would have the effect of proliferating gender configurations, destabilizing substantive identity, and depriving the naturalizing narratives of compulsory heterosexuality of their central protagonists: 'man' and 'woman.'" Ibid., 146.

<sup>8</sup> "The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and , therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them." Ibid., 147.

<sup>9</sup> "The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed, to repeat and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to *displace* the very gender norms that enable the repetitions itself. . . . Cultural configurations of sex and gender might then proliferate or, rather, their present proliferation might then become articulable within the discourses that establish intelligible cultural life, confounding the very binarism of sex, and exposing its fundamental unnaturalness." Ibid., 148-149.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the role candidates' military service plays during political campaigns, see Sheila Tobias, "Shifting Heroisms: The Uses of Military Service in Politics," in *Women, Militarism, and War: Essays in History, Politics, and Social Theory*, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sheila Tobias (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990).

<sup>11</sup> Cynthia Enloe, "Beyond 'Rambo': Women and the Varieties of Militarized Masculinity," in *Women and the Military System*, ed. Eva Isaksson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

<sup>12</sup> Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

<sup>13</sup> For Carol Gilligan's classic work, see *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

<sup>14</sup> Betty Reardon, *Sexism and the War System* (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1985), 89.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>16</sup> For another example of this approach, see Jacklyn Cock, *Colonels and Cadres: War and Gender in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991).

<sup>17</sup> Enloe, "Beyond 'Rambo', 73-4.

<sup>18</sup> Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, 212.

<sup>19</sup> Cynthia Enloe, "Bananas, Bases, and Patriarchy." In *Women, Militarism, and War*.

<sup>20</sup> Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, 212.

<sup>21</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 206-207.

<sup>22</sup> Judith Butler, "Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig and Foucault." In *Feminism As Critique*, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 139.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 142, 140.

<sup>24</sup> For my disagreement with Elshtain's reading of the Citizen-Soldier tradition, see Chapter Two of this work.

<sup>25</sup> Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), 4.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

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- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 16.
- <sup>28</sup> Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You?*, 119.
- <sup>29</sup> Enloe, *The Morning After*, 51.
- <sup>30</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1439.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 1441.
- <sup>32</sup> See "Women without Hair: Lost or Found?" *New York Times*, 7 August 1994; "Judge Allows Head Shaving of a Woman at the Citadel," *New York Times*, 1 August 1995; "Storming the Citadel," *USA Weekend*, 28-30 July 1995; "Judge Rules the Citadel May Shave Woman's Head," *New York Times*, 10 August 1995; and "A Woman Reports for Duty as a Cadet at the Citadel," *New York Times*, 13 August 1995.
- <sup>33</sup> Sanford M. Dornbusch, "The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution," *Social Forces* 33 (1955), 317.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> See Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: BasicBooks, 1996).
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 318.
- <sup>37</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1441.
- <sup>38</sup> Susan Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," *The New Yorker*, 1994.
- <sup>39</sup> *U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia*, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), 1239.
- <sup>40</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1421.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 1424.
- <sup>42</sup> *Shannon Richey Faulkner v. James E. Jones, Jr.*, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), 229.
- <sup>43</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Cadet," 64.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., 1422, emphasis mine.
- <sup>45</sup> *U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia*, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), 1239.
- <sup>46</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1423.
- <sup>47</sup> Faludi, "Naked Citadel," 64.
- <sup>48</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1423.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 1427.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 1424.
- <sup>51</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 64.
- <sup>52</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1427.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 1425, 1413
- <sup>54</sup> See Richard R. Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam Era* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), ch. 2; Faludi, "The Naked Citadel;" and Steven Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexuality: Crossing the Line Between 'Straight' and 'Gay' in the U.S. Navy* (New York: The Haworth Press, 1995).
- <sup>55</sup> Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers*, 26-27.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., 29, emphasis mine.
- <sup>57</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1422.
- <sup>58</sup> A young midshipman at the United States Naval Academy confirmed that misogyny and homophobia are still strong at the USNA. Personal conversation, 27 October 1995.
- <sup>59</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 70.
- <sup>60</sup> As Moser puts it, "the obsessive drive to create and maintain machismo drew upon an insatiable insecurity that may be momentarily slaked only by a display of domination against some threat," *The New Winter Soldiers*, 28.



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- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., 29.
- <sup>62</sup> Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexual Identity*, 57-58.
- <sup>63</sup> Wilhelm Reich, *Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970), 31.
- <sup>64</sup> Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexual Identity*, 5.
- <sup>65</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 79.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 80.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexual Identity*, 5.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid., 5-6.
- <sup>70</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 79.
- <sup>71</sup> Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexual Identity*, 65.
- <sup>72</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va.*, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), 1233.
- <sup>73</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va.*, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), 896.
- <sup>74</sup> *U.S. v. Com. of Va.*, 766 F.Supp. 1407 (W.D.Va 1991), 1435, emphasis mine.
- <sup>75</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 78.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., 78-9.
- <sup>78</sup> Zeeland, *Sailors and Sexual Identity*, 50.
- <sup>79</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 70.
- <sup>80</sup> Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers*, 27-28.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., 28.
- <sup>82</sup> Faludi, "The Naked Citadel," 70.
- <sup>83</sup> Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 302.
- <sup>84</sup> Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1988).
- <sup>85</sup> For an interesting discussion of this idea, see Michael Walzer, *What It Means To Be an American: Essays on the American Experience* (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1996). I am also indebted to Linda Zerilli for this point. Personal conversation, 28 October 1996.
- <sup>86</sup> Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers*.
- <sup>87</sup> Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 146.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., 66.
- <sup>89</sup> See Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988).
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., 46, emphasis mine.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid., 202, emphasis mine.
- <sup>92</sup> Young, "Impartiality and the Civic Public," 66.
- <sup>93</sup> Elshtain, *Women and War*, 244.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid., 257.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid., 232.

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- 1984-1986 Smith College, B.A. *cum laude*, Psychology
- 1988-1997 Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Ph.D., Political Science
  
- 1986-1987 Case manager at Fame Haven, Fame Charities, Inc.
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- 1988-1992 Excellence Fellow, Rutgers University
- 1992-1993 Coordinator, Walt Whitman Center for the Culture and Politics of Democracy
- 1993-1995 Whitman-Kettering Research Fellow, The Kettering Foundation
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