

THE FIRST IMAGE REVERSED: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GENDER POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

by

DENISE MARIE HORN

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-New Brunswick

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy


Graduate Program in

Political Science

written under the direction of

Professor Edward J. Rhodes

and approved by

Four handwritten signatures are written on four horizontal lines. The signatures are in cursive and appear to be: 1. A signature that looks like 'E. J. Rhodes'. 2. A signature that looks like 'J. E. Rhodes'. 3. A signature that looks like 'J. E. Rhodes'. 4. A signature that looks like 'Muneder'.

New Brunswick, New Jersey

October 2005

UMI Number: 3195690

Copyright 2005 by
Horn, Denise Marie

All rights reserved.

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3195690

Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

© 2005

Denise Marie Horn

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE FIRST IMAGE REVERSED: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GENDER POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

by DENISE MARIE HORN

Dissertation Director:
Professor Edward J. Rhodes

My research finds that US policy makers impact the domestic policy of states in democratic transition, not only through direct influence, but through funding those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are involved in building civil society. Using comparative case study methods, I examine US funded women's NGOs in Estonia and Moldova to determine the impact of this funding on how these women perceive their role in the state and in their respective societies, and further, how these changed perceptions affect domestic politics within those states. The research also evaluates the intentions of US policy makers in creating these types of programs, using in-depth interviews and analysis of primary sources. The research finds that US foreign policy affects civil society in transitional states by determining the language of civil society, the goals of NGOs and their programs, and shapes the terms of civil society debates.

In terms of International Relations theory, this work fills a gap in the studies of democratization that neglect the importance of individual security, but it does so with a feminist understanding of what constitutes security and participation in civil society. This project also questions common assumptions regarding the nature of security, democracy as a palliative for global conflict, the place of the individual with respect to resolving these conflicts, and the position of women within this context.

DEDICATION

For Kitty. Thank you.

Acknowledgements

This has not been an easy journey. Aside from the normal growing pains of graduate students—the course work, the mind-numbing anxiety—I managed to also take on so many other responsibilities that I often forgot what my main responsibility was supposed to be—writing this dissertation. Luckily I was driven to the point of exasperation, exhaustion, and despair which began to put things into perspective; a year without funding and teaching as an adjunct for miserable pay finally convinced me that I should either finish the dissertation or jump ship. And for that, I suppose I am grateful, although I don't recommend that particular path if it can be avoided. That being said, I do not mean to sound ungrateful for the opportunities that I have been given. An award from the Rutgers University Porte Fund came just in time to finance my field work in Estonia, and my enthusiasm for personal involvement in interesting projects paid off in allowing me to work in Moldova. Thus, I do recommend getting involved in the unconventional projects, especially if airfare is provided.

This work would not have been possible without the willingness of so many interesting, insightful, and dedicated people to work with me, both at home and abroad. In Estonia, I was lucky to know several incredibly talented feminists who see nothing but possibilities for their country—I would especially like to thank Ilvi Jõe-Cannon, the director of the Women's Resource Center (ENUT) for taking me under her wing. She was an inspiration in her determination to bring democracy—and women's equality—to Estonia. I feel that Moldova has become a second home, with so many friends there to welcome me every time I return. Members of my Moldovan family, the Şişians, are among the most loving, generous souls I have ever met. I am eternally grateful for the

home, the boisterous family meals (complete with delicious home wine!), and the support they have provided me over the past year; I could not have completed my field work without them. I'm looking forward to continuing visits and watching the family grow.

At home, the list of acknowledgements is impossibly long. For the past seven years, the Political Science department of Rutgers University has been my source for intellectual stimulation, for work, and for friends. I doubt a more collegial and congenial department for graduate students is possible. Among those I count as mentors, I would like to thank Ed Rhodes for modeling academic discipline, excellent teaching skills, and grace under fire; I hope to be such a model for my students some day. Ed's groundbreaking work on the Northern European Initiative and his conference on the topic serve as the basis of this dissertation—not to mention his particular (and personal) interest in Estonia, a country I probably would never have seen otherwise! I would also like to thank Ed for standing up for me on numerous occasions, for being firm with me when necessary, and for tolerating my superfluous use of quotation marks.

Michael Shafer showed me the possibilities of the global classroom through his unflagging efforts in the messy work of creating “civil society”; I am especially thankful for the opportunity to work on the Civic Engagement Program at the State University of Moldova. Leela Fernandes' work continually stuns and inspires me, and I am so thankful for her help and comments on early drafts of this project, not to mention her guidance on that terrifying specter called “fieldwork.” Jan Kubik's gentle advice in the early stages of this project steered me clear of a potential monster (read: impossible) dissertation; his ongoing intellectual explorations of the problems of civil society have been refreshing and rewarding to read. Joanna Regulska's fierce determination to bring women's issues

to the forefront of global politics has been a constant reminder to me of what is possible to do in this sometimes restrictive world called academia.

As for friends and colleagues, there are so many, and I hope they know who they are, especially the wonderful band of feminist scholars who have been the backbone of my graduate experience: Jennifer Schenk Sacco, Isabelle V. Barker, Melissa (Uncle) Brown, Jennifer Einspahr, Kate Bedford, Nichole Shippen, Helen Delfeld, Undarya Tumursukh, and Michele Ruiters. Every one of these exceptional women will make our messy discipline—and our respective societies—much more welcoming to future generations of women. My “IR Guys”—Bill Mabe and Martin Edwards—pulled me through my coursework and exams with good advice, great humor, and lots of wine and beer; Bill has been especially entertaining ever since. A special mention, however, is reserved for Jonathon DiCicco, my dear friend, chief editor, critic, conference partner, office mate, and lunch time support group. Very few pieces of my work have gone out to the world without his advice and commentary—a chore for him, I’m sure, but for which I am forever in his debt. I take full responsibility for the mistakes and missteps in this work—many of which are a result of ignoring Jon’s sage advice.

Of course, I would like to acknowledge my family, ever my touchstone: Glenn and Colette Horn, my parents, who never asked me when I would have a real job, even when they made up titles to tell their friends. I have been blessed by the values my parents taught us, which continue to serve me well—traveling to understand, not just to be a tourist, accepting differences, and simply being joyful. My father’s long service in the military and the effects on my life and the life of our family has always informed my work, as I try to understand the workings of the policy machine that continues to send

kids off to war while also—wonderfully—looking for ways to increase the peace.

Understanding my mother's experiences as a military wife have helped me think more carefully about the "militarization of women's lives" of which Cynthia Enloe writes so powerfully.

My sister and brother-in-law, Michelle and Todd Atchison, amuse the hell out of me, but also gave us all a reason to keep trying to make things better, little Hayden Glenn. Thanks to Michelle for all those phone calls while I made the long drive from one teaching gig to another, complaining about the dissertation all the way. My brother Daniel, continues to keep me fueled for yet another adventure abroad with his own swashbuckling stories; I did my best to dissuade him from going to graduate school, but he would not be deterred.

Katie and Bruce Ethridge, my mother and father-in-law, have been nothing but loving and supportive during this journey, and always offered a calm place at the beach to unwind and retrench. I would especially like to thank Katie for her wisdom, love, and utilizing her direct line to God on my behalf.

Although they are not my "family" in the literal sense, I'd like to thank my oldest and dearest friends, Marianne Linger and Bryan Gregory. Over the past 12 to 18 years, respectively, they have become such an integral part of my life, I can't imagine living without the wry wit and intellectual breadth with which they constantly entertain and astound me. And, they both keep me honest because they can—and remind me that they can—"remember when" (e.g., when I started this dissertation...).

But above all, my partner, Kitty Dare Ethridge, deserves the credit for the best years of my life. Thank you for seeing me through this dissertation, cheerfully and

lovingly, even when my progress was exasperatingly slow. Thank you for the silly times that remind me to be human, traveling the world with me, the wonderful meals you've prepared for us and for our family and friends, and for the home we've created together. I wouldn't—and couldn't—have done this without you.

Table of Contents

Abstract of the Dissertation	ii
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	ix
1. The First Image Reversed as Strategy and Model: Creating Pro-American Spaces	1
Introduction: Post Cold War International Politics and Democratization	3
Waltz's Images and the First Image Reversed Model	6
Culture, Ideology, and US Foreign Policy: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Individual Security	12
Culture, Ideology, and Foreign Policy Making	14
Destiny and Identity: Cultural and Ideological Development	17
Civil Society, Democratization, and Gender Politics: US Values and Culture in Policy Making	28
Gender, Language, and Power	36
The First Image Reversed as a Strategy of Foreign Policy Making	41
Research Design	52
Methodology and Case Selection	53
Interviews and Data Collection	56
Research Issues: Access, Language, and Elites	57
Chapter Outline	61
2. The Seeds of Freedom: US Policy and Democratization	64
The Seeds of Freedom: US Foreign Policy, Security, and Democratization	68
NATO Expansion and NEI	72
Creating the Northern Borders of a Free Europe: NEI	75
Identity and Security in the Baltics	79
“A Europe whole and free”: Identities and Shifting Borders	82
Identities and International Institutions: NEI, SEEI and Democratic Enlargement	84
Conclusion: NEI as a Model of Future Policies?	90
3. Setting the Agenda: US Foreign Policy and Gender Roles in Estonia	93
Introduction: Democratization and Civil Society in Estonia	93

US Foreign Policy and Democratization Efforts: The First Image Reversed	100
Comparing US and Nordic Gender Policies in the Baltic Region: New Strategies for Women	101
Speaking the Language: Funding Policy and Cultural Shifts	107
Setting the Agenda: Policy goals and Changing Roles	121
Conclusion: Gender Equality, Democratization, and the First Image Reversed	126
4. Moldova: Constructing Agency or Constructing Victims?	129
Introduction	129
Cultural Identity in Moldova: Tensions between East, West, and Historical Constructions	131
The Politics of Language and Culture	135
The Weakness of Civil Society	140
US Foreign Policy, Moldovan Civil Society, and the Creation of Gender Identities	146
Feminism and Women's Identity in Moldova	151
Conclusion: US Policy and Gender Constructions in Moldova	155
5. First Image Reversed: Universally Applicable or Culturally Specific?	
Conclusions and Evaluation of the Model	159
Case One: Belarus and "Selective Engagement"	163
Belarusian Civil Society and Government Resistance	164
Gender Politics in Belarus	170
Case Two: Poland and Civil Society	173
USAID Efforts and Poland's Tradition of Opposition	173
Women and the Democratic Transition in Poland	178
The Usefulness of the First Image Reversed: Soft Power on the Rise?	182
The Future of US Foreign Policy and the First Image Reversed Model	185
Fostering Pro-Americanism through US Foreign Policy	187
Appendix A: Preliminary Interview Questions	196
I. Interview Questions for US Foreign Service Officers	196
II. Interview Questions for Administrators of Women's NGOs	199
III. Interview Questions for NGO Participants	204
Bibliography	208
Curriculum Vita	232

Chapter One
The First Image Reversed as Strategy and Model: Creating Pro-American Spaces

“Seduction, Joseph Nye tells us, “is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive” (2004: x). Seduction is a subtle process: the seducer flatters, the seducer promises, the seducer suggests. The final seduction requires the seduced to acquiesce to the seducer’s requests, yet, at the same time, to see those requests as fulfilling his or her needs and desires. Such is the game of politics in the post-Westphalian international system, where seduction—rather than conquest—is much more acceptable and ultimately, more satisfying. The seducer offers the promise of democracy—and the peace and security enjoyed by more “developed” democratic states—and the seduced is flattered that these possibilities exist. I intend to tell the story of this seduction.

To frame this idea in less romantic terms, allow me to outline the foundation of my inquiry. US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been intent on shaping the institutions and character of post-Communist states to serve US needs by actively encouraging democratization. Clinton-era policies, such as the Democracy Network (DemNet) or the Northern European Initiative (NEI), emphasized a reliance upon the development of civil society to facilitate the transition to democracy in these transitional states. What is striking here is the tacit acknowledgement that the US could, and would, by-pass state interactions (that is, government to government), and instead use government to group or individual strategies. Using funding opportunities for NGOs, exchange programs, training programs, and other such “cultural outreach” programs, US policy makers hoped to use a few groups or individuals to motivate post-Communist states (and newly emerged states) to develop strong civil societies that would favor

democratic values, thus creating governments and states that could join the world of “free” societies.

What prompted the change in US policies from targeting elite politics to targeting individual and group activities on the subgovernmental level? How widespread is the use of these types of policies—and are they successful? Can these ideas be applied more generally? This puzzle guides my research, which explores the degree to which a hegemonic power can utilize NGOs as tools of foreign policy, and how successful this strategy has been or could be. The result is a framework I refer to as the “first image reversed” which is at once a strategy of international political socialization and a theoretical model, as I will explain below. This research traces the change in types of activities funded by the US and analyzes the degree of success of these retargeted US activities/policies toward democratizing states; in short, what this research traces is the promotion of pro-American policies in former Communist states through funding strategies. While the model suggests that these policies will ultimately change the foreign policies of other states, I use this study to focus upon the effects of US foreign funding on the intermediary variable, attitude change. The conclusions I draw here will be applied towards future projects that will make the link between changes in political and social attitudes and values, domestic policy change, and international politics more specifically.

This chapter will outline the First Image Reversed Model (FIRM) in its theoretical form as well as how it describes the workings of foreign policy strategies implemented by US policy makers. I begin with a brief introduction of the “first image reversed” model, which is framed by a discussion of Kenneth Waltz’s three “images” of international

relations, as outlined in Man, the State, and War (1959) and further expanded upon in Theory of International Politics (1979); this discussion establishes the relevance of the First Image Reversed model to the study of international relations. I will also address the underlying theoretical assumptions that guide this research: first, by tracing the effects of culture and ideology on American foreign policy-making and emphasizing constructivist and feminist approaches which privilege the position of the individual in global politics. I will then present my research design, including case selection, a brief outline of my findings, and research concerns. A chapter outline of the project concludes this chapter.

Introduction: Post Cold War International Politics and Democratization

Democratization policies in the immediate post-Cold War period contained certain assumptions about the spread of democracy, peace, and the importance of open economic systems. Understanding these assumptions helps to explain the impetus for US policies in transitional states, while offering a guide to tracing their effects. These policies often rested on the supposition that civil society, and NGOs in particular, serves as a necessary “balancer” to state power, and that the growth of civil societies would necessarily lead to freer, more liberal, and more democratic societies in general (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Quigley 2000). These efforts were part of a widespread trend among democratic states following the “waves” of democratization:

as democratic openings spread through Latin America and parts of Asia in the 1980s and then surged in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan Africa at the start of the 1990s, the established democracies have sought to respond positively. [...] They do so out of both a generalized idealistic sense that democracy is the best political system and the belief democratic regimes are likely to make better political and economic partners in the long run. (Carothers and Ottaway 2000: 5)

During the Cold War era, as Carothers and Ottaway note, Western aid agencies tended to shy away from this kind of assistance. These efforts increased at the end of the Cold War, however, because of the opportunities to influence newly forming governments and states: “the end of the Cold War substantially lowered ideological tensions and barriers in many parts of the world and dramatically reduced the assumption that any politically oriented aid was driven by underlying security concerns” (2000: 5-6). Further, early US efforts to encourage democratization, particularly in Latin America, depended mainly upon promoting economic growth and supporting moderate political parties. The “exception” to these strategies was exemplified by efforts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—in addition to encouraging economic growth and political parties, these policies experimented with the more elusive idea of re-building “civil society.”

The Clinton administration developed policies to expand (or create) civil society in transitional states; civil society came to be seen as a key component in democratization efforts. International philanthropic organizations—specifically, the Soros Foundation—encouraged this strategy and acted in tandem with the administration, acting quickly to develop local offices in the transitional states. There are many reasons for this shift: on the one hand, a top-down approach to democratization may have been perceived as a heavy-handed way of dealing with the newly independent states (NIS), and certainly would not have been agreeable to Russia, which continues to be sensitive to Western involvement in its former sphere of influence. On the other hand, a bottom-up approach was a less expensive alternative for the US. While a large amount of funding was dedicated to other security issues, such as restructuring Baltic military capabilities to

conform to NATO requirements (i.e. BALTBAT, BALTNET), tackling stickier issues of ethnic conflict and political upheaval needed a more subtle approach that would rely on grassroots movements. Rather than supplying a large amount of funding, as I will argue, what was needed was the introduction of a new language of civil society that would lead to changes in local attitudes towards the West in general and the US in particular.

Further, this language would be loaded with pro-American values, as carried by US policy makers and grant-making bodies. The “language” of civil society is important for (1) establishing the “rules” of civil society issues (2) framing debates within civil society and domestic politics and (3) shaping how individuals perceive themselves vis-à-vis civil society and the state.¹ Most important, this new language would emphasize the importance of the individual within global politics.

How Foreign Funding Creates the
Language of Civil Society

1. Foreign funders establish the “rules” of civil society through establishing the boundaries of the issues that they identify as being important to “democratization”; these issues will be value-laden, particularly in terms of American values and culture.
2. Foreign funders frame the debates within civil society and domestic politics by focusing on these issues and funding local NGOs willing to support their causes.
3. Foreign funding shapes the way individuals perceive themselves vis-à-vis civil society and the state through the programs and social campaigns that are implemented by local NGOs.

¹ Language, power, and assimilation take on different meanings and strategies in the cases I have followed. When discussing the role of language to determine who rules, or who makes the rules of social construction, I take Nicholas Onuf’s (1989) constructivist approach that traces the ties between language, rule, and social relationships. In this sense, language does not necessarily refer to the ethnic language (i.e. Russian, Moldovan, or Estonian), but rather, the meanings ascribed to particular constructions of people within those societies, such as the notion of women’s empowerment as envisioned by Western policy makers. On the other hand, David Laitin’s 1998 work on the relationship between ethnic language and in-group and out-group status is most applicable in discussions of the political tensions in post-Communist states where language has become the marker of reemerging identities. In chapter four, for instance, I describe the politics of language that play such a large role in Moldovan society: the jockeying for power in Moldova can be traced through the debates surrounding the dominance of either Romanian or Russian in political and civil society. See also Laitin 2000; Ponarin 2000.

Waltz's Images and the First Image Reversed Model

Much has been written regarding Waltz's (1959) three "images" of international relations, or levels of analysis, as explanations of international conflict. Waltz's 1979 work, Theory of International Politics, outlined one of the dominant theoretical approaches of the field, neorealism, an approach which relies upon systemic explanations for understanding and explaining international politics and conflict. Neorealism was a departure from classical realist approaches (e.g. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948) that attempted to understand the realpolitik cloaked by ideology during the early 20th century, yet still relied upon analyses of diplomacy and culture to understand world politics. Neorealists, on the other hand, sought to create a "scientific" approach that would rely upon positivism to understand the "universal" mechanisms of international politics—an approach divorced from the messiness of human interaction.

As the field of International Relations (IR) has developed, Waltz's approach has been widely imitated and defended, as well as widely criticized and bemoaned (e.g. Keohane 1986). It is in this latter category in which this work is placed; however, it is not a critique of systemic understandings of international relations per se so much as it is a call for a synthesis of the images themselves. Much as Wendt (1992; 1994; 1999) argued that states (the second image) are both shaped by international systems (the third image) while also shaping the system itself, I argue that the first image—that is, the relationships between citizens of states and the international system—play an important, if not key, role in the behavior of states within this system. This project describes the ways in which this interaction has been and can be used in the service of foreign policy making.

Allow me to briefly outline the three images as posited by Waltz's earlier work, Man, the State, and War (1959). The three images are heuristic devices used to understand the complex causes of international conflict, whether through human nature, the nature of individual states, or the state system as a whole. Waltz finds that the third image, the systemic level, offers the greatest explanatory power in its parsimony. Because all self-interested states are subject to the permissive nature of the anarchic environment in which they operate, all states will act rationally to either balance their power relative to other states, or to enhance their power in the zero-sum game of the international system. While this level of analysis can not offer a theory of foreign policy, it is, as Waltz argues, theoretically robust enough to offer testable hypothesis based on several "useful" assumptions: states are sovereign, unitary, and rational actors existing within an anarchic environment in which there is no higher authority than the states themselves.

The second image refers to the possibility that the nature of states serve as causes of international conflict. That is, this level of analysis looks for institutional traits that might make a state more or less warlike or prone to conflict. Immanuel Kant's essay "Perpetual Peace" (1795), for example, theorized that those governments who rely upon the consent of the governed will be less likely to go to war, and further, increasing the number of such states will result in a "cosmopolitan" peace. This hypothesis, of course, has developed into the commonly accepted theory that democratic states are unlikely to war with other democracies (Doyle 1986, 1997; Levy 1988; Fukuyama 1991, 1992; Russett 1993). Liberals advocate for a breaking down of state barriers and limitations upon the power of state institutions, while social democrats argue that state provision of

basic needs will leave its citizens free to lead productive, peaceful lives. According to Waltz, this level of analysis cannot offer any general theory of war, nor does it offer a realistic normative project: convincing (or coercing) all state governments to institute such changes appears unlikely. Waltz does not dispute the importance of domestic politics, but, in the end, concludes that this level of analysis brings us no further in understanding the behavior of states without reliance upon a systemic explanation:

The action of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of international relations. But the international political environment has much to do with the ways in which states behave. The influence to be assigned to the internal structure of states in attempting to solve the war-peace equation cannot be determined until the significance of the international environment has been reconsidered. (1959: 122)

For Waltz, the assumption that all states, regardless of ideological bent or type of government, will act in like fashion within the international environment supersedes all other explanations.

Interestingly, even when the “rules” of the international system seem to have changed (i.e. the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the transition to democracy among many former Soviet states), Waltz (2000: 10) maintains that the fundamental antagonism between states will continue, democratic or no:

Democracies may live at peace with democracies, but even if all states became democratic, the structure of international politics would remain anarchic. The structure of international politics is not transformed by changes internal to states, however widespread the changes may be. In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy.

Thus, structural realism (or neorealism), according to Waltz (2000), should continue to hold sway.

Waltz maintains that neorealism explains American liberal interventionism in the post cold war world because the most dominant state in the system—the US—happens to be a democratic state. Thus democracy becomes a form of power in itself, a “noble cause” which permits intervention in order to establish what the stronger state sees as “peaceful” conditions. But this “interventionist spirit” is inter alia a recipe for conflict, no matter what the intentions may be: “the end is noble, but as a matter of right, Kant insists, no state can intervene in the internal arrangements of another. As a matter of fact, one may notice that intervention, even for worthy ends, often brings more harm than good” (2000: 13).

While I agree with Waltz that intervention often leads to unintended negative consequences, and, in a sense, I rely upon systemic explanations at some level of my argument (i.e. that hegemonic states use funding for NGOs as tools of foreign policy making), I also argue that his reliance upon systemic explanations and power politics between states misses the impact of human behavior, and further, reliance upon these explanations among policy makers represents dangers to human security. Thus, in pointing to the problems inherent in a first image approach, and offering a critical assessment of US foreign policy in this realm, I point to the very real consequences of foreign policy “on the ground” rather than simply as a product of state interaction. As I suggested earlier, rather than separate the three “images” as Waltz has done, what is needed is an analysis of how the three are inextricably connected; further, the “first image” is often the key to understanding global politics.

In the first image, Waltz explores the “human nature” explanation—that is, something in the nature of man (not people or men and women) is responsible for the

persistence of conflict in the world. He presents two sides to this issue: the pessimists, who take the Hobbesian view that human nature is unchanging and basically bad; and the optimists, such as Rousseau, who argue that the right education or training will shape man's malleable nature to the benefit of all. Either way, Waltz suggests, this presents a rather reductionist view of international conflict as a whole, because individual behavior cannot necessarily be generalized, nor can human nature—which suggests a constant—be changed.

Waltz then takes these observations to their logical conclusions. That is, if men's behavior is responsible for world conflict, either behavior or institutions must then be the focus of change, which is the end of the behavioral sciences. The pessimists, who believe that change in human nature is impossible, will seek "political remedies" while optimists will seek to change men themselves (1959: 42). The issue here, of course, is the extent to which change is possible, preferable, or even probable, given the diversities of cultures, peoples, and institutions. Waltz admits to modest gains by behavioral scientists, but notes, in the end, it is those behaviorists who pay attention to politics who are most effective (1959: 79).

Waltz's protestations aside, there remains a considerable amount of scholarship built on the idea that changing the nature—or, more correctly, national, cultural, or ideological identities—of people and groups of people may have a considerable impact on conflict reduction. Identity, unlike the notion of "nature," is not static; it is influenced by a variety of ever-changing factors. Indeed, the idea of a "nation," which often serves as the guiding factor of political identity, is an "imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991: 6). Nations and

states are constructed entities, as is international society; the key to change is realizing that this construction is itself capable of being changed, of being re-imagined.

Cultural anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have explored the impact of social restraints, cultural traits, and group identity. The 1980s and early 1990s, for instance, saw the development of Feminist International Relations, with groundbreaking works by Cynthia Enloe (1988, 1990), J. Ann Tickner (1992), V. Spike Peterson (1992), Christine Sylvester (1994), and many others. These scholars demanded a re-thinking of the IR “canon” and a reinterpretation of the “images” that had come to dominate our thinking in the field. Tickner (1992: 22) associates gender equality, for instance, with larger issues of security—and “common security” more specifically—and argues that any analysis that leaves out issues of human security and justice is a limited analysis at best and a dangerously empty analysis at worst. In that light, I explore what Waltz ignores: the relationship between civil society and the development of state interests which ultimately affects the relationship between states in the international system. Unlike Waltz’s approach to the first image, I do not assume that human behavior is predetermined. Indeed, I assume that relationships within civil society and between citizens and their states are products of domestic and outside forces: the values of civil society reflect broader global cultures where people react to the environment in ways that will affect the behavior of states.

To that end, I have developed a “First Image Reversed Model” (FIRM) which refocuses the researcher’s attention on non-elite domestic politics to help us understand the relationship between attitude changes within civil society (particularly when those attitude changes become primarily pro-American), domestic politics, and international

relations. This does not mean that elite domestic politics are ignored; rather, FIRM is dependent on analyzing the changing relationship between non-elite domestic politics and elite domestic and international politics. This relationship represents a site of contestation for collective values and attitudes. Further, in striving to include non-elite politics, this mode of analysis reaffirms the importance of the individual in global politics. More specifically, this approach also investigates the construction of collective values in the context of US interpretations of nationalism vis-à-vis American political culture, which will be explored throughout this project. Below I offer a more detailed description of the effects of culture on foreign policy making, and US foreign policy making in particular.

Culture, Ideology, and US Foreign Policy: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Individual Security

Throughout this project the normative implications of US foreign policies in the former Communist states are evident; I would argue that current US foreign policies towards transitional states attempt to communicate a particular facet of American culture (i.e. liberal democratic ideals), and in return, policy makers expect to see particular American values and attitudes reflected in the domestic politics of these states. Although I use the term “political affinity” to describe the goal of of US policies in these states, I would also argue political affinity is a result of changing cultural values; there is an artificial divide between conceptions of politics, culture, and ideology.

A case in point concerns the emphasis upon the individual that is implicit in a pro-American approach. Here I rely on two distinct, yet concurrent characteristics of American foreign policies: liberalism and neoliberalism. The former relates to the ideological and cultural underpinnings of US foreign policy, while the latter refers to

state and international policies that privilege capitalist, free market institutions and processes, most notably in the form of deregulation and privatization. As I will show throughout this project, both have important consequences for women in transitional states, either in terms of policies that focus on women's political participation and feminist social values (liberal) or in the creation of policies that rely heavily upon free market economic structures to provide social services, often to the detriment of those services themselves (neoliberal); in both the Estonian and Moldovan cases, US funding for NGOs clearly advocate both liberal and neoliberal approaches.

The traditional liberal view that takes individual liberty to reign supreme over the demands of the state has long played a role in US domestic and foreign policies. Citizenship, on this view, is not based upon ethnicity, heritage, or language, but rather upon the commonly held ideals of self-reliance, inclusion and democratic governance (de Tocqueville 1994 [1848]; Hartz 1955; Huntington 1981; Smith 1988, 1997). Further, Jaggar (2005: 7) notes, "because the liberal tradition has always been concerned to limit the power of the state, it has tended to look favorably on civil society as a space of freedom, in which individual happiness and fulfillment might be found." Civil society, for US policy makers, has come to be viewed as the site of democracy in its pure form, a place where individuals partake in the activities that lead to a vibrant, dynamic, free society. At the same time, neoliberal governments, such as the US, have come to rely civil society to provide social services through voluntary action.

US liberal policies abroad invoke liberal values, and the concurrent innate goodness of civil society, while encouraging democratizing states to adopt them; moreover, policy makers often make the acceptance of these values a requisite part of

American assistance. This is not a new phenomenon; indeed, American forays abroad have, in most cases, been accompanied by a liberal fervor only matched by American religiosity—which often seem to go hand in hand (Rosenberg 1982; Hunt 1987). To understand US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world, a discussion of culture and ideology is necessary, particularly where American culture and foreign policy are predicated on the notion that American values can—and should—be exported.

Culture, Ideology, and Foreign Policy Making

In his 1969 essay “American Foreign Policy and Moral Rhetoric,” David Little attempts to address the effects of “liberal disillusionment,” which took aim at Wilsonianism in foreign policy. Opponents of this quasi-utopian view of human relations reformulated the American approach to international affairs to exclude questions of morality and value judgments; indeed, foreign policy would be viewed as motivated by power and self-interest, not the empathic cooperation Wilsonianism seemed to suggest.² American realism³ would come to represent relationships among states devoid of cultural and ideological influences, despite the apparent ideological battle of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, however, questions of culture, ideology, and national identity have once again become pressing issues for policy makers (see chapter two). The influence of American culture and ideology on foreign policy cannot be ignored if we are to understand the nature of American foreign policy decisions. Further, these policies will

² Little (1969: 7) includes Charles Beard, Reinhold Niebuhr, Theodore Draper, Senator Fulbright, and George Kennan, among others, as the “debunkers of American moralism.” He notes, however, that Kennan’s language in particular (*American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*) is normative in nature and therefore suggests value judgments: “he seeks to discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ patterns of international behavior, a task that begins to look like moral reflection” (16). See also Gellman, 1984, chapter three.

³ Specifically in the shape of Waltz’s neorealism—see my earlier discussion.

have demonstrable effects in terms of shifts in values and attitudes abroad.

How, in fact, can “culture” and “ideology” be operationalized adequately to show a clear causal relationship with policy making? How does one study the relevance of cultural factors without falling into the trap of relativism? Does “culture” simply serve as a catch-all for those variables in foreign policy that cannot be explained otherwise? A review of the relevant literature reveals several problems with the cultural approach, including the difficulty cultural explanations have with policy changes, the under-theorization of identity⁴ in foreign policy making, and the problem of generalizability and predictability from a cultural perspective. In this study, for example, understanding the importance of culture and ideology is framed in terms of understanding the effects of US foreign policy (and the cultural implications of such) as well as understanding the impact of these policies on the (pro- or anti- American) attitudes and values of people in transitional states; the problem, however, is that changes in attitudes and values do not adequately capture the extent of American influence on transitional states, particularly in terms of cultural shifts.

Nevertheless, theories of culture and ideology do question the extent to which cultural values are meaningful—that is, how committed policy makers may be to the value-systems they claim to espouse—but the point remains that culture and ideology exert powerful influence upon policy makers and the American public. As an “organization of meaning” (Hudson 1997), culture and ideology constrain and shape the way policy makers view reality; rather than conceive of all states (and foreign policy

⁴ Although many of these scholars refer to “national identity,” the issue of the construction of individual identities through cultural intersections needs to be more fully explored; a conception of “national identity” may often lead to the problem of reductionism.

makers) as sharing similar “rational”⁵ goals and strategies, these theories suggest that studies of foreign policy may be better served by viewing policy as a product of cultural and ideological development. Many of the scholars I will review do not assume the latter as a causal factor; that is, culture and ideology directly affect the foreign policies espoused by varying states. Rather, they maintain the idea that, beyond a simple causal relationship, culture and foreign policy are actually mutually reinforcing.

Culture, Clifford Geertz (1973) explains, “[is] an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.” These patterns of communication are not easily divested, nor are they readily evident to those who operate within them. The extent to which culture affects American foreign policy is illustrated by those ideologies espoused by policy-makers and the way in which they are utilized to justify policy decisions. I do not wish to imply, however, that ideologies are (always) transparent justifications for ulterior motives;⁶ rather, ideologies act as a “short-hand” for deeper cultural meanings and expectations, and are individually subjective⁷ only to the extent

⁵ “Rationality” as conceived by most political scientists is a primarily Western notion. Hudson suggests that it may be more fruitful for studies of decision making to examine varying types of reasoning, which may be culturally specific. See also Sampson 1987, Alexander and Mohanty 1997 (introduction), and Spivak 1999.

⁶ For a contrasting argument, see Chomsky (1979: 15): “In every society there will emerge a caste of propagandists who labor to disguise the obvious, to conceal actual workings of power, and to spin a web of mythical goals and purposes, utterly benign, that allegedly guide national policy.” Although I agree, to some extent, that power is manipulated by policy makers, theories of culture may find it difficult to agree that an individual could be so self-conscious of the effects of culture upon his or her actions as to succeed in not only completely overcoming cultural constraints, but also in shaping the way culture is perceived by larger society. Chomsky often points to the media as the main conveyor of these manipulated cultural images (see Howard and Chomsky 1988), but his argument that this is a vast conspiracy among American policy makers may grant them far too much agency independent of cultural constraints (see Wendt 1987). Likewise, Snyder (1991) questions why a unified elite would espouse “myths” or ideologies that may, in the future, actually act against their best interests. See also R. Smith 1997.

⁷ Szalay and Kelly (1982) argue that ideology may be collectively subjective as well.

that culture and individual identity are mutually constitutive. That is to say, individual and state identities (which are products of culture) are “ongoing accomplishments of discursive practices” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 46; Wendt 1987)⁸ in which ideology plays a role in setting the boundaries of the discourse. Ideology represents “the sociopolitical beliefs and aims characteristic of a culture...[and possess] a high degree of explicitness and authoritative promulgation centered about one or more preeminent values...and a passionate concern to bring to pass the realization of these values or ideals” (Shils 1968; Roth and Whitemore 1986: 23). Thus, if states display a change in ideology—say, a dedication to pro-democratic reforms—we should assume this represents a change in certain cultural attitudes as well. As I will explain below, this does not necessarily mean that these attitudes are adopted by the entire society, but I do mean to argue that ideologies are culturally situated.

Destiny and Identity: Cultural and Ideological Development

In Ideology and the American Experience, John Roth and Robert Whitemore et al take a philosophical tack, beginning with the origin of the word “ideology” itself. Whitemore (1986: 20) notes that “ideology” as developed by de Tracy and Bacon was to be “a purely naturalistic unity of sciences as a system of science.” This neutral position of ideology, however, was soon given a derogatory meaning by Napoleon who viewed the idéologues as “sectarians and subversives as opposed to factionally neutral social scientists,”⁹ a taint which would remain.

Shils notes that ideologies come to the fore during periods of crisis and “entail an

⁸ Wendt (1987) notes that the structure of the state is not independent of the actors, whose actions are only possible through the structure of the state; the agent and state structure are co-determined.

⁹ Ibid.

aggressive alienation from the existing society.”¹⁰ While ideologies are produced within particular cultures, their adoption, however, is neither universal nor even universally acceptable within a culture. Marxism, for example, represents a departure from the norms of capitalistic culture, but the theory was based upon those “social ills” inherent to the culture examined by Marx, industrialized Britain. The fact that Marxism was never able to take hold within every culture, indeed, certainly not the culture for which Marx intended, does not necessarily illustrate the extent to which an ideology must have, at least, some recognizable ties to the culture in which it is propagated. As suggested by Shils, however, an ideology will not be readily accepted by a society simply because it is a product of its culture.

Despite Shils’ assertion that there exists some aspect of ideology that represents a complete departure from cultural norms, I would argue that ideologies, in fact, often embody an intensification of certain norms that would not otherwise be systematized. For instance, the “extreme right wing” in the United States espouses an overtly racist value system that is not necessarily shared by the rest of society. This not to say, however, that racism has not permeated almost all aspects of American life; whether consciously or not, at least the seed of the extreme right’s beliefs may be found in the larger cultural context. Likewise, an intensification of the “self-other” dichotomy can be seen in much of the Cold War rhetoric; Truman’s perception of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, for example, was deeply influenced by the exaggeration of the capitalist-communist split favored by his advisors.

There is, however, a contrast between the ideologies a society may profess and

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 23

those it actually utilizes in political life.¹¹ Rogers Smith traces the influence of Louis Hartz's 1955 work, The Liberal Tradition in America, which, following de Tocqueville, asserts the supremacy of the liberal tradition in American culture. Rather than view American society in terms of equality and universal opportunities, Smith (1997) notes that the American brand of "liberalism" is based upon the exclusion of non-white, non-male, non-European, and non-heterosexual peoples. Although Hartz and others¹² have attempted to justify cultural exclusions in terms of liberal ideology, Smith asserts that this cannot be done; American culture is not based upon liberalism, he argues, but upon a system of "ascriptive inequality," as reflected in citizenship laws:

...[R]acial, ethnic, and gender restrictions were blatant, not "latent." For these people, citizenship rules gave no weight to how liberal, republican, or faithful to other American values their political beliefs might be....

These statuses [of racial, gender and sexual inequality] have been generated by ideological and institutional traditions of political identity that steadfastly resist the efforts of Tocquevillian analysts to reduce them to varieties of liberalism or democratic republicanism...they provide elaborate, principled arguments for giving legal expression to people's ascribed place in various hereditary, inegalitarian cultural and biological orders, valorized as natural, divinely approved, and just. That is why a multiple traditions approach to American political culture is necessary. (1997: 18)

In American foreign policy discourse, however, American liberalism (and neoliberalism) is an inextricable part of the American package—one cannot escape the power of American ideology in this sense, no matter how transparent the ideals may seem.

Racial issues form a core value of American culture; Michael Hunt and Whittemore, for instance, note the influence of "social Darwinism." Social Darwinists translated Darwin's theory of biological evolution into a representation of American ideals: it is the industrious, apolitical, capitalist "forgotten man" (and woman) upon

¹¹ See also Huntington 1982.

¹² Smith also critiques, for example, Gunnar Myrdal, American Dilemma (1944). For a counter-argument see Orren 1996.

whose back “the burden of society rests” (Whittemore 1986: 28). The strong of the world, represented by the American nation, would not only carry the burden of industrialized society, but would also assure itself a dominant place in the world through sheer force of will and ingenuity. Although agreeing that these American myths were popular and far-reaching, Hunt (1987: 34-35) does note those who questioned whether American expansion actually fit with republican ideals; they asked how Americans could protect liberty at home if involved in imperialism abroad. In accordance with Smith’s assertion, however, these arguments were also couched in exclusionary terms, that is, imperialism would force the United States to absorb more foreign peoples, no matter their particular liberal inclinations.

Hunt notes that a racial hierarchy in which the peoples of the world were placed characterized the predominance of social Darwinism in nineteenth century American ideology. This hierarchy, Hunt contends, determined the course of American foreign policy and reflected deeply embedded cultural values. Social Darwinism was served by three components of American ideology and culture: a belief in “national greatness” coupled with the pursuit of liberty; deeply-held racial attitudes towards non-Western Europeans, Africans, Latinos and Asians; and a fear that foreign revolutions would spiral out of control (1987: 17-18). Whittemore and Shils posit ideology as a unitary, almost foreign doctrine which must be propagated forcefully by its believers; in contrast, Hunt suggests that ideology is much more subtle and fluid, and does not represent such a drastic break from its cultural backdrop. Instead, Hunt argues that ideologies are “integrated and coherent systems of symbols, values and beliefs” (17) that are more likely to persist within stable political cultures.

Ideologies in eighteenth and nineteenth century America, Hunt argues, were developed from pre-existing cultural values in order to build a consensus within the policy making elite: “Building on the shared outlook and interests inspired by previous socioeconomic developments, nationalists in this stage engaged in clarifying the idea of the nation and giving it concrete expression by creating historical myths, propagating values, and constructing loyalties.”¹³ These ideologies, he notes, are not “static...[sic] the ideas that make up a foreign-policy ideology may be reassembled by different leaders or in different ages in different ways” (16). Cultural developments and environmental conditions have an important impact on the ways in which these ideas are combined and the extent to which these ideologies become ingrained in the conception of “national identity.” These conditions, Hunt argues, are reflected in the dominant political rhetoric of various time periods.

Similarly, Sanjoy Banerjee (1997: 29) argues that culture is a type of grammar, an “evolving fund of semantic elements that can be combined in certain ways and not others to define situations, motivate and plan actions, or release emotions.” The development of a national identity, then, depends upon the historical contexts in which these ideas are placed, as well as how these ideas position a culture in opposition to another. Insofar as ideologies represent a distinct set of norms within a culture, they also serve to distinguish cultural identities (Katzenstein 1996: 7). Szalay and Kelly (1982) maintain that ideologies, to the extent that they are accepted by the broader culture, reflect the “subjective culture” of a society. That is, ideologies reflect the way in which members of a society wish to be represented to the larger audience (i.e., other states), as well as

¹³ Ibid.

differentiating that culture from another. This differentiation is a necessary outcome of international interaction; without interaction there would be no need for ideological or cultural subjectivity. According to Wendt (1992: 401-402):

Because states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus security interests apart from or prior to interaction, we assume too much about the state of nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy, “international political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units.” ...These claims presuppose a history of interaction in which actors have acquired “selfish” identities and interests; before interaction...they would have no experience upon which to base such definitions of self and other.

If culture serves as a means of organizing information and ideologies delineate possible courses of action, ideologies and culture cannot be separated from each other theoretically or methodologically (Szalay and Kelly 1982), nor can state policies be considered immune to cultural influences (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996). In addition, cultural factors must first be taken into consideration when analyzing ideological influences on foreign policy or the decision-making processes involved (Rosenberg 1982; Sampson 1987).

A related argument notes that cultural identities affect the chances of conflict between states (Huntington 1993).¹⁴ Payne (1995: 8) argues that, despite the American propensity to use force to resolve disputes (on the individual and societal level), “the stronger the cultural similarities and interdependence between the United States and

¹⁴ Huntington argues “the fundamental source of conflict in this world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” I am not convinced by his argument, however. Huntington’s definition of “civilization” (“the highest cultural groupings of people [which] are differentiated from each other by religion, history, language and tradition) is often used interchangeably with “culture,” a term not adequately operationalized. It also appears that the delineation of civilization, for Huntington, is either ideological or economic—the developed West versus Islam, for instance. As can be seen by an analysis of relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors, Islam is not necessarily the unifying civilizing force. Indeed, the differences are as much racial as ideological.

For a more optimistic view of Huntington’s thesis (one that has been expanded to view civilization “boundaries” as an actual opportunity to expand “civic spaces” à la Habermas) see David Cheshier and Cori Dauber 1999.

another country, the less likely Americans are to perceive themselves in conflict with it and to use force against it to settle disputes.”¹⁵ The values Americans hold dear and the belief systems they develop through the acceptance of these values shape the way Americans perceive the “other.” Further, the institutions created to maintain relationships with other states would reflect those “enculturated” values of the society at large as well as the policy makers themselves (Payne 1995: 17; Jervis 1991). In attempting to affect the values and attitudes of groups within other states, as I argue US policies have attempted to do in post-Communist states such as Estonia, Poland, and Moldova, US policy creates pro-American spaces where potential confrontation will be supplanted by potential cooperation.

It is important to note, however, that the theoretical focus of more recent cultural studies has become increasingly aware of the danger of determinism in regard to culture (Hudson 1997: 4). That is, culture may impact foreign policy, but foreign policy makers should not be viewed as completely determined by culture, nor does culture (or ideology, for that matter) completely account for particular policy decisions. As noted by Margaret Weir (1992: 189), cultural norms do not adequately explain changes in policies over time: “...broad cultural explanations are quite limited as explanations of policy because they are poorly equipped to explain variations in the shape and timing of particular policies.” Instead, Weir offers the notion of “bounded innovation,” in which attention is given to “the diverse links between ideas, political institutions, political actors, networks of experts and social interests that are often overlooked in culture or interest-based accounts of policy-making” (192). By reducing political action to an operation of culture, we

¹⁵ Payne’s argument is quite similar to those of the “Democratic Peace” literature. See Russett 1993, Owen 1994, Levy and Mabe 1999, and Kahl 1999.

overlook the innumerable interactions that exist within policy-making itself.

The flexibility of cultural parameters and the evolution of ideologies, as noted by Hunt (1987), illustrate the ways in which culture is affected by individual choices and cultural institutions are shaped by individual policies. Human beings are constantly engaged in changing, expanding and reassessing their environments. In his critique of neorealism, for example, Ashley (1986: 291) notes that neorealist concepts of the state do not take into account the importance and consequence of human action upon state interaction, thereby denying the subjectivity of humans and the institutions they create. In this light, further theoretical work needs to be done concerning other types of identity and their impact on foreign policy, aside from deterministic and essentializing cultural characteristics; gender, for instance, remains sadly under-theorized in International Relations as well as foreign policy making, although some interesting scholarship is emerging.¹⁶ Attempts to unravel the web of the relationships of states (and their differing cultures) will be well served by a deeper understanding of how our individual conceptions of reality influence and are influenced by our environment.

The preceding theoretical approaches to ideology and culture guide the empirical research of the effects of ideology and culture upon American foreign policy making and implementation. I will discuss two historical studies as illustrations of these applications.

Michael Hunt (1987), as noted above, traces the development of American foreign policy over three centuries. He asserts that American foreign policy has been deeply influenced by three core ideas which emerged by the twentieth century: a vision

¹⁶ See, for example, Peterson 1992, Steans 1998, as well as a large body of postcolonial feminist literature which addresses the impact of global politics upon the lives and identities of women in developing countries. For example, see Alexander and Mohanty 1997, Spivak 1999.

of national greatness related to the pursuit of liberty; a foreign policy justified in terms of racial hierarchy; and a deep wariness of foreign revolutions gone awry. The idea of American exceptionalism is embodied in all of the great American policy doctrines: the Monroe Doctrine, for instance, made clear that “manifest destiny” would be extended beyond continental boundaries, while the Truman Doctrine illustrated the American resolve to support all free peoples, who, presumably like Americans, saw the inherent righteousness of democracy, free speech, and, perhaps more importantly, free trade. These doctrines were underpinned by a deep sense of moralism and legalism, combined with a missionary zeal (both literally and figuratively, as we will see below).

While Hunt illustrates the use of ideology to justify particular policies (for instance, the backing of strongmen in Latin American states because of a fear of revolution and the notion that “backward” peoples only understand force), Rosenberg (1982) explores the intricate relationship between foreign policy, culture and economic interests by tracing those agents responsible for spreading the American Dream. Foreign policy not only depends upon the decisions of formal policy leaders, but has also depended to a large extent upon the efforts of private interests, in this case, traders, investors, philanthropists, merchants of mass culture, and missionaries. Like Smith, Rosenberg argues that these private interests espouse their own versions of liberal American ideology and culture—that is, American liberalism extends only as far as it benefits American interests. She does not, however, seem to escape from the trap that Smith has outlined, in that she does not separate “true” American culture from a liberal ideology which is not, in fact, liberal.

Rather, Rosenberg attempts to resolve the ideological contradiction Smith

illustrates through the concept of “liberal-developmentalism,” which “merged nineteenth century liberal tenets with the historical experience of America’s own development, elevating the beliefs and experiences of America’s unique historical time and circumstance into developmental laws thought to be applicable everywhere” (17). She demonstrates this point through an historical analysis of three distinct levels of state development: the Promotional State (1890-1912), the Cooperative State (1920s) and the Regulatory State (from the Great Depression until World War II) (13). Throughout these three periods, a variety of private and state actors interacted to spread American culture and effect American economic expansion. American culture, Rosenberg insists, served as a vehicle for the dissemination of liberal values.

American culture has often been noted for its religiosity, despite the apparent separation of church and state. Religious zeal, for instance, not only contributed to the sense of American mission at home but across the world as well. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1974: 337) notes that “though evangelical compulsion was one of the first and strongest motives in the expansion of the West, the classical theories of imperialism have generally ignored the missionary.” Religious missionaries, he suggests, served as important carriers of American culture as well as aiding in the expansion of American economic dominance. Likewise Rosenberg argues that during the Promotional State era, government was too weak to engage in cultural and economic expansion on its own; instead private actors were either recruited to do so or engaged in these activities autonomously. American missionaries served a dual function: they spread Protestant beliefs (which stressed the importance of hard work and individualism) as well as opening up foreign cultures to the temptations of American goods.

Rosenberg's emphasis upon independent actors may, in fact, undermine the cultural argument she puts forth; missionaries, for instance, may spread cultural values, but they do not necessarily affect foreign policy directly. Of course, Rosenberg is commenting on a particular time period,¹⁷ in which American foreign policy institutions were not yet firmly established, but this only underlines the point that generalizable explanations for foreign policy cannot be painted with the broad brush of culture. Institutional, individual, and temporal factors need to be taken into consideration as well. Weir (1992: 193) argues that apart from cultural considerations, analysts of policy must look at the institutional constraints of the American political system, which "pushes parties and presidents to put together ad hoc coalitions around specific issues and to assemble broad public support sustained by rhetoric with wide but shallow and often vague appeal." Policy decisions, she contends, are created through "institutional processes, not preexisting preferences" (194).

Contrast this argument with that of Wildavsky (1987: 5), who asserts that cultural theory "is based upon the premise that preferences are endogenous—internal to organizations.... Always, in cultural theory, shared values and social relations go together: there are no disembodied values apart from the social relations they rationalize." Political institutional processes, therefore, cannot be considered separately from culturally based preferences. Sampson (1987: 384) offers the empirical evidence to support this idea; cultural differences, he asserts, are observable and do impact

¹⁷ Schlesinger notes, for example, that during the period Rosenberg calls the "Promotional State," missionaries served as almost colonial agents: "By teaching submission, humility, and non-opposition to foreign aggression...missionaries became the means whereby the imperialist monopoly tries [sic] to preserve its influence" (340). In terms of this project, the present-day missionaries utilized by US foreign policy makers may well be the international NGOs and consulting agencies to NGOs that the US now supports.

organizational behavior. Rather than focus on the characteristics of individuals as well as the cultural content, Sampson argues that more fruitful results may be achieved by studying the culturally circumscribed process by which a policy was made. These organizational characteristics, Sampson finds, are translated to the organizational setting and, logically, to foreign policymaking. Thus, in US policies that encourage democratization, not only do we see the promotion of US political and cultural values, we also see the promotion of particular organizational structures that will reinforce these values—e.g. the Baltic Battalion in the Baltic states, the organization of American funded NGOs across Central and Eastern Europe, or local governmental structures in Poland or Moldova. This is not to suggest, however, that organizational style will necessarily predict conflict or cooperation; the paucity of this particular type of empirical research lies in its reliance upon process rather than content or context.

Civil Society, Democratization, and Gender Politics: US Values and Culture in Policy Making

The extent to which American values and culture are intrinsic to policymaking becomes more apparent when analyzing the current trend in US efforts abroad: encouraging the growth of democratic institutions and civil societies. These policies reflect deeply rooted American values regarding civil society and the relationship between the state and the individual. Gender politics, I argue, play an important role as well; tracing the impact of US foreign policies that include gender issues allows a closer look at the creation of pro-American policies through the importation of culture and values via foreign policy. The following discussions describe democratization as it has

been theorized over the past decade—particularly in terms of civil society—while describing gender as a site of power relations within this context.

There is a rich body of literature in the comparative field regarding democratization efforts. The “third wave” of democratization, as Huntington (1991) referred to the newly independent states and democratization in Latin America and the developing world, replaced the assumption that these states were not ready for democracy or incapable of appreciating democratic institutions, either culturally or structurally. It became fashionable among policy circles to think of democratization as merely the application of a laundry list of democratic institutions and procedures, such as a multiparty system or voting.¹⁸ States that could provide proof of reasonably fair elections and efforts towards liberalization were assumed to be “transitional” democracies.¹⁹ These rather facile assumptions, however, completely ignored the impact of structural factors, such as existing institutions, previous experience as independent states, or (dis)inclination towards Western liberal culture (Bunce 1999; Carothers 2002). Indeed, many of those states still assigned to the “transitional” category—Moldova, for instance—look nothing like burgeoning democracies; only the thinnest definition of democracy could allow these states to retain their status as such.

The transitologists were followed by the “consolidationists” who examined “consolidated” democracies, where it appeared that democratic institutions were beginning to

¹⁸ Cohen and Arato (1992 [2003]: 273) note the differences between “elite” and “participatory” democracy. Elite democracy (following Schumpeter 1942) “is defined as not as a kind of society or as a set of moral ends or even as a principle of legitimacy but rather as a method for choosing political leaders and organizing governments. The elite model of democracy claims to be realistic, descriptive, empirically accurate, and the only model that is appropriate to modern social conditions.” Participatory democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes the active role of citizens within democracy, where political experience leads to political virtue, tolerance, and encourages compromise. (See also Arendt 1963; Barber 1984)

¹⁹ The “transitology” literature (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Collier 1999) seeks to make a science of measuring these efforts.

take root. The definition of democracy, however, remained rather superficial, based upon an institutional approach rather than real structural and attitudinal changes. This literature has since begun to question the efficacy of democratization efforts, particularly those that promote the (supposedly independent) NGO sector as the central focus of civil society (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Quigley 2000). If we think about NGOs as a mechanism of hegemonic influence, however, the debate is refocused—the structural and attitudinal changes we would expect to see in democratization are reinforced by international ideological and political concerns. Civil society is no longer represents a site of contestation set between the private and public sectors within a state, but has become a site of interaction (and influence) between local civil societies and global politics.

This speaks to the construction of civil society as imagined by western European and American scholars. In the neo-Toquevillian model (Alexander 1998; Gellner 1994; Putnam 1993, 1995), for example, civil society is predicated on the freedom of the individual to act according to his (or her, but generally his) personal social predilections or political bent, which ultimately results in democratic political organization. The relationship between democratic institutions and civil society then becomes a mutually reinforcing relationship; civil society in non-democratic states, as Foley and Edwards (1996: 46) note, will become a site of radicalism against the state:

Where the state is unresponsive, its institutions are undemocratic, or its democracy is ill designed to recognize and respond to citizen demands, the character of collective action will be decidedly different than under a strong and democratic system. Citizens will find their efforts to organize for civil ends frustrated by state policy--at some times actively repressed, at others simply ignored. Increasingly aggressive forms of civil association will spring up, and more and more ordinary citizens will be driven into either active militancy against the state or self-protective apathy.

Democracy begets democratic civil society—but civil society is necessary to beget democracy. This is the paradox to which we have been alerted by Walzer (1992: 104): given power imbalances within civil society, and the inequities of state power, “only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society.” Nevertheless, civil society has come to be viewed by theorists and policy makers alike “as a necessary precondition or companion of democracy in every context” (Kubik 2004: 1).

In the context of transitional states and US foreign policy, however, the paradox must not be overlooked. As Kubik (2004: 14) notes, political scientists “tend to focus on transparent arrangements and mechanisms of accountability while they tend to neglect the task of identifying and analyzing mechanisms (particularly informal) of emancipation.” Similarly, policy makers tend to underestimate the actual “mechanisms of emancipation” when developing democratization strategies. Where policy makers attempt to inculcate democratic values through the creation of civil society—by encouraging the growth of NGOs and other independent associations, for example—they must contend with the counter efforts of governments proclaiming the virtues of democracy while continuing age-old power struggles. As can be seen in cases such as Moldova in chapter four, political leaders often play lip service to the necessity of civil society (a “magic word” often used to placate US policy makers) while simultaneously undermining the growth of democratic civil society through legislation and other measures meant to inhibit and intimidate any possible opposition. In this light, we must not consider the rudimentary elements of civil society as sufficient conditions for democratization; we must also question whether these elements actually serve to instill the values and norms US policy makers associate with a free, democratic society.

In this sense, focusing on women's NGOs or "women's issues" (as they are often referred to in US policy statements) may offer a window into these "mechanisms of emancipation" as women negotiate their roles in newly democratizing states. In researching these efforts, however, or even offering solutions, it is important that we do not assume that the appearance of civil society guarantees that a particular emancipatory project is underway. Kubik's intervention, then, raises some important questions: first, what does it mean for outsiders (i.e. US policy makers and foreign NGOs) to assume and encourage an element of civil society—a concept of women's rights—that may not exist within a particular political culture, or that may exist in alternative forms not immediately recognizable by outsiders? How do western models of civil society contend with issues of resistance and subalternity? When policy makers seek to encourage "political affinity," do they grasp the possibility (or inevitability) of resistance? Analyzing US foreign policies that are aimed towards women's NGOs and feminist movements within transitional states presents an opportunity to explore these areas of emancipation and resistance, and to offer possible solution to these problems.²⁰

While scholars have since focused on "bottom-up" approaches, such as social movements, Waylen (1994: 334) notes this "meant that links between grassroots political activity and the wider context, particularly the relationship with political parties and the state, were ignored" (Ekiert and Kubik 2001). While this may be true, the emphasis upon social movements has also given rise to wider scholarship that focuses on the role of women within these movements (Caldeira 1998; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998;

²⁰ McMahon (2002: 49) notes that Western involvement may actually serve to marginalize women's NGOs, which negates the emancipatory project. I have found that this is true to an extent, but I have also found (as I show in chapters three and four) that the tensions caused by Western influence in the women's movements in Estonia and Moldova may serve, in the long run, to give rise to a "domestic" feminism which will better serve these societies in the long run.

Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999; Jaggar 2005). The emphasis upon women's NGOs addresses a deeper concern among feminists for the integration of women into global civil society and international politics, and presents an alternative vision of security, in which social attitudes, values, identity, and the relationship with the state takes priority over abstract notions of "state interests."²¹

US policymakers in the 1990s were not unaware of the growing importance of women in the development of civil society as well as democracy; popular wisdom regarding the development of civil society holds that democratization require at least some consideration of women's rights if the endeavor is to succeed (Einhorn and Sever 2003).²² American visions of how democracy should be constructed, however, often idealize women's roles in transitional states. First, because the NGO sector (and thus civil society) has been positioned as an alternative to the state, a place for democratic action, while also differentiated from the undemocratic space of the family (Cohen and Arato 1992), it has come to be seen as a natural site for women, who have traditionally been shut out of the public sphere and oppressed by the private (Dahlerup 1994; Duffy 2000; Einhorn and Sever 2003). Secondly, civil society has been characterized as a site of diversity and inclusiveness. As Hawkesworth (2001: 228) notes, "cultivation of civil society is said to be beneficial because it encourages citizens to organize to promote their interests and foster ties among like-minded people across divisions of race, class, ethnicity, and gender." Further, women have been disproportionately attracted to the NGO sector because it is viewed as less affected by economic and political corruption,

²¹ This approach finds its roots in the feminist and constructivist approaches to IR, which I will outline below.

²² See, for example, a Washington Post story regarding Madeline Albright's comments regarding women's rights (Lippman 1997).

and NGOs are often built upon non-hierarchical structures (Lang 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Caldeira 1998; Phillips 1999; Jaggar 2005). Civil society is thus constructed as a site of emancipation for women by foreign funders, while at the same time, civil society represents a site for contestation between varying groups within the transitional state, particularly when democratization also involves a nationalist struggle between “native” and “foreign” identities. As a result, women within these societies become both cultural symbols as well as markers of tradition versus modernity (Moghadam 1994; Mani 1998; Eisenstein 2000: 43).

This version of democratization raises several issues for women in the Eastern European context, specifically the applicability of an American or Western European model of women’s rights (and feminism) that does not necessarily speak to the reality of women’s lives in these states (Busheikin 1997; Goldfarb 1997; Watson 1997b; Acsady 1999).²³ Because civil society has been viewed as a giving voice to traditionally marginalized groups, many feminists (particularly western feminists) “came to see NGOs as grassroots democratic vehicles for achieving feminist goals” (Schild 1998; Jaggar 2005: 10). However, this strategy often meets strong resistance either in terms of maintaining cultural traditions or through denial: in the case of Estonia, traditionalists (most conspicuously, Estonia’s First Lady) frame women as protectors of Estonian culture and mothers of the nation; in Moldova I was told, “there is no gender problem here,”²⁴ as if the high incidences of domestic violence and trafficking in women do not matter. The economic, political, and social transitions faced by these countries, as Einhorn and Sever note (2003: 164), are “imbued with notions of correct gender roles and

²³ I examine this issue more closely in Chapter 3.

²⁴ Personal conversation with leading NGO administrator in Chişinău, Moldova, name and organization withheld to maintain confidentiality.

identities that are naturalized in the service of dominant and ideological and cultural standpoints.” While these shifts seemed to promise a new site for women’s activism, the reverse—that many women disappeared from the political realm—was often more accurate (Einhorn and Sever 2003; Duhaček 1998).

The effects of foreign funding on women’s participation in civil society cannot be discussed without also pointing to the normative questions at stake; my intention in including a critical and normative element in this project is to offer insight to policy makers regarding the importance of cultural specificity, particularly when dealing with issues of civic and cultural identity. In the course of my research I continually encountered the frustration of US policy makers and officials who met resistance to US efforts, but I often wondered what they were gleaning from these experiences, other than policy making headaches or attempts to justify courses of action with superficial markers of success, such as reports and conferences.²⁵ The emphasis on product rather than process constrains NGOs in the programs they may offer, as well as affecting their ability to “change power structures or dominant social values [which] cannot easily be quantified through standard evaluation procedures to fit neatly into a project report for a funding agency or government” (Silliman 1999: 138; Schild 1998). The real test of the strength of the FIR model, I have concluded, is not whether policies continue to replicate

²⁵ During a meeting of the American delegation to the 2003 Women and Democracy conference in Tallinn, Estonia, one exasperated US State Department official declared, without the slightest hint of irony, that if only they (the Estonian organizers of the conference) would allow the Americans to conduct the workshops and roundtables, “real” progress would be made during the conference. This notion that “they” (whether it be the Estonians or the Moldovans) are not capable of realizing their own needs or accomplishing particular goals on their own was a pervasive theme during my encounters with US officials. The underlying problem, of course, was that “they” were not doing things the way “we” would like them to be done. Thus the reliance on tangible products which seem to reflect “successful” programs: pamphlets, books, and conference reports. Of course this also reflects a bureaucratic need to quantify program results. In the interest of full disclosure, of course, I should note that I have participated in several of these conferences (and have written the conference report for one of them); they are useful in terms of networking possibilities (which can be invaluable), but I question the long-term effects of such efforts.

past efforts (the “tried and true” although not necessarily really true), but if policies reflect the tried, revamped, reconfigured, and culturally relevant strategies which not only expect resistance, but learn to work with it.

Gender, Language, and Power

Both feminist and constructivist approaches to IR are concerned with the social understanding of power. However, while mainstream constructivists continue to identify power as a material resource of the state (e.g. Wendt 1999), feminists have long conceived of power as a social construct, and gender as an expression of power relations: “because feminists consider power as always present in social construction and because they understand gender as a code for power, they treat gender as a core variable in analyzing international relations” (Locher and Prügl 2001: 118). Perhaps more importantly for this project, feminist constructivists have begun to investigate the process of identity construction (e.g., Weldes 1996; Leffey and Weldes 1997; Alexander 2000). This new emphasis on process takes constructivism a step forward: whereas constructivists have used “national identity” (in terms of “national interests”) as the key explanatory variable (e.g., Katzenstein 1996), feminist constructivism focuses “less on identity as an explanatory variable than on the process of identification, on the way in which identity formation evokes gendered power, on the way in which gender is structurally pervasive in all practices and discourses” (Locher and Prügl 2001: 123).²⁶ While I am not measuring identity change per se, by evaluating the processes by which values and attitudes are influenced, I am focusing on that process the Locher and Prügl emphasize.

²⁶ The process of identity and ideological formation and its relation to power is a key theme of this project; in the case of Moldova (chapter four), for instance, I outline how this process has highlighted power hierarchies and inequalities in Moldovan society.

Although gender is only one of a multitude of dimensions that constitute and individual's values, identities, and attitudes (i.e., class, race, religion, sexuality, and so forth), gender lies at the intersection of these factors; we tend to interpret one's social roles in terms of gendered roles, although gendered roles themselves are interpreted differently in each society. In the case of the transitional states of Eastern Europe, for example, the women fared badly during the transition due to the "widespread revival of nationalist and traditionalist ideologies [which] has had the effect of relegating women once more to the domestic sphere and has led to their growing desocialization" (Einhorn and Sever 2003: 164). Thus, the material constraints of gendered roles may be found in the very real discrimination against women in the job market or within the abuses of the globalized economy, while, concurrently, women are constrained by ideas about family and notions of nationhood.

Key to understanding how gender roles are constructed, as well as how the "rules" of society and politics are constructed more generally, is an analysis of how language (through the public written word, formal policy statements, as well as the vernacular) creates and reinforces those social interactions that are then taken as "rules." Constructivists such as Nicholas Onuf (1989) focus on the importance of "speech acts," by which "human beings construct reality through their deeds, which may be speech acts. Speech acts in turn may be institutionalized into rules and thereby provide the context and basis of meaning for further human action" (Zehfuss 2001: 59). The rules thus created provide the basis of political society, which make political activity meaningful, while at the same time, creating a system of asymmetry in the distribution of benefits—that is, rules create rule. As Zehfuss (2001: 61; Onuf 1989: 122) notes, "the political

therefore is always potentially about privilege and thus involves normative questions. Rules establish stability in social institutions by privileging certain people. We usually call this phenomenon order. Stability ensues precisely because those who made the order benefit from it. Order is a fiction we believe in.”

In the case of the First Image Reversed Model, then, I trace the impact of language—policy language, language politics, etc.—on the creation of the rules of civil society and ask “who benefits?” which is, in itself, another way of asking, “who rules?”. Civil society, as Cohen and Arato (1992; Jaggar 2005: 7) point out, is itself the coordinator of action “through the medium of communicative interaction.” Thus, civil society represents a site of contestation regarding the rules of citizenship, gender roles, and democratic development; within this context, the language of liberalism and neo-liberalism—and Western democracy—for example, creates a system of rule which reinforces gender inequalities, albeit in forms different from what we normally associate with gendered hierarchies.

American assumptions about the role of gender in democratization processes, for example, can be problematic once implementation has begun. In the case of the former Soviet states, for example, gender integration and talk of gender equality has been widely viewed as a remnant of their communist past where “equality” reflected superficial efforts to maintain women in the workplace while also expecting them to carry the domestic burden (Einhorn 1993a; Waylen 1994; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Einhorn and Sever 2003). US democratization policies are based upon a neo-liberal economic model that actually serves to reinforce this relationship, thus serving to undermine any efforts at “gender equality” that might be implicitly (or explicitly) embedded in their policies.

A more troubling issue, however, as noted by Jaquette and Wolchik (1998) and Funk (1993), among others, is that the neoliberal view of civil society encourages the engagement of women in order to provide the social safety net usually cut by governments undertaking free market reforms. On this view, the inclusion of women in civil society is not so much an issue of gender equality, but rather reinforces women's roles as caretakers while simultaneously allowing the free market to make it increasingly difficult to raise families as well as work outside the home. As Sawyer (2003: 362; Jaquette 1994) paraphrases Jaquette's argument, "[Jaquette] notes the priority given to women and democracy in bilateral US democracy assistance. This suggests [...] that engendering democracy is part of making democracy safe for the free market, with women's presence providing an alibi for cuts to welfare." Petras (1997) argues that the "self-empowerment" model utilized by neoliberal strategies actually serves to depoliticize the poor—particularly women—by channeling their limited resources to the provision of social services.

The tension between liberal and neoliberal approaches to civil society and democratization are evident throughout this project: I encountered the struggle to establish women's equality in deeply patriarchal societies through their inclusion in civil society and democratization versus the tendency of foreign policy makers (particularly the US) to think of "women's issues" mainly in terms of economic, rather than social, frameworks. In chapter three, for example, I address these differences by comparing Nordic and US democratization policies, which points to the differences and consequences of neo-liberal models versus social equality models of democratization. In this comparison, I find that the US is more likely to fund organizations that deal with

immediate needs of women (what Molyneux 1986 would call “feminine” interests), rather than “feminist” organizations whose goals are far less concrete and whose results are not as immediate as, say, opening a small bakery in Moldova or opening a small business in Estonia. The “first image strategy” employed by the US and the Nordic states both seek to affect women and women’s NGOs in terms of both practical (feminine) and strategic gender interests (feminist), but Nordic policies do seem more concerned with the long term impact of gender equality.²⁷ Thus “women’s issues” come to take on different meanings dependent on who is creating the rules by which civil society deals with these issues. This is not a small point, as this project illustrates, because the rules reify particular solutions to social and civil problems to the detriment of other, potentially better, possibilities. As the chapter outline below suggests, I return to the question of “language” repeatedly, whether through explicit policy language or through the politics of language within society. It is through language that identity—as the basis of civil society—is shaped (Laitin 1998, 2000; Duffy 2000; Ponarin 2000). Further, the solidification or malleability of these identities will reinforce a society’s receptivity to the influence of US policy efforts to influence attitudes and values.

²⁷ According to Maxine Molyneux (1986), gender interests “are those that women (or men for that matter) may develop by virtue of their social positioning through gender attributes” (283-284). “Practical” gender interests are those that deal with immediate needs faced by women, such as the price of food or childcare. They are, Molyneux writes, “given inductively and arise from concrete conditions of women’s positioning by virtue of their gender within the division of labor. In contrast to strategic gender interests, these are formulated by the women themselves who are within these positions rather than through external interventions. Practical interests are usually a response to an immediate perceived need, and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women’s emancipation or gender equality” (284). Alvarez (1990: 25) qualifies this further by differentiating between “feminist” and “feminine” organizations: “whereas feminist organizations focus on issues specific to the female condition (i.e. reproductive rights), feminine groups mobilize women around gender-related concerns.” While it may be argued that this classification flattens out the variety of linkages between both strategic and practical interests, Alvarez’s distinctions are useful in thinking about the intentions of hegemonic states vis-à-vis women’s organizations.


The First Image Reversed as a Strategy of Foreign Policy Making

Given the preceding discussions, it should be clear that the model I outline below is based upon the following assumptions: US foreign policy is a transmitter of American values and culture, and as such, US democratization policies will seek to inculcate these values in others. Second, the role of gender in the development of civil society will also be tied to American expectations regarding the role of the individual within civil society, whether or not this may hold true in every case. Finally, American policies regarding civil society are based on these liberal ideals while also advocating for neoliberal economic structures that privilege free market reforms and privatization of social services. All three will have important effects on the attitudes and values reflected by civil society, because they will shape the way NGOs behave within civil society. Civil society will look, act, and behave in ways that reflect this Western—and American—influence.

Thus, a “first image reversed” model assumes that hegemonic states or international institutions may produce important changes in group attitudes and values through local, individualized efforts that will ultimately change governmental behavior; it is a bottom-up approach (see figure 1.1). Moreover, this model suggests that if states harness this ability through policy initiatives, targeting local values and attitudes may serve as an important strategy in influencing state behavior. Further narrowing this investigation on those foreign policies directed at women’s issues, as I have done in this research, allows us to focus on a particularly potent form of domestic politics; indeed, the degree to which women’s issues and rights are institutionally recognized is seen on national and international levels as a key determinant of a state’s liberal (or illiberal)

character. The US government's repeated reference to the plight of Afghan women during the "war on terror," for example, rests upon the assumption that in "free," democratic countries, women's rights are secured.

Figure 1.2 The First Image Reversed Model



The shift from top-down to bottom-up, externally-inspired strategies seen in US foreign policy making during the 1990s, involved a conscious development of a foreign policy that works more closely with individuals and groups on the sub-governmental level. Thus, this project looks to US foreign policy towards the former Soviet states over the past fifteen years to illustrate the First Image Reversed Model and to trace the workings of these types of strategies.

First, as a process of political socialization for groups within transitional states, a First Image Reversed strategy is based on the assumption that NGOs serve as an important link between local value and attitude change, domestic action, and state political structures. While this strategy is often implemented in conjunction with other strategies,²⁸ it can be effective not only in its subtle power, but also in its flexibility. Hegemonic states or international institutions²⁹ who implement this strategy rely on the power of localized NGOs to deliver a particular message and re-form cultural and political norms. This strategy deliberately targets key social areas that will ultimately impact the domestic politics within states, such as health, employment, social welfare, or gender issues.

²⁸ See Judith Kelley (2004). Kelley argues that socialization efforts directed at state governments are less effective than those efforts combined with conditionality based on membership in international organizations such as the OSCE or EU, based on rational choice methodologies. Her findings are persuasive, yet she only addresses interactions between these international organizations and state governments; I argue that socialization efforts occur below the government level in ways that place pressure on governments from below. While it is also true that NGOs act as rational actors in terms of strategic funding applications, this does not explain the extent to which funding initiatives on the part of hegemonic actors become part of a larger cultural consciousness and act to change public attitudes.

²⁹ I use the term “hegemonic” to describe an international power—whether a state or institution—that is politically and culturally influential, and possesses the means to spread its cultural and political values. This includes regional powers that seek to influence those around them. In this project I take the United States as a hegemonic power, however, this model could also apply to regional hegemons, such as the Nordic states (led by Sweden) in Northern Europe or the European Union.

A “First Image Reversed strategy” may use a number of tools. To name a few, for instance, the hegemon may use indirect investment in civil society, such as supporting and encouraging elections and nascent political parties. The hegemon may encourage cultural exchanges through student exchanges, business summits, or mentoring programs. Propaganda, such as that communicated through Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America, is an important tool, particularly in times of conflict or extreme state ideological resistance (Nye 2004); ideological resistance may also be overcome by membership conditionality, as noted by Judith Kelley (2004).

Finally, combined with these efforts, funding for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can serve as a useful and vital tool of foreign policy. I have focused my attention on this particular area as a means of narrowing the scope of the research, but I am also following in the tradition of post-Cold War research that has recognized the growing impact of local and international NGOs on world politics (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). Rather than emphasize the influence of NGOs as these past studies have done, however, I seek to understand how NGOs themselves are influenced, and the effects of this process.

Recognizing NGOs as a tool of foreign policy may appear counter-intuitive because NGOs in transitional states (particularly in the Eastern European context), as well as in civil societies more generally, have often been portrayed as standing in opposition to the state (Howard 2003: 38; Gellner 1994; Arato 1981), and as somehow outside the influence of international politics (Cohen and Arato 1992).³⁰ Many of the women’s NGOs and social service NGOs I examined, in fact, were often established to

³⁰ Cohen and Arato (1992: x) note that in liberal democracies, “it would be a mistake to see civil society in opposition to the economy and state by definition.” Quoted in Howard 2003: 38, fn. 11.

challenge oppressive social norms or fill perceived governmental inadequacies; as they developed, however, they also became part of the fabric of social change and embedded in domestic politics. Thus, governments were then forced to contend with them as important political players.³¹ The interesting point here, however, is that this political clout often came through the NGOs' relationships with foreign funders—that is, access to foreign funding. Those funders, I reasoned, influences the programs and social causes these NGOs implemented, thus also influencing their political positions as well. Further, as the governments of these states in transitions began to realize the importance of adopting acceptable standards of democratization³², according to the international community, they also began to rely upon NGOs to carry out the hard work of social transition for them.

To conceive of NGOs as tools of foreign policy is to address the nature of international political structures, in that they influence political conversations within the state, while at the same time, they are influenced by outside forces themselves. NGOs, inasmuch as they reflect either burgeoning social needs or nascent ideas regarding change, are also indicators of trends in collective attitudes. In that sense, then, a foreign policy that includes a specific strategy towards influencing the goals and methods of the NGO sector will also serve to impact the development of collective attitudes and values

³¹ An example from the Estonian case indicates the government's changing attitude towards NGOs: one of the leading AIDS service organizations (ASO) was once a government agency, but is now an independent NGO. The idea was that an NGO would be able to attract more foreign funding as well as operate more effectively and creatively without the restraints of domestic politics and bureaucratic apparati. Personal interview, AIDS Information Centre, Tallinn, 2/2/04.

³² Nancy Bermeo (1992: 274-6) refers to this process as "political learning," in which "people modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and changes in environment." Elites may come to believe that the benefits of pro-democratic attitudes outweigh the benefits of dictatorship, but this does not, however, indicate the "emergence of a deep normative commitment to democracy *per se*." This process is evident in Moldova, as I note in chapter four, where the dominant communist party has come to invoke Western values in the face of severe economic and political challenges.

within those societies. Public attitudes that are more open and amenable to US values and goals, for example, will serve to influence the ultimate interests of a state in democratic transition.

Using NGOs as a tool of foreign policy, however, can be a tricky proposition. First, the very nature of this strategy—as a long term, time intensive (if not funding intensive) endeavor—requires foresight and patience on the part of policy makers. It is not a quick fix. Secondly, as a direct consequence of the first point, this strategy requires a high degree of bureaucratic commitment and policy longevity. While foreign funding is always at the mercy of politics, bureaucrats and policy makers generally should believe NGO funding is simply a matter of course in any effort to affect the policies of another state; current USAID policies toward transitioning states seems to bear this out. In the 1990s, this idea did appear to be a given, especially as the idea of “civil society” was equated with the development of the NGO sector, rather than a broader conception of what “civil society” entails.³³ As I show in chapter four, this does serve to limit the scope of US policies and can be problematic in terms of far-sighted policy making. Nevertheless, the Northern European Initiative (NEI) of the 1990s embraced this idea in the Baltic states (Horn 2003b), as do evolving USAID efforts in Moldova and elsewhere. With the “war on terror” in the post 9/11 period, however, attention (and optimism) regarding the potential of NGOs has been diverted to more pressing needs; the shift in attention from NGOs and civil society to fighting terrorist groups is reflected in the decrease in US funding for these efforts, as well as more emphasis upon trafficking in persons as a social and economic problem connected to terrorism (see chapter four). Further, policymakers

³³ See Putnam 1995, for a broader concept of civil society, which includes religious organizations, sports teams—and bowling leagues. See also Kubik 1994, 2004; Ekiert and Kubik 2001; Cohen and Arato 1998.

have found that this particular strategy was not strictly linear—that is, simply funding local NGOs did not necessarily lead to an immediate and obvious deepening of democracy (Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Quigley 2000).

There are two important points to be made regarding funding for these policies, however. First, as one state department official noted, bureaucrats will continue the course of a policy until told otherwise, even as appropriations are reduced.³⁴ Secondly, although funding levels are important indicators of interest, these levels are relative. That is, even small amounts of funding by donor country standards can be influential relative to the amounts of funding available domestically or through other sources. For example, a State Department funded project contributed less than \$500 to two Moldovan foreign language instructors as seed money for an influential English language program in a Chişinău orphanage; this program was quite successful and will be replicated in the coming years. The specific amount of money, while obviously important in terms of the number of civil society programs that can be funded, is not the most important factor in the First Image Reversed strategy. Rather, the key factor in this regard is the way that the language of funding and funding priorities (as reflected in the “request for proposal” or RFP) communicates the particular norms and values prized by the hegemon. It should be noted that those charged with distributing these small funds (“Small Democracy Grants” in many cases, distributed by the individual US embassies) are US foreign service officers—well trained in US policy and communicating the US administration’s positions. Thus, funding, in part, helps to construct a particular relationship between the grantee and the grantor in which the grantor sets the rules of the game, while the grantee, in translation, communicates its willingness (or lack thereof) to change, to accept these

³⁴ See the comments of Robert Hilton, Horn 2003b.

values as its own. The intention of funding priorities helps construct social attitudes and values through a combination of effects: funders set the agenda; funders create an acceptable “language” which reflects and communicates the funders’ values; and, consequently, funders set the rules of acceptable behavior within civil society. Although policy makers cannot expect to see immediate results, these subtle effects ultimately serve as building blocks for future democratization efforts.

Compounded with the impact of funding requirements, a “first image reversed” strategy appears to be most effective in states that share at least a moderate level of political affinity with the hegemon. For the purposes of this project, I have defined “political affinity” in terms of a states’ relationship with the hegemon: those states who welcome Western (or US) intervention and partnerships, and who share similar commitments to democracy, liberal economic policies, and human rights (or the desire to achieve such norms) will be considered to share either high or moderate levels of political affinity. Low political affinity is defined as those governments who appear to be antagonistic towards Western politics, culture, or ideology generally (or toward the US specifically) through their political rhetoric and adoption of policies detrimental to civil society development. While these values may change over time, for the purposes of this research, I classify a state’s political affinity by the relationship (or lack thereof) governments sought with hegemonic powers in the ten years following the Soviet Union’s demise. Further, I assume that political affinity results in the opening of political opportunities for hegemonic states to become involved in shaping civil society and local politics more generally.

In this project I have identified two cases that represent enough variation on the

political affinity variable to establish the relevance of this variable for the First Image Reversed strategy. Estonia and Moldova both obtained independence in roughly the same time period, both are non-Slavic states (which is important in terms of “political affinity” with Russian and other former Soviet states, such as Belarus), and both sought to establish democratic governments following independence. The difference between the two, however, is that Estonia made an obvious and concerted effort to turn to the West and reject Russian influence; in contrast, the persistence of Soviet cultural and ideological artifacts and Moldova’s ties with Russia, while often fraught with tension, have continued to have a large influence on Moldova’s domestic and foreign policies.

While political affinity is a necessary condition in this process, however, it is not a sufficient condition; the important point here is receptivity for foreign funding, which represents the degree of political opportunity mentioned earlier. Funding for NGOs must not be provided in large part by the domestic population or government, but must be seen as the province of foreign entities; however, the “target” government must also be willing, on some level, to allow this foreign interference, whether through turning a blind eye to these efforts, or, at best, encouraging domestic NGOs to seek foreign assistance. “Receptivity,” then, is measured in terms of the state’s willingness to allow foreign intervention in terms of funding, without imposing significant legal barriers to the development of the NGO sector, as well as implementing international standards of equality and human rights in their legislation. This is a difficult variable to measure, however, in that it may be the growth of civil society itself that forces this receptivity, which represents an endogeneity problem. For my purposes, however, I consider states that have encouraged the growth of the NGO sector through positive legislation as

“receptive,” compared to those states which continue to place obstacles in the way of NGOs and civil society entrepreneurs.

For example, in those Eastern and Central European states continuing to struggle with democratic transitions, ethnic divisions, and the residual economic hardships of their communist past, many governments have been less than enthusiastic about the NGO sector, and the benefits of foreign funding for many in society have been minimal (Quigley 2000: 205). “Storefront NGOs”—as I refer to those entities or groups that are NGOs in name only, often consisting of a staff of one—are common, particularly in those states, such as Moldova, that continue to struggle with the transition to democracy. They may consist of individuals who share a vague notion that an “NGO” is a good way to fill a gap in social services, to bring attention to a social ill, or they may be created to serve political interests within the state (Quigley 2000: 205). The result is a fairly unstable and underdeveloped NGO sector that is more dependent on the strength of individual personalities than on well-defined social movements. One goal of a First Image Reversed strategy in these situations, then, is to encourage increasing interaction between these individuals and the hegemon (through exchange programs, for instance) until a “tipping point” has been reached; what were once disparate individuals and causes can then become concerted social movements. This situation represents an important point of political opportunity, as NGO and civil society leaders actively seek out foreign assistance to supplement the lack of such assistance locally.

Ironically, in those states with high political affinity to hegemonic powers and a high degree of receptivity to the growth of the NGO sector and civil society, the impact of a First Image Reversed Strategy is reflected in the tapering effects of such policies.

Once local NGOs become sophisticated enough to survive and succeed on their own and civil society is capable of supporting them, foreign funders become less influential. Thus, the First Image Reversed Strategy should show to be quite effective in the early stages of democratic transition, but these effects will diminish as transitional states, their citizens, and local NGOs become more accustomed to democratic institutions. As civil society matures and NGOs seek wider funding both domestically and internationally, FIRS becomes less effective for the hegemon, while also becoming less costly. At this point, however, political affinity between the donor state and local NGOs should have increased and the lessons learned by NGOs will have created a system of NGOs that closely resemble that of the hegemon. In this way, civil society will behave very much like that of the hegemon, while also sharing many values of the hegemon—FIR, then, is at once a utilitarian strategy and a normative process. Thus, this “tapering” effect is a marker of success, not an indication of the failure of FIR.³⁵ These effects can be seen most clearly in successfully transitioned states, such as Poland or Estonia, which have been “graduated” from US assistance.

Finally, the capacity of civil society as a “balancer” of state policies will ultimately affect the foreign policy of the “target” state. Because of the lessons learned, the increased political affinity, and the influence of the “hegemon-trained” NGO sector, states will behave in ways that closely reflect the needs of the hegemon; in effect, the

³⁵ As I will show in the following chapters, however, the tapering effects represent two sides of the this coin: first, NGO leaders do, indeed, become more sophisticated through their contacts and trainings with Western funders, so the need for on-going intervention becomes less necessary. On the other hand, the projects favored by foreign funders tend to be short-term and proactive, rather than long-term and reactive, resulting in NGOs that live from project to project, rather than developing a long-term strategy for survival. Thus the tapering effects here may have a negative impact on civil society even as it appears to be progressing. See McMahon 2002: 36.

NGO sector has become embedded in the political fabric of the state and can use its influence to change (or at least help change) domestic and foreign policies.³⁶

Research Design

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent transition to democracy by many former Soviet states offers a natural experiment in international politics because of the extent of policy innovation required to handle these changes. This project traces changes in US foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War area, roughly 1991-2003. This includes Clinton era policies, but also addresses the shift in policies prompted by the events of September 11, 2001, where US policy priorities shifted from an emphasis upon democratization and the (relatively) beneficial effects of an enlarged civil society to a reassertion of confrontational and alienating foreign policies.

To investigate the process of the First Image Reversed Model, I chose to investigate a range of failed to successful cases of post-Communist states in democratic transition, while simultaneously surveying the shift in US foreign policy in regard to democratization from strictly state-centered to value-centered policies. The cases of Estonia and Moldova were explored most closely through field work and consulting primary sources; extensive interviews provide the bottom-up analysis crucial to a First Image Reversed Model.

Utilizing secondary sources of NGO activities in Belarus, I compare them with civil society movements in Poland, also based on secondary sources. These two cases represent an interesting dynamic: While Poland shares a high degree of political affinity

³⁶ See figure 1.3 below.

with the US, its well-developed civil society (based on the strong influence of the Roman Catholic church and trade unions) may have shaped the direction of foreign funding, rather than foreign funding shaping the development of civil society; on the opposite end of the spectrum, the Belarusian transition to democracy has not been successful, yet civil society continues to develop; vis-à-vis US efforts, however, Belarus shares low political affinity as well as in high degrees of resistance to outside influence. Comparing these two cases simultaneously exposes the limitations of the First Image Reversed Model, yet also opens possibilities for its further development. The dependent variable—the degree of pro-American and pro-democratic attitudes within civil society and in foreign policies—reflects the range of successes and failures of FIR strategies, which remains the focal point of this research.

Methodology and Case Selection

The central methodological tool utilized in this research is a comparative case study method. As I will explain below, this includes two types of comparisons: a comparison within one case as well as a comparison between successful and failed cases. The former examines apparent competing strategies in one state to establish the mechanisms involved in a “first image reversed” strategy, as I outlined earlier. The latter comparison assumes similarities on the independent variable (that is, the type of strategy used in transitional states by US foreign policy makers) to enable an exploration of differences on the dependent variable (increasingly pro-American policies and attitudes). In all cases, I examine the impact of the intervening variables that I describe earlier: political affinity and receptivity.

Cases were chosen based on their rankings by Freedom House in terms of democratic consolidation by 2003 (see table 1.3 below); democratic consolidation is here taken to indicate political affinity as well as an indicator of pro-Western (and pro-American) attitudes. Thus, Estonia and Poland both represent firmly consolidated democracies, while Moldova continues to be “in transition” and Belarus remains a non-democratic, authoritarian state. The two main cases, Estonia and Moldova, are primarily non-Slavic nations, which allows me to evaluate their relationship with Russia in terms of politics rather than in terms of nationalism. In the following table, I outline how the cases have been classified, according to the variables described above. My main hypothesis is thus: US policymakers, taking advantage of political opportunities found in states with high or changing degrees of political affinity and receptivity to foreign funding, may increase pro-American attitudes within civil society through funding for local NGOs.

Figure 1.3 Case Selection

	Poland	Estonia	Moldova	Belarus
Political Affinity/Political Opportunity	High—outside influence of Catholic Church, as well as efforts of Polish-American lobby in US	High, due to US support during Cold War. Non-Slavic ethnicity creates closer ties with West and Nordic states.	Low to Moderate—more entrenched Russian influence. However, non-Slavic majorities (Romanian) create tension within state as communists shift to pro-West policies.	Low—strong anti-Americanism and anti-Western attitudes. Strong pro-Russian attitudes.
Receptivity	High. Foreign funding welcomed. Tapering effects evident as Polish NGOs rapidly develop.	High. Willingness to change domestic policies regarding foreign funding. NGOs encouraged to seek foreign funding.	Moderate/Weak. Moldovan Civil society dependent upon foreign funding. Government continues to marginalize independent groups.	Low. Foreign funding for NGOs highly suspect and regulated.
Strength of Civil Society (Freedom House 2004b) ³⁷	Civil Society grows rapidly during 1990s. Government encourages NGOs to provide social services, although recent legislation regarding charitable contributions caps may hinder growth. FH rating: 1.25	Civil society weak at end of Cold war. Weak links with government, yet evidence that this sector is growing rapidly. FH rating: 2.0	Civil Society non-existent or very weak. FH rating: 4.0	Civil Society growing by some accounts (CIVICUS) but non-existent by others, such as Freedom House, which cites systematic destruction of NGO sector by government. FH rating: 6.75
Democratic Consolidation ³⁸ (Freedom House, 2004b)	Consolidated, Liberal Democracy FH rating: 1.75	Consolidated, Liberal Democracy FH rating: 1.92	Transitional Government/Hybrid Regime FH rating: 4.88	Consolidated Authoritarian Regime FH rating: 6.54

³⁷ Freedom House uses a rating scale of 1-7 to measure civil society, based on several factors, including: “the growth of nongovernmental organizations, their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function. [Freedom House] also considers the development of free trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; the freedom of educational systems from political influence and propaganda; and the freedom of society from excessive influence from extremist and intolerant nongovernmental institutions and organizations.” Freedom House 2004b.

³⁸ Freedom House uses a similar 1-7 scale to measure democratic consolidation. The score is based upon an aggregate of six categories: electoral processes, civil society, independent media, governance, constitutional, legislative and judicial framework, and corruption.

Interviews and Data Collection

Data for this project were collected in two ways: analysis of primary sources and surveys (i.e. US Department of State policy statements, US Congressional Bills, USAID project reports³⁹, surveys conducted by IPP, Freedom House, and CIVICUS⁴⁰) and personal interviews (for the two in-depth cases, Estonia and Moldova). Secondary sources were used to supplement primary sources; in the Poland and Belarus cases I relied mainly on US policy statements and secondary sources to serve as a basis for future research.

My fieldwork research was aided by institutional connections in Estonia and Moldova. I established contacts in Estonia while attending the Tallinn Women and Democracy conference in 2003 and the 2003 Riga Women in International Security conference on Baltic Security issues; using the list of participants from these conferences I was able to identify important figures and groups within the women's NGO network in Estonia, which enabled me to set up a preliminary interview schedule before I left for my fieldwork in February 2004. The director of the Women's Resource Center (ENUT) in Tallinn, Ilvi Jõe-Cannon, was instrumental in helping me make further contacts within the NGO sector and with government officials. I conducted extensive interviews in

³⁹ The reliance upon USAID reports throughout this project should not be taken as blind acceptance of USAID's representation of the situations in transitional states. On the contrary, I use these reports as illustrations of the American perception of policy results, which are representations of American culture and ideology at work. The contrast between the "successes" reported by USAID and the very real problems on the ground should not be underestimated or ignored.

⁴⁰ The disparities between Freedom House's reports and the CIVICUS reports are often stark. In the case of Belarus, for example, Freedom House (2004b) notes the harsh restrictions on NGOs and civil society in general, while CIVICUS claims that there is a growing, "vibrant" civil society (CIVICUS report, Zagoumenov 2001). The author of the CIVICUS report, as I note in chapter five, is, in fact, the director of a relatively successful Belarusian NGO, one which enjoys government support. Thus, it is important to point out that even seemingly objective reports, based upon quantitative measures, can be quite biased. Taking these issues into consideration, I take the Freedom House reports to be a more accurate reflection of the situation in transitional states, as the reports are based on a larger number of indicators, widely based reports, and independent review. However, the CIVICUS reports do provide meaningful information, in that they provide useful anecdotal evidence in several cases, which should not be completely dismissed. My thanks to Jan Kubik for pointing to these issues.

Estonia with administrators of women's NGOs and human rights organizations, members of the US embassy, the Nordic Council, Estonian policy makers, rural Estonian women, young Estonian feminists, and faculty and students of Tartu University; I used this data to compare US and Nordic funding efforts for women's organizations.

From October 2003-October 2005 I worked on State Department funded project that established a partnership between Moldova State University and Rutgers University. This project resulted in the Civic Engagement Program Office (CEPO) which seeks to combine civil society development with active learning methods in the classroom. My position as grant coordinator and trainer for junior faculty enabled me to travel to Moldova multiple times over the course of the grant period (2003-2005) for 10 day periods; I spent a longer period there in May-June 2004 to conduct my own fieldwork. This allowed me to make close contacts with key NGO figures, and fostered a deeper understanding of Moldovan society. I conducted a series of interviews in Moldova, concentrating mainly on NGOs which deal with the issue of trafficking in women, one of Moldova's largest foreign and domestic problems. I also interviewed university faculty and students of the State University of Moldova, social activists, US Foreign Service officers, USAID staff, and US Peace Corps staff and volunteers.⁴¹

Research Issues: Access, Language, and Elites

The differences in access to NGOs in Moldova and Estonia were stark. First, Estonia's NGO sector, in comparison to Moldova's, is well-developed and the

⁴¹ In all cases, confidentiality and anonymity for interviewees was assured. With the exception of those public figures who permitted use of their names, all names and indicators of affiliation have been omitted.

connections are transparent. ENUT maintains a constantly updated list of operating women's NGOs as well as a list of funding sources. In interviewing NGO administrators, Estonian NGOs were quite open in discussing their funding sources as well as the problems and successes they have had with their funders; while there was a sense of competition between some of the NGOs, for the most part the women's NGO network appears to be healthy and thriving.

In contrast, I was only able to develop one list of women's NGOs in Moldova, based on US Embassy information and information from the Resource Center for Moldovan Human Rights NGOs (CREDO). Of the brief list I was able to compile, several NGOs apparently no longer existed (i.e. phone numbers were no longer accurate, websites disappeared, and e-mail addresses did not work); if they did still exist in name, many of these groups were simply inactive. In this case, then, I relied more heavily on interviews with community activists and administrators of foreign NGOs, such as Italy's La Strada or Soros' Open Society Institute. Those NGO leaders I did meet were suspicious of my intentions⁴² and were usually not willing to divulge funding sources, project details, or political connections. Rather than take this as an impediment to my research, however, I see this as a marker of the early stages of the growth of civil society and a remnant of Moldova's Soviet past. The Moldovan government made this no easier: seeking to measure women's employment rates as a simple indicator of women's progress, for example, I discovered that the Labor Ministry no longer used gender as a

⁴² In Estonia, for example, no one questioned the need to sign the requisite consent form for the interview (required by the Human Subjects Research Board); in Moldova I found that asking anyone to sign an "official" document resulted in a refusal to do so (typically) or inhibited the interviewee to such an extent that the information obtained was useless. Thus, in Moldova I relied on verbal consent and note taking rather than written consent and tape-recorded interviews. In these cases, I asked interviewees to confirm their statements to avoid inadvertently misrepresenting their quotes or meaning.

variable when gathering statistics on the labor force.⁴³ Thus, I found that I was able to obtain more information through casual conversations and observation.

An important issue with this type of fieldwork is the issue of language. Speaking neither Estonian nor Romanian, I worried about the quality of my interviews and my ability to understand what was being said to me (or how others construed what I was asking). In the case of Estonia, however, I found that English was widely spoken, especially among those engaged in NGO work, so I was able to conduct my research without the aid of an interpreter. Moldova is a different matter. Being a small, poor, isolated country, English has yet to take hold as a widely spoken language, which did hinder my ability to conduct some interviews fluidly.⁴⁴ I did, however, establish a close relationship with a professional translator who aided me in my interviews with non-English speakers and served as a trusted interpreter of Moldovan customs and language.⁴⁵

Although I was relieved to find that, for the most part, my research could be conducted largely in English, this speaks to the issue of NGOs, foreign funding, and elite influence on the development of civil society. This is not a small issue, nor is it limited to developing civil societies. This much is clear: those who speak English and have some degree of access to funders will be more likely to have their projects funded; those who

⁴³ These statistics are, of course, available in Estonia, although, as the Soros report points out, gender statistics continue to be under-reported. That labor statistics are available, however, should come as no surprise, given the conditions of EU membership, which require actively including women in political and economic life. While I have not included these statistics here, one could argue that the existence of such statistics (or lack thereof) is in itself an indicator of particular attitudes towards women's participation in the labor force or politics. Thus, that the Moldovan government has made a deliberate decision not to measure women's participation could (and, in my opinion, should be) taken as an indication of the overall condition of women's participation in society: invisible. See Brainerd (2000) for a review of women and labor statistics in Eastern Europe.

⁴⁴ Interviews with the more (relatively) successful NGOs were conducted in English, as were interviews with community activists and most of the academics.

⁴⁵ During the period of my fieldwork, I lived with my interpreter and her family, which was invaluable in terms of making formal and informal contacts, sifting through the data, and understanding the subtleties of my Moldovan experiences.

live in the rural areas, who have not learned English, and who do not know how to locate funding sources will not be players in the development of civil society on the level that I examined; further, the fact that I chose to interview subjects who had high profiles in the NGO sector reinforces this bias. This situation is troublesome, because the point of examining NGOs is to determine the relationship between foreign funding and grassroots activism—but the creation of an NGO elite is unavoidable given US funders' preference for those organizations that look, speak, and organize like American NGOs (Lang 1997; Silliman 1999; McMahon 2002). The leaders of these organizations, in many cases, have had the opportunity to travel to the US or Western Europe as part of academic or professional exchange programs, which has given them access to a broad network of other NGOs and funding sources. On the other hand, this “professionalization” of the NGO sector also means that these leaders are more likely to be accepted by domestic government officials as legitimate political players, thus allowing the possibility of domestic political influence. Given my limitations and the limitations of this situation, I sought to obtain as much information from the “non-professionals” that I could, thus the interviews and conversations with young activists, rural women, and men and women not affiliated with NGOs per se. While this did not entirely overcome the problem of dealing with elite access, I hoped that this method would give my research some sense of balance.

Chapter Outline

In chapter two, “The Seeds of Freedom: US Policy and Democratization,” I trace the shift in US policy following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. In this chapter, I explore the development of US foreign policy in this period, particularly in terms of NATO enlargement in the Baltic region. A discussion of the effects of the SEED Act, the FREEDOM Act, and an exploration of the Northern European Initiative serve as the basis of the First Image Reversed Strategy. These policies reveal an emphasis on the importance of identity in light of shifting spatial boundaries and a move to a post-Westphalian world, while also reflecting important changes in the language of democratization. I also argue that these policies contain crucial American assumptions regarding local values and the role of women in democratizing societies; while these assumptions serve as the foundation for innovative policies, they also serve to limit the possibilities of such policies.

My discussion of NEI and the implications for affecting domestic values and attitudes are extended further in chapter three, “Setting the Agenda: US Foreign Policy and Gender Roles in Estonia.” One of the most successful transitions to democracy, Estonia shares the greatest affinity with the West, and the US particularly; Estonia enjoys a growing civil society has been encouraged by the process to NATO and EU accession. This case reflects competing efforts of hegemonic powers in the region while revealing the importance of political affinity and the agenda setting effects of NGO funding. Indeed, this case reveals how the language of funding constructs the environment in which NGOs operate, a key component of the First Image Reversed Strategy.

Chapter four, “Moldova: Constructing Agency or Constructing Victims?” follows US funding for women’s and social service NGOs in Moldova, and explores the difficulties the First Image Reversed Strategy faces in societies with low political affinity to the US. Moldova, according to 2003 Freedom House statistics, is marginally democratic. The state’s 2001 election witnessed the return of the Communist party, and subsequently, renewed regulations slowing the growth of civil society. Further, Moldova’s continues to struggle with the Transnistrian⁴⁶ separatist region, political corruption, “traditional” values, heightened ethnic tensions between Russian and Romanian speakers, and the highest poverty rate in Europe: all these factors continue to negatively affect this country’s transition. This case is used to reflect the possibilities for a FIR strategy if the hegemon is willing to devote the time, money, and energy to create closer cultural ties as well as encourage democratic values.

In the Republic of Moldova, I was able to investigate the extent of US influence in a society with a far less developed NGO sector. Here I discovered the extent to which states in transition rely on foreign funding to support nascent civil society; ironically, this reliance also creates governmental resistance to this influence, as reflected in the Moldovan government’s creation of laws unfriendly to NGO development. While Moldova has not yet reached the levels of democratic transition enjoyed by Estonians, renewed efforts on the part of US policy makers reveal the continued importance of targeting NGOs and civil society to encourage free, democratic elections, the growth

⁴⁶ The Russian name for the river that divides the breakaway republic from the Republic of Moldova is Днестр (Dniestr); the Romanian name is Nistru. The common Russian name of the breakaway republic is Приднестровье (*Pridn'estrov'ye*); while the Moldovan (Romanian) name is Republica Moldovenească Nistreană, more commonly referred to as Transnistria. Throughout this project I refer to the region by its abbreviated Moldovan name, Transnistria, which is often written as Transdnistria if using the Russian name.

small businesses (particularly among women), and efforts to eradicate international trafficking in persons.

Chapter Five, “First Image Reversed: Universally Applicable or Culturally Specific? Conclusions and Evaluations of the Model” presents two smaller case studies where the effects of a First Image Reversed Strategy has been limited or nonexistent. In the case of Belarus, the limitations are due to both low political affinity as well as low receptivity to outside influence in civil society based on deeply ingrained ideological and political factors. Poland, although sharing a high degree of political affinity, is also low on the receptivity axis, not because of a lack of civil society, or because of a lack of acceptance of US funding, but because of the relatively well developed civil society that existed before the change in US policies. The First Image Reversed Model, however, is useful in both cases in analyzing the position of women within these societies and the impact of foreign influences.

Chapter Two

The Seeds of Freedom: US Policy and Democratization

In November 2002 seven former Soviet countries—Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--were accepted into NATO, a precursor to EU membership, which they attained in 2004 (Bulgaria and Romania are to officially join the EU in 2007). NATO accession has been called a success story of American foreign policy, spreading the American security umbrella over an increasingly unified Europe. Despite the rift in US-European relationships immediately before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the increasingly hawkish position of the Bush administration, it is important to recall the surprisingly progressive reliance on “soft security” in the Clinton administration’s drive for NATO expansion. NATO expansion was not framed in terms of strategic necessity; rather, it was hailed as a new tool for encouraging civil society, economic integration, prevention of disease, and the nurturance of democratic ideals. As a result of the Northern European Initiative (NEI), the Clinton administration’s expansion strategy, the Baltics became an example of a seemingly new approach to foreign policy—foreign policy that looks beyond traditional geopolitics and looks to address new notions of security and cooperation. At the time of its conception, the policy represented a heady brew of hard and soft security issues, multilateral cooperation, and a willingness to adapt policies created in European forums. The policy recognized the importance of addressing structural inequalities as well as the insecurities created through negative attitudes towards minority groups and within society in general.

Despite its successes, however, critics of seemingly imperialistic US foreign policy argue that these policies represent reliance upon neoliberal approaches to social issues, particularly gender issues (Einhorn 1993a, 1995; Snitow 1999). Indeed, gender policies in the Baltics as well as other transitional states have moved from encouraging women in civil society (voting, political participation) to a greater emphasis on women's entrepreneurship. I will discuss this further below, but this neoliberal emphasis on free market economics may serve to reinforce many of the structural inequalities already faced by women in the region. Further, the Bush administration's strident opposition to domestic policies such as affirmative action and abortion rights is reflected in its inability to look to innovative global approaches to women's integration, such as quotas and family planning.

Given the current global concern with war in Iraq, the US move to a neo-Wilsonian⁴⁷ position, and the threat of terrorist attacks, it remains to be seen if the innovative policies of the 1990s will continue to be implemented or if budget cuts and disinterest in democratization programs will soon spell their demise. We might also question the efficacy of US sponsored programs that must bear the brunt of a moralizing administration whose "compassionate conservatism" has been viewed as less than compassionate towards global women's issues, particularly reproductive rights. Nevertheless, if we consider security in terms of individual needs, human rights (especially women's rights), and the conflation of those needs with pro-Western attitudes, as I argue in chapter one, then we might consider the original implementation of first

⁴⁷ By neo-Wilsonian policy, of course, I refer to the notion that the US can "make the world safe for democracy," an idea that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refers to as "transformational diplomacy." While this idea is indeed an extension of the Clinton administration's proactive policies, the difference lies in the current administration's willingness to intervene with force to enforce American values of liberal, American style democracy.

image reversed strategies such as NEI as a model of future American foreign policy in other regions, such as the South Eastern Europe Initiative (SEEI).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the creation of first image reversed policies, with a particular interest in the NEI as a model of such policies. This chapter will also expand upon the theoretical approach outlined in chapter one, particularly the incorporation of gendered identities into US foreign policy; the case of NEI is used to illustrate the possibilities and drawbacks of such an approach. I begin with the initial policies that followed the great changes in the Soviet Union and eastern and central Europe, the SEED Act of 1989, the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992, and NATO expansion and enlargement of the 1990s, followed by a more detailed discussion of NEI and SEEI.⁴⁸

The case of the Baltics and NEI is used to illustrate the importance of addressing individual security to encourage democratization, and to discuss the nature of gendered identities in this process. I will outline the development of NEI, its policy prescriptions, and the issue areas the policy addresses, as well as how this model has been extended to South Eastern Europe in the form of SEEI; this chapter relies most heavily upon NEI and the Baltic case, as SEEI was developed based upon the success of NEI. Next I will discuss the concept of “identity,” followed by a discussion of the current shift in security studies from state security to individual security, and the impact of rethinking spatial boundaries; this discussion is relevant in terms of identifying the elements of society (attitudes and values) that were targeted by policy makers.

⁴⁸ While these policies do span the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Clinton, respectively, I argue here that it was during the Clinton administration that we see the greatest emphasis upon foreign policies that target individual attitudes and values through funding for community based and national NGOs and other civil society organizations.

This argument engages feminist and constructivist approaches to security, maintaining that gendered identities continue to serve as markers of deeper meanings of security. For example, people who continue to see men as the primary breadwinner may also be more inclined to accept politics that are top-down, overly bureaucratic, and formulaic. Here security would be perceived as a paternalistic condition, a reflection of some greater anarchic force. In this regard, threats to security are almost entirely external, a process of “othering.” In contrast, people who see the value of gender equity, social welfare to foster this equity, as well as the need for greater accountability among policy makers will value security in terms of social connections—the situation fosters relational ties that depend upon the security of all in terms of the one. Regionalized security, then, benefits from the encouragement of “soft” security constructions.

Finally, I discuss identity, NEI, and SEEI in terms of democratic enlargement, arguing that American policies are dependent on a particularly American identity;⁴⁹ thus, US policies during the Clinton administration resulted in an attempt to shape individual values such that these individuals come to see their own security needs mirrored in American security needs. Gendered identities and policies geared towards these issues offer us a glimpse into US policy strategies, revealing the extent to which US policy is tied to American identity; the impact of these policies (if any) reveal the problems associated with a liberal worldview of women, women’s place in domestic and international society, as well as the positive association of empowered women and

⁴⁹ See chapter one for a discussion of American liberal values and ideology, and their impact on foreign policy making.

national progress. These issues also bring to light the conflicts between a reemerging American conservatism and practical solutions to many of these issues.

The Seeds of Freedom: US Foreign Policy, Security, and Democratization

The demise of the Soviet Union offered US policy makers a golden opportunity to shape the future and character of the former Soviet bloc. Two linked issues were quickly identified as key to maintaining the US's position as hegemon: introducing democratic and free market reforms while expanding military security to the newly independent states. The Clinton administration's National Security Strategy issued in 1994 –titled Engagement and Enlargement—made NATO enlargement the cornerstone of US policy towards the newly independent states. The document, Gale Mattox (2001: 19) notes, “reflected a commitment, despite Somalia, to assume a leadership role globally with respect to US interests and to support efforts to achieve free market reforms and democratic governance by bringing emerging democracies into the community of Western values.”⁵⁰ The link between Western (read: American) values and global security, then, was clearly drawn; this link would become a theme in future US foreign policies towards states in transition.

NATO expansion, however, represented a tough sell for the administration, particularly to the Defense Department and the military, which questioned the feasibility of extended US commitments abroad, given military downsizing and the struggle to maintain force structures (Mattox 2001: 19). Further, there was added worry that any attempt to expand NATO protection to the former Soviet states would incur the wrath of

⁵⁰ This policy came to be known as the “En-En Doctrine.”

Russia; while the Russians might be down, they were not taking the stance of a country beaten. The administration's response to its critics—and as pabulum for the Russians—was to create the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, introduced at the January 1994 Brussels NATO summit. While initially extending NATO membership to a few states, the PfP allowed all former Warsaw Pact states and the newly independent republics a place at the table (albeit without a vote), participation in NATO exercises, and gave them the hope of future NATO membership. An important goal of PfP was to give potential NATO members the opportunity to revamp their military—and social—structures to conform to NATO and Western standards, such as creating civilian leadership of the military and reforming chain-of-command structures. Further efforts would also create regional command structures, such as the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT).

Thus, NATO expansion became the (ironic) tool of the US's new policies. The “En-En Doctrine,” however, was founded on policy precedent, particularly the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, which would work hand-in-hand with En-En efforts. The goal of SEED was to “promote democratic and free market transitions in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, enabling them to overcome their past and become reliable, productive members of the Euro-Atlantic community of Western democracies.”⁵¹ The original policy was meant to encourage democratic and free-market reforms in Poland and Hungary through “diverse undertakings designed to provide cost-effective assistance to those countries of Eastern Europe that have taken substantive steps towards institutionalizing political democracy

⁵¹ Thomas Adams, Acting Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, US Department of State “Introduction: US Government Assistance to Eastern Europe under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, FY 2002”, January 2003. Downloaded from www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2003/23580pf.htm 7/23/2004.

and economic pluralism.”⁵² The successful integration of several former SEED-recipient countries—particularly Poland⁵³—into NATO and the EU has marked SEED as a model policy; despite on-going budget cuts, policy makers clearly recognize the value and potential in such efforts.

The FY 2002 report, for instance, noted that four out of the five former Yugoslav states “now have democratically elected governments and are learning the difficult lessons of democratic governance.[...] The SEED program has played an essential role in this turn of events.” SEED, the author notes, symbolizes the American commitment to the region, and continued US engagement will serve as a guarantor for success for other donors. Beyond SEED’s symbolic importance, of course, lies its practical implementation: “SEED assistance zeroes in on the areas that largely will determine the successes or failure of these countries’ democratic transitions—better laws and more effective judiciaries, reduced crime and corruption, effective programs against trafficking in humans and support for the victims, healthier inter-ethnic relations between majority and minority populations, market economies that work, free and vigorous media, and vibrant civil societies characterized by energetic non-governmental organizations, to name only a few.” SEED was a bottom up approach, meant to reconfigure domestic politics in order to secure international security.

In short, SEED was an ambitious policy, and the resulting “spin-off” policies, such as the Northern European Initiative, as well as the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) are no less ambitious. SEED explicitly meant to change the way citizens related to their states, as well as how they related to the broader global economy—with the US at

⁵² Text from Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, downloaded from www.usaid.gov/pl/seedact.htm 4/28/2005.

⁵³ See chapter five for an evaluation of USAID efforts in Poland.

the helm. In 1992, the (first) Bush administration created a similar policy, the Freedom for Russian and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act (FREEDOM), which sought to provide “a flexible framework to constructively influence the fast-changing and unpredictable events transforming Russia and Eurasia.”⁵⁴ This comprehensive act contained ten components, including: provisions for humanitarian aid, nuclear safety and demilitarization, assistance in building free markets, support for democratic institutions, credits for purchase of US food, eliminating Cold War restrictions on trade and investment, development of a private sector, leveraging US contributions through the IMF, supporting a US leadership role in a stabilization fund, and finally, “the Act expands the American presence on the ground and increases people-to-people contacts.”⁵⁵ These “people-to-people” contacts included increased Peace Corps placements in the newly opening societies, as well as a variety of cultural and academic exchange programs that would increase contacts with Americans and American culture.

US policy makers were clearly creating a policy agenda that emphasized free market economies, democratization, and the development of civil society, from the ground up. The Clinton administration made the link between the three elements explicit in its 1994 USAID initiative, the Democracy Network Program (DEMNET), which was created to “encourage the development of civil society and support greater citizen participation in public policy-making, throughout Central and Eastern Europe.”⁵⁶ DEMNET was developed to offer technical assistance and training directly to NGOs on

⁵⁴ “FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 Fact Sheet,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, April 1, 1992. Downloaded from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/b920401.htm 3/25/03.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Mark Segal and David Burgess, “Executive Summary: USAID/Lithuania Democracy Network Program Impact Report,” USAID/Lithuania 1999. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/lt/demnet.html. 4/29/05.

the local level, and to create regional programs to facilitate NGO networking. In the three Baltic states, DEMNET was “implemented by local branches of the US Baltic Foundation (USBF). Regional initiatives were carried out by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and Freedom House/National Forum Foundation (FH/NFF). This two tiered approach was designed to combine local, regional, and international expertise to obtain the maximum benefit for indigenous civic culture.”⁵⁷

SEED, FREEDOM, and DEMNET serve as the basis of a First Image Reversed” policy strategy that emphasizes the importance of civil society and the link between international and domestic politics. NATO expansion was framed as an issue of domestic political security rather than as a geopolitical chess move; in doing so, US policy makers introduced a new way of thinking of the rapidly changing global political climate. The resulting policies—such as the Northern European Initiative—would further illustrate the link between international and domestic politics and the creation of civil society.

NATO Expansion and NEI

The Northern European Initiative was announced in September 1997. Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick’s pivotal 1996 article “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,” outlined US needs in the region and created the bases for the policy. They suggested a policy with the fundamental goal of assuaging Russian fears of NATO enlargement and US involvement in the region. The policy, they argued, should attempt to pull Russia into a cooperative relationship in the Baltic region rather than heighten hostilities by ignoring the very real security issues in the region. They pointed to six

⁵⁷ Ibid.

“building blocks” of a future American policy: the need to encourage political and economic reform in the region; encourage the Baltic states to modernize their militaries according to Nordic models; facilitate programs that support Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Further, the policy should attempt to coordinate EU and NATO timetables while working to bring the Baltic states to the level of development necessary for EU and NATO membership; and the US should strive to remove obstacles to NATO membership, expanding the Partnership for Peace, for example. Finally, the US needed to maintain a relationship with Russia that would alleviate Russian fears of NATO expansion in the Baltics (Asmus and Nurick, 1996; Rhodes 2001: 46). The resulting Baltic-American Charter, signed in January 1998, serves as the cornerstone of the policy. Integration of the Baltic states was framed as a key element of US-European cooperation and European security:

As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the Partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security, and defense institutions. Europe will not be fully secure unless Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.⁵⁸

The Charter also lays the foundation for value and attitude changes through democratic institutions, especially in terms of political and social reforms.

Security in the region would be accomplished through a bottom-up approach, with the aid of several other countries in the region (most notably Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and to a lesser degree, Germany). Official US policy states that “NEI seeks to bring together and energize government agencies, the private sector, and the community of non-governmental organizations...to build a ‘culture of cooperation’ among the Baltic

⁵⁸ Baltic American Charter of Partnership downloaded from www.usembassy.ro/USIS/Washington-File/500/98-01-16/eur506.html 3/6/01.

states, northwest Russia, the Nordic countries, Poland, and Germany.”⁵⁹ NEI was actually a variety of programs developed to address six interrelated groups of issues: business and trade; law enforcement; civil society (including social integration and women’s issues); energy; environment; and public health. These programs were co-financed by the US government and other governments within the region, but they have been developed and implemented by a network of NGOs, local business communities, USAID, and local governments; the Soros Foundation’s Open Society, for instance, figured prominently in implementing civil society programs. There were three interrelated tracks: the Baltic track, the Nordic track, and the Russian track. Essentially, the policy covered the entire Northern region, with the crucial recognition that Russia could not be excluded.

Despite the apparent importance of this policy, US funding remained paltry; funding levels over the life of the policy (1997-2003) remained at approximately \$5million, with significant cuts following the policy’s 2003 rebirth as “E-Pine”. The policy’s end reflected the sense that the Baltic countries had successfully passed through the elementary stages of democratization and, thus, could be “graduated” from US aid. Although the Nordic states continue to play a much larger role in the Baltic region, waning American interest has only fueled perceptions of the US as less than committed to soft security issues and more interested in strategic, hard, security issues. For example, women’s groups in the region frequently cite the US failure to ratify CEDAW or a domestic equal rights amendment as illustrative of this lack of commitment to soft security, despite US efforts (through NEI) to include women in the democratization

⁵⁹ US Department of State Bureau of European Affairs Fact Sheet, April 1, 2001. Downloaded from www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/index.cfm?docid=1985, 4/13/01.

process.⁶⁰ When US policy does emphasize the role of women in the region, the focus is on women in business or trafficking, but little attention is paid to the link between globalization and prostitution, for example. As I will show in the following chapters on Estonia and Moldova, US policies tend to make too fine a point on the connection between economic freedom and gender equality, with little to no attention paid to underlying social and cultural values that may inhibit true equality.

Creating the Northern Borders of a Free Europe: NEI

At its heart, NEI addresses basic tensions in the emerging “post-Westphalian” world. “Post-Westphalian” denotes a system where states are no longer the referent of security and global politics; it is a system where cross-border cooperation is more frequent, and border-crossing issues, such as crime, disease, and international politics affect domestic politics. This emerging reality offers US policy new challenges, but has also created a fundamental conceptual tension between post-Westphalian foreign policy strategies and the longstanding American policy of democratization, where US policy makers must preserve US primacy in a traditional state system with concrete borders while also designing policies that more adequately address issues of individual security, identity, and shifting spatial conceptions. The key to US foreign policy in a post-Westphalian system is not how well policy makers can shape policies that compel states

⁶⁰ During the 2003 Third Baltic Sea Women’s Conference on Women and Democracy in Tallinn, Estonia, this point was stressed in speeches, workshops, and personal conversations quite often, either directly or through innuendo. The fact that the US continues to rank quite low among states with women represented in the legislature was not lost on participants looking for ways to increase women’s participation in government (the US ranks 59th; comparably, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Costa Rica are at the top of the list, while even Latvia and Estonia rank above the US, at 47th and 49th, respectively).

to do what the US wants it to do; I argue that foreign policies—successful foreign policies—will be based upon how well those policies affect the collective values of individuals and integrate notions of personal security into policy frameworks.

American foreign policy may have always affected individual security and people's values concerning their own security (take Radio Free Europe, for example, which made explicit connections between liberal democracy and personal well-being), but what we see in the implementation of the NEI was a conscious recognition of the usefulness of these types of policies, given the emerging issues of the post-Cold War world. Not only must US policy makers worry about the ways US citizens come to identify with US foreign policy, but foreign policies must also aim to change the way individuals in other states perceive their own security. Moreover, the “national interest” is the result of the interaction between international institutions and collective values, measured in terms of personal security—it should be a bottom-up approach, where local values and attitudes are considered in light of globalized security issues.

NATO expansion and the case of NEI present us with three equally important and intertwined issues. The first two deal with changing perceptions of world politics; the third explores US policy makers' attempts to reconcile emerging post-Westphalian tendencies towards localization, regionalization, and globalization with states' desires to cling to the modern state system. First, the political landscape in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe, where state identities shaped in terms of Cold War security needs have splintered, has left a multitude of identities, and, concurrently, a multitude of security issues. Hungary seeks to protect Hungarians outside its borders; violence erupted in Yugoslavia and destroyed the state; policy makers struggle with solutions for trafficking

in women; the AIDS epidemic was suddenly an issue of international importance. There is no way these issues can be ignored, but how do policy makers deal with issues that refuse to be bounded by a state's borders? The post-Westphalian system has also encouraged the exploration of gender and its impact on these issues; rethinking security in terms of gender has blown apart traditional political notions, revealing the extent to which exclusionary politics have hampered social progress (Tickner 1992, 2001; Peterson and Runyan 1999). The rapid increase of women's networks since 1990 speaks to the growing awareness of those issues that affect women particularly, including illiteracy, poverty, violence, and political inequalities (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In times of instability, Hyde-Price (2000: 43) notes, identities tend to coalesce into "us versus them" relationships; during the Cold War, for example, global instability resulted in a strict demarcation between East-West, NATO-Warsaw Pact, First-Second-Third Worlds. With the end of the Cold War, however, national identities and old rivalries have reappeared, and with them, new considerations of security—issues that are not easily resolved with a threat of nuclear war or saber rattling. The US, then, has to create policies that foster a feeling of security by satisfying the demands of reemerging identities, not only to protect its own interests, but to avoid the dangerous crystallization of identities found in the last century. While Michael Walzer (1994: 200) might argue, "when identities are multiplied, passions are divided," we still need to deal with the tensions this multiplication of identities might cause. This implies, then, that US foreign policies in a post-Westphalian world must take identities seriously, not as an afterthought in security policies, but as a vital component.

The second issue, as described by both Rhodes (2001a&b, 2002) and Browning (2001), is that a post-Westphalian system implies that state borders are permeable, porous, and, perhaps in the case of Europe, fluid. Who and what should be the target of policy, if the “state” is no longer the referent of policy or capable of supplying security from the variety of issues now crossing borders? As Lapid (2001: 26) notes, “A world of increasingly destabilized identities and blurred boundaries does not easily lend itself to territorially based (Westphalian) solutions.” This poses a problem for the US’s traditional approach to foreign policy, especially in a world where regional politics have become much more prominent. Further, localized politics make individual security even more important; if the individual is to be the new referent of security policies, to what extent must US foreign policy also engage in social welfare programs? If regionalization is the key to understanding global politics, can US policy makers continue to rely on state-based solutions to perceived security threats? In the case of the Estonia, for example, local security issues have become more closely identified with regional issues, and Estonian identity has become more distinctly Nordic. NEI was successful in incorporating Nordic policy into US policy, but the question is if this will continue as the US moves from multilateral to unilateral strategies. US policy must take changing spatialized identities into consideration to maintain any kind of effectiveness in the region.

Third, following from these two issues, we might rightfully assume that national identities are more important than state institutions that define a state’s identity. But even if national identities—say, one’s identification with a Russian minority, or a Kurdish nation—take precedence, the persistence of state institutions (and particularly, the

encouragement of the development of democratic institutions) must be taken into consideration. This means that there will be a tension between shifting identities, changing spatial conceptions, and institutional structures, especially when a particular world-view (i.e. American) is based upon the survival of these (democratic) institutions. Consequently, to maintain the conceptual equilibrium of the traditional state system⁶¹ with fixed, institutionalized borders, US policymakers are compelled to find ways to connect cross-border cooperation, national identity, and democratic state institutions.

Identity and Security in the Baltics

If we consider identity and security in terms of individual security, as I have described in the previous chapter, the Baltic states actually present a hard case. Despite a long history of foreign invasion and occupation, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have managed to create and maintain a strong sense of national identity. This would suggest that efforts to change identity or perceptions of identity would be met with much resistance—certainly Soviet efforts to Russify the Baltics failed. Baltic identities, many would argue, have been shaped in response to the fear that national cultures may be subsumed into a greater Europe, a fear founded on hundreds of years of submission to invading powers and occupation. In terms of security in these cases, then, identity may

⁶¹ I do not mean to suggest that the “traditional state system” is a “real” entity that is somehow on the wane—I am not making a structural realist argument. Rather, I mean to suggest that the ontological basis of American foreign policy making has been deeply affected by a realpolitik approach to world politics. What I am pointing to is the tension between this traditional theoretical foundation and the emerging consciousness that this approach is inadequate in dealing with human security issues. Rhodes (2001: 42) notes the tension between traditional US approaches and emerging conceptions of global politics: “The ambiguity and tension in America’s relationship with the Baltic nations can be understood as reflecting the more fundamental unresolved dialectic in American foreign policy which pits America’s commitment to liberalism against its embrace of realpolitik.”

very well be tied to traditional geopolitical concerns, both on the part of the Baltic states, and on the part of their Northern European allies. For a variety of reasons, for example, the Baltic states (particularly Estonia, and to a lesser extent Lithuania) have sought to align themselves with the Nordic states, and have been welcomed back as a traditional bulwark between Finland, Sweden and an historically rapacious Russia; indeed, the NEI is based upon policy initiatives created by Finland and Denmark who sought US “muscle.” Asmus and Nurick (1996: 122) note that regional cooperation is important to the Baltic states, but only insofar as territorial security is assured: “Thus, while acknowledging the importance of regional cooperation and of maintaining friendly relations with Russia, the Baltic states have unambiguously stated that their goal is to become full members of the European Union and NATO—the two organizations they believe can anchor them in the West and provide real security—as soon as possible.”

However, considering this relationship in strictly geo-political terms ignores the impact national, cultural, and individual identities have on issues of security. In the case of Estonia, for example, Merje Feldman (2000: 4) notes that Estonian identity has been shaped by a variety of institutional settings (e.g. government institutions, academia, the media), a mutual constitution of identities through foreign and domestic policies, and in respect to geographical and geopolitical considerations. She notes that “arguments about location, cultural realms, geopolitical threat and security are pivotal to the identity discourse. Estonian identity is depicted as an identity under an omnipresent threat of extinction...Security is conceived not just in military or economic terms; it also involves culture, demographics, linguistics and pedagogy as issues deemed vital to the survival of the Estonian nation.” Here identity and individual security are tied to broader issues of

culture and state security; a threat to national culture is a threat to the state. “It is necessary,” Feldman (2000: 5) argues, “to examine how the perceptions of threats are constructed and how they are incorporated into understandings of identity.” The nation and state are intertwined such that the primary objective of the state is to protect Estonian identity.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, leaders of former Soviet states sought an identification and a more secure relationship with the West—NATO, Behnke (2000: 50) argues “is arguably the most relevant institution when it comes to securing the boundaries of a Western community of states, which links the USA to the security political concerns of its European allies.” The debates about NATO expansion in the Baltic states, however, largely occurred on the level of elite policy makers; on the domestic level, the prerequisites required for NATO membership—and the concurrent prerequisites for EU membership—have been viewed as a threat to national cultures (Feldman 2000; Rhodes 2002). On the part of the US, the debates around NATO expansion centered on democratic expansion, representing a departure from NATO’s traditional role as a provider of “hard” security. President Clinton’s policy of democratic enlargement and engagement, for example, made a direct link between NATO expansion and the spread of (American) liberal democratic ideals.

Asmus and Nurick (1996) acknowledge that the Baltic states sought NATO membership in response to a perceived Russian threat, but they also indicate that democratic enlargement was an important concern. Although I am not suggesting that NEI somehow escaped geopolitical motivations, I would suggest that the program evolved to consider success of these programs based on shifts in individual attitudes in

terms of Baltic and European identity (Rhodes 2001, 2002; see discussion below regarding this evolution). This identity would not be shaped in opposition to Russia—on the contrary, it should be an identity constructed to fulfill positive security needs, for Baltic communities as well as Russian. This identity, I argue below, would also be subjected to a particularly American view of liberal democratic ideology, a reflection of American identity; it is here that we see identity as a site of contestation, particularly gendered identities.

“A Europe whole and free”: Identities and Shifting Borders

Rhodes (2001a; 2001b; 2002: 42) refers to the postmodern nature of NEI, arguing that the policy exemplifies an evolution—or revolution—in thinking about security: “...the NEI conceived of security in terms of the full range of threats to human welfare and quality of life—including economic deprivation, energy shortages, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, crime, corrupt political institutions, and loss of cultural identity.” What Rhodes points to as a fundamental shift from the traditional geopolitical strategic concerns to the explicit linkage between individual and state security is remarkable in terms of policy, but even more so in terms of theoretical and political analyses. One need only peruse the earliest feminist scholarship on world politics, for example, to see that feminist scholars and activists have long called for this very shift.⁶²

The important point here is that US policies must address shifting identities vis-à-vis shifting borders; policy makers must think in terms of “imagined” communities rather

⁶² See, for example, Tickner 1995, 2001; Enloe 1990, 2000.

than demarcated territories occupied by people with fixed identities (Albert et al 2001; Anderson 1983). “Unlike Westphalian borders,” Rhodes (2002: 7) writes of the Baltic region, “the borders within this new northern European community will be permeable, multi-layered, and issue-specific. Identity and loyalty within this community will be increasingly diffuse and cross-cutting, and the resolution of disputes may conceivably be conducted with relatively little attention to national identity.” Shifts in identity have occurred simultaneously with spatial shifts; in Yosef Lapid’s terms, policy makers and scholars of international relations are currently witnessing a rethinking of borders, order, and identities (Lapid 2001; Albert et al 2001).

The Baltic states have turned to recreating a European identity and past, based upon the Hanseatic League of the 13th and 16th centuries, where the Baltic cities were considered part of a Northern cooperative security and economic community.

Christopher Browning (2001: 7) refers to this shift as a dismantling of the artificial boundaries created by the Cold War: “the construction of a neo-Hanseatic League of the pre-modern state era is presented as representing a return to normality following the artificial division of the region during the Cold War.” Both Rhodes and Browning note that US policy has also undergone a spatial shift regarding the region, moving beyond Cold War conceptions of East/West to more inclusive and fluid notions of northern Europe. Rather than thinking of the Baltic states as a buffer zone against a threatening Europe, Browning (2001: 8) suggests, the American emphasis on Northern Europe is meant to invoke a sense of possibility for Russia, a gateway to Europe rather than a buttress against it. This return to a pre-Soviet identification has important implications for

women in the region, particularly as states such as Estonia move towards a more Nordic identification.

Identities and International Institutions: NEI, SEEI and Democratic Enlargement

Implicit in the American slogan “a Europe whole and free” are American liberal ideals of democracy and social cohesion.⁶³ However, a “whole” Europe implies dealing with cross-border issues while acknowledging the thorny issue of sovereignty. How might we reconcile the continuing restraints of a sovereign state system with this emerging reality? American foreign policy makers may have the ability to construct policies that target individuals or changes in social identities, but the effectiveness of these policies will also be affected by institutional and structural factors. We cannot ignore the broader cultural elements, such as political ideology, that may help or hinder the success of these policies. It may be, then, that particular American policies will have a greater effect upon the identities of individuals where these individuals and groups already share some basic similarities with Americans—the most prominent being a shared commitment to democratic institutions. Democratic peace theories suggest that democracies share a cultural norm which frowns upon adversarial relationships with other democracies (Doyle 1997; Levy 1988) but this does not explain how this particular norm comes to be accepted on either side, nor how democracies of different forms, or newly minted democracies, come to be seen as ready-made allies.

What we might assume, however, is that a shared institutional ideology opens the door for engaging individuals, for somehow convincing them to identify themselves with

⁶³ See chapter one for a discussion of American liberalism and American foreign policies.

the interests of others, in this case, the interests of the US. Democratic institutions, then, serve as a scope condition—the success of American foreign policies rests on the ability to affect individual identity, but we may be able to witness this process more clearly when democratic institutions are in place. The Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic “enlargement and engagement” (of which NEI is a product) certainly suggests that the value of encouraging democracy was (and is) based on the need to find common political ground as much as it was based upon a tradition of American liberal crusades. It is not surprising, then, that projects sponsored by NEI serve to promote liberal, democratic ideals; NEI may represent a new way of thinking for American policy makers, but it has not been unaffected by firmly rooted American liberal ideological traditions.

Implicit in NEI and SEEI are uniquely American assumptions of the meaning of identity and its relationship with democratic institutions. In the American democratic perspective, democracy tends to be thought of in inclusive terms; despite very real problems of exclusion within American society, the American ideal of a multicultural melting pot society is a persistent theme in American democratizing discourses. We would expect to find that American foreign policies would address issues of exclusion in ways meant to reflect these ideals. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, where the Russophone minority is excluded from civil society in a variety of ways, ranging from a lack of economic opportunity to questionable citizenship status, US policies have been designed to change the way Estonians and Latvians think of themselves in terms of this minority, as well as attempting to change how the Russophone minority perceives itself in the context of Estonian and Latvian society. In the case of Moldova, enhanced

regional stability through transparent political cooperation and regional support means resisting Russian encroachment and identifying with the West. Framing identity in American terms allows US policy makers to address issues of security in more familiar ways, rather than dealing with the unfamiliar historical context of identities in Northern and South East Europe as well as the unfamiliar approach to gender equity in the Nordic states.

The language of NATO expansion has been framed in reference to NATO's role as the savior of Europe, of a presence necessary to create and maintain peace and prosperity in Western Europe, and now in Eastern, Central, and Northern Europe. Touting NATO expansion in 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Albright proclaimed, "Now the new NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the cold war began." NATO was offered as more than a military alliance to secure European territorial sovereignty; it is portrayed as a guiding light for a global (liberal) community, where liberal economic structures, ethnic integration, and individual security would obtain only under American guidance and protection.

US policy, however, has had to contend with the spatial shift in the Northern region, particularly Baltic identification with Europe and European institutions. For example, Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves "says his nation has so thoroughly changed it can't be said to be 'ex-Soviet.' He says 'Nordic' or 'pre-EU' more aptly describes today's Estonia" (Tarm 2002). No US policy, then, can be effective without acknowledging the importance of European identity. Accordingly, policy

statements have made the link between democratic institutions, European identity, and American values. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, delivering the keynote address at the Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation in Stockholm (October 19, 2000)⁶⁴ outlined the “four principles” of American policy toward the region, all of which centered on the link between American, European, and Baltic identities. First, he pointed to the American affection for the Baltics, linking democratic enlargement to global security. Second, he addressed European security based on political, economic, military, and cultural integration; integrating Russia into this community would be yet another principle. Following the democratic enlargement policy, he promised an “Open Door” to “our core institutions” for “democracies that can contribute to our overall security, prosperity, and freedom.” His speech is peppered with references to the ties between the US and the Baltic region, even pointing to the relationship between Kant, American democracy, and the Baltics.

The development “civil society,” for example, has been a cornerstone of NEI (as well as SEEI). These programs promote the integration of Russian minorities as a way to ameliorate fears that ethnic Russians will rise up as a fifth column should Russia take a hostile stance against the region, as well as attempting to reassure Russia that these groups are treated fairly. Programs have been developed to integrate Russophone women into the Baltic economy through language training, a move meant to address gender and ethnic inequalities, as well as practical economic considerations. The US also participates in joint UN and EU programs which address the growing AIDS and tuberculosis epidemics in the region, and others target organized crime. These programs affect individual values and attitudes in a variety of ways: empowerment of women,

⁶⁴ Downloaded from www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001019_pickering_bssc.html 3/7/01

opening new avenues for personal economic success, and relieving tensions caused by discrimination. Along these lines, Pickering's speech draws parallels between American domestic issues and the problems facing Baltic civil society:

Social integration is a long-term process. The U.S. is in nearly its 224th year of working on social integration in our own country, and we realize how difficult it can be. That is why we are supporting job retraining and language training for Russian-speakers to enable them to participate more fully in Estonian and Latvian society.

Americans can identify with this particular kind of struggle, despite the fact that many Americans cannot really understand the type of identity bred under conditions of oppression and occupation. More importantly, however, policy makers attempted to impress upon Baltic societies the need to identify with American values; to identify their unique struggles with democratization, social integration, and re-identification with Western Europe with the American desire to remain a force in the region.

Critiques of NATO and EU membership are often couched in terms of cultural imperialism from Western Europe (in terms of an all-encompassing "European culture") or as a further exclusion from the West because the Baltics are often associated with Russian security needs. For example, Feldman (2000: 8) notes that "...EU recommendations to integrate non-Estonians into the Estonian society translate into pressure to compromise Estonia's Western identity and are constructed as threats" by Estonian nationalists. Further, demands by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for inclusion of the Russophone population in civil society are seen as a consequence of Russian pressure on the EU and OSCE to exclude the Baltic states from membership in NATO and the EU (Browning, 2002).

This critique extends to feminist work in the region, where the importation of western-style feminism has created a sense of historical dislocation. On the one hand, there is the real need to integrate women into democratic institutions and decision-making, but on the other, there is the perception that the idea of gender equality was a farce perpetuated by the Soviet system, thus trivializing its importance. Further, western-style feminism has not addressed the deep-seated need to protect cultural institutions, particularly the family (Funk 2004). While Western NGOs argue the need for greater political participation and equal pay, Baltic political leaders openly encourage women to return to their roles as mothers and homemakers; the birth rate in the region has fallen substantially, giving rise to fears of cultural deterioration.⁶⁵

Current US efforts in the region, however, continue to stress the importance of economic integration as a means of political integration. US Ambassador Bonnie McElveen-Hunter (Finland), for example, organized the “Women Business Leaders Summit” in 2002 which brought together American and Baltic businesswomen—the American businesswomen were to serve in a mentoring capacity, while the Baltic women were to learn from American capitalist techniques. The program is widely touted as a success, but aside from the useful connections made by the Baltic women involved, these efforts raise some important issues. First, to what extent will these efforts “trickle down” to other women in the region, particularly those without access to the necessary capital to begin a business, for example? Secondly, as noted above, reliance upon the free market to increase women’s participation has not been found to be the most practical or successful route. Increasingly, women’s rights have been tied to commodification and

⁶⁵ See chapter three for further discussion on this point.

economic needs—if good for the economy, good for women. This flies in the face of a great deal of findings, namely that a strong welfare system is more important in guaranteeing women’s political participation, as well as perhaps a quota system, as in the case of several Nordic states, most successfully, Sweden. This is obviously contrary to current US policy, although one could argue that the Clinton administration was much more amenable to social welfare programs, and much more open to innovative approaches to human security.

Although the Baltic region is no longer seen as a security risk, the US will continue to foster its relationship in the region and to encourage Baltic identification with American needs and security goals. The NEI (now E-Pine), for example, will continue in the near future, although the policy has been pared down from its original optimistically idealist approach. The US will seek to aid the Baltic states in developing their security capacity (especially in fighting terrorism), with the continued aid of the Nordic states. The US will also encourage a program of “Healthy Societies/Healthy Neighbors,” which entails a focus on health issues, civil society (judicial reform, breaking corruption), environmental issues, and trafficking in persons. Finally, the US will continue to stress trade and investment in the region, with an emphasis on entrepreneurship, particularly among women.

Conclusion: NEI as a Model of Future Policies?

In the case of South Eastern Europe, SEEI is relatively new, but uses methods strikingly similar to NEI. The South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP), adopted in Budapest on May

29, 2001, aims to promote “a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing SEE countries, and to facilitate actions to address these challenges, as well as to complement the efforts of international organizations, such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, European Union and Council of Europe.”⁶⁶ While NATO’s South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) seeks to promote regional stability, SEECAP makes the relationship between culture, identity, democracy, free-market economies, and security explicit when identifying specific challenges to security: political challenges, including ethnic tensions and “failure to respect differing ethnic, religious, and cultural values”; defence-military challenges, which includes fostering democratic control over the armed forces; healthy economic development; social and democratic development challenges; and environmental challenges and civil emergencies.⁶⁷

To resolve these issues, NATO’s SEEI utilizes quite similar methods to those of NEI: while working with SEE countries to reform their military structures, US policies work in tandem to restructure civil society, and to help create new “European” identities. Moldova’s 2002 endorsement of SEECAP, for instance, can be viewed as a move away from Russia and towards the US—and US efforts within Moldova have acted to encourage this move. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, however, these efforts are not without their problems, which speaks to the usefulness of applying the NEI model in the South East Europe region.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ “South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP)” NATO, May 2001. Downloaded from www.nato.int/docu/comm/2001/0105-bdp/d010530b.htm. 4/28/2005.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ NEI programs were meant to address cross-border issues while encouraging further development of democratic institutions bound by state borders; the policy was at once concerned with post-Westphalian demands while at the same time recognized the persistence of modern state structures. Given the US’s continuing interest in maintaining an important political and strategic foothold in Europe, it seems that US policy makers would be just as concerned with encouraging identification with American identities as well

The innovative nature of the NEI, as it was originally implemented, does offer a framework for southeastern Europe, Afghanistan, and more than likely, future Iraqi humanitarian intervention. It is vital that gender issues be taken into consideration here, and even more important that those efforts be localized efforts—that is, any US policy must be a multilateral effort, with the “expertise” left in the hands of those who live in these societies. Civil society cannot be imposed, but policies that encourage these efforts will, in the long run, ultimately benefit US security needs while also fostering individual security.

as European; to do so, American policy makers should recognize the importance of changing identities, the relevance of spatial shifts, and the uniquely American identity implied in a liberal democratic discourse. The US, however, also needs to embrace other practical solutions that move beyond framing identity and gender equity in terms of the liberal free market.

Chapter Three

Setting the Agenda: US Foreign Policy and Gender Roles in Estonia

Introduction: Democratization and Civil Society in Estonia

In this chapter I establish the prevalence of a First Image Reversed strategy and explore the consequences of using NGOs as tools of foreign policy. I have chosen a case where the process of democratization has been relatively successful, and where there was a noticeable degree of outside intervention in these efforts. Estonia, “the little country that could,” certainly fits the bill; using this case, I seek to compare gender policies of the US and the Nordic states to determine how influential these policies have been and to what degree they have changed the way women in Estonia view themselves as members of a democratized state. I focused primarily on funding for women’s NGOs as a means of narrowing the scope of this project but also as a way of exploring an area where collective values and attitudes have been so openly affected by the intersection of domestic culture and outside influences.

Of the three Baltic states Estonia seems to share the greatest affinity with the West, and has made significant strides economically and politically; within the past ten years Estonia has seen an explosion of capitalism, and, to a lesser extent, healthy political debate over the future of the state. Further, the US government has identified Estonia as a success story, ironically, through the cessation of USAID programs: in 1996 Estonia “graduated” from US foreign assistance due to “the rapid progress that Estonia has made

in re-establishing its democratic institutions and economic relations with the West.”⁶⁹ The transition has not been without its problems, of course—high employment rages in the rural areas; the increase in HIV infections is among the highest in the region⁷⁰; a mounting drug problem, prostitution and human trafficking represent a growing social blight; falling birthrates and the presence of a Russian minority appear to threaten Estonian culture; and the equitable role of women within society continues to be met with derision and suspicion by many within Estonia, both women and men.

According to a 2001 CIVICUS study, civil society “currently forms the weakest link in the Estonian democracy” (1).⁷¹ The authors note that “the non-profit sector as a whole does not constitute an influential actor in the democratic development of Estonian society. The government has not created a space for community service organizations (CSOs) in political decision-making and politicians and civil servants lack an understanding of the newly-emerged non-profit sector, since most CSOs have no clearly defined management structure, and lack advanced leadership and organizational skills” (2001: 2). Nevertheless, the study found that the structure of the non-profit sector in Estonia is fairly well established; indeed, in the USAID 2001 NGO Sustainability Index Estonia earned an overall score of 2.1, placing it firmly in the ranks of consolidating

⁶⁹ “Estonia Graduates From US Foreign Assistance,” USAID press release, 9/5/96 (downloaded from www.usaid.gov/press/releases/960905.htm 1/19/04)

⁷⁰ UNAIDS reports that the rate of HIV infection in Estonia is among the highest in the European region; infections are most prevalent among Russian-speaking Estonian intravenous drug users, ages 15-24. (“Estonia: Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections 1/9/2004” downloaded from www.unaids.org 10/28/04) Government resources to abate the problem are slim. Among the groups I interviewed was an AIDS service organization [see the section titled “Setting the Agenda: Policy goals and Changing Identities” in this chapter]. This organization was originally a government agency, but was privatized by the Estonian government in May 2003. On the one hand, this allowed the agency much more flexibility in terms of programs, but on the other, the agency is also subject to the same problems as other NGOs in the region. See Caldeira 1998 for a discussion of the problems associated with social service privatization in transitional democracies.

⁷¹ Aire Trummal and Mikko Lagerspetz, “The Profile of Estonian Civil Society” CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Project in Estonia, July 2001. Downloaded from www.civicus.org 3/20/03.

democracies.⁷² CIVICUS identifies three types of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Estonia: non-profit associations, foundations, and non-profit partnerships, which are unregistered informal associations. Setting aside apartment, housing, and garage associations, which are required by law to manage commonly owned real estate, at the time the survey was conducted there were approximately 6,000 registered NGOs in Estonia, mainly in the larger cities (i.e., Tallinn, Tartu).⁷³ Likewise, the 2004 Freedom House Report, Nations in Transit, gave Estonia a rating of 2.00 (also on a scale of 1-7), citing weak connections to the government and their political isolation from the political process. Interestingly, Freedom House notes that Estonian NGOs were more successful in affecting policy within international organizations, particularly within the EU, than in domestic policy.

Estonia's fairly rapid democratization can be attributed, in part, to the extraordinary efforts of the government to secure Estonia's accession to NATO and the EU. These efforts have included improving the NGO sector as well as addressing gender equality in Estonian society and government. In December 2002, for example, the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) approved the "Estonian Civil Society Development

⁷² "The 2001 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia," edited by Mark Levinson and Jennifer Stuart, USAID. The Index measures NGO sustainability across seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The scores range from 1-7, with 7 indicating no change or erosion in the NGO sector since the Soviet era. A score of 1 indicates that while the development of the NGO sector is not yet complete, the local community recognizes the need for further development of the NGO sector and has a plan and the ability to do so. Estonia's overall score of 2.1 indicates that "the environment is enabling and the local NGO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing needed reforms and to developing its professionalism. Foreign assistance continues to accelerate or facilitate these developments. Model NGOs can be found in most larger cities, in most regions of a country, and in a variety of sectors and issues" (15). Most of the Northern Tier states fall in this category, while, in contrast, Southern Tier and Eurasian states lie either in the Mid-Transition categories or in the Early Transition categories. Moldova, for instance, earned a score of 4.2 in 2001 (mid-transition) while Belarus earned a score of 5.5 (early transition).

⁷³ By June 1, 2004, the Network of Estonian Non-profit Organizations (NENO) reported 9,000 civic initiative (volunteerism) associations and organizations, but only 1,200 of these are "public benefit" organizations. NENO's website, www.ngo.ee. Downloaded 10/24/04.

Concept.” The decision cites Estonia’s tradition of civil society since the 19th century, “rooted in the traditions of educational societies; in joint activities the economic interest was combined with mutual willingness to help; choral and theatrical societies were the cradle of our professional culture” (1).⁷⁴ The decision invokes the necessity of developing civil society in order to foster democracy, as well as reinforcing a sense of civic responsibility among Estonian citizens. Among the aims of the concept is “to make conscious the values and principles which are the basis of co-operation between the non-profit sector and public sector, to frame mutual obligations, rights, and priorities of action” (2). Essentially, the concept seeks to promote the relationship between civil society and the state, and acknowledges that this relationship is vital for the growth of democracy in Estonia.

Given the emphasis placed on these values by Estonia’s European and US allies, it is not surprising that this type of language would be adopted during the transitional process. As I have found, however, while the Estonian government certainly does encourage the growth of civil society, this encouragement has been made much easier by the willingness of foreign funders to pave the way; indeed, the Estonian government seemed content in most of the cases I followed to allow NGOs to rely almost wholly upon outside (foreign) funding. If the relationship between the government and civil society has grown according to the mandate of the Civil Society Concept, then, it follows that this relationship has also been influenced in large part by foreign funders. The Estonian case is useful, therefore, in tracing the types of strategies utilized by those states

⁷⁴ “Decision of Estonian Parliament: Approval of Estonian Civil Society Development Concept, December 12, 2002,” downloaded from www.ngo.ee, 10/24/04. Estonians are particularly proud of their choral tradition, celebrating with an enormous choral festival in Tallinn every summer, and smaller choral concerts throughout the country. Estonia’s liberation from the Soviet Union has been called the “Singing Revolution,” as Estonians used their choral tradition as a form of protest against the regime.

who wish to influence the actions of this state in transition.

During February 2004, I lived in Tallinn, Estonia, and conducted a series of interviews (both formally and informally) with members of the US embassy, Estonian ministry officials, officials from the Council of Nordic Ministers, administrators of women's NGOs, human rights NGOs, and social service NGOs, rural Estonian women, and young Estonian feminists.⁷⁵ I also attended a seminar at the Tallinn Pedagogical University which sought to increase membership in the "centrist" Social Democrat party (formerly the Moderates): the seminar included members of labor organizations, the Green Party, Estonian academics, and the former foreign affairs minister, Toomas Hendriks Ilves. I was interested in the impact of Nordic and American funding, particularly in the kinds of programs that funding encouraged. I wanted to know how much these women felt the influence of international forces upon their work, and to what degree they believed this influence was responsible for the growth of democratization and civil society within Estonia.

Although the results were mixed, I was able to outline three particular themes. First, the differences between US and Nordic priorities are stark, although not surprising: the US policies stress women's entrepreneurship and trafficking in persons; the Nordic policies, on the other hand, are more concerned with encouraging the adoption of the "Nordic Model" of gender equality.⁷⁶ Secondly, and perhaps more strikingly, the US

⁷⁵ With the exception of Estonian government officials, I have not revealed the names of my interview subjects as a condition of confidentiality.

⁷⁶ The Nordic Model seeks absolute equality between men and women in the family as well as within society. It relies upon a complex web of state-supported social welfare programs to decrease workplace discrimination, to encourage equal roles within family structures, and to guarantee women's individual security. Nordic and Scandinavian states have offered a great deal of assistance to encourage women's

approach seems to appeal more widely to Estonian women because of the relatively small emphasis upon women's rights, and the greater emphasis upon self determination and human rights, with a particularly conservative view of what this entails, as I will explain below.

Third, and more to the point of this research, the First Image Reversed strategy does serve the interests of the funding states, but in doing so, local interests and needs are subsumed, ignored, or otherwise shaped by these larger interests. Given the goal of the strategy—to create environments conducive to the growth of a particular brand of democracy—this result is not unwelcome (and indeed, is encouraged) by the hegemonic powers. However, in terms of women's movements, the strategy serves to limit, constrain, and undermine local women's needs. This strategy recreates inequalities between women and strengthens the divide between the “two Estonias”—the divide between the relatively wealthier entrepreneurs and professionals in the capital Tallinn, and those in poor rural areas of Estonia.⁷⁷ Further, encouraged by Western states, the Estonian government has adopted neoliberal ideas of privatization, resulting in the dismantling of social services formally provided by the state in the late 1990s. Delegated to the NGO sector, the provision of these services falls victim to the vagaries of funding cycles, further increasing the gap between rich and poor.

Interestingly, the reliance upon NGOs to provide social services appears to be common in democratizing states where NGOs have played a large or noticeable role in this development. In the case of Brazil, for example, Teresa Caldeira (1998: 80) argues

entrepreneurship, but it appears that the goal has been to encourage this Nordic Model, unlike the US, which has a more liberal free market approach.

⁷⁷ The idea of “two Estonias” has become a popular description of the growing economic disparities in the country, both in the press and public discourse.

that Brazilian government's reliance on NGOs to provide social services, as well the lack of institutional influence for women's groups in the government has resulted in the "NGO-ization" of the women's movement. While beneficial in terms of opening up political space for women, this process allows foreign funders to set the agenda for the women's movement as NGOs become increasingly dependent on foreign funding. Secondly, this process encourages competition for resources and recreates inequalities among groups of women rather than resolving these issues; the distance between middle class and working class women, for example, is exacerbated under these conditions as better educated middle class women come to dominate the increasingly professionalized NGO sector. Many women's NGOs, then, are often out of touch with the needs of working class women who are left out of the new activities of the movement. Caldeira (80) notes that the further consequence of this process is the cooptation of the women's movement: "at the same time that feminist discourses receive wide circulation and are absorbed and incorporated into the media and into official and governmental documents, they are also tamed, selected, and resignified, losing radicalism and transformative power."⁷⁸

While the Estonian women's movement may enjoy the encouragement and support of Estonia's more "progressive" Nordic neighbors, in light of the influence of foreign funders, as I will illustrate in this chapter, the growth of a localized, "homegrown" women's movement is, in many ways, limited to the wishes of the its more powerful funders. Particularly on the part of the US, the shift from supporting the growth of civil society through funding NGO projects involved in democratization to an almost single-minded and narrow emphasis upon trafficking as the main human rights issue in

⁷⁸ See also Alvarez 1997 and Schild 1997.

Estonia (coupled with a lack of funding), means that other women's issues in the region are largely ignored or undervalued. Further, while Estonian women's organizations have certainly gained much ground in a relatively short period of time, the kind of "democratization" growing in Estonia has less to do with the rights of citizens and more to do with the growth of an increasingly callous upper class, both economically and politically.

US Foreign Policy and Democratization Efforts: The First Image Reversed

The Estonia case establishes the usefulness of a FIR strategy, based on three questions: first, how do hegemonic states utilize NGOs to promote democratization policies in transitional states? Second, how do these policies affect the ways women within these states relate to state institutions? Finally, what does this tell us about the place of the individual in international security?

As I have shown in the preceding chapter, US policy makers began to celebrate the virtues of civil society and democratization following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Policies such as the Northern European Initiative were crafted around particularly American notions of liberal democratic society, emphasizing individual rights, political participation, economic liberalization, and the rule of law. The Clinton administration, in particular, was willing to fund a broad range of programs to be implemented by American NGOs, both private and those associated with the US government (e.g. the Soros Foundation, the Baltic-American Foundation), who would inculcate these values in the citizens of newly liberated states. An important component to these programs has

been the integration of women into civil society through greater economic and political participation. Indeed, the notion of “women’s rights as human rights” has become a frequent slogan (if not an actual policy priority) in the American foreign policy discourse—no policy that claims to aid democratization or “liberation” seems to be complete without mention of first liberating women or improving their lot.

At best, these policies reflect beloved American values—freedom, self-determination, the pursuit of happiness—and the civic responsibility required to maintain these values. At worst, efforts to include women in these policies could be construed as merely a rhetorical justification for American interventionism or hegemonic arrogance. Either way, the interesting point here is how these policies assume particular constructions of women and their roles vis-à-vis democratizing societies. This suggests that policy makers presuppose that the way women understand their relationship with state institutions is a fundamental element of social, institutional, and political change. Further, these policies reveal important assumptions regarding the impact of American power upon the values and attitudes of groups within other states—namely, that American hegemonic power can be used to construct these attitudes in a manner conducive to US policy goals.

Comparing US and Nordic Gender Policies in the Baltic Region: New Strategies for Women

As a result of the Northern European Initiative (NEI), financed primarily from funds appropriated under the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act (SEED), the Baltics became an example of a seemingly new approach to foreign policy—foreign

policy that looks beyond traditional geopolitics and looks to address new notions of security, identity, and cooperation. At the time of its conception, the policy represented a heady brew of hard and soft security issues, multilateral cooperation, and a willingness to adapt policies created in European forums. The policy recognized the importance of addressing structural inequalities as well as the insecurities created through negative identity constructions. Further, this policy carried implicit notions of the place of women within democratization—women were to be integrated politically, economically, and perhaps most importantly, as equal partners in the process.⁷⁹ The policies have since changed their focus, of course, due to a shift in priorities in the Bush administration. Funding for NEI has dried up, and the scope of programs dealing with women seems to be limited to women's entrepreneurship and trafficking in women. These limits, however, also seem to reflect US attitudes regarding the appropriate means of achieving gender equality: equality is not reached by actively seeking equal rights for women through legislation and top-down methods, but rather through teaching women the skills necessary to compete within the established social order.

Much of the NEI's gender-based policies were conducted in partnership with American NGOs such as the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund, which made low-interest loans and grants to small businesses, and the Soros Foundation, which worked with the Baltic-American Partnership Fund (a quasi-governmental organization⁸⁰) to "establish NGOs in the region, with special emphasis on the welfare of women, families and

⁷⁹ First Lady Hillary Clinton played an active role in these efforts: her organization Vital Voices was established to encourage women to play a role in the economic and political development of the Baltic states, and co-sponsored the first Women and Democracy conference in Reykjavik in 1999.

⁸⁰ These types of organizations are also referred to as "GONGOS" (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations) in the more recent literature on NGOs and international organizations, to emphasize the relationship between NGOs and governments. See Willetts 2002.

children.”⁸¹ In this way, the relatively small amount of money allocated to the policy (roughly \$5 million each year for all three Baltic states) could be maximized to greater effect. The new policy toward the region, e-PINE, frames the US relationship with the region as one of cooperation between equals, to spread the success of the Baltics (particularly Estonia) to other regions, such as the Caucasus and southeast Europe, and continuing fruitful security and business relationships. E-PINE’s broad focus includes cooperative security, healthy societies, and vibrant economies, but while policy statements surrounding the NEI specifically mentioned the importance of women in these efforts, in e-PINE’s policy statements, only US efforts regarding human trafficking and limited involvement in women’s entrepreneurship seem to suggest a continuing commitment in this area.

The recent programs supported by the US embassy in Tallinn, Estonia, bear this out. While NEI funding is coming to an end, most of the projects funded were on a two year basis in FY03, thus their funding will continue until at least 2005. “Democracy Grants” (funded by SEED money) will suffer the same fate. Of the 19 women’s programs supported by the US embassy in Tallinn from 2000-2004, ten were anti-trafficking programs, and seven dealt with women’s entrepreneurship and leadership. The remaining two were “gender equality” projects, one of which aided the Estonian Open Society Institute (a Soros-funded NGO) in publishing a volume investigating gender discrimination, and the other to the Estonian Women’s Resource Center (ENUT) to compile and publish its journal Ariadne’s Clew (Ariadne Lõng in Estonian), Estonia’s

⁸¹ Strobe Talbott, “Progress and Hardship: Women as a Force for Change in the Northern Neighborhood,” remarks at the Conference on Women and Democracy, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 8, 1999. Downloaded from http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991008_talbott_remarks 3/9/04.

first academic feminist journal.⁸²

In the case of Estonia, both the US and the Nordic states sought to influence women's efforts to serve their practical interests (e.g. women's entrepreneurship, trafficking), while also influencing those groups seeking to serve strategic interests (e.g. ENUT).⁸³ To the extent that women's equality is at stake, however, the Nordic states have been much more proactive in supporting "feminist" organizations, while the US focuses a great deal of attention upon organizations that are concerned with women's issues (what Molyneux refers to as "practical" or "feminine" issues). The US goals concerning gender have been broad based, albeit vague, yet many of these efforts have proven to be quite effective. When the NEI was in effect, the policy had identified six priority areas: trade and business promotion; law enforcement; civil society; energy; environment; and public health. Of these priority areas, women's entrepreneurship and engagement with civil society were largely supported through conferences (e.g. co-sponsorship of the Women and Democracy conference in Reykjavik, October 1999 and the much-touted 2002 Women's Business Leaders conferences organized by the US ambassador in Finland) and a variety of small grants to women's NGOs. Entrepreneurship continues to be a touchstone of US funding for women's NGOs, and reflects uniquely American ideas about the importance of personal responsibility; more importantly, however, the success of the programs funded by the US underscore the

⁸² Information sheet compiled by the US Embassy, Tallinn 1/30/04. "Ariadne's Clew" refers to the Greek myth of Theseus and the Minotaur. Ariadne, daughter of King Minos and Queen Pasiphae, was in love with Theseus. Before Theseus went into the labyrinth to kill Minotaurus, Ariadne feared that he would not find his way back, so she gave Theseus a ball of yarn. By leaving a trail of yarn, he was able to find his way out of the labyrinth and return to Ariadne. The founders of the journal use this story as a metaphor for Estonian women's part in Estonia's democratic transition.

⁸³ See chapter one (footnote) for a discussion of Molyneux's strategic v. practical gender interests and Alvarez's (1991) distinction between feminist and feminine organizations.

impact these types of interventions can have on collective attitudes within transitional societies.

For example, in line with the emphasis on women's entrepreneurship, the US embassy in Tallinn cites one of its most successful grantees as the Women's Training Center, which brings together businesswomen as mentors and mentees and conducts training seminars for women entrepreneurs. Although this may seem to be a modest program, the idea of mentorship in this region was still a new one as recently as 2000—when I asked about the most innovative programs the US embassy had funded, an Estonian public affairs officer at the US embassy responded:

What I liked most, I can't get past the mentoring things we did in 2000. When the NEI funds came in, we did a 2000 conference at a hotel, with 80 people...I couldn't believe my eyes...the idea of mentoring was new, and has been exploited [sic] since then...there are high business women mentoring those who are beginners, not anybody can do that...[The idea of mentoring] was brand new, taken as a gate to a better world, would solve all the problems of women who were not thinking of entrepreneurship, [who] could do something for themselves. I can't say if men would have made this difference.⁸⁴

The idea of "mentoring" is quite common to American women, which may lead some to underestimate its usefulness, but the impact it has had upon the way Estonian women now think of themselves in their burgeoning capitalist society has been enormous. This program in particular illustrates the possibilities for small-scale programs with a larger impact on collective values and attitudes.

In the context of the Baltic states, this idea also gives a new meaning to social networks as a site for political contestation; during the Soviet occupation "women's clubs" and other such unions were intended as a means of social control, rather than

⁸⁴ Personal Interview, 1/30/04

encouraging the growth of civil society as a counter balance to the government.⁸⁵ Indeed, as one program administrator reported, when her organization announced its first grants for women's groups in 1996, many, if not most, of the proposals submitted had to do with stereotypical women's issues because they had no conception of what it meant to mobilize politically:

In 1996, most of the programs [being funded by foreign NGOs] were then about gender stereotyping and gender roles, and a wider view rather than specific themes. The first applications from women's organizations—they didn't understand what the funding was for—there were applications for beauty days for women, for cosmetics and fashion shows, and they thought this was what "women's programs" meant...it was a general understanding of femininity, and feminism in Estonia was only academic feminism.⁸⁶

When specific social issues were targeted by funders—particularly foreign funders—suddenly the notion of "gender issues" changed quite radically in Estonia, as I will explain below.

In contrast to the US approach, the Nordic posture in the region reflects an unambiguous commitment to social equality as the goal of their policies. Gender equality in the Nordic context "means that power and influence are to be equally distributed, women and men have the same rights, obligations and opportunities in all areas of life, and gender-based violence has been eliminated from society."⁸⁷ The Nordic Council of Ministers, for example, has developed a five year program to address gender equality

⁸⁵ As Einhorn and Sever (2003: 165) note, however, this should not necessarily be taken to mean that grassroots activity among women was not occurring under state socialism, nor that a type of feminism—in Eastern European terms—was rejected by women. What they call the "myths of transition" are the views that first, "under state socialism, despite women's official political 'equality,' they were politically inactive, lacking (as did men) a civil society space filled with the voices of democratic control. The second myth is that, following the fall of state socialism, women in Central and Eastern Europe rejected feminism, and indeed politics in general as 'dirty,' and hence failed to take advantage of this opening and the opportunities it provided for increased political involvement."

⁸⁶ Personal Interview, Open Estonia Institute, 2/3/04

⁸⁷ Nordic Co-Operation Programme on Gender Equality 2001-2005. Copenhagen: Nordic Ministry, 2001.

issues. This cooperation between the Nordic states has identified seven main themes in this area: “integrating a gender perspective into Baltic-Nordic programmes; integrating a gender perspective into financial policy; women and entrepreneurship; trafficking in women; violence against women; men and gender equality; youth and gender equality.”⁸⁸ While there are obvious similarities between the Nordic and US policy priorities—encouraging entrepreneurship and curbing trafficking, for instance—the Nordic preference for socialist solutions to gender inequality is underscored by the types of programs the Council is willing to fund. Further, while the US and the Nordic states often fund the same organizations, the emphases in the grant requirements, as I will explain below, differ significantly enough to identify the differences in foreign policy approaches between the two entities.

Speaking the Language: Funding Policy and Cultural Shifts

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) entered into force in Estonia on November 20, 1991. The turning point for those concerned with women’s rights in Estonia, however, followed the 1995 Beijing Conference; here the issues were crystallized and, following the conference, the Estonian government undertook a study of gender equality during 1995-2000.⁸⁹ The result was the drafting of the Gender Equality Act, but the legislation has inspired rather

⁸⁸ Fact sheet “Nordic-Baltic Cooperation on Gender Equality, 2001-2003,” obtained during personal interview 2/05/04. The degree to which these actually reflect Estonian priorities can be seen in the willingness to accept these Nordic initiatives; as I argue here, Estonians seemed to adopt US priorities more readily, especially where they concerned security, and accepted Nordic priorities where EU accession was concerned.

⁸⁹ Bureau of Gender Equality report

healthy (if contentious) debate within Estonian society. Further, with EU accession looming large on the Estonian horizon in 2004, Estonian officials increased efforts to meet the equality standards set by the EU and vigorously promoted by the Nordic states.

These efforts, however, have been carried by a small number of women, who have been met with a less than enthusiastic response in the legislature and society at large. Part of the problem is that many Estonians—if not most—do not see gender inequality as an issue; indeed, many women I spoke to explained that the problems Western feminists associate with sexism and patriarchy (e.g. domestic violence, employment discrimination, overly sexualized images of women in the media), do not reflect inequality between men and women as much as they simply represent cultural norms. These norms may be changing, they argue, but feminism is not the key factor in this change. (Interestingly, I encountered the same sentiments in Moldova, even among those charged with creating positive change in Moldovan society.)

While it would be absurd to imply that US foreign policies toward women in transitional states are driven largely by feminist activists, the role of over 30 years of feminist activism in the US should not be underestimated; however, as noted earlier, this does not necessarily play out in increased funding for “feminist” organizations so much as it is reflected in US policymakers’ consciousness about the needs of women in transitional societies. This is evident in the US’s rather limited vision of the role of gender in democratization; despite the influence of feminism, US policy ideals also tend to be influenced by neoliberal approaches to social issues generally, and, coupled with the zeal of the righteous, US policies can often appear overbearing in terms of program expectations. There is the perception among many of the women with whom I spoke, for

example, that US policies often seek to impose American values upon others as a prerequisite for further US involvement or funding.⁹⁰

In Estonia, however, the lack of overt feminist language (or goals) in US policies may well serve as an attraction rather than a deterrent to Estonian lawmakers and Estonians more generally. As in the United States, “feminism” carries a stigma, even if individuals agree with some of the broader notions of social equality and fairness. Unlike the US, feminism in Estonia suffers from a Soviet legacy, and as such, the resistance is much greater than in those states that lack this past.⁹¹ Further, the economic neoliberalism encouraged by the West, and the US in particular, has placed gender equality far below rapid capitalist growth on the list of priorities for Estonian lawmakers and their constituents. Ülle-Marike Papp, director of the Estonian Equality Board of the Social Affairs Ministry explained the difficulties her office has had in pursuing gender equality in Estonia, particularly in light of free market reforms:

People don’t know what [feminism] means, and there was a time when feminists were in “comics”...now there are different kinds of feminists....I think there are lots of such kinds of empty words in Estonia—democracy is quite an empty word for the public; civil society doesn’t mean anything. So I think this [attitude towards] feminist women or human rights or equal rights all are slightly coming with ideology from Soviet times...in that time, the human person was less...so we need to change this...to say that there are no more valuable resources in Estonia than human beings, to be more person centered...but it’s very difficult, especially when you have those in power whose attitude is that “now I have power and I can do whatever I want to do.”⁹²

⁹⁰ I encountered this sentiment during at least two of my formal interviews with administrators of NGOs as well as in informal conversations with women from rural Estonia and Tartu University.

⁹¹ Duhaček (1998: 2) cautions against thinking of feminism only in terms of Western feminist objectives, which closes out the possibilities for other sites of feminist interventions. She notes, first, the historical and sociological diversity of Eastern Europe, a tradition of Eastern European feminist philosophy, the impact of socialism on the roles of women, and the diversity of reactions to these roles, resulting in what she refers to as “Eastern European feminism.” When Western feminists proclaim the lack of feminist activities in Eastern Europe, they ignore—and, in effect—denigrate—this tradition: “How do we speak of feminism which is other than Western feminism, if not as a feminism which is the other to it, which would presuppose Western feminism as the parameter?” See also Einhorn and Sever, 2003, Gapova 2001.

⁹² Personal interview, 2/4/04

In contrast, the policies of the Nordic states are more openly “feminist” and obviously encourage a more social democratic approach to democratization than US policies. While focusing on issues such as trafficking, the Nordic states have been active in promoting women’s equality in Estonia. They have, however, run into considerable resistance in this arena. Kalli Klement, the director of the Estonian office of the Nordic Council of Ministers, related the difficulties in promoting gender equality in a country where both male and female politicians and government officials deny the double and triple burdens placed on women in society,⁹³ and who fail to see the necessity of legislation meant to encourage equality between the sexes. These difficulties are further conflated by the prevailing attitudes in the government, which is increasingly the realm of young entrepreneurial men who seek office mainly to further their advantages in the “new” Estonia, where money and finance are the most important issues. Their interests conflict with the more traditional views of rural Estonia (the “second” Estonia) but both result in the same lack of awareness (or denial of) the issues facing Estonian women.⁹⁴

Although the Nordic states have given the Baltics considerably more attention than the United States, largely because they are so close geographically, Estonians seem more open to the Western capitalist/democratic ideals espoused by the US. While Estonia does identify itself as a historically Nordic state (Feldman 2000), its identification with the US is perhaps stronger because of the conservative US policies, an

⁹³ See Duhaček 1998 for a discussion of the double and triple burdens placed on women during the communist era: “the system which they shared was egalitarian in its ideology, which meant that women were nominally and officially declared equal to men. [...] It further meant that women were economically independent, which was one of the least disputed advantages of the shared ‘real socialism.’ The immediate consequence was what was commonly called a double- [...] or even a triple-burden day, meaning that women, beside wage-earning, also had the tasks of housework and child care. Their third daily burden was society’s expectation that they engage politically.” See also Einhorn 1993, Einhorn and Sever 2003, Gal and Kligman 2000a & b, Gapova 2001.

⁹⁴ Personal interview, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2/5/04

emphasis upon free-market capitalism, and US security policies. The director of women's programs for the Open Estonia Institute noted that recent research shows that Estonia "is following the US model of democracy, and not the Nordic model, which is more about taking care of everybody [...] It doesn't have to be termed 'USA,' it's just what we call an 'early capitalist attitude' where money matters more than people." She also noted that NATO accession played a large role in this process, particularly in political and military decisions, such as Estonia's support for the US war in Iraq. The ever-present threat from Russia, whether real or imagined, further encourages the belief that Estonia should rely on those who will be most willing to help—not Finland, their closest Northern neighbor, she argued, but the US, "who are intervening everywhere."⁹⁵

As much as Estonians see themselves as Nordic and respect the EU's institutions, these had little involvement in Baltic independence compared to the US role, and Estonians continue to measure their security in terms of a looming Russian threat which can only be warded off by a US presence. Many within the Baltic region also perceive a common proactive approach to foreign policy between the US and the Baltics: "In the US, there is a tradition of 'doing something' when they see a problem," remarked Mari-Ann Kelam, a former member of the Riigikogu, during a 2003 Women in International Security conference in Riga, "there is action rather than debate" (Horn 2003a).

There are, of course, cultural considerations that make overtly Western feminist approaches in the region problematic. Critiques of NATO and EU membership are often couched in terms of cultural imperialism from Western Europe (in terms of an all-encompassing "European culture") or as a further exclusion from the West because the Baltics are often associated with Russian security needs. For example, Feldman (2000:

⁹⁵ Personal interview, Open Estonia Institute, 2/3/04

8) notes that "...EU recommendations to integrate non-Estonians into the Estonian society translate into pressure to compromise Estonia's Western identity and are constructed as threats." Further, demands by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for inclusion of the Russophone population in civil society are seen as a consequence of Russian pressure on the EU and OSCE to exclude the Baltic states from membership in NATO and the EU (Browning, 2002).

This critique extends to feminist work in the region, where the importation of western-style feminism has created a sense of historical dislocation. On the one hand, there is the real need to integrate women into democratic institutions and decision-making, but on the other, there is the perception that the idea of gender equality was a farce perpetuated by the Soviet system, thus trivializing its importance. Further, western-style feminism has not addressed the deep-seated need to protect cultural institutions, particularly the family. While Western NGOs argue the need for greater political participation and equal pay, Baltic political leaders openly encourage women to return to their roles as mothers and homemakers. Calls for a return to traditional family life are exacerbated by falling birth rates in the region, which have given rise to fears of cultural deterioration. For example, during the Third Baltic Women's Conference in 2003, the First Lady of Estonia, Dr. Ingrid Rüütel, encouraged Estonian women to choose to preserve Estonian cultural traditions and center their lives on the well-being of the family. She argued that Estonian women have not supported "European feminism" because they have not experienced "social oppressions" and they want to experience the "opportunity of just being a woman." The interesting point in her argument, however, is the idea that gender equality suggests a condition of unisexuality, where gender roles are

conflated or absent; this situation would make actual sexual reproduction impossible, while also ending the possibility of reproducing Estonian culture:

A woman remains a woman and a man a man: nature has given them different functions and different mentality. Men will never give birth or breastfeed children and the compulsory military service will hopefully never be extended to involve women...Men and women are certainly equal, even when performing their different roles, for a unisexual society would be doomed to extinction. Let us thus remain women and preserve our dignity, only through this can we overcome evil, maintain our inner balance and earn the respect of society!⁹⁶

While these sentiments were not greeted with enthusiasm at the conference (which was, after all, well attended by feminist activists from all over the Baltic region and Western Europe), I did encounter these ideas among many women I interviewed, whether in formal or informal conversations. Kalli Klement of the Nordic Council noted that, in Estonia, gender roles in the family are firmly segregated, which also serves to segregate men and women in public life: “here in Estonia, there are two different kinds of life. One is the man’s life, and one is the woman’s life. If you look at families, you see that a man and a woman don’t communicate, they somehow stay together and raise a family together, but the man has his world and does his thing and the woman has her life, and it’s so difficult in Estonia to talk about it and most people in Estonia think that’s how it should be.”⁹⁷ The problem is that, even in the traditional “2nd Estonia,” rapid economic, cultural, environmental and political changes have served to eliminate or undermine the traditional roles of men and women.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Plenary speech given at the Third Baltic Sea Women’s Conference on Women and Democracy, Tallinn, Estonia, February 14, 2003.

⁹⁷ Personal interview, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2/5/04.

⁹⁸ During the interview with Klement, for example, her assistant noted the predicament of men and women in the rural Estonian island of Kiku: “they have very old traditions...when we [representatives of the Nordic Council] were there, they said men had to fish, but there is no fish nowadays, so they just sit, they can’t do anything else, because it’s humiliating for them. Women have to do the gardening and had to do everything at home, but the men, because they can’t fish, they are sad, and they can’t do anything else.”

For instance, “Evelyn,” a 23-year-old woman from Pärnu, a seaside resort town in Southwestern Estonia, described the near impossibility of finding employment for young women from the rural areas, leaving them with three options: find a husband, become the mistress to an older married man, or emigration.⁹⁹ The first, certainly, is the preferable course among many, granting a young woman instant respectability and hopefully some form of security. In Estonia, however, the divorce rate has sky-rocketed to an estimated 77%, while marriage rates, along with the birth rate, have fallen precipitously in the past ten years.¹⁰⁰ More common in the changing Estonia is the second option—the phenomenon of an older man taking a much younger mistress became so widespread over the past ten years that the model of the younger mistress has become known as the “Babe.” By the spring of 1997, discussion of the Babe became widespread in the Estonian media and captured the public’s imagination: her suggestive yet fashionable dress, makeup, and comfortable lifestyle mark her dual position as something both desired and envied by other young women while she is also denigrated for undermining traditional Estonian families through a form of high-class prostitution (Laas 2000). Among the young women I interviewed, many were either “Babes” themselves or had at least one friend in this position. One 22-year-old Tartu University student defended her role as the mistress of a 55-year-old married man (who had children her own age) by likening their relationship to a business partnership—she provides him with the companionship his wife does not, and in return he pays for her car and other

See V. Spike Peterson (2003) *Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy* for a discussion of consequences of changing men’s traditional economic roles on productive and reproductive economies.

⁹⁹ Informal conversation with “Evelyn,” 2/2/04. Despite Evelyn’s training as an art teacher (a common occupation for young Estonian women) she was unable to find a job in her field, and has spent the past few years as a shopgirl. When I met her she was homeless, living with various friends in Tallinn.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Embassy 1/30/04.

amenities.¹⁰¹

The third option—emigration—offers more enticements to some, while also presenting more dangers. Like many other former Soviet countries, trafficking in persons—and, particularly poor rural women—has increased substantially in Estonia. Laas (2000) ties this to the rising rates of prostitution in Estonia, which were accompanied by increased media attention and advertising for prostitutes and models for pornography; as these became more common in Estonia, going abroad to do the same work seemed not only lucrative but somewhat acceptable.¹⁰² A 2003 report on trafficking by the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights noted that more than 500 women and girls from Estonia annually are trafficked to work abroad as prostitutes, abused workers or servants, mainly to Western Europe, Japan, and to the US.

Thus, Western feminist discourses that highlight “postfeminist” approaches make no sense in a region where gender equality under Soviet rule did nothing to alleviate the double or triple burden faced by most women in their working and family life (Einhorn 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000a; Gapova 2001), nor do they make sense in the social transitions reflected in the problems noted above. The Soros Foundation’s report on gender issues in EU accession states, for example, highlights the issues faced by women in former Soviet states:

The general perception that gender equality had already been achieved under communism continued to hold sway during the period of economic, social and

¹⁰¹ Personal Interview, Tartu University Gender Studies Unit, 2/13/04.

¹⁰² Haas et al (2003: 182) note that the Estonian public appears ambivalent towards prostitution, but do question the legitimization of it as a career path: “the widespread feeling that prostitutes ought to pay their fair share of taxes is counterbalanced by a fear of what would happen if Estonia turned into a sex tourism center. Prostitutes are more numerous now and have more venues to ply their trade: new hotels, brothels (*lõbumajad* or ‘fun houses’), striptease sex clubs, erotic telephone lines, and so on. Newspaper ads brazenly recruit ‘complex free’ (uninhibited) women willing to offer ‘intimate services.’ Anecdotal evidence from newspaper stories suggests that prostitutes typically enter the profession voluntarily and cite economic hardship as the rationale.”

political transition. In fact, despite the incontestably positive elements that were introduced, real gender equality was never achieved, and discrimination did occur under the old regimes, although it was largely ignored, and never documented, admitted, or punished. At the same time, the communist policy implied various types of representation, particularly on gender and national belonging, in some central and local leading bodies. Of course, this representation was based rather on party affiliation and support than on people's competence and skills, and in most cases those representatives were perceived as bringing no value to the structures to which they were assigned. It was merely a matter of reports and statistics. It was thus not particularly surprising that after 1990 the idea of quota representation for women, of 'positive discrimination' or 'special measures' aimed at better representation for women, was rejected by the political elite of these countries and the public as well. These difficult lessons of the past have been constantly invoked in discussions on positive action, although the previous practice had nothing in common with the human rights approach of affirmative action. It has taken a decade to overcome, at least partially, these old prejudices.¹⁰³

These "old prejudices" mean that gender issues do not receive the kind of attention they warrant. The Soros report notes that the Baltic region faces a lack of gender specific research and statistical evidence regarding women's issues, thus policy makers lack a frame of reference for discussion and debate.¹⁰⁴ Due to these problems and little media coverage of gender issues, "the importance of issues such as sexual harassment, indirect discrimination, parental leave, and the shift of the burden of proof [from the "victim" to the perpetrator], has been minimized and dismissed due to ignorance." The report also notes that market liberalization often leads to further abuses, especially in these states where "gender equity" is not fully understood in the Western sense. Further, the move from planned economies to a free market has exacerbated abuses against women's rights, particularly the rise in forced prostitution and trafficking,

¹⁰³ "Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 2002" downloaded from www.eonet.ro/ 2/17/03.

¹⁰⁴ The Gender Equality Department of the Estonian Social Affairs Ministry is currently undertaking a survey to measure these types of issues. In the recent past this office has completed a time-use study as well as an overview of domestic violence in Estonia.

as I note above.¹⁰⁵

US efforts in the region during the pre-accession period, however, continued to stress the importance of economic integration as a means of political integration, as did EU efforts. In winter 2002, Ambassador Bonnie McElveen-Hunter (Finland), for example, organized the “Women Business Leaders Summit” which brought together American and Baltic businesswomen—the American businesswomen were to serve in a mentoring capacity, while the Baltic women were to learn from American capitalist techniques. The program is widely touted by US State Department officials as a success, but aside from the useful connections made by the Baltic women involved, these efforts raise some important issues. First, to what extent will these efforts “trickle down” to other women in the region, particularly those without access to the necessary capital to begin a business, for example? As I noted in chapter one, access to funding and attention from foreign funders is often limited to those who speak English and possess at least some knowledge of the professional expectations of foreign funding organizations.

Secondly, as noted above, the neoliberal reliance upon the free market to increase women’s participation has not been found to be the most practical or successful route. Increasingly, women’s rights have been tied to commodification and economic needs—if good for the economy, good for women. As I have argued earlier, however, this approach seems to be more acceptable to the general Estonian public, rather than the more “radical” approach successfully utilized in the Nordic states, such as gender quotas in political parties or top-down efforts to increase gender equality. The problem, however, is that economic solutions may, ultimately, serve to again trap women in the

¹⁰⁵ Greater attention to these issues, of course, should be evident now that Estonia is a member of the EU.

“double burden” (i.e. bearing the responsibility of working outside the home while continuing to serve as the primary caregiver and housekeeper within the home) associated with reliance on the free market without compatible social reforms that create gendered role expectations (Corrin 1992; Duffy 2000).

Despite the affinity Estonians may feel for the US and to the Nordic region, this does not mean that women’s NGOs are capable of taking full advantage of US and Nordic funding priorities, thus achieving the goals each hopes Estonia will achieve. As Ülle-Marike Papp noted, “democracy”—as well as “feminism”—is in itself an empty concept to many in Estonia. Further, the language of these grants serves as a marker of the differences between US and Nordic approaches to gender issues; the language of democratization, however, is in itself ambiguous, which further obscures the intentions of policy makers and inhibits prospective grantees’ ability to fulfill these intentions. Part of the problem is that those women who would like to apply for these grants simply do not have the vocabulary necessary to write successful grant applications. In a lengthy conversation on the topic, one NGO administrator explained the difference¹⁰⁶: “gender equality is a very important part of democratization, but if you just say ‘democratic process,’ a lot of organizations don’t know what that means. The US embassy has these funds for building democracy, and women’s organizations don’t get that they have access to these funds, because they don’t see the connection between what they are doing and ‘big’ democracy...you have to have this kind of vocabulary first. This is the same with EU funds: it is a different vocabulary to get EU funds.” When asked to identify the difference in the vocabularies, she noted that the Nordic states emphasize gender

¹⁰⁶ Personal Interview, Open Estonian Institute 2/3/04

mainstreaming, gender equality, equal pay and equal opportunities, while the “magic words” emphasized in US grants were “democratization” and “giving opportunities.”

Very similar sentiments were expressed during an interview with three of the women who lead an AIDS service organization in Tallinn. They are acutely aware of the cultural differences between the US and Nordic states, and how this plays out in the types of programs each is willing to fund, despite similarities in the goals each share. All three women noted the emphasis placed on trafficking by the US and Nordic states, but also noted important differences to their approaches: “[There is] a lot of attention for trafficking—every year the US state department talks about trafficking [at] every conference. In Estonia...the emphasis [by the US] is on trafficking in persons, but Nordic funders emphasize trafficking in women and girls...[for US grant proposals] you can talk more about men and boys, and Nordic countries, if you write the project, you have to write in ‘feminism’ and the ‘men and women equality’ thing inside with trafficking if you want to get any funds.”

The interesting point for these women was that they were more willing to accept the less “radical” approaches offered in the US request for proposals (RFPs), such as the emphasis on human rights, as one woman noted: “I think that it should be more about human rights at home, because it is about human rights: we have the same view on the issue with the US. But you see, every country has its own thing, what it believes, so if you’re applying, you have to believe the same thing. So sometimes you see that the US is too conservative, sometimes you see that it’s very democratic, so it depends on the issues. If you try to open up the other side, you see it’s a mistake because they don’t like that approach, but sometimes for us it’s very important, and you see that you need to do

that, then you have to find a way how to be like they want us to be.”

When pressed for an example, one of the women related their experiences in writing a book on sexuality to be used as teaching materials for high school students, to which they applied to the US embassy for a small grant. It became clear to the organization that the US would not fund a book that discussed (unwed) pregnancy, abortion, or homosexuality. Given the high abortion rates and increasing numbers of HIV infections in Estonia, this material would have served an important purpose. In the end, the US embassy declined to support the project. The administrator of the organization noted that it is often much easier to secure money to hold a conference than to create the kinds of teaching materials that are needed in Estonia. She noted, however, that “when you want to apply [for a grant], you have to think about what you’re talking about. Also, if you apply to one embassy, you have to think about who their partners are—if you apply to one then go to another, and they don’t have good relations with the other, it’s bad. So you have to be very flexible.”

Coming to terms with the tension between the practical need to increase women’s equality and the theoretical understanding of what that equality means, however, has become the mission of many of the women’s groups I examined; for these women, the issues are inseparable, thus an understanding of feminism is essential. For example, a recent publication undertaken by several of these groups (including the Open Estonia Foundation, the Women’s Equality Bureau, and ENUT) attempts to use humor as a means of reaching a larger audience. The book they developed is based upon the double meaning of the Estonian word for “dill” as an herb but also as a slang term for a penis: With or Without Dill (in Estonian) is a book of feminist “recipes” meant to explain basic

feminist ideas while dispelling common cultural myths (e.g. that feminists are angry spinsters, lesbians, or just unattractive women). The book has proven to be enormously popular and has gone through its second printing.

“Feminism” aside, gender equality has been identified as a key component of democratization, and as such, any understanding of democratization in Estonia must also be accompanied by an understanding of the importance of women in politics, in the economy, and as actors within civil society. The Clinton administration certainly recognized this issue in its policies towards the Baltic states, and the Bush administration, to some extent, continues to make gestures in this direction (especially in Afghanistan). Any policy concerned with the development of a healthy democracy, then, must include a gender component. This component, however, is especially difficult, given the cultural understanding of “equality” in post-Communist states (Corrin 1992; Einhorn 1993a; Busheikin 1997; Watson 1997b; Duffy 2000), and the necessity to change attitudes and behaviors in society as a whole. Not an easy task in any society, to be sure, but in a society already faced with tumultuous changes in its economy and government, finding the right formula to effect change must be based upon a careful combination of foreign efforts and domestic grassroots efforts.

Setting the Agenda: Policy goals and Changing Roles

The language of grant applications and RFPs plays a large part in shaping the kinds of programs that are implemented and the formulas that are developed to resolve these issues. As noted earlier, once foreign funders began to establish the issues they

were willing to fund, the notion of gender issues underwent a radical change in Estonia. In 1997, for example, the Network Women's Program (a Soros program) identified violence against women as an underreported and underestimated issue in Estonia. In cooperation with the Nordic Council and the International Labor Organization, the Bureau of Gender Equality produced a study on domestic violence, after an initial pilot study. The resultant book became an instant bestseller: it included interviews with victims of domestic violence, civil servants, and articles by imminent researchers. The administrator of the women's programs for the Open Estonia Institute noted the surprising public reaction that followed the publication of the study:

This was a new perspective for Estonia—nobody had talked about violence against women at all. It was a big surprise when a big research project was done in 2001 that showed that violence against women is a big problem...everybody was so surprised...they thought it was a personal problem, and you have to find personal solutions, they didn't see it as a social problem, as connected to social status of women.

1997 was the first steps, in 2001 [the issue of violence against women] was in the media, newspapers, and public opinion changed...it was a big bang. In 1997 there were no shelters for women, only women with children, so if you had no children, you had no specific place to go. Now [there is] one [women's shelter] in Tallinn and one in Tartu. These people working then, were working for a children's center in Tartu, but then they started working with the view that it is deeply connected, the violence against mother and child.¹⁰⁷

Likewise, the emphasis upon trafficking in women has only recently become fodder for public debate, largely through the efforts of outside forces. During the 2001 Women and Democracy conference in Vilnius, the Swedish Minister of Gender Equality, Margareta Winberg, proposed a joint Nordic-Baltic campaign against trafficking in

¹⁰⁷ Personal Interview 2/03/04. The children's center to which she refers is the Tartu Child Support Center, which has received funding from the US embassy in Tallinn for its anti-trafficking programs; indeed, the embassy identified these programs as among the most innovative programs it had funded.

women.¹⁰⁸ In Estonia the working group's members included Ülle-Marike Papp from the Bureau of Gender Equality, a representative from the Ministry of Justice, and a national Coordinator, Kristina Luht. "The goal of the Estonian campaign against trafficking," the report explains, "was to start discussion about the problems surrounding the issue of trafficking in women and prostitution, and to start changing existing attitudes."¹⁰⁹ The campaign began in May 2002 with a two day seminar in Tallinn and the launch of a parallel research project; the educational component of the project began in September of the same year. Following a series of lectures and training seminars for teachers and youth workers and a seminar for government officials, the campaign ended in March 2003.

The campaign also involved the efforts of several different NGOs, including the Open Estonia Institute and ENUT, who also received funding from the US embassy for these projects. With the aid of the US embassy and the US-based International Organization for Adolescents (IOFA), the AIDS Information Centre, for example, worked on the pilot project monitoring trafficking in Estonia. The project resulted in a training seminar, the dissemination of anti-trafficking brochures and pamphlets, and lectures for young people in Tallinn and elsewhere. They were also able to create a website in both Estonian and Russian, and although funding for this program has ended, the center still manages to disseminate their remaining materials to schools in the area.¹¹⁰

For the US, there was a noticeable shift in funding priorities from the emphasis on creating women entrepreneurs to trafficking as a human rights issue that could be

¹⁰⁸ "Nordic-Baltic Campaign Against Trafficking in Women in Estonia 2002-2003 Report" obtained during personal interview with director of Nordic Council of Ministers, Tallinn.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 2

¹¹⁰ Personal interview, AIDS Information Center, 2/02/04

resolved through economic means. Papp remarked:

Of course trafficking is a new issue for the US. At first [US funding] was more targeted to economic programs, entrepreneurship and women's entrepreneurship: the first seminar between Nordic and Baltic countries. The US was involved in the first big conferences in Iceland and Finland, but then trafficking was so big, but it started some years later. It was difficult because we cannot see it here; it's not visible that we are losing people... But I think it's more important to work on the complexity of this issue—prostitution, pornography, sexism—it would be good to have a critical analyses of Estonian advertising [for example].

Although both the US and Nordic countries share an interest in the issue of trafficking—both as a transnational security issue and as a human rights issue—they do have different approaches to the issue, which are reflected in the funding language. The administrator of the AIDS Information Centre noted, for example, that the Nordic funders tend to frame trafficking as strictly a women's issue, while the US has been more inclined to address the issue in terms of human rights. It is the latter approach, she argues, that may be more effective:

The Nordic countries talk about this issue in a feminist way, that always bad happening [sic] to young women, or we have to protect ourselves from bad men. But there is another side, it is about human rights, because if you talk only about women, men aren't so interested, but if you talk about human rights, you can talk about boys, because also boys go overseas to work, and they don't get the salary, they work over hours—this opens a wider picture, this works much better, because we need men involved in these kinds of issues, because there is everywhere women, so the human rights issue inside trafficking helps a lot, you can see more men clients coming in. This is what we presented to the US embassy [in their recent project proposal].

What this implies is that overtly “feminist” language does not attract US funding, while the less loaded “human rights” does. Obviously the Nordic states care a great deal about human rights, and one could argue that in terms of understanding what “human rights” entail in terms of individual security, the Nordic states are far more advanced than the

US.¹¹¹ The US language of “human rights” rather than women’s rights as applied to this issue (among other social issues), however, appears to resonate with Estonians.

Trafficking has received a great deal of press in Estonia, but some worry that this issue, when the funded campaigns are finished, will lose its potency, and thus erode the effectiveness of the campaigns. Coupled with the notion that once Estonia joins the EU, these issues will somehow resolve themselves, NGO administrators and activists worry that the issues that accompany trafficking—HIV infections, drug use, abortions—will be exacerbated. The Estonian government does give limited funding for these programs, but over all, it seems to depend largely on foreign states and organizations to provide much of the necessary funds to sustain these programs. Further, Estonian NGOs, like many NGOs in transitional states, have not yet learned the valuable skills such as fundraising, creating a supportive donor base, and recruiting volunteers that are so vital to sustaining long-term social service programs.¹¹²

Despite US policy commitments to trafficking, funding for the Baltic states, as I have noted earlier, has all but ended for every sector except defense. What little money that has been allotted to fight trafficking provides funding for programs such as those sponsored by the AIDS Information Centre and ENUT—i.e., trainings and seminars—but may not do enough to address the underlying reasons for the spread of trafficking. Herein lays the danger for policy agendas that are, ultimately, concerned with changing collective ideas regarding civil society and citizens’ relationship with the state. There

¹¹¹ I would argue, as would others (e.g. Tickner 1992, 2001), that “individual security” is the basis of a truly secure society, and can only be achieved through the provision of sufficient housing, food, medical care, education, childcare and other forms of well-being; the social democratic policies of the Nordic states have gone quite far in addressing these needs.

¹¹² See Henderson 2003. My own research bears this out—for example, when I asked one group of NGO administrators if they had a volunteer base, they replied, that yes, they worked for free—that is, their volunteer base consists of the three women who run the NGO.

must be an understanding of the broader issues, which cannot be tied up in sound-bite slogans—there must be a well-rounded policy designed to deal with the complexity of issues such as trafficking and women’s inequality.

Conclusion: Gender Equality, Democratization, and the First Image Reversed

Implicit in the American slogan “a Europe whole and free” are American ideals of democracy and social cohesion. However, a “whole” Europe implies dealing with cross-border issues while acknowledging the thorny issue of sovereignty. How might we reconcile the continuing restraints of a sovereign state system with this emerging reality? American foreign policy makers may have the ability to construct policies that target changes in social attitudes, but the effectiveness of these policies will also be affected by institutional and structural factors. We cannot ignore the broader cultural elements, such as political ideology, that may help or hinder the success of these policies. It may be, then, that particular American policies will have a greater effect upon the identities of individuals where these individuals and groups already share some basic similarities with Americans—the most prominent being a shared commitment to democratic institutions.

What we might assume, however, is that a shared institutional ideology opens the door for engaging individuals, for somehow convincing them to identify themselves with the interests of others, in this case, the interests of the US. Democratic institutions, then, serve as a scope condition—the success of American foreign policies rests on the ability to affect individual identity, but we may be able to witness this process more clearly when democratic institutions are in place. The Clinton administration’s emphasis on

democratic “enlargement and engagement” (of which NEI was a product) certainly suggests that the value of encouraging democracy was (and is) based on the need to find common political ground as much as it was based upon a tradition of American liberal crusades. It is not surprising, then, that projects sponsored by NEI serve to promote liberal, democratic ideals; NEI may represent a new way of thinking for American policy makers, but it has not been unaffected by firmly rooted American liberal ideological traditions.

This has not been lost in the Bush administration’s approach to democratization, particularly in terms of women. Indeed, the link between democratization and women’s rights has been made explicit in many forums (the Bush administration’s “interventions” on behalf of Afghani women is a favorite theme, for example). At the 2003 Third Baltic Sea Women’s Conference on Women and Democracy, Ellen Sauerbrey, US Representative to the UN Commission on the Status of Women announced:

Ensuring women’s rights benefits not only women, but also the men and children in their families, and their society as a whole. It also strengthens democracy, bolsters prosperity, enhances stability, and encourages tolerance. Protecting both the human and property rights of women and of all people is at the core of building a civil, law abiding society...the foundation for a true democracy.

Education is increasingly essential if individuals are to succeed in a global and technologically advanced economy. Women’s integration into the mainstream of economic life lead not only to significant economic progress for the family, but ultimately for the country as well.

This is an encouraging statement of US policy, but represents a rather limited view of strategies to improve women’s position in civil society. Education is essential, but equality in the American sense falls short when applied to this region. “Equal rights” do not necessarily represent an improvement or true gender integration. Indeed, “equality” in

the Baltic states suffers from a communist legacy; the concept itself became meaningless in a society where “equality” was touted as the norm yet never actually implemented. Further, while integrating women into the economic sphere is vital, it is perhaps more important to guarantee equal political representation. While US policy supports political representation in theory, in practice this would mean US support for policies that run counter to the American brand of democracy, such as quota systems and increased welfare benefits for women.

In the case of Estonia, US policies have fared rather well, perhaps because common ground was easier to establish with a nation that actively sought identification with the West. US policy makers have at their disposal, however, a mutually beneficial means of shaping Estonian national interests to be further aligned with US interests—in creating and supporting programs that deal with individual security in all of its forms, democratization may be enhanced and amicable international ties sustained.

Chapter 4

Moldova: Constructing Agency or Constructing Victims?

Introduction

US foreign policy towards the former Soviet states has taken many forms, but chief among them are policies meant to encourage democratization (e.g. FREEDOM Act, SEED Act, the Northern European Initiative). These efforts target the development of civil society, recognized as a key component of democratization by policy makers and political theorists. Implicit in these efforts are liberal notions of individual rights and responsibilities (including self-sufficiency and personal agency) which lend themselves to capitalist growth—another key to democratization in the minds of policy makers. Further, over the course of the past fifteen years (particularly during the Clinton administration) US policy discourse has suggested that the roles and rights of women have become important indicators of the successes or failures of democratization; many US policies target women specifically, and funding is distributed to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to carry out these policies. In the case of Moldova, US policy makers have identified two important, albeit seemingly contradictory, positions for women: women as potential political and economic agents and women as potential victims of trafficking and violence who must be protected.

These positions are related, of course: economically secure women are more likely to participate in public life and will not be tempted by the promise of easy money abroad. Both positions also represent sites of contestation for the changing roles of women in Moldova. As in many post-Communist states, the role of women has reverted

to pre-Soviet traditional roles which emphasize women's roles as mothers and domestic caretakers but not as political or economic actors. At the same time, however, women are most often put in the position of providing for their families through the only lucrative means available: emigration. Through this seemingly empowering act, many women are made victims through trafficking and abusive employment practices abroad, yet receive little to no protection from the Moldovan government or society. Thus, any policies directed at empowering women must contend with deeply entrenched negative gender constructions within society as well as the victimization of Moldovan women abroad. Both positions serve to limit women's participation in political and civil society, further undermining Moldova's transition to democracy.

This chapter explores the construction of these two competing images of Moldovan women by US policymakers (women as agents versus women as victims) and foreign efforts within civil society to encourage agency among women. I use US funding for NGOs as a starting point to focus on the West's expectations for Moldovan civil society and democratization more generally while also highlighting the tensions this has caused in Moldova. First, I explore Moldova's current political situation and examine the consequences of its Soviet past. I explore issues of culture and language and explain how these issues may inhibit US efforts to influence Moldovan identity. Through a series of interviews with Moldovan women and feminists, leaders of Moldovan and foreign NGOs, and US Foreign Service officers, I examine US expectations for Moldovan women, the types of strategies used to meet these expectations, and the impact these strategies have had upon the development of civil society in Moldova.

I conclude that foreign funding can, indeed, result in positive (pro-American) changes in social attitudes and values regarding democratization if combined with long-term, culture-specific strategies. The short term, western liberal strategies espoused by the US government, however, create potentially destructive counter-forces that may ultimately weaken efforts within Moldova to encourage women's political and social agency.

Cultural Identity in Moldova: Tensions between East, West, and Historical Constructions

The breakup of the Soviet Union revealed the internal tensions that had been bred by years of forced Russification. While some states, particularly the Baltics, "reclaimed" their Western or European identities and turned their backs on Russia (to the detriment of its Russian speaking minorities), Moldova's complicated history has driven its often schizophrenic foreign and domestic policies. Throughout its history, Moldova has been part of Russia (as Bessarabia), Romania,¹¹³ then annexed by the Soviet Union and its northern and southern lands given to Ukraine, effectively land-locking the country. Romania regained Moldova in the early 1940s, but the Soviets re-annexed the territory at the end of WWII. After 1944, the Soviet Union undertook an ambitious Russification campaign in Moldova, which "included a massive population migration, official

¹¹³ Note that Bessarabia (Basarabia in Romanian) was the name given by Russia to the eastern part of the principality of Moldavia (annexed by Russia in 1812). In 1859 the rest of the region joined with Wallachia to form the Kingdom of Romania. Russian Bessarabia declared independence from Russia and united with Romania in 1918. The USSR re-annexed Bessarabia in the beginning of WW II through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; at the end of WW II, Bessarabia was reorganized as the Moldavian SSR, with its northern and southern territories assigned to Ukrainian SSR. In 1991 the Moldavian SSR declared independence from USSR as Republic of Moldova.

introduction of the Russian language and Cyrillic alphabet into everyday life, ousting of the Latin script, and cultural re-education of the population in the Soviet traditions” (Mindicanu 2003: 4). Although Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the repercussions of Russification continue to be felt in Moldovan society in the shape of ethnic conflicts and sharp societal differences.

Moldova’s breakaway Transnistrian region, located on Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine along the Nistru (Dniestr) River, presents a volatile problem for the Moldovan government as it finds itself torn between Russian and Western influences. Ethnic Russian leaders of the region, backed by the Russian army, declared the region independent in 1992, provoking a brief but volatile internal conflict. Despite Russia’s pledge during a 1999 Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit to remove its troops by 2001, Russia continues to maintain that its presence there is necessary until the issues between Tiraspol (capital of the Transnistrian region) and Chişinău (capital of the Republic of Moldova) have been resolved (Freedom House 2003). In 2002, Russia strongly supported the OSCE’s federalization plan as the solution to the problem, a solution that many argue would further divide the small country while strengthening Russia’s influence: the OSCE’s federalization plan has Russia and Ukraine as “guarantors” of success of the project. The OSCE plan would supersede Moldova’s constitution, essentially making Russia (and Ukraine) overseers of Moldova. According to Vladimir Socor (2003)¹¹⁴ the plan is a thinly veiled attempt by Russia to maintain Moldova within its sphere of influence. The US supported that position initially, although it is questionable that it will continue to do so now that Moldova is on NATO’s

¹¹⁴ Socor is a senior fellow of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Washington, D.C., and Wall Street Journal Europe columnist.

borders, and will soon be on the European Union's eastern border. The US's interest in Transnistria lies mainly in the lawlessness of the region, which has created a space for international trafficking in illegal arms, drugs, and people. Much of US policy towards Moldova is focused upon stemming the growth of these issues while dealing with the pervasive poverty and corruption that continues to plague Moldova.

The transition to democracy, according to Freedom House, has been somewhat rocky, although Moldova has had free and fair elections since independence. The landslide election of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) in 2001 "was a surprise not only for the international community but also for the communists themselves. They won 71 seats in the 101-seat parliament. Moldova became the first post-Communist country in which the Communist party controls both the legislative and executive branches" (Freedom House 2003: 285). Changes in the parliamentary system allowing the parliament to elect the president permitted the PCRM to gain political power; ongoing economic hardships forced many Moldovans to turn to the party in the hopes of reclaiming some of the relative economic security they had known in Soviet times. This caused understandable concern among the Western powers, who expressed a sense of failure at the Communist resurgence. However, as one interviewee explained, there are many differences between the communists of 1991 and those of 2001. Their priorities and understandings of the international environment have changed, making them more likely to look both eastward and westward to serve their needs.¹¹⁵ Indeed, it appears that the pursuit of political power, much more than ideology, drives the resurgence of this party; the tropes they rely upon touch an emotional chord

¹¹⁵ Personal interview, Institutul de Politici Publice (IPP), 6/1/2004.

within a largely disaffected Moldovan public, which may seek the security of the past but is also beginning to see the possibilities of a future.

Subsequent local elections, however, have also given US policymakers pause, thus the main focus of the US embassy's efforts in 2004-2005 were both national and local elections, including an emphasis on encouraging political participation among women, as I will explain below. US embassy officials cited serious problems with the election of the bashkan (leader of the autonomous parliament) of the Gagauzia region, and requested full-scale OSCE observations. The May 2003 elections were not considered "fair and free" by the OSCE; at least the Communists were fairly elected in 2001. In May 2004, one US embassy official noted that the US government was trying to convince the communists that they possessed a considerable lead for the upcoming parliamentary election (March 6, 2005), thus there would be no need to pursue unfair election practices, such as vote rigging, bribes, and intimidation.¹¹⁶ The mood among many US officials in Moldova, however, seems to be that the CPRM will continue to pursue these tactics which may eventually lead to their downfall once the public becomes more aware of their activities.

The March 6, 2005 elections, of course, did result in a communist victory, albeit by a slimmer margin than in the past.¹¹⁷ At the time of this writing the opposition, the Democratic Bloc, is now in a position to force new elections, and, they hope, the

¹¹⁶ Personal interview with US Embassy official, 6/10/2004. In a January 12, 2005 news conference, CP candidates accused the Chişinău municipal administration of organizing against them by reserving the city square for rallies for the Democratic voting bloc (headed by Chişinău Mayor Serafim Urechean) for the whole of the campaign season. One CP candidate called the action "a violation of human rights" because CP supporters may be forced to hear opposition supporters speak out against the CP candidates when passing by the square. "Parliamentary Candidates Blame Chişinău Municipality" Infotag, 1/12/05. Downloaded from http://www.infotag.md/report_en/8702 2/2/05.

¹¹⁷ The CPRM won by 45.98%, followed by the Democratic Bloc at 28.53% and the Christian Democrats at 9.07%

replacement of communist President Voronin. What is interesting is the rhetorical shift in the Communist election campaign materials: no longer pandering to the Russians, the Communists' campaign slogans now promise that "together we will transform Moldova into a rich country, with wealthy people!"¹¹⁸

The Politics of Language and Culture

US policies in transitional states often focus on creating or strengthening civil society, which, policy makers hope, will encourage healthy democracies. As I have discussed earlier, however, my research has found that some degree of political affinity between the transitioning state and the US, or the West more generally, creates a more conducive atmosphere for this type of policy strategy (Laitin 1998, 2000). In the case of Estonia, for example, Estonians' aversion to Russia has meant that policies have been distinctly western looking; this not the case in Moldova, where the lines are not so clearly drawn. Language is one of the main dividers, not only in the Transnistria region, but throughout the country. During the Soviet regime, the better educated and better placed (particularly in the capital Chişinău) spoke and read Russian exclusively, while Romanian was (and still is) widely spoken outside the city. The divisions persist: children attend either Russian or Romanian schools, and even in the universities, separate classes are held for the two groups.¹¹⁹ Interestingly, with the move to democracy,

¹¹⁸ Communist party's official website, http://www.pcrm.md/index_en.html. downloaded 3/15/05. See Bermeo 1992 for a discussion of "political learning."

¹¹⁹ There is a considerable degree of unspoken discrimination in these practices. At the State University of Moldova, for example, most classes are duplicated so that they can be taken by either Russian or Romanian speakers; the professor can either conduct both classes, or another instructor can do so. However, professors, naturally, tend to favor their own language group, so that students who are not adept in that language will be handicapped by their language skills in the course. A conversation with a senior professor

Romanian saw a resurgence among the elite circles who sought to identify themselves with rural Moldovans, the majority of whom are Romanian speakers.

While most people in Chişinău understand both languages, the majority of Moldovans can only speak (or, oddly, claim to speak) or read one of the two, despite its everyday usage. Language reflects the tensions between East and West in Moldova: speaking Russian certainly allows for greater mobility in the Russian speaking world, while Romanian is useful for immigration to (relatively) better off Romania. Once Romania is part of the EU, however, Romanian speakers will surely, in their own interests, pursue claims of Romanian citizenship (Socor 2003). In the universities English has quickly replaced French as students' second (or third) language, but for the most part, English is not widely spoken.

In terms of developing civil society, then, language presents an important indicator of how inclusive civil society is, as well as an important impediment to its development once language becomes a political issue. In Chişinău, to express one's views in Romanian—and to refuse to speak Russian—may be viewed by a Russian speaker as a political, nationalist, stance, while expressing one's views in Russian is often viewed by Romanian speakers as either stubborn resistance to changes within civil society or a statement of foreign allegiance. Either way, language serves as a marker of cultural divisions that can be manipulated by political powers, and should be addressed by any foreign policy that seeks to develop civil society in Moldova.

of archeology revealed the politics of language: he bragged of repeatedly berating a Gagauzian student in class because he claimed that he could not understand her Russian. When I asked him if she did not speak Russian well or if there was simply a problem with her accent, he (oddly) claimed that "Gagauzian Russian" and "real" Russian were two different languages, just as "American English" and "British English" were also incompatible. I explained that, despite some differences in word usage and meaning between the two English dialects, they were usually understandable both in conversation and in writing to any English speaker. Surprisingly, he refused to believe me and exclaimed that I was lying to him. Personal conversation, May 2004.

Several college instructors I interviewed, for instance, indicated that they had voted in the 2001 elections solely on the language issue. One young instructor of American studies asserted that she is deeply committed to the successful democratization of Moldova, but the problems faced by Russian speakers in the university, particularly, led her to vote for the CPRM. The resurgence of Romanian nationalism led to open discrimination of Russian speakers in the workplace and within society, whatever their national allegiances: “She [her department chief] repeatedly tells us [the Russian speaking instructors] that because we are Russian speakers, we are stupid. We should not have the best positions in the university. She expects us to work harder than the Romanian speakers to prove we are smart.” She argued that her identity as a Russian speaker should not be conflated with her identity as a Moldovan; she was born and raised in Chişinău and intends to spend her life there.¹²⁰

In addition to promising relief for the country’s severe economic woes, the CPRM (which won the majority in the parliament that year), directed its campaigns at the fears of Russian speakers, promising to protect them from the threat of Moldovan-only language requirements.¹²¹ Along with the CPRM’s campaign promises to halt decollectivization and reverse some of the privatization efforts, the newly elected President Voronin vowed to make Russian language education mandatory. Further, the

¹²⁰ Personal conversations, May 2004. It should be noted that the speaker’s father is ethnically Romanian and her mother is an ethnic Ukrainian, yet they raised their two children in a Russian-speaking household and sent them to Russian schools. During the Soviet period her father served in the Soviet army as an officer and her mother was a Communist party official. In discussions with her parents, however, it became clear that both served the Soviet Union as a matter of expediency, not necessarily loyalty to Soviet ideals; rather, they asserted their loyalty to an independent and democratic Moldova.

¹²¹ Personal interviews, October 2004 and May, 2004. What “Moldovan” actually “is” is up for question—aside from Romanian and Russian, Gagauzian is spoken in the south (the southern region of Gagauzia, with a population of roughly 150,000 Christian Turks, is an autonomous administrative unit), and Ukrainian is widely spoken in the north. The resulting language is jokingly referred to as “Moldovsky” by many in Chişinău; similarly, Americans often refer to the mixture of Spanish and English commonly spoken in many areas of the US as “Spanglish.”

party sought to “introduce a new history text in the national curriculum written by scholars widely associated with the Soviet regime” (Crowther and Josanu 2003: 10). These efforts sparked a series of protests in Chişinău, which resulted in the party’s retraction of the language policies. This attempt to reassert the primacy of Russian identity, however, served as a nod to the Russian speaking minority in Transnistria, who dominate the quasi-police state supported by the Russian army.

These efforts on the part of the CPRM, however, make sense in the larger effort to control a society seemingly spinning out of control economically and culturally (Bermeo 1992). Cultural homogeneity, as Jan Kubik (2004: 17) notes, is a means of state control. In terms of civil society, however, “effective citizenship calls for the retention of cultural heterogeneity, and the cultivation of the multitudes of subcultures.” The proposed federalization plan to resolve the Transnistrian issue may appear to be an effort to preserve heterogeneity, but many would argue that this plan only serves to further isolate different subcultures from each other.

This is not to say that other former Soviet states have not grappled with these issues.¹²² Estonia’s citizenship requirements, for example, have been largely criticized, particularly for the requirement that citizenship is contingent upon one’s ability to speak and read Estonian proficiently. But the main difference between the two cases, I would argue, is that Estonian identity is based upon a centuries-old Estonian culture, as expressed in its language. When the Soviet Union disintegrated the Estonian majority used the language laws to exercise its underlying outrage for the Soviet occupation upon the Russian speaking minority. Thus, recent Estonian identity is just as reliant upon its long history as it is upon its definition of itself as “not Russian.”

¹²² See, for example, Solchanyk 1982, Evans 1998, Laitin 1998, G. Smith 1998, Kolstø 2000, Ponarin 2000.

Moldova, on the other hand, faces a murkier situation. “Moldovan” identity is itself a recent construct created, in part, through its occupation by the Soviets; the state of Moldova did not exist, historically, until it was defined as such by the Soviets. Although Moldova was occupied by the Soviet Army in 1940 following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, it had not enjoyed independence during the interwar period, when it was part of Romania, nor did Moldovans enjoy the knowledge that other states saw them as being an occupied territory. This was not the case for the Baltic states, which the Western powers clearly defined as occupied countries and refused to acknowledge their inclusion in the Soviet Union. Thus, during the Cold War Moldova was caught between two identities, neither of which would serve it well in terms of oppression: the (hypothetical) choice was Ceausescu’s Romania to the west and the Soviet Union to the east. Language, then, does not necessarily define a Moldovan so much as it defines what kind of Moldovan a person is.

This issue presents a great difficulty for the First Image Reversed strategy of influencing the growth of civil society: while US policy makers could easily make the connection between Estonian culture and Estonia’s affinity with the west and north, mainly through its historical ties, the same cannot be said for Moldova. Attempts to influence values and attitudes regarding democratization (and liberal democratic ideals) in Moldova must overcome the persistence of Russian identifications, the very real consequences of Moldova’s Soviet past, and Moldova’s relative isolation from Western Europe. On the other hand, as NATO and the EU move eastward, Moldova’s leadership is beginning to see the benefits of such association, and the continuing exposure to western culture is beginning to affect Moldovan identities. A telling sign, for example, is

the Communist party's move away from exclusionary ethnic language to more inclusive language, while those parties that continue to be anti-Western and pro-Russian could not garner enough votes to earn seats in parliament during the 2005 elections.¹²³ Further, as noted in chapter two, Moldova's May 2002 endorsement of NATO's SEEI indicates a willingness to look to the West (and particularly the US) to provide greater economic and security opportunities.

The Weakness of Civil Society

Nevertheless, civil society, as we might consider the NGO sector, is struggling. In 2001, approximately 2,500 NGOs were registered with the government. Freedom House (2003: 288) notes that "the majority of NGOs focus on arts and culture, sports, education and training, economic development, health care, human rights, and science and technology. More than 50 NGOs focus on women's issues, 24 on disabled people, 64 on youth, 39 on ethnic communities, and 16 on animal protection." The number of NGOs officially registered, however, does not reflect the small number of truly self-sustaining, effective NGOs which are capable of responding to society's pressing needs; of those registered, Freedom House notes, only 15 to 20 percent are active, and most are dependent upon foreign funding. US efforts in the region have been carried out by the Peace Corps, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), farm and labor projects, and US exchange programs sponsored by ECA. George Soros' Open Society

¹²³ Those parties and percentage of the votes: Patria-Rodina" Bloc (4.97%), "Ravnopravie" Movement (2.83%) and "Patria-Rodina" Labour Union (0.92%). These parties did enjoy "landslide" victories in regions where national minorities dominated. Igor Botan, "Post-Election Reflections" March 14, 2005, downloaded from ADEPT, www.elections2005.md/comments/20050314/ 3/19/05.

Institute, however, seems to be a stronger force in Chişinău, at least in the minds of local NGO leaders. This is an important point, because it reflects the common notion that NGO work can only be sustained through international ties and international money; essentially, there is little to no confidence among civic activists that the local community can or will support the NGO sector.

Those NGOs that are locally grown are, in many cases, nothing more than “storefront NGOs” which often consist of a name, one staff member, and his or her home telephone. These NGOs literally live or die depending on funding cycles and project money: the NGO itself may cease to exist once the funds for a particular project have run out. This is due largely to a poor understanding of what an NGO is or how these organizations should be administered—the word “NGO” is commonly tacked on to any group of people with a special interest or concern. Thus, the NGO community in Moldova is constantly shifting. In many cases the main players may remain the same, especially among those who have learned how to play the external funding game, but there is little institutionalization to aid them in their efforts.¹²⁴ Again, those NGOs that are most successful in Moldova at this point are those with international support and backing, such as Italian-based organizations, La Strada or Amici dei Bambini. While there is an effort to train NGOs in administration, fundraising, and project management (see Figure 4.1), too few people understand what “NGO” means, other than a way to secure money for discrete projects or to pay a salary for the NGO creator for a short time.

¹²⁴ Personal interviews with NGO consultants for the Resource Center of Moldovan NGOs for Human Rights (CReDO), 6/2/04.

Figure 4.1

The Influence of Western Training Methods and Civil Society: CReDO

CReDO is the Resource Center of Moldovan NGOs for Human Rights. The bulk of their considerable funding (given the well-appointed offices and full time staff of 11) comes from Dutch international aid organization, Cordaid, USAID-Eurasia, UNDP, and a democracy grant from the US embassy. The executive director, Serghei Ostaf, is a social entrepreneur with an American MPA.

CReDO offers a Master of Non-Profit Administration Program modeled on similar programs in the US, but it is the first program of its kind in Europe. CReDO runs the program in cooperation with the State Academy of Public Administration, which apparently receives most of the profit from the endeavor—CReDO trains the teachers, supplies the materials and information, and provides training facilities. The Center also offers a masters degree in “democratization and applied human rights.”

The 2001 pilot program began by encouraging students to use a free on-line course offered by the University of Minnesota. They soon found that, aside from language issues, they needed a program that was specific to Moldovan needs and realities. Most of the information they use, however, is from the US. The center does its own translation, and develops the Moldova-specific examples.

CReDO also has trainings in organizational development, provided free of charge. The training consists of an introduction to NGOs, human resources management, marketing and activity planning (also strategic planning), and fundraising, including developing a list of potential donors, and a basic introduction to grant writing. The center also provides follow-up sessions. The center offers ongoing, consulting services for NGOs on a contractual, fee for services basis.

The newest program is the center’s advocacy and action program, which will also have a training program and an MA program. The training will focus on lobbying, negotiations, and organizing public actions. The target audience will be socially active NGOs in each sector.

A 2001 survey conducted by a Moldovan democracy watchdog, the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT), illustrates the precarious position of the NGO sector. The survey asked members of local government, parliament, mass media, NGOs, political parties, mayors, and trade unions to evaluate their relationships with NGOs as well as the effectiveness of the NGO sector. Despite advances in the development of the NGO sector, the survey reveals that the majority of those surveyed view NGOs in Moldova as playing a weak role in social and political life (ADEPT 2001). Surprisingly, trade unions were the least likely to respond to the survey, illustrating the immaturity of Moldovan civil society in terms of networking (and in terms of the role of trade unions, which still tend to resemble Soviet-era unions rather than their western counterparts). More telling, however, are the attitudes of members of parliament, who view NGOs as profit-seeking enterprises who “have an insignificant impact on the decision-making process. They also consider that there is a low level of cooperation between decision-makers and NGOs” (ADEPT 2001). The lack of trust between NGOs and the government is indicative of a larger problem between government and civil society, in that the government, despite its lack of resources and apparent commitment to (western) international norms, is unwilling to cede power to non-governmental associations that may offer alternative (or opposing) views on Moldovan domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, several of the NGO administrators I interviewed suggested that the boundaries between civil society and the government appeared impermeable, and they themselves

felt that it was better to seek alternative routes in changing society rather than attempting to breach the gap between themselves and policy makers.¹²⁵

As can be expected in this situation, then, state support of the NGO sector is inadequate at best and deliberately neglectful at worst. The Moldovan government does not offer many incentives (if any) to support NGOs—there are no real tax breaks to donors, and minimal tax breaks to NGOs themselves. According to ADEPT, only native “public benefit associations and foundations” are eligible for income tax exemptions; these associations must clearly state their bylaws, scope of work, etc. to obtain such status (which is a common practice in Western countries, of course). Further, “resident donors are entitled to deduction of any donations made for charitable purposes [...] provided these do not exceed 7% of the taxable income.” There are, however “no clear provisions regarding donations to non-resident associations or foundations.”¹²⁶ The reliance upon foreign funding, then, proves to be detrimental to NGOs because such funding calls into question the true “residency” status of such NGOs: in fact, a recent initiative in the parliament would require NGOs receiving foreign assistance to pay a portion of this funding to the state, which could effectively scare off foreign donors.

According to NGO consultants at the Resource Center of Moldovan NGOs for Human Rights (CReDO), businesses are given a choice between giving money to the state or to NGOs. There is no added future benefit, however, because the business will still be taxed on their profits, so there is no incentive to donate to NGOs to earn a tax break. Further, they added, Moldovan society is so rife with corruption within the

¹²⁵ This is not to say there have not been policymakers open to social change; indeed, Moldova’s foremost feminist, Dr. Ala Mindicanu, served two terms as a member of parliament. Her efforts to encourage women’s participation and guarantee women’s rights, however, have often been thwarted by other members, most openly by the Communist Party after the 2001 elections.

¹²⁶ ADEPT, “Taxation” <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/ngo/taxation/> downloaded 1/12/2005.

government and private sector that businesses are more likely to engage in graft and bribing bureaucrats, leaving little for charitable contributions. Neither do NGOs escape the taint of corruption—US funders seem to share an inherent distrust of local administrators, as evidenced by the number of Americans who actually run the programs. US funded programs are usually farmed out to independent agencies, such as Winrock or the International Republican Institute (IRI), who have field officers running their programs. According to USAID (1999: 46), “using intermediary American organizations provides flexibility to choose the implementing NGO best suited to operate in a particular country. Notably implementing NGOs have demonstrated intuition of the problems that confront the local NGO sector, and sensitivity to various management quandaries—such as participation, ethnic diversity, and gender balance that NGOs need to address.” While there is the sense that USAID is simply using those with the most experience (i.e. Americans) to run their programs, it is telling in terms of program expenses. For what it would cost to pay an American a competitive wage, a number of Moldovans, where the annual income is considerably less, could be hired or trained to take over.

Of course, the majority of NGOs and their administrators are engaged in honest work, but, as in the rest of Moldovan life, corruption is a constant factor, and personal relationships and connections continue to determine the success of any civil society project.¹²⁷ This is not to say that US policy makers are unaware of the dangers of prolonged intervention. USAID, particularly, has been clearly self-conscious about the impact of foreign funding for NGOs. A 1999 USAID report “Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story” focused on US policy towards NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe and

¹²⁷ Interview with CReDO staff members, 6/2/04.

the Newly Independent States.¹²⁸ The report found cause for optimism regarding the explosion of NGOs in the two areas following the initial move to democratic transition. The authors, however, found that reliance upon foreign funding was an important impediment to the growth of a self-sustaining civil society, and further, US policy should focus on long-term goals rather than short-term solutions (1999: xi-xii). As those accustomed to the vagaries of politics understand, however, short term solutions often present more “bang for the buck” in terms of offering concrete results to be used as proof of program efficacy.

US Foreign Policy, Moldovan Civil Society, and the Creation of Gender Identities

According to the US Department of State, “the Moldova assistance program has a strong focus on agricultural post-land privatization activities to help it exploit its natural competitive advantage, an anti-corruption and anti-trafficking in person component to address key corrosive issues in society, and an array of efforts to support Moldova’s active membership in the structures of Southeast Europe, the first step in Moldova’s state objective of European integration” (US Dept. of State 2004). Of the \$41.3 million allocated to Moldovan assistance, \$8.4 million was directed towards democracy programs, and \$18.9 million towards economic and social reforms. Both areas include programs intended to affect how Moldovans think about democratization as well as their relationship with the wider community of democratic (read: Western) states.

¹²⁸ USAID makes a political rather than geographic distinction between Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS). The former includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia. The latter includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

The larger question is whether this is possible given the current political situation in Moldova and the state of civil society. Can US policy successfully impact Moldovan identities through civil society if such an entity is so tenuously constructed? How effective will US policies be in a country that shares a lower degree of “political affinity” in this regard? How might US policymakers create effective identity policies, as it were, if the state itself is so resistant to such changes? In the case of Moldova, US policy has had to begin from the beginning: the most successful programs to date are not necessarily community based, but are individually based, international exchange programs.¹²⁹ But how effective is this strategy in addressing women’s needs and women’s place in the state?

These issues, obviously, are not limited to Moldova, but reflect a larger problem with NGOs and democratic transitions in the NIS and CEE more generally. Kristen Ghodsee (2004) argues that women’s issues have been constructed by Western frameworks; rather than resolving the issues faced by women in transitional states, NGOs and foreign funders have actually exacerbated these problems because they do not address underlying class and social issues that cannot be separated from gender. First, western feminists assumed that western institutions, such as capitalism, would result in similar disadvantages for women that were found under socialist institutions (e.g. Funk 1993, 2004; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Jaggar 2005), but their analyses “subsume important emerging class distinctions by their preoccupation with gender” (Ghodsee 2004: 730). Western funders, such as USAID, then funded dozens of “gender assessments” and encouraged countries in transition to development some kind of gender

¹²⁹ Personal conversation with US Embassy official May 2004.

plan. The result, Ghodsee argues, was the creation of a set of problems and stereotypes that have done more harm than good for women in these states:

The creation of NGOs to support women through the transformation process may discursively create an acceptable category of “losers” for a previously egalitarian society in which there was no acceptable category of loser. In other words, the concentration of Western resources and academic research on the problems of women may perpetuate or actually create real barriers to women who must now fight against new stereotypes that women are less adaptable to the market economy.[...] Women who are thriving in the postsocialist period may not want to associate themselves with the negative stereotypes and may distance themselves from any potential women’s movement. Finally, the discourse that women are less flexible in adapting to the new economic system may actually convince the women themselves that they are ill equipped to weather the storms of economic transformation. (2004: 734)

The notion that an egalitarian society existed during Soviet times is an overstatement, especially in Moldova, where, as I have argued earlier, language and cultural differences reinforced certain structures of class and privilege; further, gender discrimination is alive and well in Moldova, and was not created whole-cloth when the Soviet Union disintegrated. But Ghodsee’s point regarding the construction of gender identities and rejection of “feminism” is well-taken, and in many regards does reflect the experience of women in Moldova.¹³⁰

As a result of these gender assessments, US policy makers have identified two positions for women in Moldovan society: as potential political and economic actors, or as potential victims of trafficking. Both positions do reflect some point of reality in women’s lives, yet adopting such views necessarily limits the type of programs that are ultimately funded. The attention to trafficking—and the spectacle it provides in terms of

¹³⁰ As noted in chapter one, however, it is dangerous to assume that feminism—in some form—does not exist because it does not resemble the Western feminist project. See Duhaček 1998, Gapova 2001, Einhorn and Sever 2003.

anti-trafficking campaigning, the salacious details regarding the fate of women forced into prostitution or slavery—detracts from the more positive message of women’s empowerment. Connecting this issue to economic necessity strengthens the notion that the only option open for women is to sell their bodies abroad—or, as a solution, to train as hairdressers or low paid skilled workers at home.¹³¹ The image of women is thus obscured by the power of foreign funders—and the NGOs they fund—to set the terms of the debate (Lang 1997; Ghodsee 2004).

As in the case of many of the Newly Independent States and the CEE countries, trafficking in women has become the US’s main point of entry into women’s issues. This approach, however, creates even further dependence on economic models to resolve the issues because trafficking is handled only as an economic issue rather than as both an economic and social issue. USAID’s anti-trafficking efforts fall under the auspices of its Social Transition Program,¹³² which also includes humanitarian and social assistance and combating infectious diseases, but the causes of trafficking are explicitly economic, according to USAID’s own reports. Measures to fight “trafficking in persons” include:

[A] focus on prevention through public awareness and information campaigns, the identification and recognition of risk factors, an assistance to potential and actual victims of trafficking through legal consultations, crisis prevention services, psychological rehabilitation, training programs in job skills, and entrepreneurship. The objective of this project will be to prevent trafficking in persons by offering economic solutions to an economic problem. Assistance will be directed to

¹³¹ My thanks to Helen Delfeld for pointing out that sometimes you “have to start from where women are”; that is, perhaps what we in the West may point to as being less-than-desirable employment may be perfectly suited to the local situation at hand. My point here is the lack of attention paid to the underlying social issues that situate women in particular culturally “suitable” positions.

¹³² USAID’s focus in Moldova is separated into three issue areas: Private Enterprise Development, Democratic Transition, and Social Transition. Of the three, Private Enterprise Development receives 73% of the \$22 million devoted to Moldova in FY03, while the second two receive 18% and 9%, respectively. USAID country profile for Moldova. This appears to be a common distribution of funds in US policies. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/md/moldova.pdf 10/19/04.

women in rural areas, adolescent girls, university graduates who are seeking employment, and women developing entrepreneurial ideas.¹³³ (emphasis added)

Despite the title “trafficking in persons,” trafficking is clearly considered a “women’s issue.” While improving women’s knowledge of and access to business opportunities is a useful tool, of course, what is questionable is the extent to which this contributes to a positive gender identification for women and if this improves their position within civil society and the state. Even the social services provided, such as “psychological rehabilitation,” are not meant to change the way that society, as a whole, perceives the position of women in Moldovan society but rather to reintegrate women into a society that may, ultimately, reject them for their activities abroad. Further, there is little mention about the need to overcome deeper social and political issues, such as the politics of language.

US models of democratization, as noted in chapter one, often cite the empowerment of women as a necessary element of successful transitions, but this empowerment is predicated on the notion that economic and social equality are mutually reinforcing. If the concept of rights is equated with economic freedom or empowerment, as is the case with US efforts, democratization models that perpetuate liberal economic ideals should be appear to be successful. If, however, the foundation of social equality is absent, as in Moldova, the success of such models appears limited.

¹³³ USAID, “Congressional Budget Justification for Moldova, FY 2005.” Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/md.html 10/19/2004.

Feminism and Women's Identity in Moldova

While the US has encouraged the Moldovan government to consider women's issues, however limited in scope, government provisions for women's equality have been lax. Despite the growing incidences of HIV infections, increasing rates of breast cancer, domestic violence, and trafficking in women, women's issues appear to be largely neglected within Moldovan society. In her 2003 report on women's economic and social, and cultural rights in Moldova, Dr. Mindicanu points to the lack of attention paid to these issues, despite early promises to guarantee women's rights and Moldova's adoption of the UN's Convention to End Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1994. While the Moldovan constitution does provide for the equality of all citizens, it "does not reflect the definition of discrimination which prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. [...] There is no any [sic] non-discriminatory law in Moldova, forbidding discrimination in the field of labor, social security, education, housing, care, in the sphere of private and public contracts, etc. This lacuna is a serious obstacle to an effective system of gender legislation" (2003: 7-8). Further, Mindicanu notes that the Moldovan government has ignored the recommendations of Moldova's CEDAW committee, which, in 2000, pointed to the "disproportionately heavy burden of the effects of transition borne by the women of Moldova," including poverty, poor health care, and lack of social services.

The committee also emphasized the need to consider women as individuals and "active agents of change and claimants of rights," an identity that has not yet materialized for Moldova's women despite the efforts of various women's groups in the country. Women continue to work in lower paying jobs, represent an insignificant number of

decision-makers in the economic and political sphere, yet are more likely to carry the burden of providing for their families:

Moldovan women perform an enormous volume of work at the social level (family, health, education, etc.) and play a determining role in the social development of the community. At the same time they are absent from decision-making, partly because of the lack of a coherent and supportive state framework, partly because of the patriarchal mentality which still affects the whole of society, including women themselves. (Mindicanu 2003: 13)

Thus, women are often placed in the contradictory position of being the family breadwinner, either for a lower salary than men in Moldova, or, more commonly, for higher salaries—and higher risks—in work abroad. Legal and illegal immigration has increased as the economy has worsened, leaving more and more children in the care of elderly parents or abandoned to the inadequate foster-care system (orphanages) in Chişinău. Yet women do not possess the political influence within society needed to change these conditions for themselves, nor do they have the power to change conditions within society for the benefit of all.

In some ways, however, the economic model propagated by the US and foreign NGOs makes sense when other interventions—i.e., the introduction of “feminist” ideas—are not so easily inserted into Moldovan society. Indeed, “feminism” has hardly taken root in the country, unlike Estonia, which, despite some resistance to Western feminism, has benefited from its relationship with the Nordic states, arguably among the most feminist-friendly states in the world. In several conversations with young Moldovan men (between the ages of 25 and 35), I was told that gender roles are permanent and important in maintaining society; that is, men are natural public leaders and women are meant to

marry and care for children and homes.¹³⁴ The former director of women's programs for the Moldova Soros Foundation, Antonina Sarbu, noted that feminism has not really taken root in Moldova because of deep-seated traditions and attitudes:

[Feminism] hasn't been so widely received because of tradition, especially because of Orthodoxy. Women have not really been "emancipated." [...] They believe their problems are "personal" and it isn't the business of society or the state to resolve them. In Moldova there is the saying "woman goes one step behind man," which is supposedly a sign of respect for the man, and in some strange way, for the woman too. Perhaps feminism will be accepted by the next generation because of education and access to information. For the most part, women understand the concept of rights, but not within the context of families.¹³⁵

In order to change these kinds of identities, broader efforts directed at equality are necessary; economic equality is not a substitute for substantive social equality.

This is not to say that Moldovan politicians are not, at some level, aware of the importance of the gender equality issue to international society, particularly its western neighbors (and possible donors). Indeed, Moldovan politicians are quite willing to use the language of democracy to, at the very least, present a façade of liberal democracy, including the language of gender equality. The outgoing leader of the Moldovan parliament is a woman, Eugenia Ostapciuc; she has been a long time CPRM supporter. As the 2003 Freedom House report suggests, however, her appointment may have been more for show than an indication of changing gender norms in Moldova: "[the]

¹³⁴ Personal conversations, November 2003, May 2004, October 2004, February 2005. I think, however, there is a great deal of confusion among Moldovan men regarding the meaning of "feminism," which they associate (stereotypically) with a radical, foreign (read: lesbian) social movement. One young Moldovan professor, on a recent exchange visit to Rutgers University told me that he would like to speak to a feminist while in the US. He was somewhat confused when I told him that I would be happy to speak with him about it, as I teach and research feminist theories of international relations. "No," he said, shaking his head, "I want to speak to a real, radical feminist." Despite my protestations, he did not think my credentials fit his image of what a "real" feminist is. Over the course of my visits to Moldova, I have heard variations of this familiar theme from Moldovan men, usually accompanied by disparaging remarks regarding "those kinds of women" and questions regarding my own marital status.

¹³⁵ Personal interview, 6/4/04.

Communists believed that the Western press would temper its increasing criticism of the country's politics if the chair of the Moldovan legislature were a woman" (2003: 287). The interesting point here is that using the language of gender equality was perceived as a positive strategy at all, indicating at least a superficial influence on Moldovan norms if not a substantive one. The superficiality of this move, however, has not been lost on Moldovan society. Ostapciuc has been excoriated in the Moldovan press for her alleged stupidity and neglect of her family duties. Further, because her experience has been in commerce rather than politics, she is perceived as being unprepared for politics. This characterization has become so widely accepted that even young feminists often refused to believe that she possesses any capabilities to perform her job appropriately.¹³⁶

These ideas, of course, are rooted in deeply ingrained images of women in Moldova, whose roles are traditionally based. A woman, I was told, was nothing until she was married, and then her duties lie in caring for her family and children. Working outside the home may be an economic necessity, but a woman should work only if her domestic duties are not neglected. Even Ostapciuc herself has seemingly rejected any taint of feminism: Dr. Ala Mindicanu, a former member of parliament and an accredited journalist, was ordered out of Ostapciuc's first parliamentary meeting because, Mindicanu believes, she represented a "feminist menace" to Ostapciuc's position. What infuriated Mindicanu, however, was not that she had been branded so negatively for her work on women's issues, but that Ostapciuc "had been trained!" in Mindicanu's own women's rights seminars conducted by the National Committee on Women's Issues in parliament.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Personal interview, NGO Change for a New Generation, 6/7/04.

¹³⁷ Personal interview, March 8, 2005.

Rather than paint an entirely bleak picture of US policy results, it should be noted that there has been a move towards introducing the idea of “women’s rights” into Moldovan civil society. Among the various business and agricultural programs developed through USAID, programs directed at developing political parties and encouraging women’s political participation have recently begun in Moldova (as of the end of 2004). These programs, administered by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), are specifically geared toward engaging women in the democratic transition. Winrock’s program “Win With Women” seeks to involve women in the political process. According to Dr. Mindicanu, however, these programs are misdirected because they only target women without addressing the underlying issues that make gender equality problematic in Moldova. Without a concerted campaign directed at educating men and women, as well as girls and boys, nothing will change, because the real issue is who has power both culturally and politically, not only economically.¹³⁸

Conclusion: US Policy and Gender Constructions in Moldova

The politics of language, the weakness of civil society, and the weak position of women within society are all impediments to US efforts to construct agency among women in Moldovan society. But, as I have argued in this chapter, US efforts are also hindered by US policymakers’ inability to create policies and programs that can overcome these issues. Trafficking in persons is indicative of this failure at imagination,

¹³⁸ Ibid.

framed as it is in terms of victimization and lack of economic agency, rather than social agency.

The international community is beginning to understand these issues. UNDP's latest report on trafficking (March 2005) reveals the extent to which particular constructions of women in anti-trafficking efforts have proven to be detrimental. The report, which examines anti-trafficking measures in South Eastern Europe, is clear in its conclusions: anti-trafficking measures are more effective when based upon an empowerment model rather than a "repressive model." The repressive model focuses on the activities involved in trafficking, including illegal immigration, border control, and combating organized crime, with little focus on the rights of the victims of trafficking. While US policies are now shifting towards aiding the victims, as I noted earlier, the campaigns funded to this point have focused on the negative aspects of the problem and have sought economic models as a solution. The UNDP report, however, notes that the "empowerment model," which makes human rights a central component of anti-trafficking strategies, is a more effective tool:

Empowering strategies have tended to be used by human rights organizations and values-based NGOs, as well as a limited number of State agencies. Organisations that are using empowerment strategies to prevent trafficking have been advocating for governments to adopt a human rights approach and to actively engage in meaningful dialogue with civil society actors. They have been stressing the need for inter-Ministerial and inter-agency cooperation and have been trying to ensure presence of a human rights perspective in the law enforcement approach, as well as the inclusion of preventive measures into the NPAs. The experience of the NGOs showed that strategies focusing only on repressive measures are not victim-centered and often resulted in further victimisation of trafficked persons. In order for anti-trafficking strategies to be effective and to protect the victims, there has to be a general understanding and acceptance of the empowerment approach to preventing trafficking that is firmly based on human rights principles. (2005: 3)

Thus, if US efforts are to be effective—if women's identity within Moldova is to be changed in a positive light—the tactics of democratization efforts must also change.

First, US efforts must take into consideration the deeper political and cultural rifts within Moldova, as characterized by the politics of language, the receptivity to ideas of women's rights and the obstacles presented by both. Reliance on neo-liberal models that focus on individual responsibility and equality of opportunity while simultaneously espousing the image of victimization represents confusing policy dichotomies that only serve to undermine any progress within civil society. As I have shown in this chapter, civil society in Moldova is at a crucially fragile stage; empowerment rather than victimization is needed.

US funding must also focus on positive aspects of women's roles in civil society, not just as economic actors, but as agents of social change, as equal partners in democratic development. Further, US policies must make continued development aid contingent on the Moldovan government's successful implementation of gender equality policies. This strategy, of course, is highly doubtful, given the US government's blatant disregard for international standards of gender equity (i.e. the US's consistent refusal to implement CEDAW or to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment). The emphasis of democratization policies, then, should be on supporting feminist organizations as well as women's issues and understanding the need for long-term projects with varied goals rather than short term projects with concrete goals but less reach.

In Moldova, the backlash against feminism and apparent Western encroachment is clear, but not deadly. Continued contact with US and Western European funders will force a shift in these attitudes, particularly if the Moldovan government's emphasis on

European integration is to bear fruit. While I am not suggesting that “western feminism” should be adopted whole-cloth—indeed, it should not be, because feminisms are historically and culturally contingent—greater emphasis on equality between men and women, as well as political, social, and economic inclusion should be the goal.

Chapter Five

First Image Reversed: Universally Applicable or Culturally Specific? Conclusions and Evaluation of the Model

What then of the seduction? Does it work? Does a First Image Reversed strategy accomplish what policy makers seek—the creation of US-friendly governments through the manipulation of NGOs and civil society? How extensive are the benefits? What are the costs? This chapter points to many of the conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding chapters. I also offer a brief comparison of two cases that do not seem to fit the model, Poland and Belarus. Both cases represent extreme variance on the political affinity axis (Poland being very close to the US, Belarus extremely alienated from the West generally), but neither seems to exhibit high degrees of receptivity, for different reasons. This comparison serves as an outline for further research, as well as an attempt to falsify the theory constructed in chapter one. I conclude with insights for policy makers generally, and suggestions for expanding the model in more useful ways, as policy makers look eastward.

In Chapter One, I explained the First Image Reversed Model (FIRM). I emphasized the importance of thinking of international politics in terms of individual and collective identity, particularly in the ways in which changing notions of the self relative to the state may force states themselves to change. This is, of course, the basic recipe of revolutionary movements. But it can also be the recipe for gradual change—non-violent, evolutionary change. The key ingredient in the case of former Soviet European

republics, I have argued, has been the concentrated and deliberate intervention of Western states at the level of civil society. The First Image Reversed strategy, I argued, consists of a foreign policy that includes a specific strategy towards influencing the goals and methods of the NGO sector; these policies will also serve to impact the development of a collective values within those societies. Values and attitudes that are more open and amenable to US values and goals, for example, will serve to influence the ultimate interests of a state in democratic transition.

In attempting to understand this relationship, I traced the impact of US policies towards two particular states in transition, Estonia and Moldova. These two cases represent variation on the two main intervening variables I have identified: political affinity and receptivity to foreign funding. I found that these two variables helped to explain the different rates of transition; while they are broad explanations, to be sure, both are strong enough to offer insight into the problems with the first image reversed approach. In the case of Estonia, political affinity and receptivity to foreign funding have helped establish a vibrant democracy and a growing civil society. Further, hegemonic influences upon the NGO sector through civil society policy initiatives have shaped new ideas regarding gender roles, including changing notions of gender equality and the identification of social problems, such as domestic violence and trafficking in persons. The hegemonic influences are expressed through the manipulation of the “language” of foreign funding, which establishes foreign priorities, foreign expectations, and shapes the strategies implemented by local NGOs.

The case of Moldova illustrates the difficulties of the First Image Reversed strategy when policy makers encounter significant resistance to American liberal values

and the adoption of broader conceptions of civil society, thus Moldova's low ranking on the political affinity and receptivity variables. Here language is also important, but in a different light: the politics of language in Moldovan society, expressed in the tensions between Romanian and Russian speakers, is emblematic of the struggle between two different hegemonic powers to shape the language of civil society. On the one hand, US efforts to encourage democratization through the NGO sector is hampered by insufficient attention to these tensions as well as preconceived notions of what democratization and gender equality must look like. On the other hand, the continuing influence of Russia on Moldovan politics reinforces the state's resistance to foreign funding and the development of the NGO sector. The Moldovan case, then, points to the need to create first image reversed policies that are culturally and socially specific, without many of the built-in assumptions of current US policies, based as they are on successful programs such as the Northern European Initiative as well as Nordic influence.

This is not to suggest, however, that US policies towards Moldova have failed; indeed, Moldova's increasingly positive overtures towards the West and self-distancing from Russia indicates that pro-democratic social forces within Moldova are growing in influence. On March 25, 2005, the Moldovan Parliament voted to seek future EU integration and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria by the beginning of 2006. Although the EU Action Plan adopted by the ruling Communist party may reflect political expediency rather than a commitment to democratic ideals, not following through would be politically disastrous; President Voronin is also quite aware of the influence of the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" on political factions within

Moldova.¹³⁹ This shift to the West has reduced some of the tensions within the Moldovan Parliament among the Communists and the two opposition parties, while also reinforcing the notion that democratic reform is indeed possible in Moldova—but only if it extracts itself from Russian influence. Russia, for its part, has announced its intentions to reassert its influence over Moldova, particularly in the energy sector; Voronin's recent move to the West, however, has made him quite unpopular with Russian President Putin.¹⁴⁰

The real test of the First Image Reversed Model, however, lies in the analysis of cases where civil society had already begun to grow locally and thus US intervention efforts would be limited, or where efforts to influence democratization have borne little fruit. My current project has served to point to the basic function of the First Image Reversed model in relatively successful cases; future research will serve to point to its applicability (or lack thereof) elsewhere. Two cases that stand out in this regard are Poland and Belarus: Poland, with its strong tradition of civil society (particularly the Roman Catholic Church and Polish labor unions) seemed—to US policy makers—to need little in the way of encouraging home-grown civil society (with the exception of creating organizations to “incubate” the economic transition, as I will explain below) and

¹³⁹ Nico Popescu, “The Revolutionary Evolution in Moldova,” editorial, May 4, 2005, downloaded from <http://www.moldova.org/editoriale/eng/32/6/13/2005>.

¹⁴⁰ In 2002 President Vronin began making pro-Europe and pro-EU statements. In 2003 he publicly expressed his “negative reaction to the establishment of the Single Economic Area (SEA) by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. [...] This has spurred some contradictory reactions among the Moldovan society. On the one hand, President Voronin's statement that SEA had undermined Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) existence and therefore Moldova stated that from now on Moldova would take firmer action towards the European Union brought hopes to opposition parties and press that the incumbent ruling party truly embarked upon European integration path and that it might even break away from CIS.” ADEPT, political commentary, October 6, 2003. Downloaded from <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/political/20031006/>.

has successfully transitioned to democracy¹⁴¹; Belarus, on the other hand, has (so far) failed in its democratic transition yet has seen substantial growth in the number of NGOs, the sector where the US has devoted most of its efforts.¹⁴² The following two sections will give a brief overview of US efforts in these states, as they pertain to democratization and gender politics, and point to contradictions they represent for the First Image Reversed Model. These brief outlines are intended to serve as the bases of future research, thus they are incomplete in the sense that they lack the benefit of first-hand experience.

Case One: Belarus and “Selective Engagement”

Belarus, Secretary of State Rice recently noted, is “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.”¹⁴³ The US’s stated policy towards dealings with the Belarusian government is one of “selective engagement,” in response to an unconstitutional referendum passed by the Belarusian government in 1996 that restructured the parliament and legal structures in favor of the Lukashenko regime. According to US policy, no bilateral assistance is channeled through the Belarusian government, with the exception of humanitarian assistance and educational exchange programs. Instead, US assistance is almost entirely focused upon the country’s non-governmental sector, with an emphasis upon NGOs and media engaged in promoting free

¹⁴¹ I do not mean to imply that there were adequate organizations within Polish civil society to address the myriad of social problems that state faced during the transition period. Here I address the perception that civil society was well-developed in comparison to the other states that I examine.

¹⁴² An increase in the number of NGOs does not necessarily indicate the strength of civil society, except in the thinnest definitions of civil society. See Howard 2003, Ekiert and Kubik 2001.

¹⁴³ April 20, 2005, US Secretary of State Rice, meeting with Belarusian dissidents in Vilnius, Lithuania during meeting with NATO foreign ministers. “Rice: Russia’s Future Linked to Democracy” www.cnn.worldnews downloaded 6/19/2005.

access to information.¹⁴⁴ US efforts in Belarus, then, present an interesting case in terms of the First Image Reversed, given that US policy is limited to working through grassroots efforts rather than through government to government interaction. In the following sections, I examine the growth of Belarusian civil society in light of the highly restrictive political atmosphere in Belarus and US interventions.

Belarusian Civil Society and Government Resistance

A 2001 CIVICUS study, surprisingly, found that Belarusian society enjoyed consistent growth throughout the 1990s: by 1998, some 45,500 people were involved in NGOs, and by 2001 1,900 NGOs were registered (Zagoumenov 2001: 8).¹⁴⁵ In 2003, a USAID report noted that there were approximately 2,500 registered NGOs, with nearly as many unregistered NGOs.¹⁴⁶ These NGOs include trade unions, religious organizations, social service organizations (youth, women, human rights protections, and arts, history and culture), charitable organizations, and opposition political parties. Both the CIVICUS report and the USAID numbers are misleading, however, as civil society in Belarus is limited by a number of factors, most importantly, perhaps, being the lack of access and engagement to international networks due to the political situation within

¹⁴⁴ USAID, "Building Democracy in Belarus" downloaded from www.usaid.gov/democracy/ee/belarus 3/20/2003.

¹⁴⁵ See Chapter One, footnotes, for a discussion of the disparities between Freedom House and CIVICUS reports.

¹⁴⁶ USAID "NGO Sustainability Index" downloaded from www.usaid.gov 3/20/2003. The report notes that after the 2001 election, it became impossible for NGOs deemed "unacceptable" by the government to legally register; further, the registration process is intentionally burdensome to dissuade NGOs from registering.

Belarus, lack of a strong middle class, and general apathy towards social issues.¹⁴⁷ The weak connection with international civil society means that Belarusian NGOs “have lacked the knowledge about international standards of civil society development”; even the CIVICUS report admits that NGOs also tend to be concentrated among the elite, particularly in the capital, Minsk (Zagoumenov 2001: 2).¹⁴⁸

Further, even while USAID notes that a “vibrant civil society has emerged,” the Belarusian government has actively sought to quell any opposition, which may serve to seriously weaken civil society.¹⁴⁹ Freedom House’s 2004 Nations In Transit report on Belarus (2004: 2) paints a much bleaker picture:

In 2003, Belarusian civil society continued to withstand a systematic attack from government agencies. Several high-profile nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were shut down for technical and essentially arbitrary reasons; others received official warnings that could lead to their closure in the near future. Independent trade unions are being squeezed out of existence by the repression of their leadership and forceful replacement by state-controlled unions. Political control over the educational system was strengthened alongside the introduction of a new “state ideology,” an eclectic mix of ideas inherited from the Communist past and Lukashenko’s own version of “Soviet Belarusian” patriotism and anti-Western rhetoric. This ideology serves as a formal pretext for cleansing public institutions of unwanted elements. Government-organized NGOs receive budget support and are actively promoted as mouthpieces for official propaganda.

¹⁴⁷ See Kubik 2004, Ekiert and Kubik 2003, Howard 2003 for a discussion of measuring the strength of civil society. Howard (2003) uses the 1995-97 World Values Survey as an empirical baseline for establishing the strength of civil society; these measurements include assessing membership in nine different types of organizations and former and present regime types, with a comparison between established democracies and states in transition.

¹⁴⁸ This concentration of NGOs in the larger cities is a common phenomenon, of course, as the greater number of people and access to resources make organizing easier. The problem, however, is that an NGO elite is created which, rather than addressing needs within society, exists only to serve itself through the pursuit of resources. As I noted in chapters three and four, the large number of NGOs competing for foreign funds means that proposed programs become narrower in focus in order to secure those funds, which, ultimately serves to pay the salaries of NGO administrators while limiting the scope of available social programs.

¹⁴⁹ USAID “Building Democracy in Belarus.”

Clearly USAID, while admitting to shortcomings, seeks to continue funding for its projects in Belarus; emphasizing the failure of efforts there would be a sure way to end support for its efforts.

This is not to say that the US government is working with blinders in its relations with Belarus and that government's abysmal human rights record. The current Belarusian government, led by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has engaged in voter fraud, extensive human rights abuses, and repressive policies towards NGOs, human rights, women's, and youth groups. The media remains under tight control, and religious freedom has also been curtailed. The 2004 election campaign was marked by the beatings, disappearances, and deaths of several opposition leaders, peaceful protesters, and journalists, prompting the US Congress to pass the Belarus Democracy Act in October 2004. According to the US State Department's March 2005 report on US democracy efforts in Europe and Eurasia, "The Act criticizes the Government's human rights record, authorizes support for democracy programs and expresses the sense of Congress that certain sanctions be applied to the Government of Belarus. The passage of this Act demonstrated bipartisan support for the U.S. Government's policy of emphasizing democracy and human rights in U.S. relations with Belarus."¹⁵⁰ This has been the saving grace for USAID's projects in the state.

Interestingly, the US seeks to undermine the Belarusian government, not through direct confrontation, but through creating a "fifth column" of democratic reform. The Act bypasses government involvement with Belarus and instead, focuses US efforts on building civil society and encouraging democratic reform from the ground-up:

¹⁵⁰ "Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2004-2005" a report by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US State Department, released March 28, 2005. Downloaded from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004/43110.htm> 6/19/2005.

Bolstering civil society and independent media and promoting the rule of law remained key U.S. goals. The United States awarded grants to NGOs as well as human rights, women's and youth groups to strengthen independent mass media and civil society. The United States also supported journalism and management training, legal defense and business consultations to strengthen independent print and broadcast media outlets and increase their capacity to provide objective, fact-based information.¹⁵¹

Thus, on the one hand, the Act simply reiterates the realities of US relations with Belarus over the past ten years, and on the other, reflects the type of policymaking that has become de rigueur in the State Department, as I illustrated in chapter two.

As could be expected, US efforts have met with strong resistance from the Belarusian government, which has made intervention on the grassroots level increasingly difficult. In 2001, Presidential Decree #8 was implemented, severely impeding the use of foreign donations to NGOs, and requiring that these grants be registered with the Department of Humanitarian Activities; further, foreign grants are subject to taxation despite tax exempt status for charitable donations, and can be frozen by banks (USAID 2003).¹⁵² In 2004 the Belarusian government denied re-registration for the International Research and Exchanges (IREX) board, which has been the main source of individual contact between Belarusian and American academics and activists, through educational and cultural exchange programs. Counterpart International, an American NGO that works with social "clubs" and local governments on various projects, such as building playgrounds, improving nutrition among schoolchildren, and providing public health

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² As noted in Chapter Four, the Moldovan government has also attempted to introduce similar legislation. As of this writing, however, I am not aware that such legislation has passed, nor that it would have much political support given the Moldovan government's stated EU action policy.

information was denied legal registration and “forced to cease its activities.”¹⁵³ Clearly Belarusian “receptivity” to foreign funding and interaction with NGOs is dismally low.

The hegemonic struggle between the US and Russia is evident in the Belarusian case. Belarus’ lack of political affinity for the West—and the US in particular—coupled with a lack of receptivity to foreign funding for NGOs should, according to the First Image Reversed model, make US influence on collective political identity less likely, thus indicating little influence on Belarusian foreign policies. Despite the proliferation of Belarusian NGOs, the 2001 CIVICUS study and the 2004 Freedom House report agree that NGOs and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have little to no impact on government policy making (Zagoumenov 2001: 18).¹⁵⁴ Further, although the CIVICUS study does indicate that some NGOs have been able to affect legislation (particularly those not perceived by the Belarusian government as “political” such as environmental or women’s groups), this is misleading given the rubber-stamp role the Belarusian parliament plays vis-à-vis the administration and the high degree of NGO cooptation by the Belarusian government (Freedom House 2004b).

Despite the difficulties faced by NGOs and the nature of the relationship between NGOs and the Belarusian government, US policy continues to work through these organizations to effect change. According to the USAID 2003 program data sheet, the

¹⁵³ “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy”

¹⁵⁴ A notable exception has been The Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines, initiated by The Support Center for Associations and Foundations in 1998: “In cooperation with the Nobel Prize Laureate International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Belarus campaign has recently managed to convince the Belarus authorities to disclose classified information on the landmines stockpiles, and to sign the Ottawa Treaty on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines. International civil society organizations assisted Belarus counterparts in negotiating with western governments and donors to secure funding for the landmine removal in Belarus. This is a good example of how civil society in Belarus has successfully moved the Belarus government toward closer adherence to international standards and promoted solution of a humanitarian problem.” (Zagoumenov 2001: 1)

budget for FY2003 was \$3,900,000; the program began in FY 1999 and was estimated to be completed by FY 2002. Given the current situation in Belarus, however, USAID has continued funding under the FREEDOM Act for the foreseeable future, under the single “Strategic Objective”: “ ‘Increased citizen participation in democratic practices.’ This strategic objective is in harmony with the joint State Department/USAID Strategic Goal – ‘to advance the growth of democracy and good governance, including civil society, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and religious freedom.’”¹⁵⁵ This plan includes working with independent media, NGOs, and pro-democracy groups, coupled with two additional activities not funded under the current budget which is clearly based on other regional plans, particularly USAID’s approach in Moldova:

The Citizens Network for Foreign affairs currently implements the West NIS (New Independent States) Agribusiness Volunteer Program in Belarus. This initiative will receive regional funding until 2007. The program objectives are to strengthen private farmer associations, to develop private agribusinesses and to stimulate the development of farmers' entrepreneurial initiatives. This program is in harmony with the Presidential “Volunteers for Prosperity” Initiative. Second, a \$100,000 seven-month anti-trafficking activity is being implemented regionally by Winrock International to reduce trafficking of Belarusian women by developing their job-market skills and by providing vulnerable women with economic opportunities in selected regions. These programs currently operate unfettered by governmental interference.¹⁵⁶

The last point is important in terms of the possibilities for US policy: given that the Belarusian government appears to be tolerant of foreign involvement in “women’s issues,” this particular channel may serve as a crucial inroad into Belarusian domestic

¹⁵⁵ USAID Budget Statement, downloaded from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/by.html>, 6/20/05.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

politics. If the First Image Reversed model is correct, then, we should expect this result.¹⁵⁷

Gender Politics in Belarus

According to the First Image Reversed model, funding for NGOs works as a tool of foreign policy because this funding shapes the language of civil society and encourages civil society actors to adopt the attitudes and values of the funder. As I have shown throughout this project, funding for “women’s issues” is a particularly important channel because of the fundamental political disruption that changes in gender attitudes may cause—that is, challenging gender roles vis-à-vis women’s association with the state signals a new engagement between civil society (and civil rights) and the state.

In the case of Belarus—as in the cases of Estonia and Moldova—women’s roles in society have become sites of contestation over the identity of the nation and of society in general, particularly for those opposed to Lukashenko’s pro-Russia government. As Elena Gapova explains, the struggle to create a Belarusian identity that is separate from Russia—and its Soviet past—is expressed in terms of “freeing” women from Russian imperialism. She quotes a leader in the Belarusian nationalist movement, for example, who makes a direct correlation between this imperialism, women’s right to choose, and the genocide of the nation:

Russians used the war and even military operations with the goal of genocide of the Belarusian nation...Then, continuing medical genocide, they worked out the harmful policy of restraining Belarusian fertility and murdering the human fetus inside the woman’s womb....If Belarusian policy does not get rid of the

¹⁵⁷ Future research in Belarus is planned, but under the current political circumstances, access to Belarusian NGOs would be impossible for me—an unknown American researcher—to achieve. Further, personal conversations with a Belarusian academic have been instructive in terms of the extent of repression and fear of reprisals among Belarusian academics and activists—she welcomed me to send e-mails regarding “women’s issues” but warned me not to use the language of “human rights” or “democratization” as she could be severely reprimanded by her university acting on behalf of the government. Personal conversation 11/05.

aggression of Russian imperialism and does not do something about the Chernobyl legacy, then in the twenty-first century there will not be a single Belarusian left. The whole nation will be wiped out, to the last man. (Paz'nyak 2001; Gapova 2004: 95)

Further, women were ostensibly freed from their double burden of work and childcare through perestroika, but Belarusian masculinity had been undermined to such an extent by Russian dominance that women were still expected to care for them as they would for children. A resurgence of masculinity within Belarusian society was met with a concurrent rise in the “sexualized and caregiving redefinitions of women: the abortion and reproduction debate, the sexualization and objectification of women’s bodies, the displacement of women from public life [...], the relocation of childcare back into ‘women’s hands’ (from state agencies) and so on” (Gapova 2004: 94)¹⁵⁸. Clearly, then, the language of civil society at the moment does not serve Belarusian women well, but rather makes their subordination symbolic of nationalist struggles.¹⁵⁹

The irony, of course, is that nationalists have politicized women’s roles as reproducers of the nation while the Belarusian government either does not consider women’s issues to be political or chooses simply to ignore their political import. Moreover, the government may rightfully point to laws that protect women in cases of spousal abuse, rape, prostitution, and workplace discrimination; women’s rights, then, would seem to be a moot debate.¹⁶⁰ In reality, however, there are few protections for women, as the social stigma against reporting crimes against women remains strong.

¹⁵⁸ See also Gal and Kligman 2000a & b, Watson 1993 for discussions regarding the resurgence of masculinity in post-communist states.

¹⁵⁹ I noted in Chapter Three the perpetuation of the “babe” image in Estonia, where young women have been over-sexualized in common discourse. Moldova’s transition has been met with similar re-vamping of the image of once-strong—equal—women into weak, submissive overly sexualized beings.

¹⁶⁰ US Dept. of State, Human Rights Report, Belarus, 2004. Downloaded from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41671.htm>, 6/20/05.

Trafficking in women, as in other former Soviet states, has greatly increased, and only four women hold high government posts. A gender equality law proposed by lawmaker Anna Burova that would have created a commission to oversee women's issues and insure women's equality failed to pass through the legislature.¹⁶¹

The US State Department's human rights report does note, however, that women's groups in Belarus have been quite active, and indicates that foreign intervention may find an effective channel in this area:

Women's groups were active and focused primarily on child welfare, environmental concerns (especially the after effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster), the preservation of the family, the promotion of women to decision making levels in the country, the support of women entrepreneurs, and combating trafficking. Job training provided the best results in efforts to increase women's roles in business and society and to combat trafficking. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) continued its program, "Support to Expanding Public Space for Women in Belarus," which provided leadership seminars, business start up training and an MBA program. There was an active women's political party.¹⁶²

As noted earlier, current US policy does recognize the importance of addressing women's issues and working with women's NGOs in order to strengthen society. I would argue, however, that in the case of Belarus, the effect would not only be a "strengthening" of civil society by widening the discourse, but rather, changing the language of women's rights and place in society could serve as a veritable fifth column for US policy. If, however, the First Image Reversed model is correct in terms of the negative impacts of low political affinity and low receptivity, US policymakers' ability to make real inroads will be sorely tested.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. These issues are not limited to Belarus, of course—all four states I examine are dealing with similar issues.

¹⁶² Ibid.

Case Two: Poland and Civil Society

The case of Poland is interesting in that it is a completed project according to USAID reports. From 1989-1999 USAID worked with other organizations (such as the Polish-American Enterprise Fund) to fund dozens of NGOs or work with entrepreneurs to rebuild and strengthen civil society. Poland exemplifies the success of SEED, and has been used as a model for other states in the transition. In terms of civil society—and particularly, gender and women’s issues—how successful have these policies really been? Can US policymakers take responsibility for the rapid development of the NGO sector in Poland after 1989, or does this explosion represent a latent civil society that simply needed the encouragement brought by economic liberalization? In this section, I address two issues regarding the success of Poland’s transition: first, Poland’s pre-existing tradition of civil society (i.e. the Church and trade unions, a tradition of citizen participation and local, self-governance) made it receptive to foreign funding for NGOs, yet made it less receptive to the effects of US influence on the language of civil society; secondly, US emphasis on economic liberalization to speed Poland’s transition effectively limited the US’s influence to the economic realm rather than the social realm, particularly for women’s groups, which were, in fact, marginalized from the political process (McMahon 2002; Ekiert and Kubik 2001).¹⁶³

USAID Efforts and Poland’s Tradition of Opposition

USAID devoted enormous resources to the democratic transition of Poland, seeing Poland and Hungary as the stepping stones to a democratic (and US-friendly)

¹⁶³ In terms of creating a pro-American space, however, Poland may be counted as a success story. Here the links between US efforts and preexisting political affinity are evident, yet the question is whether continued US efforts regarding civil society would have an effect, given Poland’s tradition of social movements and social organization.

Eastern Europe. USAID cites the development of SEED-funded projects in Poland as the beginning of USAID's dynamic approach to democratic development, where greater willingness to work with local NGOs and governments replaced programs directed from Washington DC. Over the ten-year period of USAID's assistance, the number of NGOs increased dramatically; to facilitate the expansion of the NGO sector and effectiveness of local governance, USAID provided training assistance and consultations.¹⁶⁴ USAID's greatest accomplishment, as noted by USAID's final report on assistance to Poland (2002: 5), was the agency's hand in restructuring Poland's economy: "One of the most significant and powerful forces in transforming Poland in the early 1990s was the transition to a market economy and USAID clearly played an integral part in early reforms." Aid for NGOs, then, was also linked to the developing market economy, particularly the trade unions, which represented a vital source of political, social, and economic activism.

Thus, US policy makers made economic reform the cornerstone of its programs and efforts to influence local governments played a complementary role in this strategy. The Local Government Act of 1990 (to strengthen the capacity of local governments and municipalities and foster decentralization) encouraged US policy makers to focus on technical assistance for mayors and local government officials.¹⁶⁵ While US officials did worry about the shift to the left in the early 1990s (as a backlash against Solidarity), by 1996 USAID had developed direct partnerships between four local governments and the

¹⁶⁴ USAID, "USAID and the Polish Decade," March 13, 2002. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/pl/close-ou.html 5/21/05.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. This effort was led by the Foundation for the Support of Local Democracy (FSLD), headed by Dr. Jerzy Regulski; in 1990 USAID provided assistance to FSLD through Rutgers University, which helped "to develop the capacity of FSLD's regional training centers and their core training cadre....Over a decade, FSLD has trained and provided technical assistance to over 300,000 local government officials." (2002: 6)

American government, essentially by-passing the national Polish government. In 1997 USAID began the Local Government Partnership Program (LGPP), which worked with “a large group of Polish consulting firms, NGOs and educational institutions [which worked with] about 150 gminas [municipalities] in Poland [to support] their efforts to improve financial management, restructure municipal services, prepare infrastructure projects for financing, prepare economic development plans and increase citizen participation” (2002: 7)¹⁶⁶. Clearly, by this point US policy makers had realized that perhaps the best way to influence the national government would be to reach out to the local level, particularly through programs, such as housing assistance, that eased the pain of the “shock therapy” strategy used to transition the Polish economy from a centralized to free market economy. The American role in transforming Poland into the “economic engine and corporate capital of the region” plays no small part in USAID’s final report on its assistance to Poland, and is touted as key to the program’s success.¹⁶⁷

That these policies were being simultaneously developed in Poland and the greater Baltic region through NEI should come as no surprise, as the FREEDOM Act and SEED gave rise to a new sense of policy creativity in Washington DC.¹⁶⁸ The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland, after all, were being primed for NATO and EU accession at roughly the same time. But the success of these policies, as I have argued, was also dependent on the receptivity to American values and policy desires.

¹⁶⁶ My thanks to Joanna Regulaska for noting that this project was a “massive failure,” which resulted in the director being recalled. The point of this example is to highlight US strategies in affecting local attitudes.

¹⁶⁷ Of course, this is the USAID representation of the situation. The alternative explanation is that, rather than viewing the success as a Polish response to US policies, US policies were responding to Polish pressures to act. While I certainly do not mean to imply that the US was responsible for Poland’s successful transition to democracy, what I do intend to illustrate are the types of US policies that were enacted at the time, reflecting the First Image Reversed strategy.

¹⁶⁸ See chapter two for a discussion of NEI and its precedents.

Given Poland's long history of civil society and activism, how effective were US policies in changing civil society to reflect US needs?

Poland's democratic transition—or, more specifically, its transition to a market economy—was begun before the revolutions of 1989. Failed economic and government reforms of the 1970s (which consolidated the power of the Communist Party) under First Secretary Gierek led to the strikes of June 1976 that would ultimately lead to the demise of the Communist regime in 1989. According to Jan Kubik (1994: 17), this triggered a “symbolic war” between the Party-state, the Catholic Church, and the organized opposition [...] Eventually, this war became one of the key factors bringing about the collapse of Communist rule.” The rise of Solidarity was precipitated by a number of factors. These included economic crises, which had created a growing gap between poor and rich. Political factors included “corporatist techniques of protest absorption and interest representation,” a weak party, a “strong Catholic Church and an independent intelligentsia,” an evolved “organization of oppositional networks” which encompassed workers, and a regime that chose to be relatively tolerant of opposition. Rising expectations among the workers further complicated the situation, while the “oppositional/revolutionary ethos of Polish culture and history” and “ethnic and religious homogeneity,” combined with the sense of social justice and egalitarianism reinforced the growing realization that the reality of the system itself did not reflect the image of its own propaganda (Kubik 1994: 240-243). No one factor could explain the rise of Solidarity, Kubik notes, and the process itself was “slow and tedious” (1994: 243).

Kubik concludes that the relative success of the Solidarity movement was because it was a cultural, rather than political, movement where “the organized

opposition and the Catholic Church developed and publicly disseminated a counterhegemonic discourse that allowed the populace to challenge and ultimately reject the regime's claims to legitimacy" (267). While this developed opposition fostered the revolution because it had become so embedded culturally, by 1990 Solidarity could not meet the political expectations imposed upon it; this resulted in the shift to the left during the 1993 parliamentary elections.

In terms of the First Image Reversed Model, then, one might assume that Solidarity's failure would leave civil society open for outside influence. But if civil society is more than a political field—indeed, if civil society and collective identity are intertwined, civil society must also be social and cultural—then the persistence of the symbols and traditions that Kubik notes must also have impacted Poland's receptivity to foreign funding and concurrent impact on the language of civil society. The influence of the Catholic Church itself was based on its development as a national institution and the only legal institution that stood in opposition to the Communist authorities (Fuszara 1993; Kulczycki 1999); as such it had created an "organicist"¹⁶⁹ view of the Polish nation, which relied on the notion that the true nation could not be divided (Przeworski 1991: 92; Siemieńska 1998: 126). This is not to say that Poland did not welcome US and Western European funding to support its nascent democracy—the USAID reports indicate that US aid was quite welcome—but rather that the effects of such influence would be limited in the sense that the US would effect much change in values among groups within civil society. In the case of Poland, the language of civil society had already been shaped through the opposition struggle and the broad influence of the

¹⁶⁹ This is Przeworski's term, indicating a belief that Poland, as a nation, could not be divided by politics, and was united in its opposition to foreign influence.

Catholic Church, whose symbols and traditions had become integral to that struggle (Kubik 1994: 252).¹⁷⁰ US efforts, then, would be limited to the creation of a strong free market economy, but, as I have argued throughout this project, economic progress does not necessarily equal social or cultural progress where women's rights and women's lives are concerned. In the case of women in Poland, the influence of the Catholic Church had already shaped the terms of the social debate to the detriment of other women's issues, leaving little political opportunity for US policies in this arena; indeed, foreign funding for women's issues may have had the contrary effect of limiting the impact of the women's movement within political discourse.

Women and the Democratic Transition in Poland

Women in Poland shared a history of political activity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Githens and McBride 1996: 56). Women worked actively with the Solidarity movement throughout the 1980s, but, as Einhorn and Sever (2003: 175) note, "although women had formed the Women's Section of Solidarity during the 1980s, the movement was essentially a male-dominated trade union with strong links to the Church." Ironically, then, those factors that helped to liberate Poland also helped to reinforce gender inequalities: the Catholic Church's dominance of political life after the fall of the Communist system created the language of civil society; its "rigid views and ambitious political aspirations" would help define the role of women within the new Polish political order (Githens and McBride 1996; Siemieńska 1998: 126). As in Estonia,

¹⁷⁰ This was a temporary situation, further, the temporary unity of the Church and the opposition movements did not necessarily mean other identities and values were not as prevalent—the women's movement in Poland is a case in point, as I illustrate below. My thanks to Jan Kubik for this point.

Moldova, and Belarus, the rejection of Communist structures led to the rise of masculinism and a resurgence of traditional views of women's position in society—i.e. women belonged in the home, not the workplace, and the development of a new society was dependent on their roles as caregivers (Watson 1993; Waylen 1994).

In Poland, these attitudes were reinforced by the Church's directives regarding the family and abortion.¹⁷¹ Siemieńska (1998: 129) notes that these attitudes had begun to take shape during the 1970s and 80s, when economic and social tensions became more intense: “the need for Polish society to improve social and political conditions in the late 1970s led to a growing conviction that women should be free from the necessity of working. [...] The family was the place of retreat from the pressure of the surrounding world.” Polish women were portrayed by the Church as the Matka Polka (Polish Mother), the protectors of national identity and the family (Titkow 1993; Einhorn and Sever 2003).

The issue of abortion, however, would become the galvanizing issue for the women's movement in Poland (Einhorn 1993; Titkow 1993; Kulczycki 1999; Fuszara 2000; Zielinska 2000; Einhorn and Sever 2003: 176). As Einhorn and Sever note, however, abortion became framed as a socio-economic issue rather than a woman's rights issue, obscuring other women's issues and the work of women's organizations whose work did not focus on abortion:

[T]he traditionalist/nationalist image of woman-as-mother-of-the-nation , together with the influence of the Church over civil society had the effect of silencing political debate on women's issues other than those linked to the family and

¹⁷¹ Poland had a liberal policy on abortion from 1956-1993. Siemieńska (1998: 141) notes that high abortion rates during this time may have been due to lack of knowledge and an unwillingness to use contraceptives, effectively making abortion the most popular form of birth control. A 1993 law banning abortion was widely protested, thus it was rescinded in 1996. Abortion was legalized, but only under certain circumstances (for the health of the mother, or if the fetus was impaired).

reproduction. [...] Concentration on the struggle over the perceived empty “space” of civil society and the domination of models of feminist activism in Western Europe that placed a strong emphasis on reproductive choice obscures the wider picture. There were in fact initiatives among women in Poland at this time which refused to be restricted to mobilization around reproduction, however politicized this issue had become. (2003: 177)¹⁷²

These women’s organizations focused on women’s advancement in labor, industry, political representation, and gender discrimination. Still, as Einhorn (1993; Einhorn and Sever 2003: 178) describes the situation, women continue to face a civil society “gap,” “whereby linkages between women’s grassroots activity and state-level institutions, legislation and policy are either non-existent or inadequate.”

This situation may have been compounded, inadvertently, by foreign foundations, who had become more inclined to support women’s NGOs as part of democratization strategies (McMahon 2002). In particular, increasing attention was paid to reproductive issues, trafficking, and violence against women. McMahon’s study focuses on the efforts of Western foundations such as the German Marshall Fund, the Ford Foundation, and Soros’ Open Society, as well as the Network for East-West Women (NEWW).¹⁷³ While organizations like the German Marshall Fund and NEWW tend to focus on “reactive” projects that are domestically developed and long-term, others tended to focus on “proactive” projects that were elite-centered, short term, and process oriented—and based

¹⁷² See also Fuszara 2000, Siemieńska 1998.

¹⁷³ McMahon points out that NEWW’s activities have been especially effective in the region because of its focus on politics on the ground: “The Network for East-West Women is unique in its approach to human capital development in this region. Its extensive activities are reactive, grassroots oriented, and rely on both domestic and imported ideas to guide the organization’s involvement in the region. The network is associated with numerous short-term activities inspired by experiences in the West. [...] However, NEWW’s most important function is the voice that it gives to women’s NGOs and individual women by linking more than two thousand women’s advocates in more than forty countries and by providing free Web pages for women’s organizations in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Since 1990 it has been the main facilitator for the spread of information about women’s organizations in the region, gender-related activities (including research on women), and fellowships in the United States and Western Europe. It has given voice to small isolated groups throughout the region and assisted more mature groups to become leaders in the emerging women’s movements” (2002: 39).

on imported Western ideas, further shaping the debates to favor Western needs (McMahon 2002: 36; Regulska 2001). McMahon finds that while Western funding has been useful in developing human capital and for focusing on formerly taboo subjects (e.g. domestic violence), Western funding has actually isolated women's NGOs from domestic politics because it encourages them to seek funding for discrete projects rather than seeking to involve local actors and become involved in domestic politics (2002: 29; Einhorn and Sever 2003). This isolation was in part due to the nature of the projects funded, such as elite-focused seminars, but also because of the nature of the NGOs themselves—that is, Western funders tend to fund organizations that most closely resembled Western NGOs. American funders, in particular, were cited by Polish NGO leaders as being less sensitive than European funders to local cultures (45; Duffy 2000; Regulska 2001; Henderson 2003).¹⁷⁴

Further, McMahon notes, Western funders “appear to focus on issues deemed relevant by their home country, rather than on issues that are considered to be relevant or necessary to Central European societies” (47; Gapova 2001; Gal and Kligman 2000). This last point is particularly important in light of the First Image Reversed model: although it supports the underlying assumption that funding for NGOs will further the interests of the funder, the impact on domestic politics may, in fact, be negligible (Henderson 2003: 85). In both Moldova and Estonia we see the dominance of Western interests on the language and agendas of civil societies—particularly where trafficking in women is concerned—but the effects have been different in terms of the isolation of

¹⁷⁴ Regulska (2001) notes that the discourses engendered by EU enlargement have impacted the women's movements in two ways in Poland: On one hand, this discourse has given women's groups the language with which to make claims for rights; on the other hand, women's issues are often shaped by EU funding priorities, such as trafficking in women and migration issues.

women's groups to which McMahon points. In Estonia, the emphasis on human trafficking may have served as an effective means of networking with other women's groups in the Baltic region, as well as strengthening the partnership between the US and Estonia within the context of NATO and the EU. In Moldova's case, women's organizations were already highly marginalized within civil society, so the impact of Western agendas may have only served to increase that marginalization, not to cause it.

The Usefulness of the First Image Reversed: Soft Power on the Rise?

The main question to be addressed here concerns the efficacy of the types of policies I refer to as "first image reversed" policies and the increase of pro-American attitudes. First, in all four cases, a neorealist explanation of state behavior could be invoked: Estonia, Moldova, and Poland have turned to the West simply to increase their security in a highly volatile environment, while Belarus maintains its security through closer ties with Russia. On this view, then, shared values mean little. Secondly, one might also argue that US efforts at the level of civil society simply serves as window dressing for its own security needs—enlarging NATO and leveraging influence within the EU.¹⁷⁵ These explanations, however, do not fully realize the impact of US democratization policies on the local level, whether for good or for ill. Further, as I illustrated in chapter two, these explanations do not capture the complex political environment of the post-Westphalian world where identities and borders appear to be more fluid and security issues can not be easily classified as "hard" or "soft"; nor can they explain the inordinate attention policy makers have paid to issues of social inequalities, cultural values, and the importance of civil society.

¹⁷⁵ In the case of the Baltics, many in the EU have expressed concern that these states simply represent US interests within the EU; see Horn 2003a.

Joseph Nye's (2004) description of "soft power"¹⁷⁶ is instructive on this point. While International Relations theory and theories of foreign policy have been dominated by an emphasis on "hard power" (i.e. military and economic power), "soft power"—the often intangible ability to shape the preferences of others—can be more useful in terms of shaping the terms of interaction between governments and peoples. Soft power, Nye notes, "does not rely on hard power" and, indeed, the over-use of hard power may actually undercut the utility of a state's soft power (2004: 9). According to Nye, a country's soft power relies on three resources: "culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)" (2004: 11). Cultural resources are not the same as soft power; these resources are the mechanisms that help produce the "behavior of attraction" upon which soft power relies. Further, in answer to the argument that states cooperate simply out of self-interest, Nye responds: "...the skeptics miss the point that cooperation is a matter of degree, and that degree is affected by attraction or repulsion. They also miss the point that the effects on non-state actors [...] do not depend on government attitudes" (2004: 29). More to the point, NGOs may act in opposition to or in tandem with their domestic government, but that does not mean their influence will not eventually affect government attitudes.

This connection between soft power and non-state actors serves as the key to much of the policies that have been founded on the basis of power through attraction. Nye points to two types of "public diplomacy": academic and cultural exchanges and

¹⁷⁶ Joseph Nye, of course, first coined the term "soft power" in the 1980s, and since then it has been widely used in IR and foreign policy discourse. In terms of policymaking, however, it is important to note that Nye's work has been quite influential, particularly during the Clinton administration, when Nye served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

US-sponsored media (e.g. Radio Free Europe, Voice of America). In this project, I have added a third, which Nye does not include—funding for NGOs. As I have shown through the previous chapters, the extent to which the US has been able to influence other states—and to “attract” them to the US—has been greatly enhanced by the US’s ability to shape the language of civil society and influence the attitudes and values of groups within society.

I have also suggested that the policies adopted by the US tend to follow particular patterns, largely based on the success of SEED and the Northern European Initiative. These efforts are focused on constructing civil society based on liberal values of democracy, which includes strengthening political parties and encouraging voting; as well as the neoliberal strategies that promote open markets and entrepreneurship (particularly among women) and finding economic solutions to social problems, such as trafficking of persons and women’s inequalities. While successful in the case of Estonia and Poland, policy makers are finding that this approach may not meet the needs of Moldovan society, where the slow transition to democracy continues to be fraught with ethnic and political conflicts, nor has it overcome the resistance of the Belarusian state.

In the following section, I illustrate how US democratization policies have evolved, given the lessons learned in the ten year period following the Soviet Union’s collapse. The patterns that developed during this time are evident in all four cases I examined, although the case of Moldova illustrates how the policies are beginning to change, taking factors other than economic development into consideration.

The Future of US Foreign Policy and the First Image Reversed Model

In 1999 USAID published its report “Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story.” The report is revealing in that it illustrates the evolution of policy, recognizing the mistakes that were made, the gains achieved, and the possibilities for the future; it lauds the benefits of USAID involvement in democratic transition, and concludes that the path to democracy has been smoothed by its collaboration with local NGOs:

local NGO capacity in the CEE/NIS region has demonstrably increased as a result of donor assistance, including USAID’s, and in turn, that NGOs have served as an effective vehicle for citizens to increase participation in their society. [...] Moreover, in each country surveyed, donor assistance contributed to NGOs’ ability to successfully lobby, provide needed services, increase public awareness of pressing social and environmental problems, and improve the quality of life in communities. (1999: ii)

This points to an important component to the First Image Reversed Model: policy makers must simply accept encouraging the development of the NGO sector as a pathway to democratization as well as improved relations with the US. Several key points are made in the report: chief among them is the recognition that long-term, rather than short-term, projects should show improved results; foreign funders bring their own biases which may impede their ability to identify local needs; and the “emphasis on results and deployment of quantitative indicators has subtly influenced strategy choices and grantee selection.” This tendency towards quantification is not limited to USAID, of course, and the need to prove the worthiness of a program to lawmakers who control appropriations often boils down to the numbers (Henderson 2003: 85). However, USAID’s recognition that NGO and civil society development is a messy business is reassuring; how they will handle this messiness in the future remains to be seen.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Having worked on a State Department funded project for three years, I have yet to see this change. The number of attendees at conferences, for example, continued to play a large role in our grant reports.

In the case of women, USAID points to the enormous benefits that the development of civil society has afforded women in the CEE/NIS regions. The report notes the large number of women involved in the NGO sector, first, because it offers avenues to effect socioeconomic change not normally open to women, and secondly, because the sector is relatively devoid of corruption, making involvement “safer” for women. Further, traditional barriers to women in business and politics have “channeled women’s efforts into the NGO sector,” despite the credibility problems women might face at the outset of NGO development (1999: 23).

Regarding “women’s NGOs,” the report notes that these cover a broad spectrum of issues, usually defined as NGOs dealing with problems related to women, families or children.¹⁷⁸ Interestingly, USAID notes that the most common barriers for women in the CEE/NIS regions are human rights violations, employment and economic discrimination, and political inequality, yet the report says little about USAID’s efforts to work on any but the second issue; indeed, human rights violations and political inequality, if one were to examine the language of US programs, always seem to be a consequence of economic discrimination, rather than a cause. Nevertheless, the report offers important suggestions for future programs:

[I]n general, programming decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, without specific regard for gender and NGO activities. Civil society efforts will grow even more effective when women as well as men are explicitly targeted in strategic and implementation planning. In turn, eliminating or reducing the barriers to women’s full participation in the society will hasten the democratic transition in the region. (1999: 25. Emphasis added.)

Recent USAID program developments in Moldova, for example, reveal that USAID is, indeed, working to target women specifically, through programs such as Winrock’s “Win

¹⁷⁸ There is no mention of “feminist” organizations in the report, or of NGOs working specifically for women’s rights per se.

with Women” that encourages women’s political participation. Further, the acknowledgment that gender equality and democratization are inextricably linked marks a decided move forward.

Fostering Pro-Americanism through US Foreign Policy

Having established that US policy makers do, in fact, see funding for civil society and NGOs more specifically as a viable policy alternative, the question is whether those policies actually serve US needs or not. The basic notion that the spread of democracy is simply good for the United States underlined the policy discourse of the Clinton administration throughout the 1990s (to wit: the logic of NATO expansion) and has been perpetuated by the Bush administration, although, admittedly, for much different reasons. After reviewing the types of programs the US is willing to fund, and the consequences for civil society, we begin to see that policy makers mean for new democracies to look as much like American democracy as possible, even if this constrains the policies themselves. The American democratic crusade relies upon particular symbols and language to carry its message,¹⁷⁹ and convinces its beneficiaries to do the same; while discomforting for some, to be sure, this attitude is also a natural outcome of politics. A successful seduction, after all, requires capitulation.

Of the cases I examined, I have shown how the language of US funders shapes the ways that NGOs approach the issues facing their societies. The underlying assumption I have made is that this will also shape the interaction between civil society and the domestic government—once civil society begins to demand democratic change (based on

¹⁷⁹ See chapter one.

what it has learned through contact with foreign funders), the domestic government will be forced to change accordingly. These changes will serve the needs of civil society, but also the needs of foreign funders; for the US, this means an increase in pro-American attitudes not only on the local level, but as well as on the domestic and foreign policy level.

Assessing the validity of this causal chain is difficult, first, because it is impossible to isolate all the relevant variables that would cause a state to turn to the US or to the West more generally. Domestic governments in transitional states face enormous challenges: historical contingencies, nationalist movements, corruption, economic upheaval, and social unrest, to name but a few. Secondly, this relationship is difficult to trace because it requires us to assess changes in collective identity and cultural shifts in relation to political movements and outsider influence. What might appear to be a result of cultural influence, may, in fact, simply be a matter of political expediency for leaders looking to retain their power, as in the case of the Moldovan Communist Party. Because of these complexities, the simple measurement that I have created—an increase in pro-American attitudes—may suffice to encompass many of these factors.

In this regard, the power of shaping the agenda of the NGO sector, shaping the language of civil society, and influencing attitudes and values at the grassroots level has shown to be an effective tool in the cases I have traced, even when the results (democratization) have been so widely varied. I should note, however, as these cases of also illustrated, that there is a slippage between what programs actually are successful, versus those that US policy makers would like to believe are successful.¹⁸⁰ Thus,

¹⁸⁰ My thanks to Jan Kubik for expressing concerns regarding this issue. Although I have touched on this problem throughout the project, I have not addressed it fully. The difference between actual and perceived

improved indicators and more in-depth, independent, reports are necessary to inform policy makers; the model can and must be improved if policy makers will continue to rely on these methods.

The lessons to be drawn from the Belarus and Polish cases mirror the problems and possibilities presented in the Moldova and Estonia cases, especially where women's issues are concerned. The following points highlight these problems and possibilities while also offering suggestions for policy formation. These suggestions reflect the normative aspects of this project; as I emphasized in the introductory chapters, the *First Image Reversed* is at once a description of foreign policy making in the post-Westphalian world as well as a model for future policy making.

First, focusing on women's NGOs may serve as an important step in influencing domestic politics because it addresses an underrepresented constituency that has been traditionally excluded from other political avenues. Because women's issues often are not viewed as political issues, as in the case of Belarus, states may be more likely to allow foreign interference in this area—allowing foreign funders to work towards their own agenda under the radar of governments sensitive to Western influence. It behooves foreign policy makers, then, to construct policies that support women's networks, focus on gender equality, and advocate for women's political involvement, not just women's economic advancement. The ability of funders to influence the agenda of the NGO sector is a powerful tool that should not be under utilized, particularly in this arena.

success can often be quite broad; what I have seen on the ground in many ways contradicts US government assessments. In the end, we may only be able to measure the broader outcomes, which, in this case, are represented by pro-American or pro-Western policies.

The second point is related to the first. Women's rights should not be conflated with economic rights as understood in neoliberal discourse; rather, women's rights should be understood in terms of their displacement from the public sphere in post-socialist transitions, which includes political, social, and economic rights. As I have illustrated throughout this project, US policy makers have tended to rely on economic solutions for social problems (such as women's inequality, violence against women, and trafficking in persons), when it may be more appropriate to find political solutions, such as gender equity in parliamentary structures as well as in the workplace.¹⁸¹

Further, these rights should be understood in terms of collective values as well as individual freedom. American liberal approaches rely on the idea that the individual is free to act on one's own behalf, most often rendered in terms of economic self-reliance. But, as Funk (2004: 700) argues, "even in those countries with the strongest liberal tradition—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech lands—and in Serbia, proponents of liberal thought recognized collective as well as individual rights." Moreover, she notes that these notions of collective rights often override individual rights, particularly where "obligations of sacrifice and responsibility to others, the nation, family, God, and the state" are concerned (702). Thus, the language of civil society and women's

¹⁸¹ I noted in chapter three that Nordic funders were more likely to pursue these types of solutions; US policy makers eschew the notion of quota systems, relying instead on programs that focus on women's economic empowerment to secure social and political rights. During the Women and Democracy Conference in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2003, I brought the notion of supporting gender quotas to the table in a meeting of the American delegation (which consisted of US State Department officials, political appointees and leaders of left and right wing women's organizations). While the representatives of the left-leaning (or at least liberal) groups agreed that a quota system ought to be encouraged by US policy (most notably, Martha Burke, president of the National Council of Women's Organizations), the conservative members of the group roundly rejected the idea, and noted that we, as members of the American delegation, must represent the position of the current administration in our public remarks to the conference. At first I was surprised that the idea—which was being widely touted by the Nordic countries at the Conference—would be rejected out of hand by US policymakers until I realized that gender quotas are equated to "affirmative action" in the minds of many. This small incident reflects how US domestic politics play such a large role in the development of foreign policy by shaping policy makers' available policy options.

“emancipation” needs to be couched in language that addresses this deep tradition of collective nationhood and social good, and should reflect feminist ideas that represent the practical realities of women in these societies, not the strategies implemented by feminists in the US.¹⁸² Reliance on models that equate women’s rights with entrepreneurship, as in the case of Estonia, serve an elite group of women with access to capital and foreign contacts, but does not address underlying women’s inequalities as a social, collective, ill.

Third, policy makers need to be sensitive to cultural and political differences across the CEE/NIS regions that cannot fit easily into a model based on past successes. Assessing the political landscape without the biases inherent in US policy should be a self-conscious undertaking; the basic premise of the First Image Reversed Model can be met without also undermining these efforts through a lack of understanding of the political and cultural situation. There is nothing especially remarkable or insightful in this recommendation, but all the cases I have followed in this project reveal a cookie cutter approach that limits the power of providing support for grassroots politics. Although the cases I have outlined do share similarities (particularly where women are concerned), their histories, politics, and political language and symbols differ enough to warrant specialized approaches for each. In the case of Poland, for example, the emphasis on neoliberal economic models appears to be appropriate in light of its more

¹⁸² See Funk 2004. She argues that feminists in the CEE region may argue for goods similar to US feminists, but the strategies they have developed are not based on an individualist liberal approach that takes the private/public debate as its central critique. The realities of post-socialist societies call for different “struggles, timetables, and priorities of women in the region”: “Feminists in the United States focused on domestic violence, while women in the former Yugoslavia active on behalf of women emphasized public violence against women, especially rape in the Yugoslav wars and the consequent increase in domestic violence. Gender scholars and women active on behalf of women in the region [...] focused on critiques of nationalism; the intersection of gender, rights, the nation, family, sacrifice and ethnicity; and the role of the media rather than on specific critiques of liberalism” (716-717).

developed civil society, although, as I have noted, continued reliance on neoliberal models may serve to undermine civil society if the state relies on privatization strategies for many social services. In Moldova, civil society has been almost non-existent, so economic reforms alone will do little to encourage a true democratic transition. A reassuring sign that policy making is evolving in this regard, however, can be found in USAID's emphasis on women's political participation in Moldova.

Fourth, following on the preceding point, the two intervening variables that I have identified, political affinity and receptivity, do not adequately capture the process by which the First Image Reversed Model operates, yet they do point to important factors for consideration when developing such policies. The degree to which states share a sense of political affinity with the hegemon will have a large impact on the success of First Image Reversed strategies. As in the cases of Estonia and Poland, a state that has already identified its future with the US or Western Europe, and feels that it has, in the past, shared in the development of Western values (e.g. Estonia's Hanseatic past) will be more likely to open its doors to Western assistance. Political affinity can be increased through policies that seek to make connections between the state in question and Western or American values—this may initially rely on common security needs, for instance, or upon common economic needs—but, ultimately, they must create a sense of shared cultural and social values, such as a commitment to democratic processes or freedom.

If and when political affinity has been developed, the key for policy makers, as I shown in this project, is to make those connections in culturally specific ways, and to engage in a process of fostering receptivity (the creation of laws, government attitudes that will encourage the growth of civil society) that will appear home-grown—that is, the

strategies implemented to cultivate civil society should not appear foreign, and should work to subtly enhance or change the language of civil society in mutually beneficial ways. In the case of Moldova, for instance, the language of women's rights in civil society, as it has been drawn by US policies, has only served to reinforce a sense of victimhood among women rather than empowerment. Policies that will serve to empower women—within the context of the Moldovan culture and language politics—will, in the long run, be more effective, but only if US policymakers understand the deep divisions represented by Moldovan language politics. Foreign funding does determine the agenda—and the lifespan—of NGO activities, but these efforts are limited if the target government continues to resist allowing the NGO sector to flourish.

As we have seen in the case of Estonia, the language of women's rights did cause initial shocks in civil society (e.g. the campaigns regarding domestic violence, and the developing feminisms in Estonia), but these shocks were couched in terms of securing Estonia's relationships with both the US and the Nordic states, as well as the dependence of Estonia's future in the EU and NATO. NGOs in Estonia learned quickly to utilize the magic words required by foreign funders, but largely understood that they could pick and choose funders according to their needs (e.g., US funders for women's entrepreneur programs, Nordic funders for more overtly feminist projects). While foreign funders have, to some extent, determined the agenda of civil society in Estonia, Estonian NGOs have used this to their advantage, positioning themselves as the legitimate provider of social services and information, a role the state has gladly allowed them to play.

Clearly there is a symbiotic relationship between these two variables, and, as I have noted, it is difficult to separate out their effects. Further, there is no clear path to

democratization, as past studies have shown. What I have outlined in this project, however, is one strategy that does seem to have effects on democratization efforts at the local level; through programs that encourage western values, US policies may, in fact, encourage pro-American attitudes that encourage domestic policy makers to create pro-American policies. While I have been critical of US efforts in the region, particularly where women are concerned, I have done so with an eye on improving US efforts, not to suggest that this model is not a useful or even desirable one. The realities of the post-Westphalian world, where borders are more fluid, identities dependent on nations re-emerging from the homogenization efforts of the Soviet Union, and the struggles these entail require policies that are creative, flexible, and focused on individual security, rather than state-centered geopolitics.

The “politics of attraction” that the First Image Reversed Model represents is one tool among many available to policy makers; because it is neither costly nor openly confrontational, policy makers strapped by the constraints of US wartime commitments should find it an attractive option in maintaining a US presence abroad. Ironically, what the Clinton administration created in order to justify a new, peaceful, mission for NATO—encouraging emerging democracies—may now serve as a means of “cleaning up” after US bellicosity. One would hope that the lessons of Central and Eastern Europe, however, have impressed upon policy makers the need for restraint as well as optimism: the First Image Reversed Model requires long-term, far-sighted policies that depend on creating relationships, networks, and deep social connections, not imposing particular worldviews. If one does believe that shared values among individuals leads to more

harmony, then it would seem that fostering particular values among people who are open to creating civil society—and, hopefully, vibrant democracies—will only serve the good.

Appendix A: Preliminary Interview Questions

I. Interview Questions for US Foreign Service Officers

1. Name
 2. Rank
 3. Position in embassy
 4. Involvement in grant funding
-
1. What do you think the goals of this particular US policy [e.g. NEI, Baltic-American Charter, etc.] are?
 2. Have these goals changed over the past ten years? In what ways?
 3. What will these goals accomplish in terms of encouraging democratization? Why?
 4. How many organizations typically reply to the RFPs concerning women?
 - a. Do these organizations tend to be mainstream organizations?
 - b. Do these organizations tend to be sponsored by the local government as well?
 - c. How many smaller, grassroots organizations apply for these grants?
 5. Are there particular themes/programs that tend to be popular? That is, do you find similarities among the proposed programs?
 6. Do you receive feedback from these organizations regarding their needs, and the needs of the women they serve?
 - a. Are these needs different from the US goals/expectations?
 - i. If so, how do you respond?
 - ii. Do US policymakers respond to these needs?

1. If not, how do the organizations adapt to US grant requirements?
7. In your experience, what has been the most innovative proposal you've received?
 - a. Was it funded? Why or why not?
 - b. Has the US funded any controversial programs? If so, what was it/were they?
8. From your point of view, how well-received have these programs been in the community? How do you measure this acceptance?
9. How have local governments responded to these US initiatives? Do you find that they largely cooperate, or have the organizations you fund encountered resistance from local governments? Please explain.
10. Do you have a way of formally evaluating the programs you fund? How do you assure that the programs are following US grant guidelines?
 - a. Survey?
 - b. Annual Reports?
 - c. On-site visits?
11. Are you strict in assuring the guidelines are followed, or is there room for improvisation on the part of the organizations you fund? Aside from the possibility that they won't be funded in the future, are there any negative consequences for those organizations that don't follow these guidelines?
12. Have US funding priorities changed in the past five years? Why or why not?

13. Do you contribute, in any way, to policy initiatives or grant guidelines? Do you have any communication with those who develop these policies or those who lobby for particular policies?
14. What, in your opinion, has been the traditional role of women in this country?
15. What has been the traditional role of women in the US?
16. In terms of the roles of women in the US, how do women in this country compare?
17. Have you seen any change in the roles of women in Estonia/Moldova? If so, in what ways?
 - a. For those programs that aim to integrate women into the economy, which have proven to be most successful?
 - i. What are the aims of the US vis-à-vis women and the economy in this country?
 - b. For those programs that deal with women in political life, which have proven to be most successful?
 - i. What are the aims of the US vis-à-vis women in politics in this country?
 - c. For those programs that deal with trafficking in women, which have proven to be most successful? How would you measure success in this area?
18. Do you think that the US competes with other states (i.e. Nordic states) to fund women's programs?

- a. Or, does the US seek to partner with these states in funding and developing women's programs? Why or why not?
- b. Do you think there are some fundamental differences in the ways the US and Nordic states approach women's issues? Please explain.

19. Do you think US policy makers understand the needs of women in this state?

Why or why not?

20. What kinds of programs would you like to see implemented that are not implemented currently?

II. Interview Questions for Administrators of Women's NGOs

- 1. Name
- 2. Organization
- 3. Position
- 4. Gender

Basic biographical questions

Where were you born? Where did you grow up? How long have you been living in (city)?

Civic participation

- 1. Were you involved in the liberation movements in the late 1980s and early 90s? If so, in what way did you participate? Did you have specific goals in mind for your country?

2. How long have you worked for this organization? Were you involved in its creation?
3. Why did you want to become involved?
4. Do you find that it's difficult to attract participants in your programs? Do you advertise?

1. Does your organization receive funding from the US, a Nordic state, or both?
 - a. If from the US, have you received a democracy grant under the auspices of the NEI?
 - b. If from the Nordic states, what was the nature of the grant?
 - c. Do you receive funding from other sources?
2. Why did you apply for the grant from the US?
3. What were the grant guidelines?
4. What do you think the goals of the grant are?
5. What type of program did you propose?
 - a. Is this program directed towards women in the economy?
 - i. If so, what are the goals of this program?
 - ii. How many women are involved?
 - iii. How do you select these women? Are they self-selected?
 - iv. What kinds of outreach do you do?
 - v. Do you work with local businesses?
 - vi. Do you help these women set up their own businesses?

- vii. Do you offer some kind of educational component?
 - 1. if so, what is it?
 - 2. do you offer internet or computer training?
 - 3. literacy programs?
- viii. How do you evaluate the success of this program?
- b. Women in politics?
 - i. Are your goals to gain access for women in local or national politics?
 - ii. Is this a grassroots effort?
 - iii. Do you campaign on behalf of particular candidates or issues?
 - iv. Do you raise money for women candidates?
 - 1. whom do you target to raise this money? Other women?
Local businesses or community groups?
- c. Women's human rights?
 - i. Domestic violence?
 - ii. Trafficking?
 - iii. Women and education?
- 6. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of your program(s)?
- 7. How long have you administered these programs?
- 8. What has been the traditional role of women in Estonian/Moldovan society
- 9. Do you think this role has changed over the past ten years?
 - a. If yes, how so?
 - b. Do you think this is a positive change? Why or why not?

10. How do you perceive the roles of women in the United States? Do you imagine American women to be more or less equal than men within society?
11. Do you think American ideas about women are suitable for your culture? Why or why not?
12. In dealing with American grantors, do you find that their expectations for your programs fit in with your community's needs?
 - a. If no, explain why.
 - b. If yes, explain why.
13. Do you think that your program has positively affected the way women see themselves in your community? In what way?
14. How does American funding affect the types of programs you implement?
 - a. Do US grant guidelines negatively or positively affect the programs you create?
12. Do your programs sometimes go beyond US guidelines? That is, in the implementation of your programs, have any of your programs gone beyond what would be approved by the US government? What happened?
13. Do you feel that there is too much or too little US oversight of your programs? Why?
14. Do you think American politics has any effect on the amount of funding you receive? Why or why not?
15. Do you think there is too much American influence on politics in your country? If so, why?

16. [In the case of Estonia] In comparing Nordic and American RFPs, for which would you be more inclined to apply? Why?
- a. Do you find that Nordic funders/governments have different expectations than the US government? If so, what are the differences?
 - b. What do you perceive to be the role of women in the Nordic states? Is this different from your perception of American women?
 - i. If so, in what way?
 - ii. Are these differences more or less compatible with the role of women in your own culture?
17. How successful do you think the transition to democracy has been in your country?
- a. What role have women played in this transition, if any?
 - b. What changes would you like to see your country, in terms of democratic change?
18. [In the case of Estonia] How important do you think
- a. NATO membership is for your country?
 - b. EU membership?
19. Which is more important in terms of encouraging women to become more integrated into the economic and political spheres?
20. How committed do you think the US is to women's human rights? Why?
21. [In the case of Estonia] How committed do you think the Nordic states are to women's human rights?

22. Do the Nordic states seem to be more or less committed than the US? Why or why not?

III. Interview Questions for NGO Participants

Name

Organization/Program

Gender

Employment

Basic biographical questions

Where were you born? Where did you grow up? How long have you been living in (city)?

Civic participation

Were you involved in the liberation movements in the late 1980s and early 90s? If so, in what way did you participate? Did you have specific goals in mind for your country?

1. What type of program are you involved in?
2. How did you hear about this program?
3. How did you become involved? That is, why did you choose to become involved?

- b. Is this program directed towards women in the economy?
 - i. If so, what are the goals of this program?
 - ii. How many women are involved?
 - iii. What did this program help you to do? Did you receive help in setting up your own businesses?
 - iv. Do you participate in some kind of educational component?
 - 1. if so, what is it?
 - 2. do you receive internet or computer training?
- c. Women in politics?
 - i. Do you think there should be greater access for women in local or national politics?
 - ii. Is this a grassroots effort?
 - iii. Do you campaign on behalf of particular candidates or issues?
 - iv. Do you raise money for women candidates?
 - 1. whom do you target to raise this money? Other women?
Local businesses or community groups?
- d. Women's human rights?
 - i. Domestic violence?
 - ii. Trafficking?
 - iii. Women and education?

- 4. What has been the traditional role of women in Estonian/Moldovan society?
- 5. Do you think this role has changed over the past ten years?

- a. If yes, how so?
 - b. Do you think this is a positive change? Why or why not?
6. How do you perceive the roles of women in the United States? Do you imagine American women to be more or less equal than men within society?
7. Do you think American ideas about women are suitable for your culture? Why or why not?
8. Do you find that most women's programs fit in with your community's needs?
 - a. If no, explain why.
 - b. If yes, explain why.
9. Do you think that your program has positively affected the way women see themselves in your community? In what way?
10. Do you think American politics has any effect on the amount of funding organizations in your country receive? Why or why not?
11. Do you think there is too much American influence on politics in your country?
If so, why?
12. What do you perceive to be the role of women in the Nordic states? Is this different from your perception of American women?
 - i. If so, in what way?
 - ii. Are these differences more or less compatible with the role of women in your own culture?
13. How successful do you think the transition to democracy has been in your country?

- a. What role have women played in this transition, if any?
 - b. What changes would you like to see your country, in terms of democratic change?
 - c. What role do ethnic minorities play in your country? Are they important to democratic transition? Why or why not?
14. [In the case of Estonia] How important do you think
- a. NATO membership is for your country?
 - b. EU membership?
15. Which is more important in terms of encouraging women to become more integrated into the economic and political spheres?
16. How committed do you think the US is to women's human rights? Why?
17. [In the case of Estonia] How committed do you think the Nordic states are to women's human rights?
18. Do the Nordic states seem to be more or less committed than the US? Why or why not?

Bibliography

- Acsády, Judit. 1999. "Urges and Obstacles: Chances for Feminism in Eastern Europe," Women's Studies International Forum, Vol. 22, Issue 4, July.
- ADEPT (Association for Participatory Democracy). 2001. "NGO's Image Dimensions." Downloaded from www.e-democracy.md/en/ngo/imagedimensions. 1/12/2005.
- ADEPT. 2005. "Taxation" <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/ngo/taxation/> downloaded 1/12/2005
- Albert, Mathias, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid, eds. 2001. Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Albert, Mathias and Lothar Brock. 2001. "What Keeps Westphalia Together: Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States," in Albert et al.
- Albright, Madeline. 1997. "Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, 342 (February 1997).
- Alexander, Jacqui and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, eds. 1997. Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures. New York: Routledge.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C., ed. 1998. Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization. London: Sage
- , 1998. "Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society," in Jeffrey Alexander, ed. Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization. London: Sage.
- Alvarez, Sonia E. 1990. Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements In Transitional Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- , 1997. "Latin American Feminisms 'Go Global': Trends of the 1990s and Challenges for the New Millenium," in Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar, eds., Cultures of Politics/Politics of Culture: Revisioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Alexander, K.H. 2000. "Constructivist International Relations Theory: Reflections, Critical Evaluations, and Suggestions for Future Research," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles.
- Aggestam, Lisbeth and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds. 2000. Security and Identity in Europe. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

- Anderson, Benedict. 1983 (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread Of Nationalism. London: Verso.
- Arato, Andrew. 1981. "Civil Society vs. the State: Poland 1980-81," Telos, No. 47.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. New York: Penguin.
- Asmus, Ronald D. and Robert C. Nurick. 1996. "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States" Survival, vol. 38, Summer 1996.
- Ashley, Richard. 1986. "The Poverty of Neorealism" in Robert Keohane, ed, Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Banerjee, Sanjoy. 1997. "The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation: Contending Discourses in Late Colonial India," in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Behnke, Andreas. 2000. "Re-cognising Europe: NATO and the Problem of Securing Identities," in Aggestam and Hyde-Price.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1992. "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," Comparative Politics 24 (3).
- Botan, Igor. 2005. "Post-Election Reflections," ADEPT, March 14, 2005. Download from www.elections2005.md/comments/20050314/. 3/19/2005.
- Brainerd, Elizabeth. 2000. "Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, No. 1, October.
- Browning, Christopher. 2001. "A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Regional Cooperation: The United States and the Northern European Initiative," Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), April 2001. Downloaded from www.ciaonet.org/wps/brc01.html. 4/08/02.
- , 2002. "Competing or Complementary Policies?: Understanding the Relationship Between the NEI and NDI," Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, downloaded from www.copri.dk, 7/17/02
- Buckley, Mary, ed. Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1999. Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction

- of Socialism and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Busheikin, Laura. 1997. "Is Sisterhood Really Global? Western Feminism in Eastern Europe," in Tanya Renne, ed., Ana's Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, eds. 1998. Security: A New Framework For Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
- Bystydzienski, Jill and Jeti Sekhon, eds. 1999. Democratization and Women's Grassroots Movements. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Caldeira, Teresa P.R. 1998. "Justice and Individual Rights: Challenges for Women's Movements and Democratization in Brazil," in Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Campbell, David. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Carothers, Thomas, and Marina Ottaway. 2000. "The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid," in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds., Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, Thomas. 1996. Assessing Democratic Assistance: The Case of Romania. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.
- , 2002. "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, Number 1. January.
- Chafetz, Glenn, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel. 1999. "Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy," Special Issue: The Origins of National Interests, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3 Winter 1998/99-Spring.
- Cheshier, David M. and Cori E. Dauber. 1999. "The Place and Power of Civic Space: Reading Globalization and Social Geography Through the Lens of Civilizational Conflict," Special Issue: The Origins of National Interests, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/99-Spring.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1979. "Foreign Policy and the Intelligentsia," in Arthur Edelstein, ed., Images and Ideas in American Culture. Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press.

- CNN. 2005. "Rice: Russia's Future Linked to Democracy," April 20, 2005. downloaded From www.cnn.worldnews.com. 6/19/2005.
- Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Also in Hodgkison, V. and Foley, M., eds. 2003. The Civil Society Reader, Boston: Tufts University Press.
- Cohen, Raymond. 1997. Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Independent World, Revised Edition. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace.
- Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. Paths Towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Corrin, Chris, ed. 1992. "Superwoman" and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Toronto: Second Story Press.
- , 1999a. Gender and Identity in Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass.
- , 1999b. "Rethinking Citizenship: Analyses and Activism in Central and Eastern Europe," in Corrin, ed., Gender and Identity in Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass.
- Cox, R.W. 1997. "Democracy in Hard Times: Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy," in The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, A. McGrew, ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crowther, William, and Yuri Josanu. 2003. "Moldova," in Stan Bergland, Frank Aarebot, and Joakim Ekman, eds. Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd Edition. London: Edward Elgar Publishers. Draft Obtained from author Josanu.
- Dahlerup, Drude. 1994. "State, Market, and Civil Society: Women's Need for State Intervention in East and West," Women's Studies International Forum 17, nos. 2/3.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1994 [1848]. Democracy in America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Diamond, Larry. 1994 "Rethinking Civil Society Towards Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy, 5, 3.
- Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. 2002. Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Doyle, Michael W. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (December).
- , 1997. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. New York: Norton.
- Duffy, Diane M. 2000. "Social Identity and its Influence on Women's Roles in East-Central Europe," International Feminist Journal of Politics, 2:2, Summer.
- Duhaček, Daša. 1998. "Eastern Europe," in Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young, eds., A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Downloaded from <http://www.zenskestudie.edu.yu/wgsact/e-library/e-lib0009.html>, 9/20/05.
- Einhorn, Barbara. 1991. "Where Have All the Women Gone? Women and the Women's Movement in East Central Europe," Feminist Review, 39, Winter.
- , 1993a. Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women's Movements in East Central Europe. London: Verso.
- , 1993b. "Democratization and Women's Movements in Central and Eastern Europe: Concepts of Women's Rights," in Democratic Reform and the Position Of Women in Transitional Economies, ed. Valentine Moghadam. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- , 1995. "Ironies of History: Citizenship Issues in the New Market Economies of East Central Europe," in Barbara Einhorn and Eileen Janes Yeo, eds., Women and Market Societies: Crisis and Opportunity. Brookfield, VT: E. Elgar.
- Einhorn, Barbara, and Charlotte Sever. 2003. "Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe," International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, March.
- Eisenstein, Zillah R. 1994. The Color of Gender: Reimagining Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- , 2000. "Writing Bodies on the Nation for the Globe," in Sita Ranchod-Nilsson and Mary Ann Tétreault, eds. Women, States, and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? London: Routledge.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. 1998. "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-1993," World Politics 50.4, pp. 547-581.

- , 2001. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland 1989-1993. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987. Women and War. New York: Basic Books.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke, and Sheila Tobias, eds. 1990. Women, Militarism, and War: Essays in History, Politics and Social Theory. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Enloe, Cynthia. 1988. Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives. London: Pandora Press/HarperCollins.
- , 1990. Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- , 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Evans, Geoffrey. 1998. "Ethnic Schism and the Consolidation of Post-Communist Democracies: The Case of Estonia," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, March 1998.
- Feldman, Merje. 2000. "Does the EU Offer Security?: European Integration in the Estonian Identity Discourse," Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), June 2000. Downloaded from www.ciaonet.org/wps/fem01/fem01.html. 4/08/02.
- Fierke, Karin M. and Knud Erik Jørgensen, eds. 2001. Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. London: M.E. Sharpe.
- Foley, Michael and Bob Edwards. 1996. "The Paradox of Civil Society," Journal of Democracy 7.3.
- Freedom House. 2003. "Moldova," Freedom House Report. www.freedomhouse.org downloaded 3/18/03.
- Freedom House. 2004a. 2004 Annual Report. www.freedomhouse.org downloaded 8/01/05.
- Freedom House. 2004b. Nations in Transit 2004: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1991. "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 662.
- , 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.

- Funk, Nanette. 1993. "Feminism East and West," in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds. Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York: Routledge.
- . 2004. "Feminist Critiques of Liberalism: Can They Travel East? Their Relevance in Eastern and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 29, no. 3.
- Funk, Nanette and Magda Mueller, eds. 1993. Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York: Routledge.
- Fuszara, Małgorzata. 1993. "Abortion and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Poland," in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York: Routledge.
- . 1997. "Women's Movements in Poland," in Joan Scott, Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates, eds., Transition, Environments, Translators: Feminism in International Politics. New York: Routledge.
- . 2000. "New Gender Relations in Poland in the 1990s," in Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds., . Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics and Everyday Life after Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gal, Susan and Gail Kligman. 2000(a). The Politics of Gender after Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- , eds. 2000b. Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics and Everyday Life after Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gapova, Elena. 2001. "Understanding the Other: A Response to Tiffany Petros' Article," Central Europe Review, 3 (2).
- . 2004. "Conceptualizing Gender, Nation, and Class in Post-Soviet Belarus," in Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias, eds., Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Gellman, Barton. 1984. Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power. New York: Praeger.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1994. Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. New York: Penguin Press.
- Ghodsee, Kristen. 2004. "Feminism-by-Design: Emerging Capitalisms, Cultural

- Feminism, and Women's Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern Europe," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Vol. 29, no. 3.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Githens, Marianne, and Dorothy McBride, eds. 1996. Abortion Politics: Public Policy in Cross-Cultural Perspective. London: Routledge.
- Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. 1997. "Why is There No Feminism after Communism?" Social Research 64(2).
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2001. War and Gender. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grugel, Jean. 2002. Democratization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave.
- Haas, Ain, Edgar Kaskla and Anu Laas. 2003. "Estonia," in Lynn Walter, ed. The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Women's Issues Worldwide: Europe. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Harris, Adrienne and Ynestra King, eds. 1989. Rocking the Ship of State, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Hawkesworth, Mary E. 2001. "Democratization: Reflections on Gendered Dislocations in the Public Sphere," in Kelly, R.M, Bayes J.H., Hawkesworth, M.E., and Young, B., eds, Gender, Globalization, and Democratization. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Henderson, Sarah L. 2003. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. NY: Pantheon.
- Holsti, Ole R. and James Rosenau. 1990. "The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders," Journal of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 1, February.
- Horn, Denise M. 2003a. Baltic Regional Security Challenges: Conference Report. Georgetown: Women in International Security, Georgetown University.
- , 2003b. The Northern European Initiative: Conference-Workshop Report. New York: Columbia International Affairs Online.

- Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hudson, Valerie M. 1997. "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda," in Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Hunt, Michael H. 1987. Ideology and US Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Belknap Press.
- , 1982. "American Ideals versus American Institutions," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 97, No. 1, Spring.
- , 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- , 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2000. "Reflections on Security and Identity in Europe," in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds., Security and Identity in Europe. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian and Lisbeth Aggestam. 2000. "Conclusion: Exploring the New Agenda," in Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, eds., Security and Identity in Europe. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Infotag. 2005. "Parliamentary Candidates Blame Chişinău Municipality," posted online 1/12/2005. Downloaded from http://www.infotag.md/report_en/8702. 2/2/2005.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). 1995. Trafficking and Prostitution: The Growing Exploitation of Migrant Women from Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: IOM.
- Ivanchenko, Ilya. 2003. "Trafficking in Persons: Estonia," report by the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, Estonia. Tallinn: Inimõiguste Teabekeskus.
- Jaggar, Alison M. 2005. "Arenas of Citizenship," International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol. 7, Issue 1, March.

- Jaquette, Jane, and Wolchik, Sharon, eds. 1998. Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jancar, Barbara W. 1985. "Women in the Opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s," in Sharon Wolchik and Alfred Mayer, eds., Women, State, and Party in Eastern Europe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 1996. "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- , 1985. "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- , 1991. "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds. Dominoes and Bandwagons. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Kahl, Colin H. 1999. "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," Special Issue: The Origins of National Interests, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1991 (1795). "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Hans and Reiss, eds., Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, Temma. 1997. Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements. New York: Routledge.
- Katzenstein, Peter, ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kelley, Judith. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions," International Organization. Vol. 58, Summer.

- Kelly, Rita Mae, Jane H. Bayes, Mary Hawkesworth, and Brigitte Young, eds. 2001. Gender, Globalization, and Democratization. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Keohane, Robert O., ed. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.
- , 1989. "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," Millennium, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer (also in Grant and Newland, 1991).
- Kolstø, Pål. 2000. Political Construction Sites: Nation Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kowert, Paul and Legro J. 1996. "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: a Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein 1996.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the National Interest. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
- Kubáľková, Vendulka, ed. 2001. Foreign Policy in a Constructed World. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kubáľková, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, eds. 1998. International Relations in a Constructed World. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kubik, Jan. 1994. The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- , 2004. "Civil Society: Portable and Universal?" Second Edmund Mokrzycki Symposium, Warsaw, November 19-20, 2004. Draft obtained from author.
- Kuehnast, Kathleen and Carol Nechemias, eds. 2004. Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation Building, Economic Survival, and Civic Activism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kulczycki, Andrzej. 1999. The Abortion Debate in the World Arena. London: MacMillan.
- Laar, Mart. 2002. "Estonia's Success Story," in Diamond and Plattner, eds. Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Laas, Anu. 2000. "Images of Prostitutes and Prostitution in Estonian Media in the 1990s," report to the Euroconference on Women, Violence, and Reconciliation, March 10-12 2000, Centre for Women's Studies Trinity College, Dublin. Draft obtained from author.
- Laitin, David D. 1998. Identity in Formation: Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- , 2000. "What is a Language Community?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1, Jan.
- Lang, Sabine. 1997. "The NGOization of Feminism," in Joan Scott, Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates, eds., Transition, Environments, Translators: Feminism in International Politics. New York: Routledge.
- Lapid, Yosef. 2001. "Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New Direction," in Albert et al.
- Leffey, M. and Jutta Weldes. 1997. "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, pgs. 193-237.
- Levinson, Mark and Jennifer Stuart, eds. 2001. "The 2001 NGO Sustainability Index for Eastern Europe and Eurasia," Washington, DC: USAID.
- Levy, Jack S. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1, October.
- , 1988. "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 4 (Spring), pp. 653-73.
- Levy, Jack S. and William F. Mabe, Jr. 1999. "Politically Motivated Opposition to War: A Comparative Study of the United States in the Quasi-War and the War of 1812," unpublished manuscript.
- Limanowska, Barbara, UNICEF/UNOHCHR/OSCE ODIHR. 2005. "Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe." New York: UNDP. Downloaded from http://www.unicef.org/media/files/2004Focus_on_Prevention_in_SEE.pdf, 3/31/05.
- Lippman, Thomas W. 1997. 'Albright Puts Women's Rights Top of the Agenda', Washington Post, 20 March: A1 + A9.
- Little, David. 1969. American Foreign Policy and Moral Rhetoric. NY: Council on Religious and International Affairs.

- Locher, Birgit, and Elisabeth Prügl. 2001. "Feminism: Constructivism's Other Pedigree," in Fierke and Jorgensen, eds., Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. London: M.E. Sharpe.
- Mani, Lata. 1998. Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mattox, Gale A. 2001. "The United States: Stability through Engagement and Enlargement" in Mattox and Rachwald, eds. Enlarging NATO: The National Debates. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- Mattox, Gale A. and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds. 2001. Enlarging NATO: The National Debates. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- Matynia, Elzbieta. 1995. "Finding a Voice: Women in Post-Communist Central Europe," in Amrita Basu, ed., The Challenge of Local Feminisms. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- McMahon, Patrice. 2002. "International Actors and Women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary," in Mendelson and Glenn, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia University Press.
- McSweeney, Bill. 1999. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mendelson, Sarah E., and John K. Glenn, eds. 2002. The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mindicanu, Ala. 2003. "Women's Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Republic of Moldova" presented at the 31st session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Women's Rights Action Watch, April 14, 2003.
- Moghadam, Valentine M., ed. 1993. Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- , 1994. Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminism in International Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985 (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Molyneux, Maxine. 1986. "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, State, and Revolution," in Richard Fagan, Carmen Diana Deere, and José Luis Coraggio, eds., Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- NATO. 2001. "South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP)" NATO, May. Downloaded from www.nato.int/docu/comm/2001/0105-bdp/d010530b.htm. 4/28/2005.
- Network of Estonian Non-Profit Organizations (NENO). 2000. "Estonian Civil Society Development Concept (draft)." Tallinn: NENO. Downloaded from www.ngo.ee/est/conceptenglish.html
- , 2002. "Decision of Estonian Parliament: Approval of Estonian Civil Society Development Concept, December 12, 2002" Tallinn: NENO. Downloaded from www.ngo.ee/est
- Nodia, Ghia. 2002 (1996). "How Different are PostCommunist Transitions?" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Nordic Council of Ministers. 2001. Nordic Co-Operation Programme on Gender Equality 2001 – 2005. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
- , 2004. "Fact Sheet: Nordic-Baltic Cooperation on Gender Equality 2001 – 2003" Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
- , 2004. "Nordic-Baltic Campaign Against Trafficking in Women in Estonia 2002 – 2003 Report," Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
- Nussbaum, Martha. 1999. Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, Jr., Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Orren, Karen. 1996. "Structure, Sequence and Subordination in American Political Culture: What's Tradition Got to Do with It?" Journal of Policy History, Vol. '8(4).

- Ottaway, Marina, and Thomas Carothers, eds. 2000. Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Owen, John. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall.
- Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Payne, Richard J. 1995. The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Paz'nyak, Zyanon. 2001. "Phyzychnae znishchenne belaruskai natsii" [Physical Destruction of the Belarusian Nation], Narodnaya Volya, July 18. (Quoted in Gapova 2004)
- Perry, Charles, Michael J. Sweeney, Andrew C. Winner, eds. 2000. Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Implications for U.S. Policy. Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc.
- Peterson, V. Spike, and Anne Sisson Runyan. 1999. Global Gender Issues, 2nd Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Peterson, V. Spike, ed. 1992. Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- , 2000. "Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism," In Ranchod-Nilsson and Tétreault, eds. Women, States, and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? London: Routledge.
- , 2003. A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive, and Virtual Economies. London: Routledge.
- Petras, James. 1997. "Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America," Monthly Review, Vol. 49, No. 7.
- Phillips, Anne. 1999. "Who Needs Civil Society? A Feminist Perspective," Dissent, Winter.
- , 2002. "Does Feminism Need a Conception of Civil Society?" in Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society. Kymlicka, W.; Chambers, S., eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Pickering, Thomas. 2000. "Key Note Address: Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation," Stockholm, Sweden, October 19, 2000. Downloaded from www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001019_pickering-bssc.html. 3/7/2001.
- Ponarin, Eduard. 2000. "The Prospects of Assimilation of the Russophone Populations in Estonia and Ukraine: A Reaction to David Laitin's Research," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 8, December.
- Popescu, Nico. 2005. "The Revolutionary Evolution in Moldova," Moldova.org editorial, May 4, 2005. Downloaded from <http://www.moldova.org/editoriale/eng/32/>. 6/13/2005.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1992. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- , 1995. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, January.
- Quigley, Kevin F.F. 2000. "Lofty Goals, Modest Results: Assisting Civil Society in Eastern Europe" in Ottaway and Carothers, eds., Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Ranchod-Nilsson, Sita and Mary Ann Tétreault, eds. 2000. Women, States, and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? London: Routledge.
- Regulska, Joanna. 2001. "Gendered Integration of Europe: New Boundaries of Exclusion," in Gabriele Jähnert, Jane Gohrlich, Daphne Hahn, Hildegard Maria Nickel, Iris Peinl, Katrin Schäfer, eds., Gender in Transition in Eastern and Central Europe. Proceedings. Berlin: Trafo Verlag.
- Rhodes, Edward. 2000. "The American Vision of Baltic Security Architecture: Understanding the Northern European Initiative," Baltic Defence Review No. 4, Volume 2000.
- , 2001a. "The Northern European Initiative and U.S. Visions of Baltic Security," in Andres Kasekamp, ed., Organizing Europe's Place in World Affairs: The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Vol. 3. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press.
- , 2001b. "The United States and the Northern Dimension: America's Northern Europe Initiative," International Perspectives on the Future of

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Northern Dimension (Part I).
Lulea, Sweden: The Swedish Initiative of the Barents Euro-Arctic Co-operation
And the Northern Dimension.

- . 2002. "Rethinking the Nature of Security: The U.S. Northern European Initiative," Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, downloaded from www.copri.dk, 7/17/02.
- Rosenberg, Emily S. 1982. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Russett, Bruce. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ruutel, Ingrid. 2003. "The Role of Women in the Estonian Culture," Plenary speech given at the Third Baltic Sea Women's Conference on Women and Democracy, February 13-14, Tallinn.
- Sawer, Marian. 2003. "Constructing Democracy," International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5:3 November, pp. 361-365.
- Sampson III, Martin W. 1987. "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy," in Hermann, Kegley, Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Schild, Veronica. 1997. "New Subjects of Rights? Women's Movements and the Construction of Citizenship in the 'New Democracies'" in Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar, eds., Cultures of Politics/Politics of Culture: Revisioning Latin American Social Movements. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur. 1974. "The Missionary Enterprise and Theories of Imperialism," in John F. Fairbank, ed., The Missionary Enterprise in China and America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
- Scott, Joan. 1987. "Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis," in Gender and the Politics of History. NY: Columbia UP.
- Scott, Joan, Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates, eds., 1997. Transition, Environments, Translators: Feminism in International Politics. New York: Routledge.

- Segal, Mark, and David Burgess. 1999. "Executive Summary: USAID/Lithuania Democracy Network Program Impact Report." Vilnius, Lithuania: USAID. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/lt/demnet.html. 4/29/2005.
- Siemieńska, Renata. 1998. "Consequences of Economic and Political Changes for Women in Poland," in Jaquette and Wolchik, eds., Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Silliman, Jael. 1999. "Expanding Civil Society, Shrinking Political Spaces: The Case of Women's Nongovernmental Organizations," Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society Vol. 6, No. 1.
- Smith, Graham, et al. 1998. Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1988. "The 'American Creed' and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2, June.
- , 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 1991. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.
- Smolar, Alexsander. 1995. "Civil Society after Communism," in Diamond and Plattner, eds., 2002, Democracy after Communism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Snitow, Ann. 1999. "Cautionary Tales," American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting. Washington, DC.
- Socor, Vladimir. 2003. "In Moldova, the term 'Federalization' is Misused" Basa-Press June 4, 2003. Downloaded from Moldova Azi <http://www.azi.md/investigation?ID=24325>, 2/27/2004).
- Solchanyk, Roman. 1982. "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," Soviet Studies Vol. XXXIV, no. 1, January.
- Spivak, Gayatri. 1999. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999.

- Steans, Jill. 1998. Gender and International Relations: An Introduction. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP.
- Stevens, Jacqueline. 1999. Reproducing the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sylvester, Christine. 1994. Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-Modern Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Szalay, Lorand B. and Rita Mae Kelly. 1982. "Political Ideology and Subjective Culture: Conceptualization and Empirical Assessment," American Political Science Review, Vol. 76.
- Talbott, Strobe. 1999. "Progress and Hardship: Women as a Force for Change In the Northern Neighborhood," remarks at the Conference on Women And Democracy, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 8, 1999. Downloaded from http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991008_talbott_remarks.3/9/2004.
- , 2002. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House.
- Tarm, Michael. 2002. "A Decade On," City Paper. Downloaded from www.balticsww.com 7/9/02.
- Taylor, Andrew J. and John T. Rourke. 1995. "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2, May.
- Tickner, J. Ann. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia UP.
- , 2001. Gendering World Politics. New York, NY: Columbia UP.
- Titkow, Anna. 1993. "Political Change in Poland: Cause, Modifier or Barrier to Gender Equality," in Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, eds., Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York: Routledge.
- Tinker, Irene. 1990. Persistent Inequalities. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Trummal, Aire and Mikko Lagerspetz, eds. 2001. "The Profile of Estonian Civil Society" CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Project in Estonia, July 2001. Tallinn: CIVICUS. Downloaded from www.civicus.org 3/20/03.

- Trenin, Dmitri and Peter van Ham, eds. 2000. Russia and the United States in Northern European Security. Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik.
- UNAIDS. 2004. "Estonia: Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections 1/9/2004" downloaded from www.unaids.org. 10/28/2004.
- USAID. 1996. "Estonia Graduates from US Foreign Assistance," USAID press Release, 9/5/1996. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/press/releases/960905.htm. 1/19/2004.
- USAID. 1999. "Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story." Study sponsored by the US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, Office of Democracy and Governance: October 1999.
- USAID. 2000. "2000 NGO Sustainability Index" downloaded from www.usaid.gov 3/20/03.
- USAID. 2001. "Building Democracy in Belarus," downloaded from www.usaid.gov/democracy/ee/belarus.html, 3/20/03.
- USAID. 2002. "USAID and the Polish Decade" released March 12, 2002. Washington DC: USAID. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/pl/close-out.html. 5/21/2005.
- USAID. 2005. "Congressional Budget Justification for Moldova, FY 2005." Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/md.html 10/19/2004.
- US Congress. 1989. "Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989." Washington, DC: US Congress. Downloaded from www.usaid.gov/pl/seedact.htm. 4/28/2004.
- US Department of State. 1998. "A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of American and The Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania. January 16, 1998." (Baltic-American Charter of Partnership) Downloaded from www.usembassy.ro/USIS/Washington-File/500/98-01-16/eur506.html 3/6/01.
- US Department of State. 2002. "US Government Assistance to Eastern Europe Under the SEED Act, FY 2002," Washington, DC: US Dept. of State. Downloaded from www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2003/23580pf.htm. 7/23/2004.
- US Department of State. 2004. "Fact Sheet: US Assistance to Moldova for

Fiscal Year 2003” US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington DC, February 17, 2004. Downloaded from www.uspolicy.be 2/22/05.

US Department of State. 2004. “Human Rights Report: Belarus, 2004.” Washington, DC: US Dept. of State. Downloaded from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41671.htm>. 6/20/2005.

US Department of State. 2005. “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2004 – 2005,” a report by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, US Dept. of State, released March 28, 2005. Downloaded from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004/43110.htm>. 6/19/2005.

van Ham, Peter. 2000. “Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's New North: American Perspectives and Policies,” in Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham, Russia and the United States in Northern European Security. Kauhava: Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik.

Walzer, Michael. 1992. “The Civil Society Argument,” in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community London: Verso.

-----, 1994. “Notes on the New Tribalism,” in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring In Europe: Ethical Perspectives. London: Routledge.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War. NY: Columbia UP

-----, 1979. Theory of International Relations. NY: McGraw Hill, Inc.

-----, 2000. “Structural Realism After the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer, pp. 5–41

Watson, Peggy. 2000. “Re-Thinking Transition: Globalism, Gender, and Class,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, August.

-----, 1997a. “Civil Society and the Politics of Difference in Eastern Europe,” in Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan and Debra Keates (eds) Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminisms in International Politics. New York: Routledge.

-----, 1997b. “(Anti)Feminism after Communism,” in Ann Oakley and Juliet Mitchell (eds) Who's Afraid of Feminism: Seeing through the Backlash. London: Penguin.

----- 1993. “The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe,” New Left Review 198: 71–82.

- Waylen, Georgina. 1994. "Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transitional Politics," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 3, April.
- Weir, Margaret. 1992. "Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.
- Weldes, Jutta. 1996. "Constructing National Interests" European Journal of International Relations, Vol.2, pgs. 275-318.
- Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organizations 41, 3, Summer.
- , 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization 46(2): 391-425.
- , 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." American Political Science Review 88(2): 384-396.
- , 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP.
- The White House. 1992. "FREEDOM Support of 1992 Fact Sheet," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, April 1, 1992. Downloaded from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/b920401.htm. 3/25/2003.
- Whittemore, Robert C. 1986. "The Philosophical Antecedents of American Ideology," in John K. Roth and Robert C. Whittemore, eds., Ideology and the American Experience, Washington, DC: Washington Institute.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1987. "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, March.
- Willets, Peter. 2002. "What is a Non-Governmental Organization?" from The UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, downloaded from <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willets/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM>. 9/19/05
- Wolchik, Sharon. 1993. "Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe," in Valentine M. Moghadam, ed. Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Collaboration and Discord. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Young, Iris Marion. 1999. "State, Civil Society, and Social Justice," in I Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy's Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-----, 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender and Nation. London: Sage.

-----, 1992. "Women as Citizens," in Anna Ward, Jeanne Gregory, and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., Women and Citizenship in Europe: Borders, Rights and Duties: Women's Differing Identities in a Europe of Contested Boundaries. Stoke-on-Trent, UK: Trentham Books.

Zagoumenov, Yury. 2001. "Belarus Civil Society: In Need of a Dialogue. A Preliminary Report on the CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Project in Belarus." CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 1, Issue 3. www.civicus.org. Downloaded 3/20/2003.

Zalewski, Marysia and Cynthia Enloe. 1995. "Questions about Identity in International Relations," in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Zalewski, Marysia, and Jane Parpart, eds. 1998. The "Man" Question in International Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Zehfuss, Maja. 2001. "Constructivisms in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil," in Fierke and Jørgensen, eds., Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. London: M.E. Sharpe.

Zielinska, Eleonora. 2000. "Between Ideologies, Politics and Common Sense: The Discourse of Reproductive Rights in Poland," in Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds., Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zoellé, Diana G. 2000. Globalizing Concern for Women's Human Rights: The Failure of the American Model. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Curriculum Vita

Denise Marie Horn

EDUCATION

Ph.D. 2005, Political Science, Rutgers University
 Major Concentration: International Relations
 Minor Concentrations: Women and Politics, Political Theory

Graduate Certificate in Women's and Gender Studies, 2001
 Department of Women's and Gender Studies, Rutgers University

MA, 1995, Political Science, University of Connecticut

BA, 1993, Magna cum laude, Political Science, University of North Carolina-Greensboro

Certificate in Spanish Culture and Language Studies, 1992, Universidad Complutense, Madrid

PUBLICATIONS

"Constructing Agency: US Foreign Funding and Gender Identity in Moldovan Civil Society," Forthcoming, Transitions

"Feminist Approaches to International Relations," Encyclopedia of Government and Politics 2nd Edition, Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. London: Routledge 2003.

Baltic Regional Security Challenges Conference Report. Washington, DC: Women in International Security, Georgetown University, 2003. www.wiis.georgetown.org.

The Northern European Initiative: Conference-Workshop Report. Columbia International Affairs Online, 2003. www.ciaonet.org

RESEARCH INTERESTS/SPECIALIZATIONS

Post-Cold War American Foreign Policy
 NGO and Civil Society Development
 Transnational and International Organizations
 Democratization in Transitional States of the Former Soviet Union
 Constructivist and Feminist Approaches to International Relations

POSITIONS HELD/COURSES TAUGHT

Visiting Assistant Professor, Northeastern University, International Affairs/Political Science

Head Advisor, International Affairs Program
Introduction to International Affairs, Fall 2005

Adjunct Lecturer, Hunter College, CUNY, Dept. of Political Science

International Organizations, Summer 2005
Introduction to International Relations, Spring 2005
Women, War and Peace, Spring 2005
Theories of International Relations, Fall 2004

Lecturer, Rutgers University, Dept. of Women's and Gender Studies

Comparative Feminisms, Fall 2004

Instructor, Rutgers University Writing Program

Introduction to Expository Writing, Fall 2002, Fall 2003

Lecturer, Rutgers University, Dept. of Political Science

American Foreign Policy, Spring 1999, Summer 1999, Summer 2000, Summer 2002, Summer 2003, Summer 2004
Introduction to International Relations, Summer 2001

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY

Associate Director, September 2003-June 2005

Center for Global Security and Democracy, Rutgers University

Grant Coordinator, September 2003-August 2005

CASE/US Dept. of State, Civil Society Project in Moldova