

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA**

UMI[®]
800-521-0600

THE PUBLIC FATHER: CHANGING PRACTICES OF FATHERHOOD
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE

BY JESSE C. CROSSON III

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate School-New Brunswick
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
in partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Political Science

Written under the direction of

Professor W. Carey McWilliams

and approved by

W. C. McWilliams

Arthur R. Lewis

David J. Tim

John M. Geyer

New Brunswick, New Jersey

January, 2000

UMI Number: 9958964

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 9958964

Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

**All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346**

© 2000

Jesse C. Crosson III

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Public Father: Changing Practices of Fatherhood and the
Development of the American Welfare State

by JESSE C. CROSSON III

Dissertation Director:

Professor W. Carey McWilliams

Recently, fathers have gained attention in both academic and political debates. Specifically, concerns with the social costs of the absence of fathers from families have animated current discussions of the problems of poverty and dependence. Recent welfare reforms have explicitly sought to use the incentives of welfare policy to encourage fathers to remain with their children and become good providers. While this explicit attention to fatherhood is relatively new, welfare policies have always been defined in relation to the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood. In fact, welfare policies and institutions serve as a means for policy makers to express the dominant norms of fatherhood, a tool for shaping the practices of fathers, and as evidence of changing cultural norms of fatherhood. They

thus constitute what I call a *public fatherhood*.

In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between hegemonic conceptions of fatherhood and welfare policies as they have developed since the colonial period. For the period before the creation of a federal welfare state when poor relief was a local and state responsibility, I focus on the poor relief laws and institutions of one state where developments were typical of other states and I have access to early documents. My analysis of poor relief in New Jersey shows how these laws and institutions reproduced the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood. I find that poor relief in the eighteenth-century was designed to take on the responsibilities of fathers as primary parents and that relief in the nineteenth-century came to serve as a replacement for a less directly involved good provider.

For the period after the creation of the federal welfare state, I focus on national developments. I find that a concern with fathers and how welfare programs affect their behavior has been an important part of these developments. As these concerns have moved to the fore, welfare-based programs designed to instruct young men in the practices of fatherhood have been developed. My analysis of official documents from these programs, illustrated by interviews with some of the participants in one of these

programs, shows how hegemonic norms and practices of fatherhood continue to be expressed and reproduced through welfare policies. In each of these periods, welfare policies and institutions embody the changing character of public fatherhood.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DEDICATION

The topic of this dissertation grew out of my interest in the history of American welfare and discussions in 1995 with administrators of a welfare-based fatherhood program in Maryland. Completing this project would not have been possible without the encouragement and generous support of family, friends, and colleagues. My wife, Nicole Isaacson, was the source for the initial suggestion that I combine my interest in the American welfare system with my interest in the role of the state in the construction of fatherhood practices. She has been my most careful reader and has offered encouraging critiques of earlier versions of this dissertation. Sue Rovi read the entire manuscript and provided valuable advice and support. The chair of my dissertation committee, Carey McWilliams, asked seemingly simple questions of earlier drafts that led me to substantially rethink my argument at critical points. I hope that I have begun to address some of the concerns that he has raised. Dan Tichenor helped me to begin to find my way through the substantial literature on American political development and has offered consistent encouragement and useful advice. Cynthia Daniels' critique of an earlier draft of this project led me to rethink the importance of race in my conception of public fatherhood. Judy Gerson

provided crucial assistance and encouragement for the completion of this project. Joe Romance and Jeff Becker also read earlier versions of some of the work presented here and provided valuable suggestions. Thanks also are due to Barbara Townsend and Tyrone Furman for their help in gaining access to the fathers interviewed for chapter four and especially to the young men who shared their ideas about fatherhood with me. The support of the Department of Family Medicine at New Jersey Medical School allowed me to pursue my research while working as an administrator. Linda Boyd and Caryl Heaton helped me to secure this crucial material support and offered their encouragement at many important points. On a more personal note, my parents have offered their love and support throughout the long process of completing this project. I am also grateful to Daniel and Vivienne Isaacson for their support and encouragement and for welcoming me into their family. Finally, while writing this dissertation, I became a father myself. For this unparalleled gift and for her love, I am forever thankful to my wife. This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to her and to my son, David.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DEDICATION	v
INTRODUCTION	1
FATHERHOOD, FATHERLESSNESS AND WELFARE	2
HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD	16
PUBLIC FATHERHOOD	19
THE WELFARE STATE AND THE GENDER ORDER.....	20
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION	22
CHAPTER ONE: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SOCIAL PRACTICES OF	
GENDER	26
INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE AND PUBLIC POLICY	27
Policy Legacies and Political Learning.....	28
Ideas and Institutional Development.....	31
Cultural Patterns and Institutional Development.....	33
The Culture of Fatherhood and Institutional Development.....	37
THEORIES OF GENDER	38
Psychology and Gender.....	39
Gender as Sex-Role.....	41
Bodies and the Politics of Gender.....	44
GENDER AND THE STATE	48
The American Mythology of Family Privacy.....	50
Regulating Families.....	52
State Power and Family Values.....	57
CONCLUSION	60

**CHAPTER TWO: CONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC FATHER: POOR RELIEF IN
COLONIAL NEW JERSEY, 1663-177562**

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD IN COLONIAL AMERICA 65

COLONIAL AMERICAN POOR RELIEF 68

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD IN COLONIAL NEW JERSEY72

 Reproducing Paternal Authority..... 73

Enforcing the Obedience of Children..... 73

Enforcing the Obedience of Servants..... 75

Enforcing Paternal Prerogatives..... 77

 Replacing Paternal Authority..... 78

Teaching Industry..... 79

Educating the Young..... 81

Correcting the Wayward..... 83

SUBORDINATE FATHERS AND THE RESISTANCE TO PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 86

 Subordinate Fathers: Slaves and Freed Negroes..... 88

 Challenging Patriarchal Authority: Wanderers, Beggars, Disobedient
 Sons and the New Commercial Economy..... 92

CONCLUSION96

CHAPTER THREE: A DIMINISHING PRESENCE: BREADWINNING

FATHERHOOD AND POOR RELIEF IN NEW JERSEY, 1820-193698

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD IN THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC.....101

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL RELIEF INSTITUTIONS106

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY113

 Reproducing a Diminished Paternal Authority..... 115

The Decline of Paternal Prerogatives..... 115

"Tender Years" and the "Best Interests of the Child".....117

 Enforcing Paternal Responsibilities..... 119

<i>"Work as the Social Disinfectant": Restoring Manhood through Mandated Labor</i>	120
<i>The "Disorderly Person": State Correction of Wayward Fathers</i>	124
<i>Replacing Absent Fathers</i>	126
SUBORDINATE FATHERS: EXCLUSION AND RESISTANCE	127
Slaves and Freed Negroes.....	128
Tramps, Hobos and Idlers.....	131
CONCLUSION	132
CHAPTER FOUR: PROVIDING AND PATERNAL PRESENCE: WELFARE	
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS, 1988-1996	135
HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD AND THE CHANGING GENDER ORDER	138
PUBLIC FATHERHOOD AND THE FEDERAL WELFARE STATE, 1988-1996.....	142
The "De-Gendering" of Breadwinning.....	145
Supporting "Intact Families".....	148
Child Support and Welfare Reform.....	150
"Promoting Responsible Fatherhood".....	154
CONCLUSION	162
CONCLUSION	166
APPENDIX A - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	177
REFERENCES	180
CURRICULUM VITA	214

INTRODUCTION

The welfare state is an important location for the reproduction of the social order of gender relations. One way that welfare policies and institutions reproduce certain patterns of gender relations is by lending institutional and rhetorical support to particular parenting practices. In this dissertation, I examine the ways in which particular welfare regimes in America have reproduced the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood. I argue that throughout the development of the American welfare state, culturally dominant fatherhood practices have served as an often-unstated referent for policy makers. I call these culturally dominant fatherhood practices *hegemonic fatherhood*. In addition, I show how changing welfare policies have played an important part in reproducing hegemonic fatherhood not only through their incentive structures but also through their role in lending legitimacy to particular parenting arrangements. In the process of lending legitimacy to particular patterns of paternity, welfare policies embody what I call a *public fatherhood*. In these ways, social welfare policies have historically and continue today to play an important part in the cultural reproduction of fatherhood. This dissertation examines the history of this relationship between state and society,

politics and gender, welfare and fatherhood.

FATHERHOOD, FATHERLESSNESS AND WELFARE

Over the past ten or fifteen years, fatherhood has become an increasingly important topic in popular culture, academic research, and political debates. In 1987, Pleck remarked that "in American society, there has been an explosion of interest in fathers and fatherhood" (1987: 83). This popular interest remains today and researchers from many fields are now addressing the previous lack of attention to fatherhood. Historians are providing a wealth of new information on the changing meaning and practices of paternity in America (Demos 1986, Furstenberg 1988, Gillis 1995, Griswold 1993, 1997 and 1998, Lamb 1986b, LaRossa 1988 and 1997, LaRossa, et al. 1991, LaRossa and Reitzes 1995, Pleck 1987, Rotundo 1985). In the field of child development research, many also are reassessing what is known about the impact of fathers on their children (Crockett, et al. 1993, Downey 1994, Furstenberg and Harris 1993, Furstenberg, et al. 1987, Lamb 1986b, Radin and Russell 1983). Most recently, sociologists also have taken note of the fact that children from families with absent fathers are at increased risk of failing to graduate from high school, more likely to become teen parents or have

children out of wedlock and less likely to be strongly attached to the regular labor market (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994, McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). In addition, politically conservative observers of these trends place the blame for a host of social problems, from welfare dependency to child abuse, on what they term *father absence* (Blankenhorn 1995, Popenoe 1996).

At the same time, the meaning of fatherhood is regularly the object of political and cultural dispute. A variety of historical models of fatherhood, from that of distant breadwinner, sex role model and playmate to that of an involved caregiver who is crucial to the development of children, now compete for cultural and political hegemony. Fatherhood historian Robert Griswold observes that since the collapse of the male monopoly over breadwinning after World War II and the rebirth of the feminist movement in the nineteen-sixties, "fatherhood has become politicized: its terms are contested, its significance fragmented, its meaning unstable" (1993: 9). In fact, many observers of American families argue that fatherhood now is undergoing what could be called a crisis of meaning, setting the stage for a politics of fatherhood (Furstenberg 1988, Griswold 1993, Lamb 1986b, LaRossa 1988, Marsiglio 1993, Pleck 1987). Thus, from the "Million Man March" and the "Promise Keepers" movement to the public condemnation of "deadbeat dads" and

the call for men to become more active parents, American public discourse has rediscovered the importance of fatherhood (Griswold 1998). Traditionalist arguments are advanced to encourage men to reassert their "proper" role as "head of the household," to provide moral guidance, especially to sons, and to fulfill their obligations as breadwinners. Alternatively, the "men's movement," in reaction to the emotional distance of traditional breadwinning fathers from their children, encourages men to adopt a more nurturing idea of fatherhood and to get more "in touch" with their own emotional life.

In recent years, conservatives have argued that the absence of men from the lives of their children is at the root of many American social problems. Fatherless families, conservatives have argued, are at the root of many social problems.¹ A prominent contributor to this analysis, Blankenhorn, argues that:

fatherlessness is the most harmful demographic trend of this generation. It is the engine driving our most urgent social problems, from crime to adolescent pregnancy to child sexual abuse to domestic violence against women (1995: 1).

David Popenoe similarly has claimed that father absence is behind rising crime and delinquency, premature sexuality,

¹ As Griswold puts it in his analysis of the politics of fatherlessness, "for conservatives, families headed by men represent the foundation of a liberal democratic society and also the best hedge against social anarchy" (1998: 23).

out-of-wedlock teen birth, deteriorating educational achievement, depression, substance abuse, and alienation among teens (1996: 1-27).

Conservatives also have identified fatherlessness as being behind the growing numbers of women and children in poverty. As Blankenhorn puts it, "the feminization of poverty stems largely . . . from the masculinization of irresponsibility" (1995: 115). Other researchers have found that children in single-parent households are at greater risk of living in poverty (McLanahan 1985, see also Figure 1).

**Percentage Below Poverty Level
Families With Children Under Age 18**



Figure 1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1998

Children in single-parent households are about twice as likely to drop out of school (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994), and more likely to perform poorly when they do stay in

school (Downey 1994, McLanahan 1985). In addition, such children are less likely to have adequate health care coverage (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994), have "about a 50% greater likelihood of having poor/fair health status" than children in two-parent families (Montgomery, et al. 1996), and are at increased risk of incarceration (Harper and McLanahan 1998). While many of these differences are at least partially explained by differential access to parental resources, significant disadvantages remain even when resources are taken into account. As McLanahan and Sandefur put it:

Low income - and the sudden drop in income that is often associated with divorce - is the most important factor in children's lower achievement in single-parent homes, accounting for about half of the disadvantage. Inadequate parental guidance and attention and the lack of ties to community resources account for most of the remaining disadvantage (1994: 3).

Thus, while strict enforcement of child support obligations and a generous social welfare system could go a long way towards equalizing the life chances of children in both single-parent and two-parent families the absence of fathers from families would remain a significant social problem. Children would still be denied access to the emotional and psychological resources that fathers can bring to families.

The absence of men from families also is problematic, according to writers like Popenoe (1996) and Blankenhorn (1995), because men make a unique parenting contribution.

They agree that the absence of men from families and child rearing deprives children not only of resources but also of particular parenting styles. Or as Popenoe puts it, "fathering is different from mothering" (1996: 2) and "the expression of these differences is important for child development" (Ibid.: 140). Specifically, he argues that how fathers play with their children has some relationship to the development of self-control - essential for a free society (Popenoe 1998: 38-41). Nevertheless, Blankenhorn (1995) argues, American elite culture promotes an androgynous ideal of parenting and rejects a distinctive role for fathers. Our society, such critics argue, promotes an inconsistent and even contradictory vision of fatherhood. Cultural images of fathers tend to be those of "amiable bumlbers" (Blankenhorn 1995: 77) or as the Republican Governor of New Jersey put it "the images of fathers today are too often like those on the 'Simpsons' or 'Married with Children.' Bumbling, oafish fathers who inspire only ridicule and laughter" (Office of the Governor 1998). Fathers are portrayed, these critics argue, as superfluous and father absence is thereby validated.

However, in fact, there has been little research on the unique contribution of fathers. The research that has been done suggests that the lack of a second parent rather than the absence of men lead to disadvantages for children

(Downey 1994, B. Powell and Downey 1997). In fact, Furstenberg et al. found that children fare no better when a non-custodial father maintains "an active presence in their lives" (1987: 696). Moreover, Crockett et al. (1993) found no cognitive or psychosocial disadvantages to children resulting from father absence that could be separated from other causes. In addition, Downey found that:

children from single-father families do no better in school than children from single-mother families. . . . In addition, . . . the classroom behavior of children from single-father families is just as poor as those living with single-mother families, suggesting that the lack of a father or disciplinarian does not explain the problems of children in single-parent families. The lack of any parent, whether it is the mother or the father, appears to increase children's behavioral problems in school (1994: 144).

Although recent studies have begun to demonstrate the importance of fathers to child development, further comparative research is needed to demonstrate the unique affect of fathers on children (for summaries of the evidence on the importance of fathers see, Parke 1996: 119-178 and Pruett 1993).

The absence of men from their families, conservatives argue, is also a direct threat to social order. Agreeing with the poor relief reformers of previous centuries, these critics argue that unattached men are a potentially dangerous class of irresponsible and selfish individuals. As Griswold puts it "underlying conservative social theory is the belief that men, free from marriage and fatherhood

inevitably will become selfish barbarians" (1998: 22). Popenoe goes so far as to claim that without the cultural constraints of marriage "men's sexual behavior can be promiscuous, their paternity casual, their commitment to families weak" (Popenoe 1998: 36). Similarly, Blankenhorn argues that men have to be "conscripted" into fatherhood. They will not, he says, "volunteer" (Blankenhorn 1995: 3). Nevertheless, many men do voluntarily take on the responsibilities of fatherhood and while father absence is itself a serious social problem the presence of fathers is still the norm. Rather than biology, the individualistic norms of American society may explain the reluctance of some men to assume responsibility for their children.

Conservative critics have raised an important point by talking about the costs of father absence. However, they miss the point of what that absence means. The absence of resources can be made up by state expenditure, although this is an expensive proposition, similarly the health and educational costs to children could be addressed by more generous social spending. By focusing on the physical absence of fathers, these critics miss the crucial psychological and emotional importance of fathers to their biological children. The point is not that the absence of fathers results in failed families, but rather that fathers do contribute to the development of children. Without a

father, families can be loving and healthy. Nonetheless, children in these families must always confront the loss of their fathers. Many children face this loss even with the physical presence of their fathers. The presence of fathers matters, but this presence does not guarantee that children will do well or that those without such a physical presence will do poorly. What a physical fatherly presence does guarantee is the opportunity for a father to make a difference.

According to the influential conservative Charles Murray, the reward system of the welfare state ultimately is to blame for the explosion of out-of-wedlock births, father absence, and single parenting among poor women (1984: 154-166). The final result of the "perverse incentives" of welfare policy is thus rising public expenditures for poor relief and a growing behavioral distance between the middle-class "us" and a poor "them".² Welfare policies, these critics have argued, have created "a group of people who possess behavioral traits that are socially dysfunctional" (Harpham and Scotch 1988: 201, see also Mead 1982, Murray 1984). As Jenks (1991) argues, there is now an "underclass" of poor people composed of those who, in addition to being

² Hirschman (1991) has argued that the concern with the perverse effects of reforms has a long history in the rhetorical strategy of reaction. He argues that this reactionary thesis is an inversion of the Scottish Enlightenment concept, popularly associated with Adam Smith, of

poor, violate the norms of middle class behavior. However, whether or not the incentives of the welfare system encourage these behaviors is not clear.

The evidence for a causal relationship between expanding welfare benefits and father absence is weak. For example, in a cross-state longitudinal analysis designed to determine the relationship between benefit levels, the growth of welfare rolls and single-parent families, Ellwood and Summers (1986) found no clear temporal relationship between the relative generosity of welfare benefits and family structure. In a comprehensive survey of the literature on effects of the welfare system on family structure Moffitt found that "the failure to find strong benefit effects is the most notable characteristic of this literature" (1992: 31). Moreover, as McLanahan has shown, "the trend in welfare benefits between 1960 and 1990 does not match the trend in father absence" (1998: 94, see also McLanahan and Sandefur 1994).

While Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986: 56) did find a weak relationship between the benefit guarantee levels for Aid to Families with Dependent Children and food stamps on the one hand, and the proportion of families headed by women; Moffitt found that when looking at overall trend data

unintended consequences leading selfish behavior, "by an invisible hand" (A. Smith 1937[1776]: 423) to collectively good ends.

"the evidence does not support the hypothesis that the welfare system has been responsible for the time-series growth in female headship and illegitimacy" (1992: 29). Neckerman (1993) and Stern (1993) also have demonstrated that the changes in the family arrangements of the "underclass" predate the expansion of benefits in the nineteen-sixties. Recently, Fairlie and London (1997) have found that policies designed to deter recipients of aid from having additional children are unlikely to have a large effect on reproductive decisions and that currently observed effects are likely spurious associations. In addition, recent research has shown that welfare benefits are probably too low to encourage the passive dependence on government largess feared by conservatives. For example, Edin's detailed analysis of the family budgets of welfare recipients shows that nearly half of those interviewed supplement their benefits with unreported work or assistance from others (Edin 1991, Edin and Lein 1997a and 1997b: 42-45, see also W. Epstein 1997: 111-140, Stack 1974, Wilson and Neckerman 1986).

The effects of welfare "incentives" on family structure and fatherhood practices can not be easily determined because other factors, including male employment opportunities, have been found to have even larger affects

on family structure (Neckerman, et al. 1988).³ In fact, these family structures predate the War on Poverty (Neckerman 1993, Moynihan 1992, Stern 1993). Nonetheless, conservatives have argued that, while the direct incentive effects of welfare on family structure can not be clearly demonstrated, these policies do make men less important to poor families and militate against the development of a sense of individual responsibility for one's behavior and destiny. Welfare, they argue, may not encourage these attitudes, but it does at least "enable" them (Murray 1986). Or as Popenoe puts it, "laws, after all, do shape behavior, not only through creating rules and incentives but by conveying cultural messages about the institutions they are set up to regulate" (1996: 222).

Although the reevaluation of the incentive structures of welfare policies was a primary concern of conservative social critics like Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead, by the middle of the nineteen-eighties liberals too had begun to recognize that perhaps something was wrong with how we provided assistance to the needy. For example, even liberal economists such as Baumol and Blinder (1986) argued that AFDC policies had created strong disincentives to work,

³ Individual psychological considerations may also be important in explaining particular family structures. The sort of large-scale panel study necessary to investigate the interaction of these and other forces is well beyond the scope of this project. For more on the relationship

encouraged the break-up of families and had failed to win the "War on Poverty" declared more than twenty years before.⁴ Moreover, by 1988, liberals like Ellwood could agree that perhaps Murray had been right that the welfare system does not reinforce the values basic to American society (1988: 6). Concerns with the "family values" taught by welfare policies thus stretched across the political spectrum and shaped the direction of reform in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties.⁵

Whether or not welfare spending actually helped to create more single parent families by marginalizing poor fathers, by the middle of President Reagan's first term, the conservative criticism of welfare had become the official justification for calls to limit public spending on the poor (Danziger and Weinberg 1986). The widespread perception that the policies of the nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies had at least "enabled" these developments, developments at odds with dominant American values, meant that conservative critics found fertile ground for their

between psychological factors and poverty see Vaillant (1997).

⁴ As these authors showed, because poor families lost \$.67 in benefits for each dollar of earned income they faced an effective tax rate of 67%, a strong disincentive to work (or at least a strong disincentive to report the work and pay taxes).

⁵ Williams has called these developments "part of a disturbing effort to divert attention from the structural problems of our society and to focus instead on the so-called deviance of the poor" (1992:719). While this does describe the motivations of some of the critics of welfare in the late nineteen-eighties and early nineteen-nineties, it dismisses too easily the findings of social scientists on the behavioral

arguments among the general electorate.

These debates about what makes "good fathers," and how public policy can support them, are central to ongoing debates over what makes a good social welfare system. While much has been written about how the American welfare state constructs, and is itself affected by, the dominant practices of motherhood (Abromowitz 1988, L. Gordon 1990 and 1994, Nelson 1990, Sapiro 1986, Skocpol 1992), little has been written specifically about how dominant practices of fatherhood relate to these same policies.⁶ It is my contention here that reproducing good fathers has been an important, albeit unstated, goal of welfare policy throughout the development of the American welfare state. The reforms of both 1988 and 1996, designed specifically to address "incentives" for father absence from poor families, are simply the culmination of this longstanding concern with what kind of fathers welfare reproduces.

In the last thirty-five years, this concern has taken on a more explicitly racialized tone. At least since 1965, public discussion of the effect of the welfare system on poor families, and especially poor black families, has been an important and overt part of welfare debates. Today, a

differences between the underclass and mainstream American society (for discussion of these differences see, Jenks 1991).

⁶ Griswold's *Fatherhood in America* (1993) is an important exception to this overall trend.

racially charged public discourse about fathers underlies the current welfare debate.⁷ Thus, images of fatherhood are in play in public policy debates that ultimately determine how we will assist the vulnerable members of our society.

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD

The current state of disorder and flux in the meaning of fatherhood highlights the fact that fathering is as much a social construction as a biological reality. Being a father means, in a strictly biological sense, contributing half of the DNA needed to create a new human life, typically-though not necessarily-through heterosexual intercourse. However, many men are in fact recognized as fathers without fulfilling this biological criterion and, alternatively, some men who do fulfill the biological criterion of fatherhood are not recognized socially as fathers. Adoptive fathers and step-fathers are legally and socially recognized as fathers without participating in the biological act of reproduction which created their socially-recognized child, while anonymous "sperm donors" are not recognized as fathers even though they have performed the

⁷ In fact, popular images of irresponsible, hyper-sexualized fathers, often African-American or Hispanic, constitute a powerful undercurrent in the public discourse of welfare (Roberts 1998). Many observers have noted the racial "coding" of the general public discourse

biological function of providing half of the DNA of a particular child.⁸ Social recognition is afforded to fathers on their assumption of the responsibility for providing economic and emotional support to children. They are thus recognized for fulfilling the requirements of the social and emotional role of the father. Nonetheless, even this social aspect of fathering contains within it a biological component. Biological males are recognized as *fathers*. So fathering is neither a completely social nor an exclusively biological phenomenon, rather it is a socially recognized parenting position occupied by biological males.

But, the argument that men are recognized as fathers for fulfilling a social role from a particular biological position carries with it additional problems. Social roles come with expectations placed on the "actor" by the "audience" to the performance—they have a "script." Moreover, while social expectations do play an important part in defining fatherhood they do not define the entire field of practical variety. The terminology of roles slips easily into a discussion of *the* fatherhood role, assuming a

of welfare (T. Edsall and Edsall 1991, Gilens 1996, Hecllo 1994).

⁸ As Laqueur (1990) argues, sperm is "depaternalized" by medical authorities in order to keep donors from asserting the rights of fatherhood. Callahan cautions that this separation of paternity from social responsibility by sperm donation serves as a "socially sanctioned symbol" of male irresponsibility (1996: 166). A thorough examination of the arguments for or against allowing anonymous sperm donation is outside of the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, the presence of such a debate highlights the interconnection of the biological and

unity of practice that does not exist. In fact, LaRossa points out that fathering practices vary across geography and time, class and race.

In the nineteenth century, for example, the strain of fatherhood that might be found in a northern industrial state differed from the strain of fatherhood that might be found in a southern agricultural community. Likewise, the strain of fatherhood among Anglo-Saxons in Boston differed from the strain of fatherhood among Chinese or Italian immigrants in Philadelphia or among African slaves in Atlanta. Even these categories minimize the contradictions within locales and groups (LaRossa 1997: 21).

Fatherhood practices also vary with regard to individual attitudes toward paternity. Some fathers are emotionally nurturing and active care takers, others are aloof and distant disciplinarians and providers, still others are abusive or absent.

Despite this variety of practices, I argue that it is possible to identify certain fatherhood practices as hegemonic. The character of these hegemonic practices does change over time, giving evidence to the fact that fathering is neither simply defined by biology nor is it a monolithic and static social role. However, the hegemonic norms and practices of fatherhood do exercise a powerful influence over individual fathers, " 'hegemony' does not mean total cultural dominance, the obliteration of alternatives. . . . Other patterns . . . are subordinated rather than

social aspects of fatherhood.

eliminated" (Connell 1987: 184).⁹ Moreover, at any given time a variety of fatherhood practices will exist alongside of and in relation to these hegemonic practices.

Nonetheless, hegemonic fatherhood has a powerful influence over the development of public policies and especially over the development of the institutions of social welfare.

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD

The changing nature of the hegemonic practices of fatherhood relates in important ways to the development of public welfare policy. First, such practices constitute an important cultural referent for policy makers, thereby shaping, albeit inadvertently, the development of relief institutions. In addition, a hegemonic fatherhood is subsequently both legitimated and institutionally privileged by public policies. For example, the United States has no system of paid paternal leave that could encourage fathers to become primarily responsible for child care, while at the same time recent welfare reforms mandate that poor mothers help to identify the fathers of their children in order to

⁹ This theory of hegemonic fatherhood builds on Connell's (1987) discussion of *hegemonic masculinity*. The use of the term hegemony, both in Connell's argument and here, follows Gramsci's understanding of this concept in that it does not refer simply to domination by force or state coercion but also by the spontaneous consent "to the general direction imposed on social life" by those with prestige in any given society (Hoare and Simth 1971: 12).

collect child support payments. Public policies thus support a hegemonic practice of fatherhood defined by breadwinning. I call the ideas of fatherhood as embodied in public policy and expressed through institutions designed to mold individual men in their image, *public fatherhood*. The exercise of state power in the reproduction of hegemonic fatherhood thus produces a public fatherhood that is then imposed on particular men who are subjected to that state power by virtue of their economic dependence. The changing character of public fatherhood itself helps to reproduce hegemonic fatherhood norms and practices.

THE WELFARE STATE AND THE GENDER ORDER

The dominant practices of gender and the power relations between men and women that constitute those practices, in the workplace, the family and in emotional and sexual relationships, make up a "gender order" (Connell 1987). There is a multiplicity of possible gender norms and practices within such an order. Nonetheless, certain norms and practices are hegemonic, others subordinate, some authorized by official recognition, and others marginalized by public opprobrium. One such means of recognition is through public welfare policy and law.

Public welfare policies both reflect the dominant

beliefs and social practices of the gender order and lend the support of official sanction to their persistence. Such policies are thus an authoritative expression of a particular set of social practices of gender and, at the same time, a site for contesting the values underlying those practices. As Hartman has argued:

public policy reflects prevailing beliefs and values. Further, public policy is not only descriptive—it is also prescriptive. It not only reflects values . . . it also creates and recreates them through its enormous power to reward and punish, to encourage and prohibit, to shape behavior and exert control (1995: 183).

Through what Daniels has called the "power of *moral discourse* - the ability to legitimate the shared moral norms and cultural beliefs which undergird power relations," (1993: 6) policy both expresses the dominant values of the gender order and, at the same time is a powerful instrumentality for reproducing gender. This power can be of particular importance, both affecting and being affected by other cultural forces, during periods when the public understanding of the gender division of labor in the family is shifting.¹⁰ Heymann has described this dynamic:

widely shared, well-defined beliefs shape the actions of government. But in areas where beliefs are not so clear, we derive a sense of what the common social understanding should be from government action. That sense in turn may be translated into more public understandings that influence future individual, group,

¹⁰ Similarly, Daniels argues that "the moral authority of the state becomes most potent in times of real or perceived crisis" (1993: 6, see also Swidler 1986).

and public actions and attitudes (1988, 85).

In addition, in a democratic order, governmental policy is the result of political struggle over the values that animate it. Thus while public policy may provide a guide in areas of unclear meaning, the nature of that guide is defined through political conflict.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

It is my argument in this dissertation that the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood place important limits on the options that are available to policy makers as they work to design solutions to the problems of poverty and dependence. Specifically, I show that hegemonic practices of fatherhood are not only reflected in public welfare institutions but also are given legitimacy by these same institutions. In addition, I argue that because cultural and institutional changes do not necessarily occur simultaneously, institutions defined in relation to a particular idea of fatherhood can persist even after such an idea is no longer dominant. Thus, both prior institutional approaches to the problems of poverty and the changing order of gender exercise independent influences over the development of American welfare policies.

In chapter one, I explore theories of institutional

development and gender as I develop a theory of the relationship between gender and the state. I argue that since gender is best understood as a social practice defined not only by bodily difference but also by political power, understanding the way that social policy reproduces the gender order is crucial to understanding those policies. In subsequent chapters, I show that welfare policy can itself be seen as expressing a public fatherhood that is defined in reference to changing ideas of hegemonic fatherhood.

In chapter two, I apply the theory of the relation between state and society developed in the first chapter to the development of poor relief institutions in New Jersey in the colonial period. Public welfare in this period was primarily the responsibility of local communities and, later, of colonies and states. I focus my analysis of poor relief records and legislation on New Jersey because the institutions of this state were typical of the colonial response to poverty in America. The hegemonic norms and practices of colonial fatherhood included providing for children, teaching them a trade, educating them and providing moral guidance and supervision. In this chapter, I find that poor relief institutions in colonial New Jersey embodied a public fatherhood defined these patriarchal norms of colonial fatherhood.

In chapter three, I show that over the course of the

rapid development of the American commercial republic in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century, the dominant ideas of masculinity and fatherhood underwent important changes. Specifically, masculinity came to be increasingly equated with independence and at the same time the hegemonic norms and practices of fatherhood came to be defined primarily by breadwinning. As new poor relief institutions developed in New Jersey, these institutions and public policies came to embody a more constricted idea of public fatherhood defined by the provision of economic resources to families. The emerging cultural consensus around this diminished public conception of fatherhood helped to determine the development of New Jersey's welfare programs into the early twentieth-century. The institutions that developed in the crisis of the nineteen-thirties thus were designed to provide work in order to preserve at least the appearance of independent manhood for recipients. Once the crisis of the Great Depression had passed, these work programs for men declined as a means for providing relief to poor families. What persisted was a federalized system of cash assistance to women and dependent children, continuing the practice of substituting state assistance for the breadwinning of absent and poor fathers.

In chapter four, I argue that since 1988 welfare reforms have become increasingly concerned with the

regulation of fatherhood. These reforms have arisen in a context of changing cultural expectations of both fathers and mothers. Specifically, I argue that the shared responsibility for breadwinning that has come to define most American families has provided an important backdrop to recent welfare changes. Thus, welfare reforms have not only required that mothers receiving assistance work, but also that the presence of fathers in families does not automatically exclude them from cash assistance. Nonetheless, the federal government remains involved in important ways in the enforcement of breadwinning and support obligations. However, several states have taken their newly reacquired authority over welfare programs and developed policy measures and programs designed specifically to instruct fathers in practices of fatherhood that go beyond breadwinning. It is my argument that these programs, while supporting breadwinning conceptions of fatherhood, also embody the newly hegemonic expectations of a more involved fatherhood. My assessment of these programs, illustrated by interviews with participants in one such program, shows that they encourage a paternal presence in poor families at the same time that they seek to enhance the breadwinning capacities of poor fathers.

CHAPTER ONE: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SOCIAL PRACTICES OF GENDER

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between public policies, specifically welfare policies, and gender. The theory developed here draws on the insights of both institutional scholars and gender theorists to come to a working understanding of the relationship between the changing gender order and the development of the American welfare state. I argue that institutional scholars have made an important contribution to this understanding by showing the importance of prior institutional developments in subsequent policy developments. However, I claim that such approaches rarely allow for a sufficient consideration of the independent influence of intellectual and cultural developments on public policies. It is my contention that policies develop both within a political context defined by prior institutional responses to related problems and within a cultural context defined in important ways by gender. However, gender itself is not unchanging. I argue here that gender is neither a self-reproducing system of roles nor a clear social reflection of biological sex, but rather, is a set of social relations and practices related in important ways to both bodily difference and other social

relationships—notably race, class and political power. It is thus my claim in this chapter, that state policies and institutions are both affected by and work to reproduce the dominant social patterns of gender.

INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE AND PUBLIC POLICY

The interrelationship between, and the relative causal importance of, institutions, policies, ideas and culture has long been the subject of debate in the social sciences. The examination of this interrelationship has ranged from Weber's idealism and Marx's economism to "historical institutionalist" efforts to understand the development of the modern state as a process relatively autonomous from either cultural or economic developments. In this section, I consider the contributions of both the historical institutionalist approach and alternative "cultural" approaches to understanding political and institutional developments. I argue here that poor relief policy and institutional developments cannot be accounted for without consideration of the changing nature of the American gender order and, more specifically, the changing norms and practices of fatherhood.

Policy Legacies and Political Learning

Historical institutionalists argue that policies and institutions shape political developments (March and Olsen 1984, Skowronek 1982, Skocpol 1992 and 1995). Through the public response to perceived social problems, institutional capacities are created. Those capacities then shape the direction of subsequent political developments. For example, when a national response to poverty was necessary during the Great Depression of the nineteen-thirties, policy makers drew upon the existing state-level mothers' pension policies as they constructed a national welfare system. The social work capacities developed in the nineteenth-century provided these policy makers with both a ready resource and a professional constituency for a particular approach to the problem of poverty. Because the capacity and expertise for investigating aid recipients had already been developed at the local and state levels, the federal approach to poverty could mandate a determination of the worthiness of recipients as a condition of assistance. Skowronek's examination of Progressive Era political reform shows that "state building is most basically an exercise in reconstructing an already established organization of state power" (1982: ix). Thus, the institutional capacities created by policies shape subsequent policy developments

through their mediation of the political struggles that are entailed in any policy reform. Institutions, as they persist through time, also guide subsequent policy developments into particular channels. As Skocpol suggests:

Policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes. . . . (And), because of the official efforts made to implement new policies using new or existing administrative arrangements, policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They therefore change the administrative possibilities for official initiatives in the future, and affect later prospects for policy implementation (1992: 58).

It is thus possible to construct a history of institutional development by tracing "the sequences of outcomes over time, showing how earlier outcomes change the parameters for subsequent developments" (Skocpol 1995: 106). Public policies, historical institutionalists argue, are rarely cut out of whole cloth; rather they typically are pieced together out of preexisting approaches. Institutional developments can thus be said to create what could be called a "policy legacy," or a store of tested approaches to public problems. As March and Olsen state, "the chance fluctuations of history change the baselines of the next step of the historical process . . . Policies, once adopted, are embedded into institutions. They are associated with rules, expectations, and commitments" (1984: 745). These rules affect the behavior of future policy makers approaching the same problems.

Policies and institutions also may shape subsequent

political developments by serving as negative examples, providing an opportunity for what Heclo (1974) calls "political learning." Perceptions of past policy successes or failures are the stuff of political debate around "what to do" about a particular problem. Heclo suggests that, "policy invariably builds on policy, either in moving forward with what has been inherited, or amending it, or repudiating it" (1974: 315). For example, recent welfare reforms sought to address the perceived failure of the poverty policies of the New Deal and the Great Society. These policies, some have argued, failed because they encouraged dependence rather than self-sufficiency among aid recipients. Thus, new policies are expected not only to address the problems of poverty but also this motivational failure of past policies. Addressing this perceived failure has structured the debate over what should be done and driven reform proposals and policy changes. McDonagh (1998) makes a similar argument when examining the legacy of the Progressive Era. She claims that not only did the expansion of state capacities in this period lay the institutional groundwork for the New Deal, but also that the repressive racial policies of the period (for example, anti-miscegenation laws and the post-war repression of blacks in the South) encouraged the development of the Civil Rights Movement in the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties.

Weir and Skocpol argue that, "policy making is inherently a historical . . . process in which all actors consciously build on and/or react against previous governmental efforts for dealing with the same . . . problems" (1985: 119). Policy makers, and the public, "learn" from the past responses to particular public problems. Policy successes and failures thus influence how people interpret the social world, framing subsequent policy debates and affecting the perceptions of participants in the policy process and shaping the "cognitive processes of social order" (Pierson 1993: 611). However, as the examples of institutional development discussed above demonstrate, the determination of success or failure is itself an inherently political process.

Ideas and Institutional Development

Although these institutional and learning effects of policy legacies are important for understanding institutional development, such development does not occur within an intellectual vacuum. It is not simply an inexorable structural development with each institutional development defining all subsequent developments. Nor are policies and institutions simply the result of accumulated political knowledge of what works and what does not.

Neither are intellectual developments simply the result of what Skocpol calls "policy feedbacks" whereby "new policies affect the social identities, goals, and capabilities of groups that subsequently struggle or ally in politics" (1992: 58). In fact, intellectual and ideological processes are central to institutional developments and are defined at least in part by their own internal dynamic.

Particular ideas have cultural salience and authority constituting what Fiorina terms "informal institutions" themselves (1995). For example, Converse argues (1964) that ideas exercise a limiting power in political life, especially for elites. Holding to particular "belief systems" thus rules out particular policy options in favor of logical and psychological consistency.¹¹

Ideas are also central to the existence of institutions and to the processes of institutional development because institutions must be legitimated in order to survive. Rogers Smith (1995) suggests that the existence of an institution necessarily implies a system of meaning defined by the human participants in its reproduction. As

¹¹ Early public opinion research showed that these ideological constraints were of little importance to most Americans outside of the political elite. What these early investigations found was not that Americans are strong liberals but rather that they have a commitment to abstract democratic principles, (of for example, tolerance) but that "when these broad principles are translated into more specific propositions . . . consensus breaks down completely" (Prothro and Grigg 1960: 286) and the commitment to the abstract principle gives way in the face of practical application.

Kloppenberq puts it:

Any institution survives culturally only as long as it can sustain its legitimacy in the face of challenges. . . . We cannot understand politics without understanding institutions. But we can not understand institutions without understanding the ideas, the purposes, of those historical persons who created them, and without understanding the broader cultural values that sustained the institutions and made it possible for them to persist (1995: 128).

Thus, an examination of the legitimating ideas behind institutions and the cultural context in which they arise is necessary for understanding both the direction and nature of institutional developments.

Cultural Patterns and Institutional Development

Tocqueville argued that when trying to understand nineteenth-century America, "too much importance is attached to laws and too little to mores," or the "habits, opinions, usages, and beliefs" of the American people (1969: 308). Specifically, he contended that both the American belief in equality and the rough "equality of conditions" in America defined what we might call the American culture and that this cultural context was central to understanding the existence, strength and character of American democratic institutions. Since Tocqueville, other theorists of American politics, notably Hartz (1955), have taken up the claim that a shared American culture influences political

and thus institutional developments. Hartz claims that liberalism in America constitutes a "way of life" or a sort of unspoken and dogmatic ideological consensus. Many observers have in fact found a widespread commitment to the individualistic values of liberalism and capitalism in the American public, including beliefs in an ethic of self-reliance, individual self-determination, and in the supposedly meritocratic structure of American capitalism (Ladd 1993, McClosky 1984, McClosky and Zaller 1984, Sniderman and Brody 1977).¹² This liberal culture, Galston (1989) argues, exercises power over political developments by preventing the development of institutions based on particular conceptions of "the good." Specifically, such a cultural milieu limits the depth of support for any redistributionist policy (J. Hochschild 1981). Clearly then culture places important constraints on American political development.

However, a conception of American culture as either monologically liberal or as unproblematically committed to equality fails to capture the complexity of the American context. In fact, Tocqueville recognized that not only

¹² Rawls (1989) argues that some sort of "overlapping consensus" on central political issues (such as how power is legitimately contested) is necessary for the existence of any free society. This consensus, he argues, can never be particularly robust or include an

equality but also a race-based system of slavery defined the American experience, and he argued, threatened its peaceful existence. Moreover, contrary to the claims of theorists of the liberal society hypothesis, institutions based on particular conceptions of the good have a long history in America. For example, Jim Crow laws in the South were established on the presumption that racially separate institutions were socially desirable while, on the other hand, modern affirmative action programs specifically seek to advance the counter claim that an integrated society is morally desirable.

As Swidler argues, "all real cultures contain diverse, often conflicting symbols, rituals, stories, and guides to action" (1986: 277). These symbols change over time and can be variously employed to legitimate particular institutions. For instance, conflicting notions of what constitutes "family values" play important rhetorical roles in current debates over welfare policy. Thus, although traditionalists argue that the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program was anti-family because it "weakened the marriage bond and promoted fatherlessness among welfare recipients" (Popenoe 1996: 221), liberals argue that a true appreciation for family values requires the acceptance of alternative family forms and "that we leave it to each of us to work

agreement on the nature of the good life without the use of force.

through what it means to be lovers and parents, rather than have the state impose limits" (Cornell 1998a: 129).

Thus, in order to understand the influence of "culture" on institutional developments (and vice versa) an understanding of the inherently conflictual and political nature of culture is called for. If we accept the idea that "American politics is best seen as expressing the interaction of multiple political traditions, including *liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive forms of Americanism*" (R. Smith 1993: 550), then it becomes apparent that political actors have at their disposal a variety of means to legitimate particular institutions.¹³ In fact, rather than serving as a simple determinant of development, culture provides a "'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems" (Swidler 1986: 273). Alternative legitimating ideologies are thus available to political actors at specific historic moments. For example, racist doctrines were available to justify the inferior education of African Americans at the same historical moment that Progressive doctrines were available to legitimate the direct election of United States

¹³ Although there is some evidence of increasing "attitude consistency" in the electorate (Nie, et al. 1976), most Americans have a set of beliefs that rely on a variety of justifications (Campbell, et al. 1960, Converse 1964, Feldman and Zaller 1992) depending on the

Senators. Moreover, the variety of legitimate institutions and "the very tendency of institutions to persist through time implies that many different rules of legitimate action, many different systems of meaning, will be operative at any given moment" (Skowronek 1995: 94, see also Friedland and Alford 1991). Thus, diverse cultural and political traditions, and the mores associated with them, play an important causal role in institutional developments as those institutions themselves provide a base of authority for particular ideas.¹⁴

The Culture of Fatherhood and Institutional Development

Changes in the American gender order and the various norms and practices of fatherhood, constitute an important organizing element for the cultural tool kit that political actors utilize in developing American poor relief policies and institutions. The gender order at any given time is both a cultural artifact and set of institutionalized

policy and the population that it affects (Prothro and Grigg 1960).

¹⁴ Swidler argues that the role of culture in shaping action varies in relation to the stability of a particular society. Specifically, she claims that:

within established modes of life, culture provides a repertoire of capacities from which varying strategies of action may be constructed. Thus culture appears to shape action only in that the cultural repertoire limits the available range of strategies of action. . . . In unsettled periods, in contrast, cultural meanings are more highly articulated and explicit, because they model patterns of action that do not 'come naturally' (1986: 284).

practices exercising an important influence over the development of policies and other institutions. One important aspect of the gender order is the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood. Because the gender order at any given time includes not only dominant practices and beliefs but also alternative and subordinate ones, various, even conflicting, cultural conceptions of fatherhood are available as potential "tools" for policy makers. However, because political and social elites are rarely promoters of alternative practices of gender, the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood tend to be expressed in the institutional arrangements of poor relief. This public expression of gender helps to reproduce certain practices of fatherhood, as policies, once implemented, create selective incentives for and lend legitimacy to particular family forms and gender practices.

THEORIES OF GENDER

The gender order changes in response both to institutional developments and cultural change. Gender is not, therefore, a straightforward reflection of biological sex, it has a history. Various sociological and psychological theories have been advanced to explain the cultural reproduction of gender. In this section, I examine

three of the major schools of thought on the reproduction of gender: psychoanalytic theory, sex-role theory, and social constructivist theories. I argue that a workable theory of gender must account for the historically specific and changing nature of the gender order, the relationship of specific practices of gender to other structures of power and to bodily difference, and finally the role of the emotional self in determining individual variation in the practice of gender.

Psychology and Gender

Various psychoanalytic theorists argue that the personal experience of gender is constructed through the emotionally important relationships of early childhood. Freud posited the existence of an "Oedipal" desire on the part of the boy to supplant the father as the mother's love object. The associated guilt feelings that these desires engender are at the root of modern masculine identity (Freud 1962: 88-96, and 1966: 320-338). Feminist object relations theorists assert that gender is constructed in the psychological adjustments that children make to the sexual division of labor in families. These theorists argue that the gender division of labor in parenting assigning child care to women reproduces a situation in which women have a

greater capacity for emotional connection with others and the nurturing capacities of men are systematically repressed (Chodorow 1978, Dinnerstein 1976). Masculinity, these theorists argue, thus comes to be defined in opposition to the qualities of mothers. Thus manhood, and by extension fatherhood, comes to be defined, through the rejection of the nurturing practices that make up the typical boy's experience of motherhood, as "that which is not-mother, not-female, not feminine" (Di Stefano 1991: 46).

By attempting to account for the role of the gender division of labor in parenting in the construction of a gendered identity, object relations theorists thus offer an explanation of how "the social is present in the person" (Connell 1994: 34). Nonetheless, it is dependent on the historically specific condition of the absence of fathers from the household and from nurturing. As such, these psychoanalytic approaches have difficulty accounting for variation and deviation from these patterns. In addition, such an approach has difficulty accounting for those who do not fit the expected patterns of socialization. For example, object relations theorists have no way to explain girls who do not identify with their mothers and who choose to live their lives as "tomboys" with a more masculine identity (Carr 1998). Such an approach tends to collapse parent/child relations of different social situations into

one, describing a universal and static human condition. As Butler argues, a psychoanalytic approach, while stressing the social construction of gender, "tells a story that constructs a discrete gender identity and discursive location that remains relatively fixed" (1990b: 329). More recently, psychoanalytic theorists have stressed the importance of recognizing that individual responses to social structures are varied and that many different outcomes to the struggle to deal with the emotional conflicts of early childhood are possible, even for the same person over the course of their life.¹⁵ Nevertheless, both the Freudian and object relations theoretical understandings of gender fall short when it comes to explaining change and variation in the patterns of gender.

Gender as Sex-Role

A related theory of gender sees masculinity and femininity as "sex-roles" developed in response to early psychological influences that are themselves functional to the reproduction of the social order. In his study of American kinship structures, Parsons suggests that the functional needs of the social system dictate that children

¹⁵ See Lupton and Barclay (1997: 29) for a summary of these approaches.

will respond emotionally "in relatively definite and uniform ways" (1949: 255) creating a particular division of labor in the family. Thus, daughters, he argues in terms similar to those of the object relations theorists, develop into mothers and wives through their identification with their same sex caregivers while a son "revolts against identification with his mother in the name of masculinity" rejecting femininity to develop individuality (Ibid.: 258). The sex-roles that develop in this context reproduce themselves by becoming "imbedded in the psychology of adults as well as in that of children" (Ibid.).

Some theorists see the development of sex roles as a response to "an innate psychological need to develop sex role identity, the individual is preprogrammed to learn a traditional sex role as part of normal psychological development" (Pleck 1981: 4). In addition, these "preprogrammed" roles are seen as constrained by the necessity of their functionality.

Structural analysis clearly shows that, if the United States is to remain and develop further as a democratic, urbanized, industrial society, with a large measure of equality of opportunity, the range of possible family structures which are compatible with its type of society is very narrow (Parsons 1949: 273).

This sort of sex-role theory explicitly naturalizes and decontextualizes the family forms of modern middle class life. In this theoretical paradigm, there is little room for change or variation in family structures or practices

(other than the dysfunctional).

If role theory is to be useful as a theory of gender it must account for the power relations determining the imposition of certain gender norms and critically evaluate the prescriptive power of social forces. Thompson and Pleck (1987) undertake just such an appropriation of "sex-role" theory through an emphasis on the "external" reproduction of prescriptive role norms. Thus, when analyzing masculinity, they use the term *male role* to refer to the social expectations facing men in modern society. The male role is the "social norms that prescribe and proscribe what men should feel and do" (Ibid.: 26). Gender, they argue, should be understood as a set of roles determined by social forces and performed in response to the expectations of others. Nevertheless, even if such an appropriation of role theory avoids the most deterministic elements of Parsonian functionalism, such a theory of gender necessarily flattens differences among biological males and females in order to describe socially prescriptive roles (Kimmel 1987b).

Both Parsons' role theory and the critical appropriation of it exaggerate the prescriptive power of social forces while ignoring the political, and varied, nature of gender (Carr 1998, Connell 1995). The problem with seeing gender as a sex role, according to Ferree, is that it fails to:

encompass the actual variation in men's and women's lives - individually over the life course and structurally in the historical context of race and class. The role approach also obscures the dimension of power and the ongoing processes of conflict associated with change (1990: 868).

While people do often act as they are expected to, they also sometimes act at odds with those expectations. For example, men abandon their children despite the social expectation that they will provide them with support. At the same time, neither can it be said that those who do provide support do so only because they are expected to by society. In fact, while role theory tends toward a functionalist and ahistorical account of the gendered division of labor in the family, variation in the practices of gender reveals a more complex and even contradictory reality (see Collier 1995: 58).

Bodies and the Politics of Gender

Bodies do not simply determine gender. The practice in some Native American cultures of allowing people with male genitals to live as women, through the recognition of the category of "berdache," highlights the way in which gender has no necessary relation to bodily structures (Kessler and

McKenna 1978, Lorber 1994: 17).¹⁶ Too, transsexuals maintain that they feel themselves to be of a different gender than their physical genitals would suggest and they go on to participate in social interaction as a person of the "opposite" gender, with varying degrees of success and acceptance (Kessler and McKenna 1978). It would seem then that gender is something we "do" by "attributing" a particular gender to others on the basis of certain accepted and expected roles, it is thus a "social construction" (Ibid.) or even a "performance" (Butler 1990a). Nevertheless, gender is not as arbitrary as these accounts imply.

A wholly semiotic or cultural account of gender is no more tenable than a biological reductionist one. The surface on which cultural meanings are inscribed is not featureless, and it does not stay still. Bodies in their own right as bodies, do matter (Connell 1995: 51).

Thus, while gender is a social construction or a set of social practices, it is constructed in relation to the differential physical capacities of bodies.

Although role theorists and object relations theorists are correct to note the importance of biological sex in the reproduction of gender, where both approaches misunderstand gender is in their common assumption of a uniform

¹⁶ Forgey summarizes the reports of the berdache institution among the following Native American tribes: Assinboine, Dakota, Cree, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Mandan, Hidatsa, Omaha, Caddo, Kansa, Sioux,

relationship between bodies and gender. Nevertheless, while the limitations, both political and analytic, inherent in such "essentialist" approaches to understanding gender are real, bodies must be taken into account in any reasonable theory of gender.¹⁷ Beauvoir acknowledged the centrality of the body in her analysis of women's oppression.

Biological considerations are extremely important. . . . For, the body being the instrument of our grasp upon the world, the world is bound to seem a very different thing when apprehended in one manner or another. . . . Biological facts . . . are one of the keys to the understanding of woman. But I deny that they establish for her a fixed and inevitable destiny. They are insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes (Beauvoir 1952: 36).

Any attempt to theorize gender in relation to bodies must recognize that bodies are not static and unchanging determinants of gender, for they age, change and are constituted of great diversity. As Connell contends:

bodies cannot be understood as a neutral medium of social practice. Their materiality matters. They will do certain things and not others. Bodies are *substantively* in play in social practices such as sport, labour and sex (1995: 58).

Thus, while gender is constructed through social relationships it is not simply written on a disembodied blank slate. Lactating mothers have a different physical relationship, because of the capacities of their bodies, to

and Pawnee (1975: 3).

¹⁷ The danger inherent in relating bodies to gender in a theoretical sense is that, just as in previous theories of gender, categories can take on an unchanging definition assuming a "sameness across places and times" (Ferguson 1993: 82), naturalizing gender

their children than do even the most physically nurturing fathers. The engagement of fathers in the daily activities of childcare and nurturing also vary with regard to physical capacities and, perhaps most importantly, stamina. While biology may not be destiny, it is not irrelevant either. Gender is a social practice, but a practice that is "constructed" in relation to bodily difference and bodily structures.

As a social practice, gender is deeply affected by other social practices and power relations. Racial, class and sexual relationships, for example, are fundamental in the ongoing construction of gender, and thus "to understand gender . . . we must constantly go beyond gender" (Connell 1995: 76). Thus, economic opportunity and racial prejudices constantly affect the gendered practices of fathers in American society. Those fathers who are able to fulfill the expectations of breadwinning are "good fathers" while those who either cannot or will not contribute financially are "deadbeats," their children "fatherless." However, the opportunities needed to fulfill these expectations of good fatherhood are distributed unequally within a context of racial discrimination. In public discourse, Roberts argues, "the absent Black father is the antithesis of the ideal of the wage-earning husband" (1998: 154). The source of black

hierarchies in the attempt.

father absence is often linked explicitly to sexual irresponsibility drawing on the longstanding racist assumption of the "supposed sexual lust of black men," (Morone 1996: 34, see also Bederman 1995). As the public uproar over New Jersey Governor Whitman's offhand comment in 1995 that black teen boys played a game called "jewels in the crown" where they sought to impregnate as many women as possible demonstrates.¹⁸ This public discourse, which frames black men as irresponsible fathers, works to disguise and divert attention from the economic inequalities that prevent many black men from meeting the conventional male expectation of financial support of families. Thus, understanding the hegemonic patterns of paternity requires an understanding of the specific institutional and cultural contexts in which they develop.

GENDER AND THE STATE

Although state policies and institutions also play an important part in reproducing the hegemonic social practices of gender, this role is controversial. In fact, many observers of the modern family have concluded that the modern state, by regulating gender, has intruded upon what

¹⁸ Jenks (1991) points out the importance of the judgment of sexual and reproductive behavior in the public construction of the

had previously been a private realm, protected from community meddling and control. For example, Lasch claims that the "socialization of reproduction" in the nineteenth-century eroded the possibility of the isolation of a private sphere for the family, and that now "the modern world intrudes at every point and obliterates its privacy" (1977: xxiii), while Aries dates to the eighteenth-century the development of a state that "was loath to accept the fact that there were certain areas beyond its sphere of control and influence" (1979: 31). Donzelot (1979) too, argues that the increasingly medicalized "social policing" of families in the eighteenth-century created a situation in which the privacy of the modern family became contingent upon the acceptance of publicly defined norms. As Arendt puts it, "in the modern world, the social and the political realms are much less distinct . . . (and) housekeeping and all matters pertaining formally to the private sphere of the family have become collective concerns" (1958: 33). Phillippe Meyer goes even further in asserting that "the entire social and geographical terrain has become a realm where official recognition is necessary" (1983: 27).

Despite these protestations of privacy lost, of independence subordinated, families and the gender relations within them have always been the objects of political

category of the "underclass."

action. In Colonial America, Demos argues, because families were of the central importance as places of business, schools for the young and even as rudimentary welfare institutions:

the entire community had an interest in the smooth performance of these various tasks, (therefore) it seemed only natural that there should be a certain amount of governmental supervision over the family. When a given family failed in some area . . . the authorities might decide to intervene (1970: 184).

Dingwall and Eekelaar date the state concern with caring for dependents in England to the Tudor Poor Law and note that "the price of public assistance was the scrutiny of private conduct" (1988: 344). As Gottlieb puts it, "states ancient and modern have pursued policies based on assumptions about the state's interest in the family" (1993: 239).¹⁹ The state regulation of family life is not a purely modern phenomenon, but rather has a significant historical precedent that has been largely ignored in contemporary denunciations of public regulation of the family.

The American Mythology of Family Privacy

This persistent mythology of family privacy in a hazily

¹⁹ The concern of ancient political theorists with the family is well known. Both Plato, in Book V of the *Republic* (Bloom 1968), and Aristotle, in Books I and II of the *Politics* (Barker 1958), saw the crucial importance of the nature of the family in the life of the *polis*. Aristotle's critique of the communal unity of political and family life

defined period before state intervention continues to be given political credence.²⁰ Nelson (1985) makes a persuasive case that the ideological sources of this modern mythology are twofold. This mythology is thus founded on both the liberal and individualist roots of the American political tradition and the Victorian ideology of separate, gendered spheres of activity. Specifically, in the nineteenth-century, an American mythology of "rugged individualism" and *laissez faire* dominated the intellectual scene making the assertion of any positive role for government regulation difficult (Beard 1931, Fine 1966, Girvetz 1966). In addition, the separate spheres ideology of the Victorian era assigned the maintenance of morality to women and the regulation of family life to quasi-public charity organizations usually staffed by women (Baker 1984, Welter 1966). Both justify a clear demarcation between the public and private, between the masculine and the feminine, each with its proper range of concerns and legitimate participants.

However, this dividing line has never been clearly drawn in practice. From the colonial period, governments in

advocated in the *Republic* is at the crux of his disagreement with Plato.

²⁰ For example, Minow argues that the Supreme Court's recent construction of a constitutionally protected right to family privacy is really a papering over of its prior recognition of the power of states to intervene in family life by emphasizing the instances in which this power has been *limited* in adjudicating majority/minority disputes (1987).

America have been involved in business activity (Hartz 1948), public poor relief (Leiby 1967, Stafford 1941, Trattner 1979) and, as I show here, family relations. It is my contention that, in fact, by regulating reproductive behavior, giving legal definition to families, controlling access to labor markets and mandating standards of appropriate parent/child relations, the state plays a constitutive role in creating and reproducing the social patterns of gender and further that this state role in the social patterns of gender is *not* a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon (see also Connell 1987).

Regulating Families

The state role in constituting or forming the social patterns of gender extends from setting the basic rules by which families are recognized to the more explicit regulation of family forms and internal family functioning. At a minimum, "the state is responsible for the background rules that affect people's domestic behaviors" (Olsen 1985: 837). For example, laws uphold official recognition of who is married and who is considered a child of a specific person or persons. In so doing "the state defines and reinforces specific roles and a particular hierarchy within the family" (Ibid.: 846). For instance, the shift in child

custody decisions from the practice of awarding custody to fathers based on their property rights to that of awarding custody to mothers based on the belief that children are most in need of mothers during their "tender years" affected the relative power of women within families. But the state power over families has been exercised even more directly, especially concerning the "failed" families of the poor (Grubb and Lazerson 1982). Thus, for example, during the colonial period "public authorities generally dismantled families on relief, placing the mother and father in service and indenturing the children" (Vandepol 1982: 222).²¹ As late as the eighteenth-century, elaborate rules were developed for dealing with the problems of "bastardy," and, in New Jersey, for example, "fornication" was the most common offense, after assault and battery, on the court dockets (Leiby 1967: 13). Men convicted of fornication under the 1704 "Act for the suppression of Immorality" were held liable for the support of their illegitimate children under the poor law of New Jersey (Allinson 1776: 4, Leiby 1967: 13). Clearly state actors, and their private charity

²¹ In New Jersey, for example, overseers of the poor had the authority to supervise the care of illegitimate children, and to "separate 'neglected' children from their parents" (Leiby 1967: 10). The power to dismantle poor families survived as the dominant method of dealing with poor children until the early part of the twentieth-century. See for example Katz' discussion of the break-up of the "Sullivan" family by poor relief workers in Philadelphia in the early part of the twentieth-century (1983: 17-54). For more on the "farming out" of the poor to local families for work, see Leiby 1978: 35-47 and

agents, have been deeply implicated in the "private" realm of the family and thus in the social practices of gender for far longer than is commonly believed.

By the late nineteenth-century, a complex political apparatus was developed with the institutional capacity and power to positively regulate the inner workings of families, especially those of the lower classes. Poor relief, administered by private philanthropies in many cases, came to be made "conditional on a painstaking investigation of needs by delving into the life of the poor recipient" (Donzelot 1979: 68).²² Investigators used the information that they collected to root out the "causes" of pauperization, mandating with whom recipients could associate in order to preserve a moral home environment, auditing home spending to eliminate "profligacy," even mandating regular church attendance and continuing the practice of breaking up failed families (see Katz 1983 and 1986).

While Donzelot (1979) and Aries (1979) argue that the regulation of families was part of a newly developed, perhaps even totalizing, "policing" power of states with regard to families, Keller argues that what happened in the

Trattner 1979: 14-27.

²² Katz (1983) shows how the semi-public bureaucracies of "scientific philanthropy" first developed the institutional capacities for this investigatory power.

nineteenth-century was simply that "an old inclination to regulate public mores found a new life in the age of American industrialization" (1977: 507).²³ The institutions of poor relief thus exhibited a renewed concern with "the formation and reformation of character" (Katz 1983: 204). Along with this renewed concern came a more clearly articulated administrative apparatus as Progressive reformers sought to eliminate child labor, regulate the wages and hours of women, mandate standards for child health, promote a system of juvenile justice, and ultimately, through the Mother's Pension movement, provide state support for full time homemaking (L. Gordon 1994, Leff 1973, P. Meyer 1983, Mink 1990, Sapiro 1986, Skocpol 1992, Vandepol 1982). Despite these important institutional developments, the intervention in the family and in the social practices of gender and reproduction, far from being an invention of the modern welfare state, actually predates its founding.

This active role for the state in gender and family life continues. Thus, even with a constitutional protection for personal and family privacy formally recognized by the Supreme Court, the American state still regulates and re-

²³ The concern with regulating the moral life of aid recipients is commonplace because, as Offe argues, the support of public goods like a welfare system in a democracy is dependent upon "a sufficiently binding conception of durable collective identity" which makes it possible to

forms the sexual division of labor within the family as it sets the background rules of marriage and sexuality. For example, during the Depression of the nineteen-thirties women were excluded from Federal employment so that the breadwinner/homemaker division of labor within the family could be given added institutional support. Moreover, the Aid to Dependent Children program (later Aid to Families with Dependent Children) incorporated the moral content of the Progressive Era Mothers' Pensions. Thus ADC provided state support to mothers on the condition of their being engaged in full-time mothering and not having a "man in the house" who could provide economically for them or their children (Bell 1965, Orloff 1988). In *Bowers v. Hardwick* 1986, the Supreme Court reasserted the power of state actors to regulate sexual conduct between adults, a power which the 105th Congress acted upon as it passed the "Defense of Marriage Act" officially defining marriage as a monogamous heterosexual union. Although these are particularly controversial examples of the use of state power in the reforming of gender relations, Olsen argues that "most people today support a certain level of protective intervention by the state" in families, particularly in those that are seen to be dysfunctional (1985: 842). Less controversial state programs thus teach parenting skills and

trust that aid will not go to the morally unworthy (1987: 523).

enforce child support collection while programs that are more controversial impose a "family cap" on public assistance to poor women in an attempt to alter their reproductive choices. Nonetheless, the ideology of family privacy continues to exist within a context of family and gender regulation, masking the role of the state in maintaining a particular set of gendered power relations.

State Power and Family Values

Far from being a neutral expression of support for poor families, public welfare policies thus express an idea of the "good family" and the social practices that such a vision entails. In so doing, "public social provision . . . shapes gender relationships . . . and contributes to the formation and mobilization of specific identities and interests" (Orloff 1993: 303-4). For example, women's full-time homemaking and mothering have historically been privileged by social policy. Social policy has become a means by which policy makers can communicate their own vision of what constitutes good "family values."

Still, despite the important role that state power can play through the expressive or prescriptive role of public policy, such policies do not have the power to effect family change apart from broader social and economic forces.

Glendon argues that:

A country's law . . . both affects and is affected by the culture in which it arises, and though the effects of law are modest, they are not always trivial. . . . It seems likely that when law is in harmony with other social forces, it will synergistically produce a greater effect in combination with them than it could on its own. But when the messages communicated through law run counter to those prevailing elsewhere in the culture, the effect of laws on ideas and behavior must remain small (1989: 311-312).

As Ellwood puts it, "changes in the structure of the family are probably the result of some sizable and largely unstoppable changes in social and economic patterns" (1988: 46). For example, the greater participation of women in the paid workforce has meant that women are no longer as dependent on men to be providers. There is some evidence that this changing economic pattern may be effecting the extent of fathers involvement in childcare activities (Barnett and Baruch 1987). These changes while affected by law and policy also have an independent development.

Public policy is most important in creating a public mythology of family life, which is then authoritatively communicated to the recipients of public assistance. Family life, Gillis argues, is the location onto which we "map our deepest moral values" (1996: 5) and policy makers put forth a vision of a family for us to "live by" with particular values and practices which are often at odds with the families that we actually "live with." Thus, while public welfare policies may express the family values of policy

makers and vocal constituencies, these policies can have only a limited effect in changing the family practices of recipients. Nonetheless, this "discursive dimension" (Fraser 1989) of public welfare policy is important. Government policy still can "play a leadership role in the evolution of social attitudes" (M. Bane and Jargowsky 1988: 220) and, at a minimum, public policy is an authoritative expression of the dominant norms and practices of the gender order.

Thus while liberals might hope for a state which is neutral with respect to what constitutes a good family, policy makers are faced not with the question of *whether* the state should support a particular set of gendered power relations but rather *which* gender relations should receive state sanction.²⁴ To oppose a particular welfare policy, as an attorney for the National Organization for Women opposed the New Jersey Family Cap, on the grounds that "we don't think it should turn into a vehicle for social engineering" (Davis, quoted in Gladwell 1993: 31) shows a serious misunderstanding of the character of welfare legislation. As McWilliams suggests, it is not possible to "legislate without moral effect" (1973: 108) and, in fact, welfare legislation is always "social engineering" and is a site for

²⁴ Cornell states the liberal position most strongly when she argues that "the state should have no right to privilege or impose one

contesting the authoritative expression of the practices of gender.²⁵

CONCLUSION

The institutions of public welfare in America have developed within a context defined by both prior institutional developments and the changing order of gender. Specifically, the changing nature of the hegemonic public idea of fatherhood has both been expressed in welfare policies and shaped by those same policies. The fact that public fatherhood has changed belies the notion that gender is a simple reflection of biological necessities. Nevertheless, while bodies do not simply determine gender practices, I have argued here that bodies are not simply a blank slate for the inscription of those practices. Masculinity and fathering thus do not exist only as cultural constructions, nor are they simply roles to be played out on some social stage defined by rule structures and the expectations of others. Gender, as I have defined it in this chapter, is rather a set of social relations and

form of family structure or sexuality over another" (1998b: 199).

²⁵ Whether or not P. Davis (1994) is right when she states the liberal argument that the American constitutional system "forbids state action that has no purpose other than moral standard-setting," such standard setting is almost always attached to other purposes (e.g., "fiscal responsibility"). In any case, moral standard-setting is an

practices that relate to bodily differences and bodily structures.

Since gender consists of a set of social practices and power relations, it is necessarily an object of political practice. I argued here that while many observers have lamented the loss of privacy faced by the modern family, state power has long been utilized to support certain practices of gender and not others. This state role extends from setting the basic rules for the formation of families to the positive regulation of parent/child relationships. Families, especially those of the poor, have been regulated and monitored by public policy makers and their private proxies. Moreover, public policies constitute an authoritative expression of the dominant values of gender and family life. In the remaining chapters, the extent to which this authoritative voice plays a shaping role in gender relations will be uncovered in the examination of how public policy effects the construction of particular fathering practices.

important outcome of state policy regardless of whether or not it is the intended object of legislation.

CHAPTER TWO: CONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC FATHER: POOR RELIEF IN COLONIAL NEW JERSEY, 1663-1775

As I have shown in the previous chapter, public policies addressing poverty serve both to express and to reproduce the dominant norms and practices of the gender order. Specifically, it is my contention that poor relief policies constitute a significant site onto which the hegemonic ideas and practices of fatherhood are mapped. Moreover, such policies constitute what I have called *public fatherhood* both in their authoritative expression of a particular set of ideas of fatherhood and in their role in the reproduction of the hegemonic ideas and practices of paternity.

In this chapter, I show how culturally dominant conceptions of fatherhood and masculinity in seventeenth and eighteenth-century America were embodied in and legitimated by the poor relief and other related legislation of colonial New Jersey.²⁶ In order to show how particular conceptions

²⁶ For this chapter, I collected and analyzed all of the New Jersey poor laws and legislation that served to regulate fatherhood for the period from 1663-1775. Laws and public acts included were: those of the Proprietary governments of East and West Jersey, and those adopted by the General Assembly of the Royal Colony of New Jersey. Laws, grants, and charters from 1663 to 1702 were identified from Hood's (1905) *Index of Colonial and State Laws of New Jersey* and collected from Leaming and Spicer (1881[1751]). In addition, P. Edsall's (1937) introduction to the *Journal of the Courts of Common Right and Chancery of East New Jersey, 1683-1702*, provided further information on the laws

of fatherhood are expressed in this legislative record I first examine the nature of *hegemonic fatherhood* in colonial America. I argue that dominant conceptions of paternity in the colonial period owed a great deal to the feudal and patriarchal family order of Western Europe that persisted into at least the mid-eighteenth-century. Next, I argue that the institutions of poor relief in England, first codified in the reforms of 1601, provided an important model for relief in colonial America, a model itself defined in important ways by a patriarchal cultural milieu. It is my contention that poor relief in colonial New Jersey developed within this dual cultural and institutional context. I show that through the institutions of poor relief, authorities in colonial New Jersey constructed a *public fatherhood* that embodied the dominant expectations of fathers. Specifically, fathers were expected, as heads of their households, to manage the "business" of their families while

of this early period. For the period from 1703 to 1775, laws were identified and collected from Bush's (1977, 1980, 1982, 1986) *Laws of the Royal Colony of New Jersey* and compared with the texts available in Allinson (1776) and Nevill (1752). These document collections are considered the standard and authoritative sources for New Jersey legislation in this period (Axel-Lute 1998). The following index headings from Hood (1905) and Bush (1986) were used to identify legislation relevant to this chapter: Adultery, Adulterers, Apprentices, Death for children who smite or curse their parents, Fornication, Illegitimacy, Immoral Behavior, Immoralities, Infanticide, Marriage Regulations, Overseer of the Poor, Paupers, Poor, Poor Law, Poor Rates, Poor Relief, Poorhouses, Servants, Servitude, Slaves, Vagrants, Workhouses, and the subheadings to each of these general headings. For records of the local application of these laws, I examined the *Town Book of Hopewell, New Jersey* (1721-1800) and the *Records of the Town of Newark, New Jersey* (1864).

instructing the next generation both morally and practically.

Poor laws and related colonial legislation in New Jersey reproduced paternal authority in a variety of ways. Relief institutions and laws provided legitimacy for the patriarchal organization of family life. Moreover, where fathers were found by the community to have failed in their duties, the laws and institutions of the colonial social order replaced paternal authority with public authority. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, the power of hegemonic norms and practices of fatherhood can not be all encompassing, rather subordinate and resistant patterns of paternity also are present. Thus, the explicit regulation of subordinate fathers and the implicit regulation of those resisting hegemonic norms of paternal authority are both important in determining the nature of public fatherhood in any period.

In colonial New Jersey, those fathers who were found to violate the dominant patriarchal norms of society were punished in a variety of ways, from corporal punishment and fines to the loss of their children. At the same time, slave laws determined the ability of both enslaved and free African American men, and to a lesser extent Native Americans and those of mixed race, to be effective heads of households by limiting their access to property and other

resources. Finally, the colonial law of New Jersey provides a record of a communal concern with a general decline in patriarchal authority, especially after 1750. This concern was expressed in legislation that addressed the dangers to the patriarchal family order presented by the free movement of single men. Colonial poor laws in New Jersey thus expressed a public fatherhood defined by hegemonic conceptions of paternity through both the positive mandate of fatherhood practices and the regulation of subordinate fathers and those men who resisted patriarchal authority.

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD IN COLONIAL AMERICA

In the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries, even as Americans left behind the aristocratic order of Britain to settle a new land, the dominant norms and practices of family life continued to be organized around the patriarchal norms of the feudal past (Carnes 1989: 107-113, LaRossa 1997: 24-26). Thus, although Hartz (1955) asserts that the defining characteristic of American political development is the absence of a feudal past, such a past was in fact present in the patriarchal family relationships dominant in the New World.²⁷ In the patriarchal families of the western

²⁷ Similarly, Orren shows that the feudal past influenced the labor relations of master and servant well into the industrial era in

European feudal order, fathers were held responsible for the production assigned to their families and their authority over the members of the family was recognized in law and custom. In addition, fathers were given wide-ranging authority to manage their households and to control the lives of their children, both minors and adults. Donzelot describes the father's position in this social order as one where "in compensation for his responsibility toward the authorities that bound him, the head of the family had a virtually discretionary power over those around him" (1979: 49). Thus, for example, under the *ancien regime* in France, fathers could "determine the children's careers, decide how the family members could be employed and which alliances would be contracted" (Ibid.) and they could rely on state authorities to reinforce and support their own familial authority (Hanley 1989, P. Meyer 1983). Further, political authorities could rely on the fact that the authority of fathers legitimated, by analogy, a political order defined by obligation and dependence.²⁸ In the colonial social

America such "that the labor system in place in the United States after the Civil War was in its essentials unchanged since the late Middle Ages" (1991: 4).

²⁸ The authority of fathers provided a ready cultural referent for the legitimation of European absolutist political authorities (see Filmer 1947[1680]). As Schochet puts it:

the seventeenth-century English family was indeed an authoritarian institution that was well suited to be the basis of an absolutist political doctrine and, furthermore . . . for the vast majority of Englishmen in this period, the patriarchal justification of the duty to obey the state was an accurate translation of their regular experiences into political terms (Schochet 1975: 64).

order too, families faced many of the same social expectations faced by families in the western European feudal order. Homes were also places of business, schools for the young, sites for vocational training, places of worship, houses of correction and relief institutions for the sick, the orphaned and the poor (Demos 1970: 183-184, see also Degler 1983 and Leiby 1967).

Many historians of both the American family and of American masculinity have noted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries, fathers were the dominant figures in American families (Carnes 1989, Demos 1970 and 1986, Greven 1970 and 1983, Kann 1998, Pleck 1987, Rotundo 1985). Fathers, as heads of households, occupied a crucial position within the community, having wide-ranging duties with respect to, and legal authority over, the other members of their household. American fathers, like their English counterparts, controlled the family resources, and were also considered the legitimate representative of the family in a social order that still assigned a central cultural and economic position to families (Greven 1970: 72-99).²⁹ Specifically, the hegemonic norms of fatherhood demanded that fathers: teach children a trade, provide basic

²⁹ In England too, "the household or family was still in the seventeenth century - as it was throughout the pre-industrial period - the primary unit of production and economic activity in society" (Schochet 1975: 69-70).

literacy, serve as a moral example, care for sick children, exercise control over family property and play a central part in the courtship and marriage plans of children (Demos 1986: 44-48, see also Greven 1970 and 1983, Pleck 1987, Rotundo 1985 and 1993: 11-12).³⁰ Moreover, because "work, indeed was a wholly natural extension of family life and merged imperceptibly with all its other activities" (Demos 1970: 183), fathers were a continual presence in family life (see also J. Bernard 1981, Demos 1986: 47). Although mothers had primary responsibility for nurturing young children and participated in the common work of the household, there was no formal notion of separate gendered spheres within the family, no area where the authority of mothers was recognized as paramount. In fact, American families, much like their British counterparts, were seen primarily as domains of legitimate masculine dominance, where fathers both had authority over the household and wide-ranging communal and intergenerational responsibilities.

COLONIAL AMERICAN POOR RELIEF

Poor relief policies in seventeenth and eighteenth-

³⁰ Gillis suggests that this pattern also held in Britain, where "Fathers were active in all the major nurturing and educational

century America were founded on an institutional and legal foundation that, like the dominant patriarchal family structure, was inherited from English feudal institutions. English poor relief, while first codified in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, dates from the feudal regulation of labor in the fourteenth century.³¹ These labor policies prohibited travel by the poor and assigned local responsibility for the relief of the poor (Piven and Cloward 1971: 15-17, Stone 1984: 30-37, Trattner 1979: 1-13). With the Elizabethan reforms of 1601, these policies were codified and a formal responsibility for relief was established.

Elizabethan poor laws exercised an important influence on relief provisions in the American colonies. In fact, colonial American poor relief policies and institutions were often adopted directly from the English poor law system (Breul and Diner 1980, Katz 1986: 12-21, Trattner 1979: 14-25). Most American poor laws shared with the Elizabethan codes the basic assumptions that poor relief was due only to

functions we now associate with motherhood" (1995: 5-6).

³¹ Piven and Cloward (1971) have argued that relief policies dating from this period to the present have served two important labor market functions, absorbing surplus labor, and depressing wages by creating a demeaning alternative to the labor market. While this may actually describe the effects of punitive relief systems, it does not explain what has caused such systems to develop. The fact that certain functions can be ascribed to particular institutions provides no necessary explanation for their development. Functionalist arguments, such as that of Piven and Cloward, conflate cause and effect, ascribe an untenable coherence and intentionality to social developments, and at the same time often discount the stated intentions of social actors (see

residents of a particular locality and that this relief was only the responsibility of those same residents.

Poverty, in eighteenth-century America, usually was seen as a temporary condition caused by personal calamity and an opportunity for the exercise of Christian charity (Trattner 1979). Local communities, churches and extended families were expected to provide for their less fortunate members and these local institutions were the primary means for delivering poor relief. Moreover, because of their central importance to the colonial social order, families were not strictly private arenas. Thus, "when a given family failed in some area . . . the authorities might decide to intervene" (Demos 1970: 184). The local system of self-help that made possible this intervention was predicated on the existence of cohesive communities with shared values; even with shared membership in a common church. In such small "face-to-face" communities, the calamities that temporarily caused poverty were widely known and the worthiness of recipients could be easily evaluated.³² To preserve the possibility of such relief, colonial poor law legislation often explicitly established residency requirements for the receipt of assistance, going

also, Sayer 1987: 123-5).

³² Demos (1994) shows how the constant warfare of the early American experience in Connecticut contributed to economic dislocations and how local and colonial-level governments provided encouragement for

so far, in many cases, as to require residents to post a bond when visitors came from outside of the community.

Colonial New Jersey's system of poor relief followed these Elizabethan poor law precedents in assigning local responsibility for the poor (Leiby 1967: 6, Stafford 1941: 19-24, Stanton 1934: 15). The Town of Newark, for example, in 1692 and annually from 1698 on, chose local officials "to take the Care of the Poor" of the town and collected taxes for their support much as did the "overseers of the poor" in Elizabethan England (*Records of the Town of Newark* 1864: 105, 111, hereafter cited as *Records*). Thus, although the first "Act for the Relief of the Poor" in 1709, recognized that "it is necessary that the Poor should be relieved by the Publick where they cannot relieve themselves, nor are not able to work for their Support" (Bush 1977: 55), the responsibility for these poor people was assigned by the law to each community. The 1709 law empowered localities to choose "overseers of the poor" with taxing authority who could assist the town poor thereby discouraging the poor from going "from Town to Town for Relief" (Bush 1977: 56). In 1740, 1758 and 1774 the legislature saw the need to explicitly set strict residency requirements for relief of the poor so that individual towns did not become

charitable contributions to offset these losses. For a description of this organization of charity in Boston, see Hofstadter (1971:26).

overburdened. The 1740 act specified that to be considered a resident a person would have to be either a native, an employed servant, or self-supporting for one year "in all which Cases such Persons shall be accounted legal Settlers where such Person or Persons last dwell, and be entitled to Relief, and not otherwise" (Bush 1977: 527, emphasis added). Only the residents of a locality were entitled to relief in that locality. These laws thus mandated that all other poor persons should be deported to their original place of residence.

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD IN COLONIAL NEW JERSEY

The laws and local relief institutions of colonial New Jersey embodied a public fatherhood defined by the hegemonic expectations and practices of paternity. Specifically laws regulated household relationships between masters and servants and between parents and children (both minors and adults). In the application of these laws, colonial legal authority *reproduced* paternal authority by mandating obedience and formalizing the powers of fathers. Poor laws and related legislation also constructed a *public father* capable of *replacing* paternal authority when particular fathers failed to meet their responsibilities. Through these laws and their application, the hegemonic fatherhood

of colonial New Jersey was reproduced.

Reproducing Paternal Authority

A variety of colonial laws and institutions in New Jersey reproduced paternal authority. Laws mandated obedience from both children and servants and reaffirmed the traditional authority of parents over their children's marriage choices. These laws and their application reinforced and reproduced the hegemonic conception of colonial fatherhood defined by a patriarchal authority inherited from the feudal cultural milieu of sixteenth and seventeenth-century England.

Enforcing the Obedience of Children

Among the earliest acts of the General Assembly was the mandate that the obedience of children to parents could be enforced by the state. Thus in 1668 and again in 1675 the colonial legislature provided that:

If any child or children above sixteen years of age, and of sufficient understanding, shall smite or curse their natural father or mother, except provoked thereunto, and forced for their safe preservation from death or maiming, upon the complaint or proof of the said father or mother, or either of them (and not otherwise) they shall be put to death (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 80 and 106).

Laws of this sort were common throughout the northern

colonies and although they were never actually invoked in any particular cases, their presence in the colonial legal code demonstrates a ready acceptance of the alignment of public power with familial authority structures.³³

While colonial law commanded obedience to both mothers and fathers, in the seventeenth-century most authorities recognized that the final authority rested with fathers. For example, both the patriarchalist Filmer (1947) and his liberal critic Locke (1960) recognized fathers as the final authority in families. Thus, while recognizing important limits on the power of parents over children and of husbands over wives (accepting the legitimacy of divorce for example), Locke still puts the final authority in the family in the hands of the father. Locke finds that "the last Determination, *i.e.* the Rule, should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the abler and the stronger" (1960: 321). While colonial laws stated a duty of obedience to parents, this common assumption that fathers have the final word in disputed matters was widespread and it is in this light that colonial admonitions of obedience to masters *and* mistresses should be evaluated.

³³ Demos (1970) found similar laws in the legal code of colonial Massachusetts. Although Mason reports similar laws in Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire, she erroneously asserts that "children outside of New England (were not) held to the Old Testament standard of obedience where infractions were theoretically punishable by death and in practice punished by public humiliation" (1994: 12).

Enforcing the Obedience of Servants

Along with the obedience of children, obedience to fathers as heads of households was also legally required of other household members, specifically apprentices and indentured servants. As Mason points out "the rights and obligations of fathers and masters overlapped" in their rights to control the labor of household members and in their obligations to provide education, moral guidance, food and clothing to their dependents (1994: xvii). Thus, just as the obedience of children was a concern of colonial governments so too was the obedience of servants an early and persistent concern in New Jersey. For example, the 1714 act "Regulating White Servants," mandated that run away servants were "to serve Double the Time he, she or they have so absented themselves" and to repay the costs of tracking them down to their master or mistress (Bush 1977: 141). The 1730 amendments to this same act showed a continuing concern with the obedience and productivity of servants. Thus the act prohibited and set fines for those who would either sell "to any Servant or Servants any strong Drink, or shall permit any Servant or Servants to sit, drink or tipple in any of his, her or their Houses without the Leave of the Master or Mistress of such Servant" (Bush 1977: 426).

Public authority thus effectively reproduced a family order headed by fathers and based on duty and obligation.

Indenture contracts also reproduced this same concern with duty, obedience, and moral behavior. For example, the indenture agreement that bound six-year old Benjamin McCollock ordered that while learning the trade of cordwinding over the next fourteen years eleven months, "he shall behave himself as he ought to do" (*Town Book of Hopewell 1741: 131*, hereafter cited as *Town Book*). The indenture agreement that bound out an eleven-year old girl in 1743 provided even greater specificity regarding the moral and paternal authority of her master. The Overseers of the Poor in Hopewell thus ordered:

Put out and Bound Elizabeth Hendrickson, A Poor Child of Jon Hendrickson's by and with the³⁴ consent of the Town, Afores'd Apprentice to the S'd Ralph Hunt till the S'd Elizabeth Hendrickson Shall come to the Age of eighteen Years . . . During which time the S'd Apprentice her S'd Master well and faithfully Shall Serve, his Secrets Keep, his Commandments Lawfull and honest everywhere Willingly Shall Do. She Shall do no Hurt nor Damage to her s'd Master nor Consent to be Done by Others, but her Power shall prevent the Same or give Notice to her S'd Master. She Shall not waste the Goods of her S'd Master nor lend them to Any person without his Consent. She Shall not Frequent Taverns, Inns nor Alehouses Except it be to do her S'd Masters Business there. She shall not During the S'd Term Play at Cards, Dice or Any Other Unlawful Game. She Shall

³⁴ In the text "the" is crossed out and replaced with "his" indicating that Elizabeth's father gave his consent to the indenture. However, the phrase "Consent of the Town" remained in the agreement indicating some confusion of lines of authority with regard to Elizabeth. Thus, we do not know whether she was "put out" at the behest of her own father or of the "town fathers."

not Either by Day or Night, Absent herself by Day or Night from her S's Masters Service. But in All things as A good and faithful Servant Shall Demean herself towards S'd Master and all his (*Town Book 1743: 133-134*).

More than service is mandated here. Elizabeth is given specific instructions to live a morally upright childhood and to follow her master's instructions "willingly." In other words, she is instructed to be an obedient member of her master's household. As a member of the household, servants and apprentices were expected to provide their masters not only with their labor during the period of indenture but also with the same obedience and moral uprightness that a father would expect of any of his children.

Enforcing Paternal Prerogatives

With regard to their natural children, the authority of fathers was further enshrined in the colonial laws of New Jersey by the requirement, common in other colonies at the time, of parental permission for marriage.³⁵ Thus, in 1682 the then separate provincial governments of East and West Jersey each passed laws mandating parental permission for legitimate marriages. In East Jersey, the law mandated that

³⁵ See for example, Greven 1970 for a discussion of paternal control of marriage in colonial Massachusetts.

the registration of lawful marriages required that "parents or guardians shall be first consulted, and consenting thereto" (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 236). In West Jersey, the law "For preventing clandestine and unlawful Marriages" mandated that:

if any justice shall presume to join a couple in matrimony, without the consent and knowledge of the parents or trustees of such persons so married (if such consent may be reasonably obtain), then such justice so offending shall be fined (Ibid.: 446).

By 1719, the colonial legislature had limited the force of these laws against "Clandestine Marriages" to minor children or those "under the Age of One and Twenty years" (Bush 1977: 256). Early colonial law had embodied and reproduced the dominant expectation that parents, and especially fathers as the heads of households, would play an important role in the marriage choices of their children.

Replacing Paternal Authority

Where fathers failed in their duties to the members of their household, colonial laws and institutions in New Jersey, both substituted public authority for paternal authority, delegated fatherly duties to other men and mandated that fathers at least provide their own resources for bringing up their children. Thus, poor laws mandated indenture or workhouses for children whose fathers had

failed to teach them a trade and for those with absent fathers. Fathers were commonly seen as responsible for the future well being of their children, their practical training, and moral instruction (Demos 1986: 44, Fliegelman 1982: 1, Pleck 1987: 84). Thus, indenture agreements guaranteed not only the obedience of servants but also the fulfillment of the fatherly responsibilities for education and guidance on the part of masters. Finally, when fatherly authority could be seen to have broken down, resulting in immoral behavior, laws set punishments designed not only to suppress vice but also to teach responsibility.

Teaching Industry

In 1702 from the Queen instructed Lord Cornbury to establish a Royal colony in New Jersey. These instructions included the mandate that he "endeavour with the assistance of the Council, to provide for the raising of stocks, and building publick work houses, in convenient places, for the employing of poor and indigent people" (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 642). However, it was to be more than forty years before the colonial assembly saw a need for such institutions. In 1748 and again in 1754, the legislature did authorize the construction of poor houses in Middlesex County and in Elizabeth. The authorizing legislation set as

one of the principal objectives of these institutions "the educating and bringing up poor Children in some honest and Industrious way" (Bush 1980: 130, Allinson 1776: 180, see also Bush 1980: 288 for the 1754 law). The public notion of fatherhood embodied in these acts was one that saw a crucial paternal educational duty.

Just as fathers were expected to educate their children in a trade and make sure that they would have the skills needed to become independent citizens, the *public fathers* embodied in the colonial poor laws sought to insure that children gained practical skills. The first colonial act for the relief of the poor in 1709 thus required the local overseers of the poor "to take care to put forth such Poor Children as have no Parents, and such as their parents are not able to maintain" (Bush 1977: 56, Nevill 1752: 9). Such children "put forth" in indenture contracts would be taught a useful trade, thereby ensuring the possibility that they would become self-supporting adults.

Subsequent poor law revisions expanded the application and strengthened the effect of this public mandate to provide poor children with practical skills. Thus the 1758 poor law, made it lawful for the overseers to "put forth" not only orphans and those poor children whose parents petitioned for relief but also "the Child or Children of such poor Parents who shall bring up their said Children in

Sloth, Idleness and Ignorance" (Bush 1980: 607). Failure of parental duty was thus an occasion for public intervention in poor families. The last colonial era poor law reform in 1774 served only to strengthen these provisions. This law now positively "enjoined and commanded" rather than simply permitted the overseers of the poor to bind out these groups of poor children (Bush 1986: 204). Colonial poor laws expressed the hegemonic norms of fatherhood in their mandate to teach the habits of industry to the young. When poor fathers failed in this basic responsibility to their children, the public father would step in.

Educating the Young

Colonial families were expected to provide more than just practical skills to their children. Families were also expected to give children a basic education. In recognition of this duty, as early as the seventeen-forties, indenture agreements mandated educational responsibilities for masters. For example, the Town of Hopewell mandated that George Clifford, in addition to teaching his apprentice the "Art, Trade, and Mystery" of cordwinding, "shall teach him to Read and write and Cyphor Sufficient to Qualifie him for the Business that he Shall follow" (*Town Book*: 1741: 131). In the same town, Ralph Hunt was expected to, in return for

obedience and service from Elizabeth Hendrickson:

Educate and also Bring up or Cause to be brought up in the Business of Housewiving with Due and reasonable Correction and Chastisement And find and Allow her sufficient Meat, Drink (illegible) or Lodging, Apparoll and Other Necessaries Meant for Such An Apprentice and to Learn her to Read (*Town Book: 1743: 134*).

The 1758 poor law reform mandated that all subsequent indenture contracts would have to include the following clause: "*That every such Master and Mistress to whom such poor Child or Children shall be bound out as aforesaid, shall cause every such Child and Children to be taught and instructed to read and write*" (Bush 1980: 608 and 1986: 204). Education thus became an officially recognized responsibility of masters (and mistresses) to their indentured servants, a responsibility that ultimately rested in most families with the father. Indenture agreements thus not only mandated the teaching of practical skills, but also the educating of the young by their effective surrogate fathers.

By the seventeen-fifties, the concern with providing for the education of children was embodied explicitly in the poor laws of the colony. Thus, the 1754 authorization of a poor house in Elizabeth allowed the managers of the house:

to receive, provide for, educate in Reading and Writing, and detain, set to work, and keep in the Service of the said Corporation until the Age of

Fourteen Years, any poor Child or Children belonging to said Borough (Bush 1980: 289).³⁶

This responsibility for educating the children of poor families extended even to the "farmed out" poor of the towns. Poor law officials nonetheless maintained a supervisory role in this education. For example, in Newark in 1769, after successfully bidding £100 for the labor of the poor, Caleb Camp was instructed to "keep them in sufficient Victuals and Cloathing, give Schooling to such children as require it, which s'd Schooling &c. is left at the Direction and Discretion of Samuel Huntington one of the Overseers" (Records 1864: 151). Newark, in 1774 again mandated "That the Poor Children shall be constantly sent to School at the expence of the Person that takes them" (Records 1864: 155). Although mothers were certainly involved in this education, fathers in this period were the headmasters of the family school and thus held ultimately responsible for the fulfillment of these obligations. Indenture and the poor law provided a public guarantee of the fulfillment of this fatherly responsibility.

Correcting the Wayward

From the earliest years of the provincial settlement,

³⁶ For similar arrangements in Newark see also, *Records* (1864: 151)

New Jersey legislators were concerned with protecting the social order from those who violated moral and sexual norms. For those men who might be tempted to reject the hegemonic norms of masculinity, the "Capital Laws" of 1668 included the death penalty for "sodomy" and corporal punishment for both adultery and "fornication" (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 79-83). While such crimes were regarded as transgressions against the moral or natural order, they also violated the norms of the patriarchal gender order. Specifically, sodomy presented the possibility that some men might reject fatherhood and live outside of the patriarchal family order considered fundamental to colonial society. More importantly, adultery and fornication exposed the community to a twofold threat, the possibility that fathers might pass on their property to the children of other men, and the possibility that "bastard" children might interfere with the distribution of paternal property. Because, in terms of potential financial burdens on the community, fornication and "bastardy" posed the greater problems, they received the most attention of lawmakers.

When it came to the problems of illegitimacy, New Jersey laws, like those of the other colonies, followed the precedents set down by the Elizabethan poor law reforms. Those reforms had "decreed that the parents of an

and 155) .

illegitimate child had to pay for its upbringing, thus relieving the public of those costs" (Grossberg 1985: 198).

Thus, the New Jersey laws of 1668 and 1675 mandated that:

if any man commit fornication, with any single woman, they shall be punished by enjoining marriage, fine, corporal punishment, either of which at the discretion of the court; and the parties so offending shall put in good security for the discharging of the town or parish from any charge by such unlawful birth (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 83 and 107).

Moreover, in 1686 the legislature strengthened these provisions and assigned the duty of support specifically to the father by ordering "that if any unmarried woman shall be with child, and charge it upon any man, and it cannot be legally prov'd, notwithstanding the man shall be forc'd to maintain the child" (Ibid.: 285, see also P. Edsall 1937: 124). The colonial assembly in 1704 added the admonition that:

every Man that shall be by the said Court be adjudged the Reputed Father of every such Bastard, shall also be fined in the Sum of five Pounds Money Aforesaid, and give security to save the Town or Precinct harmless from the Charge of such Bastard Child (Bush 1977: 22 and Allinson 1776: 4).

Saving the town from the substantial costs of rearing illegitimate children was thus even more the object of these laws than securing the moral order of monogamous marriage. The public fatherhood of colonial New Jersey was thus defined in important ways by the expectation that paternity meant providing for ones children, both legitimate and illegitimate.

With regard to legitimate children, the poor laws also recognized a paternal duty of support. Specifically, in 1758 and again in 1774 the poor law authorized the local overseers of the poor:

where any Father shall run away, or absent from his Wife and Children, or any Widow shall run away or absent from her Children, and leave them a publick Charge . . . to take and seize the Goods and Chattels, and to let out and receive the annual rents and Profits of the Lands and Tenements of such Father or Mother so absconding . . . for and towards maintaining, bringing up, and providing for such Wife, Child or Children (Bush 1980: 608 and 1986: 204).

Since married women could have no property of their own, their abandonment of children entailed no necessary community duty of support. Public notions of fatherhood in colonial New Jersey thus relied on an adherence to both the sexual norms of monogamous marriage and the support duties of hegemonic fatherhood. By correcting wayward men and enforcing their fatherly responsibilities, the town authorities sought to protect the community from the financial burden of immoral behavior while providing that dependent children would be cared for.

SUBORDINATE FATHERS AND THE RESISTANCE TO PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY

Although the hegemonic norms and practices of fatherhood in seventeenth and eighteenth-century America

were defined by a patriarchal gender order, many fathers stood outside of the hegemonic paternal position. These men were either subordinated to other fathers or in active rebellion against their authority. For free men in colonial America, although "the precise nature of a husband's authority varied by religion, race, ethnicity, class, and region, . . . the legitimacy of his family sovereignty was everywhere secured by law and custom" (Kann 1998: 7). However, for those men who were not free, those not considered citizens, and those who either rejected fatherhood for themselves or the authority of their own fathers, such patriarchal authority was elusive. New Jersey law denied to slaves, freed Negroes and, to a lesser extent, Native Americans, the means to meet the expectations of hegemonic fatherhood. By the middle of the eighteenth-century, and increasingly as the century wore on, public concern with a general decline in paternal authority was expressed in poor law revisions that recognized the growing problems of beggars and the "wandering" poor. In addition, the nascent development of a commercial economy and demographic changes resulting in earlier marriages further served to reduce the reliance of sons on their fathers (Fliegelman 1982, Greven 1970). Thus although in the colonial period a multifaceted patriarchal authority was hegemonic, the fatherhood practices that this model entailed

did not describe the experience of all fathers.

Subordinate Fathers: Slaves and Freed Negroes

An essential component of masculinity, and ultimately of fatherhood, has long been the ability both to protect and provide for one's family. In colonial America men were required to use firearms to protect their families and property from warfare, from kidnapping raids led by Native American warriors (Demos 1994), and to supplement the family diet with hunting. The New Jersey colonial legislature thus mandated in 1668 that "every male from 16 years and upwards, to the age of 60 years, shall be furnished at their own cost and charge, with good, and sufficient arms, and constantly maintain the same" (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 78). Although this act included "every male," particular males were effectively excluded and, even when permitted to use firearms, limited in their ability to use them to meet the hegemonic expectations of fatherhood. For example, on complaint of colonists that slaves were, under pretense of hunting, killing swine, the East Jersey colony in 1694 ruled that "no slave or slaves within this Province . . . be permitted to carry any gun or pistol, or take any dog with them into the woods, or plantations, upon any pretence whatsoever" (Ibid.: 341). Again in 1751, the colonial

authorities mandated whipping for any slave whom "shall be seen to hunt, or carrying a Gun on the Lord's Day," the only day when their labor potentially was not under the direct supervision of their masters (Bush 1980: 181). Legally, enslaved Africans thus were denied access to an important source for supplementing their families' diets.

Nonetheless, recent archeological evidence from the slave quarters at Monticello suggests that legal prohibitions against hunting to supplement the diet of slave families were probably circumvented in practice (Crader 1990).

Without legal access to hunting, enslaved men could be expected to turn to trade and independent agriculture to supplement the provisions for their families. These avenues to the self-supporting manliness that the hegemonic norms of masculinity demanded of men in the eighteenth-century were also closed off by colonial legislation.³⁷ In 1682, the Province of East Jersey passed "An Act against Trading with Negro Slaves" with the stated aim of preventing slaves from trading stolen goods. This act went well beyond the traffic in stolen goods to mandate that:

in case any negro, or Indian slave, or servant, shall tender, bring or offer to sell, barter, or trade with any matter or for any thing to any person without permission or licence of his master or mistress, such negro slave, or servant, shall and may be taken up and

³⁷ For more on the importance of self-support to the hegemonic construction of masculinity see, Kann (1998: 15-16).

be whipped by the person or persons to whom he shall tender such sale (Leaming and Spicer 1881[1752]: 255).

In addition, the 1694 slave regulations of East Jersey stated "that no person or persons within this Province shall suffer his or their slave or slaves, to keep any swine, but what are of their owners mark" (Ibid.: 341). The first slave law of the royal colony, passed in 1704, prohibited trade "with any Negro, Indian or Mallato Slaves, for any Rume, Wine, Beer, Syder, or any other strong Drink, or any other Chattels, Goods, Wares or Commodities whatsoever" (Bush 1977: 29). Although English authorities disallowed the 1704 law in 1709 because of its harsh penalties (including castration, branding, and execution) for slaves convicted of crimes, the revised 1714 statute included the same language prohibiting trade as did the earlier act (Ibid.: 136). Enslaved African men were effectively denied any opportunity for even a limited independent manhood.

The slave codes made manumission difficult and expensive and limited the ability of freed blacks to pursue economic independence. Manumission was actively discouraged by the requirement that masters post a bond for their slaves' freedom. For example, the 1714 slave codes stated that:

And Whereas it is found by experience, that Free Negroes are an Idle Sloathful People, and prove very often a charge to the Place where they are . . . any Master or Mistress, manumitting and setting at Liberty any Negro or Mullatto Slave, shall enter into

sufficient Security . . . the Sum of *Two Hundred Pounds*, to pay yearly and every year to such Negro or Mullatto Slave, during their Lives, the Sum of *Twenty Pounds* (Ibid. 140).

In 1769, the colonial legislature reaffirmed this bond requirement (Bush 1982: 511). Once freed, African men faced the daunting task of becoming effective fathers without access to economic resources. Specifically, freed Negroes and their descendents were prohibited from owning property by the 1704 slave code, which stated:

That all Children that have been or shall be born in the Country of Such Negro, Indian or Mallato Slave as have been formerly, or may hereafter be set at Liberty, and all their Posterity shall be and are hereby forever after rendered incapable of purchasing or inheriting any Lands & Tenements within this Province (Bush 1977: 30).

The 1714 law regulating slaves further states "That no Negro, Indian or Mullatto Slave, that shall hereafter be made free, shall enjoy, hold or possess any House or Houses, Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments within this Province" (Ibid.: 140). Freed slaves could thus neither own property nor, and this was particularly important in the maintenance of fatherly authority at this time, pass any inheritance to their children. Thus, the legal apparatus of public fatherhood made it abundantly clear that only certain men were culturally, socially and legally acceptable as fathers. Black men, whether free or not, were effectively precluded from participating in the publicly reinforced exercise of paternal authority that was available to white men. This

legal emasculation of black men in colonial times set the stage for future portrayals of such men as absent, ineffectual or irresponsible fathers.

**Challenging Patriarchal Authority: Wanderers, Beggars,
Disobedient Sons and the New Commercial Economy**

The fatherly control of family property was an important component of the power and authority that fathers exercised over their children, and especially over their sons. If sons wished to marry, for example, they would need some grant of family property in order to support themselves and their new family. By withholding this "marriage portion," fathers could continue to use the labor of their adult sons. Greven (1970) has shown how this control of property led to relatively late ages of first marriage among sons in Andover, Massachusetts in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries. What he also documents, is the declining importance of this control of property both as property was divided into smaller parcels over time and trades and manufacture rose in importance (Ibid.: 272-273). Kann argues that at the same time "the gap between the patriarchal ideal and family reality expanded as republican values seeped into the domestic culture" (1998: 10). With new opportunities to pursue a trade, the declining

importance of a familial land inheritance, and new ideologies questioning patriarchal justifications of political authority, larger numbers of young men began to abandon their father's household.

This dynamic of declining patriarchal authority, that Fliegelman (1982) also dates from approximately 1750, was expressed in New Jersey poor relief legislation. The laws requiring parental permission for legal marriage detailed above are one example of this use of state power to support paternal authority in the face of disobedience. In addition, the growing concern with vagrants, vagabonds and wandering laborers marked the effect of economic and demographic forces that also worked to challenge traditional patriarchal authority. Specifically, more young men, faced with the prospect that the property they might inherit from their fathers would be insufficient to support a family of their own, sought their living in trade and the emerging commercial economy (Fliegelman 1982: 9-10). The authority of fathers declined as they had less to offer to their adult sons.

Patriarchal authority was implicitly challenged by a newly emerging class of propertyless young men who traveled from town to town either begging for alms or seeking employment. These men existed outside of the patriarchal family order. They were neither under the supervision of a

father nor the heads of households themselves. In recognition of the threat posed by such men, as early as 1714 the colonial authorities adopted a travel pass system, designed to prevent individuals from becoming public charges, and applied it to "all Sea-Men, Souldiers, Servants, and other Laborers and suspected Persons" (Bush 1977: 141). By 1740, the assembly took notice of the growing numbers of "idle, dilatory, and vagrant Persons" who were becoming "Chargeable, Vexatious, and Burthensome to the Inhabitants of this Province" (Ibid.: 526). Again in 1748, the legislature empowered Middlesex County to build a poor house to serve all of the county's localities in response to the fact "that the Numbers of poor People have of late Years very much increased within the said County" (Bush 1980: 130). In response to this growing problem, the legislature set strict residency requirements for the receipt of poor relief and provided for the deportation of indigent persons "from whence he, she or they so came" (Ibid.: 527). Again in 1758 and 1774, the colonial legislature recognized that:

the Number of idle Vagrants, Vagabonds and Beggars, do daily increase, who infest the publick High-Ways, Cities and Townships in this Colony, insomuch that they are become a publick Nuisance, and a dangerous Annoyance to honest industrious People (Bush 1980: 614 and 1986: 211).

Clearly, the authorities perceived that more men were rejecting the households of their fathers and seeking independence, whether they had the means to do so or not.

However, in a bow to the newly emergent economic order, the 1758 and 1774 poor law reforms also recognized a new right of persons to travel in pursuit of employment. Previously, those without property were required to post a bond upon entering a town where they were not resident. With the 1758 and 1774 laws, the legislature recognized that:

It is found by Experience, that many poor Persons belonging to this Colony, cannot find Employment in the City, Town corporate, Township or Precinct where they are legally settled, yet might get Work for themselves and Families in other Places within the said Colony (Bush 1980: 602 and 1986: 198).

Upon presentation of a certificate stating their place of legal settlement, white persons were entitled to move to any Town "to follow any honest Employment" (Ibid.). Thus, by the middle of the eighteenth-century, the New Jersey authorities had begun to recognize that the dominant norms of family life, and hence of fatherhood, were beginning to change. No longer could young men necessarily count on pursuing the same trade or agricultural pursuits as did their fathers, or at least not in the same location. As the patriarchal authority of fathers diminished over the course of the eighteenth-century, public fatherhood, as I show in the next chapter, also gradually diminished.

CONCLUSION

The public fatherhood embodied in colonial New Jersey poor relief, and related public acts, was defined by the patriarchal norms of hegemonic fatherhood. These public acts reflected the fact that fathers were expected to provide for their children, teach them a trade, educate them, and provide them with moral guidance. The acts of the colonial authorities reproduced these responsibilities both by lending support to the authority of fathers and by replacing failed fathers with public authority. When such fathers were replaced, public authorities often specifically instructed their substitutes to carry out the commonly accepted duties of fathers. Subordinate men, specifically enslaved and freed Africans, were denied this same legal support to their familial authority. In fact, the slave codes effectively denied these subordinate fathers from carrying out the patriarchal duties commonly expected of fathers. Those men seeking independence from the authority of their fathers were also, until the second half of the eighteenth-century, subjected to the coercive power of the poor laws. Authorities took notice of the dangers posed by these men and the requirement that they carry travel passes was designed to prevent them from "wandering" in search of work. By the end of the eighteenth-century, political,

economic, demographic and cultural forces converged to challenge the patriarchal model of family life that was dominant since the colonial founding.

**CHAPTER THREE: A DIMINISHING PRESENCE: BREADWINNING
FATHERHOOD AND POOR RELIEF IN NEW JERSEY, 1820-1936**

In this chapter, I show how the hegemonic conception of fatherhood defined by fathers' diminishing presence in family life and a focus on breadwinning, was embodied in, and reproduced by the poor laws and other related legislation of New Jersey from 1820 to 1936.³⁸ I argue here that while the expectations of fatherhood contracted, public relief policies continued to serve as a site onto which the hegemonic ideas and practices of fatherhood were mapped. Poor relief policies and institutions in this period thus embodied a *public fatherhood* that was significantly diminished from that reproduced in colonial legislation.

In order to elucidate this relationship between ideas

³⁸ For this chapter, I collected and analyzed all of the New Jersey poor laws and legislation that served to regulate fatherhood for the period from 1820-1942. Laws from 1820 to 1903 were identified from Hood's (1905) *Index of Colonial and State Laws of New Jersey*. Laws from 1904 to 1910 were identified from Honeyman's (1910) *Index-Analysis of the Statutes of New Jersey, 1896-1909*. These indexes are considered the authoritative guides to New Jersey legislative documents in these periods (Leiby 1967: 466, Axel-Lute 1998). Laws from 1911 to 1936 were identified from the subject indexes of the individual volumes of the *Acts of the Legislature of the State of New Jersey*. The following index headings were used to identify laws for this chapter: Almshouse, Apprentices and Servants, Bastards, Bastardy, Births, Marriages and Deaths, Children, Children's Guardians, Education, Fathers, Infants, Indigent, Illegitimate, Institutions, Marriages, Married Women, Mothers, Poor, Slaves, Unemployment, Widows, Welfare, Welfare-house, Workhouses. In addition, influential documents relating to particular reforms were identified from Hasse's (1914) *Index of Economic Material in Documents of the States of the United States: New Jersey, 1789-1904*, Lucas' (1947) *Bibliography of New Jersey Official Reports, 1905-1945*, and from various secondary sources (F. Bane and May 1949, Ellis 1945, Leiby 1967,

of fatherhood and poor laws, I examine changes in the gender order and in the institutions of poor relief. First, I recount the rise to cultural hegemony of a paternal practice defined by and limited to the demands of being a good provider. I argue that, at least in the Northeastern states, a breadwinning model of fatherhood achieved cultural hegemony by the middle of the nineteenth-century and that, in a related cultural development, masculinity came increasingly to be equated with independence in this period. At the same time that these cultural changes challenged the traditional gender order of the colonial northeast, the development of a commercial economy, and its attendant crises, affected American poor relief institutions. I show that, by the mid-nineteenth-century, localities in New Jersey proved unable to meet the expanded relief demands created by economic depressions, and state funding began to augment their efforts. By the nineteen-thirties, these state efforts also proved inadequate and federal programs began to constitute a significant relief source. Throughout this period, both prior institutional arrangements and dominant cultural conceptions of fatherhood played important parts in shaping the character of state and federal involvement.

I focus on the period from 1820 to 1936 in New Jersey

Stafford 1941, Stanton 1934).

for several reasons. In New Jersey, 1820 marks the formal end of separate relief systems for blacks and whites, while 1936 saw the assumption by the federal government of a significant portion of the funding obligations for relief programs. In this period, changing institutional arrangements reproduced a lesser paternal authority in many different ways. Laws recognized both the declining authority of fathers in families and a new independent role for mothers - especially those with young children. However, fathers still had significant obligations that were enforced through laws that mandated work and strengthened the legal requirement of support for illegitimate children. By the early decades of the twentieth-century, state programs were designed to replace the support of absent fathers through programs giving cash assistance to the mothers of dependent children. Throughout this period, laws continued to treat fathers who were slaves or had previously been enslaved as incapable of meeting the demands of hegemonic paternal norms. The poor law was one way that New Jersey denied African American fathers their family legitimacy, preserving both manhood and fatherhood solely for whites. Laws also sought to address the threat to public order posed by men who rejected their obligation to work outright. Poor laws and related legislation thus expressed a *public fatherhood* defined by the hegemonic

breadwinning expectations faced by fathers through both a recognition of a family role for mothers and through the regulation of subordinate fathers and those men who stood outside of these norms.

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD IN THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC

In the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, the patriarchal norms of feudal life that had played so central a role in the colonial family were challenged by economic and cultural developments. While most men in the colonial period worked on a family farm or at a trade pursued within the household, by the end of the nineteenth-century most men pursued their work outside of the home, leaving childrearing to women (J. Bernard 1981, Carnes 1989: 113-114, Degler 1983, Gottlieb 1993: 24-46, Griswold 1993: 13-17, Kimmel 1996: 29-30, LaRossa 1997: 26-30, Rotundo 1993: 26-30, Zaretsky 1976). The hegemonic conception of fatherhood in this context came to be defined by the economic expectations of being a good provider and, ultimately, "success in the good-provider role came in time to define masculinity itself" (J. Bernard 1981: 4, see also Pleck 1987: 86-90). The family thus declined in importance as a site of economic activity and, at the same time, hegemonic conceptions of fatherhood demanded that men leave the household to be good

providers.

With the rapid industrialization that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, most men were no longer able to meet the demands of being a good provider through independent economic activity. Thus, while "before the Civil War nine of every ten American men owned their own farm, shop, or small crafts workshop," by the end of the century most men worked as the employees of other men (Kimmel 1996: 29, see also, Philopson 1981: 64).

Nevertheless, the dominant ideology of masculinity continued to celebrate the virtues of independence. As Griffen puts it:

Middle-class men after the Civil War moved toward an accommodation with the emerging world of bureaucratized corporate capitalism . . . and simultaneously moved toward compensatory ideas and fantasies of male independence, adventure, and virility (1990: 191).

These fantasies of independence were played out in a variety of ways. Popular literature and biographies of successful men celebrated a mythology (and a fantasy) of the "self-made man" singularly responsible for his own success or failure (Kimmel 1996: 26-27).³⁹ A masculine mythology of capitalist development celebrated a "rugged individualism," supposedly responsible for the rapid American economic development, encouraged a skepticism of state intervention in the

³⁹ Thoreau's (Atkinson 1937) anti-capitalist fantasy of self-reliance, *Walden*, published in 1854 is an example of this cultural

economy, and fostered an abhorrence of public assistance (Beard 1931, Fine 1966, Girvetz 1966). Popular success manuals trumpeted the virtues of independent entrepreneurs (Hilkey 1997: 142-143), and men were counseled to emulate these models of successful masculinity through "self-denial" (Bederman 1995: 82, Kimmel 1996: 45, Sumner 1963[1883]: 67). Political discourse also defined citizenship in these masculine terms as "dependence" justified the exclusion of both women and African Americans from the electoral process (Bederman 1995: 20). The independence and self-sufficiency came to epitomize hegemonic norms of masculinity at the same time that the possibility of independence became ever more elusive. Successful men thus were defined by their ability to avoid dependence on others and to provide independently for their families.

Along with these cultural and economic changes, a new ideology of separate spheres arose in the nineteenth-century that justified this new gender division of labor. Women, it was argued, should focus on the family sphere where their superior moral sense would be most valuable, while men should focus on the public sphere of capitalism and democracy where their natural competitiveness was valued (Carnes 1989: 111-113, Degler 1983: 65, Griswold 1993: 14, Rotundo 1985: 11, Welter 1966). According to Grossberg:

trend.

As the home broke free from the world of work, the masculine responsibility for family support became more concrete while male household involvement atrophied. Domesticity became the stellar female attribute, the newly isolated home a woman's more exclusive domain (Grossberg 1985: 7).

At the same time, the equalizing forces of democratic life made the family a more important emotional arena. In a democracy, Tocqueville argued, the traditional patriarchal authority of fathers declines and "the relations between father and sons become more intimate and gentle, there is less of rule and authority, often more of confidence and affection" (1969: 587, see also, Furstenberg 1966, Grossberg 1985). Although these developments created an opportunity for a new type of fatherhood based not on authority but affection, the pressures of the commercial economy made achieving this connection with children difficult. With men increasingly absent from the everyday routines of family life, mothers rose in importance in this new affectionate family. One sign of this shift was the fact that over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, child-rearing literature was aimed almost exclusively at mothers (Griswold 1993: 128-9, Philopson 1981: 61-62). By the mid-nineteenth-century, the ideal of the modern affective family dominated by mothers had replaced the cooperative economic enterprise dominated by fathers that was the hegemonic family form in America before the Revolution.

In the nineteen-twenties and thirties the expectations of fatherhood shifted again as fathers were called back into the home and into the lives of their children first as playmates and then as role models (Griswold 1993: 93-4, LaRossa 1997: 39-40, Pleck 1987: 90-93). "Family experts" in the nineteen-twenties argued that more fatherly involvement in families was necessary so that children (especially boys) could be provided with the masculine model necessary for their normal psychological development (Griswold 1993: 93-4, Pleck 1987: 90-93). Many feared that by focusing exclusively on breadwinning, the dominant pattern of modern fathering was contributing to the creation of a generation of weak men. These developments were thought to threaten the existence of the heterosexual family unit and, "by the nineteen-thirties, fears of overfeminization were a steady refrain in both academic and popular literature" (Griswold 1993: 94). However, the "new fatherhood" brought men back into the household in what was primarily seen as a helping and peripheral role that preserved not only their privileges but also their isolation from the routines of family life. Thus, the dominant meaning of fatherhood throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries remained that of breadwinning (Griswold 1993).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL RELIEF INSTITUTIONS

American relief institutions in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century were built upon the colonial institutional legacy of local responsibility for poor relief. In New Jersey, the colonial poor law revision of 1774 remained formally in effect until the revision of 1846. This revision preserved practices that dated from the 1758 colonial poor law including: the "removal" of the poor to their place of "settlement," the obligation of family members to provide for their own poor relations, the "putting forth" of poor children for indenture and the local responsibility for relief (Statutes of the State of New Jersey 1847, Title 32: 877-904).⁴⁰ Even the move towards "indoor relief," or the provision of poor relief in an institutional setting, common in most northern states in the early nineteenth-century, had a colonial precedent (Keller 1977: 503-4, Trattner 1979: 52). In New Jersey, various colonial statutes had authorized the construction of specific poorhouses. What did change was that after 1820, in counties with poorhouses, localities were required to

⁴⁰ Because chapter numbers were not always used, subsequent references to revisions of the New Jersey laws will be cited by giving a year and a page number using the following system: (ex: Statutes 1847: 877-904). The yearly laws of New Jersey will be cited using the following system: (ex: Acts 1820: 166-169). Full citations for the individual volumes referenced appear in the "References" list.

"remove" poor persons to these institutions for relief (Acts 1820: 167). The poor laws mandated this move to institutionalization in order both to prevent the "waste" of resources by profligate poor families and to allow for the close supervision of such families and poor individuals in order to break their habits of dependency. In 1846, New Jersey poor law sought to encourage this use of institutional relief by ordering localities to deny relief to any person who refused to be placed in local poorhouses (Statutes 1847: 885). Nonetheless, despite these changes, much of the language of the 1774 colonial law was preserved in the New Jersey poor laws until their complete revision in 1911 (Acts 1911: 390-410).

A series of economic depressions in the later nineteenth-century strained local resources to the point that both state governments and private organizations stepped in to augment local relief efforts in many states (Berkowitz and McQuaid 1992: 11-13, Bremner 1956: 4, Keller 1977: 499-506, Klebaner 1980: 114).⁴¹ For example, throughout the late eighteen-seventies and eighteen-eighties, various acts of the New Jersey legislature authorized cities and counties to increase their indebtedness in order to meet the relief demands imposed by

⁴¹ In addition, some nineteenth-century party "machines" provided another limited source of relief (McCormick 1979, Pratt 1961, Riordon

the economic depressions of the time (Acts 1876: 56-7, 1877: 17-18, 1878: 63-4, 1879: 53 and 190-1, 1881: 20, 1882: 26, 1883: 41-2, 1888: 35-6). By the late eighteen-seventies, private "Charity Organization Societies" had formed in many northeastern states and in large cities. These societies worked closely with city agencies, investigating conditions in relief institutions and providing a private source of relief funds. In many areas of the country, "public and private agencies combined to form a loosely coordinated network for the alleviation of dependence" (Katz 1983: 42, see also Keller 1977: 504).⁴² In New Jersey, the legislature gave the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey "the power to visit, inspect and examine the county and town poorhouses, jails, asylums and other public reformatory and penal institutions" (State Charities Aid Association 1887: 15).⁴³ These investigations provided the impetus for several reforms of relief institutions including, separating poorhouse residents by sex after 1889, and removing children from poorhouses after 1899 (Acts 1889: 350-351, Acts 1899: 365).

Nineteenth and early twentieth-century norms and

1963, Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983: 92-95).

⁴² The officers of these societies, with their investigative authority, developed some of the earliest systematic knowledge of American poverty (Bremner 1956: 67-85, 123-139).

⁴³ This organization was later funded out of state revenues since it was "rendering important and valuable services to the state," further blurring the line between private charity organizations and public

practices of gender played an important part in the development of the institutions of the modern American welfare state in this period. Mink (1990) has argued that the common identification between manhood and independent citizenship in nineteenth-century America meant that public assistance to men could not be reconciled with their citizenship while, on the other hand, women, excluded from full political participation, could accept assistance without endangering their contribution to the republic through mothering. In fact, apart from the patronage-based relief of the Civil War Pensions, "the United States offered little help to adult male workers before the thirties" (Skocpol 1992: 158).⁴⁴ However, in the early decades of the twentieth-century, many states did experiment with relief programs for mothers and children. Mother's Pensions, as these relief programs came to be called, provided cash assistance to widows in order to prevent them from living in almshouses. The mother's pension movement came to New Jersey in 1913 with "An Act to promote home life for dependent children" (Acts 1913: 578-81).⁴⁵ The act

authority (Acts 1892: 206).

⁴⁴ In fact, about half of all northern white men were receiving these pensions in the period from 1890 to 1910 (Orloff and Skocpol 1984:728, Skocpol 1992: 102-152). Although many recipients of this assistance were not injured in combat and the terms defining disability were ultimately expanded to include old age, the pensions continued to be justified as payment for service to the Union - they were "earned" by the deserving (Skocpol 1992: 151).

⁴⁵ Although this act marked the formal start of these pensions, in

empowered the Courts to commit poor families headed by widows with children under age sixteen "to the care of the State Board of Children's Guardians, and directing that there shall be paid to the mother . . . monthly out of the county funds . . . for the maintenance and support of the children" (Ibid.: 579). Board officials were required to investigate all such recipients of aid by visiting them in their homes at least six times a year (Ibid.: 580). The supervisory powers and investigative skills developed by the officials responsible for these programs provided an important set of institutional referents for later poverty legislation at the federal level.

Mother's pensions were specifically advocated as a means to preserve the gender division of labor in the family dominant since the early nineteenth-century (Cohen and Hanagan 1991, L. Gordon 1994, Leff 1973).⁴⁶ In fact, all of the state-level mothers' pension laws required that

1910 the State Board of Children's Guardians had obtained authorization from the state attorney general to "board" children in their own homes, effectively creating a system of cash assistance to the single mothers of dependent children (Stanton 1934: 60, see also Leiby 1967: 94-96 and Skocpol 1992: 551).

⁴⁶ Ursei (1992) has made the argument that state action created this pattern and maintains it by taking on the patriarchal function of breadwinning by providing monetary support to mothers (see also Abromowitz 1988). This argument, while provocative, overstates the power of state actors to shape the private behaviors of citizens and underestimates the ways in which recipients of aid have long resisted and subverted the rules of public welfare. Moreover, the separate spheres gender ideology, which predates the mother's pension movement, was also popular among the middle classes. Nonetheless, the American welfare state has, at least until the recent reforms, been predicated on the broad acceptance of "traditional" breadwinner and housewife roles in the family (Kammerman 1983: 23, Sapiro 1986).

recipients be single mothers and that they stop any paid employment while receiving the assistance. Thus, while reformers opposed "outdoor relief" or cash assistance for men, they supported this subsidy of women's dependence.⁴⁷

By the early nineteen-thirties, state attempts to alleviate poverty by augmenting local relief efforts and relieving women and children were overwhelmed by the worldwide economic depression. By 1931 in New Jersey, the increasing numbers of unemployed men overwhelmed the county system of relief established in the 1924 poor law revision. The legislature, in June, authorized counties and municipalities to aid the able-bodied and to appropriate money specifically for the relief of the unemployed (Acts 1931: 1215-6). However, by October the legislature found that:

relief and assistance that can be provided by private agencies and local governing authorities are not presently sufficient to meet the minimum needs of the people of this State, it therefore (is) necessary to supplement the local public and private relief work by State aid and support (Ibid.: 1451).

The State Emergency Relief Administration was thereby created to distribute this new state relief. A federal response to poverty was initiated by 1933 with the Emergency Relief Act and "for the first time, the federal government

⁴⁷ Although relatively few poor families actually benefited from the mothers' pensions, they did serve as a model for later federal relief programs (Howard 1992, Leff 1973, Piven and Cloward 1988, Skocpol

assumed responsibility for relief and appropriated substantial funds to carry out that responsibility" (Piven and Cloward 1971: 74).⁴⁸ Nevertheless, when faced with the necessity of providing assistance to the rapidly increasing numbers of impoverished Americans, federal policy makers built upon a legacy of state policies and institutional capacities for relief. In addition to the institutional capacity for social work investigations of poor families, the two-track gendered nature of American welfare was well established by the time that federal relief programs were instituted to combat the Depression.

Federal developments built upon these cultural and institutional foundations. For example, the social work model of monitoring family life ultimately was incorporated into the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program established by the Social Security Act. The new federal programs thus "shored up traditional gender relationships by emphasizing work relief and passing legislation that either assumed or promoted the economic dependence of women" (Griswold 1993: 154 and see Katz 1986).⁴⁹ Work relief programs provided

1992).

⁴⁸ Trattner (1976) has shown that federal participation in relief efforts were not entirely absent in the nineteenth-century. However, those efforts were limited to grants of land to states for the relief of specific classes of dependents and never constituted a continuing or programmatic commitment to poverty relief.

⁴⁹ The federal relief system did not challenge traditional assumptions about race either. Specifically, the local control aspects of the ADC program and the exclusion of agricultural and service sector

temporary employment for men in order to preserve the family wage system and, later, ADC supported full-time homemaking, substituting state support for male wages (L. Gordon 1994: 193-196, Sapiro 1986: 229). Harry Hopkins spoke for many New Dealers when he expressed the belief that relief programs should not challenge this division of labor in the family because "most of our family habits and customs are constructed around the central fact that the father is the breadwinner. . . . The mother is the domestic guardian" (quoted in Griswold 1993, 155). The gender beliefs of reformers in this New Deal era were closely tied to the breadwinner/housewife model and the reforms advanced in this period provided material support for this model of family life (L. Gordon 1994: 293). Although the mass unemployment of the Great Depression challenged the equation of masculinity with breadwinning, the responses to this crisis were predicated on this association and were designed to support the traditional gender order.

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

The development of state and federal relief institutions in New Jersey in the late nineteenth and early

workers from Social Security denied much of the new national assistance to blacks, especially in the South (Lieberman 1995).

twentieth-centuries embodied a public fatherhood defined by the diminished expectation and practices of paternity. These expectations were themselves determined in relation to the new gender order of the period with its ideology of "separate spheres" for men and women. Thus, laws institutionalized an expectation of fatherly support of children and motherly nurturing, especially of young children. State authorities effectively *reproduced* a newly diminished fatherhood by gradually eliminating paternal prerogatives, increasing the relative power of mothers in families and focusing ever more state resources on enforcing breadwinning obligations. Moreover, state laws continued to construct a *public father* to *replace* the paternal authority of men outside of the hegemonic norms of paternal obligations. Laws thus enforced work for the able-bodied, especially in times of perceived crisis, used the police powers of the state to enforce the duty to support offspring, both legitimate and "illegitimate," and created a system of cash assistance to mothers and institutions for children in order to provide for those without fathers. In and through these institutional developments, and the official reaction to both subordinate and resistant groups of fathers, the diminished expectations of a hegemonic fatherhood defined principally by breadwinning were reproduced.

Reproducing a Diminished Paternal Authority

Although New Jersey laws continued to reproduce paternal authority in families, that authority was significantly diminished by a series of policy changes in the nineteenth-century. Where colonial authorities had seen fit to mandate the obedience of children and servants, and enforce the parental authority to bind out children, the state authorities gradually eroded these principally paternal prerogatives. By the end of the nineteenth-century, married women had property rights, the "best interests of the child" would be considered in custody cases, and fathers lost their ability to solely determine the indenture contracts of their children. The paternal authority reproduced by New Jersey law was greatly diminished from that of the recent colonial past.

The Decline of Paternal Prerogatives

Paternal prerogatives gradually diminished following the Revolution and the rise of the commercial economy. In 1798, the "Act respecting Apprentices and Servants" reaffirmed the colonial custom that persons could only be legally bound "by and with the consent of his or her father,

or, in case of the death of his or her father, by and with the consent of his or her mother" (Acts 1798: 360). By 1871, all indenture contracts required "the consent of the mother" (Acts 1871: 13) and after 1895 the legislature mandated that if the "child be above the age of ten years its consent thereto shall be first obtained" (Acts 1895: 137). Moreover, while most indentures had previously entailed the placement of a child within the household of another father to learn a trade of some sort, by 1844 the General Assembly affirmed the legality of indenture contracts made "to serve several persons, constituting a firm or co-partnership" (Acts 1844: 233). Economic changes thus had begun to remove this master/servant relationship from the household. Finally, in 1880, the legislature sought to bring New Jersey law into accord with the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution by ending the right of masters to punish, what a 1798 law had called, "any stubborn, disobedient, rude or intemperate slave or male servant" (Acts 1799: 500-1) by putting them to hard labor in a work-house (Acts 1880: 97-98). The prerogatives of men both as fathers and as masters of servants were thus diminished. Economic, political and cultural changes meant that fathers no longer had the expansive authority of the colonial era patriarch. Moreover, those prerogatives that continued to be enforced

by state authority were explicitly shared with mothers.

Of course, some parental prerogatives had long been formally shared with mothers. What was new was that women now had rights *independent* of their husbands, rights that they had formally gained only in the nineteenth-century. In 1852 new legislation determined:

That the real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry . . . shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property, as if she were a single female (Acts 1852: 407).

Over the course of the next few decades married women were given the right to bring independent legal suits (Acts 1867: 959-60) and to sue for support when separated from their husbands (Acts 1878: 334-5). While women did not have full rights to political participation until after the ratification of the nineteenth amendment in 1920, women did gain property rights independent of their husbands and fathers. This change in the economic status of women affected their relative power within the family. With the new importance of women to families, public fatherhood came to be defined almost exclusively by breadwinning.

"Tender Years" and the "Best Interests of the Child"

One of the most striking examples of the decline of

paternal prerogatives in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century is the shift from the presumption for the father in custody disputes to a presumption for the mother.⁵⁰ The colonial presumption that fathers were the primary parents with a common law right to the company of his legitimate offspring gradually was replaced by a new belief that mothers were more suited to nurturing children. Thus, in 1860, the New Jersey legislature sought to guarantee that, in cases of separation, mothers should maintain their access to any children. Specifically, the law mandated that children under age seven should "remain in the custody of the mother until said child or children shall attain such age, unless said mother shall be of such character and habits as to render her an improper guardian" (Acts 1860: 437).⁵¹ Although an 1896 revision of this statute placed both parents on equal legal footing, judges were instructed that "the happiness and welfare of the child shall determine the custody" (Acts 1896: 171). In the gender order of the nineteenth-century, the happiness and welfare of children in general was seen as best provided for by women (Grossberg 1985: 234-253, Mason 1994:49-62, Welter 1966,). The formal end of any remaining legal presumption in favor of fathers

⁵⁰ For a discussion of this development throughout the United States see, Mason (1994).

⁵¹ In 1892, this presumptive custody practice was extended to children over the age of seven upon the mother's petition (Acts 1892:

came in 1921 when the legislature mandated that "the father, as such, shall not have preference over the mother as to the award of custody of such minor child if the best interests of the child may otherwise be protected" (Acts 1921: 205). The common law prerogative of fathers to maintain custody of the children was formally ended in favor of protecting both the tender years of childhood and the best interests of the child.

Enforcing Paternal Responsibilities

While paternal authority was progressively diminished both in its objects and extent over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, fathers still had significant responsibilities towards both their families and the community. Charity workers, specifically, were concerned that their efforts not only work to relieve distress but also to encourage poor fathers to independently support their families. Relief efforts thus were aimed not only at poverty but also at the "causes" of poverty in individual profligacy or laziness. In times of crisis, legislators turned to programs that either enforced work or provided it to men who could not find employment. However, not all fathers lived up to the hegemonic expectations of

159) .

paternity. Laws mandated support from both absent fathers and those with "illegitimate" children. Moreover, with the advent of mother's pensions, state authorities sought to provide a public replacement of absent breadwinners. A diminished public fatherhood, primarily identified with breadwinning was embodied in these acts of both public authority and quasi-private agencies.

*"Work as the Social Disinfectant": Restoring
Manhood through Mandated Labor*

In the nineteenth-century New Jersey was no exception to the nationwide move to end "outdoor relief" and replace direct cash assistance with the "indoor relief" afforded in poorhouses.⁵² These poorhouses enforced work as a condition of relief. Thus the 1846 revision of New Jersey's poor law not only continued to authorize communities to construct poorhouses, but also provided that:

in case any poor person or persons, claiming relief of any township within this state, where such house or houses shall be so built . . . shall refuse to be lodged, kept to work and maintained in such house or houses, such poor person or persons so refusing, . . . shall not be entitled to ask or receive any relief (Statutes 1847: 885).

"Out-door relief" the influential 1883 report on pauperism

⁵² On the national move towards indoor relief from 1820 to 1860 see, Katz (1983).

by the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industry argued, "should not be granted, except in cases of sudden and pressing necessity, and not without careful investigation into the circumstances and character of the applicant" (1883: 406). Alternatively, as the State Charities Aid Association put it in their second annual report:

out-door relief, which allowing personal liberty to the beneficiary in place of confinement in an Alms-house, is vastly alluring, to those devoid of honorable pride. To develop manhood and self-respect, not to vile it, should be the aim of every form of charitable endeavor. Otherwise, would be benevolence inevitably tends downward, multiplying indefinitely and with fearful rapidity a class of able-bodied men and women who corrupt and demoralize completely the whole substratum of society (1888: 44).

Relief not conditioned on work was thought to encourage future dependency. Nonetheless, the notion that "personal liberty" was dangerous, when held by the poor, conflicted with the dominant ideology of masculine independence that suffused public fatherhood.

At the same time that these concerns over the development of a dependent class of able-bodied paupers came to the fore, the dominant, middle-class, "separate spheres" gender ideology of the time made the problem of male dependency a more pressing one. The 1878 annual report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industry stated the common understanding of fatherly responsibilities.

It is unquestionably the duty of every male head of a family to use his best powers and adapt his habits and mode of life to the primary necessity of supplying all

the reasonable wants of those who are dependent upon him. This should be accomplished, if it is possible wholly without wage-labor assistance either from wife or children (1878: 46).

Those who failed to meet these standards were of questionable manhood. Because working class families typically required the labor of all able-bodied members of the household to survive, the fathers of these families always faced an implicit criticism of their manhood. Moreover, since racial discrimination drove African American men out of the ranks of the skilled labor force they faced an even greater likelihood that the survival of their families would require reliance on the wages of their wives and children (Trotter 1993: 58-63).

Adopting the public health rhetoric dominant in charity circles at the time, the State Charities Aid Association's "committee on adult able-bodied paupers" reported that:

Your committee looks on work as the social disinfectant, the restorer of lost manhood, the great antidote for all the complicated evils of pauperism, and thinks this Association should bend all its efforts to make living without work impossible in this land of a perhaps unfortunate plenty (1888: 46).

Both public and private institutions worked together in the poor relief field to ensure that the charitable impulses of local communities did not undermine the development of the habits of independent manhood and responsible breadwinning fatherhood. The positioning of work as the source of manhood in this quote testifies to its centrality in the

construction of public fatherhood. Its power to "restore lost manhood" and to serve as an antidote to the "evil sickness of pauperism" meant that reformers would continue to look to the encouragement of work the principal means to enforce fatherly responsibility.

Two crises of the early twentieth-century necessitated a public interest in work. Because of the drain on labor resources caused by the mobilization for the First World War, the New Jersey legislature, in February of 1918, passed a law mandating employment for men. The law declared that it is:

the duty of every able-bodied male resident of this State, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to be habitually and regularly engaged in some lawful, useful and recognized business, profession, occupation, trade or employment (Acts 1918: 160).

This law empowered the Commissioner of Labor to make work for the unemployed and provided that those failing to work at least thirty-six hours a week would be punished by fines or imprisonment. Finally, when faced with the economic crisis of the early nineteen-thirties, the legislature, in 1931, created the State Emergency Relief Administration whose purpose was to find employment for the growing masses of the unemployed (Acts 1931: 1451-60). In each of these cases, the state faced not only economic and political threats that necessitated action but also a challenge to the gender order. These crises threatened not only military

defeat or economic ruin but also the collapse of breadwinning fatherhood. The response in each case was to create state institutions capable of providing opportunities to men to meet the dominant expectations of breadwinning fatherhood and independent manhood.

The "Disorderly Person": State Correction of Wayward Fathers

When particular men failed to live up to the expectations of hegemonic fatherhood, they faced the corrective authority of the law. Specifically, the legislature periodically updated the "bastardy" laws to mandate that fathers of illegitimate children pay for their support. The fathers of illegitimate children had long been considered liable for the support of their children in New Jersey and they remained so in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. While the law after 1794 allowed localities to order either the mother or the reputed father to pay for the support of an illegitimate child, the main emphasis of the enforcement of these responsibilities was on the "putative father" rather than the "lewd mother" (Acts 1795: 991-2 and 1846: 902-3). The 1874 revision of the "act for the maintenance of bastard children" focused exclusively on the apprehension and trial of fathers of such children likely to

become public charges. The new law authorized judges to make "an order of filiation, in which they shall specify the sum to be paid weekly, or otherwise, by such putative father, for the support of such bastard" (Revision 1877: 72). Failure to pay such support could lead to the imprisonment of such putative fathers. The emphasis on the recovery of support from fathers continued throughout the nineteenth-century and into the first decades of the twentieth-century.⁵³ In 1884, the legislature mandated, "That any husband or father who deserts or wilfully refuses or neglects to provide for and maintain his wife or other family, shall be deemed and adjudged a disorderly person" (Acts 1884: 259). Such fathers were "disorderly" in two ways. They were disorderly in the sense that they were guilty of a misdemeanor and could be jailed, fined and ordered to post a bond for support of their children. Fathers neglecting to provide for their wives and children were also disorderly in the sense that they existed outside of the gender order, rejecting the dominant norms of breadwinning fatherhood. Because these laws applied to the fathers of both legitimate and illegitimate children, all men potentially faced the coercive power of state authority should they fail in their duty to support their wives and

⁵³ What did change was that after 1915, New Jersey broke with common law tradition and mandated that children could be "legitimated"

children.

Replacing Absent Fathers

In the nineteenth-century, the focus in providing for poor dependent children was to place those children in institutions or foster homes. Thus in 1895, the legislature authorized the societies for the prevention of cruelty to children to take custody of children being raised by immoral or dissolute parents (Acts 1895: 630-1). This power was given to a State Board of Children's Guardians in 1899 (Acts 1899: 362-5). In the early years of the twentieth-century, New Jersey legislators focused their attention on providing relief for families where fathers were absent. Beginning in 1910, the state board of children's guardians began the practice of providing cash assistance to single mothers and their dependent children (Leiby 1967: 94). After 1913, "mother's pensions" were offered to widows with children under age sixteen after passage of the "act to promote home life for dependent children" (Acts 1913: 578-81). In these cases, state officials were willing to step in to meet the support obligations of absent fathers, implicitly making the claim that the "best interests" of the child were served by outdoor relief for single mothers. While poorhouse relief

by the marriage of their parents (Acts 1915: 333).

remained the norm for poor men, providing cash assistance to women and children was thought not to risk the reproduction of a dangerous dependence. Rather, since dependence was considered normal for women and children, such relief would allow women to focus on their domestic responsibilities and save community resources otherwise spent on orphanages.

SUBORDINATE FATHERS: EXCLUSION AND RESISTANCE

Meeting the hegemonic expectations of fatherhood embodied in New Jersey's poor laws and related legislation was problematic for certain men. With the gradual end of slavery after 1804, new barriers to black fathers seeking to meet the hegemonic expectations of fatherhood were raised. Abolition laws dealt with the children of freed slaves as if they were illegitimate offspring. African American men also were denied full rights to political participation, which was an important expectation of hegemonic masculinity in the nineteenth-century. Even with the passage of the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1870 guaranteeing their right to vote in federal elections these men continued to face segregation and discrimination for many years after this time. As had been the case in the colonial period, some men rejected or resisted the dominant norms of fatherhood and masculinity. In the eighteen-seventies and

again during the Great Depression, lawmakers were concerned with the problem of "tramps" and "hobos," men who traveled from town to town seeking employment or handouts, thereby rejecting the family norms of the time. Even those non-working men who did not seek public assistance were condemned as "society idlers." The laws of New Jersey embodied a public fatherhood defined by breadwinning. Nonetheless, some fathers were prevented from fulfilling the expectations of that fatherhood and others "chose" not to meet their manly obligations.

Slaves and Freed Negroes

In 1804 the General Assembly passed "An act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery," which provided that the children of slaves born after July fourth would become "free" indentured servants until their adulthood (Acts 1804: 251-4). Under this law, masters were allowed to "abandon" their rights to the labor of these children and, until 1811, the state would pay for the support of children so abandoned (Acts 1811: 313-14). However, the gradual end of slavery did not mean that freed slaves would achieve equal political rights. Throughout the early decades of the nineteenth-century, freed slaves faced limitation on their travel both within the state and to other states (Acts 1797: 371-2).

Moreover, free blacks were stripped of the franchise in 1807 and formally excluded from the political process with the adoption of a new state constitution in 1844 (Price 1980: 90). Thus, the end of slavery did not mean that African American men would be admitted to the rights and privileges of nineteenth-century manhood.

New Jersey's poor laws also maintained separate rules of relief for freed slaves and other Negroes. Thus, until 1820, freed slaves gained the "settlement" of their former masters and in the event that they became paupers, they would be returned, for purposes of relief, to the town where they had last been enslaved. In 1820, the Assembly ended this practice by mandating that in "application for the relief or removal of slaves, or free negroes, or persons of colour, the proceedings shall be the same as in cases of other persons who may be chargeable or likely to become chargeable" (Acts 1820: 169). Nonetheless, as late as 1874, townships were allowed to return any "poor colored servant" to the estate where they had been enslaved if such servants were in need of relief (Revision 1877: 841). Once returned to these estates, their former masters were responsible for covering the costs of the relief of these paupers. Thus, even with the formal end of a separate legal system for slaves and free Negroes, former slaves continued to be marked by the nineteenth-century system of poor relief. For

these New Jerseyans, becoming a public charge meant returning to the place of their enslavement and the start of a dependent relationship with their former masters.

Moreover, the New Jersey law treated the children of freed slaves in the same manner as illegitimate children. The 1820 revision of the act for the gradual abolition of slavery mandated the recording of the births of all the children of slaves on a certificate "containing the name, age, and sex of such child so born, and the name of the mother of such child" (Acts 1820: 74). Fathers, thus would have no legal record of the paternity of their children would be likely to face diminished legal rights and their children would face legal treatment akin to that of "bastards." Thus, the children of former slaves were considered to have the "settlement" or residence, for purposes of relief, of their mothers, just as did "bastard" children.⁵⁴ The poor law thus refused to recognize the "legitimacy" of African American fathers; they faced the responsibilities of fatherhood with a presumption of their failure to be able to support their families.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ The practice of illegitimate children achieving settlement with their mothers continued until 1924 when those illegitimate children whose fathers were known achieved the same settlement as their father (Statutes 1846: 879, Revision 1877: 835, Acts 1911: 394, Acts 1924: 277).

⁵⁵ Despite such legal obstacles and breakup of families that often occurred in the prior slave system many black families did manage to

Tramps, Hobos and Idlers

Men who rejected the dominant norms and practices of breadwinning fatherhood or failed to live up to those expectations attracted the attention of policy makers in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. Much as had been the case in the colonial period, localities feared being overwhelmed by an influx of poor persons from other communities. In fact, the colonial provision against receiving "vagabonds, vagrants, beggars, and other idle, strolling, disorderly person or persons" into any house persisted until the 1874 revision of the poor law (Statutes 1847: 879). The objects of these statutes were usually able-bodied unemployed men or, as they become known in the later nineteenth-century, "tramps." As Katz notes:

During the 1870s American social commentators invented the noun tramp to describe the groups of men suddenly roving through towns and cities, begging alms, asking for outdoor relief . . . (And) the size and pervasiveness of the wanderers . . . both appalled and frightened the respectable classes (1983: 157).

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries in New Jersey, tramps could be removed to their place of legal residence for relief. In addition, after 1911 overseers of the poor were instructed to "insist that those able to labor shall seek employment" and directed not to provide cash

stay together in this time (Gutman 1976 and 1983).

assistance to able-bodied non-residents (Acts 1911: 398-9). In 1918, the crisis of the first World War encouraged Governor Walter Edge to issue a proclamation directing public officials to report "society idlers" and "hobo types" or:

those workless individuals whose lack of ambition and fondness for idleness constitutes not merely a financial burden to every community, but also a genuine menace to the welfare of the nation's manhood under arms and their safety on the battlefield (Acts 1918: 1260).

Thus, the presence of these men symbolically undermined those men performing the ultimate masculine duty to the state - going to war. The persistent concern with the threat to both public order and public finances presented by the wandering poor and "idlers" of various types, demonstrates that, especially in times of economic crisis, some men found it difficult to meet the expectations of hegemonic masculinity while others rejected these norms.

CONCLUSION

New Jersey poor laws in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century embodied a public fatherhood defined by the hegemonic expectation that fathers would play a diminished role in family life compared to their colonial counterparts. The dominant gender ideology of the time encouraged fathers to focus their efforts on the public

sphere of politics and the economy in order to become good citizens and providers, while leaving the household and childrearing to mothers. Poor relief legislation in New Jersey reproduced the expectations in a number of ways. Paternal prerogatives created under the colonial regime, regarding both servants and children, gradually came to be shared with mothers or these prerogatives disappeared altogether. Moreover, wives achieved a separate legal existence from their husbands and mothers came to be seen as presumptively better parents for young children. At the same time, relief institutions sought to encourage a "manly independence" among recipients, enforcing work where this independence was lacking. Bastardy law, long associated with poor relief issues, came to be focused less on moral correction and more on constructing an institutional apparatus for collecting support from fathers. In addition, in the early decades of the twentieth-century, mother's pensions in New Jersey sought to replace the wages of absent men, thereby allowing mothers to focus on their proper sphere of childrearing. Laws ending slavery in New Jersey, and those incorporating freed blacks into the relief system, refused to recognize African American fathers as a normal and legitimate presence in their own families. Finally, those men who rejected breadwinning and work, or who failed to succeed as wage laborers, faced state authorities

mandating their participation in the work norms of middle-class masculinity. By the early decades of the twentieth-century, the breadwinning norms and practices of paternity embodied in New Jersey's poor laws helped to make fathers a diminishing presence in most families.

The public father became more associated with the good worker. Those who did not conform to the expectations of this new conception of public fatherhood constituted a threat to the construction of manhood in general. In the terminology of the nineteenth-century, these men were "diseased" and could only be cured by the inoculation of labor. If work constituted masculinity, then the only way to meet the demands of public fatherhood was to labor for one's family. Expressions of nurturing, working at home in an interdependent household like that of the colonial period, or failing to adequately earn enough to support a family without relying on the wages of a wife or children were thus seen as failures of masculinity. Such a narrow and diminished construction of the public father guaranteed that poor men in general, and African American men in particular, would struggle to meet the demands of fatherhood and face punitive measures when they, as was often the case, were unable to meet those demands.

**CHAPTER FOUR: PROVIDING AND PATERNAL PRESENCE:
WELFARE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS, 1988-1996**

In this chapter, I show how changing conceptions of fatherhood have been embodied in and reproduced by federal welfare policies and state-level relief programs from 1988 to 1996.⁵⁶ I argue that recent cultural developments have led to a fragmentation of hegemonic expectations of fatherhood. In this context, welfare programs since the reforms of 1988 have expressed a *public fatherhood* defined not only by providing for children but also by a new emphasis on encouraging a paternal presence. In a period of declining cultural agreement on the expected norms and practices of fatherhood, the public fatherhood embodied in welfare policies and various related programs is in

⁵⁶ For this chapter, I collected and analyzed federal welfare laws, federal child support enforcement regulations, fatherhood program descriptions and evaluations, and, for illustrative purposes, a small number of interviews with fatherhood program participants and officials. Federal welfare reform laws were identified from various secondary sources and collected from the United States code. These laws are referred to in the text by reference to their public law number (ex: P. L. 100-485). For the fatherhood programs, I examined various evaluation reports and summaries of state programs (Achatz and MacAllum 1994, S. Bernard and Knitzer 1999, Doolittle et al. 1998, Doolittle and Lynn 1998, Knitzer et al. 1997, Smollar and Ooms 1988, Watson 1992). The interviews with fatherhood program administrators and participants were conducted in the Annapolis, Maryland offices of a welfare-based young fathers program over the course of several months in 1995. An interview schedule was used that included questions designed to elicit information about fatherhood practices and attitudes. Questions included, "describe a typical day in your son/daughter's life," "what kind of father would you like to be?" and "how would you define fatherhood?" The interview schedule and consent form were approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board, access # 96-032 R (see Appendix A).

transition.

In order to assess the relationship between various welfare policy developments and changes in the dominant ideas of fatherhood, I examine recent changes in the American gender order and institutional changes resulting from recent federal welfare reforms. To explain this relationship I first show how the expectations of fatherhood have begun to change in response to various cultural, economic, and political developments. I argue that, while breadwinning remains an important part of the dominant norms and practices of fatherhood, greater numbers of mothers now share these providing responsibilities. In this context, fatherhood has come in for critical reevaluation and many fathers have been called upon to contribute more than just money to their families. Since the 1988 federal welfare reforms, relief policy has begun to be reconstructed around the fact that the responsibilities of breadwinning in most families now are shared. The 1996 welfare reform recognized this "de-gendering" of breadwinning responsibilities by requiring that even the mothers of young children must work after a short period of cash assistance. This new requirement is significant in that it is a departure from the support that welfare provision formally provided for poor women working as full-time mothers. Despite this change in the official treatment of poor mothers and

fathers, breadwinning remains an important paternal norm and, thus, the enforcement of child support orders remains a fundamental element of federal welfare policy. While the continued emphasis on collecting child support from absent fathers, or "deadbeat dads", is still a politically popular approach to addressing the poverty of some families, the alterations in relief programs over the past two decades do constitute a significant change in the gendered institutional norms of the welfare state.

In this period of cultural and political change, Congress, since 1988, has progressively returned authority over welfare programs and policies to the states. Several states have begun to use their renewed authority over welfare policy to experiment with programs designed to bring fathers back in to poor families. Thus, a few states have developed welfare-based fatherhood programs specifically designed to encourage a more "responsible" practice of fatherhood. These programs typically embody a public fatherhood defined both by the developing hegemonic expectations of fathers that they will be both breadwinners and an active paternal "presence" in their families. In order to elucidate this dual character of fatherhood programs, I briefly discuss the character of some of the most prominent fatherhood programs and then present interview data collected from the administrators and

participants in a fatherhood program. I find that while the participants in this program did support the notion that a good father is foremost a good provider, the circumstances of the program and of their lives encouraged them to be an active and nurturing presence in the lives of their children. With these programs and the federal reforms of the past few years, the American system of relief is now moving, in halting steps, away from replacing the support of absent fathers and towards encouraging mothers to share support responsibilities and fathers to maintain an active presence in their families.

HEGEMONIC FATHERHOOD AND THE CHANGING GENDER ORDER

Although the "new fatherhood" of the nineteen-twenties and thirties had brought men back into families at least in a helping role, the hegemonic expectations of fatherhood continued to be associated with breadwinning. In fact, it was not until the nineteen-sixties and seventies that the gender division of labor in the family began to be effectively challenged by both the growing feminist movement and economic developments. In 1963, Friedan (1983) voiced the feminist criticism of the breadwinner/housewife model of family life with its clearly delineated gender roles and its "mystique of feminine fulfillment" through domestic labor

and childrearing. Rather, she argued, the feminine specialization on these domestic responsibilities had trapped women in a world of stultifying drudgery while freeing men to pursue more fulfilling lives in the public realm. At the same time that feminists were making this critique, families faced declining wages for male breadwinners further encouraging more women to join the workforce in order to maintain family living standards.⁵⁷ Thus the feminist challenge to the "fundamental assumption that the principal economic unit is the two-parent family, only one of whom is the primary wage-earner, with the other being cast in a supporting role" (Freeman 1990: 477), has thus coincided with economic developments that have made it increasingly difficult for most Americans to maintain such families.

The "de-gendering" of breadwinning, brought about by the entry of greater numbers of women with young children into the paid work force (Cherlin 1988, Ellwood 1988, C. Epstein 1988), has encouraged the reexamination of what practices actually constitute good fathering. In fact, the "increased occupational role of women has altered the

⁵⁷ While these changes in family structure have occurred in all racial and class groups in America, they have been most significant for white working and middle-class families. African American mothers have long been responsible for labor both inside the family and in the economy. In fact, African American women since the end of slavery have participated in the labor force in greater numbers than have white women (Collins 1991: 43-66, A. Miller 1993: 285-289, Neckerman 1993: 200).

dynamics of family life" (C. Epstein 1988: 169). Thus, Barnett and Baruch find that "in families with employed mothers, the number of hours the wife worked per week was the strongest single predictor of fathers' participation" in household and childcare tasks (1987: 36). These new family power relations have meant that many women now expect fathers to share in the nurturing and care of young children. Ideologically dominant since the mid-nineteenth-century, the model of fatherhood based on the idea that men would earn a "family wage" sufficient to support a wife engaged in full-time homemaking is fast losing whatever limited economic salience it once had. With more women in the workforce, and increasing demands for equality from women, many families were forced to reexamine the gender division of labor associated with fathers having sole responsibility for breadwinning.

With the breadwinner/housewife division of labor in the family, the acceptable paternal model had been one where the father was:

uninvolved in child care—pacing the waiting room floor during childbirth, never changing a diaper or warming a bottle, and generally steering clear of the nursery . . . provid(ing) a strong but distant model for their children and moral and material support for their wives (Parke 1996: 1).

By the nineteen-eighties, many expected that a good father is one who:

is present at the birth; . . . involved with his

children as infants, not just when they are older; . . .
. . . participates in the actual day-to-day work of child
care, and not just play; (and is) involved with his
daughters as much as his sons (Pleck 1987: 93).

Further, some men had begun to recognize that, while they
gained freedom by abandoning domestic labor and childrearing
to mothers, they lost access to the love and affection that
children develop for their primary caregivers (LaRossa 1997:
16). Thus, men are now confronted with cultural
expectations of greater involvement, a growing personal
awareness that they lose by being emotionally "absent"
parents, and a more tenuous hold on their sole association
with breadwinning.

Nonetheless, while more mothers have begun to share
breadwinning responsibilities with fathers over the past
twenty years, parenting norms and ideologies have changed
faster than have parenting practices. Family researchers
have found an "asynchrony between culture and conduct" in
many families (LaRossa 1988, 1997). Men, they find, are
more likely to express support for the idea of sharing
childrearing and household responsibilities than they are to
actually take on these responsibilities (A. Hochschild 1989,
LaRossa 1988). Thus, although family researchers have found
evidence of a growing subset of fathers who share
childrearing responsibilities, they have also found a
remarkable persistence of parenting patterns formed around
the division of household labor implicit in the

breadwinner/housewife model (Brannen and Moss 1987, A. Hochschild 1989, Horna and Lupri 1987, Sanchez and Thomson 1997). In fact, as women have entered the paid work force many have not seen a reduction in their household responsibilities, rather they now work a "second shift" at home, after their paid work is done (A. Hochschild 1989). While there is some evidence that men are beginning to contribute more household labor, in most families women still do a disproportionate share of this work (Aldous, et al. 1998, Coltrane 1995: 260-1). Thus, women now face many of the same pressures to succeed in the work world that men have faced but with little relief from the demands of child care and housework. Fathers too face increasing economic and personal pressures to participate in childrearing, but at the same time the dominant expectations of fathers remain those of being the principal provider for their families.

PUBLIC FATHERHOOD AND THE FEDERAL WELFARE STATE, 1988-1996

In the nineteenth-century, state relief programs supported a household division of labor defined by a fatherly responsibility for breadwinning and a motherly responsibility for childrearing and domestic labor. Federally mandated welfare programs in the early twentieth-century continued the support for this gender division of

labor in the family (Abromowitz 1988: 313-42, Burtless 1989: 105-107, L. Gordon 1988, Mink 1990, Sapiro 1986). The public fatherhood that such programs embodied was one in which the economic contributions of men were valued above their physical presence in the everyday lives of their families. Mothers, these programs implied, should be counted upon to nurture children and do domestic labor and fathers should concentrate on breadwinning.

In the past two decades, federal welfare institutions have come to embody a public fatherhood defined by the cultural reevaluation of the gender division of labor in the family. Thus, as more mothers outside of the welfare system have been expected to work to help support their families, the exemption of mothers receiving welfare from these expectations have been increasingly criticized. In fact, a new consensus has emerged that mothers who lack financial support from men should work (M. Bane 1988, Garfinkel and McLanahan 1994, Mink 1998, Orloff 1998).⁵⁸ Recent reforms have thus begun to recognize a shared responsibility for breadwinning. At the same time, welfare reforms have sought

⁵⁸ Mink has argued that this consensus around obliging mothers receiving assistance to work has gained crucial support from feminists who, she asserts, "have conflated their own *right* to work outside the home with poor single mothers *obligation* to do so" (1998: 28). Of course, most mothers work outside of the home not because they have a *right* to do so but rather because they have an economic need to do so. Moreover, as Edin and Lein's recent work has shown, most women receiving public assistance, even before the recent end of the AFDC program, were already working, albeit illegally, for pay (Edin 1991, Edin and Lein

to end the punitive treatment of two-parent families that existed formally until 1968 and informally for another two decades. Where state and federal programs had once decreed that only families with absent fathers were entitled to relief, recent changes in the law have offered financial assistance to "intact" families. Thus, recent federal policy changes have expressed support for the involvement of fathers in poor families and sought to encourage their physical presence as well as their economic contribution. Nonetheless, for those fathers who fail to support their children, federal and state policies have continued to include a variety of punitive measures designed to ensure the collection of child support obligations. These measures have gained political support because they are aimed at protecting children, punishing irresponsibility, and reducing public welfare expenditures.

While policies enforcing child support orders continue to embody a cultural expectation that fathers will be breadwinners, new policies and programs have begun to promote a broader definition of fatherhood. Thus, in response to cultural and political changes, several states have developed "fatherhood programs" designed to support the greater involvement of poor men, both as breadwinners and as an important physical presence, in the lives of their

1997a and 1997b).

children. In fact, most of these programs connect these two fatherly expectations in that they encourage the involvement of fathers in order to increase their commitment the voluntary payment of child support. Taken together, these institutional and policy developments constitute a gendered "institutional realignment" of the American welfare state as they express a new set of fatherhood expectations defined by the idea that men will both participate in childrearing and share breadwinning with women.⁵⁹

The "De-Gendering" of Breadwinning

With the passage of the "Family Support Act of 1988" (FSA) (P. L. 100-485), relief programs began to take account of the cultural reevaluation of the gender division of labor in the family. Specifically, the act sought to strengthen the requirement that recipients of assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program develop the skills needed to move off of the welfare roles and in to paid employment. To this end, title II of the Family Support Act (FSA) mandated that states implement a "Job

⁵⁹ Esping-Andersen argues that welfare states "pass through distinct regime changes and institutional realignments" defined by the changing relationship between the state and the economy, as societies evolve (1987: 7). Similarly, changes in welfare states can be understood in terms of the relationship between the state and the gender order.

Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program," intended to help poor families "avoid long-term welfare dependence" (P. L. 100-485, sec. 201, Part F, §481(a)). States were given the authority to require participation in their JOBS programs as a condition of receiving AFDC and required making such a program available statewide, if determined feasible, by 1992. However, the work requirement was waived for pregnant women, the parents of children under age three who are "personally providing care" for a child, or the parents of children under age six in states where child care is not provided by the state (P. L. 100-485, §201(a)(19)(C)). Educational activities of various sorts, (e.g., high school, college, or vocational school attendance) also qualified as work for purposes of this program. Finally, states were permitted to disregard need considerations when determining AFDC eligibility for those who refused to participate in the program. In other words, the FSA created an enforceable obligation on the part of recipients "to fulfill their responsibilities to support their children by preparing for, accepting, and retaining such employment as they are capable of performing" (P. L. 100-485, §201, Part F, §482(c)). Nonetheless, this work obligation was coupled with the continued support, through its various exceptions and exemptions, of mothers who stayed

at home to care for young children.⁶⁰

In 1996, these experiments in work requirements were replaced by the mandate that all welfare recipients should work and that even the mothers of very young children were to be included in this requirement. Thus, the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" (PRA) ended the entitlement to relief that had existed under the AFDC program and replaced it with "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families" (TANF) program. States must now:

require a parent or caretaker receiving assistance under the program to engage in work . . . once the State determines the parent or caretaker is ready to engage in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assistance under the program for 24 months (whether or not consecutive), whichever is earlier (P. L. 104-193, §103, amendment to Title IV, Part A, §402 of the Social Security Act).

Further, the funding of the TANF program depends on work participation rates, and:

a State may, at its option, not require an individual who is a single custodial parent caring for a child who has not attained 12 months of age to engage in work, and may disregard such an individual in determining the participation rates (P. L. 104-193, §103, amendment to Title IV, Part A, §407 of the Social Security Act).

This provision thus creates a financial incentive for states to require the parents of children over age one to work (Gallagher, et al. 1998: V-2). In fact, forty-five of the

⁶⁰ Patterson has argued that the nineteen-eighties reforms were part of a general shift in emphasis from helping the poor to encouraging

states have responded to these incentives by mandating that single parents of children older than one year must participate in work, with eighteen states requiring that the parents of children over six months old work (Ibid.). Thus, unlike AFDC and older relief programs, the new federal welfare program specifically encourages the paid employment of the mothers of young children. Today poor mothers are expected both to work in exchange for public assistance and to develop the skills that they will need to at least share in the responsibilities of supporting their children. They now face the formal expectation that, like some of their middle-class counterparts, they too will share breadwinning responsibilities with fathers.⁶¹

Supporting "Intact Families"

By the nineteen-fifties, the structures of relief in America were well established. Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) provided cash relief to single mothers on the condition that they submit to varying levels of monitoring

work (1994: 210-242).

⁶¹ The perception that AFDC had enabled poor mothers to live a life out of step with this shared responsibility for breadwinning may have provided some of the motivation for this reform and the state-level reforms that inspired it. Similarly, arguments for New Jersey's Family Cap program, which denies additional benefits to women who have children while on welfare, drew on the perception that welfare enabled poor women to ignore the financial pressures that had led many middle-class women to put off or limit their childbearing (Gladwell 1993).

by state welfare workers. One object of this monitoring in many states was to ensure that there was no "man in the house" who could provide support to the mother and her children (Bell 1965: 76-110). Any such man present was presumed to be a "substitute father" and thus responsible for supporting the children in the household. Homes with men present were thus usually ineligible for assistance. Although assistance has been allowed for two-parent families since 1961, as late as 1968, when the Supreme Court (in *King v. Smith* 392 U.S. 309) struck down welfare rules denying assistance to women found living with a man, eighteen states and the District of Columbia still had such rules (Piven and Cloward 1971). Even as late as 1990, "two-parent families were ineligible for cash assistance in 22 states" (Winkler 1995: 4).

In a break with this legacy, the 1988 "Family Support Act" (FSA) was designed to remove any remaining incentives for father absence or family breakup. Specifically, where previous AFDC rules had *permitted* aid to two-parent families, now title IV of the FSA *required* states to provide AFDC to needy two-parent families (P. L. 100-485, Title IV, §401(a)). The FSA thus signaled the emergence of a concern with encouraging the presence of fathers in poor families and began the process of redefining the public expectations of both mothers and fathers. Nonetheless, mothers were

still expected to care for *young* children and AFDC benefits were still seen as making full-time childcare an option for these mothers. What had changed was that financial and legal incentives now explicitly encouraged fathers to stay with their children (Szanton 1991).

Child Support and Welfare Reform

Despite the changing expectations faced by fathers over the past several decades, the obligation to economically support one's children has been a constant. One way that this obligation is given direct support by the federal government is through its involvement in the area of child support collection. Although the federal government now sets standards for state collection efforts, before 1950 child support was considered a state, or even a local concern. In 1950, states were first required to cooperate in the pursuit of "deadbeat dads," as they have recently come to be called, by the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" (Josephson 1997). Nonetheless, the failure to pay court ordered support continued to be a growing problem and policy makers sought to address the problem of non-payment of support through a series of acts making collection easier. Thus, in 1965, Congress allowed the use of Social Security numbers to track non-paying fathers (P.

L. 89-97). In 1967, Congress further mandated the development of both a paternity establishment program for any child "born out of wedlock who is receiving aid to families with dependent children" and the establishment of a state child support collection agency (P. L. 90-248). Finally, in 1975, after discovering that these provisions, as Lima and Harris put it, were not being "vigorously implemented by the states" (1988: 25) and facing a growing problem of non-support, Congress created standards for state child support enforcement. Moreover, states gained a financial incentive to pursue non-paying parents. Specifically, states were instructed to use the amounts that they collected from such parents, after "passing through" a small amount to the families, to offset their own relief expenditures (P. L. 93-647). Thus, the effect of these reforms was to tie the collection of support order with state welfare expenditures.

Reforms in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties have continued to strengthen the federal role in the enforcement of child support obligations. For example, in 1984 the "Child Support Amendments" (P. L. 98-378) created mandatory collections procedures that allowed for automatic withholding of income from fathers who owed support. Moreover, the incentive for the state collection of child support obligations was augmented with a rule allowing

states to keep a percentage of support collected from both AFDC and non-AFDC cases. To aid this collection, states were allowed to seize the income tax refunds of non-paying parents. The FSA, in 1988, made an absent parent's wages subject to withholding "regardless of whether support payments by such parent are in arrears," set numerical standards for State paternity establishment programs, and established performance standards for child support collection agencies (P. L. 100-485, Title I). Even after these reforms, child support collection remained a problem and in 1992, the "Child Support Recovery Act" was passed (P. L. 102-521). This act increased the federal role in child support collection by mandating that not only would absent parents be responsible for restitution but also:

whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation to a child who resides in another State shall be punished . . . in the case of a first offense (by) . . . a fine, . . . imprisonment for not more than 6 months or both; and in any other case (by) . . . a fine . . . imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or both (P. L. 102-521).

Finally, Title III of the 1996 PRA requires that states revoke the drivers or professional licenses, garnish wages, and seize the assets of non-paying parents (P. L. 104-193, Title III, Subtitle G). The federal role in mandating state enforcement of child support orders thus has continued throughout the recent period of increasing state-level responsibility for welfare.

While child support collection, is not necessarily a "welfare issue," it has remained closely tied in public perception, policy analysis, and public policy making to the politics of welfare. Thus, throughout the early nineteen-eighties and nineties, policy analysts argued that better child support collection would lead to lower levels of welfare dependence (Lima and Harris 1988), a lower likelihood of returning to the welfare rolls after exiting, (D. Meyer 1993) would reduce child poverty in general, although perhaps only marginally (Sorenson and Clark 1994), and would decrease welfare program costs (Lerman 1989, Robins 1986). Policy makers continue to see the rigorous enforcement of child support obligations as a potentially effective, and politically popular, anti-poverty measure. The laws that have arisen in this context provide evidence for a widespread belief among policy making elites that the problems of poverty can, in large measure, be traced to the moral and economic failings of certain fathers and that the failure of these men to take responsibility for their actions leads to significant public costs. The longstanding federal interest in the problem of non-support reveals the persistence, even in the face of cultural changes, of a public fatherhood defined by breadwinning expectations. Perhaps because fatherhood now is in flux, policy makers have held most firmly to previously dominant expectations of

fathers.

"Promoting Responsible Fatherhood"

The cultural uncertainty surrounding fatherhood has also created an opportunity for various policy experiments. Specifically, several states have used the devolution of authority embodied in both the 1988 and 1996 welfare reforms to pursue the development of fatherhood programs to address the needs of poor fathers and to use these programs to give public support to "responsible fatherhood" practices. These programs, many of which have arisen from within state child support enforcement bureaucracies, have been focused not only on supporting breadwinning fatherhood but also on using the social work expertise of state welfare offices to encourage active parental participation by poor fathers. Fatherhood programs thus have set as their goals, increasing both the amount and the quality of father-child contact, encouraging the acknowledgment of paternity, and at the same time, increasing child support collections by improving the earning potential of participant fathers.

One such program, the "Parents' Fair Share" (PFS) project, began as a demonstration project in the early nineteen-nineties. The program was an adjunct to child support enforcement efforts and continues to exert an

influence over the development of new fatherhood programs. In this program, child support enforcement authorities can require that non-custodial parents who are unable to meet child support obligations participate in programs providing education, training, support groups, and fatherhood education. While, the principal goal of the program is to improve child support collection by increasing the earnings potential of participants, fathers participating in the program are also encouraged to become more involved in the lives of their children. The PFS program, which began in 1992 and expanded to seven locations around the country in 1994, has now been adopted at the state level in Massachusetts, Missouri and Tennessee (S. Bernard and Knitzer 1999, Doolittle, et al. 1998, Doolittle and Lynn 1998).⁶²

In the past few years, other states and localities have begun to implement fatherhood programs. For example, the "Alternative Parent Support Program" of the Arkansas Child Support Agency offers to non-custodial parents, the postponement of child support payments in exchange for enrolling in education, job training, and parent education classes. Vermont's "Reach Up" state welfare program offers

⁶² The sites in the demonstration program in 1997 were: Los Angeles, California; Jacksonville, Florida; Springfield, Massachusetts; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Trenton, New Jersey; Dayton, Ohio; and Memphis, Tennessee (Doolittle, et al. 1998).

case management services to fathers of children receiving assistance in order to encourage their increased financial and emotional involvement. Both, Wisconsin and Oregon include parenting skills instruction in the job training programs that they offer to non-custodial parents of children receiving TANF. In addition, California has recently implemented a parent education and employment training program designed to increase child support collection and father involvement in poor families called the "Noncustodial Parent Employment and Training Demonstration Program" (S. Bernard and Knitzer 1999: 81-187). Finally, many states are exploring the creation of fatherhood programs through the Welfare-to-Work grants available from the federal government under the 1996 welfare reform law (DeParle 1998: A1).

In order to get a better understanding of how fatherhood programs such as these actually affect the men who participate in them, I conducted several interviews with both participants and administrators in one locally run program in Maryland. In 1995, I interviewed administrators and six participants in the Annapolis, Maryland, Young Unwed Fathers (YUF) program. The YUF had begun as a pilot program in March of 1991 (funding for the pilot program ended in 1996) and was linked directly to the child support enforcement bureaucracy in the areas where it was

undertaken.⁶³ The express goals of program were to:

improve the capacity of young men to care for their children, both as providers and parents. . . . to improve or reinforce the parenting skills of young fathers; To increase the employment and earnings potential of young fathers; To motivate young fathers to declare legal paternity for their children and pay child support (Achatz and MacAllum 1994: 1).

As one of the administrators in Maryland described the program, it was designed:

to encourage men to take responsibility for their children and get them to think of the family as not just the mother and child but to include fathers. We're interested in getting these men back into their children's lives in a constructive way.⁶⁴

The goals of this program thus coupled the conventional concerns with fatherhood as an economic practice to some official recognition that the "involvement" of fathers matters for the lives of children.

At the Maryland site, the YUF program provided a variety of services to the participants. These services included, basic literacy education, computer skills training, counseling and support group services, and on-site child care services. Fathers met in a support group with other young fathers to discuss coping with the stresses of parenthood, relationship issues, and job-related concerns. The fathers also occasionally met with mothers for similar

⁶³ The sites in this program were: Annapolis, Maryland; Cleveland, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Racine, Wisconsin; and St. Petersburg, Florida (Achatz and MacAllum 1994).

⁶⁴ Interview with Tyrone Furman, Director, Young Unwed Fathers

discussions. Basic literacy and skills training workshops were conducted by an instructor hired by the child support enforcement office. The most important component of the program, in the estimation of the participants that I talked with, was the on-site child-care services. As part of these services, fathers participating in the program were responsible for dropping off their children at the day care center and for picking them up at the end of the day. In addition, fathers were encouraged to visit the day care center on breaks from the education and training program and were required to eat lunch with their children each day that they attended the program. The program thus created opportunities for fathers to practice being an active paternal presence in the lives of their children, at the same time that it supported their efforts to become more effective providers.

While the fathers that I interviewed expressed support for the childcare provisions of this program, and many of them reported significant involvement in childrearing, most identified breadwinning as the most important responsibility of a father. For example, when asked, "who should be responsible for earning money to support a family?"

Robert⁶⁵ said:

Program, 1995.

⁶⁵ All of the names used are pseudonyms.

I think the father should but it depends on the circumstances. Both of them could do it but I think it's eventually the father's responsibility.

Eric described his fatherhood aspirations in terms that necessarily placed a great deal of importance on breadwinning. As he put it:

Everything I didn't have when I was young, when I was growing up, they're gonna get and some. They gonna get more that and more. Like when I was growing up . . . I was wearing off brand clothes, but my kids coming up gonna wear, if I got the money to buy it they gonna get it, anything. . . . I want to give my child everything they want, everything they need, everything they like, anything.

While Robert had a part-time job at the time of the interview, unemployed informants expressed similar beliefs. For example, Tony said that he wanted to be the type of "father that is able to support my kids." Chris, also unemployed, said:

I'm old fashioned. I think the man should take care of the household. He should provide the house (and) the food and she's (the mother) supposed to provide the cleaning and if she wants to work, that's her choice.

For fathers, these interviewees said, work is a responsibility, for mothers it is a choice. While these young fathers faced significant barriers to becoming successful providers (i.e., they had all dropped out of high school and faced life in a community where the poverty rate for African Americans was three times that of whites), they nonetheless all expressed a desire to be better providers for their children. These fathers saw their participation

in this program, especially its educational component, as a means to that end.⁶⁶

Another idea of fatherhood that enjoyed support from these young men was that of moral guide and protector for their children. For example, Robert, who lives apart from his children, expressed a common desire on the part of the informants when he said: "I'd like to be a successful father. You know, like somebody that they could look up to." Fatherhood, he argued, should be defined as:

Being there for your children, helping them to grow, being a role model, a positive role model . . . You have to watch how you're living and you have to be positive with what you're doing so that you can project (that) to your children.

Eric too, said that he wanted to "teach them (i.e., his children) to go the right way and not to go the way I went." Or as he later put it, fatherhood is "motivating them to move on in life and do the right thing and have respect for their elders. Just motivating them to do the right thing." Many of these participants identified this absence of a moral example from their own lives as being at the root of their own problems. As Chris put it

⁶⁶ Several recent studies have sought to determine the parenting knowledge and fatherhood practices and attitudes of young and poor fathers. In a small sample of young African American fathers, Christmon (1990) found that adolescent males often held conventional views of the sexual division of proper parenting roles. Teti and Lamb (1986) have theorized that adolescents tend to have more conventional beliefs about fatherhood and the proper practices of gender because they are themselves negotiating their own transition to adulthood and are searching for accepted models of behavior.

I hadn't seen my father in ten years, I seen him twice within ten years and I talk to him on a daily basis now, but he was never actually there for me. So I basically had to take it upon myself to say OK, I'm gonna give my son something I never had. I don't want my son to go without having a father.

Providing a paternal presence for their children was an important aspect of what these young men saw as their paternal responsibilities.

All informants shared a common understanding of fatherhood. Specifically, all identified the responsibilities of fatherhood as being a provider, protector, and moral guide.⁶⁷ Tony summed it up best when he said that he felt the main responsibilities of fatherhood were "feeding the kids, making sure they have enough to eat, keeping them safe, and pointing them in the right direction." Despite the predominance of these conventional beliefs about fatherhood, these young men participated in a program that provided them with opportunities to be a more active paternal presence in the lives of their children. In fact, although the program included job training and education, the social work components of the program, such as the day care and the parenting support groups, required more attention from participants and demanded more staff

⁶⁷ Allen and Doherty (1996) and Waller (1995) have reported similar findings from a interviews with poor adolescent African American fathers. They found that these fathers defined fatherhood in terms of "being there" for the children and a "responsibility" for both support and guidance (Allen and Doherty 1996: 148-9).

resources. Programs such as this one often have a tenuous and fleeting existence and the Annapolis YUF program withered away in 1996. Nonetheless, the ongoing development of fatherhood programs and responsible fatherhood initiatives by both states and the federal government, shows that policy makers and relief workers have begun to show an interest in reproducing a public fatherhood defined by more than just breadwinning.

CONCLUSION

Various welfare reforms at the federal level and new programs developed by states in recent years have embodied a public fatherhood defined by the belief that the presence of fathers in families matters nearly as much as their financial contributions. Changes in the status of women and the increasingly dominant expectation that mothers will share breadwinning responsibilities has led to a reevaluation of the norms and practices of fatherhood. While change in the practices of fatherhood has come slower than a change in beliefs, many fathers are now expected to contribute more than financial resources to families. As "deadbeat dads" and absent fathers have come in for universal condemnation, being a good father has come to mean maintaining an everyday paternal presence in families.

Federal welfare reforms and innovative state programs have embodied these expectations in a variety of ways. Welfare reform legislation since 1988, and especially since 1996, has recognized that breadwinning responsibilities are shared between most mothers and fathers by demanding that mothers work in exchange for assistance. In a break with the policy legacy created by the mother's pensions of the early twentieth century, the support of full-time motherhood is no longer the object of federal relief. Now even the mothers of young children are expected to work in paid employment. The concern with father absence has also led welfare reformers to guarantee that two-parent families would receive the same consideration as single-parent families in the determination of eligibility for assistance. The reforms of 1988 and 1996 were expressly designed to keep poor families "intact" by ending the practice of "rewarding" with cash assistance those families that break up. With these reforms, a "man in the house" no longer constituted a barrier to relief. Despite these efforts to encourage a fatherly presence in poor families, significant federal efforts have been made to strengthen the laws enforcing the collection of child support from absent fathers. The law still recognizes the responsibility of fathers to support their children, even if that responsibility is now shared with mothers. In fact, federal rules and incentives for

states have only improved the tools available to collect that support.

State "responsible fatherhood" programs also promote a conception of fatherhood defined by providing for children and maintaining a presence in their lives. In several states, programs have been developed, usually in association with child support enforcement bureaucracies, that seek to both improve the breadwinning potential of their participants and at the same time facilitate the greater involvement of fathers in the lives of their children. Fatherhood programs provide a variety of services to poor fathers including, education, job training, counseling, and parenting instruction. Men in these programs are thus afforded an opportunity to develop the skills that will facilitate their being both a good provider and a more involved parent. My own interviews suggest that some of the fatherhood beliefs of the men in these programs may be slow to change. In fact, those that I interviewed continue to see breadwinning as a fatherly responsibility and a motherly choice. However, their own experiences with absent fathers has led most of the young fathers that I interviewed to express a commitment to maintaining an active and positive presence for their children. The program that these fathers participated in provided not only educational opportunities but also nurturing and child rearing opportunities. The

emerging construction of the public father that these reforms and programs embody entails a step back from the diminished paternal presence encouraged by nineteenth and early twentieth century relief programs and an expansion of fatherhood expectations. It remains to be seen whether states will remain committed to the difficult task of encouraging a practice of fatherhood that goes beyond being a good provider.

CONCLUSION

The dominant norms and practices of gender at any given time are embodied in the institutions and policies designed to relieve poverty. Moreover, throughout the development of the American welfare state, relief policies and institutions both have embodied dominant cultural patterns of paternity and have served as important tools for reproducing particular fatherhood practices. Thus, while relief policies have embodied a public fatherhood defined by the changing hegemonic norms and practices of American fatherhood, those policies themselves are implicated in reproducing those practices. The welfare state thus both reflects dominant social norms and practices and, at the same time, authoritatively reproduces the social order from which these norms and practices arise. In each of the previous chapters, I have sought to illuminate this interrelationship between state policy and the gender order. In particular, I have shown that relief policies, by both reflecting and reproducing hegemonic fatherhood, construct a public father.

The various institutional expressions of public fatherhood have provided an important legacy affecting the subsequent development of social welfare laws and institutions. Prior institutional arrangements,

legitimizing ideas, and cultural patterns, are also each important determinants of institutional development. Past policies and laws affect new approaches to social welfare both by developing certain institutional capacities and creating a legacy of policy successes and failures. Thus, for example, the settlement laws that were central to the local system of poor relief in colonial New Jersey persisted into the twentieth century, even as poverty came to be recognized as first a state and then a federal responsibility. These institutional arrangements played an important part in constructing a public fatherhood that officially denied black fathers the same legal recognition as whites. A variety of institutions, legitimating ideas and cultural patterns thus shaped how the recognized social obligation to the poor would be met.

The failure of local relief institutions to meet the welfare demands of the depressions of the nineteen-thirties taught many policy makers that state and federal polities should share the responsibility for meeting social welfare needs. The new social welfare and work relief programs that arose from this political learning embodied a public fatherhood defined both by hegemonic expectations of paternity and a longstanding reticence, itself arising from dominant norms of masculinity, of localities to provide cash assistance to men.

In addition, the legitimation of poor relief institutions, in each of the periods examined here, by an appeal to the power of public policy to change the "profligate" or "dysfunctional" ways of poor families has also been important. Thus, in each of these periods, relief institutions have monitored and supervised the lives of poor families with the hope that such supervision will restore responsible fatherhood and thereby remove the necessity of public support.

Finally, American cultural patterns defined by liberalism, republicanism, patriarchy, and racism have played an important part in determining the development of relief institutions. Liberal and republican values conflict with either providing direct cash assistance to men or with subjecting poor fathers to the same more supervisory apparatus as women and children. Thus, providing relief to women and children remained the central concern of social welfare institutions throughout the development of the American welfare state. Relief for men, when it was provided, came in response to general crises and typically required work in exchange for aid.

Patriarchal ideologies have legitimated the reproduction of an expansive paternal authority in the colonial period and a maternal responsibility for childrearing in subsequent periods. Racist arguments were

employed in the colonial period to deny even freed blacks access to the resources needed to fulfill the obligations and expectations of fatherhood dominant at the time. Moreover, the legacy of slavery continued to exert an influence in the differential treatment of the children of African American fathers in New Jersey until well into the nineteenth century.

As the institutions of social welfare have developed over the past few centuries in America, these institutions have reproduced particular patterns of gender and, specifically, parenting. Those patterns, as I have shown here, have changed over time as fathers and mothers have had relatively more or less authority and varying areas of responsibility in families. From primary parent in the colonial period to often absent breadwinner in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the involved paternal presence expected in many quarters today, fathers have seen the dominant expectations of their family behavior change radically. Mothers too have seen the dominant expectations of their parenting responsibilities change from legally subordinate member of the household to one whose care is preferred to fathers and finally to new expectations of shared breadwinning responsibilities. These changes indicate that gender, and more specifically parenting, is not a simple reflection of biological sexual differences but

rather is a set of social practices constructed in relation to those differences and to other power relations.

Racial, economic and gender relations of power and subordination are particularly important for understanding the hegemony of specific paternal norms and practices. Throughout the period examined in this dissertation, slavery and racial discrimination have prevented many African American fathers from meeting the hegemonic expectations of fatherhood. In the colonial period in New Jersey, enslaved African American fathers were specifically prohibited from hunting or trading or otherwise fulfilling the economic responsibilities of colonial fathers. Even freed blacks faced a colonial prohibition against either owning property or travel. Well into the nineteenth century, black fathers in New Jersey, faced the presumption in the poor law that their children were in some ways to be treated as illegitimate. In addition, while the recent public discourse around welfare condemning "absent fathers" is often a thinly veiled attack on black fathers for their failure to meet the hegemonic breadwinning expectations of fatherhood, those same fathers face continued employment discrimination.

Poor fathers of all races have faced both the state supervision of their families and the loss of their authority over their children. In the colonial period,

public institutions, from workhouses to farming out arrangements and indenture contracts, were devised to meet the responsibilities of fathers who failed to bring their children up to be industrious and honest. The practice of indenturing poor children to the service of other fathers also recognized the responsibility of fathers not only to provide for children but also to prepare them for an independent life. When fathers failed to meet these responsibilities, they faced the loss of their children, fines, or corporal punishment. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, poor law officials retained the right to remove children from poor families and have them "bound out" to the supervision of other fathers or institutions. With the development of federal welfare relief in the nineteen-thirties and until the nineteen-nineties in some states, poor fathers faced the requirement that they leave their families in order for their children to receive assistance from the state.

Public fatherhood has also embodied the dominant order of gendered power relations in American families. Thus, in the colonial period in New Jersey, the poor laws and related institutions constituted a public fatherhood defined by the culturally dominant patriarchal family order. Colonial legislation reproduced paternal authority by providing legitimacy and recognition to the patriarchal organization

of family life. Laws mandated obedience from household members and supported the authority of fathers over children and servants. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, colonial law reproduced a declining patriarchal authority. Limits were placed on the right of fathers to control the marriage choices of adult children. Finally, the poor law began to address the problems of a new class of the "wandering poor" constituted largely of men who sought their way in the world outside of the household economy controlled by fathers.

In nineteenth and early twentieth century New Jersey, the public fatherhood embodied in poor relief laws and related legislation both reflected and reproduced the diminished presence of fathers in families. Fathers saw the gradual erosion of their publicly recognized family rights and responsibilities. Married women gained the right to own and control property, and, at the same time, mothers came to be recognized as the primary parent, especially with regard to young children. The developing commercial economy took more men out of the home to earn a living and the common law presumption in favor of fathers with regard to child custody was replaced by a legal practice based on the idea that the "best interests of the child" should rule. The dominant "separate spheres" ideology of the nineteenth century ensured that in most cases those interests would be thought

to lie with the mother. Despite these diminishing prerogatives, fathers faced the belief that their manhood depended upon their ability to support themselves and their families with their independent efforts. When economic crisis threatened this ability, poor fathers were expected to work in community workhouses or make-work projects. As public fatherhood came to be defined almost entirely by the demands of being a good provider, poor men regularly faced the possibility that they would fail to meet these fatherhood demands.

In recent years, federal welfare reforms and various state-level programs have begun to express a public fatherhood defined not only by providing but also by an active paternal presence in families. As cultural agreement on what constitutes the practices of good fatherhood has declined, the public fatherhood embodied in social welfare policy has itself been reexamined. Thus, public welfare policies in the nineteen-eighties and nineties have expressed the expectations, already the norm in most families, of a shared responsibility for breadwinning. Moreover, these policies have been designed to end any previous expectation that fathers must leave their families to get support for their children from the state. However, the continued emphasis on enforcing the child support obligations of absent fathers and "deadbeat dads"

demonstrates that breadwinning remains an important part of any public notion of fatherhood. Nonetheless, the expectation that mothers now share in these responsibilities may encourage demands that men share in the responsibilities of childcare and domestic labor typically assigned to mothers.

Several states recently have begun using parent instruction and job training programs targeted at the fathers of children receiving assistance to promote an expanded understanding of "responsible fatherhood" norms and practices. While these programs, often directly connected to local child support enforcement bureaucracies, continue to emphasize making fathers into better providers, they have also promoted the importance of a paternal presence. My interviews with the participants in one of these programs illustrate the importance to poor fathers of meeting both of these demands of public fatherhood. As states take on more of the responsibility for relief under the new federal welfare system, poor fathers will continue to face the public expectation that they both support their children and maintain an active paternal presence. While the expectations of what fathers should do in families are now in transition, a consensus seems to be emerging that fathers can no longer only be breadwinners. It remains to be seen if the paternal presence expected by public welfare programs

harks back to the "new fatherhood" of the nineteen-twenties and thirties that called on men to be playmates and role models for children or looks forward to a more equitable sharing of childcare and nurturing responsibilities.

Throughout the development of American relief, the laws and institutions of welfare have embodied a public fatherhood defined largely by hegemonic norms and practices of paternity. Throughout this development, alternative models of fatherhood have persisted and those men who have been blocked from meeting the expectations of public fatherhood have resisted marginalization. Nonetheless, in large part, the story of the development of the welfare state has been one of the removing poor fathers from a significant role in their families. This general policy direction is now shifting as states attempt to encourage, through a variety of incentives and programs, poor fathers to maintain a paternal presence in their families. Moreover, at the same time that states are encouraging this paternal presence, the dominant expectations of fatherhood are themselves in transition. Since it is in periods of uncertainty and change that state authority can have the greatest cultural effect, this congruence of policy and cultural change presents an important opportunity. In some states, it may be possible to use the authority of the public welfare system to support changes in families that

would encourage fathers to share in the nurturing and caregiving that have been the primary responsibilities of mothers. Although many fathers can be expected to resist any such renegotiation of the gender division of labor in the home, others might seize the opportunity created by a new idea of public fatherhood to develop a closer emotional connection to their children and to truly make their paternal presence matter.

APPENDIX A - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The following questions were asked of participants in the Annapolis, Maryland, Young Unwed Fathers Program. The interview schedule was approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human subjects in Research, access # 96-032 R.

I want to start with getting some basic background information.

How old are you?

How old were you when you first became a father?

How many children do you have?

Are you married?

Where do your children live?

How old are your children?

When your first child was born, how did you find out you were going to be a father?

What was your relationship to the mother of your child at that time?

Who do you live with now?

How old is the mother of your children?

In an average month, how often would you say you see your children?

When is the last time you saw them?

How much regular contact do you have with your children?

Would you like to change the amount of time that you spend with them?

Can you describe a typical day in your children's life?

I'm going to read off some activities and if you could just tell me whether these are things that you think should be done by a mother, or a father, both or someone else.

Making sure that the child has clothes that are the right size or Shopping for clothes/shoes

Grocery shopping

Feeding/preparing food or formula

Changing diapers

Buying birthday gifts

Disciplining children

Teaching children right from wrong

Helping school age children with school work

Cleaning/bathing children

Earning money to support the family

Taking the child to the doctor

Playing with children

When you were growing up, in your own family how were those things divided up?

Some people say that you have to treat boys and girls differently when they are growing up, what do you think about that?

Do you have any brothers and sisters?

Did your parents treat you differently because you were a boy?

When you were growing, what was your family situation?

And what did your mother and father do?

What kind of father would you like to be?

How did you find out about this program?

Describe a typical day in this program?

Now that you have been in this program for awhile, what do you like about it? What do you dislike about it?

How has this program helped you or hindered you ?

Do you see yourself as different from people who aren't in this program?

How would you define fatherhood?

What would you say is the main responsibility of a father?

REFERENCES

- Abromowitz, Mimi. 1988. *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present*. Boston: South End Press.
- Achatz, Mary and Crystal A. MacAllum. 1994. *Young Unwed Fathers: Report from the Field*. Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures.
- Acts of the Nineteenth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the Second Sitting*. 1795. Trenton: Matthias Day.
- Acts of the Twenty-Second General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the Second Sitting*. 1798. Trenton: Matthias Day.
- Acts of the Twenty-Third General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the Second Sitting*. 1799. Trenton: Gershom Craft.
- Acts of the Twenty-Eighth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the Second Sitting*. 1804. Trenton: Wilson and Blackwell.
- Acts of the Thirty-Fifth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the Second Sitting*. 1811. Trenton: James J. Wilson.
- Acts of the Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey*. 1820. Trenton: Joseph Justice.
- Acts of the Sixty-Eighth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey. Being the First Sitting*. 1844. Freehold: Bernard Connolly.
- Acts of the Seventy-Sixty Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Eight Session Under the New Constitution*. 1852. Somerville, New Jersey: Donaldson and Brokaw.
- Acts of the Eighty-Fourth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Sixteenth Under the New Constitution*. 1860. Paterson, New Jersey: Andrew Mead.
- Acts of the Ninety-First Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Twenty-Third Under the New Constitution*.

1867. Paterson, New Jersey: Chiswell and Wurts.

Acts of the Ninety-Fifth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Twenty-Seventh Under the New Constitution. 1871. Morristown, New Jersey: Vance and Stiles, Printers.

Acts of the One Hundredth Legislature of the State of New Jersey. 1876. Paterson, New Jersey: Chiswell and Wurts.

Acts of the One Hundred and Second Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Fourth Under the New Constitution. 1878. Elizabeth, New Jersey: Drake and Cook, "Elizabeth Herald" Printing House.

Acts of the One Hundred and Third Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Fifth Under the New Constitution. 1879. Morristown, New Jersey: Vance and Stiles, Printers.

Acts of the One Hundred and Fourth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Sixth Under the New Constitution. 1880. Morristown, New Jersey: Vance and Stiles, Printers.

Acts of the One Hundred and Fifth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Seventh Under the New Constitution. 1881. Gloucester City, New Jersey: Thomas C. Hamilton.

Acts of the One Hundred and Sixth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Eighth Under the New Constitution. 1882. Paterson, New Jersey: Carleton M. Herrick.

Acts of the One Hundred and Seventh Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Thirty-Ninth Under the New Constitution. 1883. Paterson, New Jersey: Carleton M. Herrick.

Acts of the One Hundred and Eighth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Fortieth Under the New Constitution. 1884. Camden, New Jersey: Sinnickson Chew.

Acts of the One Hundred and Twelfth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Forty-Fourth Under the New Constitution. 1888. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Forty-Fifth Under the New Constitution. 1889. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Sixteenth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Forty-Eighth Under the New Constitution. 1892. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Nineteenth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Fifty-First Under the New Constitution. 1895. Camden, New Jersey: F. F. Patterson.

Acts of the One Hundred and Twentieth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Fifty-Second Under the New Constitution. 1896. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Twenty-Third Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Fifty-fifth Under the New Constitution. 1899. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Thirty-Fifth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Sixty-Seventh Under the New Constitution. 1911. Paterson, New Jersey: News Printing Company.

Acts of the One Hundred and Thirty-Seventh Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Sixty-Ninth Under the New Constitution. 1913. Union Hill, New Jersey: Dispatch Printing Company.

Acts of the One Hundred and Thirty-Ninth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Seventy-First Under the New Constitution. 1915. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Forty-second Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Seventy-fourth Under the New Constitution. 1918. Union Hill, New Jersey: Hudson Printing Company.

Acts of the One Hundred and Forty-fifth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Seventy-seventh Under the New Constitution. 1921. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Forty-eighth Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Eightieth Under the New Constitution. 1924. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.

Acts of the One Hundred and Fifty-Fifth Legislature of the

- State of New Jersey, and Eighty-Seventh Under the New Constitution.* 1931. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.
- Acts of the One Hundred and Fifty-Seventh Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and Eighty-Ninth Under the New Constitution.* 1933. Trenton: MacCrellish and Quigley.
- Aldous, Joan, Gail M. Mulligan, and Thoroddur Bjarnason. 1998. "Fathering over Time: What Makes the Difference?" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 60(November): 809-820.
- Allen, William D. and William J. Doherty. 1996. "The Responsibilities of Fatherhood as Perceived by African American Teenage Fathers." *Families in Society* 77, 3 (March): 142-155.
- Allinson, Samuel, ed. 1776. *Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New-Jersey: from the Surrender of the Government to Queen Anne, on the 17th Day of April in the Year of Our Lord 1702, to the 14th Day of January 1776.* Burlington, New Jersey: Isaac Collins.
- Anshen, Ruth Nanda, ed. 1949. *The Family: Its Function and Destiny.* New York: Harper and Row.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aries, Phillippe. 1979. "The Family and the City in the Old World and the New." In Virginia Tufte and Barbara Meyerhoff, eds. *Changing Images of the Family.* New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Apter, David E., ed. 1964. *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: The Free Press.
- Atkinson, Brooks, ed. 1937. *Walden and Other Writings of Henry David Thoreau.* New York: The Modern Library.
- Auletta, Ken. 1982. *The Underclass.* New York: Random House.
- Axel-Lute, Paul. 1998. *New Jersey Legal Research Handbook, Fourth Edition.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education.
- Baker, Paula. 1984. "The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920." *American*

Historical Review 89, 3(June): 620-647.

Bane, Frank and Geoffrey May. 1949. *Public Welfare in New Jersey: A Structural Analysis*. Trenton, New Jersey: Council of State Governments.

Bane, Mary Jo. 1988. "Politics and Policies of the Feminization of Poverty." In Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*. Princeton University Press.

_____ and Paul A. Jargowsky. 1988. "The Links Between Government Policy and Family Structure: What Matters and What Doesn't." In Andrew J. Cherlin, ed. *The Changing American Family and Public Policy*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.

Barker, Ernest, ed. 1958. *The Politics of Aristotle*. London: Oxford University Press

Barnett, Rosalind C. and Grace K. Baruch. 1987. "Determinants of Fathers' Participation in Family Work." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 49 (February): 29-40.

Baumol, William J. and Alan S. Blinder. 1986. *Economics: Principles and Policy: Third Edition: Microeconomics*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Beard, Charles A. 1931. "The Myth of Rugged American Individualism." *Harpers Monthly Magazine* 164 (December): 13-22.

Beauvoir, Simone de. 1952. *The Second Sex*. Trans. and ed. by H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books.

Bederman, Gail. 1995. *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bell, Winifred. 1965. *Aid to Dependent Children*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Berkowitz, Edward D. and Kim McQuaid. 1992. *Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of 20th-Century Reform, Revised Edition*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

- Bernard, Jessie. 1981. "The Good-Provider Role: Its Rise and Fall." *American Psychologist* 36, 1(January): 1-12.
- Bernard, Stanley N. and Jane Knitzer. 1999. *Map and track: State Initiatives to Encourage Responsible Fatherhood, 1999 Edition*. New York: National Center for Children in Poverty.
- Besharov, Douglas J. and Amy A. Fowler. "The end of welfare as we know it?" *The Public Interest* 111 (Spring): 95-108.
- Blankenhorn, David. 1995. *Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Bloom, Alan, trans. 1968. *The Republic of Plato: Translated, With Notes and an Interpretive Essay*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brannen, Julia and Peter Moss. 1987. "Fathers in dual-earner households - through mothers' eyes." In Charlie Lewis and Margaret O'Brien, eds. *Reassessing Fatherhood: New Observations on Fathers and the Modern Family*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Bremner, Robert H. 1956. *From the Depths: the Discovery of Poverty in the United States*. New York: New York University Press.
- _____. 1980. *The Public Good: Philanthropy and Welfare in the Civil War Era*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Breul, Frank R. and Steven J. Diner, eds. 1980. *Compassion and Responsibility: Readings in the History of Social Welfare Policy in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brod, Harry, ed. 1987. *The Making of Masculinities: The New Men's Studies*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- _____ and Michael Kaufman, eds. 1994. *Theorizing Masculinities*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey. 1878. *First Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey, Embracing Its*

Operations from April 1 to October 31, 1878. Trenton, New Jersey: Naar Day and Naar, Printers.

_____. 1882. *Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey, for the Year Ending October 31st, 1882.*

_____. 1883. *Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey, for the Year Ending October 31st, 1883.* Trenton, New Jersey: The W. S. Sharp Printing Company.

Burtless, Gary. 1989. "The Effect of Reform on Employment, Earning, and Income." In Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood, eds. *Welfare Policy for the 1990s.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bush, Bernard, compiler. 1977. *Laws of the Royal Colony of New Jersey, 1703-1745, with an introduction: New Jersey Archives, Third Series, Volume II.* Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey State Library Archives and History Bureau.

_____. 1980. *Laws of the Royal Colony of New Jersey, 1746-1760: New Jersey Archives, Third Series, Volume III.* Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey State Library Archives and History Bureau.

_____. 1982. *Laws of the Royal Colony of New Jersey, 1760-1769: New Jersey Archives, Third Series, Volume IV.* Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey State Library Archives and History Bureau.

_____. 1986. *Laws of the Royal Colony of New Jersey, 1770-1775, with addenda and index: New Jersey Archives, Third Series, Volume V.* Trenton, New Jersey: Division of Archives and Records Management, New Jersey Department of State.

Butler, Judith. 1990a. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.* New York: Routledge

_____. 1990b. "Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse." In Linda J. Nicholson, ed. *Feminism/Postmodernism.* New York: Routledge.

Callahan, Daniel. 1996. "Bioethics and Fatherhood." In Larry May, Robert Strikwerda, and Patrick D. Hopkins, eds. *Rethinking Masculinity: Philosophical*

- Explorations in Light of Feminism*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Carr, C. Lynn. 1998. "Tomboy Resistance and Conformity: Agency in Social Psychological Gender Theory." *Gender & Society* 12, 5(October): 528-553.
- Carnes, Mark C. 1989. *Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- _____ and Clyde Griffen, eds. 1990. *Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cherlin, Andrew J., ed. 1988. *The Changing American Family and Public Policy*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
- Chodorow, Nancy. 1978. *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Christmon, Kenneth. 1990. "Parental Responsibility and Self-Image of African American Fathers." *Families in Society* (November): 563-567.
- Clinton, William J. 1992. "Transcript of Speech by Clinton Accepting Democratic Nomination." *New York Times* A 14-15.
- Cody, Cheryll Ann. 1983. "Naming, Kinship, and Estate Dispersal: Notes on Slave Life on a South Carolina Plantation, 1786 to 1833." In Michael Gordon, ed. *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Cohen, Miriam and Michael Hanagan. 1991. "The Politics of Gender and the Making of the Welfare State, 1900-1940: A Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Social History* 24, 3: 469-484.
- Collier, Richard. 1995. *Masculinity, Law and the Family*. London: Routledge.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 1991. *Black Feminist Thought*:

Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge.

- Coltrane, Scott. 1995. "The Future of Fatherhood: Social, Demographic, and Economic Influences on Men's Family Involvements." In William Marsiglio, ed. *Fatherhood: Contemporary Theory, Research, and Social Policy.* Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.
- Connell, R. W. 1987. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- _____. 1994. "Psychoanalysis on Masculinity." In Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman, eds. *Theorizing Masculinities.* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- _____. 1995. *Masculinities.* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Converse, Phillip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In David E. Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: The Free Press.
- Cook, Thomas I. 1947. *Two Treatises of Government by John Locke, with a supplement, Patriarcha by Robert Filmer.* New York: Hafner Publishing Company.
- Cornell, Drucilla. 1998a. *At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1998b. "Fatherhood and Its Discontents: Men, Patriarchy, and Freedom." In Cynthia R. Daniels, ed. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cottingham, Phoebe H. and David T. Ellwood, eds. 1989. *Welfare Policy for the 1990s.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Crader, Diana C. 1990. "Slave Diet at Monticello." *American Antiquity* 55, 4: 690-717.
- Crockett, Lisa J., David J. Eggebeen and Alan J. Hawkins. 1993. "Father's Presence and Young Children's Behavioral and Cognitive Adjustment." *Journal of Family Issues* 14, 3(September): 355-377.

- Daniels, Cynthia R. 1993. *At Women's Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- _____, ed. 1998. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Danziger, Sheldon H., Gary D. Sandefur, and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. 1994. *Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. 1986. *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Davis, Peggy Cooper. 1994. "Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State." *Harvard Law Review* 107, 6 (April): 1348-1373.
- Degler, Carl N. 1983. "The Emergence of the Modern American Family." In Michael Gordon, ed. *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Demos, John. 1970. *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1986. *Past, Present, and Personal: The Family and the Life Course in American History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1994. *The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from Early America*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- DeParle, Jason. 1998. "Welfare Overhaul Initiatives Focus on Fathers." *The New York Times* September 3: A1 and A28.
- Dingwall, R. and J. M. Eekelaar. 1988. "Families and The State: An Historical Perspective on the Public Regulation of Private Conduct." *Law and Policy* 10, 4(October): 341-361.
- Dinnerstein, Dorothy. 1976. *The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise*. New York:

Harper and Row.

- Di Stefano, Christine. 1991. *Configurations of Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Donzelot, Jaques. 1979. *The Policing of Families*. New York: Random House.
- Doolittle, Fred, Virginia Knox, Cynthia Miller and Sharon Rowser. 1998. *Executive Summary, Building Opportunities, Enforcing Obligations: Implementation and Interim Impacts of Parents' Fair Share*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
- Doolittle, Fred and Suzanne Lynn. 1998. *Working with Low-Income Cases: Lessons for the Child Support Enforcement System from Parents' Fair Share*. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
- Downey, Douglas B. 1994. "The School Performance of Children from Single-Mother and Single-Father Families: Economic or Interpersonal Deprivation?" *Journal of Family Issues* 15, 1(March): 129-147.
- Edin, Kathryn. 1991. "Surviving the Welfare System: How AFDC Recipients Make Ends Meet in Chicago." *Social Problems* 38, 4(November): 462-474.
- _____ and Laura Lein. 1997a. "Work, Welfare, and Single-Mothers' Economic Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 62, 2(April): 253-266.
- _____. 1997b. *Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Edsall, Preston W., ed. 1937. *Journal of the Courts of Common Right and Chancery of East New Jersey, 1683-1702*. Philadelphia: American Legal History Society.
- Edsall, Thomas Byrne and Mary D. Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ellis, William J. 1945. "Public Welfare in New Jersey: 1630-1944." Trenton: Department of Institutions and Agencies of the State of New Jersey.

- Ellwood, David T. 1988. *Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family*. Basic Books.
- _____ and Lawrence H. Summers. 1986. "Is Welfare Really the Problem?" *The Public Interest* 83(Spring): 57-78.
- Elster, Arthur B. and Michael E. Lamb, eds. 1986. *Adolescent Fatherhood*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 1988. "Toward a Family Policy: Changes in Mothers' Lives." In Andrew J. Cherlin, ed. *The Changing American Family and Public Policy*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press
- Epstein, William M. 1997. *Welfare in America: How Social Science Fails the Poor*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1987. "The Comparison of Policy Regimes: An Introduction." In Martin Rein, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Lee Rainwater, eds. *Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Policy Regimes*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fairlie, Robert W. and Rebecca London. 1997. "The Effect of Incremental Benefit Levels on Births to AFDC Recipients." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 16, 4(Fall): 575-597.
- Feldman, Stanley and John Zaller. 1992. "The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State." *American Journal of Political Science* 36, 1(February): 268-307.
- Ferguson, Kathy. 1993. *The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ferree, Myra Marx. 1990. "Beyond Separate Spheres: Feminism and Family Research." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (November): 866-884.
- Filmer, Robert. 1947[1680]. "Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings." In Thomas I. Cook, ed. *Two Treatises*

- of Government by John Locke.* New York: Hafner Publishing Company.
- Fine, Sidney. 1966. *Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Fineman, Martha Albertson and Isabel Karpin, eds. 1995. *Mothers in Law: Feminist theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood.* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1995. "Rational Choice and the New(?) Institutionalism." *Polity* 28, 1(Fall): 107-115.
- Fliegelman, Jay. 1982. *Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American revolution against patriarchal authority, 1750-1800.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Forgey, Donald G. 1975. "The Institution of Berdache among the North American Plains Indians." *The Journal of Sex Research* 11, 1(February): 1-15.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1989. *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Freeman, Jo. 1990. "From Protection to Equal Opportunity: The Revolution in Women's Legal Status." In Louise A. Tilly and Patricia Gurin, eds. *Women, Politics, and Change.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Friedan, Betty. 1983. *The Feminine Mystique.* New York: Dell.
- Friedland, Roger and Robert R. Alford. 1991. "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions." In Walter W. Powell and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1961. *Civilization and Its Discontents.* Translated and Edited by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
- _____. 1962. *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.* Translated and Edited by James Strachey. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

- _____. 1966. *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Translated and Edited by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
- Furstenberg, Frank F. 1966. "Industrialization and the American Family: A Look Backward." *American Sociological Review* 31, 3(June): 326-337.
- _____. 1988. "Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood." In Andrew J. Cherlin, ed. *The Changing American Family and Public Policy*. Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute Press.
- _____, S. Phillip Morgan and Paul D. Allison. 1987. "Paternal Participation and Children's well-being after Marital Dissolution." *American Sociological Review* 52(October): 695-701.
- _____ and Kathleen Mullan Harris. 1993. "When and Why Fathers Matter: Impacts of Father Involvement on the Children of Adolescent Mothers." In Robert I. Lerman and Theodora Ooms, eds. *Young Unwed Fathers: Changing Roles and Emerging Policies*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gallagher, L. Jerome, Megan Gallagher, Kevin Perese, Susan Schreiber, and Keith Watson. 1998. "One Year After Federal Welfare Reforms: A Description of State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of October 1997." The Urban Institute.
- Galston, William. 1982. "Defending Liberalism." *American Political Science Review* 76, 3(September): 621-629.
- _____. 1989. "Pluralism and Social Unity." *Ethics* 99(July): 711-726.
- Garfinkel, Irwin and Sara McLanahan. 1986. *Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
- _____. 1994. "Single-Mother Families, Economic Insecurity, and Government Policy." In Sheldon H. Danziger, Gary D. Sandefur, and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. *Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Gilens, Martin. 1996. "'Race Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare." *American Political Science Review* 90, 3

(September): 593-604.

- Gillis, John R. 1995. "Bringing Up Father: British Paternal Identities, 1700 to Present." *Masculinities: Interdisciplinary Studies on Gender* 3, 3(Fall): 1-27.
- _____. 1996. "Is the Family Really in Decline? The Family Values Debate in Historical Perspective." Paper submitted to the Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture, Rutgers University.
- Girvetz, Harry K. 1966. *The Evolution of Liberalism, a Revised Edition of From Wealth to Welfare*. New York: Collier Books.
- Gladwell, Malcolm. 1993. "The Welfare Method of Birth Control." *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition* (December 20-26): 31-32.
- Glazer, Nathan. 1988. *The Limits of Social Policy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Glendon, Mary Ann. 1989. *The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the United States and Western Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodin, Robert E. 1985. "Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities: An Ethical Defense of the Welfare State." *American Political Science Review* 79:775-787.
- Gordon, Linda. 1988. "What Does Welfare Regulate?" *Social Research* 55, 4(winter): 609-630.
- _____, ed. 1990. *Women, the State, and Welfare*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____. 1994. *Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Gordon, Michael ed. 1983. *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Gottlieb, Beatrice. 1993. *The Family in the Western World from the Black Death to the Industrial Age*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Greven, Philip J., Jr. 1970. *Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts*.

Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

_____. 1983. "Family Structure in Seventeenth-Century Andover, Massachusetts." In Michael Gordon, ed. *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*. New York: St. Martins Press.

Griffen, Clyde. 1990. "Reconstructing Masculinity from the Evangelical Revival to the Waning of Progressivism: A Speculative Synthesis." In Mark C. Carnes and Clyde Griffen, eds. *Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Griswold, Robert L. 1993. *Fatherhood in America: A History*. New York: Basic Books.

_____. 1997. "Generative Fathering: A Historical Perspective." In Alan J. Hawkins and David C. Dollahite, eds. *Generative Fathering: Beyond Deficit Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.

_____. 1998. "The History and Politics of Fatherlessness." In Cynthia R. Daniels, ed. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Grossberg, Michael. 1985. *Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Grubb, W. Norton and Marvin Lazerson. 1982. *Broken Promises: How Americans Fail Their Children*. New York: Basic Books.

Gutman, Herbert G. 1976. *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925*. New York: Vintage Books.

_____. 1983. "Persistent Myths about the Afro-American Family." In Michael Gordon, ed. *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*. New York: St. Martins Press.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay. 1961. *The Federalist Papers*. New York: NAL Penguin Inc.

Hanley, Sarah. 1989. "Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France."

French Historical Studies 16,1: 4-27.

Harper, Cynthia and Sara S. McLanahan. 1998. "Father Absence and Youth Incarceration." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Harpham, Edward J. and Richard K. Scotch. 1988. "Rethinking the War on Poverty: The Ideology of Social Welfare Reform." *Western Political Quarterly* 41, 1: 193-207.

Hartman, Ann. 1995. "Ideological Themes in Family Policy." *Families in Society* (March): 182-192.

Hartz, Louis. 1948. *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard university Press.

_____. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Haskins, Ron. 1991. "Congress Writes a Law: Research and Welfare Reform." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 10, 4: 616-632.

Hasse, Adelaide R. 1914. *Index of Economic Material in Documents of the United States: New Jersey, 1789-1904*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington.

Hawkins, Alan J. and David C. Dollahite, eds. 1997. *Generative Fathering: Beyond Deficit Perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.

Hawthorne, Nathaniel. 1863. "Outside Glimpses of English Poverty." *The Atlantic Monthly* XII(July): 36-51.

Heclo, Hugh. 1974. *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____. 1994. "Poverty Politics." In Sheldon H. Danziger, Gary D. Sandefur, and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. *Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Heymann, Phillip B. 1988. "How Government Expresses Public

- Ideas." In Robert B. Reich, ed. *The Power of Public Ideas*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hilkey, Judy. 1997. *Character is Capital: Success Manuals and Manhood in Gilded Age America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Hirsch, M. and E. F. Keller, eds. 1990. *Conflicts in Feminism*. New York: Routledge.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1991. *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Hoare, Quintin and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: International Publishers.
- Hochschild, Arlie with Anne Machung. 1989. *The Second Shift*. New York: Avon Books.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1981. *What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1971. *America at 1750: A Social Portrait*. New York: Vintage Books.
- _____. 1992[1944]. *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Honeyman, A. Van Doren. 1910. *Index-Analysis of the Statutes of New Jersey, 1896-1909*. Plainfield, New Jersey: New Jersey Law Journal Publishing Company.
- Hood, John. 1905. *Index of Colonial and State Laws of New Jersey between the Years 1663 and 1903 Inclusive*. Camden, New Jersey: Sinnickson Chew & Sons Company, Publishers.
- Horn, Wade F. and Eric Brenner. 1996. *Seven Things States Can Do to Promote Responsible Fatherhood*. Washington, DC: Council of Governors' Policy Advisors.
- Horna, Jarmila and Eugen Lupri. 1987. "Fathers' participation in work, family life and leisure: a Canadian experience." In Charlie Lewis and Margaret

- O'Brien, eds. *Reassessing Fatherhood: New Observations on Fathers and the Modern Family*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Howard, Christopher. 1992. "Sowing the Seeds of 'Welfare': The Transformation of Mothers' Pensions, 1900-1940." *Journal of Policy History* 4, 2: 188-227.
- Jenks, Christopher. 1991. "Is the American Underclass Growing?" In Christopher Jenks and Paul E. Peterson, eds. *The Urban Underclass*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- _____ and Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1991. *The Urban Underclass*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Josephson, Jyl. 1997. *Gender, Families and State: Child Support Policy in the United States*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Kahn, Alfred J. and Sheila B. Kammerman, eds. 1988. *Child Support: From Debt Collection to Social Policy*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Kammerman, Sheila B. 1983. "Fatherhood and Social Policy: Some Insights from a Comparative Perspective." In Michael E. Lamb and Abraham Sagi, eds. *Fatherhood and Family Policy*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Kann, Mark E. 1998. *A Republic of Men: The American Founders, Gendered Language, and Patriarchal Politics*. New York: New York University Press.
- Katz, Michael. 1983. *Poverty and Policy in American History*. New York: Academic Press.
- _____. 1986. *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America*. New York: Basic Books.
- _____. 1993. "The Urban 'Underclass' as Metaphor of Social Transformation." In Michael B. Katz, ed. *The 'Underclass' Debate: Views from History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____, ed. 1993. *The 'Underclass' Debate: Views from History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keller, Morton. 1977. *Affairs of State: Public Life in*

Late Nineteenth Century America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Kessler, Suzanne J. and Wendy McKenna. 1978. *Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Kimmel, Michael S., ed. 1987a. *Changing Men: New Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity.* Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc.

_____. 1987b. "The Contemporary 'Crisis' of Masculinity in Historical Perspective." In Harry Brod, ed. *The Making of Masculinities: The New Men's Studies* (Boston: Allen and Unwin).

_____. 1996. *Manhood in America: A Cultural History.* New York: The Free Press.

Klebaner, Benjamin J. 1980. "Poverty and Its Relief in American Thought, 1815-1861." In Frank R. Breul and Steven J. Diner, eds. *Compassion and Responsibility: Readings in the History of Social Welfare Policy in the United States.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kloppenber, James T. 1995. "Institutionalism, Rational Choice, and Historical Analysis." *Polity* 28, 1(Fall): 125-128.

Koven, Seth and Sonya Michel. 1990. "Womanly Duties: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, 1880-1920." *American Historical Review* 95, 4(October): 1076-1108.

Knitzer, Jane and Stanley Bernard in collaboration with Eric Brenner and Vivian Gadsden. 1997. *Map and Track: State Initiatives to Encourage Responsible Fatherhood.* New York: National Center for Children in Poverty.

Ladd, Everett C. 1993. "Thinking about America." *The Public Perspective* (July/August): 19-21.

Lamb, Michael E., ed. 1986. *The Father's Role: Applied Perspectives.* New York: John Wiley and Sons.

_____. 1986b. "The Changing Roles of Fathers." In Michael E. Lamb, ed. *The Father's Role: Applied*

Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

- _____ and Abraham Sagi, eds. 1983. *Fatherhood and Family Policy*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Lasch, Christopher. 1977. *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Laqueur, Thomas W. 1990. "The Facts of Fatherhood." In M. Hirsch and E. F. Keller, eds. *Conflicts in Feminism*. New York: Routledge.
- LaRossa, Ralph. 1988. "Fatherhood and Social Change." *Family Relations* 37: 451-457.
- _____. 1997. *The Modernization of Fatherhood: A Social and Political History*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- _____, Betty Anne Gordon, Ronald Jay Wilson, Annette Bairan and Charles Jaret. 1991. "The Fluctuating Image of the 20th Century American Father." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53 (November): 987-997.
- _____ and Donald C. Reitzes. 1995. "Gendered Perceptions of Father Involvement in Early 20th Century America." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 57 (February): 223-229.
- Leaming, Aaron and Jacob Spicer. 1881[1752]. *The Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the Province of New Jersey: the Acts Passes during the Proprietary Governments, and Other Material transactions Before the Surrender thereof unto Queen Anne*. Somerville, New Jersey: Honeyman & Company (reprint of, Philadelphia: W. Bradford).
- Leff, Mark H. 1973. "Consensus for Reform: The Mothers'-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era." *Social Service Review* 47 (September): 397-417.
- Leiby, James. 1967. *Charity and Correction in New Jersey: A History of State Welfare Institutions*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- _____. 1978. *A History of Social Welfare and Social Work in the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Lerman, Robert I. 1989. "Child Support Policies." In Phoebe H. Cottingham and David T. Ellwood, eds. *Welfare Policy for the nineteen-nineties*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- _____, and Theodora Ooms, eds. 1993. *Young Unwed Fathers: Changing Roles and Emerging Policies*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Lewis, Charlie and Margaret O'Brien, eds. 1987. *Reassessing Fatherhood: New Observations on Fathers and the Modern Family*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Lieberman, Robert C. 1995. "Social Construction (Continued)." *American Political Science Review* 89, 2(June): 437-441.
- Lima, Lowell H. and Robert C. Harris. 1988. "The Child Support Enforcement Program in the U.S." In Alfred J. Kahn and Sheila B. Kammerman, eds. *Child Support: From Debt Collection to Social Policy*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Lorber, Judith. 1994. *Paradoxes of Gender*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lucas, Dorothy Fordyce. 1947. *Bibliography of New Jersey Official Reports, 1905-1945*. Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey State Department of Education, Division of State Library, Archives and History.
- Lupton, Deborah and Lesley Barclay. 1997. *Constructing Fatherhood: Discourses and Experiences*. London: Sage Publications.
- MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1989. *Towards a Feminist theory of the State*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review* 78: 734-749.
- Marsiglio, William. 1993. "Contemporary Scholarship on Fatherhood: Culture, Identity, and Conduct." *Journal of Family Issues* 14, 4: 484-509.
- _____, ed. 1995. *Fatherhood: Contemporary Theory,*

Research, and Social Policy. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.

Mason, Mary Ann. 1994. *From Father's Property to Children's Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United States.* New York: Columbia University Press.

May, Larry, Robert Strikwerda, and Patrick D. Hopkins, eds. 1996. *Rethinking Masculinity: Philosophical Explorations in Light of Feminism.* Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

McClosky, Herbert. 1984. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." *American Political Science Review* 58: 361-382.

_____ and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McCormick, Richard L. 1979. "The Party Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesis." *The Journal of American History* 66, 2 (September): 279-298.

McDonagh, Eileen. 1998. "Race, Class, and Gender in the Progressive Era: Restructuring State and Society." Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts.

McLanahan, Sara. 1985. "Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty." *American Journal of Sociology* 90, 4: 873-901.

_____. 1998. "Growing Up Without a Father." In Cynthia R. Daniels, ed. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____ and Gary Sandefur. 1994. *Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

McWilliams, W. Carey. 1973. *The Idea of Fraternity in America.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mead, Lawrence M. 1982. "Social Programs and Social Obligations." *The Public Interest* 69 (Fall): 17-32.

_____. 1986. *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations*

- of Citizenship*. New York: The Free Press.
- _____, ed. 1997. *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Meyer, Philippe. 1983. *The Child and the State: The Intervention of the State in Family Life*. Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, Daniel R. 1993. "Child Support and Welfare Dynamics: Evidence from Wisconsin." *Demography* 30, 1 (February): 45-62.
- Miller, Andrew T. 1993. "Social Science, Social Policy, and the Heritage of African-American Families." In Michael B. Katz, ed. *The 'Underclass' Debate: Views from History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Miller, William L. 1998. "Doing Qualitative Research." Presentation at the Department of Family Medicine, UMDNJ-New Jersey Medical School, May 19.
- Mink, Gwendolyn. 1990. "The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race and the Origins of the American Welfare State." In Linda Gordon, ed. *Women, the State, and Welfare*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____. 1998. *Welfare's End*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Minow, Martha. 1987. "We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families." *The Journal of American History* 74, 3 (December): 959-983.
- Moffitt, Robert. 1992. "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review." *Journal of Economic Literature* XXX (March): 1-61.
- Montgomery, Laura E., John L. Kiely and Gregory Pappas. 1996. "The Effects of Poverty, Race, and Family Structure on U.S. Children's Health: Data from the NHIS, 1978 through 1980 and 1989 through 1991." *American Journal of Public Health* 86, 10: 1401-1405.
- Morone, James A. 1996. "The Corrosive Politics of Virtue." *The American Prospect* 26 (May/June): 30-39.
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1965. *The Negro family: The Case*

for National Action. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

- _____. 1992. "How the Great Society 'Destroyed the American Family.'" *The Public Interest* 108 (Summer): 53-65.
- Murray, Charles A. 1984. *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980*. New York: Basic Books.
- _____. 1986. "No Welfare Isn't Really the Problem." *The Public Interest* 84 (Summer): 3-11.
- Neckerman, Kathryn M. 1993. "The Emergence of 'Underclass' Family Patterns, 1900-1940." In Michael B. Katz, ed. *The 'Underclass' Debate: Views from History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____, Robert Aponte, and William Julius Wilson. 1988. "Family Structure, Black Unemployment, and Social Policy." In Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*. Princeton University Press.
- Nelson, Barbara. 1985. "Review Article: Family Politics and Policy in the United States and Western Europe." *Comparative Politics* 17, 3 (April): 351-371.
- _____. 1990. "The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's Compensation and Mothers' Aid." In Linda Gordon, ed. *Women, the State, and Welfare*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Nevill, Samuel. 1752. *The Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New Jersey, from the time of the Surrender of the Government in the Second Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, to this present time, being the Twenty Fifth Year of the Reign of King George the Second*. Philadelphia: William Bradford.
- Nicholson, Linda J., ed. 1990. *Feminism/Postmodernism*. New York: Routledge.
- Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Offe, Claus. 1987. "Democracy Against the Welfare State? Structural Foundations of Neoconservative Political

Opportunities." *Political Theory* 15, 4 (November): 501-537.

- Office of the Governor. 1998. "Remarks of Governor Christine Todd Whitman, 2nd National Summit on Fatherhood, Washington, DC." (June 15); <http://www.state.nj.us/governor/speeches/father.htm>.
- Olsen, Frances E. 1985. "The Myth of State Intervention in the Family." *Journal of Law Reform* 18,4 (Summer): 835-864.
- O'Connor, Julia S., Ann Shola Orloff and Sheila Shaver. 1999. *States, Markets, Families: Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Orloff, Ann Shola. 1988. "The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare State." In Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, eds. *The Politics of Social Welfare Policy in the United States*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1993. "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship." *American Sociological Review* 58 (June): 303-328.
- _____. 1998. "Ending the Entitlement of Poor Mothers, Expanding the Claims of Poor Unemployed Parents: Gender, Race, Class in Contemporary US Social Policy." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California.
- _____ and Theda Skocpol. 1984. "Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920." *American Sociological Review* 49 (December): 726-750.
- Orren, Karen. 1991. *Belated feudalism: Labor, the law, and liberal development in the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parke, Ross D. 1996. *Fatherhood*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- _____, Thomas G. Power and Teresa Fisher. 1980. "The Adolescent Father's Impact on the Mother and Child." *Journal of Social Issues* 36, 1 (November): 88-106.

- Parsons, Talcott. 1949. "The Social Structure of the Family." In *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*. Ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper and Row.
- Patterson, James T. 1994. *America's Struggle Against Poverty: 1900-1994*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Perales, Nina. 1995. "A 'Tangle of Pathology': Racial Myth and the New Jersey Family Development Act." In Martha Albertson Fineman and Isabel Karpin, eds. *Mothers in Law: Feminist theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Philopson, Ilene. 1981. "Child Rearing Literature and Capitalist Industrialization." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 26: 57-73.
- Pierson, Paul. 1993. "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change." *World Politics* 45(July): 595-628.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1971. *Regulating the Poor*. New York: Random House.
- _____. 1988. "Welfare Doesn't Shore Up Traditional Family Roles: A Reply to Linda Gordon." *Social Research* 55, 4(Winter): 631-647.
- Pleck, Joseph H. 1981. *The Myth of Masculinity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- _____. 1987. "American Fathering in Historical Perspective." In Michael S. Kimmel. *Changing Men: New Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Popenoe, David. 1996. *Life Without Father: Compelling Evidence that Fatherhood and Marriage are Indispensable for the Good of Children and Society*. New York: The Free Press.
- _____. 1998. "Life Without Father." In Cynthia R. Daniels, ed. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Powell, Brian and Douglas B. Downey. 1997. "Living in

- Single-Parent Households: An Investigation of the Same-Sex Hypothesis." *American Sociological Review* 52, 4: 521-539.
- Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. Dimaggio, eds. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Pratt, John W. 1961. "Boss Tweed's Public Welfare Program." *New York Historical Society Quarterly* 45: 396-411.
- Price, Clement Alexander. 1980. *Freedom Not Far Distant: A Documentary History of Afro-Americans in New Jersey, The Collections of the New Jersey Historical Society: Volume XVI*. Newark: New Jersey Historical Society.
- Prothro, James W. and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." *Journal of Politics* 22, 2(May): 276-294.
- Fruett, Kyle D. 1993. "The Paternal Presence." *Families in Society* 74, 1(January): 46-50.
- Radin, Norma and Graeme Russell. 1983. "Increased Father Participation and Child Development Outcomes." In Michael E. Lamb and Abraham Sagi. *Fatherhood and Family Policy*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Rawls, John. 1989. "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus." *New York University Law Review* 64, 2(May): 233-255.
- Records of the Town of Newark, New Jersey, From Its Settlement in 1666, to Its Incorporation as a City in 1836, Collections of the New Jersey Historical Society: Volume VI*. 1864. Newark: New Jersey Historical Society.
- Reich, Robert B, ed. 1988. *The Power of Public Ideas*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Rein, Martin, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Lee Rainwater, eds. 1987. *Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Policy Regimes*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

- Revision of the Statutes of New Jersey.* 1877. Trenton: John L. Murphy, Book and Job Printer.
- Riordon, William L. 1963. *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics.* New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Roberts, Dorothy. 1998. "The Absent Black Father." In Cynthia R. Daniels, ed. *Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in America.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Robins, Philip K. 1986. "Child Support, Welfare Dependency, and Poverty." *The American Economic Review* 76, 4 (September): 768-788.
- Rotundo, E. Anthony. 1985. "American Fatherhood: A Historical Perspective." *American Behavioral Scientist* 29, 1:7-25.
- _____. 1993. *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era.* New York: Basic Books.
- Sanchez, Laura and Elizabeth Thomson. 1997. "Becoming Mothers and Fathers: Parenthood, Gender, and the Division of Labor." *Gender and Society* 11, 6(December): 747-772.
- Sapiro, Virginia. 1986. "The Gender Basis of American Social Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 101, 2:221-238.
- Sayer, Derek. 1987. *The Violence of Abstraction: the Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Schochet, Gordon. 1975. *Patriarchalism in Political thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth-Century England.* New York: Basic Books.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- _____. 1995. "Why I am an Historical Institutionalism." *Polity* 28, 1(Fall): 103-106.

- _____ and John Ikenberry. 1983. "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Social Research* 6: 87-148.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1995. "Order and Change." *Polity* 28, 1(Fall): 92-96.
- Smith, Adam. 1937[1776]. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: The Modern Library.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1993. "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." *American Political Science Review* 87, 3(September): 549-566.
- _____. 1995. "Ideas, Institutions, and Strategic Choice." *Polity* 28, 1(Fall): 135-140.
- Smollar, Jacqueline and Theodora Ooms. 1988. *Young Unwed Fathers: Research Review, Policy Dilemmas and Options: Summary Report*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Sniderman, Paul M. and Richard A. Brody. 1977. "Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance." *American Journal of Political Science* XXI, 3(August): 501-521.
- Sorensen, Elaine and Sandra Clark. 1994. "A Child-Support Assurance Program: How Much Will It Reduce Child Poverty, and at What Cost?" *American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings: Economic Issues for Work and Family* 84, 2 (May): 114-119.
- Stack, Carol B. 1974. *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc.
- Stafford, Paul Tutt. 1941. *Government and the Needy: a Study of Public Assistance in New Jersey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stanton, Martin W. 1934. *History of Public Poor Relief in New Jersey, 1609-1934 (Ph.D. Dissertation)*. New York:

Fordham University.

State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey. 1887. *First Annual Report of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, to the Legislature of New Jersey.* Morristown, New Jersey.

_____. 1888. *Second Annual Report of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, to the Legislature of New Jersey.* Morristown, New Jersey: Wm. B. Montague, Book and Job Printer.

_____. 1889. *Annual Report of Board of Managers of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, for the Year 1889.* Camden, New Jersey: F. F. Paterson, Printer.

_____. 1894. *Annual Report of Board of Managers of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, 1894.* Trenton, New Jersey: The John L. Murphy Publishing Company, Printers.

_____. 1897. *Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, 1897.* Blairstown, New Jersey: The Blairstown Press.

_____. 1898. *Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the State Charities Aid Association of New Jersey, 1898.* Trenton, New Jersey: The John L. Murphy Publishing Company, Printers.

State of New Jersey Emergency Relief Administration. No date [1933]. *Manual of Procedure.* New Jersey.

Statutes of the State of New Jersey. 1847. Trenton: Phillips and Boswell.

Stern, Mark J. 1993. "Poverty and family Composition since 1940." In Michael B. Katz, ed. *The 'Underclass' Debate: Views from History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stone, Deborah A. 1984. *The Disabled State.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Sumner, William Graham. 1963[1883]. *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other.* Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd.

- Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51(April): 273-286.
- Szanton, Peter L. 1991. "The Remarkable 'Quango': Knowledge, Politics, and Welfare Reform." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 10, 4: 590-602.
- Teti, Douglas M. and Michael E. Lamb. 1986. "Sex-Role Learning and Adolescent Fatherhood." In Arthur B. Elster and Michael E. Lamb, eds. *Adolescent Fatherhood*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Thompson, Edward H. and Joseph H. Pleck. 1987. "The Structure of Male Role Norms." In Michael S. Kimmel, ed. *Changing Men: New Directions in Research on Men and Masculinity*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.
- Thorne, Barrie ed., with Marilyn Yalom. 1992. *Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, Revised Edition*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Tilly, Louise A. and Patricia Gurin, eds. 1990. *Women, Politics, and Change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1969. *Democracy in America*. Ed. J. P. Mayer. Garden City, New York: Anchor Doubleday.
- _____. 1983. "Memoir on Pauperism." *The Public Interest* 70(Winter): 102-120.
- The Town Book of Hopewell*. 1721-1800. Hopewell Township, New Jersey: Manuscript in the Collection of Rutgers University.
- Trattner, Walter I. 1976. "The Federal Government and Social Welfare in Early Nineteenth Century America." *Social Service Review* 50(June): 243-255.
- _____. 1979. *From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America*. New York: The Free Press.
- Trotter, Jr., Joe William. 1993. "Blacks in the Urban North: The 'Underclass Question' in Historical Perspective." In Michael B. Katz, ed. *The*

'Underclass' Debate: Views from History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tufte, Virginia and Barbara Meyerhoff, eds. 1979. *Changing Images of the Family*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Ursel, Jane. 1992. *Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family*. Toronto: Women's Press.

U.S. Census Bureau. 1998. "Historical Poverty Tables - Families, (Table) 4. Poverty Status of Families, by type of Family, Presence of Children, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 1997;" published 24 September 1998;
<<http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/histpov4.html>>.

Vaillant, George E. 1997. "Poverty and Paternalism: A Psychiatric View." In Lawrence Mead, ed. *The New Paternalism: Supervisory Approaches to Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Vandepol, Ann. 1982. "Dependent Children, Child Custody, and the Mothers' Pensions: The Transformation of State-Family Relations in the Early 20th Century." *Social Problems* 29, 3 (February): 221-235.

Waller, Maureen R. 1995. "Claiming Fatherhood: Paternity, Culture and Public Policy." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C.

Watson, Bernardine H. 1992. *Young Unwed Fathers Pilot Project: Initial Implementation Report*. Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures.

Weir, Margaret and Theda Skocpol. 1985. "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States." In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weir, Margaret, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1988. *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*. Princeton University Press.

Weiss, Harry B. 1964. *Life in Early New Jersey*.

Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

Welter, Barbara. 1966. "The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860." *American Quarterly* XVIII, 2 part 1(Summer): 151-174.

Williams, Lucy A. 1992. "The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification and Welfare Reform Proposals." *The Yale Law Journal* 102, 3 (December): 719-746.

Wilson, William Julius. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1996. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Vintage Books.

_____ and Kathryn M. Neckerman. 1986. "Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap between Evidence and Public Policy Issues." In Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds. *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard university Press.

Winkler, Anne E. 1995. "Does AFDC-UP Encourage Two-Parent Families?" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 14, 1: 4-24.

Wiseman, Michael, ed. 1991. "Research and Policy: A Symposium on the Family Support Act of 1988." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 10, 4: 588-666.

Zaretsky, Eli. 1976. *Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life*. New York: Harper and Row.

Zelizer, Viviana A. 1985. *Pricing the Priceless Child: the Changing Social Value of Children*. New York: Basic Books.

Zinn, Maxine Baca. 1992. "Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties." In Barrie Thorne, ed., with Marilyn Yalom. *Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, Revised Edition*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

CURRICULUM VITA

Jesse C. Crosson III

- 1982-1983 Attended the University of South Florida. Tampa, Florida.
- 1983-1986 B.A. in Political Science. The University of Florida. Gainesville, Florida.
- 1987-1991 Graduate Excellence Fellow. Graduate School-New Brunswick. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- 1990 Teaching Assistant. Department of Political Science.
- 1990-1992 Lecturer. Department of Political Science.
- 1991 M.A. in Political Science. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- 1991-1992 Lecturer. Department of Political Science. Rutgers University-Newark. Newark, New Jersey.
- 1992-1994 Project Assistant and Program Evaluator. Teaching Assistant Project. Office of the Provost and Graduate Dean. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- 1992-1994 Assistant Coordinator of Tutoring Services. Learning Resource Centers.
- 1995-1996 Project Assistant. Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research.
- 1996 L. Boyd, N. Hymowitz, S. Haque, C. Mouton, B. Gardner, G. J. Hill, B. Holland, J. Crosson and I. Amanat. Breast Cancer Training for Family Practice Residencies. *Journal of Cancer Education* Vol. 11, 3(Suppl.): 12.
- 1996-1999 Research Coordinator. "Breast Cancer Training for Family Practice Residencies," National Cancer Institute Grant, #1 R25 CA66822-01A1. Department of Family Medicine. University of Medicine and

Dentistry-New Jersey Medical School, Newark, New Jersey.

- 1998 L. Boyd, J. Crosson, B. Holland, N. Hymowitz, B. Gardner. Family Practice Residents' Breast Lump Detection Skills: Preliminary Results from a Multi-Site Study. *Journal of Cancer Education* Vol. 13, 3(Suppl.): 25.
- 1998 L. Boyd, N. Hymowitz, S. Haque, J. Crosson, I. Amanat, B. Gardner. Using an Interactive CD-ROM to Improve Family Physicians' Breast Cancer Knowledge. *Journal of Cancer Education* Vol. 13, 3(Suppl.): 25.
- 1998 Does Insurance Regulation Promote the Utilization of Screening Mammograms? Third-Party Payment Mandates and Breast Health Behavior, 1988-1996. *Sociological Abstracts* Vol. 46, 7(December): 519.
- 1998- Director of Planning and Evaluation. "Adult Learning and the Art of Medicine," Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration Grant, #2 D15 PE80039-04. Department of Family Medicine. University of Medicine and Dentistry-New Jersey Medical School, Newark, New Jersey.
- 1998- Educational Coordinator. Department of Family Medicine. University of Medicine and Dentistry-New Jersey Medical School, Newark, New Jersey.
- 2000 Ph.D. in Political Science.