

CITIZENSHIP UNBOUND:  
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND LABOR MIGRATION

by

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
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
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## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Citizenship Unbound: The Global Politics of Neo-Liberalism and Labor Migration

by ISABELLE VIRGINIE BARKER

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This dissertation considers the status of citizenship in an era of neo-liberal globalization. Citing increased labor migration and the retreat of domestic social policies throughout the world as intersecting processes, I argue that narratives of national citizenship lie at the heart of this intersection, transformed by rapidly changing geopolitical conditions. Despite challenges, national citizenship remains a relevant political category, though reformulated along the lines of neo-liberal principles of privatization, market rationality, and individual responsibility. The politics and rhetoric surrounding the 1996 federal reforms of immigration and social policy in the United States serve as one example of this process. I further support my claim with an extensive illustration of the linkages between the restructuring of U.S. health care policy for senior citizens with the increased migration of women from the global South to provide low-wage direct care services for the aging population in the United States. I then evaluate the work of Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge, arguing that their respective efforts fail to offer effective interventions into the fate of democratic citizenship in an era defined by expanding inequalities and shrinking public spaces. I conclude by bringing together the works of Karl Polanyi, David Held, and Hannah Arendt with feminist scholarship to develop a feminist theory of democracy and political membership for the twenty-first century.

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## Chapter 1:

### Introduction

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, one can rather confidently advance the claim that national citizenship is a category facing great challenges and expect little disagreement from what is an otherwise discordant community of political theorists. Indeed, this is likely one of the few claims upon which most would concur. Whether defined in liberal terms as a legal status, or in civic republican terms as participation and action, national citizenship's future appears uncertain (Kymlicka and Norman 1995). However, the exact source of this uncertainty, as well as its ramifications, is the subject of much debate. It is in response to this debate that I position the argument advanced in this dissertation.

Theorists hailing from either tradition generally agree that the technological innovations that have reduced global expanses of time and space are largely responsible for creating a new terrain for citizenship. Advances in computer and telecommunications technologies as well as increasingly efficient and inexpensive modes of transportation have indeed shrunk the globe, creating challenges and opportunities to theorists advancing the liberal and republican traditions alike. Globalization has seemed to diminish the significance of the national state, once deemed essential for the concretization of the legal rights at the core of liberal citizenship. However, in the process, the conditions of globalization have created the possibility for realizing the universality of liberal rights, which until now had been circumscribed by the national state. Indeed, the strengthening of international human rights mechanisms over the past

decades and the emergence of regional governing bodies such as the European Union seem to suggest that the unhinging of liberal rights from the national state is becoming a possibility (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1996; Held 1995).

In contrast, theorists defining citizenship in republican terms as a means to realize the human inclination for political participation would likely dread the coming of a globalized world. Theorists writing in the civic republican tradition have long condemned the effects of the administrative bureaucracies of the modern state as deadening along with the attendant a-political and atomizing impact of liberalism (Arendt [1958] 1998; Wolin 1960). So it would seem that they would cringe all the more in response to the triumphant tone coursing through so much of the liberal cosmopolitan theory emerging alongside institutions of global governance. Intriguingly, this has not been the case. Judging from recent scholarship, civic republican theory is enjoying a revitalization of sorts. Indeed, civic republicanism's efforts to redirect extremist aspects of ethnic nationalism are perhaps needed now more than ever. After all, as much as the conditions of globalization have rendered supranational governance a possibility, so have they spurred all kinds of extremist parochial backlashes, and civic republican theories have stepped up to the plate to direct the impulse of political identity towards liberal variants of civic patriotism (Habermas 1995; Tamir 1993; Beiner 1995; Calhoun 2002).

The attention that citizenship is receiving in an age that would seem to render it increasingly irrelevant is noteworthy. However, just as noteworthy is the lack of critical discussion regarding two factors that underwrite the organization of contemporary globalization. These are the ascendance of neo-liberal ideological hegemony and the vast inequalities that continue to define the distribution of wealth and resources both

domestically and between nations. Seyla Benhabib (1999) is right to be concerned that "normative discussion[s]" regarding citizenship have largely "been carried out in a sociological vacuum" (709). Though theorists have certainly been well aware of globalization as a phenomenon, it has remained a largely vague and under-theorized concept. To redress this looming gap in theoretical discussions of citizenship, I examine prevailing characteristics of globalization to give a deeper account of the terrain defining citizenship. In order to flesh out the political dynamics surrounding citizenship in an era defined by neo-liberal ideological hegemony and global inequalities, I hone in on two interlocking processes: the privatization of domestic social policy and transnational labor migration. This analysis represents a departure from the reductive theorizations of citizenship as liberal, republican or some combination. Both liberal and republican traditions tend to understand citizenship as a political category that has some essential form to which qualities are added or subtracted, a category tossed about on the winds of history, more or less recognizable depending on its proximity to its idealized form. In contrast, I aim to set forth a theory of citizenship that fully inhabits a space shaped by normative theory as well as by sociological analysis. As such my approach is one that defines citizenship as a contested category, one caught up in dynamic political, social and economic processes, and very much in play as it is called upon to legitimate competing theories regarding state-society relationships. Moreover, I will argue that in our own era, national citizenship remains very much a relevant category as it has been enlisted in the legitimation of neo-liberal domestic policies in states throughout the globe, be they rich, poor or middle-income.

### Current conditions transforming the sovereign national state

Tracing the history of the modern national state and national citizenship is a task that far exceeds the bounds of this project; however, this history is one whose foundations continue to reverberate throughout the world. Thus, in order to set the stage for my discussion of citizenship in our own era, it is necessary to provide at least a brief overview of this history. What follows is but a thumbnail sketch of the consolidation of the political forms that, despite challenges, continue to dominate the political organization of the world.

The early modern coalescence of the modern state and, in turn of national citizenship was spurred by a variety of forces specific to Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> From amongst these forces emerged a convergence of interests on the part of political leaders seeking to erode the feudal powers held by members of the nobility and the Church and on the part of an emerging merchant class seeking to do away with feudal-era obstacles to broadening trade. This political shifting was the result of technological changes affecting production and warfare. In the realm of production, new methods of agriculture led to surplus production and coincided with new means of transportation. This created hitherto dormant opportunities for expanding trade networks and led to the gradual breakdown of the feudal political system which had been based on a localized manorial economy. The early capitalist merchant class to emerge from these changing conditions of trade chafed against the feudal political and social organization as the firm grip of guilds and the arbitrary levying of tithes and poll taxes on the part of the Church and local nobles represented obstacles to the expansion of trade.

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<sup>1</sup> The analysis below draws from Held (1995); Braudel (1992); and Pirenne (1937).

These technological innovations in production coincided with technological changes in warfare. This changed the practice of warfare and thus shaped the political formations that made up the international system. As Charles Tilly (1975) once quipped, "states made war and war made states." Indeed, the nation-state emerged as the political formation best suited to capitalize on new modes of warfare. First, the state could create the institutional means necessary to administer a standing military. Second, centralized state bodies provided the means necessary to extract resources to staff and finance a national military. The earliest states able to consolidate their warfare capabilities ascended in regional power. That is, as David Held (1995) explains, the states that were "able to draw upon the resources of a large population, a relatively robust commercial economy and a tradition of technological innovation became the dominant political forces" (56). In contrast, communities that still organized along the anachronistic lines of the feudal system were increasingly at the mercy of the much more effective national armies.

Out of the embers of the European feudal system emerged the form of the centralized nation-state. This, in turn, created a crisis of legitimacy. If earlier feudal hierarchies were legitimated based on religious doctrine, the burgeoning national state required new forms of legitimacy. The earliest consolidation of the nation-state rested on absolutist monarchy, but this system was legitimated by an increasingly weakened mode of divine right and the patriarchal relationship between the king and his subjects (Schochet 1975). The stage was set for the emergence of a new paradigm of political legitimacy and a new political identity: national democratic citizenship. In light of the cooperation and participation the state required of its subjects, subjects in turn came to

demand some degree of reciprocity. Citizenship came to denote a newly politicized relationship between subject and ruler whereby political institutions derived legitimacy through the consent of the people through mechanisms of social contract. While citizenship has always denoted "a certain reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, the political community" (Held 1995, 66), in the wake of the erosion of religious authority, demands for legitimacy based on popular sovereignty and popular consent emerged. These in turn underwrote the representative system of democratically elected government that could apply to the vast geographical expanses that define modern nation states, a redefinition of democracy for modern conditions best captured by James Madison in *Federalist* No. 10.<sup>2</sup>

At the risk of glossing over the centuries of history that lie beyond the scope of this dissertation, let me fast-forward to consider the contemporary conditions of governance. Recent decades have witnessed the transformation of the dominant mode of production from industrial to information technology, and in turn have profoundly challenged the form of the national state, and by association, the political category of modern democratic citizenship.<sup>3</sup> The day-to-day organization of post-industrial production is drastically different from industrial production. New information technologies have transformed the nature of economic activities. Thanks to this technology, real-time market transactions can take place simultaneously across the globe. New modes of manufacturing based on "just-in-time" production are similarly made

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<sup>2</sup> In *Federalist* No. 10, Madison distinguishes direct democracy from representative democracy according to their historical relevance. While direct democracy may have worked for the conditions of ancient Greece, he holds that this is no longer the case, including among representative democracy's advantages "the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which [it] may be extended."

<sup>3</sup> A parallel transformation of the organization of warfare lies outside the scope of this dissertation. On this, see the work of Mary Kaldor and, for the convergence of new technologies of warfare and neo-liberal privatization see Singer (2004).

possible due to more efficient modes of transportation and to computer and telecommunications technology. The post-industrial technologies have indeed shrunk the globe and heightened the interconnectivity of the global market.

These technologies have also made possible new policies and new forms of organization that replicate, and deepen, global structural disparities. Industrial manufacturing has increasingly moved off-shore, outside of advanced industrial states, while corporate headquarters remain, coexisting in urban centers alongside the growing service sector of financial services, real estate, retail trade, telecommunications and business services. The organization of Export-Processing Zones further entrenches the effects of global inequality. Because off-shore manufacturing takes place in EPZs that are designated to lie outside of the jurisdiction of the host state, firms are assured access to low-wage labor and freedom from state intervention, and have an interest in maintaining this arrangement. Thus, just as the bourgeois classes of centuries ago transformed the social, economic and political organization of feudal society at the dawn of the modern nation-state, our own era is marked by the rise of the multi-national corporation and its asymmetrical challenges to the limitations of the world's nation states. Many have charged these kinds of structural effects of late capitalism as the causes of deepening global inequalities. I add to this claim an analysis of the specific effects of neo-liberal ideology as these have further entrenched inequalities by transforming the basis of legitimate governance coinciding with late capitalism. While the consolidation of the nation-state ushered in an era of democratic governance, it is becoming apparent that as national states—rich, poor, and those in between—face the challenges of neo-liberal globalization, democratic principles may well be one of the first elements of the liberal

nation state to be sacrificed to the Hegelian altar of history. This sacrifice seems all the more likely precisely because of the ascendance of neo-liberalism in global and domestic policy-making. Indeed, as one U.S. neo-liberal economist succinctly puts it, "democracy is not necessarily the most efficient form of government" (quoted in Chua 2003, 273).

By neo-liberalism, I understand a set of contemporary economic theories that invoke principles that prevailed in the late nineteenth-century. This updated version of nineteenth-century principles of *laissez-faire* became a political possibility in the wake of the fiscal crises and economic stagnation that set in during the 1970s. Advocates for a return to some semblance of free trade linked these conditions to the post-War Keynesian policies of government regulation and the welfare state. With the coincident Reagan and Thatcher administrations at the helm, an era of neo-liberal economic policy-making was born.

The ontological assumption at the core of neo-liberalism is that markets and economic activity generate economic growth as well as individual political freedom far better than state policy ever could. Moreover, the market mechanism whereby each individual sets out to maximize his or her self-interest is by far the most efficient, and therefore, most fair means for determining resource allocation. To enact these principles, neo-liberal policies set out to transfer state services to the market, privatize state enterprise, and, as is especially the case in developing countries, eliminate barriers for international trade and foreign investment and remove state subsidies to various domestic sectors.

One of the central economic theories underpinning neo-liberalism is David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage ([1817] 1996, chap. 7). This theory was based

on Ricardo's recognition of the geographical distinction of national states, and on the agricultural and industrial advantages that this distinction brought each nation in early modernity. In his classic example, Ricardo cites the trade between British manufactured cloth and Portuguese produced wine. Though Portugal can certainly manufacture cloth, they can produce good wine far more efficiently, and so would tend to invest capital and labor in the wine-making business. Meanwhile the British, never known for the quality of their wine, can much more efficiently produce quality cloth and so will divert their capital and labor into labor manufacturing. Let each country trade its most efficiently produced goods unhindered on the international market, and the rising tide that results will lift all boats, so the free trade creed goes.

In practice, this theory has never borne out. In part this is because it presumes a level playing field. In 1817 when Ricardo wrote, the global field of economic play was anything but equal. For example, the effects of colonialism on the global organization of production were such that imperial powers such as Great Britain prevented their colonies from producing goods in a way that might compete with British industry (Narayan 2004). Today, conditions perpetuating inequalities continue. Consider technological advantages. Arthur MacEwan (1999, chap. 2) notes the significance of "location-specific technological externalities" in determining whether or not a state can assume its comparative advantage in the global economy. He notes that the theory of comparative advantage presumes that all the conditions for a state to set out its comparative advantage are a given, therefore any state investment is irrelevant at best. However, even in the instances when developing states have been able to invest and develop technological know-how to compete with more affluent states, the result has been the depression of

wages in these latter states as the case in the off-shoring of manufacturing and white collar jobs. So, in the end, a global free market economy hinging on comparative advantage will not result in rising tides all around—rather, it create the conditions for a global tide rapidly receding. Testifying in 2004 to Congress regarding the effects of global outsourcing, economists Ralph Gomory and William Baumol stated that "as the underdeveloped country develops and starts to look more like the developed one, the balance turns around and further loss of industries becomes harmful to the overall welfare of the more developed nation" (quoted in Cassidy 2004). But even in poor states, it remains debatable whether the influx of industry and management jobs has resulted in greater opportunity for the national population at large. For example, even within India and China, often cited as the poster-states of liberalization, income inequality has grown (Weller, et al. 2001; *Economist* 2004). Moreover, the middling tide of the global economy and the means required to get there are not without political consequences in states rich, poor and those in between. This is especially apparent if we track the recent ascendance of neo-liberal policymaking with its market fundamentalism and its remarkable underestimation of the effects of political and social dynamics.

As the neo-liberal creed swept past the domestic Anglo-American arenas, it was soon reflected in the policies of international financial institutions. Indeed, in the 1980s, the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank together made up what has been called "the Washington Consensus," a school of thought espousing the virtues of neo-liberalism for development economics. The dominance of neo-liberalism in domestic economies throughout the globe has merely deepened in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the institutionalization of neo-liberal principles has

been furthered through the World Trade Organization with its more than 140 member states. In turn, neo-liberal economic policies have proliferated through international financial institutions and have had profound effects on democratic governance.<sup>4</sup> Consider for example the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which came into force in 1995. GATS codifies the liberalization of global trade in services by facilitating cross-border flows in 160 industries that include banking, telecommunications, tourism, construction, water provision, healthcare, education, energy and sanitation (WTO 1995). In so doing, GATS has had the effect of "open[ing] up the door to the wider privatization of the state and with it the reprivatization of important institutions of social reproduction, particularly in education, health care and social services" (Bakker and Gill, 2003c, 28). One of the aims of this dissertation is to track the effects of neo-liberal policies on modern political formations by looking at the category of national citizenship. I link citizenship to neo-liberalism by considering in particular the ways that it has been reformulated at the intersection of social policy privatization and transnational migration. The national reconfigurations of citizenship along the lines of neo-liberalism illustrate the formation of new mechanisms of legitimacy. Moreover, an analysis of the variations in neo-liberal forms of citizenship exposes the ways in which global inequalities are deepening.

As has been well documented by the UNDP (1999; 2003), growing inequality gaps have coincided with the era of neo-liberal policy-making. The 1990s witnessed a broadening of neo-liberal policies in domestic and regional economies throughout the world, an ascendance that has created conditions of lop-sided erosion of national

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<sup>4</sup> On the effects of neo-liberalism on governance, see Stephen Gill's recent work on "new constitutionalism" (2002).

sovereignty. Held has suggested that the liberalization of the global economy has meant that advanced industrial states are now faced with an erosion of sovereignty hitherto known only to developing states. He writes, "the growing awareness in many Western countries today that their sovereignty is under pressure from a variety of forces places before them (often for the first time) issues that have been apparent to other countries for a long time" (1995, 82). He does note, however that though this process of erosion is universal, its effects are far from equal. That is, "although the internationalization of production and finance places many instruments of economic control beyond even the most powerful countries, the position of those at the lower end of the globalization hierarchy, experiencing the strongest effects of unevenness, is substantially worse" (82). While all states experience some degree of erosion of autonomy when confronted by the liberalization of trade, some states feel it much more. For example, debtor nations, which tend to be located in post-colonial regions (Latin America, Africa, and South Asia), are subject to the lop-sided structure of global production as well as bound to the conditionalities set in place by international loan organizations (the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, in particular). The provision of loans are contingent on "good governance"—a condition that insists on the eradication of government corruption but that also insists on imposing austerity measures such that government social spending is diverted to the private sector.<sup>5</sup>

The suffusion of neo-liberalism throughout the architecture of the global economy faltered somewhat in the face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and, indeed, a retreat from pure neo-liberalism was reflected in the substitution of Sector wide approaches

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<sup>5</sup> Ironically some critics of neo-liberalism have linked privatization to increased corruption.

(SWAPs) for Structural Adjustment Policies. In 1995, even before the Asian crisis, then president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn set forth a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) meant to encompass a more "holistic approach to development" than that reflected in Structural Adjustment Policies. The CDF moved past economic growth as a sole goal to include other goals such as good governance, participatory democracy, universal education, expanded social services and environmental protection. However, this reformed approach has amounted to little more than a transformation in rhetoric, as forces of global inequality and neo-liberal priorities of economic growth remain the undercurrents that propel the implementation of development policies (Klees 2001).

These concrete and ideological conditions have led to two simultaneous processes affecting states universally (though not equally): severe cuts in social spending and transnational labor migration. Due to cuts in social spending (whether due to ideological shifts, as in the United States, or due to imposed conditionalities, as in states indebted to the IMF), public spending as central to state formation is increasingly being shifted into the private sector. Healthcare and insurance, education, old-age pensions, and safety-net provisions are among some of the public spending areas whose oversight is being assumed by the private sector. Moreover, due to the globalization of economic liberalization, states in the global South have increasingly developed labor export strategies as emigration has become central to many indebted states' policies regarding loan repayment. Sending labor abroad lowers domestic unemployment rates and also leads to remittances which provide a crucial flow of foreign currency into the domestic economy. In the United States, the dual processes of cuts in domestic social spending and transnational labor immigration have come to be legitimated by a broad-based acceptance

of neo-liberal discourse of freedom, choice and individual responsibility. In debtor states, these processes are set in motion through an interplay of domestic and international policies. The discursive modes by which these dual processes are legitimated differ from country to country and point to the ways in which the national state remains alive and well in the midst of neo-liberal globalization. This is most apparent, as I will argue in chapter two, in the shifting meanings of national citizenship. Indeed, national citizenship provides a window onto the national state's continued relevance, as well as onto the threat to democracy posed by neo-liberal globalization. Whereas the national state once facilitated the transformation of subjects into democratic citizens, now the reverse may be the case.

#### Citizens back into Subjects?

The liberalization of national and international economies is generating new forms of citizenship that reflect an a-political space emerging both within and between national states. In tracking several instances of how citizenship is being reconstituted, I join those who bear witness to the emergence of what Ulrich Beck has termed neo-liberal "individualization" (quoted in Brodie 2003, 63). In the case of the United States, this individualization is visible in multiple arenas. One such arena is the restructuring of Medicare, the social policy ensuring health insurance for all senior citizens in the United States. With regard to transnational labor migration, I identify a related new form of citizenship which I refer to as "partial citizenship" so as to reflect the conditions whereby sending states develop strategies to foster emigration of citizens to advanced industrial

nations.<sup>6</sup> In the context of receiving states, such as the U.S., partial citizenship reflects the limited incorporation of labor migrants into the U.S. reinforced by precarious immigration status that hinges on employer sponsorship and temporary contracts. In the case of immigrant and undocumented working poor, partial citizenship reflects the lack of access to federal benefits that many of the working poor who are citizens rely on. In a sense, the partial citizenship of transnational labor migrants serves as a harbinger for the kind of de-politicization of citizenship in the domestic political sphere of advanced industrial states. That is, the domestic fiscal restructuring such as the reforms affecting Medicare are ushering in new, individualized forms of citizenship—while these do not entail the kind of de-territorialization at the heart of partial citizenship, these individualized forms of citizenship do certainly follow a similar logic of the atomization of political membership.

These multiple sites of citizenship reconfigured according to neo-liberal principles are currently eroding the political means by which to secure democracy. This is not an uncontested process, and is not irreversible. Nonetheless, this erosion of democracy is illustrated by the ways in which the rhetoric surrounding national citizenship is increasingly tilted towards legitimating neo-liberal globalization. In order to illustrate the multiple sites of citizenship today, I consider transnational labor migration as this coincides with the restructuring of social policy in both poor and wealthy states. At the nexus of these two processes, I find a linkage that tells much about the challenges facing citizenship, and more broadly, the principles of universal equality and public accountability that lie at the heart of modern democratic citizenship.

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<sup>6</sup> I borrow the term from Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (2001).

In this inquiry I prioritize the principles of equality and public accountability as essential for underwriting healthy democratic institutions. Modern formulations of equality have, to date, been universalist in spirit, but parochial and partial in national practice. Of course, even within the nation-state, equality has been partial in practice, as illustrated by the history of political exclusion in the United States shaped by class, race and gender. My work is deeply indebted to the scholarship that has unpacked the disconnect between the ideal of equality and its practice in American politics; however, in this project, I broaden this scope to consider the transnational dimensions of a contemporary process of inequality. I trace the mechanisms by which equality is suspended at the national borders of the United States while simultaneously being reversed *within* these borders. Labor migration and the "partial citizenship" of non-citizen women workers underscore the tension inherent in the truncated implementation of the purportedly universal principle of equality. At the same time, the restructuring of domestic social benefits highlights the precarious status of equality amongst the U.S. population.

In a related fashion, and throughout the world, public accountability has been weakened. That is, the shift of services from the public sector to the private shields the dynamics of power from view, foreclosing avenues of public accountability. Privatization in effect is about the diminishment of public accountability. Though often hailed as the means of achieving efficiency and cost-effectiveness, privatization has generally resulted in increased government spending on securing private contractors who exert pressures to increase appropriations (Nasser 2003, 25). Another predictable, though less often touted

result of privatization is a dramatic reduction in public oversight and accountability for effective service provision.

Certainly, the immigration policies that have been put into place as national security measures since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 have profound implications for domestic and international politics. However, in this dissertation, I focus in particular on labor migration in an effort to track the profound world-historical trends surrounding political economy, the fate of the modern nation-state and, most importantly, the fate of the principles equality and accountability that underwrite democratic citizenship. Indeed, immigration and social policy, two seemingly distinct policy arenas, when linked, serve to shore up the neo-liberal ideological evacuation of past meanings of democratic citizenship. This is apparent in a variety of ways. One example I consider at length is the process by which the labor provided by non-citizen women workers in the long-term care industry has become an essential component to that industry. In the United States, immigration provides both rhetorical and structural mechanisms by which neo-liberal reformers attempt to elicit the population's consent to the restructuring of popular domestic social policies that fund benefits for senior citizens. This in turn creates the conditions for the unraveling of social citizenship, a key element of democratic citizenship with its concretization of egalitarian ideals and enhancement of mechanisms of public accountability. Before further developing the relationship between immigration and the privatization of social policy, I turn next to elaborate on the ethical as well as historical relationship between social citizenship and democracy.

### Neo-Liberalism, Social Citizenship, and Migration

Due to a number of political, social and economic factors, the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a new political form of social citizenship. John Maynard Keynes's early twentieth century economic theory called for an expanded public sector to counteract the free market's boom and bust tendencies; this economic theory in turn led to the expansion of various forms of modern welfare states (Heilbroner [1953] 1995). One effect of government spending in the public sector was social citizenship, which many held would lead to greater equality between citizens and to the fostering of republican democratic citizenship, even in the case of the United States, often denoted a "laggard" welfare state compared to European states.<sup>7</sup>

Income redistribution staved off the market effect of commodifying labor. Gøsta Esping Anderson (1990) highlights that one of the results of universal capitalist markets is that individuals come to depend entirely on wages for labor for their subsistence. In the context of the emerging modern welfare state, social citizenship reflected the non-market priority of decommodifying individuals. Following Karl Polanyi, Esping Anderson explains that the state-funded entitlement programs of the welfare state were designed in part to protect individuals from the dynamics of capitalism. As Polanyi ([1944] 2001) so trenchantly documented, the historical development of modern capitalism required that individuals be commodified. Polanyi argued that labor, which is essentially a human activity "not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons" is transformed into "an object produced for sale on the market" (75). Here, Polanyi's analysis runs parallel to Marx's descriptions of the alienation of workers from their labor. Esping Anderson adds

that the central aim of social rights is to reverse, or at least manage this process. On his definition, "[d]e-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market" (1990, 21-22).

De-commodification in turn fostered conditions for wider political participation. As T.H. Marshall (1964) famously suggested, the development of social citizenship capped the evolution of modern democratic citizenship. Setting forth his tripartite conception of the evolution of citizenship, Marshall traced the development of social rights of citizenship as the natural—and apparently inevitable—outgrowth of civil and political rights. Basing his analysis on the mid-twentieth-century policies of the English government, Marshall suggested that greater spending in education and public services marked the latest development of the evolution of modern rights of citizenship. This public spending created the institutions that grounded the ideals of income redistribution central to social citizenship, mitigating the inequalities wrought by industrial capitalist production and invigorating popular participation in democratic governance. Many commentators have argued that the extension of social rights did little to enhance political participation. Rather, due to the extension of the state bureaucracies needed for their administration, social rights fostered political alienation and apathy (Arendt [1958] 1998; Wolin 1960, chap. ten). I disagree and suggest that social citizenship, when set out in non-paternalistic policies, did in fact created the conditions for broad, cross-class political participation to be possible in the first place (Marshall 1964; Skocpol 2000; Soss 1999).

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<sup>7</sup> As is apparent in the discussion that follows, social citizenship developed furthest in states in the global North. In chapter four, I discuss the post-colonial global inequalities that coincided with twentieth-century social citizenship, thus underscoring the limits of social citizenship understood as a national form.

In his work on citizenship Jürgen Habermas (2000) emphasizes the political effects of social welfare as they pertain to democracy. Over the course of the twentieth century in industrialized states of the global North, the aims of liberal democracy and social welfare generally appeared to be mutually constitutive. In these regions, mid-twentieth-century citizenship in the modern state was marked by an era of redistributive national policies which furthered the normative aim infused into the historical coalescence of the national state. In other words, at the national level, social citizenship was a central foundation for a vibrant modern democratic public sphere, whereby policies fostering equality amongst citizens helped to constitute the legitimacy of democratic governance. In the last decades of the twentieth century, this productive coexistence of national liberal democracy and state-led social policies has foundered on the shoals of ideology and global economic recession. Economic crises of the 1970s opened the doors for the reappearance of liberal economic policies, long since dormant, and now referred to as neo-liberalism. In their current incarnation, one effect of neo-liberal policies has been a profound and rapid retreat from the kinds of social policies that underwrote social citizenship for so many decades. I contend that this retreat is facilitated through narratives surrounding national citizenship. I develop this claim in chapter two, discussing in particular the role of national citizenship in relation to neo-liberal globalization, underscoring the political and ideological processes shaping the structures of globalization in our time.

Focusing on the United States as a site to bear witness to the effects of neo-liberal globalization may well seem an endeavor taken in vain. After all, as many would certainly contend, the retrenchment of social rights in the United States does not seem to

represent much of a paradigm shift regarding social welfare. The U.S. welfare state has always been truncated in form and in practice compared with the European welfare state. Scholars of the U.S. welfare state have long observed that the dissemination of social rights in the U.S. differs significantly from the Western European welfare state. To denote the nature of the U.S. welfare state, scholars have issued labels including (but certainly not limited to) the "liberal welfare state," the "shadow welfare state," the "corporate welfare system," and "the divided welfare state."<sup>8</sup> In short, as these labels suggest, the U.S. welfare state is widely recognized as one that exists in the interstices of a balance between the public and private sectors. The American welfare state, such as it is, has always been decidedly limited in its extension of social rights, egalitarian norms and de-commodification. Following this, it could be argued that reforms that shrink these rights do not represent a radical shift in norms and values. In other words, in contrast with their Western European counterparts, American citizens have never had universal social rights, so the erosion of these rights in the context of neo-liberal globalization is not experienced as that significant a reversal.

However, even within the public/private venture that is the mark of American social policy, the public programs funding retirement stand out as the closest approximations of a universal social insurance program in the United States and remain highly popular programs (Esping-Anderson 1990).<sup>9</sup> Social Security, designed in the 1930s, and Medicare, designed in the 1960s, together form the core entitlement programs for retired persons. Though the provision of each is linked to an individual's working life,

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<sup>8</sup> These terms are from Esping Anderson (1990), Gottschalk (2000), Jacoby (1997), and Hacker (2002) respectively.

and so rest on some limiting guidelines, these programs do indeed stand out in the U.S. as the most "universal" of the American social safety net. In the case of healthcare provision for the elderly, Medicaid, a means-tested program, also plays a central role in the provision of social support for low-income senior citizens. Currently, each of these programs faces an unlikely future due to changes in demographics and changes in dominant political ideologies regarding social entitlement programs more generally. Indeed, the restructuring of public funding for the retirement-age population represents a shift away from the egalitarian norms that emerged through the establishment of these programs. The shift of the burden for retirement funding away from the state and onto the private individual reflects the deepest encroachment into the twentieth-century American-style design of social rights.

The future of U.S. social benefits for senior citizens is threatened from a number of directions. The increase in life expectancy, the higher costs of health care provision, and the sharp increase in numbers of beneficiaries with the baby boomer generation retiring are all real conditions that together pose a challenge to the guarantee of pension and health benefits for senior citizens. Add to these conditions the emerging hegemony of neo-liberal policies driven by an ideological opposition to the very existence of these programs, and the future of these guarantees appears in doubt. Some contend that the threat to these programs has been overstated for political reasons, arguing that the architects of Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security factored the baby boom retirement into their long-term calculations (Baker and Weisbrot 1999). Nonetheless, the battle lines over the future of public funding for senior citizens have been drawn. Regardless of the

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<sup>9</sup> Of course, scholars have noted that the distinctive design of social insurance programs in contrast with social assistance programs, like AFDC, and now TANF, has helped to reproduce racial, gender and class

actual fiscal solvency of these programs, their mere existence has become the site of a larger ideological battle regarding the nature of the relationship between government and citizens. Indeed, assessing the effectiveness of several decades of increasing calls for privatization, Jacob Hacker (2002) suggests that one result is that currently, "the United States appears to be approaching a new crossroads in the long debate over public and private benefits, as opponents of existing policies advance new strategies premised on the weakened position of public social programs and the growing role of private social benefits" (320). At the center of this crossroads is a shift in defining what constitutes national American citizenship. Before considering the state of citizenship in these debates, however, I turn now to sketch the policy landscape that has become more receptive to calls for privatization of programs whose existence was for decades held to be almost sacred in the eyes of the public.

Those who have long denounced public spending programs are currently in the position to advance fiscal policies, such as large tax cuts, that in effect would erode the government's ability to fund such programs. Indeed, as Paul Krugman (2003) has noted, the tax cuts implemented in 2001 and 2003 will likely have the effect of severely limiting funding for Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security. He writes: "Once the new round of cuts takes effect, federal taxes will be lower than their average during the Eisenhower administration. How, then, can the government pay for Medicare and Medicaid—which didn't exist in the 1950s—and Social Security, which will become far more expensive as the population ages?... The answer is it can't." The obstacle facing this wholesale policy reversal of these entitlement programs is that for the most part, Medicare and Social Security remain popular programs amongst the American public. So, to effectuate these

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inequalities as well as a sense of the deserving and undeserving poor. Schram (2000), 164-175.

policy reforms, nothing less than a wholesale recasting of the dominant principles of social citizenship is necessary.

Of course, racialized and gendered norms of voluntarism, rugged individualism and a deeply entrenched work ethic have marked American social welfare policies from their inception (Mink 1990; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Skocpol 1992; Fox Piven and Cloward 1971; Shola Orloff 1993). Nonetheless, the ideological principles at the core of the non-means tested entitlement programs such as Medicare and Social Security include some degree of appreciation for non-market principles of universal risk pooling, public accountability, resource redistribution, and a reciprocal solidarity within a national political community. These principles are currently subject to reversal, to be replaced by principles of self-sufficiency and independence from public services. Again, these market-based principles have always existed concurrently with social welfare programs; however, as Sanford Jacoby (1997) has noted, these principles have been amplified in the context of a new economy. Middle class professionals increasingly identify with a sense of "market individualism." He explains that "[s]uch workers are adjusting to what they see as the new dog-eat-dog economy, having lost faith not only in welfare capitalism but in other institutions as well" (263). New attitudes regarding social welfare have emerged as members in the formal labor sector "seek individualized security—medical savings accounts and portable pension plans—instead of social insurance" (264). However, despite even this new individualized attitude regarding social benefits, such as health insurance, when it comes to retirement benefits, future retirees continue to assume that they will be able to rely to some extent on public programs in their old age.

According to a recent study conducted by the National Council on Aging, American citizens express confidence that they will enjoy comfortable retirement due to assumptions regarding the future availability of public funding for their retirement and, in particular, their health insurance. As Robyn Stone summarizes, "[i]gnorance about who pays for long-term care is still common. Almost three out of four respondents...believe that Medicare is the primary funding source for most older persons' services and 48 percent report having done little or no long-term care planning" (2000). This, despite concurrent popular support for reforms cutting public spending generally. Since the 1970s, increasingly dominant ideologies favoring privatization have tipped the balance between the public and private sectors that stands at the center of the U.S. welfare state increasingly towards the private sector. And these calls for reform have seen multiple successes in the policy arena. In a recent article, Jacob Hacker (2004) uses the examples of health insurance and pensions policies to argue that privatizing reforms have taken place not at the level of formal policy, but rather, more surreptitiously, at the level of internal reform, or by preventing social policies from adapting to new conditions and needs. He notes in earlier work that the result of this kind of under-the-radar approach to reforming policy is that, "between 1975 and 1994, the proportion of U.S. social spending that came from private sources grew by more than a quarter, even though the United States already had the largest domain of private social benefits in the world" (2002, 7). Against the backdrop of this several decades old trend, and, perhaps in a case of biting the nose to spite the face of the body politic, popular support for policies of privatization continues despite the fact that individual planning, or lack thereof, reflects confidence

regarding the availability of sufficient public funding for one's own retirement and health care in old age.

Ironically, in its popular support for cutting public spending programs, the mass public votes against its own material interest. Many scholars of the American welfare state would note that this is nothing new. In his tripartite scheme of welfare states, Esping-Anderson argues that this political dynamic is central to the form of the liberal welfare state. He notes that in the United States, welfare provision has largely been allocated to the working poor and indigent populations through means-tested programs. And, except for senior citizen entitlements, the middle-class has generally relied on private insurance and employer-sponsored benefits. In this context, the middle class is never, or at least rarely, "wooled from the market to the state" (31). In contrast with a country such as France, where reforms of social policy are regularly met with cross-class mass actions and strikes, the middle-class in the United States identifies its fate with the fortunes of the private sector.

Certainly, that the middle class in the United States in general aligns itself with the private sector is an outcome fated by the structure of the liberal welfare state. However, Social Security and Medicare represent exceptions to this logic, as these are the most universal programs in American social policy—thus linking the vast constituency of middle class retirees to the state. Thus, it remains important to explore the historically specific structural and discursive conditions that create the contemporary environment wherein popular sentiment supporting the retrenchment of social welfare contradicts the material interests of American citizens. This puzzle has been around since the extension

of universal suffrage, and scholars have developed a range of explanatory theories.<sup>10</sup> For example, a Gramscian explanation would point to the role in civil society to elicit popular consent in the nightwatchman state institutions that in effect serve the interests of the ruling class. Feminist and critical race scholars, such as Sanford Schram, Nancy Fraser, Linda Gordon, Frances Fox Piven and Gwendolyn Mink, have long pointed to the entrenched norms of racism and sexism as central to the popular distaste for social citizenship and lack of support in general for government-funded social policies. Weighing in from an institutional perspective, Hacker (2004) suggests that kinds of retrenchment that would be politically untenable are successful in that these reforms go unnoticed, taking place as they do at the administrative level and/or merely through their absence due to lack of political will to adapt social policy to meet new social needs. Finally, with regard to entitlement programs for the elderly in particular, Theda Skocpol (2000) points to how politicians have increasingly pitted the interests of younger workers against senior citizens, suggesting that out of this intergenerational conflict emerges further erosion of popular support for public programs. Indeed, proving Skocpol's point, AARP recently weathered controversy for its endorsement for the expansion of Medicare spending to include private prescription plans. William D. Novelli, the president of AARP, based his decision to support the Medicare reform on the calculation that while current retirees opposed the reform in large numbers, future retirees—the baby boomer generation—“would support an experiment with private competition in the government-run Medicare program” (Freudenheim and Gay Stolberg 2003).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See Jacqueline Stevens' discussion on this dilemma of universal suffrage (1999, 53–56).

<sup>11</sup> While political calculation of AARP's future membership base may have been part of what drove Novelli's endorsement, it is perhaps no coincidence that he wrote the forward to Newt Gingrich's recent book *Saving Lives and Saving Money* (2003) which argues for the privatization of Medicare.

In this dissertation I advance an additional explanatory theory specific to the contemporary ideological and economic conditions of neo-liberal globalization. In the context of globalization, national citizenship narratives emerge in the intersections between immigration and social policy. Immigration scholars have effectively illustrated that the contemporary reliance on non-citizen labor to contribute to the American national economy is undoubtedly one of the dominant paradoxes of our time. But, while immigration scholars have written extensively of the American business sector's perennial reliance on low wage immigrant labor, less attention has focused on another form of American reliance on immigration. In this dissertation, I suggest that two seemingly independent policy arenas, immigration and domestic social policy provision, are in fact linked. I consider two manifestations of this linkage. First, in the context of the restructuring of social provision, increased immigration since the 1960s into the United States creates the backdrop against which the meanings ascribed to the relationship between citizens and national government are reconfigured to enhance neo-liberal principles. The rhetorical links made between restructuring social policy and maintaining high levels of immigration were especially salient over the course of debates surrounding the 1996 reforms of immigration and welfare policies, a process I will explore in chapter three. Immigration and social provision intersect at a second level, raising further questions regarding the meaning of citizenship. Indeed, these questions are particularly acute as the labor migration of women from the global South into the United States helps shore up the restructuring of domestic social policy, particularly in the case of long-term care provision of senior citizens, as I will discuss in chapters four and five. Heightened security concerns in the United States further deepen the paradox between an invigorated

assertion of national sovereignty regarding securing borders and the seemingly entrenched need for access to low-wage, non-citizen labor. These deep shifts regarding the meaning of citizenship predated September 11, 2001 and continue to have a lasting imprint on current U.S. immigration and social policy-making.

In the United States, a reconstituted narrative of national citizenship helps to facilitate popular acceptance for the privatization of popular social policy. In chapter three, I will consider as one illustration of this narrative the rhetoric surrounding the overlapping legislation of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (Public Law 104-208, September 30 1996) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (Public Law 104-193, August 22 1996). Out of the neo-liberal successes represented by these two Acts emerged a narrative of immigration setting forth non-citizens as models of the norms of the productivity and self-reliance while foreclosing their access to public benefits. This, in turn, laid the foundation for the promulgation of the entrenchment of American citizenship as a practice of market rationality with an emphasis on individual responsibility, efficiency, and productivity.

In chapters four and five, I explore the rhetorical and structural conditions of "outsourcing" social reproductive labor to non-citizen women of color as these represent another means by which to legitimate the increasingly privatized relationship between the state and citizens, senior citizens in particular. Indeed, while the pressures of increased healthcare costs due to technological and pharmaceutical innovation have become the stuff of national headlines, this other dimension of care provision remains invisible for the most part. Non-citizen women of color have increasingly provided the material basis for service provision in the privatized sector of care-work, working as professional

nurses, para-professional nurse aides in nursing homes and with home healthcare agencies and in informal positions providing domestic care for the elderly. That is, against the rising costs of providing the benefits of new healthcare technologies to an aging population, the cost of feeding, bathing, and tending to the material and emotional needs of an ailing senior citizen remain remarkably low due to the cheap dependable labor of non-citizen women emigrating from poorer parts of the globe. Moreover, the gendered and racialized narratives surrounding non-citizen workers providing elder care services function as legitimizing mechanisms as they reinforce both low-wages and neo-colonial global economic inequalities. These narratives are generated through a simultaneous redefinition of national citizenship in the poor states that send citizens abroad and in the affluent states that receive overseas workers. In the relationship between two states, one relying on the emigration of its citizens and the other relying on the immigration of low-wage non-citizen labor, we find that one state's immigration policy is linked to another's emigration policy. Moreover, and more significantly for this project, one state's norms of national citizenship are inextricably linked to the norms of another. Thus, the production of the norms of neo-liberal citizenship is a decidedly transnational affair. Certainly, in the United States, sentiment for privatizing popular programs hinges on each of the processes identified by Gramsci, by feminist and critical race scholars, and by Skocpol. But, in addition, as I will argue throughout, it hinges on the transnational effects of neo-liberalism's reconstitution of the meanings of national citizenship.

Increased, and increasingly privatized, labor migration is one of the transnational dimensions of neo-liberal domestic policies. It is also representative of the ways in which

neo-liberalism reinforces capitalism's penchant for reproducing inequalities. That is, neo-liberalism, for all of its calls for the elimination of borders with regard to financial and trade transactions, respects national borders and sovereignty when it comes to migration policy. Indeed, rather than eroding the national state, when it comes to migration, neo-liberal capitalism takes advantage of the national state's prerogative to set restrictions on mobility. A brief overview of the liberal right to free movement will help explain this claim.

Frederick Whelan (1981) provides a thorough overview of the development of the right to emigrate, underscoring the crucial detail that, because of the national state, this liberal right has never corresponded with a coincident right to immigrate. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) represents the first time free movement was codified, yet this freedom falls far short of a call for open borders. Article 13 provides that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own," while Article 15 provides that "no one shall be arbitrarily...denied the right to change his nationality" (qtd. 636). Whelan notes at the outset that while the UDHR sets forth a right to leave as prior to the state, it does "not stipulate a general right of entry or immigration (for aliens)" (637). Thus the right of entry (and of acceptance for changing nationality) is "a matter which remains under state sovereignty and which of course imposes a practical limitation on the right to emigrate" (637-8). That is, the right to emigration is not matched by a right to immigration. In his conclusion, Whelan argues that Western liberal democracies represent a middle course whereby "the right to leave is combined...with acceptance of substantial state sovereignty, epitomized...in the state's authority to regulate and even prohibit immigration" (651). Thus, we are left with the decidedly

asymmetrical effects of this "liberal" compromise: the right to leave, the right to emigrate, and even the right to *change* one's nationality, but no corresponding right to immigrate, indeed, no right to *acquire* another nationality.

Jacqueline Stevens (1999) reminds us that this kind of catch-22 that is endemic of the liberal state is no coincidence. Indeed, state citizenship laws are precisely what allow for the engines of capitalism to roar. She argues that "the international conditions of capital accumulation" (40) are assured by limits on immigration. Borrowing Rosa Luxemburg's classic argument, Stevens points out that by restricting labor mobility, the state divides labor by national identity and creates a more pliable workforce, one that is tied to national well-being and bent on competing with workers in other states. Stevens explains, "as long as Mexicans perceive their jobs as tied to relatively cheaper labor costs and U.S. workers perceive their higher wages as dependent on the exclusions of Mexicans, for instance, transnational organizing and alliances are extraordinarily difficult" (39). Citizenship requirements restricting migration are key to this system that essentially divides labor by nations. That is, global inequality is perpetuated precisely by the denial of the right to immigrate. She goes on to argue that "if labor markets were free (i.e. no immigration restrictions), then corporations would have no incentive to lay off American workers to hire people in Singapore, since unions would be transnational and labor would be almost as likely to move as capital" (40).

While restricting cross-border migration is certainly one of the ways in which state policy is the site by which global inequalities are maintained, there is another way as well. Just as migration policy produces inequalities through prohibition, so does it do so by allowance. That is, by allowing migration, albeit via channels that ensure precarious

legal status, states provide employers in the global North, for example, access to low-wage workers in the global South. Neo-liberal economic policies restructure state economies throughout the globe and, in so doing, create an environment that essentially offers no other possibility but to emigrate. And, coincidentally, avenues *allowing* for emigration and immigration (both legitimate and illegitimate) facilitate this transfer of low-wage labor across national borders. This is particularly important for staffing industries, such as care-services, that cannot simply pick up and relocate to other states the way that industries such as manufacturing, computer programming, and technological support can.

In this dissertation, I draw on the modern Western tradition of political theory to develop a normative response to the forces of post-industrial production and neo-liberal free market economic policies which have eroded social policies and have propelled mass labor migration from the global South to the United States. What light do these contemporary conditions shed on the current status of the modern political formations of the national state and democratic citizenship? More generally, what are the effects of neo-liberal economic policies on politics? Finally, in an era of neo-liberal globalization, what political and ethical categories remain meaningful as mechanisms by which to concretize democracy, freedom and equality? In sketching out answers to these questions, I will suggest that national citizenship has come undone. In a sense this is a good thing. National citizenship has all too often been the site of political exclusions. Nonetheless, along with the degradation of national citizenship as a political category, the possibility of enhancing the expansion of social rights of citizenship that emerged in the twentieth century is rendered virtually irrelevant. This irrelevance is troubling due to the link

between social rights and democracy. This claim of course begs the question of why social rights are central to grounding vibrant democratic institutions? I will argue that moral argument as well as historical record suggests that they are. In light of this connection, the erosion of social rights of national citizenship suggests nothing less than a threat to democracy. To address this threat, in chapter six, I consider recent efforts in moral philosophy to address global issues. In particular, I look at the work of Martha Nussbaum on world citizenship, Amartya Sen on development as freedom and Thomas Pogge on democracy and global poverty. I assess the salience of each argument in the face of current conditions with particular attention to the arenas of social policy and immigration. Can these theories provide leverage regarding social rights, national citizenship, equality, and finally, democratic politics as these take shape in the global landscape—or not? Do any of these theories provide a viable normative intervention into prevailing conditions regarding the nature of the relationship between citizens and government? I will argue that none is wholly adequate.

By bringing together literature from political theory and political economy I aim to develop more productive links between theoretical discussions of modern citizenship and the concrete conditions that shape citizenship in our time, links I build on in the conclusion. Indeed, perhaps the concrete and ideological conditions that have unbound democratic citizenship represent a crucial moment of opportunity. After all, as I hope will be clear, the argument in the pages that follow is not one driven by a nostalgia for a bygone Golden Age. That post-war Golden Age, hailed by so many left-leaning political economists, was enjoyed by a relative few as it required the continued subjection of

populations throughout the world and was deeply stratified along the lines of gender, race, class and nationality.

Rather, it is my aim to incorporate the lessons of the past with the moral political theory and feminist theory of the present to set out an alternative normative theory regarding the relationship between institutions of governance and individuals that accounts for the transnational dimensions of contemporary life while prioritizing democratic egalitarianism. Some might argue that the language of citizenship for the purposes of advancing democratic practices has been rendered obsolete due to globalization. Out of this line of argument have emerged numerous calls for human rights to replace citizenship as a means by which to advance claims in the global arena. While I support these efforts, I find human rights on their own to be insufficient. At this juncture, there remains a critical gap between the articulation of human rights and their institutional concretization. Certainly, in an era of neo-liberal globalization, a similar gap is emerging in the case of democratic citizenship, as I will argue throughout. Nonetheless, citizenship remains a more effective category to track the shifting relationships between public institutions and individuals as well as a more effective basis by which to demand a far better relationship than that available today. In so doing, I set forth a configuration of democratic citizenship that more effectively reflects the kind of ethical content that can translate worldwide into norms *and* institutions.

## Chapter 2:

### Neo-Liberal Globalization and National Citizenship

#### Globalization and its leaner, meaner nation-states

It has become common to characterize globalization in such a way that it seems practically devoid of ideology and national politics. Indeed, popular and scholarly definitions focusing on the technological underpinnings of globalization, cultural homogenization and the attendant undoing of national sovereignty are common in both mainstream media outlets as well as in academic circles.<sup>1</sup> Technological advances in transportation and in information technology and communications certainly do provide the structural capacity for increased economic, cultural and even political cross-border transactions. But, in conceptualizing globalization, many commentators limit their definitions to these technological phenomena, at times considering the potential for cultural homogenization with the dominance of certain forms of culture, generally American. Moreover, common throughout these essentially sociological assessments is the assertion that in the face of these technological realities, the coming demise of the national state is inevitable—a passing either to be celebrated or to which one must resign oneself, depending on one's point of view.

These kinds of conclusions are certainly correct in the assertion that changing forms of technology have altered cultural, political and economic transactions, and that, as a result, the sovereignty of the modern nation-state is in flux. But this perspective seriously under-appreciates the continued relevance of the national state and of national politics. The nation-state continues to thrive as a mediating force in the interplay of

international economic, political and cultural interests and local and national interests. In its continuing relevance, the national state provides insight into the political and, significantly, the ideological processes that define the shape that contemporary globalization has taken.<sup>2</sup> With this in mind, Peter Evans (1997) cautions against arguments that suggest the state has been eclipsed in the context of globalization. Arguments regarding the sociological conditions of "statelessness" are prone to being duped into overlooking the contemporary global dominance of neo-liberal, or what he terms Anglo-American, ideology. He explains that "today, the untrammelled hegemony of Anglo-American ideological premises is one of the most salient forces shaping the specific character of the current global economy, including the extent to which globalization is viewed as entailing the eclipse of the state" (Evans 1997, 64). I would add that the current trend in scholarship that conceptualizes globalization as an essentially structural or sociological condition serves to reinforce the dominance of neo-liberal ideas in policy-making, both at the domestic and international level.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, to define globalization as the result of some combination of technological advances with a nod towards the cultural effects of globalization is to obfuscate the political and ideological dimensions of globalization. And these dimensions, which are currently dominated by neo-liberal ideas of privatization and the free-market, continue to be based in the dynamics of the national state.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview of this trend in scholarly and mainstream writings, see Bergeron 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Leela Fernandes's work on the nation-state in the context of globalization is an excellent example of analysis that takes seriously the continued relevance of national politics (2000).

<sup>3</sup> Mary Hawkesworth (2003) has pointed out that yet another obfuscating effect of neo-liberalism is the invisibility of political activism, and feminist activism in particular, in popular media and in scholarship.

<sup>4</sup> I join other scholars who have emphatically underscored the ideological dimensions of neo-liberal globalization. See for example, the essays in Mittelman (1996), especially Mittelman's essay, "How Does Globalization Work?"; Bourdieu (1998), especially 29-44; and Steger (2001).

Evans offers a useful reminder that, regardless of the vogue of claims noting the "end of the state," the state remains very much a central part of globalization—even in the case of neo-liberal policy-making. The state remains essential, but its task has changed. As he puts the matter, the crucial point "is not that states will end up as marginal institutions but that meaner, more repressive ways of organizing the state's role will be accepted as the only way of avoiding the collapse of public institutions" (Evans 1997, 64). The tenets of neo-liberalism hold that the state's primary function is to provide the regulatory infrastructure necessary for free trade, at least with regard to maintaining institutions necessary to enforce the rule of law and maintain security. In this form, the state seemingly plays a minimalist or nightwatchman role, functioning primarily to enforce the private property rights of citizens, provide general security and adjudicate conflicts in the private sector. As some scholars of neo-liberalism are beginning to note, however, ironically, the state remains very much an active institutional mechanism in securing neo-liberal economic policies. The contours of the state may look different, but in its "leaner meaner" Anglo-American form, it still provides the crucial political infrastructure of a liberal constitutional state to enable global free trade (Evans 1997, 85). Moreover, as economist Arthur MacEwan (1999) has shown, state policy has been essential in many states hailed as examples of the success of neo-liberal economic policies. Contrary to the "free trade myth" that holds that economic growth will only take place if freed from the fetters of government regulation, MacEwan points out that "[v]irtually all of our experience with economic development suggests that extensive regulation of foreign commerce by a country's government has been an essential foundation for successful economic growth" (1999, 36). Thus, definitions of globalization

that focus solely on its technological aspects ignore at once the neo-liberal ideological underpinnings shaping the global economy as well as the continued role of the national state in making the economic growth credited to the myth of free trade possible.

By tracing the supporting role that the national state plays in the unfolding drama of neo-liberal globalization, we can develop a more nuanced conceptualization of the political and ideological dimensions that attend the structures of globalization. The aim of this dissertation is to delineate the political context by which the category of national citizenship has been stretched thin and redefined so as to remain meaningful in this era of privatization and globalization. I hold that the reconfiguration of national citizenship is a manifestation of the neo-liberal climate of global opinion.<sup>5</sup> In this chapter I will assess the continued role of the state in the context of neo-liberal hegemony as well as the continued political salience of national citizenship in globalization. This discussion lays the groundwork for my analysis in the next chapter of how neo-liberal American citizenship is one result of the productive tension that lies at the intersection of neo-liberal policies and nativist political impulses. There I will argue that transnational labor migration has played a key role in the formation of American neo-liberal citizenship, and marks what has emerged as a transnational logic central to the narration of neo-liberal norms of citizenship. The contemporary political processes surrounding immigration and neo-liberal reforms of redistributive social policy have fueled the reconfiguration of the meaning of American citizenship and shed light into how domestic popular support for

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<sup>5</sup> When Carl Becker (1932) used the concept of "climate of opinion" he meant it in a much broader sense that I do here. For him, the notion of climate of opinion, defined as "those instinctively held preconceptions in the broad sense, that... world pattern" (5) helped to explain the 18<sup>th</sup> century persistence of Christian thought that was so dominant in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. While neo-liberal ideas do not have that kind of centuries-old hold on world opinion, the notion of "climate of opinion" is useful for denoting the ways in which neo-liberal ideas (whose genealogy can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century at least, if not the 18<sup>th</sup> century) have held sway over economic policy-making for the past thirty years in both domestic and global arenas.

neo-liberal policies coheres. Reading these two seemingly dissimilar policy arenas against one another reveals the dynamics of the productive tensions underlying neo-liberal citizenship. In the next chapter I consider the nearly coincident passage of neo-liberal national reforms in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (Public Law 104-208, September 30 1996) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (Public Law 104-193, August 22 1996). In chapters four and five, I delve further into the link between immigration and the restructuring of social policy—this time honing in on neo-liberalism's effect on the ideals of democratic citizenship. Here, I analyze what feminist scholars have denoted as the "international division of reproductive labor" as this provides an example of the structural link between domestic policy reforms and immigration. I consider in particular the contemporary conditions of elder care funding in the United States as well as the conditions of non-citizen women care providers to demonstrate the shifting terrain of economics and politics and the larger impact of neo-liberalism on democratic citizenship. Before delving into these specific cases, in the discussion below, I lay out a broad theoretical framework for thinking about the role of the national state in relation to neo-liberal global markets, paying particular attention to the continued relevance of the category of national citizenship.

### Neo-Liberal Governmentality and the Entrepreneur

MacEwan is certainly correct to reveal the myth of free trade for what it is. As he points out, in case after case, when free trade is credited for improving a nation's economy, trade is often not "free" at all, but is in fact dependent upon state intervention

in the market. But the state is bound up in promulgating neo-liberal policies in other ways as well. Scholars from a variety of backgrounds have recently deployed Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality to analyze neo-liberalism, finding it particularly useful for delineating the relationship between neo-liberalism, state institutions and individual citizens (Burchell, et al. 1991; Barry, et al. 1996; Lemke 2001; Brown 2003).<sup>6</sup> I too find it a useful, but, as I will argue, insufficient approach to unpacking the political dynamics of neo-liberalism. While a number of Foucauldian scholars have honed in on a set of lectures Foucault delivered on the topic of neo-liberalism and governmentality, even sociologist Saskia Sassen (1998) has made use of his notion of "governmentality" to describe the relationship between the state and privatization. In defining the neo-liberal state, Sassen observes that neo-liberalism bolsters the role of the state treasury departments, and has the coincident effect of diminishing the role of state welfare institutions (1998, 25). A further effect of neo-liberalism on the state is that processes of governmentality are increasingly shifted away from public institutions subject to public scrutiny and into privatized institutions. Thus, she notes, "there is no doubt that some of the intellectual technology that governments have and allow them to control their population, (e.g. Foucault's governmentality), has now shifted to non-state institutions" (1998, 25). In this sense the privatization of public institutions is a markedly new development. Stephen Gill (1996) notes that the reliance on market forces and privatization are old arguments, dating back to nineteenth century classical liberal economic theory. The reconfiguration of state institutions is what is new in late twentieth-century neo-liberalism. That is, neo-liberalism engenders the encroachment of the principles of privatization onto public life. Gill writes, "state agencies are made to

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<sup>6</sup> I am grateful to Barbara Cruikshank for suggesting the body of work discussed here.

compete with the private sector in, for example, service provision and to behave as if they were marketplace animals" (1996, 217). Thus, the state facilitates neo-liberalism by fostering the narrative of market rationality, a process that can be readily exposed through the use of Foucault's concept of governmentality.

Each of the essays collected in *The Foucault Effect* and *Foucault and Political Reason* engages with Foucault's later lectures on governmentality; and, in a more recent article, Thomas Lemke elaborates on these collections providing the most detailed summary of "The Birth of Bio-Politics," Foucault's direct engagement of neo-liberalism. In so doing, Lemke recalls Foucault's trenchant analysis of the relationship between the state and modern forms of *laissez-faire* economic theory. In this lecture, Foucault notes that twentieth-century neo-liberalism parts ways from its eighteenth-century roots. Early theorists espousing the virtues of the free market did so based on an ontological understanding of the market as a natural phenomenon that preceded sociopolitical institutions of government. Indeed, Adam Smith's theory of the "invisible hand" credited humans with a propensity, endowed by God, to "truck, barter and exchange one thing for another" ([1776] 1985, 15).<sup>7</sup> Crucially, this propensity for industrious labor and exchange of goods was one that could be "found" in the state of nature—a claim John Locke laid the groundwork for nearly a century before Adam Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations*. In Foucault's analysis of twentieth-century neo-liberal thought, he considers the work generated out of the Chicago School of thought (Lemke 2001). Focusing in particular on the work of George Becker, he highlights the neo-liberal break with early ontological claims. Twentieth-century neo-liberals suggest that the human propensity for engaging in

the free market is not natural, but instead, must be fostered. Enter the state, and in turn, the salience of Foucault's notion of governmentality.

Indeed, as Colin Gordon (1991) explains, neo-liberalism entails "a reactivation and a radical inversion" of eighteenth century theories of political economy and of the "economic agent" (43). Rather than looking to nature and finding man in the form of *homo economicus*, now he must be made. Gordon explains,

the great departure here from eighteenth-century precedent is that, whereas *homo economicus* originally meant the subject the springs of whose activity must remain forever untouchable by government, the American neo-liberal *homo economicus* is *manipulable man*, man who is perpetually responsive to modifications in his environment. (43)

Wendy Brown (2003) extrapolates on Foucault's claim that that *homo economicus* must be crafted, noting that state policy is central to this process. She writes,

Because neo-liberalism casts rational action as a norm rather than an ontology, social policy is the means by which the state produces subjects whose compass is set by their rational assessment of the costs and benefits of certain acts, whether teen pregnancy, tax cheating, or retirement planning.... The state is one of many sites framing the calculations leading to social behaviors that keep costs low and productivity high. (para. 16)

Thus, despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of whittling down the role of the state in all spheres of life, the concept of governmentality underscores that it is due to state social policies that market rationality comes to be disseminated throughout society, one citizen at a time.

In addition to assigning the state a crucial role in fostering individual market rationality necessary for the "free" market to function, neo-liberalism also reconfigures the meaning of work and of workers. That is, as Lemke sums up Foucault's definition of the neo-liberal worker, "wage labourers are no longer the employees dependent on a

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<sup>7</sup> Smith takes what is essentially an Aristotelian approach in interpreting that this propensity is natural because it is likely due to the natural human "faculties of reason and speech" (15). Of course, Smith departs from Aristotle in his interpretation of man as an "economic," not a political, animal.

company, but are autonomous entrepreneurs with full responsibility for their own investment decisions and endeavoring to produce surplus value; they are entrepreneurs of themselves" (199). Indeed, it seems that neo-liberalism entails the transformation of individuals into entrepreneurs in every aspect of life. Colin Gordon explains, "the individual producer-consumer is in a novel sense not just an enterprise, but the entrepreneur of himself or herself" (44). In this neo-liberal reconstitution of work, the two figures of capitalist production which Marx had seen as distinct and opposed to one another—the owner of the means of production and the wage laborer—are now collapsed into one in the form of the individual entrepreneur. Gordon writes, "the idea of one's life as the enterprise of oneself implies that there is a sense in which one remains always continuously employed in (at least) that one enterprise, and that it is a part of the continuous business of living to make adequate provision for the preservation, reproduction and reconstruction of one's own human capital" (44).

While Lemke and Gordon point to neo-liberalism's effect on how work and workers are conceptualized through the entrepreneurial logic of market rationality, Wendy Brown extrapolates what is at stake for political citizenship, and so underscores the relationship between individual, society and the state. She explains that neo-liberalism transforms the moral subject and in turn transforms the political arena. Brown explains, "neo-liberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life. It figures individuals as rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for 'self-care'—the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions" (para. 15). The neo-liberal moral subject is one who is fully capable of enjoying his/her political liberty and

willing to assume the personal responsibility that this entails—thus shifting responsibility for oversight of individual well-being from the society and the state onto the individual. However, while Brown points to the shift of social burdens from the state to individual citizens, she glosses over the political processes that this shift entails. This oversight may well be a symptom of a reliance on Foucauldian analysis. That is, while Foucault is a trenchant diagnostician of the terms underwriting modernity, his genealogical methodology tends to skim over the specificities of political processes and the dynamic tensions that underwrite historical shifts in dominant ideologies.

A more thorough study of neo-liberal ideology demands that we inquire as to the political process whereby consent to neo-liberalism, along with the attendant reconfiguration of citizenship as entrepreneur, is elicited. This reconfiguration depends upon a deep shift in what it means to be a member of a political community. To understand this dimension of neo-liberal governmentality, we have to further tease out the role of *national* citizenship and *national* politics. Indeed, as I will argue, the modern political formation of the nation-state, both at the level of politics and at the level of citizenship, is key for the legitimation of neo-liberal governmentality.

Colin Gordon has suggested that Foucault recognized the shortcomings in his earlier work for the study of political action. Gordon argues that in a later essay "The Subject and Power," Foucault finesses his definition of power, suggesting that "although power is an omnipresent dimension in human relations, power in a society is never a fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game" (5). While I could not agree more, Foucault fails to provide adequate tools of analysis to explain the terms of these "games" or, more specifically in the case of this study, the game of

citizenship, national politics and neo-liberal globalization. For this, I turn instead to Antonio Gramsci's work on ideology, hegemony and counter hegemony and Karl Polanyi's notion of double movement.

### Holding Stock in the Nation: The Citizen Shareholder

The national state plays a crucial role in mediating between its entrepreneurial citizens and the global market. In an essay inspired by Karl Polanyi, André Drainville (2000) notes the national political form is very much in force, partnering with the global market by overseeing the transformation of its citizens into avid supporters of liberalization of its domestic economy. His work highlights that national citizenship remains a relevant political category—one that now functions as a mediating device legitimating the dominance of neo-liberal policies. Indeed the individual entrepreneur, who, as we've seen, is the result of neo-liberal governmentality, is constantly enlisted in a *national* project as a citizen-shareholder. Drainville explains:

the shaping of citizenship in the contemporary world economy is accompanied by a two-fold transformation of the structures of political participation: at once, national citizens are increasingly cast as bearers of economic rationality whose primary function is to bring to states claims for greater efficiency in the management of economic resources, and lead the assault on...the social rights of citizenship, and their relationship to the state is increasingly contingent on their position as minority shareholders in the running of the affairs of the state. (198-199)

He goes on to suggest that the national state plays a central role in this transformation. That is, "the process of political integration in the world economy...passes through states and is reliant on the ability of states to structure political participation, either through consensus-building or coercive measures" (199). Along the same line of analysis, Peter Evans explains that "politicians and state managers gain support for the state as an

institution in return for restricting the state's role to activities essential for sustaining the profitability of transnational markets" (1997, 85).

So again, the national state is anything but irrelevant, or eclipsed, in this era of globalization. Quite the opposite. Taking the example of the citizen-shareholder, Drainville forcefully notes that shoring up citizens' commitments to the national state is essential. He writes, "the restoration and strengthening of national ties of citizenship are central to the political management of the contemporary world economy" (199). The national state serves the essential function of legitimating the workings of the global economy—along with shoring up the neo-liberal climate of opinion, which has defined global economic policy-making in the last several decades. Indeed, the national state's significance has perhaps increased due to this essential role. Drainville explains that "though truly organized globally as a productive venture, the world economy remains socially rooted in the space of the nation state, and politically dependent on the ability of states to strike social compromises" (199).

There exist various approaches to study the processes by which these social compromises are generated. For example, an institutional analysis of how public policy achieves social compromises might include a study of how policies are devised to serve and balance the interests of different sectors. Along this line of inquiry, an analysis might attend to the kinds of national measures, such as subsidies or tariffs, instituted to protect domestic sectors in the face of international competition. Or, as in the case of Jacob Hacker's recent work on welfare state retrenchment (2004), another line of institutional inquiry explains popular acceptance of risk privatization as hinging upon various strategies of under-the-radar-screen policy reform.

In my analysis, however, I adopt a different methodological approach, attending instead to the kinds of processes that Antonio Gramsci illuminated in his work. That is, I consider the means by which popular consent to ideologies underwriting governance, and in this case, economic policies, is manufactured, or reinforced, through norms guiding civil society. In borrowing Gramsci's methodology, I do not mean to reproduce the essentialism of his Marxist argument that material conditions and the interests of the ruling classes determine the ruling ideologies of the day.<sup>8</sup> Rather I find Gramsci's work useful for illuminating the dynamic cultural and ideological processes within civil society that serve to reinforce particular arrangements of political power and resources. For example, in nineteenth-century Europe, the newly forming state bureaucratic functions developed legitimacy in the eyes of the populace in part through the concurrent development of ideas about national citizenship. In this case, one form of logic by which citizenship was tied to the national state relied on eliciting ethnic identification and infusing modern nationalism into that era's climate of opinion.<sup>9</sup> In our own era since the 1970s, and especially in the United States, we have yet another logic regarding national citizenship—one defined by economic individualism tied to state success in the global economy. In this case, new norms of citizenship serve to link individual productivity and market rationality with national comparative advantage. David Ricardo ([1817] 1996) first delineated comparative advantage in terms of one nation's superiority in the production of certain goods compared with other nations. And enhancing the benefits of comparative advantage has been cited as one of the advantages to integrating the global

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<sup>8</sup> I agree with Laclau and Mouffe's estimation that Gramsci is still useful even without this essentialism. See Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2001, 109).

<sup>9</sup> There exists extensive scholarship on this era. See in particular, Benedict Anderson (1983); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983); and for a case study, see Eugen Weber (1976).

market through trade liberalization (Dam 2001, 75-78; MacEwan 1999, 46-48). In current practice, an essential component of comparative advantage is that it depends upon the market behavior of national citizens. That is, a nation derives its competitive edge in the global market based both on its citizenry's entrepreneurial capacities as well as on the degree of their shareholder zeal for cutting state costs.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, a citizenry's support for "dumping" domestic social policies is essential if a state is going to compete globally according to the logic of neo-liberal globalization. And, the simultaneity of these dual aspects of neo-liberal citizenship, the individual entrepreneur and the national shareholder, is at once a reaction to the dislocations of neo-liberal global markets as well as a mechanism by which to reinforce neo-liberal hegemony.

It is no easy task for the national state to elicit popular consent for the liberalization of the domestic, not to mention the global, economy.<sup>11</sup> To understand why this is the case requires a more nuanced methodological approach to the study of political processes than that offered by Foucault. For this, I rely on Karl Polanyi's notion of the *embedded* nature of economic processes ([1944] 2001). In his classic text, *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi asserted an ontological argument that spheres of human life, social, political and economic, are essentially imbricated and overlapping. The market, in other words, is embedded in social and political life and in the environment. And because of this essentially ontological claim, Polanyi could make the argument that market

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<sup>10</sup> The concept of the "social dumping thesis" reflects the international pressures for cutting domestic state spending. Felice Roberto Pizuti (2001) explains that "the main point of this thesis is that, by pitting against each other countries with labor costs variously saddled with social welfare payments, trade integration would undermine the competitiveness of countries, such as the European ones, with more developed welfare systems. It follows that, in order to preserve growth and employment levels, it is necessary to reduce welfare state expenditures" (13).

<sup>11</sup> Indeed, James E. Cronin (2000) argues that the success of the neo-liberal model in both England and the United States depended upon political conditions that were "fleeting and utterly unique" (799) thus

volatility has direct repercussions on each of these spheres. Because of this, a dynamic "double movement" takes place in reaction to the liberal organization of the economy. Social and political institutions will naturally emerge to counter market volatility so as to protect land and labor. As he puts the matter, "if market economy was a threat to the human and natural components of the social fabric...what else would one expect than an urge on the part of a great variety of people to press for some form of protection?" (156). The form that this counter-movement takes, however, varies with the times. In his most poignant example, Polanyi points to the effects of late nineteenth-century global *laissez-faire* economic policy which, in its fixation on the virtues of the self-regulated market, sought to split the market off from social and political spheres. He explains, "while the organization of the world commodity markets, world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard gave an unparalleled momentum to the mechanism of markets, a deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled environment" (79-80). The nature of this movement, however, was just as much a threat. Indeed, the free global market of the nineteenth century split the market from other spheres of life and spurred a political and social counter-movement that took various forms in different national contexts. In each variant of counter-movement, society "seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market forces" (Ruggie 1982, 387). The form of greatest concern for Polanyi was European fascism with its combination of social planning at the expense of human freedom.<sup>12</sup> Later, in the mid-twentieth century, the

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underscoring the challenge of eliciting popular consent for policies that privilege the market over the government.

<sup>12</sup> Ruggie sums up the forms of counter-movement that for Polanyi revealed the dynamic of society reacting to the self-regulated markets: "Polanyi looked back over the [inter-war period] from the vantage point of

welfare and regulatory functions of the state emerged as institutions of social protection, a development Polanyi would likely have welcomed, though, due to his emphasis on freedom, with great reservations.<sup>13</sup>

Fred Block provides a helpful explanation of Polanyi's view of the necessity of government social protection and regulation of markets, citing some of the actions taken by governments in the course of the twentieth century:

the state has to manage shifting demand for employees by providing relief in periods of unemployment, by educating and training future workers, and by seeking to influence migration flows. In the case of land, governments have sought to maintain continuity in food production by a variety of devices that insulate farmers from the pressures of fluctuating harvests and volatile prices. (2001, xxvi)

In contrast, by adhering zealously to the mechanisms of the self-regulating market, the neo-liberal national state, once again, is attempting to disembed the market and so has the effect of rendering the populace vulnerable to dislocations resulting from the dramatic cycles of the market. However, in this era of free markets, unlike that of the Nineteenth Century, the form of counter-movement looks quite different from that of fascist Europe.

Block explains that state reliance on market self-regulation renders workers more vulnerable. In the context of liberalization, "workers and their families are made more vulnerable to unemployment, farmers are exposed to greater competition from imports, and both groups are required to get by with reduced entitlement to assistance" (Block 2001, xxvii). This creates the potential for political volatility—a volatility that can be

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the Second World War—at the emergence of mass movements from the Left and the Right throughout Europe, the revolutionary upheavals in central and eastern Europe in the 1917-20 period, the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain, and, above all, the rapid succession of the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain, the instituting of the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union, the launching of the New Deal in the United States, unorthodox budgetary policies in Sweden, *corporativismo* in Fascist Italy, and *Wirkshaftslenkung* followed by the creation of both domestic and international variants of the 'new economic order' by the Nazis in Germany" (1982, 386-387).

<sup>13</sup> This would be due to Polanyi's insistence that freedom be central to social policy, a priority not generally reflected in the modern welfare state.

controlled through measures of repression and coercion. So, ironically, diminishing the potential for popular turmoil created by liberalization requires greater state intervention—but state intervention of a kind quite different than that of the welfare state. This, as Block puts the matter, "is part of what Polanyi means by his claim the '*laissez-faire* was planned'; it requires statecraft and repression to impose the logic of the market and its attendant risks on ordinary people" (2001, xxvii).<sup>14</sup> Echoing Gramsci, Block notes that in their efforts to liberalize markets, states may rely on both eliciting consent and on coercive measures to stabilize the population.<sup>15</sup>

National states around the world are committed to putting into practice neo-liberal economic policies, committed either because of conditionalities imposed by international organizations like the IMF, or in the case of the United States, committed because of the neo-liberal saturation of the current climate of opinion. This begs the question of what mechanisms are at work fostering the social compromises necessary to mediate the resulting volatile effects on the national citizenry? How does state policy-making reinforce the neo-liberal climate of opinion in such a way that the population consents to policies that can expose them to the vagaries of an unregulated market? Finally, what is the form that counter-movement is taking in response to the effects of neo-liberal economy?

Part of the answer to these questions lies in how national citizenship may be harmonized with neo-liberal tenets. Of course, the terms delineating the transformation of citizenship are specific to national contexts and vary accordingly. But, though the means

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<sup>14</sup> In his claim that "*laissez-faire* was planned," Polanyi primarily referred to "the enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state" set in place to "fulfill the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism" ([1944] 2001, 145). I focus more on the mechanisms that coerce and elicit consent from the population.

by which citizenry are transformed differ, Drainville's point that the citizenship must be redefined applies to any of the 146 national states that currently is a member of the World Trade Organization and so signed on to policies of trade liberalization. In the following chapter, I attend to the case of the United States. The United States is not subject to the international institutions managing the global economy in the way that debtor states have been, be they formerly communist states or non-self governing territories. Thus, the kinds of measures deployed in these cases are distinct from those in the United States and for the most part lie beyond the scope of this project.<sup>16</sup> But this does not detract from the fact that *nationally* defined measures are very much in force in the United States designed to manage the shifting relationship between the citizenry, the state, and the global market.

Taking the example of the United States, I contend that in this era of neo-liberal hegemony, the national citizenry has become a populace that advocates against its own material interests maintaining, as it does, popular support for neo-liberal policies despite social dislocations. This elusive transformation is rendered viable due to shifts in the overall climate of opinion—shifts due to the coercive play of popular ideologies as well as due to repressive measures. The manufacturing of ideological transformation is a key mechanism in eliciting popular support for neo-liberalism amongst the middle and working classes in the United States. Coercive measures are also in effect in the United States—however, these are targeted primarily at the racialized underclass in the form of criminalization. In this dissertation I consider the ideological measures that target

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<sup>15</sup> For an overview of Gramsci's theory regarding the production of consent in civil society, see Buttigieg (1995).

<sup>16</sup> Though I will consider the case of the Philippines in later chapters.

primarily the working and middle classes, with special attention to the transnational dimension of this process.<sup>17</sup>

Before considering the case of the ideologically driven formation of neo-liberal norms specific to the United States, let me sketch out a definition of political ideology in order to specify its relation to the political category of citizenship. Political ideology is the means by which theoretical concepts are grounded in dynamic contests for political hegemony. In other words, by ideology, I do not refer to the kind of totalizing system denying all freedom of thought that Hannah Arendt sees in the notion of ideology ([1949] 1979, chap. 13). Rather, I use ideology to denote the means by which theoretical ideas are activated in popular political discourse. In other words, ideologies are simply a part of political life. They represent competing interpretations about how, for example, goods and resources should be distributed. Out of these contests, a particular ideological interpretation will come to dominate the climate of opinion in much the way that Gramsci describes the processes of hegemony.<sup>18</sup>

British political theorist Michael Freedman's (1996) recent efforts to take seriously the study of political ideology are helpful here. He defines ideology broadly as follows:

First, ideologies are importantly attached to social groups, not necessarily to classes.... Second, ideologies perform a range of services, such as legitimation, integration, socialization, ordering, simplification, and action orientation, without which societies could not function adequately, if at all. Third, ideologies are ubiquitous forms of political thinking.... Fourth, ideologies are inevitably associated with power, though not invariably with the threatening or exploitative

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the coercive measures in effect through criminalization see Sheldon (2001) and Horowitz de Garcia et al. (2001). And for an intriguing argument linking the criminalization of inner city men of color to the American middle-class reliance on non-Western women working in the American domestic sphere, see Mohanty (2002, 526). In my discussion of the international division of reproductive labor, I will suggest that this latter reliance in the U.S. on non-citizen women to work the domestic sphere is central to shoring up support for neo-liberalism.

<sup>18</sup> On Gramsci's definition of hegemony, including the temporal dimensions of its tenuous hold on the climate of opinion, see Swanson (2003). See also the classic statement by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe ([1985] 2001).

version of power. For inasmuch as ideologies justify certain political decisions and encourage political action, they evoke power as the influence and direction of human beings.... Fifth, ideologies are distinct thought-products that invite careful investigation in their own right. (22-23)

For Freedon, this definition of ideology necessitates a new approach to the study of political thought. He seeks to revalue the study of political ideology and so challenges those who view political ideology as playing second fiddle to political philosophy.

Freedon places a high premium on linking political philosophy to actual politics, and argues that political ideologies bridge the two. He explains, "ideologies need...to straddle the worlds of political thought and political action, for one of their central functions is to link the two" (76).

Freedon suggests in turn that the mechanism by which political ideologies feed off of political philosophy is the core concept. He sums up his approach to the study of political ideology as follows: "the exploration of political thought, historically and contemporaneously, can benefit greatly from adopting a three-tiered unit of analysis, comprising the political concept, its components, and its configurations within the confines of ideologies" (136). Core concepts are those that are necessary to define a political theory, such as liberalism. Ideological entrepreneurs draw on these theoretical concepts and interpret, or in Freedon's terminology, "decontest", them in particular ways so as to convey a certain point of view. As Freedon explains, "competing ideologies are hence struggles over the socially legitimated meanings of political concepts" (77). The success or failure of an ideology's use of theoretical concepts seals its fate in popular politics. For example, defining John Stuart Mill as the paradigmatic liberal, Freedon suggests that the core concepts of liberalism include: liberty, individualism, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, and limited and responsible power (179). I

suggest that neo-liberalism as an ideology makes use of these liberal concepts. That is, neo-liberal policy-making requires an ideological dimension to secure its legitimacy, and this neo-liberal ideology makes use of theoretical concepts, such as the liberal concept of liberty, to forward its political vision.<sup>19</sup> In the next chapter I will argue that effective decontestation of a variety of theoretical concepts is partially responsible for the suffusion of neo-liberal ideology in the United States.

To return to my earlier discussion, what role does national citizenship play in this process? To understand the link, I define national citizenship as a mechanism, or device. That is, as Freedden suggests, ideologies make use of certain devices of legitimation to put forth and prioritize a conceptual interpretation. For example, it is of note that Freedden does not think that rights are a core concept of liberalism—instead rights are a device to facilitate the rendering of an ideological configuration of concepts as legitimate. This because as Freedden explains, "the concept of rights cannot be part of an ideological core, being definitionally attached to any political value or concept it is designed to protect and prioritize. A right is a prioritizing concept which deliberately secures a specific configuration of the core concepts of a given ideology" (162). I submit that the same holds for citizenship. Indeed, national citizenship is a prioritizing concept, serving to render legitimate ideological configurations. Competing ideologies all lay claim to the concept of citizenship, deploying it as a vehicle to render politically viable a particular viewpoint. In modernity, national citizenship, like rights, has attained the special status of being a privileged category in popular imagination. Thus, throughout modern history, and

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<sup>19</sup> Freedden argues that neo-liberalism, or libertarianism, is an "attenuated" ideological decontestation of liberal political theory, because libertarianism does not offer a sufficiently complex rendering of liberal concepts (chapter 7). I would counter that this underestimates how that neo-liberalism successfully feeds off of concepts from different theoretical traditions, not just liberalism.

especially in the era of mass politics, national citizenship has been deployed as a mechanism by which to advance a host of political aims, including securing democracy, fighting for national independence, and even fostering fascism. Neo-liberal versions of citizenship are simply the contemporary variant of this modern history of citizenship. The question that the study of ideology demands we ask is "why one specific decontestation, one ordering of the political world prevails over another" (77). As Freedman explains, answering this question requires analysis of concrete conditions as these reflect how "morphology is underwritten by culture and history" (77). The task at hand is to consider the concrete conditions that underwrite neo-liberal ideology and to assess the role that state policy and national citizenship play in reinforcing our contemporary climate of opinion. To begin to address these concerns, in the following chapter, I turn to define the specific concepts and political contexts that constitute hegemonic renderings of the American citizen as at once both an individual entrepreneur and a national shareholder.

## Chapter 3:

## Liberty and Virtue: Immigration and American Citizenship

James Mittelman (1996) has written that "as an ideology extolling the efficiency of free markets, globalization offers the prospect of an open world economy in which actors compete in a positive-sum game wherein all players are supposed to be able to win" (231). In this chapter, I will consider the means by which the neo-liberal myth of globalization as a win-win situation is upheld in the United States through a reconfiguration of national citizenship. I argue that citizenship has been reconstituted to legitimate the neo-liberal configuration of citizen as an entrepreneurial individual and as an investor holding stock in the nation. Before considering this contemporary case, however, I turn first to identify some of the conceptual building blocks of citizenship generated through U.S. history and political theory. American political theorists offer rich discussions regarding citizenship that have shaped, and been shaped by, U.S. history. But many students of U.S. politics and citizenship limit their work to identifying a particular tradition or set of traditions that lie at the core of American political thought. On these readings, debates trend toward contrasting interpretations of the American citizenship tradition as either liberal or republican.<sup>1</sup> I contest the view that American political thought is of such an essential and seemingly static nature and draw on the work of Judith Shklar (1991) to argue that interpretations of American political thought are enhanced when set in motion in relation to historical context. I open this chapter with a brief

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<sup>1</sup> For discussions in this vein, see the work of and commentaries about Hartz (1955) and Pocock (1975). Scholars have challenged this dual schema. For example, Schaar (1991) and Miller (1999) have highlighted the role of Puritan traditions in American political thought while Rogers Smith (1997) has attended to ascriptive traditions. I take up Smith's intervention below.

discussion of Rogers Smith's (1997) efforts to generate a more dynamic theory of American citizenship by reading traditional theories of citizenship against the history of American politics. Ultimately, I find Shklar's own accounting of American citizenship more useful as she delineates how theoretical concepts, such as liberalism's liberty and republicanism's virtue, were themselves transformed in the process of reconstituting the meaning of American citizenship over the course of the nineteenth century. Borrowing from Freedman's approach to political ideology, I read Shklar in such a way that her work provides a conceptual road map to navigate how the category of national citizenship is being deployed at the turn of the twentieth century to galvanize neo-liberal ideology in the United States. The figure Shklar sketches of the nineteenth-century independent citizen-earner haunts this process and is very much a part of the lineage of contemporary neo-liberal citizenship. In my discussion of the current politics surrounding American citizenship, I attend in particular to how liberty and virtue are once again redefined, this time against the political backdrop of immigration and redistributive social policy, and this time, in the service of neo-liberal globalization.

#### Rogers Smith's "Multiple Traditions" Theory of American Citizenship

With some exceptions, contemporary American scholarship on citizenship has tended to suggest that two competing theories of citizenship have cohered from out of the modern Western tradition. Though characterized in a variety of ways, scholars theorizing citizenship have generally defined the debate as one between liberalism and civic republicanism. The outlines of this debate may have been the result of the publication of Louis Hartz's classic *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955) and the more recent

republican responses published in turn (Pocock 1975). Indeed, if contemporary scholarship is any evidence, it seems that this mid-century debate has left a lasting impression on discussions of citizenship more generally. Consider for example the following characterizations of theories of citizenship: J.G.A. Pocock's "political citizenship" and "juridical citizenship"; Michael Ignatieff's "republicanism" and "liberalism"; George Armstrong Kelly's "civic" and "civil" citizenships; Richard Flathman's high and low citizenship; Alisdair MacIntyre's "morality of patriotism" and "morality of liberal impersonalism" to name a few.<sup>2</sup> Though several of these scholars delineate these two dominant trends with the aim of elucidating a third alternative, they nonetheless limit their analysis of contemporary aspects of citizenship to these two perspectives. While this kind of dual characterization certainly has its merits for the purpose of achieving philosophical clarity, too often it obscures the nuanced (and not so nuanced) variations of each tradition, particularly as these have emerged in the case of contemporary neo-liberal politics. The liberal-versus-civic republican framework cannot readily shed light on how the concepts of each tradition are deployed in specific political processes. This shortcoming prevents these philosophical discussions from addressing the concrete conditions and ideological conceptualizations that are underwriting citizenship in a variety of national contexts.

As if responding to the at times too narrow rendering of theories of citizenship, Rogers Smith has recently put forward his "multiple traditions" thesis over the course of his grand overview of American citizenship. In so doing, he attends to the history of the *political* dimensions of traditions of citizenship. Smith argues that, to make sense of the history of policies defining American citizenship, one must recognize the simultaneous

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<sup>2</sup> These examples are all culled from the essays collected in Beiner (1995).

existence of three, not two, competing traditions. These are liberal, republican *and* ascriptive. Though he notes that liberalism can be interpreted in a number of ways, for his definitional purposes, he borrows from Louis Hartz: "with Hartz, I here take liberal traditions to stress government by consent, limited by the rule of law protecting individual rights, and a market economy, all officially open to all minimally rational adults" (507-508). In defining republicanism, he invokes J.G.A. Pocock: "With Pocock, I treat America's interlinked republican traditions as grounded on popular sovereignty exercised via institutions not just of formal consent but of mass self-governance. They generally preach an ethos of civic virtue and economic regulation for the public good" (507-508). Finally, with regard to ascriptive traditions, Smith explains that "adherents of what I term inegalitarian ascriptive Americanist traditions believe that 'true' Americans are 'chosen' by God, history, or nature to possess superior moral and intellectual traits associated with their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation" (507-508). Out of these three distinct traditions, Smith spins his "multiple traditions thesis" arguing that elites with political power have always cobbled together rhetoric blending republican, liberal and inegalitarian ascriptive traditions in order to generate popular support. Due to this political reality, Smith argues for a more nuanced conceptualization of what traditions define the history of citizenship in the United States.

According to Smith, these traditions are logically autonomous. That is, at the formal level, each tradition is conceptually distinctive from the others.<sup>3</sup> He underscores that in political *practice*, however, these traditions are recast and blended by elites seeking to further their political power. That is, over the course of American history,

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<sup>3</sup> Though I would agree with commentators who have noted that Smith tends to blur liberal and republican traditions throughout his analysis. See for example Hochschild (1998).

political elites have made pragmatic use of each tradition, cobbling together whatever formula would be instrumental to their political ends. The political history of American citizenship is riddled with as many examples of elites emphasizing the differences between contrasting traditions as there are examples of elites bringing seemingly contradictory traditions into alliances of convenience. In this interpretation Smith offers a useful corrective to what has at times been an approach to citizenship theory abstracted from concrete politics. Nonetheless, Smith's interpretive framework has limits. These emerge most clearly in Smith's application of his framework to contemporary politics, especially in his discussion of the contemporary resurgence of ascriptive traditions in recent debates regarding citizenship.

Smith suggests that, in general, inegalitarian ascriptive American traditions have gained currency throughout the course of American history due to the threats posed by liberal reforms. Liberalism and illiberal ascriptive traditions seem to be locked in a mutually constituting dialectic.<sup>4</sup> On his interpretation, this mutually constitutive dynamic is responsible for the revival of ascriptive traditions since the 1980s in the form of xenophobia, sexism and homophobia. He holds that the cultural conservatism of 1980s, for example, was a response to the cultural liberalism set in motion during the 1960s (4). In this vein, he suggests that these liberalizing changes set the stage—"often created the conditions" (5)—for a resurgence of inegalitarian traditions, arguing that these kind of liberal advances pose threats to those who stand to lose privileges. So, the demand that rights be extended to women, ethnic and racial minorities and gays and lesbians since the 1960s prompted the emergence of the corresponding ascriptive traditions of sexism,

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<sup>4</sup> It is in this focus on liberalism that the distinctiveness of the republican tradition falls from view in Smith's analysis.

racism, xenophobia and homophobia. Smith writes that "the threat posed by many liberalizing and democratic reforms to institutionalized systems of status and meaning in which a large number of Americans have been deeply invested, prompt[s] many to hunt for rationales to preserve or even extend their traditional political, economic, and social places and privileges" (471). In this analysis he posits a very narrow definition of "liberal changes" that references social and cultural changes solely. He is certainly not alone in suggesting that the cultural advances of the 1960's and 1970's set in motion the resurgence of conservative ascriptivism. However, this view masks the deeper ideological and structural shifts at work during the same era.

Smith's analysis of the political dynamic between theories of citizenship elides significant elements of contemporary American and global economic and political development. In his focus on *cultural* politics, he neglects to consider the structural conditions of the post-industrial globalized American economy as another significant factor in creating a disaffected political discourse ripe for an assertion of illiberal ideologies. Furthermore, his multiple traditions thesis has the effect of rendering the concepts of each tradition static. He maintains that while historical actors advance all kinds of combinations of liberal, republican or ascriptive concepts, these concepts are themselves unaffected by the process—they, by definition, remain logically distinct at the formal level. Thus, for the purposes of my analysis, Smith's multiple traditions thesis falls short. As I will suggest in this chapter, popular and legislative debates regarding both immigration and public entitlement policies have been marked by ideological definitions of citizenship that cannot be teased apart simply by overlaying static concepts of liberal, republican and ascriptive traditions, as though these were themselves untouched by

political contestation. Moreover, this political process cannot be reduced to one of liberal advance and illiberal retreat. To understand this, we need a theoretical framework that can recognize that theoretical concepts are themselves part of the dynamic and productive process of politics. For this, I turn next to consider Shklar's example of how citizenship in the nineteenth-century United States came to be understood through historically specific notions of liberty and virtue. I find her analysis to be useful for a number of reasons, not the least of which is her recognition of how theoretical definitions of citizenship are enmeshed in historical dynamics surrounding sociopolitical institutions and so molded by the process.

#### Configuring American Citizenship: The Nineteenth-Century Independent Citizen-Earner

Judith Shklar's brief but incisive study of the re-constitution of citizenship in nineteenth-century American politics is a useful framework for thinking about how theoretical concepts are taken up and transformed in political processes. Take her historical overview of the "independent citizen-earner" (1991, 64). The independent citizen-earner is the very American result of a melding, and re-defining, of liberal independence and republican virtue. Shklar's work reminds us that this current era is certainly not the first to be marked by shifts in the ways citizenship gets defined. Shklar's work is helpful not only due to her remarkable method of analysis by which she seeks to "remind political theorists that citizenship is not a notion that can be discussed intelligibly in a static and empty social space" (9). Her analysis of the historical and cultural context by which nineteenth-century configurations of citizenship came to pass is itself a significant interpretation of the concepts underpinning citizenship. Moreover, as she

herself points out, historical conceptualizations of citizenship still have residual effects on contemporary configurations of citizenship. Thus, an overview of the formulation of the independent citizen-earner will reveal earlier instantiations of concepts that continue to reverberate.

The prevailing nineteenth-century interpretation of citizenship was carved out of the material at hand, material made available through theoretical concepts coinciding with concrete conditions. As Shklar explains, American citizenship is indelibly marked by the success of populist characterizations of aristocracy as idle alongside references to the institution of chattel slavery. For example, early debates regarding the expansion of suffrage beyond propertied classes represented an instance of the successful ideological transformation of the meaning of the liberal concept of the independent individual. These early debates resulted in the populist recasting of independence through a combination of the concept of republican virtue and racialized evocations of the institution of slavery. Populist reformers thus transformed the meaning of liberty and of virtue, advancing new ideas regarding the dignity of work in the form of wage-labor beyond the bonds of slavery.

The concept of liberal independence was historically linked to property-ownership. As nineteenth-century British jurist Sir William Blackstone put the matter, only members of the propertied classes were sufficiently morally—and presumably, financially—stable enough to have a "will of their own" (Blackstone quoted, 37). - However, this interpretation of liberty was not written in stone. Shklar explains that in liberal theory, the citizen-proprietor "is normally expected to own external goods, but this is not logically necessary" (36). Populist reformers exploited the ambiguous nature of the

concept of independence and, through political contestation, were successful in redefining liberty. They did so by both invoking republican virtue conceptualized as military valor, and by positing slavery as the demarcation of the limits of liberty and virtue. Popular pressure to widen the franchise to property-less white men converged with war-time demands on the part of soldiers. As Shklar explains, soldiers "asked whether men good enough to serve their country in war were not also fit to be full citizens" (31). Drawing on the tradition of Machiavelli's virtuous citizen-soldiers, popular reformers "rejected wealth as a sign of virtue" (51). In addition to asserting the virtue of the citizen-soldier to reconstitute the meaning of liberal independence, the institution of slavery served to further offset new definitions of what independence and virtue were—and were not. That is, by referring to the institution of chattel slavery of black Africans in the United States, reformers were able to substitute race for wealth as a demarcation for virtue. In so doing they "imputed lack of virtue to all blacks" (51). Moreover, on the democratic populist ideological re-configuration of liberty, white men possessed ownership in themselves, even if they owned no land, and so, on the basis of property in themselves, they could claim the independence required of citizenship.

Nearly simultaneously, citizenship became the vehicle for yet another ideological conceptual transformation. Straddling the needs of homesteading while on the verge of broader industrialization, the young American republic could no longer accommodate an interpretation of virtuous citizenship defined solely by military valor. Instead, the meaning of the concept of virtue transformed. Popular reformers saw success once again when they coined free labor as central to the meaning of virtue. In order to transform this republican concept, reformers turned to the now transformed liberal concept of

independence. This transformation drew on an American tradition already evident in the words of Benjamin Franklin: "disdain the chain, preserve your freedom and maintain your Independency" (quoted 72). Shklar extrapolates Franklin's meaning to be "if you want to be your own master, don't be idle. 'Be industrious and FREE'" (72). Moreover, this ideological conceptual reconfiguration churned forth within the cultural context of a growing distaste for the trappings of aristocracy. Indeed, next to the free industrious worker, the aristocrat, and his American counterpart the monopolist, were figured as immoral, unfree, *and* decidedly unpatriotic due their respective idle lifestyles (74-75).

In the hegemonic conflation of virtue and work, work was infused with civic import. Shklar describes this as "parallelism," explaining that, "[t]he individual citizen may expect to improve his social position by hard work because he lives in a democratic and constantly progressing society, and uninterrupted social progress is in turn assured because Americans are hard-working and public-spirited democrats" (67).<sup>5</sup> In this ideological climate, the American vestiges of aristocracy, far from being the bedrock of the nation, fell far short of manifesting the work ethic that the new patriotism necessitated, reflecting instead a threat to national democratic progress. In the nineteenth century, democratic social progress became the *raison d'état* for the American nation-state. And, the drive for individual improvement through work on the part of the individual (white male) citizen was mutually constitutive with this national democratic *raison*.

The independent citizen-earner was the outcome of all of these conceptual reconfigurations combined. These were made possible due to populist reformers' bracketing citizenship with the racialized specter of slavery on one side, and the

purported idleness of aristocracy on the other. On Shklar's reading, the nineteenth-century figuration of the independent citizen-earner endures in the contemporary popular disdain for welfare dependency as well as for intellectual classes (85-96). This genealogy is compelling, but is not a full accounting of the lasting imprint of the independent citizen-earner. While it illuminates recent popular debates regarding welfare reform, it does not address the role that national citizenship plays in neo-liberal globalization. Building off of Shklar's work, I contend that the figure of the independent citizen-earner has been activated in the neo-liberal transformation of American citizenship to suit the dynamics of the globalized, free-market economy.

The current neo-liberal conceptualization of the independent citizen-earner is the entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder serving as a mediating force between citizens and the global economy. In this form, American citizenship is taking shape through the politics surrounding transnational migration into the United States. In what is essentially an interpretation of domestic American political institutions, Shklar omits a fuller analysis of the role of immigration. In passing, she notes that immigration looms large in the development of American citizenship, but holds that the institution of slavery had a greater impact on nineteenth-century contests over the meaning of American citizenship. She writes that the history of immigration "is not the same as that of the exclusion of native-born Americans from citizenship. The two histories have their parallels, since both involve inclusion and exclusion, but there is a vast difference between discriminatory immigration laws and the enslavement of a people" (5). And, with regard to studying nineteenth-century citizenship debates, this distinction is an important one to make. However, in the case of the turn of the twentieth century, and in the absence of a

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<sup>5</sup> Shklar borrows the term "parallelism" from Wiebe (1985), 264-290.

contemporary institution of chattel slavery, I hold that immigration has emerged as a dominant factor in a globalized era in that it helps to demarcate what makes the current independent citizen-earner *American*. And, as I will suggest, liberal independence and republican virtue are molded once again, this time to underwrite American neo-liberal citizenship. I turn next to consider the transnational dimensions of this contemporary ideological transformation of citizenship.

### The sting of neo-liberal globalization and the balm of national citizenship

Neo-liberal policies have both encouraged increased transnational labor migration into the U.S. and eroded public funding for a host of social policies. If we accept, as I do, Karl Polanyi's reading of the embedded nature of economic life, it would follow that the sting of these neo-liberal policies has the potential to destabilize the American social and political life.<sup>6</sup> However, I will suggest that any volatile political counter-movement from this destabilization has successfully been managed through the formation of a distinctly American version of neo-liberal citizenship. As I will argue next, this latest ideological reconfiguration of U.S. citizenship is a political symptom of contemporary conditions of neo-liberal globalization.

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<sup>6</sup> Domestic dislocations engendered by neo-liberal economic policies have the potential to emerge in all states involved in neo-liberal policy-making. The scope of my analysis in this chapter is limited to the political context of the United States. In later chapters I offer an analysis of the gendered coercive strategies employed in the Philippines depicting emigrating women workers as "national heroes." These serve to divert individual dissatisfaction away from neo-liberal policies. For a provocative exploration of the diversion of individual dissatisfaction with liberalisation in another national context, see Leela Fernandes (2000b). Fernandes demonstrates that "idealized images of affluent consumers" (102) discursively define India's middle class. Based on her field work, she goes on to show that "individual strategies and responses of white collar workers demonstrate the effectiveness of these images as individual dissatisfaction has not led to political opposition to India's economic reform policies" (102). Political opposition such as that reflected in the May 2004 elections, comes instead from peasant and rural classes, whose existence is neither benefited by neo-liberal policies nor idealized in popular culture.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, while scholars are correct to note that globalization is the result of structural transformations, this insight underestimates the effect of political ideology in shaping the form that globalization has taken. If we are to consider the interplay between the transformation of national citizenship and globalization, it makes sense to specify that what we are talking about is *neo-liberal* globalization. I argue that one effect of neo-liberal globalization is increased labor migration from the global South to the global North set in motion in part because of global inequalities and domestic dislocations exacerbated by neo-liberal policies. Thus, transnational labor migration comes to figure prominently in the reconfiguration of what constitutes American citizenship in a neo-liberal global era.<sup>7</sup>

Neo-liberal economic policies began their ascendancy in the 1970s, first emerging in the domestic economic policies of the United Kingdom and in the United States. The dominance of neo-liberalism spread across the globe in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. The 1990s witnessed the extension of neo-liberal policies in domestic and regional economies throughout the world. The global proportions of liberalization have, however, been attended by a lopsided restructuring of national sovereignty. While all states experience some degree of erosion of autonomy when confronted by trade liberalization, some states feel it much more. For example, debtor nations, located either in the post-Soviet debtor bloc, or in post-colonial regions of the global South are bound to the conditionalities linked to international loan packages and/or Structural Adjustment Programs. These conditionalities have taken on a decidedly neo-liberal bent in the past several decades with the preeminence of the Washington

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<sup>7</sup> Other symptoms of neo-liberalism include the restructuring of the domestic workforce in advanced industrial states whereby outsourcing has led to jobs moving overseas as well as spurring migration within

Consensus in international institutions. The provision of such loans are contingent on "good governance"—a condition meant to eradicate government corruption but one that also insists that national government's impose austerity measures so as to divert social spending into the private sector. International trade agreements such as the World Trade Organization sponsored General Agreement on Trade in Services reinforce the liberalization of government services, with the minimalist Anglo-American states serving as examples.<sup>8</sup> Loans and agreements are further contingent on a nation agreeing to open up its borders to foreign direct investment, such that investment may move freely in, and out, of states at will.<sup>9</sup>

These ideologically-driven policies have led to increased transnational labor migration from the global South to the global North. Indeed, the period of neo-liberal economic policy-making coincides with the rapid growth rate of world migration, most of which takes place from the global South to the global North. In 1989 50 million people in the world made their homes outside the countries they were born in. In 2002, the number had increased to 175 million, or about 3 percent of the world population.<sup>10</sup> Though I will consider the effects of neo-liberal economic policies on emigration in greater detail in chapter five, following is a brief overview. Due to economic liberalization, sending states

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countries from rural regions to urban centers.

<sup>8</sup> Of course, the Anglo-American states serve as examples only with regard to certain policies. Policy makers certainly do not intend debtor nations to mirror such protectionist policies as those regarding domestic sectors like agriculture.

<sup>9</sup> Consider, however, the recent emergence of the Buenos Aires consensus set forth by debtor states, including Brazil and Argentina, T. Smith (2003).

<sup>10</sup> This data is from the United Nations Development Program *International Migration Report 2002*. With regard to South-North migration, the report's overview summarizes that "In the ten years from 1990 to 2000, the number of migrants in the world increased by 21 million persons, or 14 percent. The total net growth in migrants took place in the more developed regions.... In contrast the migrant population of the less developed regions fell by 2 million during the 1990-2000 period" (2). "In just the five years from 1995-2000, the more developed regions of the world received nearly 12 million migrants from the less developed regions, an estimated 2.3 million migrants per year" (2). Data from the 1980's is from Mittelman (1996, 235).

from the global South encourage emigration as a matter of policy. Labor emigration is central to many indebted states, many of which have developed explicit or implicit policies advocating emigration in efforts to stabilize their national economies. Sending labor abroad lowers domestic unemployment rates and also leads to remittances, which provide crucial flow of currency into the domestic economy.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, sending labor abroad reduces strain on anemic government resources, which have increasingly been directed away from social spending due to the requirements of international financial institutions. Due to these kinds of factors, it is no surprise that transnational labor migration is often part of the economic development strategy for sending nations, as I will explore in greater detail in chapter five in the case of the Philippines.

The dominance of neo-liberal ideology in receiving nations, such as the U.S., adds to the favorable climate for transnational labor migration. Indeed, the free movement of labor across borders meshes well with the principles of *laissez-faire*. In his work on the history of American politics surrounding immigration, Daniel Tichenor (2002) explains that expanding labor immigration is a central principle of neo-liberal reformers, or in the terms of his broader category, "free-market expansionists" who "welcome expansive alien admissions to meet labor market demands and to promote national prosperity" (37). From these examples of the embrace of neo-liberal approaches to migration in a variety of national settings, I draw the connection, explicit at times, implicit at others, between

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<sup>11</sup> According to the UNDP International Migration Report, in 2000, "remittances from abroad were more than 10 percent of the gross domestic product for countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Samoa and Yemen" (Overview, 5).

neo-liberal economic policies and increased transnational labor migration from poor states to more affluent states.<sup>12</sup>

While our neo-liberal era has indeed seen an increase in transnational labor migration, this phenomenon has not gone without political reaction. Regarding this political process, Saskia Sassen has suggested that, in the context of economic globalization whereby the economy is increasingly de-nationalized, politics has become increasingly re-nationalized.<sup>13</sup> This claim is supported by the UNDP's *International Migration Report 2002* which found an increase in the number of "adopting policies to lower immigration from 6 percent in 1976 to 40 percent in 2001" (Overview, 2).<sup>14</sup> And the dynamic of political re-nationalization takes its cue from global inequalities. That is, though the emigration policies of sending states are indeed an example of neo-liberal globalization's erosion of borders, many receiving states have used immigration policies to reassert national sovereignty, thus bolstering Evans' claim that the state is anything but eclipsed. Immigration policy lies at the intersection of economic de-nationalization and political re-nationalization, and as such, reflects the dynamic process of Polanyi's double movement. This double movement is certainly apparent in the case of U.S. politics surrounding immigration. Sassen (1998) explains,

immigration has been attacked as part of a broader renationalizing of politics in the United States—a process that can be seen as partly a reaction to economic globalization.... Thus, after two decades of rights-based liberalism, Congress and public opinion are now pushing for pronounced curtailments of the rights and

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<sup>12</sup> This is not to suggest that liberalization and migration are causally linked. Indeed, migration has existed for centuries. However migration is accelerated by several factors in particular, including the influence of liberalized economic policies on government policy. Other factors include, but are not limited to, advancements in means of transportation, and political conflict and instability in sending states. On the connection between neo-liberal policies in particular and emigration see Misra (2004).

<sup>13</sup> For a fascinating analysis of the gendered dimensions of re-nationalization in the context of Indian politics, see, Fernandes (2000a).

<sup>14</sup> The report notes a parallel increase in policies limiting emigration, however, these are far outpaced by policies limiting immigration.

entitlements of legal immigrants, not to mention undocumented immigrants. (10-11)

What is deeply curious here is that the form the re-nationalization of American politics is taking has not led to a closing off of the borders. In other words, one could argue that a counter-movement of a re-nationalized immigration policy would advocate ending immigration altogether, or at least severely curtailing it, blaming immigration for the social and political dislocations resulting from self-regulated markets.<sup>15</sup> This was the direction that early twentieth-century immigration reform took in the racialized policies of the National Quota Laws of the 1920s.<sup>16</sup> Following Polanyi, one could argue that the National Quota Laws were a manifestation of the xenophobic, protectionist counter-movement that emerged in reaction to the Gilded Age's nineteenth-century form of *laissez-faire* globalization with *its* high levels of immigration.

But, in this most recent case of political re-nationalization immigration policy reforms of the 1990s, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIA), did little to curtail immigration. Daniel Tichenor (2002) explains that in its final version, the IIRIA "enhanced the federal government's ability to guard national borders, tightened asylum procedures, limited immigrant access to public benefits, required U.S. financial sponsors for newcomers, and established stringent provisions for criminal and undocumented aliens" (283-284). But, he adds, the bill did nothing to alter earlier expansive policies that legislated family and employment sponsorship. Indeed, as American immigration scholars have noted, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act protected the expansive policies of legal immigration into

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<sup>15</sup> The analysis that follows draws in part from essays in *Globalization* editor Mittleman, especially Stephen Gill 206-209 and 224-226.

<sup>16</sup> National Quota Law (1921), National Origins Act (1924) and National Quota Law (1929).

the United States. So the question remains, how were neo-liberal reformers to elicit popular consent to maintaining expansive immigration policies at the very moment when Pat Buchanan was getting significant popular support for his decidedly protectionist call to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico? I contend that what this reform did, along with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, was change the subject away from immigration numbers and redirect popular attention to another policy arena altogether—the supposed albatross of the twentieth century, government funded social policy programs.<sup>17</sup> In so doing, these policy reforms together promulgated an updated narrative of the independent citizen-earner in the form of the free and virtuous entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder.

The 1996 reforms represented an across-the-board win for neo-liberal policy. Tichenor explains, "the outcomes of 1996 immigration and welfare reforms were a triumph for free-market conservatives, who allied with pro-immigration liberals to sustain large-scale legal admissions and with anti-immigrant conservatives to rollback alien civil and social rights" (295). Based on this, I argue that neo-liberalism's success at transforming the content of American citizenship hinges on a productive paradox of increased immigration in an era dominated by nativist calls for exclusion. Neo-liberal reformers, eager to maintain high levels of immigration, refracted the xenophobic counter-movement to this symptom of neo-liberal globalization onto a second policy

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<sup>17</sup> Daniel Tichenor, chapter 9, especially 245-246. Tichenor explains the paradox of restrictionist rhetoric and expansionist policies as the result of two institutional processes in particular: the insulation of elite policy makers from mass publics and increased immigrant enfranchisement (246). In this discussion, I attend less to these institutional dynamics, focussing instead on the processes by which neo-liberal hegemonic discourse succeeds in recasting common sense understandings of citizenship. For an excellent overview of how this legislation has impacted immigration rights, see Martin 2002, and for an assessment of more recent debates regarding restoring benefits to immigrants, see McQueen 2002.

arena—public spending on social rights. This refraction is evident in the words of Newt Gingrich and in the policy prescriptions of the CATO Institute. Tichenor explains,

free-market defenders of immigration ... celebrated newcomers who were hardworking and economically self-sufficient, not those who relied upon government for financial support. As Gingrich proclaimed on the House floor, 'Come to America for opportunity. Do not come to America to live off the law-abiding American taxpayer.' (282)

And in their Handbook for the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, the CATO Institute coined the motto "immigration yes, welfare no" (Tichenor 2002, 282; Cato 1995, 145-151). By bringing together two distinct policy arenas, immigration and public entitlement programs, neo-liberal reformers were able to craft the outlines of a distinctly neo-liberal American citizenship. This deployment of citizenship helped to maintain policies of economic de-nationalization, while fostering popular discourse of political re-nationalization to fuel cutbacks in public spending on social assistance. From out of this context emerged an updated configuration of the independent citizen-earner. To explain more fully how immigration policy reforms helped to resolve the paradoxes of neo-liberalism, I turn next to the works of Ali Behdad (1997) and Bonnie Honig (2001) on the discursive effects of American immigration policy. While I ultimately part ways with both Behdad and Honig regarding their respective conclusions, I find both models of analysis essential to illuminate the ways in which immigration is deployed to promulgate the turn-of-the twentieth century figure of the American entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder.

#### Ali Behdad, Bonnie Honig and the Symbolic Function of Immigration

In 1997 Shirley Hufstедler, the last chair of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, stated that "immigration is about who and what we are as a nation" (quoted in

Pickus 1998, xvii). Though presumably meant to hail the United States' unique historical heritage as a nation of immigrants, this statement reveals much about the mutually constitutive relationship between immigration and the American nation. Ali Behdad, no fan of American immigration policy, would likely agree with Hufstedler's estimation that immigration illuminates how the American nation and state have historically been, and continue to be, constituted. For Behdad, immigration provides the United States a discursive and political means by which the nation asserts its sense of "we-ness" while the state puts into effect its sovereign policy-making powers. Behdad would not be the only political theorist who shares Hufstedler's assessment of immigration's role while disagreeing with her meaning. Bonnie Honig's work *Democracy and the Foreigner* is an exploration of precisely just how central "foreignness" is to democratic nation-building. Honig would certainly agree with Behdad that foreignness is key to the American national imagination and state sovereignty. She would also agree that a symbolic relationship to foreignness is necessary for a society such as the United States to come to grips with the anxieties and ambivalences of the American nation-state. The source of these anxieties, however, lies not with history, but rather with the practice of the principles of liberal theory, democracy and capitalism.

Both Behdad and Honig offer useful ways of thinking about the relationship between immigration and the popular attitudes and state policies that predominate in the United States. Indeed, they offer critical contributions to political theory in that they each emphasize just how central immigration and "outsiders" are to the formation of a democratic political community and its institutions. However, as I will suggest, they fall short of providing analysis of the specificities of contemporary conditions and of how

immigration figures currently in the shifting understanding of the relationship between citizens and the state. Nonetheless, their respective discursive analyses of immigration are useful for my own interpretation that in addition to the being a structural effect of neo-liberal economic policies, transnational labor migration also plays a symbolic role in that it helps secure American popular support for neo-liberal principles of citizenship. I turn next to consider Behdad's and Honig's arguments in further detail before returning to my interpretation of the current relationship between immigration and neo-liberal American citizenship.

Behdad argues that American immigration policy-making is by definition paradoxical, putting forth a critical analysis of the productive relationship between state and nation evidenced by U.S. immigration policy-making. He makes the intriguing claim that U.S. immigration policy has always served as a means by which the state helps to secure a national identity for a nation that bears an uncertain relationship to the modern political form of the nation-state. Borrowing from Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined communities, Behdad suggests that the circumstances of the United States' historical creation preclude a simple conflation of the imagined nation with a common ethnic identity and language, and with ancestral territorial boundaries. So, in this context, immigration policy becomes an essential means by which the state facilitates the imagining of what (and who) constitutes the American *nation*. Thus, the state is productive at the level of imagining the nation: it is "productive, in that it mediates and manages the nation's social crises to enable a sense of national culture (169).

In turn, through immigration policy-making, the U.S. *state* lays claim to its sovereignty by asserting its authority in overseeing the regulation of immigration policy.

In so doing, the state gains legitimacy in a Weberian sense as the sole arbiter overseeing the terms of exclusion and inclusion. Thus, immigration policies, and the apparent national crises that usher in policy reform, provide the opportunity for the state to assert its authority over the boundaries of the American national state. Behdad writes, "*the perpetual crisis of immigration re-inscribes a notion of difference on the national community and its others, a difference that must be constantly maintained to propagate a space of contestation where concepts of nationality as citizenship and state as sovereignty can be re-articulated and re-affirmed*" (165-166, emphasis in original). He goes on to explain that "the regulation of the immigration crisis by the state...is at once a response to the nation's concern about the intruding other and productive of a differential mode of identification through re-affirming the claim to sovereignty" (168).

Ambivalence about American identity helps legitimate state sovereignty as it creates the conditions for the perpetual "crisis" of immigration. Indeed, periodic crises surrounding immigration necessarily result from the ambiguous and competing definitions of the American nation—is America a white protestant nation, or is it a melting pot, a multicultural society, a "heaven for immigrants" (158)? Behdad notes that the United States is both—however, even in its most pro-immigrant mode, the United States betrays an exclusionary national identity. To illustrate this charge Behdad explains that the humanitarianism behind America's pro-immigration impulse in fact generates an image of the immigrant as "a poor and miserable figure in need of assistance by the imaginary America" (166). In so doing, even in its most immigrant friendly moments, U.S. immigration policy perpetuates a narrative of "us" in contrast to "them." The state continually reforms immigration policy to mediate the national crises that arise from time

to time due to the ambivalent stance towards immigration. In so doing, the state elicits popular consent to its governance and ends up falling back onto and so fostering "patriotic fervor and exclusionary attitudes" (173). Contemporary anti-immigration policy is thus a form of "defensive patriotism" that is fueled by the state and serves to consolidate the state's authority as well as the national imaginary of what it means to be an American citizen.

Ultimately, Behdad draws his conclusions far too broadly, setting out an understanding of immigration policy-making as always determined by the historical origins of the American founding. I disagree that the exclusionary paradoxes of immigration policy in the U.S. are necessarily a foregone conclusion, fated by the historical conditions of the founding of the American nation-state and its ambivalent relationship to nation-hood. Though Behdad attends to some of the variations arising out of the historical conditions of immigration policy in the United States, his overall claim is that there exists an essential logic underlying the relationship between nation and state formation that has prevailed throughout U.S. history. Here, he overdetermines the specificities of American history. It is as though the circumstances of the American founding have doomed the United States to perpetually exercise itself as a xenophobic immigrant nation—a fatalistic and sisyphian analysis to say the least. Nonetheless, his general argument regarding the ambivalence at the heart of the American nation-state, and the reliance on immigration policy to manage this ambivalence, is useful for analyzing the very specific discursive forces at work in contemporary approaches to immigration.

His work is that much more useful if read through the lens of Bonnie Honig's *Democracy and the Foreigner*. Honig pushes past Behdad's fatalism, and emphasizes the role of xenophilia in the American national imagination. Indeed, Honig opens her work with an agenda quite different from Behdad's critical description. In so doing, she paves a way for her own interpretation through the figure of the "foreign-founder" (3) as it relates to democracy. Honig wants instead to ask what symbolic work foreignness does in order for a political community to cohere in the first place. To illustrate, she considers immigration as it pertains to the liberal democratic case of the United States. Here the foreign founder assumes varying roles within the myth of immigrant America. Following Honig, not only is immigration simply about who and what we are as a nation, as Hufstedler had it, but immigration runs deeper in the United States. We need immigrants to tell us about who and what we are because, for a host of reasons, we are unable to do this for ourselves. On Honig's estimation, the foreign founder is alive and well in the national imagination, acting as "an agent of national reenchantment that might rescue the regime from corruption and return it to its first principles" (74).

American first principles range from capitalist, communal, familial and liberal. Assuming a range of forms, the immigrant, cast as the supercitizen, reinvigorates each these principles. The immigrant entrepreneur models the possibility of a successful upward mobility, while the immigrant community reflects the importance of communal ties. Traditional immigrant family arrangements shore up the patriarchal values that are threatened by changing attitudes. And finally, the active consent reflected in immigrants choosing to come to the United States underscores the "choice-worthiness" of this regime and momentarily renders concrete the at times elusive nature of Lockean liberalism's

principle of tacit consent (74-75). Of course, in this mission to restore the nation, the supercitizen evokes a paradox central to immigration and the United States. The American reliance of an influx of immigrants to reinvigorate the national imagination is precarious. This ambivalence regarding immigration is of course Behdad's point. But Honig wants to emphasize that the xenophobic side of immigration has its xenophilic twin. This Janus-faced dynamic is revealed over the course of the "*anxious* dependence upon the kindness of strangers" (76). The national reliance on immigrants for symbolic purposes is threatening, and so results in immigrants coming to be scripted as threats themselves. As Honig puts it:

'Their' admirable hard work and boundless acquisition puts 'us' out of jobs. 'Their' good, reinvigorative communities also look like fragmentary ethnic enclaves. 'Their' traditional family values threaten to overturn our still new and fragile gains in gender equality. 'Their' voluntarist embrace of America, effective only to the extent that they come from elsewhere, works to reaffirm but also endangers 'our' way of life. (76)

While Honig's discursive rendering of immigration is intriguing, her analysis suffers from shortcomings similar to those found in Behdad's analysis. She generalizes the terms of this cultural discourse to make a larger philosophical claim regarding liberal national state formation. Like Behdad, she elides the historical specificity of contemporary processes of transnational migration and so overshadows and underestimates the effects of these processes on domestic and international politics, and the variations of how immigration gets deployed at particular historical junctures. However, both analyses highlight the productive ambivalence at the heart of American immigration policy-making and so shed light on the dynamics underwriting the contemporary climate of opinion. That is, Behdad's notion of productive paradox of crisis and legislation surrounding immigration, and Honig's notion of immigration as a

symbolic reference for the management of ambivalent first principles highlight how the neo-liberal use of the rhetoric of citizenship against the backdrop of immigration policy can orient the populace to accept, and ironically, advocate for, the dislocations of free-market globalization. I turn next to further develop this argument.

### Immigration, Privatization and the Entrepreneurial Citizen-Shareholder

In the case of contemporary neo-liberal restructuring, transnational labor migration figures as both a structural symptom and as a symbolic referent. For Behdad, immigration policy is a site by which the American nation is consolidated and the state's authority asserted. For Honig, the figure of the foreigner in the form of the immigrant serves the crucial, but ultimately threatening, role of rehearsing America's first principles. These approaches are intriguing, but too broad in their claims. I argue that immigration does indeed serve a symbolic purpose in American politics, but I hone in on the specific example of the politics surrounding neo-liberal restructuring—a contemporary manifestation of classical liberalism's self-regulated market.

As I suggested in my earlier discussion of Karl Polanyi's thesis of the effects the economy disembedded from social life, neo-liberal policies create the conditions for the emergence of sociopolitical volatility. In the U.S., the maintenance of an expansive immigration regime coinciding with the retrenchment of social spending is symptomatic of the neo-liberal refusal to recognize the embedded nature of the economic sphere.<sup>18</sup> This neo-liberal condition creates a crisis along with the potential for politically and

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<sup>18</sup> In linking immigration with the state of the domestic economy I do not mean to endorse the reductive interpretation that policy shifts from expansive to restrictive immigration simply reflect shifts in the state of the domestic economy. On the limits of economic explanations for immigration policies, see Tichenor (2002, 19-23).

socially volatile popular reactions. More generally, neo-liberalism seems to threaten the foundation of national society. Indeed, to the principles of free trade, national borders are porous, and cultural traditions the object of "creative destruction" as Joseph Schumpeter put it. In a protectionist vein, often emerging in nativist political rhetoric, mass transnational immigration has often been interpreted as a symptom of neo-liberal capitalism's apparent threat to the meaning of American citizenship (or any other national citizenship, for that matter). Mass transnational labor immigration, along with the social dislocations set in motion by neo-liberal economic policies of de-regulation and the restructuring of production whereby jobs are sent overseas, are all symptoms of the most recent variation of governments fostering self-regulated markets. As I have already suggested, one might conjecture that a xenophobic, protectionist popular reaction would gain momentum to become a full-fledged counter-movement.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, following this line of interpretation, a counter-movement to the social and political crisis apparently posed by mass immigration coinciding with cutbacks in social policy would espouse nativist restrictions on immigration, in the name of preserving the American nation. In the 1990s, xenophobic calls for protectionist measures certainly existed; however, intriguingly, they were not the prevailing ideology defining the final shape of immigration policy reform. I have argued that this is due to neo-liberal reformers successfully retooling American citizenship so as to head nativist forms of counter-movement off at the pass and redirect their zeal at redistributive social policy instead.

In the case of the United States, the social volatility that has ensued from the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy has been diffused through a decidedly neo-liberal

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<sup>19</sup> Of course, wide-spread anti-immigrant sentiments in the 1990s certainly existed and were linked to "negative economic experiences and economic uncertainty" (Tichenor 2002, 277). See also Citrin, et al.

reconfiguration of the core concepts of citizenship. For example, in the course of the policy debates of the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress, the concepts of virtue and independence were once again reconfigured, this time in a way that invoked national parameters so as to convey what is distinctly *American* about the neo-liberal entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder. Just as nineteenth-century reconfigurations of the concepts of liberty and virtue were shaped by the conditions of chattel slavery and residual aristocracy, so too are neo-liberalism's reconfigurations shaped by dynamic historical conditions. Indeed, if we consider the neo-liberal rhetoric surrounding immigration in the 1990s, it seems that immigration policy is one significant site by which the American version of neo-liberal citizenship comes to be defined. The liberty of the entrepreneur's self-care and the civic virtue of the shareholder's market rationality are bracketed, and so defined, by immigration. I turn next to assess neo-liberalism's deconstesting of the concepts of liberty and virtue as these pertain to the category of citizenship.

The shifting conceptual makeup of citizenship forms the basis for how immigration is figured into neo-liberal rhetoric. As I argued in the previous chapter, the citizen as entrepreneur is one aspect of neo-liberal formulations of citizenship. This figuration specifies a kind of liberty, or freedom that consists of the ability and eagerness to rely solely on one's self. Recall Wendy Brown's characterization of neo-liberal citizens as "entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life" who are to assume the responsibilities of "self-care" and "provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions" (para 15). Liberty thus entails an express lack of need for or interest in being the recipient of the public services generated by the state's redistributive policies. Neo-liberal liberty entails a further reconfiguration of state redistribution, best expressed in the work of

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(1997); Heymann (2000); and Conroy (2000).

libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick (1974). Redistributive policies require taxation of all members of particular society. This taxation, as Nozick has it, amounts to nothing less than a form of partial slavery, or "forced labor" in his words (169)—a clear violation of a citizen's liberty. He writes,

Whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over a certain amount, or through seizure of profits, or through there being a big *social pot* so that it's not clear what's coming from where and what's going where, patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other persons.... This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a *part-owner* of you; it gives them a property right in you.... These principles involve a shift from the classical liberals' notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in *other* people. (172)

Thus liberty has a decidedly social dimension, whereby, to mangle the lyrics of a classic gospel spiritual, none of us are free if one of us pays taxes.<sup>20</sup> Thus neo-liberal liberty entails both a personal responsibility and an expectation that all members of society will express the same personal responsibility for their own needs (indeed *must* if liberty of each is to be assured). Otherwise, "they," as Nozick terms members of society, stand in the way of individual liberty.

The neo-liberal morality of market rationality also has profound ramifications for the concept of civic virtue. Indeed, contemporary neo-liberal citizenship necessitates an updated version of nineteenth-century "parallelism," which rooted the civic virtue of work in a constitutive relationship between individual and national progress. In the nineteenth century, individual work and personal development were mutually constitutive with the democratic progress of the nation. The "new" parallelism at the turn of the twentieth century looks quite different. No longer is virtue linked to national egalitarian democracy (that is, egalitarian amongst white males) or to social progress—now it is

linked to neo-liberal principles of profit and independence redefined in terms of personal responsibility and market rationality. The national *raison d'état* has shifted to match new notions of comparative advantage in the neo-liberal world economy. Now, in a shift that is distinctive of this neo-liberal era, the national state is legitimated through maximizing the productivity *and* market rationality of individual citizens. Thomas Lemke explains that the national state is no longer legitimated in the transcendent terms of "an historical mission" or in the case of Shklar's interpretation of the nineteenth-century United States, a populist narrative of democratic social progress (196). Instead, now, the state legitimates its existence with reference to economic growth and manifests its sovereignty in the form of "guaranteeing the rules of economic exchange" (196). But for this new neo-liberal *raison d'état* to take flight, the nation's populace must enact a zeal for economic productivity in their own lives. In this instance, the parallel connection between citizens and nation is linked by the productivity resulting from entrepreneurial self-care as well as the civic virtue of applying market rationality to assess the performance of state institutions. In other words, the individual citizen's productivity, purchasing power, and lack of dependence on social spending, is mutually constitutive with the nation's overall productivity and America's comparative advantage in the global economy. But national productivity, and so individual profits, will only continue to grow if Americans demand government efficiency in managing economic resources, just as Drainville suggested with his notion of citizen as shareholder. This market rationality is itself a mark of neo-liberal civic participation. That is, the new parallelism between individual citizen and the greater good of the national state requires that citizens express the market

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<sup>20</sup> Conveying quite a different sentiment, the original lyrics go like this: "None of us are free if one of us is chained."

rationality of investors seeking profits on their investments, as proof of their civic virtue lies in their ability to act as shareholders demanding government efficiency.

Here, Honig's framework of analysis of the paradoxical role of the foreigner in propping up the American principle of capitalism proves helpful. She explains that in the vein of the supercitizen narrative, the image of the hard-working immigrant propels the American equation of success with hard work. She writes, "[t]he capitalist immigrant helps keep the American Dream alive, upholding popular beliefs in a meritocratic economy in good times and bad. If he can do it, starting with nothing and not knowing the language, surely anyone can" (80). Of course, as Honig usefully points out, this is not the only representation of the immigrant worker. On the flip side of this version of the super-citizen is the image of the immigrant as threat. She explains,

Because the capitalist foreigner is depicted as someone who is interested only in material things, he quickly turns from someone who has something to offer us into someone who only wants to take things from us. His virtuosic acquisitiveness slides easily into a less admirable, crass, and self-serving materialism. The nationalist, xenophilic deployment of the foreigner to model the American dream does not just offset these xenophobic reactions, it itself helps to generate them. (80-81)

While I find this model of paradoxical tension surrounding immigration and capitalism intriguing, Honig's diagnosis is a little too broadly construed when it comes to specifying the symbolic role immigration plays in contemporary neo-liberal configurations of American citizenship. Based on analysis of the coincidence of the two 1996 reforms, I would agree that the xenophilic moment of neo-liberalism lies in the celebration of the immigrant's entrepreneurial zeal and productivity but suggest that this is *in addition* to hailing the immigrant's independence from social programs. Moreover, in a neo-liberal context, the xenophobic flip side is less about conjuring the immigrant as a self-serving

materialist than it is about configuring the non-citizen as potential "public charge," and as such a cost to the nation.

Immigration policy prohibiting all immigrants from receiving public benefits represents an opportunity to reassert the entrepreneurial norms of neo-liberalism, all the while providing an occasion for American citizens to exercise their neo-liberal civic virtue. Consider that over the course of the passage of the 1996 reforms, and in the absence of an elite segment of the population widely viewed as idle, unpatriotic aristocracy, in a deft neo-liberal twist, the state itself was scripted as unpatriotic and lacking virtue. Indeed, its willingness to provide non-citizens with publicly funded benefits was configured as an example of government excess and as endemic of government's *lack* of respect for the virtue of hardworking American citizens, made virtuous by their demand for government efficiency. Without the institution of slavery as a reference against which to define self-ownership, independence and virtue take on new connotations in relation to immigration. In the passage of the 1996 reforms, dependence was defined in relation to depictions of non-citizen workers taking advantage of American productivity and of the largess of the welfare state. Those seeking to curtail immigration highlighted this linkage, tracing a decidedly unpatriotic dependence in any non-citizen use of American services, from draining publicly funded social benefits, to crowding public schools, to clogging highways with additional traffic.<sup>21</sup> And, neo-liberal notions of citizenship allowed for this argument, indeed fostered it, as immigrant reliance on public programs depicted as brazenly flying in the face of the fiscal responsibility and self-reliance helps shore up the principles of neo-liberal American citizenship. This

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<sup>21</sup> Colorado Representative Tom Tancredo, founder of the House Caucus for Immigration Reform is one among many immigration opponents who make these kinds of arguments.

characterization of dependence seemed pliable however, if evidence could be marshaled to demonstrate that immigrants legitimately contribute to American productivity while leaving little to no imprint on public resources. Indeed, supporters of cutting aid to immigrants continue to hold that the "law discourages welfare dependency among immigrants and ensures that new arrivals' sponsors will take responsibility for their care" (McQueen 2002, 1150-1151). In scripting the latest version of the independent citizen-earner, though immigrant remittances smack of treacherous behavior, from a neo-liberal point of view, this may be forgiven in light of their productivity so long as they are models of entrepreneurial self-reliance and personal responsibility. Of course, the principle of personal responsibility on the part of immigrants is assured through legislation prohibiting immigrants, legal and undocumented, from having ready access to public benefits. Moreover, the virtuous demand on the part of neo-liberal citizens to restrict public benefits to non-citizens does not stop at the border; indeed, this restricting of public benefits has its own domino effect. In other words, the neo-liberal stance denying immigrants access to benefits is not an act of welfare chauvinism, whereby welfare institutions are upheld, but restricted to citizens (Bommes and Geddes 2000). Rather, in the United States neo-liberal virtue entails a more general rejection of state institutions of resource redistribution across the board, a rejection that comes to affect non-citizens and citizens alike.

The terms generated in these debates have since suffused popular discourse regarding the immigration. Consider the case of Schenectady in upstate New York. A manufacturing town in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Schenectady experienced large-scale attrition with the gradual downscaling of jobs in G.E.'s factories. Faced with

an aging population, Schenectady's mayor has recently launched a campaign to recruit Guyanese immigrants living in Queens to move to the town. Since the mayor's campaign, Schenectady has benefited from an inflow of non-citizens willing to work in low-wage service jobs including as nursing aids in one of the towns many nursing homes.

Therefore, non-citizens have filled a labor gap in the town. But they have done more than this. The presence of Schenectady's new immigrant population contributes to the new symbolic politics of immigration legitimating the erosion of the welfare state. In a recent article the mayor is cited as touting the work ethic of the Guyanese immigrants: "In his courting of the Guyanese, [Mayor] Jurczynski talks up their work ethic. 'They're entrepreneurial. They don't believe in public assistance'" (*Times Union* 2003). Never mind that in light of the 1996 reforms, their chances of receiving public assistance are drastically reduced.

Mayor Jurczynski's comments reflect the tenor of neo-liberal think tanks as well as more recent policy prescriptions on the part of President George W. Bush. The mayor's statements echo the Cato Institute's policy prescription, "immigration yes, welfare no" (1995). The Institute's argument in favor of expanding immigration lies in the economic and normative contributions immigrants make to the United States. Of the benefits that immigrants bring to the U.S., Cato analyst Stephen Moore includes that immigrants "are self-selected on the basis of motivation, risk-taking, work ethic, and other attributes that are beneficial to a nation; they tend to come to the United States when they are in their prime working years" (1995, 146-147). Consider also the rhetoric in President George W. Bush's recent immigration initiative which amounts to a guest worker program: "America is a stronger and better nation because of the hard work and the faith and the

entrepreneurial spirit of immigrants.... They bring to America the values of faith in God, love of family, hard work and self reliance—the values that made us a great nation to begin with" (Bush 2004).

So, immigration policy is indeed productive in the sense that both Behdad and Honig write of. As I have interpreted here, it helps to render neo-liberalism hegemonic by consolidating popular support for neo-liberal reforms. Transnational labor migration is a structural symptom of the global dominance of neo-liberal economic principles. But it is also the means by which to deflect domestic political volatility by invoking an "us" versus "them" logic in restricting access to public benefits to native-born Americans. This in turn encroaches upon public institutions more generally and serves to reify the principles of entrepreneurial independence and the virtue of a shareholder's market rationality as central to the meaning of American citizenship.

### Conclusion

To conclude, I evoke the image of two statues in New York City—one iconic, the other somewhat obscure—the pair, an illustration of Polanyi's "double movement." Atop the highest point in the borough of Brooklyn stands a statue of the goddess Minerva. This 1919 statue in the middle of Greenwood Cemetery memorializes the War of Independence and the Civil War. From this lofty position, Minerva holds her left hand high, and seems to be waving to the Statue of Liberty, which stands in view in the New York City harbor. The Statue of Liberty, meanwhile, famously faces away and outward towards the Atlantic Ocean, faithfully welcoming the world's migrants. In contrast to the Statue of Liberty's liberal hospitality, the statue of Minerva asserts a national glory

founded on American war heroes and institutions. The plate on the statue reads "Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, glory and patriotism, here salutes the goddess of liberty and enwraths this altar in tribute to the heroes of American liberty and to the wisdom of American institutions." Indeed, it is as if Minerva is a sculptured corrective—this statue of patriotism, a reminder of the need to reign in Liberty's at times too generous welcome.

This monumental tension reflects the potential paradox at the heart of contemporary neo-liberal citizenship. Though the Statue of Liberty is most often taken to symbolize the universal reach of America's liberal principles, if we consider the iconic image of boats filled with European immigrants making their way past the statue, it is clear that the Statue is as much a testament to the *laissez-faire* approach to immigration during the Gilded Age.<sup>22</sup> It is in relation to this aspect of the Statue of Liberty that Minerva represents the counter-movement of the era. Erected in 1919, Minerva shores up the American nation in a manner that evokes the early rumblings of modern fascism; on this reading, it is no coincidence that Minerva was erected just a few years before the passage of the most restrictive immigration legislation in the United States—a set of policies Adolf Hitler praised in his writings.<sup>23</sup>

At the outset of the twenty-first century, the United States is once again beholden to a Gilded Age-era ideological marriage of convenience between neo-liberal commitments to free trade coinciding with liberal commitments to maintaining expansive immigration policies.<sup>24</sup> But the domestic, not to mention global, commitment to free trade

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<sup>22</sup> For a provocative discussion of the varied symbolic meanings ascribed to the Statue of Liberty, see Zerilli (2000).

<sup>23</sup> D. Smith (2003). In his 1928 manuscript, Hitler praised the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924 stating that "compared to old Europe, which has lost an infinite amount of its best blood through war and emigration, the American nation appears as a young and racially select people." I am grateful to Carey McWilliams for pointing out this article.

<sup>24</sup> Indeed, this coalition helped propel the 1996 Immigration Reforms forward. See Tichenor (2002, 284).

creates the conditions for a domestic political counter-movement, just as it did at the turn of the nineteenth-century. In the case of the turn-of-the twentieth-century counter-movement, however, neo-liberalism has successfully managed a reconfiguration of the meaning of American citizenship and in so doing, preempted protectionist, and even fascist, policies. But it has also helped promulgate narratives of neo-liberal citizenship. In the 1990s, American citizenship was configured in the terms of the entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder helping to secure popular support for two neo-liberal policies—the maintenance of high levels of labor immigration and the reduction of government funding for public programs.

Immigration has contributed to securing norms of neo-liberal citizenship in several ways. Neo-liberal reformers support high levels of immigration into the United States because they advocate for the private sector's quest for cheap labor made available through immigration pathways. However, neo-liberalism reformers also require immigration and immigrants as reference points by which to render neo-liberal American citizenship viable, with its emphasis on personal responsibility, productivity, and market rationality in all aspects of life. Indeed the transnational process of immigration enables a neo-liberal mechanism by which to manufacture popular consent for transformed norms and expectations on the part of American citizens, a process evidenced in the neo-liberal political rhetoric surrounding the 1996 reforms. This kind of transformation, in turn, contributes to the ideological climate wherein American citizens come to expect less from public institutions. In the following chapter I consider the relationship between Medicare's fate and the international division of reproductive labor as this highlights

another effect of neo-liberal hegemony: the erosion of the ideals of democratic citizenship.

## Chapter 4:

### The Development and Dismantling of Modern Democratic Citizenship

In the context of economic restructuring at both the domestic and international levels, the category of national citizenship is in flux. Just as processes of trade liberalization are unevenly affecting sovereignty in varying national contexts, so are they variously reconfiguring the content and practice of national citizenship. The processes of modernity that propel this analysis include the structural shifts that have resulted in post-industrial forms of production paired with the hegemony of neo-liberal policy prescriptions that determine how global production and markets are organized domestically and internationally. In the past fifty years, information technologies based on telecommunications and computers have vastly altered the mode of production, which was previously limited to industrial manufacturing and agriculture. Moreover, as I have argued, neo-liberal policies oversee the global distribution of production and resources, and so underwrite the structures of globalization more broadly. This has led to new distributions of economic production that alter national sovereignty and national citizenship in uneven ways, and so deepen global disparities.

One form of unequal distribution is the transfer of manufacturing from advanced industrial states into Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in newly industrializing states. EPZs are set up within the geographic territory of newly industrializing states, and employ citizens of these states, but remain outside their legal jurisdiction and are exempt from paying taxes to the host nation. Due to information technologies, the headquarters of these manufacturing companies can, and generally do, remain located in advanced

industrial countries. Here they function alongside other higher value information operations including financial services, real estate, telecommunications and business services.

Against this backdrop of the uneven distribution of production across the globe are the concurrent developments in labor structures and in relationships between governments and citizens that, though new, still harbor residues of inequalities of the past. The industrial economy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries made way for stable domestic employment, and in Western Europe and the United States, was the basis for the development of the welfare state and greater equality amongst domestic populations particularly during the Golden Age following the Second World War. It is important to bear in mind, however, that this era was a descendent of nineteenth and twentieth-century political imperialism. That is, the industrialization of the West over the course of the modern era was dependent upon pre-industrial economies to provide raw materials and agricultural production. And out of this era emerged the dramatic political and economic inequalities of modern imperialism (Narayan 2004). This political system precluded the development of full citizenship among members of colonized populations—establishing instead a category of colonial subject. These kinds of political inequalities were not remedied until the mid-twentieth century wars of independence and the post-Second World War processes of de-colonization, which were fueled by the rhetoric of nationalism and claims to the rights of national citizenship (Hobsbawm 1987, chaps. 3-6). In spite of the demise of the political system of imperialism, however, stark domestic inequalities prevail throughout post-colonial countries. Post-colonial states continue to be beset with the effects of colonialism, including the concentration of wealth

and land ownership in the hands of the elite few. Due to neo-liberal economic policies and debt servicing, these kinds of domestic inequalities seem increasingly impervious to change, thus weakening the possibility for the emergence of post-colonial variants on democratic citizenship.

While the contemporary, post-colonial global economy hinges on a new global distribution of industrial and post-industrial production, this shift in modes of production has not reflected a universal enhancement of citizenship rights. Quite the opposite. In fact, neo-liberal globalization has had the similar effect of eroding citizenship in every national context, though by different means. The broader structural conditions of a new mode of post-industrial production paired with the neo-liberal ideologies dominating economic policies are reshaping citizenship in multiple ways. Just as national sovereignty is being transformed, so are the meanings of citizenship as I argued in the last chapter. In the next chapters I consider in greater detail two intersecting arenas wherein citizenship is being reconstituted: the shifting of the burden of funding eldercare services from the public into the private domain in the context of the United States, and the promotion of large-scale transnational labor migration from the global South to advanced industrial countries, including the United States. The passage of legislation that privatizes risk and the erosion of the tax base to fund social spending, together reflect a the sway of a general ideological shift away from a public commitment to providing some degree of support for national healthcare, insurance, education, old-age pensions and safety nets. Increasingly, responsibility for funding these programs is being shifted into the private sector, under the guidance of for-profit business or of religious or secular philanthropic groups, and onto individuals, and their communities of family and friends. This suggests

a shift away from the relationship between citizens and the state that was designed over the course of the twentieth-century Western welfare state. Moreover, as is apparent in migration pathways, the inequalities of modern imperialism persist, a phenomenon evident in the differing forms that the reconfiguration of citizenship has taken in the global South in comparison with the global North.

Currently, the institutions and norms of modern social welfare are being dismantled in advanced industrial states and curtailed in newly industrializing countries. The logics by which social programs are dismantled vary and these in turn reflect the lop-sided effects of the new global economy. For example, the domestic economies of newly industrializing countries are restructured according to international policies including the conditionalities set forth by the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Policies or the World Trade Organization's array of trade policies.<sup>1</sup> In the United States, however, restructuring is due in large part to the dominance of neo-liberalism, a dominance shaped by the kinds of domestic political conditions I discussed in the last chapter. This process casts doubt on the tendency to view globalization as a process that affects all sovereign states in a similar fashion. While that line of argument assumes that the erosion of state sovereignty applies equally to all states, it is clear that through policy-making, the wealthiest states who comprise the G-8, and in particular, the United States, maintain dominant positions in the global economy. Indeed, the lop-sided organization of post-industrial production is made possible by the neo-liberal policies that dominate economic policy-making, coinciding as they do with the realities of global inequalities. Consider, for example, the recent negotiations surrounding the creation of the Central

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<sup>1</sup> For a thorough overview linking the global inequalities of colonialism with the current balance of power in international institutions of financial oversight, see Anderson 2000.

American Fair Trade Association, wherein the United States will not cede its protectionist measures regarding agricultural subsidies and immigration while states in Central America will likely resign themselves to this protectionism while opening up their own economies (Becker, 2004). The hegemony of a neo-liberal approach to economic policy guided by a commitment to privatizing domestic spending has further deepened these kinds of global inequalities. In spite of, or perhaps due to, these global inequalities, the implementation of restructuring in varying domestic contexts is structurally and discursively linked—a linkage I will consider through the example of the international division of reproductive labor. In this chapter I consider the example of the erosion of the redistributive model of public funding for the long-term care provision of senior citizens in the United States. In the following chapter, I contend that the organization of labor in this sector illustrates how non-citizen women's partial citizenship status is central not only to the privatization of American social policy, but also to the broader reconfiguration of democratic citizenship. This case provides an illustration of the relationship between neo-liberalism and politics. Indeed, the fate of democratic citizenship in the context of the international division of reproductive labor highlights the ways in which neo-liberal market rationality gradually saturates all spheres of political and social life. However, when we consider neo-liberalism in multiple national contexts, it is clear that neo-liberalism erodes democratic citizenship to differing degrees—a difference that helps maintain, and even deepen, global inequalities.

### Ideals and Institutions of Modern Democratic Citizenship

The past thirty years has witnessed the unraveling of economic policies governed by socialist-style national economic development in postcolonial states and the "Keynesian consensus" in the West. Though each of the 191 states currently represented at the United Nations has a singular story regarding nation and state-building, we can very roughly sketch out some commonalities amongst affluent states on the one hand and poorer states on the other. And, as I will argue, in this contemporary era of neo-liberal globalization, further commonalities emerge with regard to the erosion of citizenship.

Following World War II, the political system of imperialism collapsed and postcolonial nationalism flourished on the waves of wars of independence.<sup>2</sup> Indeed nationalist rhetoric and policies underwrote the transition from colonial subjects into national citizens, as most postcolonial states engaged in socialist-style, state-run development, nationalizing resources and spurring industrialization through public spending (Mamdani 1996). The doomed fate of this kind of development was shaped in part by the politics of the Cold War. And this fate has been sealed by the ascendance of neo-liberal policies in international institutions of economic oversight which have advocated varying forms of economic shock to rapidly re-set national economies according to neo-liberal principles.<sup>3</sup> As James Mittelman (1996) notes, "the old fashioned exercise of national development planning, based on the assumption that states are autonomous and that leaders can really determine their destinies, has, for all practical purposes, been abandoned and replaced by globalization projects" (233-234). An assessment of the relationship between democratic political institutions, the spread of

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<sup>2</sup> On this transition, see Chatterjee (1993) and Hobsbawm (1994).

<sup>3</sup> For a collection of essays detailing these transitions in several states, see Desai (1997).

equality, and state-run economic development in the broader context of Cold War politics is beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this project, I simply want to note the role of national citizenship as central in the postcolonial experience of what Timothy Mitchell (1998) calls the "brief era of nation-states and national economies" (417). The current erosion of national citizenship in postcolonial states is a symptom of the truncated development of political democracy and equality in the postcolonial context—a point I will return to below with the case of the Philippine's promotion of overseas labor migration.<sup>4</sup>

In Western state development, Keynesian economics dominated for much of the twentieth century. John Maynard Keynes's early twentieth-century economic theory called for an expanded public sector to counteract free market capitalism's boom and bust tendencies on the basis that greater employment would lead to greater demand and so would represent the foundation of economic strength. This in turn led to the creation of various forms of modern welfare states in the global North. Though by no means a panacea, government spending in the public sector did encourage greater equality (Krugman 2002). Indeed, greater equality led to higher consumer spending, which in turn led to greater aggregate demand. Though not likely Keynes's goal, a related effect of his policies in the political sphere was the fostering of republican democratic citizenship. Jürgen Habermas (2000) has written of the relationship between the constitutional nation-state and Keynesian re-distributive fiscal policy and describes it as an era whereby

growth depended on factors that were by no means only favorable to capital investments but also benefited the population as a whole [...]. [N]ational economies provided a range of opportunities for redistribution that could be

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<sup>4</sup> The Philippines has a unique history of post-colonial development as it can be argued that this period began in 1986 with the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos. See Schirmer and Shalom (1987).

exploited, through wage policies and—on the side of the state—welfare and social policies, to satisfy the aspirations of a demanding and intelligent population. (121)

In this context, "the nation-state [...] provided the framework within which the republican idea of a society that consciously shapes itself was articulated and even institutionalized to a certain extent" (121). That is, as Habermas suggests, the emergence of the modern welfare state provided the institutional mechanisms for the political integration of subjects as citizens of a democratic, constitutional state. At the same time, the national state provided the infrastructure necessary for overseeing the development of twentieth-century economic growth. He suggests that the twentieth-century welfare state marked the fullest realization of political democracy and economic conditions as mutually constitutive. Indeed, the Keynesian state represented a balance between the "logic of the market against the social logic of the labor movement," as Richard Falk has written (Falk 1996, 59). Out of this system of regulated capitalism emerged what Falk has termed the "humane state"—a form capable of bettering the material conditions and social life of citizens. This modern organization of welfare facilitated and maintained the historical transformation of citizens from subjects, or in the words of David Held (1995), echoing those of Hegel, "the transition of the citizen from private person to full membership of the community" (178).

In 1949 T.H. Marshall gave a series of lectures in which he laid out what has become a frequently referenced tripartite schematization of the evolution of rights. For Marshall, this set of rights defines the modern democratic citizenship which lies at the heart of what Falk terms the humane state. Basing his lectures on the historical case of England, he distinguished between three generations of rights and related each to an

historical century: Civil rights emerged in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth century, and social rights in the twentieth century (Marshall 1964).

By civil rights, Marshall refers to the right to legal personhood—a right reflected in the right to enter into contract, the right to own property, and so on. Of course, this set of rights make no sense unless there exists the legal-judicial institutions by which to legislate these rights *and* to enforce them in courts of law. He summarizes civil rights as follows:

The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought, and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.... [T]he institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice. (1964, 78)

On Marshall's interpretation, eighteenth-century England witnessed the solidification of these kinds of institutions, and so, by association, civil rights. It is of note that these are also the kind of limited rights that, as Karl Marx noted, match the needs of capital quite well—a point that continues to resonate.

A second generation of rights, political rights, emerged in the nineteenth-century struggles to broaden self-determination through suffrage. Marshall defines political rights as follows:

By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. (1964, 78)

For Marshall, extending the right to vote to all males, regardless of property ownership, helped render concrete the "universal" right of political participation. In England this reform occurred in 1918 (Marshall 1964, 86).

Finally, the twentieth century, with its welfare state institutions created the conditions for the emergence of social rights. Marshall explains,

By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services. (1964, 78-79)

For Marshall, social rights create a universal right to economic well-being which does not depend solely on the market value of one's labor. Social rights thus represent a political response to the commodification of labor introduced by the rise of capital and modern forms of production. As historians of political economy have noted, the rise of capital markets marked the demise of pre-capitalist social formations, which had provided the basis for individual subsistence, through, for example, communal forms of agriculture, or parish-based redistribution (Polanyi [1944], 2001; Moore 1966). In contrast, capitalism, along with modern forms of production, created (and continues to create) conditions for subsistence that are based solely on the economic relationship of an individual's ability to exchange his or her labor for wages. This relation is essentially one of commodification, whereby, in order to stave off hunger, individuals have no choice but to contract out their labor. On Marshall's interpretation, the historical emergence of social rights, along with modern welfare institutions, reversed—or at least tempered—the de-humanization that this commodity status entailed.

Not surprisingly, Marshall's optimistic schema has been met with critiques of all kinds. Historians have questioned his all too neat match of rights with specific centuries. And feminist, critical race, and postcolonial scholars have highlighted the profound limitations of the universality that Marshall saw in evidence in the institutionalization of

the rights of national citizenship.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, his notion of nationally grounded rights reinforces the exclusionary effects of national citizenship, whereby, for example, in the case of the social rights, the redistribution of national wealth hinges on demarcations between insiders—national citizens—and outsiders, all non-citizens. Finally as Linda Bosniak (2000, 502-503) has suggested, redistributive policies in advanced industrial states have historically exploited global inequalities to produce the vast economic resources that fund such policies.

These are important interruptions of Marshall's work, and suggest caution with regard to embracing Marshall's celebration of the evolution of citizenship, rights and modern state institutions. Nonetheless, I find in Marshall's work a useful reminder that democratic citizenship requires not only rights but also institutions to render these meaningful. I find it particularly useful as a means of measuring the structural and discursive conditions defining neo-liberal forms of citizenship. While the triumphant conclusions Marshall reaches with regard to the institutionalization of citizen rights in the modern national state do indeed seem naïve, his schema of the rights as foundational to democratic citizenship can serve us well as ideals or norms, as can his recognition that rights have a sociological history. In a recent assessment of Marshall's work, John Crowley (1998) writes that "a theory of citizenship, especially one that incorporates Marshall's insights, requires detailed attention to the concrete sociological process by which rights become endowed with meaning" (171)—in particular, this kind of analysis must pay attention to "the institutions that give substance to rights" (171).

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<sup>5</sup> For these critiques, see the essays collected in Bulmer and Rees (1996). Consider also criticism that Marshall's sociological analysis of the linear progression of rights, while problematic even in the case of England and other Western nations, certainly cannot be generalized to apply to non-Western national contexts. See Chatterjee (1993) and Mamdani (1996).

In my analysis of the global division of reproductive labor, I focus on the national institutions that are in theory designed to render concrete civil, political and social rights. Of course, there has always existed a dramatic disconnect, and at times, an outright contradiction, between the ideals of rights and their realization by way of the institutions of the modern state. What I am interested in is tracking the contours of that disconnect as it is taking shape in neo-liberal globalization. When we look at both the structure and the narratives shaping contemporary citizenship, what we see is a sharp departure from the norms of democratic citizenship.

#### Neo-liberalism and Democratic Citizenship

Neo-liberal priorities of privatization are decidedly at odds with national, and in the case of postcolonial states nationalist, democratic politics. Recent economic restructuring raises profoundly troubling questions regarding the new kinds of normative work being done by citizenship. In a sense, Habermas picks up where T.H. Marshall left off. While Marshall hailed the teleological amassing of rights of national citizenship, Habermas bears witness to the precarious current state of affairs whereby the nation-state seems to have "run its course" (2000, 124). He wonders if, too, "all forms of *political* integration" have become anachronisms whereby "the neoliberal inspiration of...the autonomy of the citizen is unceremoniously stripped of the moral components of democratic self-determination and pared back to private autonomy" (2000, 125). Falk underscores Habermas' concern when he points to the ethical vacuum that has attended the ascendancy of neo-liberal policy at the level of global economic governance. Falk notes that one effect of neo-liberal economic policy is an "ethically deficient globalism"

with policies embodying a rationale that is "entirely market-oriented and economic" (Falk 1996, 57).

Though weighing in from a Foucauldian perspective that would seemingly preclude a normative argument regarding neo-liberalism, Wendy Brown (2003) ends up coming to a similar conclusion regarding the effects of neo-liberalism on moral and political life. That is, she suggests that the logic and practice of neo-liberalism seek to close a "gap" between social and political life on the one hand and the economic life of the market on the other. In so doing, it suffuses social and political life with neo-liberal norms of market rationality. She explains that "neo-liberal governmentality undermines the relative autonomy of certain institutions from one another and from the market—law, elections, the police, the public sphere—an independence that formerly sustained an interval and a tension between a capitalist political economy and a liberal democratic political system" (para. 21). In eliminating the critical gap between spheres, neo-liberalism eliminates the tension between liberal democracy and capitalist economy. Of this tension, she invokes Marx's "On the Jewish Question" to argue that "this is the Janus-face or at least Janus-potential of liberal democracy vis-à-vis a capitalist economy: while liberal democracy encodes, reflects, and legitimates capitalist social relations, it simultaneously resists, counters, and tempers them" (para. 21). The ascendance of neo-liberalism, then, spells a precarious future for political life and for critical thought more generally. Brown suggests that neo-liberalism "submits every aspect of political and social life to economic calculation: asking not, for example, what does liberal constitutionalism stand for, what moral or political values does it protect or preserve, but rather what efficacy or profitability does constitutionalism promote...or interdict?" (para.

22). One result of this is the erosion of the "insulation against the ghaſtlineſſ of life exhaustively ordered by the market and measured by market values" (para. 22), an insulation previously available in the language of moral and political principles held as distinctive from market rationality. While I find Brown's conclusions in the end drawn too broadly, I find her general point well taken. As I will ſuggeſt in chapter five and in the conclusion, there do exiſt arenas of lively conteſtation of neo-liberal hegemony that have the potential to keep alive diſtinct, counter-hegemonic modes of political critique. Nonetheless, her analysis of neo-liberal logic is uſeful for my own purpoſes of diagnosing the ramifications of the ſtatus of citizenship as entrepreneur in an era of neo-liberal aſcendance.

The ſuffuſion of the political category of citizenship with neo-liberal norms of market rationality is not a wholly domeſtic project. In chapter three, I explored one inſtance in which citizenship as ſhareholder of the nation enhances the citizen as entrepreneur. As I ſuggeſted, the national configuration of the entrepreneurial citizen ſhareholder ſurfaced in neo-liberal rhetoric ſurrounding immigration and ſocial policy reform in the courſe of the 1990s. In this chapter and the next, I conſider another tranſnational dimension in the reconfiguration of citizenship that is apparent in the proceſſ feminists have termed the "international diſviſion of reproductive labor." Jan Jindy Pettman (1998) provides a uſeful definition, ſuggeſting that this diſviſion of labor,

amounts to the transfer of reproductive labour from a claſſ, ethnic group, nation or region to another. States participate, both through direct regulation of foreign domeſtic workers, and through their failure to provide alternative or adequate ſupport for children, aged and ill people, whoſe care, along with other forms of ſocial reproduction, remain women's work. (Transnational Domeſtic Labor)

She links this diſviſion of labor to ſeveral proceſſes, including neo-liberaliſm. She writes,

the function of domestic worker varies[:] compensating for more of the host state women going out to paid work; or in some states compensating for increased pressure on family women owing to states retreating from social provision and care; or to replace young local women who have been siphoned off from domestic labour into the factories and EPZs. (Transnational Domestic Labor)

To consider this division of labor, I turn next to focus on the case of the United States and analyze the current state of eldercare services. I will then argue in the following chapter that labor migration is essential for staffing this sector with low-paid and dependable workers and argue that this process has significant implications for democratic citizenship.

The backdrop for this is the ascendance of neo-liberal policies in most domestic arenas and in global financial institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the American case, this ascendance is reflected in shifting attitudes towards Medicare, among other social policies.<sup>6</sup> The 1994 elections that ushered Newt Gingrich in as Speaker of the House of Representatives dredged up an old debate about Medicare that had been dormant since its the passage in the 1960s.<sup>7</sup> Of course, ideological debates regarding the relationship between citizens and government have been gathering steam for some time now. But more recently, these debates have provoked mainstream questioning of the redistributive principles of Medicare, which for many years enjoyed broad acceptance. Over the past decade, neo-liberal reformers have enjoyed success in their efforts to privatize social policies, including Medicare (Hacker 2004). It may seem ironic that while these reforms are done

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<sup>6</sup> Neo-liberal ascendance in the United States is by and large a product of popular ideology. Other countries have adopted neo-liberal reforms largely in response to extra-national pressures. European states, for example have reformed their domestic economies according to the neo-liberal principles of the European Union and the WTO. See for example, Pollack and Price (2000); and, Price, Pollack and Shaoul (1999). See also The CornerHouse (2003).

<sup>7</sup> Oberlander (2003). On the increasing commodification of geriatric care, see also the articles in Gill and Ingman (1986).

in the name of trimming spending, government spending has not actually decreased. However, what this suggests is that privatization is actually comprised of a transfer of public funds to the private sector—not necessarily a decrease in public spending. In the case of Medicare, this transfer of funds entails a shift of oversight to the private sector as well and takes place in the name of restructuring public health insurance for seniors from a single-payer, universal system to one subject to forces of market competition. The second domestic arena that forms the backdrop for my analysis is in the Philippines. Filipino neo-liberal policies are due to both a legacy of Ferdinand Marcos' regime as well as to the IMF's requirements attached to loans. And, as I will explore in greater detail in chapter five, these policies have resulted in the state advocating labor emigration.

Neo-liberal privatization in the United States requires a shift in the principles defining citizenship, especially apparent in the case of senior citizen healthcare, as the norms of entrepreneurialism, market rationality, and personal responsibility infuse policy surrounding Medicare. Significantly, as I will show in chapter five, the privatization of domestic social policy requires the simultaneous reconfiguration of the meaning of citizenship in other national contexts, such as the Philippines. Astute as ever, feminist scholars are rapidly developing a body of research addressing the processes by which non-citizen women from the global South migrate to countries in the global North. What I hope to add to this literature is an analysis that traces structural and discursive linkages between the changes in domestic American social policy and women's transnational labor migration. For this, I focus on the example of eldercare as this is one of the few sectors of reproductive labor that has been proactively addressed by American policy-makers. And, as a political theorist, I am especially interested in how this era of neo-liberal

globalization entails a *political* process whereby the norms of national citizenship in a variety of contexts are constituted in relation to one another. Chandra Talpade Mohanty has suggested that advanced capitalism creates a notion of the consumer as "the" citizen and goes on to "argue that this definition of the citizen-consumer depends to a large degree on the definition and disciplining of producers/workers on whose backs the citizen-consumer gains legitimacy" (2003, 141). In this dissertation, I attend to the production of the entrepreneur as citizen, but hold that a similar logic exists. That is, as we will see with the example of restructuring Medicare, the definition of the senior citizen-entrepreneur depends to a large degree on the definition of non-citizen careworkers on whose backs the citizen-entrepreneur is structurally rendered a possibility and in turn gains legitimacy. For the remainder of this chapter, I trace the emergence of neo-liberal norms in the restructuring of Medicare.

#### Medicare Reform and the Productive Capacity of the Elderly

In schematizing welfare states in the advanced industrial West, Esping Anderson (1990) classes the U.S. as a "liberal welfare state" due to its emphasis on employment based benefits and means-tested social policy, whereby eligibility for benefits is based on financial means. He notes, however, that American policy affecting senior citizens has generally been the exception. Funding the livelihood and care of American senior citizens, the combination of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid stands out as the closest approximation of a universal redistributive program available in the United States (Esping Anderson 1990, 28). Of the three, however, Medicare reflects the most universal reach. The national pension program, Social Security, is premised on heteropatriarchal

norms of the single-earner, family-wage system. Medicaid is a crucial piece of senior citizen social policy because it covers the costs of long-term chronic care provided by nursing homes and home health care agencies, while Medicare does not. However, it is a means-tested policy, leading many seniors into the bind of having to spend down their assets in order to be eligible for Medicaid. Medicare, too, is far from being a perfectly universal social policy—though it is a universal single-payer policy, it has never been a generous policy and, moreover, due to lack of sufficient political will on the part of policy-makers, it has failed to meet changing medical needs (Oberlander 2003). In contrast, a more universal distributive welfare state is one whereby all citizens enjoy sufficient benefits, regardless of work history, regardless of income, simply as a matter of citizenship. But, for the purposes of my argument, what I want to highlight is that even the weak universalism of Medicare is under threat. Moreover, I will suggest that this threat entails a re-constitution of the kinds of norms that make up citizenship.

The development of Medicare was a response in part to the extraordinary poverty of many of America's senior citizens. In the 1960s, the plight of so many impoverished senior citizens helped galvanize public support for the universal provision of national health insurance for senior citizens, regardless of income. At the time, the advocates of Medicare viewed universal health insurance as a citizen's social right. Indeed, though rarely stated publicly, Medicare strategists saw its passage as the first step towards extending public health insurance to all citizens (Oberlander 2003, 32-33)—of course, as we now know, this scenario was not to be.

In theory, entitlement programs for senior citizens reflect the *ideal* principles of social rights, as opposed to the paternalism of means-tested programs. These norms

include reciprocity, intergenerational shared risk, national solidarity, and a support for redistributive justice. The universal approach of social policy for senior citizens has had the additional effect of bolstering other rights. Theda Skocpol (2000) has credited the relatively inclusive social policies for senior citizens as responsible not only for alleviating the effects of poverty but also for helping strengthen the experience of democratic citizenship. Arguing that these policies increased civic participation among senior citizens, Skocpol helps explain the institutional foundations for the emergence of the "senior vote"—a factor that has been crucial in most modern elections (2000, chap. 3). So, along the lines of Marshall's tripartite schema of rights, social policy for senior citizens represented an instance of the convergence of civil, political and social rights, though, of course, these remain bound up in the exclusionary dynamics of the national state.

In recent years Medicare has come on hard times, sharing an uncertain future along with all other government-funded redistributive policies. While Medicare's now precarious position is due to numerous factors, central among these is the dominance of neo-liberal ideology. In other words, in the current ideological climate, neo-liberal reformers have effectively seized on the range of factors threatening Medicare to create a sense of urgent need to replace the norms that originally defined Medicare with norms of personal responsibility.

One of the challenges to Medicare's original design is the increased life expectancy enjoyed by Americans on average. Medical research, technological advances and pharmacological innovations have all truly transformed healthcare. In addition to adding years to life, these factors have made healthcare provision a great deal more

costly. A further challenge facing Medicare is the coming retirement of the baby boomer generation. Projected demand for Medicare in the not-so-distant future is staggering. In their efforts to reign in federal spending, neo-liberal reformers have highlighted these factors, arguing that they point to inevitable fiscal insolvency.<sup>8</sup> Some economists have contested this conclusion, arguing that Medicare's architects anticipated the demographic bubble that would result from the retirement of the baby boomer generation (Baker and Weisbrot 1999; Krugman 2004). Nonetheless, even neo-liberalism's detractors concur that the rising costs of healthcare do indeed pose a challenge to Medicare (Krugman 2004). Moreover, the reality of runaway national deficits further creates the likelihood that the government will be unable to fund entitlement programs in the future.<sup>9</sup> This revenue shortfall may well be part of a long-term neo-liberal strategy to see Medicare "wither on the vine" as Newt Gingrich (1996) once put it—and even if it isn't an explicit strategy, it certainly represents an unintended consequence neo-liberals welcome.

Another set of challenges facing Medicare has to do with the nuts and bolts of care provision. Because Medicare has not been reformed to keep pace with developments in healthcare, a disconnect has emerged between the "promise" of public health insurance and what Medicare actually covers (Oberlander 2003). In addition, new models of care delivery such as assisted living facilities and home health care agencies are developing in response to the limits of the medical-model of institutionalized care. And, needless to say, the business of developing these new models of care delivery is booming. While these models create greater options for eldercare provision, they also have implications for how

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<sup>8</sup> See Skocpol (2000) for a thorough discussion of the political maneuvering on the part of opponents of social spending for senior citizens, especially chapter 3.

care is financed. Assisted living facilities are run by private corporations—many of which are hotel corporations branching out into new markets—and are much more costly to run than nursing homes. So, in addition to private assets, which have always played a role in funding healthcare, private long-term care insurance is becoming an essential means of paying for care. However, this insurance is primarily available to wealthier seniors who can afford to finance their retirement and care without the assistance of state funds. The provision of publicly funded care is also changing. Home care is much less costly than residency in a nursing home, and public funding for long-term care is increasingly being channeled to privately run home care agencies. In the case of home care, expenses are kept down by cutting corners in care provision and by trimming labor costs through shifting the burden of care provision onto family members and friends and/or onto low-wage care workers (Chang 2000; Glazer 1993)—a point I will return to in the next chapter.

A final challenge to Medicare is the profound shift occurring in the private health insurance industry. With the ascendance of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs) since the 1980s, free-market, managed-care models of competition and profit-making have swept through the insurance industry. In this context, neo-liberal reformers have criticized the public Medicare model as hopelessly outdated and inefficient. As in the case of the 2003 prescription drug law, this criticism has coincided with the successful passage of policies transforming the provision of benefits whereby Medicare contracts with private health plans. And in this kind of public policy tilt towards the private sector we have a classic case of the logic of capital

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<sup>9</sup> It is of note that national deficits are the result of another neo-liberal transnational dynamic, whereby massive increases in spending to restructure American global dominance in the name of the war on

at work.<sup>10</sup> As Marx told us many years ago, capital has an unquenchable thirst for profit created through new markets. So, since insurance companies have basically saturated the private healthcare market, Medicare, with its tens of millions of beneficiaries, represents a lucrative market for insurance companies to expand into. Indeed, recent Medicare reforms have not only led to managed care companies expanding their market, but to these companies making tremendous profits while doing so (Oberlander 2003, 171). This is due in part to a shift in policy rationale whereby neo-liberalism's effect of funneling public spending to private profiteering has become all that much more blatant. While earlier efforts to privatize Medicare were done in the name of cutting costs, this is no longer the case. Indeed, the Medicare reforms passed in 2003 pay managed care companies seven percent more than spending for traditional Medicare provision. With this reform, as one researcher puts the matter, "the government 'has pretty much given up on the argument that H.M.O.s save money.'"<sup>11</sup>

In this climate the ideals of distributive justice once built into Medicare have faltered. Indeed, efforts to reform Medicare have increasingly adopted the neo-liberal agenda of shifting oversight into the private sector. As a result, the norms that have underwritten policies of distributive justice have weakened. So as citizens face getting older, they increasingly have no choice but to put into practice their right to take personal responsibility for financing their own care. Indeed, this is precisely one of the aims of neo-liberal ideology as it oversees the reinstatement of pre-Keynesian capitalist principles,

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terrorism coincides with tax cuts in the name of putting money back into individuals' pockets.

<sup>10</sup> A similar logic is at work in the efforts to channel Social Security accounts into private individual accounts. This privatization would amount to transferring seventy billion dollars per year out of state-managed retirement accounts into private sector brokerage houses and banks—representing quite a boon to private capitalist institutions (Nasser 2000).

<sup>11</sup> Lori Achman quoted in Freudenheim (2004).

or as one economist puts it, "born-again capitalism" (Nasser 2000). In an interview, Paul O'Neill, the former Treasury Secretary under President George W. Bush, explains the renewed emphasis on individual responsibility quite clearly, stating that "able-bodied adults should save enough money on a regular basis so that they can provide for their own retirement, and, for that matter, health and medical needs" (quoted in Nasser 2003, 36). Based on the inability to put this kind of money aside during one's working life, for all but the wealthiest senior citizens this reinvigorated norm of responsibility will likely include an extension of work into old age whereby quality of life will depend on the value that individual senior citizens can muster in the job market.

Consider the doomsday rhetoric on the part of the neo-liberal fiscal watchdog organization the Concord Coalition as it lays the groundwork for calls to reconfigure the norms of citizenship for senior citizens. The Coalition insists that the insolvency of entitlement programs for retirees "is due to arrive in the midst of a demographic revolution that threatens to overwhelm the federal budget—and to transform the very shape of our national economy, our society, and even our culture" (1998). For the Concord Coalition, as for many critics of keeping these programs solvent, the near future demands a total rethinking of entitlement programs for senior citizens. Neo-liberal reformers emphasize that a deep denial has set in amongst the American public. As the Concord Coalition (1998) puts the matter, "the generation whose benefits must be cut is highly dependent on them." Indeed, expectations regarding retirement have not kept pace with the restructuring of service delivery and of programs funding long-term care. The lack of retirement saving amongst baby boomers combined with the retrenchment of federal spending on entitlement programs could well lead to the transformation of

yuppies into what one analyst has termed "'dumpies'—destitute, unprepared, mature people carrying signs reading, 'Will work for medicine'" (quoted in Concord Coalition 1998). Of course, absent from neo-liberal calls for reforms is a demand that policy makers strengthen public funding for elder care provision. Instead, the neo-liberal approach to reforming social policy is dominated by an insistence that norms of citizenship must be transformed. Indeed, reforming expectations is central to rendering viable the privatization of long-term care. For this restructuring to be effective, individuals must be willing to revise their own retirement expectations and adapt to the norms of self-reliance and, by association, inequality.

Effective privatization has to alter the relationship of recipients to service provision as it encroaches on the entitlements previously guaranteed through citizenship. This requires nothing less than a shift in norms that helped prop up social welfare institutions. The Concord Coalition, has elaborated on the need to alter norms. In its article aptly titled "America's Coming Retirement Crisis" (1998) the Coalition states that we will need to profoundly change "our expectations about everything from work and savings to family and healthcare." The Coalition article lists a number of necessary changes including the following:

- Increase [Americans'] voluntary retirement savings. It's time for a return to the thrift ethic, once so strong in America.
- Encourage leaders to mount the bully pulpit and spread the word. The government sets guidelines to tell us when we're overeating. Why not for when we're undersaving?
- Consider enacting a system of mandatory personal savings or funded child endowments. This is especially important for low-earners—who are saving nothing today and will be hit hardest by benefit cuts tomorrow.
- Acknowledge that the pursuit of good health must be balanced against available resources. An aging society will have to abandon the ideal of open-ended health care without regard to cost.

- Prepare to assume more personal responsibility for the long-term care of elderly family members—and recognize that government cannot always pay the bills.
- Move beyond the "three box" life cycle of work, retirement, and leisure. An aging society must throw off outmoded stereotypes and learn to take advantage of the productive capacity of the elderly.
- Invest in the education and training of the young—not just because we love them, but because our fiscal future will depend on their productivity. (1998)

As I have suggested, quite a few commentators have warned that the apparent crisis of social security and Medicare are "phony" (Baker and Weisbrot 1999; Oberlander 2003). Nonetheless, this kind of approach has been drowned out in the media by the dominance of doomsday warnings of impending crisis and the concomitant call to reform norms and expectations on the part of citizens. The norms of entrepreneurial productivity and self-reliance are in fact part of the privatization package—and in light of the effectiveness of the rhetoric of crisis with regard to social policy for senior citizens, neo-liberalism has made significant headway in transforming American citizenship.

As seniors are weaned off dependence on publicly funded social programs, they can be minimally comforted by Karl Marx's reminder that, as entrepreneurial citizens, they will at the very least continue enjoying their civil right to enter into legally enforceable labor contracts. This is because they will have no choice but to continue exchanging their labor for wages and health insurance. But neo-liberal privatization will reverse the de-commodifying effects of social rights. Furthermore, it will likely have the added effect of altering the character of a civically engaged population of seniors who have made good use of their political rights. In the case of the United States, American senior citizens are on the frontlines of the neo-liberal reconfiguration of citizenship, as they are experiencing the kind of re-commodification and de-politicization that entrepreneurial citizenship entails.

Perhaps the unraveling of national redistributive policies such as Medicare is a good thing. Critics of Medicare have cited that even the most universal of American entitlement programs still hinge on an a variety of exclusionary logics. For example, Medicare, as well as Social Security, tend to privilege those who have worked consistently, or who have been married to someone who has. Sanford Schram (2000, 164-175) underscores that due to this premise of entitlement programs, racialized and gendered ideologies are infused in the distinction made between social insurance programs, like Social Security and Medicare, and means-tested policies such as AFDC, and now, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). These ideologies are reflected at the most basic level whereby those receiving Social Security are termed "beneficiaries," while TANF clients are termed "recipients." Moreover, he notes that the institutional mechanisms overseeing the distribution of public funding are markedly different. TANF clients must undergo dehumanizing and invasive regulation on the part of welfare administrators, while Medicare and Social Security beneficiaries are spared this kind of bureaucratic humiliation. These distinctions are further bolstered by the rhetoric of "just desserts" as opposed to "cultures of dependence." Schram explains, that senior citizens receiving Social Security "have been seen as having earned their benefits by virtue of their relationship to the wage-labor market" (2000, 165). In the meantime, public assistance for low-income citizens, which is designed to go to single women and children, is structured in such a way that it creates a racialized and gendered discourse that underwrites stereotypes of the undeserving poor. Moreover, from a different perspective, Linda Bosniak (2000) has also been critical of redistributive policies. She argues that redistributive policies in advanced industrial countries have historically

perpetuated global economic inequalities to generate the kind of national wealth necessary to fund these policies.

Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that the demise of social rights of senior citizens in wealthier nation states does not have the effect of increasing these, and other, democratic rights in other national contexts. Moreover, it does nothing to enhance the position of those coded as the undeserving poor in the United States. Indeed, the erosion of citizenship rights on the part of senior citizens in the U.S. has not coincided with an inverse enhancement of rights in other national contexts, or of the rights of the American poor—quite the opposite. With this in mind, I turn next to consider the ways in which the diminishment of citizenship rights in the United States requires an even deeper erosion of citizenship in states relying on emigration as a strategy for national economic development. This link surfaces in the case of staffing carework.<sup>12</sup>

At first pass it may seem that the neo-liberal restructuring of Medicare is an essentially domestic concern, having little or nothing to do with transnational migration. But the question of staffing care work brings to the fore the ways in which neoliberal domestic reforms entrench the international division of reproductive labor. As Grace Chang (2000) explains,

ironically, immigrant domestic workers, nannies, in-home caregivers, and nurses pick up the slack for cuts in government services and supports that pervade the First World, as well as the Third World. Overseas, they provide care for the ill, the elderly, and children, while their own families forego this care because of the economic restructuring that drives them overseas. (130)

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<sup>12</sup> Note that an exploration of the disciplining of the American poor as low-wage careworkers lies beyond the scope of this analysis but could very well be undertaken with a similar analytical model. Indeed, as Mary Hawkesworth has pointed out, numerous welfare to work programs have developed with the aim of training TANF clients as nursing aides. E-mail message, December 2003.

Building off of Chang's connections, I will suggest that transnational labor migration and the neo-liberal restructuring of American social spending on policies such as Medicare are inextricably linked. To develop this link, I will consider that the inexpensive labor provided by noncitizen workers is crucial to rendering viable the shifting burden of funding and providing elder care onto individual senior citizens and their families and communities.

While commentators have long noted the private sector's reliance on low-wage noncitizen labor, what I am suggesting is that we are entering a new era of the modern state whereby public funding for services is being transferred into the private sphere—and that this privatization of previously publicly funded services is rendered possible due to noncitizen labor. The relatively cheap and dependable labor of noncitizen labor is crucial to the structural and normative configuration of a restructured long-term care industry, and this transfer of labor is one example of the larger macro-economic processes of transnational labor migration. However, as I will argue for the balance of this dissertation, there is a political process at work here too. The maintenance of cheap and dependable labor in an advanced industrial state like the United States is secured and maintained *because* of the degradation of citizenship in other national contexts, reflected in the emergence of another anemic political category the status of partial citizenship. Partial citizenship serves multiple functions in that the gendered de-politicization of non-U.S. women workers is a precondition for the consolidation of the norms of entrepreneurial citizenship in the United States.

In the next chapter, I trace the structure of partial citizenship on the part of non-citizen women. I will explore this status in more detail, considering the link between

privatization of popular social insurance programs for senior citizens and the international division of reproductive labor. The relatively inexpensive labor of non-citizen women plays a key role in the diversion of public oversight for the care of the elderly into the private sector. I will argue that these domestic neo-liberal policies require a simultaneous reconfiguration of national citizenship in a very different domestic context—that of states who devise policies of emigration, such as the Philippines. Indeed, in the Filipino government's production of overseas workers as national heroes we find a related instance of the degradation of democratic citizenship that is essential to shore up American neo-liberal citizenship.

## Chapter 5:

National Heroes without Monuments:  
The Troubled Citizenship of Overseas CareworkersThe Transnational Dimension of New Paternalism

Contemporary globalization creates a unique context rife with new migration patterns and changing definitions of democracy, the national state and citizenship. In order to assess the ideals of democratic citizenship in this era, I consider the status of citizenship in relation to a rapidly emerging labor structure, the international division of reproductive labor. By reproductive labor, I refer to the concept of social reproduction generated by feminist political economists. Social reproduction includes "biological reproduction, reproduction of labor power, and social practices connected to caring, socialization and the fulfillment of human needs" (Bakker and Gill 2003b, 4).<sup>1</sup> In this chapter I focus on the United States and analyze how the increasing reliance on non-citizen women to provide for a particular form of reproductive labor, eldercare services, illustrates that the privatization of domestic social policy has a decidedly transnational dimension. Drawing on the example of the labor structures that have resulted from the reform of universal healthcare coverage for senior citizens in the United States, I illustrate that the international division of reproductive labor is an essentially de-politicizing process. This division of labor is underwritten by a paternalist logic and has the especially pernicious effect of significantly encroaching on the citizenship rights of non-citizen women from the global South. To support this claim I draw on the example of the migration pathway of Filipina women to the United States. And, as I will suggest, this example makes clear that reforming domestic American social policy along the lines of

neo-liberal principles requires a reconfiguration of citizenship on the part of states like the Philippines that send citizens overseas for work.

In *After Welfare: The Culture of Postindustrial Social Policy* (2000) Sanford Schram examines the cultural context that frames post-industrial domestic social policy-making in the United States. He traces in particular "how cultural anxieties leave their traces in the texts of social welfare policy," arguing that these anxieties arise due to shifting modes of production and to shifting gender relations (3). He explains,

along with persistent poverty, growing inequality, and the collapse of the manual labor market, the traditional two-parent family has continued to dissolve and gender relations have undergone wholesale revision. Social welfare policy has been enlisted in what seems to be an eleventh-hour attempt to enforce the traditional values of work and family. (1)

Schram goes on to trace the emergence of a "new paternalism" marked by a return to the patriarchal values of the industrial family-wage system. He explains that new paternalism represents a reaction to the social changes and the changes in modes of production endemic of the late-twentieth century. While this may well be the case, it seems that, in addition, new paternalism coincides with neo-liberal efforts to dismantle the government social programs developed since the New Deal. Not satisfied with simply reforming these programs to provide more appropriate (and less paternalistic) social programs for citizens in a new economy, neo-liberal reformers have sought the wholesale scaling back of government social programs and have implicitly endorsed the paternalistic norms of the private sphere. In this context, it would appear that new paternalism maps smoothly onto policies advocating the privatization of social benefits.

Or does it? Consider that in the United States, for example, new modes of production and economic organization certainly have dismantled the industrial conditions

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<sup>1</sup> See also Nakano Glenn (1992) for a thorough review of the concept of social reproductive labor.

that rendered the patriarchal single-breadwinner, family-wage system viable in the first place.<sup>2</sup> And so it would seem to follow that the economic realities of post-industrial society have no need for the patriarchal social mores of the industrial family-wage system. This is but one example of the ways in which capitalism and new technologies represent the "perennial gale of creative destruction," as Joseph Schumpeter famously described capitalism's penchant for running roughshod over cultural traditions.<sup>3</sup> That is, because the structure of post-industrial capitalism requires the labor market participation of all able-bodied individuals, including women of all but the most privileged economic classes, it should have the effect of rendering anachronistic patriarchal traditions confining women to the private sphere.

Herein emerges what seems to be an untenable paradox. On this account, neo-liberalism and capitalism, the destroyer of traditions, are at odds with new paternalism. Highlighting this tension, feminist political economist Janine Brodie (1994) predicts that the alliance of paternalism and privatization will result in an inevitable crisis. On the one hand, privatization places women in the workplace requiring that they be equal with men as productive and self-reliant workers while also relying on their wages to make up for the overall drip in single-earner income since the 1970s (Warren and Tyagi 2003). On the other hand, lies a reinvigorated paternalistic set of values that insists that a woman's place is in the home, doing the care-work of social reproductive labor in the reinvigorated private sphere.<sup>4</sup> Brodie argues that the combination of privatization and paternalism in

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<sup>2</sup> Of course, the viability of a family-wage system was delimited by class and race (Kessler-Harris 1981).

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Heilbroner ([1953] 1995) 302.

<sup>4</sup> This paternalist line of stay-at-home motherhood applies primarily to middle class women. Though the traditional values apparently inherent in marriage have been invoked in policy applied to low-income women, values of work have been invoked as much, if not more, as is clear since the welfare to work reforms of 1996.

neo-liberal policies presents no "coherent plan for social reproduction. Indeed, its phallogentric and patriarchal underpinnings appear to blind it to a fundamental contradiction. It places women simultaneously in the workforce and in the home. This provides a formula for a crisis in social reproduction" (1994, 58).

In theory this paradox may be untenable, as Brodie suggests. However, there is no tangible crisis looming on the horizon. On the contrary, paternalistic ideologies abound in contemporary politics, as Schram points out. So, following Schram's interpretation, perhaps the persistence of paternalism should be understood as a dialectical reaction to the creative destruction of post-industrial capitalism. But this does not address the structural problem that Brodie has highlighted; that is, she is absolutely correct to point out that women cannot work in two labor sectors simultaneously.<sup>5</sup> In this chapter, I argue that the immigration of women from the global South into the United State is essential to resolving this apparent contradiction. In a more recent essay, Brodie (2003) considers this immigrant labor stop-gap, but dismisses its impact, arguing that most individuals cannot afford to hire care-workers. This point is well taken but does not preclude that a larger pattern of reliance on non-citizen labor on the part of American social policy has emerged. As I will argue, American social policy's reliance on gendered labor migration is most apparent in the case of non-citizen professional, paraprofessional, and domestic elder-care service providers.<sup>6</sup> I will suggest that the potentially destabilizing crisis of

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<sup>5</sup> On this, see Hoschild (1989). See also the collection of essays of which Janine Brodie is a contributor which provides a deeper analysis of the global dimensions of the tensions emerging in the contemporary political economy (Bakker and Gill 2003a).

<sup>6</sup> This is apparent also in childcare. I choose to focus on elder care in this dissertation, because the United States has historically been far more proactive in designing public policy regarding elder care. Thus, the restructuring of these policies reflect a greater transition regarding the privatization of public programs.

"paternal privatization" is resolved through the partial citizenship of non-citizen workers.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, women migrating to the U.S. provide the relatively inexpensive labor necessary to bridge the gap regarding social reproductive labor in contemporary post-industrial America.

In the United States, as I have suggested, publicly-funded long-term care for senior citizens faces a looming fiscal crisis due to shifting demographics of an aging population alongside efforts to cut public spending. Indeed, funding for long-term care reflects broader strains on public funding of the most "universal" U.S. entitlement programs, Social Security and Medicare. Trends towards the radical restructuring of these programs include a shift away from any guarantees of social protection on the part of the federal government. This represents an ideological transformation regarding the role of the national government and public spending. For example, Medicare, one of the pillars of the Great Society, was based on the fundamental principles of reciprocity and egalitarianism, including "that all Americans pay into the same Medicare system; that the healthy and the sick, the rich and the poor, end up in the same program; and that all have the same core benefits when they retire" (Toner and Pear 2003). No longer do the guarantees of the New Deal and Great Society programs hold; instead, responsibility is increasingly shifted onto states and the private sector, including onto individuals themselves. Though critics of the devolution and privatization of these programs argue that this will lead to precarious medical coverage for more than half the elderly, reforms continue apace (Toner and Pear 2003).

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<sup>7</sup> Mary Hawkesworth has pointed out that partial citizenship in the arena of care-workers has its domestic variant, noting the growing number of businesses that train women who have exceeded the five-year limit for TANF benefits to work as home health aides. E-mail correspondence - December 2003.

In spite of their inegalitarian effects, the restructuring of entitlement programs has been successful to date due to popularized rhetoric of "starving the beast" to trim "big government" spending. Reforms liberalizing the financing and provision of long-term care place responsibility for these programs in the hands of the states and the private sector. Though for different reasons, states and private insurers similarly seek to cut costs of care provision to the elderly—states are motivated by the need to balance budgets while facing the some of the worst budget crises since the 1930's, while private providers are motivated by profit margins. Moreover, the popularity of neo-liberal ideology has great influence over efforts to render social policies for eldercare provision more cost effective. In this context, non-citizen women workers play a crucial role in staffing care-services for seniors. Certainly, increased reliance on non-paid care work provided by family members and friends (usually women) plays a role in enabling the restructuring of long-term care, as Brodie suggests. However, I argue that, in fact, the transnational dimension of new paternalism has offset pressures, especially for American middle and upper-middle class women who have entered the labor force in large numbers. This is apparent in post-industrial American society's *de facto* reliance on non-citizen women workers to fill in the care-gap resulting from women entering the workforce, and more importantly, from the restructuring of social policy. Indeed, the privatization of eldercare services has significant implications for who does the work of providing care. This is because the primary mechanism for turning a profit in the business of privately-run facilities is by keeping costs low. And one of the primary ways to do this is by decreasing labor costs (Chang 2000, 133). Feminist political economists have argued that privatization creates greater demand for the unpaid labor of women, making the

convincing case that those taking up the slack for providing care are often women who are wives, partners, mothers, daughters, friends. This analysis certainly applies to the restructuring of funding for elder care (Mellor 2000; Glazer 1993). However, it does not tell the full story of who is providing care work in this era of neo-liberal globalization, and it does not capture how global inequalities are structured into the privatization of domestic U.S. social policy.

Feminists like Janine Brodie are quite right to be concerned with the growing strain on women, as it points to a severe shortage of available care-workers in the United States. This labor gap is due in part to the reality that women of all economic classes are less available to provide the unpaid informal labor of caring for aging family and friends because they work. Moreover, this gap has become entrenched reality ever since the entrance of middle-and upper-middle income women into the workforce, the result of shifts in the economy coinciding with feminist demands that women have greater professional opportunities. The care gap in the home is matched by a gap in the healthcare industry. In addition to the absence of available women to care for elderly family and friends, a shortage of nursing staff has plagued the American healthcare industry. One factor leading to severe shortages of nurses is a drop in nursing school admissions as middle-class American women have enjoyed greater and more lucrative career opportunities while remuneration for nursing has remained relatively low, especially compared with that of physicians. Moreover, privatization in the health care industry has led to depressed wages and worsening working conditions for nursing staff. Due to cost containment, nursing staff are subject to mandatory overtime, increased work

load and decreased staffing ratios (GAO 2001).<sup>8</sup> Similarly, due to the grossly low wages and lack of benefits offered at the paraprofessional, or nursing assistant level, it should come as no surprise that these positions are hard to fill as low-income workers seek better paying jobs in other low-wage labor sectors (GAO 2001).

While low wages and poor conditions place strains on nursing staff in all areas of healthcare, these conditions are exacerbated in the long-term care industry. Long-term care depends overwhelmingly on the labor of nursing assistants in particular. Nursing assistants are responsible for 80 percent of direct care services in nursing homes and 90 percent in home care (Stone 2000). Demographic shifts of a growing elderly population exacerbate the care gap. With aging baby boomers, job growth in the field of eldercare is far outpacing labor supply. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2003) reports that paraprofessional work in nursing homes and in-home services is projected to grow faster than average job growth through 2010. Home healthcare positions are expected to grow the fastest, with an increase of 76.4 percent between 1996 and 2006 (Stone 2000). In the face of this demand for labor, however, rather than improving working conditions and shoring up social policies for elder-care, contemporary liberalizing trends in the United States have maintained the gendered and racialized degradation of care work to keep costs low. Moreover, the devaluation of care work has only deepened due to the exploitation and perpetuation of global inequalities to staff the long-term care industry (and the healthcare industry more generally). Indeed, in the context of the staffing shortage with regard to care services, the healthcare industry has come to increasingly rely on the availability of relatively inexpensive non-citizen women's labor.

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<sup>8</sup> See also Seaton (2002). Although Seaton links the staffing crisis to privatization trends, the GAO study does not.

### The International Division of Reproductive Labor

The reliance on non-citizen women to staff this sector is an example of the international division of reproductive labor. This global division of care work is comprised of multiple patterns of transnational migration of women, but generally, the prevailing pathways are those that consist of women of the global South emigrating to the global North. Migration pathways include regional migration within Asia, migration from Asia to the Middle East and the United States, migration from the Caribbean basin to the United Kingdom and the United States, migration within Latin and Central America, and migration from North Africa to France and Germany.<sup>9</sup> For the purposes of this project, I consider migration of women of color from countries in the global South to the United States, focusing in particular on the case of Filipina migration.<sup>10</sup>

The international division of reproductive labor hinges on the intersection of a set of multiple processes. In the case of the United States, these processes include first, the informal, flexible nature of increasingly privatized settings for inadequately funded long-term care. A second process rests on the global inequalities that make available a pool of non-citizen women from the global South to work in the United States. As Joan Tronto (2002) points out in her analysis of nannies in the United States, employing child care workers only continues to make sense as long as the wages of care takers are kept far below the wages of the parents who employ them. These wage inequalities between the

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<sup>9</sup> For a thorough overview of the global division of reproductive labor comparing migration pathways from Poland to Germany with those from Morocco to France, see Misra (2004).

<sup>10</sup> Nursing and paraprofessional staff in the United States emigrate from many countries, including: the Philippines, Jamaica, Haiti, the West Indies, Ghana, Nigeria, Mexico, Puerto Rico, India, South Korea, and China. See Diamond (1992), 39. Next the Philippines, Jamaica is a source for vast emigration of nurses to North America. As a result more than 50 percent of nursing positions in Jamaica are left unfilled The CornerHouse (2001), 12.

global North and the global South are an essential part of the calculation underwriting all care sectors in the global division of reproductive labor.

A third process is the continuing feminization of care-work reflected, in turn, by the feminization of labor migration.<sup>11</sup> As Jan Jindy Pettman puts the matter, "making labour cheap depends, in part, on ideologies of femininity" whereby "women's work is seen as temporary, filling in before marriage; as supplementary, as if only men are family providers; and natural, as women are expected to have caring and domestic skills already" (1999, 213). A fourth, and related, process is the re-constitution of the class and race-based hierarchy between women entering the workforce and women hired to perform care-work, as this remains a de-valued labor sector. The feminization of care-labor migration intersects with racialized ideologies, as it is women of color who predominately make up the population migrating to wealthier nations. Randolph B. Persaud (2003) has suggested that the history of migratory paths, responding as these have to the shifting demands of capitalist accumulation, is one that "at each turn produced its own hierarchy based upon some combination of racio-cultural, ethnic and economic characteristics" (134). In the United States, the contemporary racialized process of the immigration pathways that lead to staffing care work feeds off of the American history of racial discrimination. This history has defined the division of care work both during and after slavery, a connection Evelyn Nakano Glen (1992) has astutely traced in her work on the racialized and gendered labor in the case of nursing aides.<sup>12</sup> Elsewhere she has

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<sup>11</sup> Numerous scholars have noted the increase of women migrating. See for example the work of Jan Jindy Pettman, as well as Grieco (2002). Citing the U.S. Census Bureau, Grieco points out that "since the early 1990s, there have been more female than male immigrants to the United States." See also Pedraza (1991).

<sup>12</sup> See also Jones (1985).

explained that "when caring is done as paid work, it not only remains gendered, but also becomes conspicuously racialized" (2000, 86).

Thus, the international division of labor in long-term care represents multiple processes that are endemic of the "new paternalism" of privatization in the United States. As I have suggested, these include the informal, flexible nature of increasingly privatized care-work; the global inequalities that make available a pool of non-citizen women from the global South to work in the global North; the continuing feminization of care-work; and finally, the class and race-based hierarchy between women entering the workforce and women hired to perform care-work. These processes are in turn reinforced by the participation of national states via their migration policies.

I turn next to outline the migration policies in the United States and in the Philippines, considering in particular the growing role of private agencies in facilitating transnational labor migration pathways. In so doing I elaborate on one of Jacqueline Stevens' arguments in *Reproducing the State* (1999). There, Stevens articulated how immigration policies serve to reinforce global inequalities by dividing labor-interests according to nationality through restricting trans-border migration and tying political membership to kinship relationships (36-43). I agree that immigration policies reinforce the kinds of inequalities that are endemic of capitalism, but add that they do so by way of *allowing* legitimate, as well as illegitimate, passage in addition to restricting movement. In exploring the linkages between the migration policies of a receiving state and a sending state, I will argue that sanctioned transnational migration converges with a restructured division of reproductive labor to secure a gendered and racialized non-citizen low-wage labor force.

There are numerous avenues by which non-citizen women may come to work as nursing staff in the healthcare industry in the United States.<sup>13</sup> Currently, American immigration policy is designed to sanction employer- and family-based sponsorship. Both create opportunities for staffing the long-term care industry with non-citizen workers. Foreign-trained nurses, for example, can be recruited to work for specific hospitals through either nonimmigrant visas or immigrant visas. International recruitment through employer sponsorship also indirectly leads to foreign trained nurses staffing paraprofessional positions. This occurs through either the down-grading of recruited nurses or through false representations on the part of recruitment agencies. Nurse recruits must take the U.S. nurse licensing exam (NCLEX-RN) once in the United States. Employers determine when a recruit will take the exam and in the interim, designate nurses as "nurse technicians, " or "graduate nurses." In the meantime, these trained nurses are paid a wage only slightly higher than that of nursing assistants (Diamond 1992, 40). Moreover, non-citizen care-workers gain knowledge of elder care through working in hospitals and this institutional experience can translate readily into performing elder care-work in more informal domestic settings as aids. In some cases, trained nurses voluntarily downgrade their training; that is, as Vivien Choo (2003) has highlighted in the British healthcare journal *The Lancet*, nurses trained in the global South often "'de-skill' to emigrate to more affluent countries as caregivers or even as domestic aides" (1356).

Private recruitment agencies also contribute to providing low-wage labor in the long-term care sector through false representations. Indeed, in a system that amounts to sanctioned human trafficking, it is no surprise that some agencies readily violate the rights of migrant workers. For example, a recent investigative report exposed a number of

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<sup>13</sup> This section draws on the analysis presented in Ong and Azores (1994).

recruitment agencies engaged in luring foreign recruits based on offering them training in the United States (Roche and Mariano 2002). To do so, agencies exploited the 1986 Compact of Free Association, an international agreement between the U.S. and the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands that lifts visa requirements for those seeking work in the United States. Recruitment agencies charged employers from nursing homes up to \$5,500 to deliver workers who had signed one to two-year contracts on the understanding that they would be trained as nurses. Upon arrival they were sent to work as nursing assistants in privately-run rural nursing homes. Their employers deducted from their wages to pay for substandard housing, transportation and other dubious fees. The contracts built in stiff penalties to ensure that non-citizen workers remained in these otherwise hard to staff positions.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to the legitimate—and illegitimate—use of employer sponsorship to staff long-term service provision, another avenue by which a non-citizen woman may come to work in the long-term care industry is through achieving legal permanent resident status through family reunification policies. Executive Director of the Institute for the Future of Aging Services, Robyn Stone has pointed out that immigrants who come to the United States through family reunification programs "comprise a current a future labor pool for low-skilled markets, including the paraprofessional long-term care workforce" (2000). Indeed, it seems that one effect of family reunification policy is the creation of an underclass with very limited legal rights.<sup>15</sup> Finally, a political system that

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<sup>14</sup> This kind of sanctioned abuse of trafficking labor is a result of guest worker programs in general, and would likely be one of the outcomes of President George W. Bush's immigration reform proposals set forth in January 2004 if ever implemented.

<sup>15</sup> This line of argument has been taken up by anti-immigrant forces, though for very different reasons than my own. For example Representative Tom Tancredo (R-CO) suggests that the growing inequalities in the U.S. between rich and poor are due to the presence of poor immigrants. See also Camarota (1999). This reasoning obscures that the reliance on low-wage labor is a structural factor of neo-liberal global

tolerates undocumented migration further adds to a class of workers available to perform cheap, informal labor, especially in private settings with minimal public oversight.<sup>16</sup>

Based on these examples, it appears that American immigration policy creates structural opportunities, directly and indirectly, to make available a labor pool of non-citizen women to perform both the skilled work of nursing and the menial labor of paraprofessional nursing assistants and domestic elder care workers.

Sending states participate by making available a pool of labor through either implicit or explicit domestic policies. As suggested by Rhacel Parreñas (2001, chap. 3), due to the economic insecurities set in motion by neo-liberal global economic policies, sending states from the global South, such as the Philippines, have ended up fostering emigration in efforts to stabilize their domestic economies.<sup>17</sup> During his dictatorial rule, Ferdinand Marcos first developed labor emigration policies in the 1970s to offset domestic unemployment and meet a labor demand that emerged with the expansion of the oil industry in the Middle East. The government has continued to pursue and expand these policies long after democratization in 1986. Currently eight percent of the Filipino population lives and works overseas (O'Neil 2004).

According to some analysts, labor emigration represents a significant strategy in the Filipino government's efforts to meet the International Monetary Fund requirements attached to international loans (Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng 1994; Parreñas 2001). On the surface, sending labor abroad seems to have the effect of stabilizing the national

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capitalism. It holds instead that this is the result of a disregard for the sanctity of the culture of American prosperity on the part of immigration advocates, be they progressive leftists or free-traders.

<sup>16</sup> Dan Tichenor (2002) offers a thorough analysis of how American policy-makers have generally tolerated undocumented labor migration into the United States. See in particular his discussion of the influence of various business lobbies and the strength of regional Congressional representation. See also Schlosser (2003).

economy. Citing Stephen Castles and Mark Miller's *The Age of Migration* (1998), Rhacel Salazar Parreñas notes that "[w]ithout labor outmigration, the rate of unemployment would increase by 40 percent" (2001, 52). Ironically, efforts to meet IMF conditions, including eliminating funding for social policy, end up contributing to joblessness and general social dislocation. This creates a "push" factor, leading people to seek work overseas. As Parreñas (2004) has argued, the diversion of public funds from national redistributive program that is necessitated by IMF conditionalities destabilizes the livelihoods of citizens, creating the conditions whereby a family member moves overseas for work. Once having emigrated, citizens are actively encouraged by the government to return portions of their wages back to family in the Philippines. These remittances are the Philippine's largest source of foreign currency and represent revenue that is crucial to the subsistence of many Filipino families. In 2003, \$7.6 billion was transferred from overseas workers back to the Philippines through banks, comprising 7.5 percent of the gross domestic product. Moreover, an additional millions, perhaps billions are transferred unofficially (Mydans 2004).

In this context, trained nurses are but one sector of the seven million skilled and unskilled Filipino workers that the state actively encourages to emigrate. In the process of creating development strategies that rely on sending nearly one-tenth of its population overseas, the Philippines joins other developing states in creating the conditions of "brain drain" whereby skilled workers are sorely lacking. This kind of strategy ultimately weakens sending states. The deleterious effects of labor export strategies are especially acute in poor states. Consider for example the case of Malawi where two-thirds of the

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<sup>17</sup> For more on the effects of neo-liberal economic policies on emigration from debtor states, including the Philippines, see the discussions in Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng (1994). See also Rosca (2000).

public health nursing positions are unfilled. A *New York Times* article reports that due to migration, public health systems in states across Africa are faced with severe nursing shortages, resulting in threats to the provision of public healthcare (Dugger 2004). The recruitment strategies on the part of wealthy states to shore up *their* nursing shortages have merely left in their wake crumbling public health infrastructure in states throughout the global South. For example in one hospital in Malawi, ten nurse midwives deliver over 10,000 babies in a year. Not surprisingly, childbirth deaths have risen at an alarming rate.<sup>18</sup> Nurse training paid for by the state with its few resources to begin with ends up benefiting wealthy states at the expense of the future of the sending state. While the conditions facing the Philippines are perhaps less dire than those facing Malawi, the case of "the poor subsidizing the rich" nonetheless applies here as well (Dugger 2004). Indeed, as one NGO has put the matter, "the investment these countries put into training such professionals is an example of aid flowing from South to North" (The CornerHouse 2001, 12).

In addition to these immigration and emigration policies, an emerging quasi-privatized regime that manages the transnational migration of women workers has become central to the organization and maintenance of the international division of reproductive labor. Not only has the restructuring of the domestic economy created opportunities in the private sector to develop lucrative international recruitment strategies; it has also to some degree displaced state oversight of migration (Sassen 1998). International trade agreements, such as the WTO's General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), add another layer of institutionalization of an increasingly privatized immigration regime (The CornerHouse 2001, 12). GATS functions both at the

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<sup>18</sup> In Malawi, the rate of deaths related to childbirth and pregnancy in 2000 was nearly double that of 1992.

level of dismantling government services and privatizing them and at the level of overseeing labor migration and easing national restrictions on immigration. According to the International Committee of Nurses, the migration of healthcare workers through private channels with minimal state oversight is beginning to be formalized through international trade agreements, an additional factor in the emerging quasi-privatized regime overseeing international recruitment (Kingma 2001).

It is in this context that the U.S. government's efforts to privatize services can rely on recruiting non-citizen women from the global South to staff nursing homes and home healthcare agencies. And this reliance is becoming big business. Private recruitment agencies are key players in the transfer of labor from the global South to work in the health care industry in advanced industrial states like the U.S. Indeed, recruitment of foreign nurses is a wildly lucrative business. One reporter estimates that recruiters have received up to \$10,000 per recruit (Friess 2002). Another journalist cites an example of a private recruiter receiving more than \$1 million in fees for recruiting 235 nurses to Washington D.C. area hospitals (Brubaker 2001). These private recruitment agencies reflect the emergence of a quasi-privatized immigration regime as they provide valuable services for employers including navigating the bureaucracy of federal immigration requirements in the U.S. and emigration policies of sending states. The institutionalization of a broader privatized international immigration regime facilitates the growth of this kind of business sector in both sending and receiving states.

While all of the factors I have listed, from the racialized and gendered aspects of care work to the specific forms of quasi-privatized national migration policies, are necessary for the international division of care-labor to occur on a large scale, they are

not sufficient. Indeed, for this global division of labor to be viable, a *political* process involving the meaning of national citizenship in sending states must also take place. To track this political process, I invoke the notion of partial citizenship. This category helps bring to light how citizenship is being constituted both structurally and discursively in states that encourage citizens to work overseas. Moreover, partial citizenship helps to delineate the *transnational* political dimension occasioned by the privatization of American healthcare policy and underscores the ways in which neo-liberalism encroaches upon all spheres of social and political life.

#### Overseas Workers and Partial Citizenship

In her study of Filipina migrants Rhacel Salazar Parreñas provides a useful definition of partial citizenship as denoting the precarious status whereby overseas workers are "neither fully integrated in receiving nations nor completely protected by the Philippines" (2001, 37). This status is structured into the experience of non-citizen women providing care work for American senior citizens. For my purposes, partial citizenship vis-à-vis the United States can be understood more specifically as the limited incorporation of labor migrants into the U.S., a condition reinforced by the ambivalences of American immigration policy. Depending on one's immigration status, these include the precarious status that hinges on employer sponsorship and temporary contracts; the lengthy duration of limbo in the case of green card status; and/or the uncertain fate that comes with undocumented status. In the case of immigrant working poor, partial citizenship is further entrenched by the lack of access to federal benefits upon which many American working poor rely, including Medicaid and Food Stamps. Thus, though

the United States immigration regime may in general terms provide more access to eventual citizenship than many receiving states, the insecurities endemic of immigration policies foster a vulnerable, and thus "docile" non-citizen workforce (Persaud 2003, 144).

The political category of partial citizenship has emerged in the fault lines between the economic denationalization of national economies and the political renationalization of domestic politics in states that receive immigrants. The simultaneity of denationalization and renationalization places states in the global South between a national rock and a globalized hard place. As Parreñas explains,

[o]n the one hand, the denationalization of economies compels these nations to respond to the demand for low-wage labor and extend their range of exports to include their able-bodied workers. On the other hand, they cannot enforce the protection of their exported nationals due to the renationalization of politics. In the same vein, the recipients of these...migrant workers do not accord them the same rights as their own nationals. (2001, 48)

This effect of the new global economy has led to a deepening of exclusionary policies of national citizenship. As I have charted, in the case of the United States, re-nationalization has taken the form of laws denying public benefits to undocumented and legal immigrants in addition to the perennial vicissitudes of American immigration policy. While the exclusionary effects of citizenship are by no means new, exclusion in this particular form underscores the emergence of the status of partial citizenship and the overall erosion of citizenship more generally. As Parreñas explains, "the economic gains" that are the result of the political status of partial citizenship "entail the loss of civil and political rights [on the part of the migrant worker], first from the nation of citizenship, which loses juridical-legislation rights, and second from the host nation-state, which relegates unequal rights to migrants along the lines of race, class, and gender" (2001, 48).

In the case of health care workers in the United States, partial citizenship, with its weak to non-existent civil, political, and social rights, meets the structural needs of a privatizing health care industry because it helps to create a pliable, low wage workforce. Targeting health sector employers, private international recruiting agencies point to the precariousness of immigration status as one of the "benefits of foreign recruitment" (World Health Resources, Inc.). One such recruiting agency, World Health Resources, Inc. touts that "foreign professionals have a vested interest in performing their duties at a higher level performance because their visas are contingent with their employer's willingness to provide the visa petition." Moreover, non-citizen nurses are promoted as providing flexibility in their apparent willingness to work in areas and on shifts difficult to staff. Many foreign nurses are hired at comparatively lower salaries, purportedly due to the fact that their prior experience in home countries does not translate into experience in an American healthcare setting (Brubaker 2001). Ironically, international recruitment has the effect of creating a pool of highly trained, but poorly paid nursing assistants, many of whom are trained nurses who have "de-skilled" to work in healthcare settings in the United States. A final advantage of international recruitment is that non-citizen employees are unlikely to unionize. The logic behind these purported advantages perpetuates global inequalities whereby the labor of non-citizens is valued at a lower rate while the precarious status of partial citizenship prevents workers from making demands on employers.

The Filipino government participates in the production of partial citizenship. As I have already suggested, sending labor abroad lowers unemployment rates, and, bolsters the national economy through remittances. Skilled but relatively low-wage labor in

particular represents a national resource for debtor states like the Philippines; by exporting this labor abroad, states attain a comparative advantage vis-à-vis advanced industrial states—though one that commits sending states to a vicious cycle of draining the domestic labor force of skilled labor. Significantly, this kind of state participation entails the foreclosure of institutional accountability to its citizenry, diminishing Filipino citizens' democratic rights to self-determination. Moreover, it entails the promulgation of a narrative of de-territorialized national citizenship that legitimates the commodification of migrant labor.

Consider the weakening of the government's institutional accountability to its citizens. The Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the more recent Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) are the institutional mechanisms by which the government facilitates its labor export strategy. The POEA oversees labor contracts between workers and overseas recruiters. And, in response to public pressures, the OWWA was developed to encourage legal emigration through offering subsidized social benefits. However, the overall strategy has at its core the priority of fostering overseas employment, not the well-being of its citizens. Even if the state wanted to do more for its overseas workers, it cannot. As Parreñas points out, the Filipino government can exercise only extremely limited influence over policies affecting its overseas workers in sovereign states. Ultimately the labor export policy positions citizens as a means to the economic ends of the state, even though the extent of the benefits of the emigration strategy remain far from certain. The policy actively encourages remittances and seeks to maintain an attachment to the Philippines. Policy analyst Kevin O'Neil (2004) notes that the government efforts to enhance channels for

remittances include designing the OWWA identification card to function also as a Visa card to facilitate easy and inexpensive transactions with Philippine banks. To foster national identity, the government organizes overseas tours with Philippine entertainers and offers support services at its overseas offices that emphasize "Filipino values" (O'Neil 2004). It is if note, however, that each of these variants of public policy vis-à-vis overseas workers is restricted to foster the overall aim of "market[ing] Filipinos abroad as a high-quality 'brand-name' of migrant labor" (O'Neil 2004).

Prior to 1995, overseas migrants were truly wanting for government-endowed rights. In 1995, the execution of a wrongly accused Filipina national working in Singapore led to widespread popular discontent with the national government's inability to protect its citizens' rights overseas.<sup>19</sup> In response, the government passed the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (R.A. 8042), which created government offices to make services available to overseas workers. Though termed the "Magna Carta" for migrants by many government officials, the Act establishes a system whereby the government extends a limited set of rights to migrant workers. For example, the government has only recently allowed migrants to vote in absentia, and even now places strict conditions on this political right. Meanwhile the Act includes extensive details as to the obligations of workers to the Philippines, including the duty to pay taxes (Rodriguez 2002, 347). So, in the context of labor export strategies, adequate enforcement of overseas workers' rights remains decidedly uncertain. After all, as Jan Jindy Pettman (1998) points out, "in these circumstances, embassy staff may not always be committed

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<sup>19</sup> Consider also the recent case of the kidnapping in Iraq of Filipino truck driver Angelo de la Cruz. The Philippine government's decision to comply with kidnapper's demands in Iraq is another example of the government's need to prevent popular protest at home of its labor export strategies. However, though the

protectors of their citizens' interests, especially where the states in which they are located are major foreign aid donors as well as employers of exported workers returning much valued remittances" (Transnational Domestic Workers).

The resulting anemic vestiges of the government's relationship to its citizens are also in evidence in the government's production of narratives of citizenship that reinforce its emigration policies. Sociologist Robyn Rodriguez (2002) argues that "citizenship has become a means by which the Philippine state disciplines migrants as cheap workers for the global economic order" (342). This is clear in the state's efforts to hail labor migrants as "modern-day heroes." To honor this new kind of hero, the government has designated a national holiday June 7<sup>th</sup> of each year to celebrate migrant workers. Each year during Migrants' Day, twenty overseas workers are given awards based on their "moral fortitude, hard work and track record of sending money home" (O'Neil, 2004). This globalized twist on nationalism has resulted in a de-territorialized and de-politicized form of citizenship. Rodriguez writes, "in order to contain im/migrants as national subjects linking them to the 'homeland', the state has attempted to incorporate them as... 'New National Heroes,' with the effect, for migrant workers, of the state using citizenship to discipline migrants as cheap and flexible labor" (355) for the global economy.

Being the pride of the nation is a dubious honor when it requires a degree of self-reliance that marks a radical departure from the mix of civil, political and social rights that T.H. Marshall (1964) viewed as foundational for modern democratic citizenship. In his classic tripartite schema, Marshall suggested that modern democratic citizenship had come to require several key components: civil rights, political rights, and social rights.

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government pulled out its 51 soldiers a month early, by and large the 4000 Filipino overseas contract workers who moved to Iraq since 2003 will remain (Mydans 2004; Arnold 2003).

Though Marshall wrote of the twentieth-century British welfare state, the principles inherent in his definition continue to be useful as ethical standards by which to measure the practice of citizenship today. Against this, it is clear that partial citizenship is fast emerging as an undemocratic status—undemocratic in that those who possess it are subject to market forces with little to no access to the institutionally grounded civil, political or social rights needed to secure the conditions of self-determination. The erosion of citizenship runs deep, as citizenship is stretched past territorial borders and across vast oceans. Certainly the technological advances in information and transportation that shrink time and space throughout the globe have lent to the precarious status of national citizenship and democracy. But, I hold that the neo-liberal policies underwriting the organization of the domestic economies throughout most of the world do much more to preclude the possibility of revising political institutions to create the climate needed to foster democratic self-determination in the twenty-first century. Under the sway of neo-liberal hegemony, the Filipino government, when it has extended some semblance of rights to its overseas citizens, as in the case of recent reforms, has been less concerned with shoring up democratic citizenship than with facilitating a status of de-territorialized citizenship. This status maintains the extraordinarily weak form of civil rights necessary for staffing the global economy with low-wage skilled and unskilled workers, but it certainly does little to ground political or social rights, and, by extension, democracy.

In addition to degrading democratic citizenship, partial citizenship reflects even deeper social dislocations, as increasingly, families and communities are broken up by the necessities of labor migration imposed by neo-liberal globalization (Parreñas 2001).

Finally, the labor export strategy has done little to create jobs in the Philippines or to create the conditions of sustainable domestic economic development, thus entrenching overseas work as a long-term condition rather than as a means to a more vibrant democratic future. Veronica Plandano, a domestic worker in Hong Kong, sums up her political status vis-à-vis her Filipino citizenship quite succinctly:

[W]e are called the living heroes or the new heroes. Yet, why are we called 'heroes' when we are slaves in other countries. Oh, OCWs [overseas contract workers]—the heroes without monuments. Yes, we earn a little bit more yet the pain of our bodies, minds and most of all feelings are equal to none. Why does the government, instead of supporting our college graduates and youth and pushing them to strive in our country, actually allow them to leave the country yet without sufficient protection as citizens?... When can you finally provide us with a peaceful and simple life? (quoted in Parreñas 2001, 57)

This frustrated testimony is evidence of what has become a depleted public sphere at the dawn of the twenty-first century, a symptom especially acute in countries in the global South. Indeed, the international division of reproductive labor, which is a result of neo-liberal domestic policies in national settings throughout the globe, has had the effect, not of ameliorating global inequalities, but instead, of exacerbating them.

In spite of this eroded public sphere, however, neo-liberalism has not entirely vanquished all forms of ethical and political critique, contrary to Wendy Brown and others' claims. In the next chapters, I will consider the hegemonic climate wherein instances of disruption of neo-liberal hegemony do exist. These instances highlight the fissures of neo-liberal hegemony, and illuminate the contours of various counter-hegemonic narratives. I assess the ramifications of these examples of counter-hegemony and suggest the need for a more thorough moral framework to guide alternatives to neo-liberal globalization. In so doing, I consider recent efforts on the part of Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge to chart moral norms so as to counter the

ravages of contemporary conditions of the denial of human rights; the lack of freedom which in turn engenders poverty; and the harsh realities of deepening global inequalities.

## Chapter 6:

## Moral Political Theory and Global Inequalities

Just as Karl Polanyi argued, the ascendance of policies espousing the virtues of the self-regulated market have the effect of disembedding market processes from political and social life. This is as much the case now as it was in the period Polanyi studied. And, as Foucauldian scholars have noted, one aspect of the current process of disembeddedness is the reformulation of political and social life according to the economic principles of market rationality. With the ascendance of neo-liberal ideology all political and social relations are drained of non-market forms of meaning. This insight builds off Polanyi's claim that in the case of the self-regulated market system, "instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system" ([1944] 2001, 60). In the contemporary case, neo-liberal economic policy has not only wrenched market processes out of all other spheres of life, it has also reconstituted these other spheres of life, including democratic citizenship, according to the logic of economic calculus. This has led many Foucauldian scholars to conclude that the ascendance of neo-liberal conservatism has increasingly foreclosed the articulation of alternative conceptions of political, social and economic life. But this perspective is too quick in its besieged resignation. While I am sympathetic to the Foucauldian elaboration on Polanyi's insights, I have suggested that the view that neo-liberal logic has utterly saturated political and social life does not bear out when held up against actual developments in contemporary social and political life. In other words, the social and

political manifestations of Karl Polanyi's counter-movement are not fated to be forever fed back into the loop of neo-liberal ideology.

There is evidence that counter-hegemonic articulations abound in contemporary politics, both at the level of local and global politics. In his Polanyi-inspired assessment of neo-liberal globalization, James Mittelman (1996) notes that the ideological terms of neo-liberal globalization have experienced both widespread acceptance as well as resistance. While numerous states and segments of the world's population accommodate neo-liberal globalization, this does not reflect the only experience of globalization. Indeed, evidence suggests that disparate counter-movements throughout the globe, though still a "far less coherent counterforce," do show up neo-liberal globalization's vulnerabilities (Mittelman 1996, 241). Hegemony as an analytical category for the study of modern politics is useful as a lens through which to consider instances of counter-movement. That is, hegemonic politics surrounding forms of ideological dominance underscore that neo-liberal dominance is never fixed. Indeed, hegemony, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have it, is by definition a form of continually contested politics. As they explain in their now classic *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* ([1985], 2001),

in a medieval peasant community, the area open to differential articulations is minimal, and, thus, there are no hegemonic forms of articulation.... [T]he hegemonic form of politics only becomes dominant at the beginning of modern times, when the reproduction of social areas takes place in permanently changing conditions which constantly require the construction of new systems of differences. Hence the area of articulatory practices is immensely broadened. (138)

Certainly, the conditions of globalization create the possibility of a wide range of "articulatory practices," including those that challenge neo-liberal hegemony.

A range of counter-hegemonic practices has emerged, and this is a good thing. However, the mere existence of these practices should elicit no more than a cautious optimism. That counter-hegemonic politics exist is insufficient cause for celebrating the supposed revitalization of democratic processes alongside reinvigorated principles of freedom and equality. Occupying the other end of the spectrum of progressive scholarship, and in contrast with the resigned tone of much Foucauldian-inspired work, many scholars have taken to what seems an almost naïve celebration of transnational non-governmental organizations, citing Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, Medecins Sans Frontiers, feminist organizations involved in the UN World Conferences, and so forth. These NGOs, and others like them, are marshaled again and again as evidence that freedom and democracy can be resuscitated through global civil society.<sup>1</sup> Other expressions of counter-hegemony certainly exist, ranging from conservative religious organizations to local labor union organizing but these have received less scholarly attention. My concern here is primarily the all too frequent blind spot regarding deeply anti-democratic reactions to neo-liberal hegemony. Missing from this reverence for transnational NGOs is, first, a critical interrogation of the full range of manifestations of counter-movement, and second, an assessment of the normative assumptions and political efficacy of these instances of counter-hegemony.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Consider for example Bamyeh (2000). He writes, "The emergence of the global civil society can be seen as a refreshing antidote to the virtual absorption of much of *national* civil society by the modern nation- and then welfare state.... Much more importantly, civil society invites a more demure manner of living in this world, apart from the dictates of total governability or instrumental tyranny, and where one is more open to fate and insecurity, but also to the yet to be used possibilities of freedom from large, deadly vacuities" (25).

<sup>2</sup> An exception to this kind of celebration of counter-hegemony can be found in Peter Evans' critical and realistic assessment in Evans (2000).

Counter-hegemonic politics espouse a host of ideological alternatives to neo-liberalism, some more committed to principles of democracy, freedom and equality than others. Stephen Gill (1996) recognizes this noting that,

a pervasive sense of social anxiety and insecurity is becoming more and more widespread and is cutting across the so-called North-South divide.... [T]here has been a multiplication of community and grassroots organizations in many parts of the world, as well as other developments that show that real alternatives to neoliberalism and the politics of austerity are being forged—even though these conditions are also proving to be fertile for the revival of fascism. (224-225)

The task is not to argue that neo-liberalism is impervious to countervailing forces, as many would have it, but rather to take note of the examples of counter-movement as well as subjecting these to scrutiny. Instances of resistance on their own right are not worthy of the naïve celebration they enjoy from some quarters. Their normative content must be evaluated. After all, as Polanyi noted, and as Gill recalls, the prevailing form that resistance to globalization took at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was fascism—certainly a form of resistance whose potential re-emergence merits profound concern.

Current forms of counter-hegemony run the gamut with regard to their normative commitments. While many instances of transnational counter-hegemony appear to espouse commitments to human rights, democracy and so forth, many do not. As Fred Block (2001, xxxv) points out in his introduction to *The Great Transformation*, responses to neo-liberalism are now often shaped by militant nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Consider for example, Philip Jenkins' work on the growth of what he calls "counter-reformation" expressions of Christianity (2002). Citing recent findings, Jenkins highlights that reactionary, hierarchical forms of Christianity are making Christianity the fastest growing religion in the world—having already extended its sphere of influence deep into U.S. politics, conservative Christianity is now growing fastest in

the global South.<sup>3</sup> He notes that conservative Churches increasingly fill a gap by providing an "alternative social system" to the increasingly incapacitated state services, pointing out that "being a member of an active Christian church today may well bring more tangible benefits than being a mere citizen of Nigeria or Peru" (60).<sup>4</sup> These developments should make clear that the existence of counter-hegemonic forces, whatever form these may take, should not in itself be cause for celebration. These developments beg the question: what may be an ethical intervention into neo-liberalism's sure but uneven erosion of democratic citizenship in various national settings that can bolster democracy, freedom and equality? After all, as Polanyi reminds us, the social reaction to the self-regulated market may just as likely endanger society.

In an effort to turn attention to the normative commitments underwriting instances of counter-movement, I assess recent work emanating from the tradition of liberal egalitarian moral philosophy. Indeed, it is encouraging that a body of work regarding normative responses to globalization is beginning to appear.<sup>5</sup> This is especially encouraging in light of what appears to be a perilous moment for democracy and its attendant commitment to the principles of freedom and equality. Consider, for example, that we are living in an era when, after an average of twenty-five years of democratic national rule matched with deepening neo-liberal economic reforms since the 1980s, the majority of citizens living in Latin American countries now express a preference for

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<sup>3</sup> For a thorough overview of conservative Christianity's relationship to U.S. politics, see Diamond (1995).

<sup>4</sup> The rise of conservative religious communities, many of them Christian, serving immigrant communities is of note here as well. See Jenkins (2002). See also Wakin (2004). As noted in the article, sociologists who have identified this trend tend to suggest that these religious communities provide forms of support denied by the state. Parreñas (2001, 204-206) finds this to be the case in her study as well, whereby in Italy, the Filipino Chaplaincy is far more active than the government administered Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. See also Odine de Guzman's excellent fieldwork on the religious membership of overseas Filipina domestic workers in Malaysia.

authoritarian rule in exchange for economic security, an alarming finding I will discuss below (UNDP 2004). It is perhaps no coincidence that, in the midst of this burgeoning disaffection with democracy, Latin America in particular has seen a rapid growth fundamentalist and conservative Christian Churches such as those described by Jenkins. Clearly, then, if we are to discern and head off the anti-democratic forces of counter-movement, we need more robust theories to underwrite democratic processes that are capable of creating the conditions of economic security.

In this chapter, I consider several recent efforts in moral political philosophy to take global issues seriously. With her work on world citizenship, Martha Nussbaum ([1996] 2001) has added to her earlier definitions of the capabilities approach to redress poverty. I begin this chapter with an assessment of Nussbaum's articulation of world citizenship as the moral standpoint necessary from which to redress injustices and violations of rights around the world. I focus on this aspect of her work rather than on her capabilities approach in large part because her work on world citizenship reflects a wider trend in political theory to situate transnational civil society as the source of resolving globalization's ills. Following my discussion of Nussbaum, I then turn my attention to the genesis of John Rawls's liberal egalitarianism by focusing on the works of two of his interlocutors, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge. In his classic *Theory of Justice* (1971) Rawls set forth a liberal argument supporting distributive justice. Towards the end of his life, Rawls turned his attention to international issues, and, in so doing, as many have noted, he emphasized issues of legitimacy of international law at the expense of

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<sup>5</sup> See the collection of essays in de Greiff and Cronin (2002). See in particular their introduction titled "Normative Responses to Current Challenges of Global Governance."

expanding his egalitarian commitment worldwide (1999).<sup>6</sup> In their own respective efforts to develop moral theories with the aim of redressing global poverty, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge have sought to fill in gaps in Rawls's liberal egalitarianism, though they do so in very different ways. Ultimately, when held up against the conditions that are the focus of this dissertation, the views of Sen and Pogge falter as well. While I find Sen's version of the capabilities approach with its commitment to freedom generally more compelling than Nussbaum's, I hold that it too warrants a more thorough critique than it has received. His focus on the national state as the source for instituting a support-led environment to foster capabilities is ultimately too narrow to attend to the realities of the contemporary global economy. Pogge seeks to address this shortcoming which he sees as endemic to much liberal egalitarian work to date. While his attention to the conditions of global interconnectedness is refreshing, he too fails to broaden his scope to incorporate a more thorough diagnosis of the intersection of neo-colonial forms of capitalism with the ideological dominance of neo-liberalism.

Before considering the work of these moral philosophers, let me review the conditions against which I will assess the salience of this body of work. The principles of neo-liberal economic policies have held sway over global policy-making for some time now.<sup>7</sup> The implementation of these policies has, in turn, had profound implications for global and domestic politics and social life. While many scholars of globalization have attended to the technological foundations of globalization and their cultural effects, I have highlighted that the evisceration of democratic citizenship remains by and large a national project, but it is one that depends upon similar erosions in other national settings.

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<sup>6</sup> For an overview of how Rawls's law of peoples has been received, see Weinar (2002).

I have suggested that neo-liberal reforms have eroded democratic citizenship in a variety of national contexts, and that the exact form that erosion takes is determined in part by a country's relative status in the unequal global order. In the case of the United States, for example, the dominance of neo-liberal ideology has had the effect of reconfiguring citizenship in the form of the entrepreneurial citizen-shareholder. In this form, the civil rights of citizenship are emphasized while social rights are impoverished, as evidenced in the privatizing reforms of Medicare. Moreover, this neo-liberal reconstitution of citizenship in the wealthiest nation-state in the world hinges on a transnational logic whereby it is formed against a narrative of immigration. This narrative, in turn, requires a simultaneous, but even deeper erosion of national citizenship in poorer states. That is, in poorer states making up the so-called Third World—states formerly colonized, and now largely debtor states—the story of the erosion of democratic citizenship looks quite different. Due to the history of colonization, the stories of the development of institutions of democratic citizenship in formerly colonized states are, in the first place, far shorter than those of Western nation-states. Secondly, the erosion of democratic citizenship due to neo-liberal reforms is far deeper as it includes the de-territorialization of citizenship whereby numerous poor states pursue labor emigration strategies as part of national economic development. These simultaneous but different processes of erosion reproduce global North/South inequalities and help to shape the contours of the global organization of production and the division of labor, including the international division of reproductive labor.

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<sup>7</sup> See Overbeek (1993). For an argument regarding the impact of neo-liberalism on epistemological transformation see Escobar (1995), especially 89-94.

These conditions have certainly propelled counter-hegemonic processes. I contend that the responses to the conditions of neo-liberal globalization can be enhanced by a moral framework that is committed to democracy, freedom and equality. Fortunately, quite a few moral theorists have begun to take seriously global concerns in their efforts to deepen their liberal egalitarian arguments. Unfortunately, however, the global concerns articulated by many, including Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge, miss the mark when it comes to the conditions laid out in this dissertation. In order to explain this claim, I will consider the following questions in my discussion of this body of work. What does each thinker identify as pressing global issues in need of moral response? What does each identify as the underlying causes of these issues? And, what may be the means by which to address these issues and therefore minimize their effects? Over the course of this assessment, I will point out the ways in which these liberal egalitarian approaches do not adequately address the ways in which neo-liberal globalization has aligned distinct social policy arenas of national resource redistribution and immigration and has eroded democratic citizenship more generally.

In some respects this inability on the part of liberal egalitarianism may be indicative of liberalism's inability in general to both recognize and intervene in structural conditions. Indeed, this aspect of liberalism has been the source of criticism for many scholars, beginning with Karl Marx. Thus, the question may rightfully be asked, why waste time with liberalism in the first place? And why spend time considering the work of liberal egalitarian philosophers in a study dedicated to elucidating the structural inequalities fostered by neo-liberal economic policies? I do so because I agree with Wendy Brown's recent reminder that Marx supported liberalism's ideals, and that his

critique of liberalism was due to the fact that in a capitalist society, the ideals of liberalism were never applied to the conditions of production (2003). Now, liberalism continues to be attacked from all sides—critics on the left have variously assailed liberalism's penchant for presuming the experience of secular, Western masculinity as the norm to be applied universally. Meanwhile, from an opposite corner, neo-liberalism has increasingly drained liberalism's ideals of any meaning outside of market rationality. In spite of these criticisms, I contend that liberalism continues to have potential as critique, a potential that Marx was aware of. That this potential has yet to be exploited on a wide scale to critique neo-liberal globalization, as apparent in the work of Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge, suggests that a more rigorous engagement with liberalism is warranted—I will take up precisely this kind of engagement in my conclusion.

#### Martha Nussbaum: Feeling Worldly

At the outset of her brief but provocative essay "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" Martha Nussbaum quotes the Cynic, Diogenes Laertius's assertion "I am a citizen of the world" ([1996] 2001, 2). This short essay, along with a reply to her responders, represents Nussbaum's efforts to set forth an updated version of what world citizenship might look like now. Nussbaum is clear that she is not calling for global institutions to form a world government. By world citizenship she means instead to invoke a set of universal moral norms along with an individualized practice of applying these norms in a way that transcends national borders. This individual practice is to be fostered through education. While her work on capabilities, along with her even more recent work on capabilities and human rights, has as its focus redressing poverty in a variety of local contexts, her

concept of world citizenship is much more explicitly engaged with addressing the inequalities underlying the global order.<sup>8</sup> In turning her attention to affluent societies, Nussbaum uses the concept of world citizenship to situate poverty and oppression as issues that should be of universal concern.

Over the course of her two essays in *For Love of Country?* Nussbaum defines the gap between liberal instantiations of universal rights to life, liberty and happiness and their truncated implementation in the world. Most people in the world do not enjoy these rights in their daily lives. Focusing on citizens of the United States, Nussbaum is particularly scathing regarding the hypocrisy of the American celebration of these liberal rights while the actualization of these rights remains deeply limited beyond the borders of the United States. Though she does not fully spell out this link, she suggests that the liberal particularism on the part of American citizens is not only hypocritical but is also "self-serving"(13). Moreover, she notes that the relative affluence enjoyed in the United States cannot be universalized, not because this is an impossibility structured into the capitalist organization of the global economy, but because to do so would spell "ecological disaster" (13).

For Nussbaum, the limited practice of universal rights, the global issue that most concerns her in this essay, is the result of first world moral particularism, which itself is the result of imagination narrowed by the form of the national state. In her call to world citizenship, Nussbaum seeks to enlarge our moral imaginations beyond the parochial setting of the national state. She writes that "all too often...our imaginations remain oriented to the local" (x). The universal application of norms—the enlargement of mentality, or "world thinking" (10)—can be fostered through education. In contrast with

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<sup>8</sup> See Nussbaum (2002).

the national focus of current forms of civic education, a cosmopolitan curriculum would serve as "a reminder of the interdependence of all human beings and communities" (10). Through cosmopolitan forms of education, we can learn to enlarge the object of our compassion. As Nussbaum argues, "for many Americans, [the] expansion of moral concern stops at the national boundary" (xii). She recognizes that "compassion begins with the local" (xiii), but she holds firm to her contention that compassion can be tapped into through the education of world citizens.<sup>9</sup> She writes, "since compassion contains thought, it can be educated" (xiii). American students need to

learn to recognize humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories. (9)

By such an enlarged training, students will come to understand their role in the larger world, beyond the national borders. Equipped with knowledge about other parts of the globe, American citizens can better become citizens of the world. Indeed a cosmopolitan curriculum has as its goal that:

we should not confine our thinking to our own sphere, that in making choices in both political and economic matters we should most seriously consider the right of other human beings to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that we should work to acquire the knowledge that will enable us to deliberate well about those rights. (14)

Nussbaum's emphasis on the moral category of world citizenship and the role of education in fostering this moral view begs the question, what are the corresponding institutional mechanisms in which this form of citizenship is to be grounded? Consider

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<sup>9</sup> Her attention to teaching *American* students to be world citizens belies the ways in which this approach ultimately reinforces global inequalities. With her focus on training the U.S. population to be good citizens, Nussbaum ignores the role of U.S. power in producing the very problems around the world that as world citizens, they are supposed to be sensitive to. Thanks to Uma Narayan for underscoring this point.

for example, Amy Guttmann's comment in her response regarding the significance of state institutions of governance: "Democratic citizens have institutional means at their disposal that solitary individuals, or citizens of the world only, do not. Some of those institutional means are international in scope (the United Nations being the most prominent example), but even those tend to depend on the cooperation of sovereign societies for effective action" (71). On this point regarding the necessity of sovereign state governing institutions, Nussbaum has little to say, focussing instead on non-governmental organizations as the sites for the practice of world citizenship. However, in this, she endorses a remarkably personalized notion of world citizenship that centers on individual conduct. For Nussbaum, world citizenship is a sentiment, not a political category with a corresponding polity, such as a world state. She insists that individual conduct as a world citizen does not require state institutions:

For the entire [cosmopolitan] tradition, individuals bore duties of benevolence that were loosely defined.... To say 'I cannot act as a world citizen, since there is no world state' would have been seen by this tradition as a cowardly way of avoiding thinking about how high a price one will pay to help others who are in need. For one can always find ways to help, if one thinks as a member of that virtual commonwealth, which Kant called the 'kingdom of ends.' (134)

For Nussbaum, a world polity is not a prerequisite for world citizenship, but neither are state institutions the ground by which moral principles, such as world citizenship, are rendered meaningful. Rather, individual world citizens can actualize their membership in humanity's kingdom of ends through institutions of civil society more effectively than directly through public institutions of governance. She explains, "in our own world...there are many practical opportunities for world citizenship that were simply not available to the Stoics, or even to Kant and his contemporaries" (134). She goes on to cite Richard Falk, who in his response to Nussbaum elaborates on his own work on

global civil society. Nussbaum agrees that "nongovernmental organizations of many kinds are mobilizing to influence government action on issues ranging from ecology to domestic violence; one may support or join such organizations. Through such groups one may pressure national governments to take action toward certain global aims" (134). In addition to paying membership fees of NGO's, getting news from around the world is another means by which to begin thinking as a world citizen. She explains,

the information revolution is rapidly multiplying the possibilities for action as world citizens.... The very existence of such news opens possibilities of action for the world citizen, possibilities ranging from financial support for Human Rights Watch to thinking and writing to (where it is open to individuals) more direct participation in deliberations about the welfare of children and women. (135)

There are numerous limits to Nussbaum's work, many of these articulated in the responses collected in *For Love of Country*. My own concern with Nussbaum's work stems from the personalized nature of her account of world citizenship, which impacts both her diagnosis of the world's ills as well as her solution. Indeed, Nussbaum's unquestioning use of liberalism's celebration of civil society leads her analysis to verge on the ultra-individualistic as well as to blind it to the effects of material inequalities that are the result of the history of colonialism and capitalist development, and that have in turn been exacerbated by neo-liberalism.

My concern regarding the personalized nature of her notion of world citizenship is similar to criticisms of "postnational citizenship" and is driven by my analysis regarding neo-liberalism's erosion of institutional mechanisms for grounding freedom and equality. Indeed, the 1996 reforms leading to the denial of social rights to legal and undocumented immigrants underscore the critical significance of rendering rights meaningful through institutions. As Michael Jones Correa (2002) has argued, the 1996 reforms in the United

States highlight the critical oversight endemic to post-national citizenship, or in the case of Nussbaum, world citizenship.<sup>10</sup> He writes that

'postnational citizenship' is partial, insubstantial, and insecure. By itself, it is only a simulacrum of full citizenship... Recent events in the United States—most notably curtailing of social services to both undocumented aliens and permanent resident [sic]—serve as a pointed reminder of the vulnerability of immigrants, even those with claims to social rights, in the absence of political rights. (236)

Jones Correa echoes Hannah Arendt's classic articulation of the category of the "stateless." Arendt's trenchant analysis of the "stateless" sheds light on the significance of mechanisms by which to render rights meaningful. She notes that the plight of the stateless during the 1920s and 1930s underscored that the rights of humanity are identical with the national rights of citizenship as "the former inevitably entail[s] the latter" ([1949] 1979, 292). Pointing to the historical example of the refugees whose emergence coincided with the consolidation of nation-states, she notes that "the more they were excluded from right in any form, the more they tended to look for a reintegration into a national...community" ([1949] 1979, 292). She concludes, underscoring the profound limitations of human rights, stating that "the Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable...whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state" ([1949] 1979, 293). That large numbers of non-citizens naturalized to obtain U.S. citizenship after 1996 reforms merely substantiates Arendt's claim regarding the significance of national membership as citizenship continues to be the locus by which rights are secured.

Though neither Michael Jones Correa nor Hannah Arendt explicitly reflects a concern with global inequalities, the reality is that the vast majority of the world's

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<sup>10</sup> In his critique of post-nationalist arguments, Jones Correa writes of the work of David Jacobson (1996) and Yasmin N. Soysal (1994).

migrating population of partial citizens is originally from poorer nations (UNPD 2002). This in turn underscores what is at stake in the intersection between the lack of secured rights and the perpetuation of global inequalities. Theories of post-national or world citizenship tend to gloss over the need for grounding rights in institutions, and in so doing, when read against the realities of transnational labor migration, they clearly ignore the realities of global inequalities. In other words, goods, services, and even rights continue to be rendered meaningful mostly through national social policy and institutions. But when these are foreclosed to migrants from the global South, no amount of expanding moral thought will be sufficient to redress this gap between universal rights and their concrete actualization that is the mark of partial citizenship. To blind oneself to this is to do a serious disservice to those in the world with precarious sets of rights, including transnational labor migrants from the global South migrating to wealthier states.

This leads me to my second concern with Nussbaum's work on global politics. Nussbaum fails to acknowledge that inequalities between affluent and poor nation-states are in part structured by the history of colonial forms of capitalism. Uma Narayan's (2004) recent work is helpful here. She has argued that the contemporary division of labor in the global economy is marked by disproportionate numbers of women in poor countries working in the informal labor sectors when compared with the division of formal and informal sector work in affluent countries.<sup>11</sup> She points out that this contemporary labor sector, with all of its insecurities, is one effect of the colonial

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<sup>11</sup> Narayan defines the formal sector as meaning "work for wages in the public sector controlled by the state, and in the 'official' or 'recognized' segments of the private sector, such as working for corporations or in registered family-owned businesses or working as a self-employed professional" (1). She defines

organization of capitalist means of production. Narayan cites that while 84 percent of the working population in High Income Countries is employed in the Formal Sector, in Low Income Countries a mere 17 percent of workers work in the Formal Sector (2004, 1). She notes that "the majority of women in developing countries are in the Informal Sector" (2004, 1), and argues that to understand "*why* the informal sector is a more substantial component of developing economies than of developed economies, and to understand *why* women in developing economies are disproportionately relegated to this sector," one must consider "the unequal forms of economic development between developed and developing economies engendered by the historical intersection of capitalism and colonialism" (2004, 2-3). In her explanation, she notes that colonial capitalism included policies that favored sharecropping's hierarchical organization of agricultural production; prevented the creation of mechanized agriculture; and fostered a condition of "non-industrialization" to forestall competition from the colonies. This deeply affected the forms of wage-labor available to colonized peoples. She writes, "wage-labor in many colonies remained relatively scarce, predominantly agricultural, or involved options such as domestic service or working in 'unskilled' urban jobs" (9). This historical division of labor is the foundation for the informal sector work available in poorer countries today. Narayan's concern with the lasting effects of colonial capitalism on the contemporary division of labor and the informal labor sector applies to the contemporary pathways of transnational labor migration. Indeed, that the preponderance of labor migration takes place from the global South to the global North is no coincidence. It is yet another residual effect of the macroeconomic aspects of colonialism on today's global economy.

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informal work as any other wage-earning activity, ranging from microenterprises to agricultural labor—activities that are done "without official contracts" (2).

Narayan forcefully argues that liberal moral philosophers who are concerned with women's lives throughout the world, such as Martha Nussbaum, have a recurring blind spot with regard to this history. Indeed, for Nussbaum, as I've suggested, global inequality is the result of First World moral myopia—a moral failure, rather than the effect of neo-colonial capitalism. But no amount of rights expansion will radically alter the imprint of colonial history on the contemporary global division of labor if the very fact of this history and its effects go unacknowledged. The mere expansion of civil society players concerned by the conditions that most of the world lives in is not sufficient for eradicating the causes of these conditions. Yet, the celebration of the expansion of global civil society, of which Nussbaum is one of many proponents, amounts to a veritable dogmatism. Indeed, the kind of hope invested in NGOs and global civil society is undertaken at the expense of thinking seriously about the role of state institutions and plays all too neatly into the hands of neo-liberal ideology's degradation of state institutions. Marianne Marchand and Anne Sisson Runyan caution that "it is important to keep in mind that a strengthened civil society is also on the neoliberal agenda.... [T]he elements of civil society neoliberals wish to privilege over the state are precisely those which will broaden and deepen relations of domination in the absence of any recourse to democratic governance at local, national, and global levels" (2000, 20). Similarly, David Rieff (1999) has chastised proponents of global civil society noting that in their rush to avoid the trappings of the state, "the idea of civil society begins to look less like a way of fostering rights and responsive governments and more like part of the dominant ideology of the postcold war period: liberal market capitalism." Certainly, developing democratic governance to ground rights is not sufficient to undo the

continued imprint of the colonial past on our neo-liberal present, but it is at least a more effective step compared with the individual charity on the part of Nussbaum's world citizens. To consider both the possibilities as well as the limitations of configuring democratic institutional mechanisms by which to ground freedom and equality, I turn next to the work of Amartya Sen.

### Amartya Sen and Embedded Freedom

In contrast with Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen (1999) has placed a higher premium on thinking seriously about what may be the state-sponsored mechanisms necessary for creating the conditions for universal freedom and equality. Sen's recent attention to the relationship between freedom and economic development is intriguing in that he at once attends to the institutional ground for freedom while at the same time he leaves open the meaning of freedom. With regard to the latter, Drucilla Cornell (2004) has articulated that the distinction between Sen's and Nussbaum's respective definitions of the capabilities approach hinges on the contrast between the openness of Sen's approach and the finality implied by Nussbaum's commitment to identifying a list of capabilities based on broad empirical investigation. Nussbaum suggests that this list is both "thick" in that it is the result of these findings while also "vague" in that the list is ever changing according to new findings (2002, 120). Despite her commitment to the open-endedness of the list, however, Nussbaum's determination to create a list in the first place parts with Sen's approach to conceptualizing the capabilities approach. Cornell highlights this distinction, citing the difference between "Sen's emphasis on freedom and Nussbaum's own attempt to defend a list of what equality of well-being actually entails" (11). But

there is yet another way in which Sen's work suggests a further departure from Nussbaum. Sen's grounded conceptualization of development as freedom is quite distinct from Nussbaum's emphasis on the personalized actualization of world citizenship as a moral stance. His original account of freedom provides a complex institutional understanding of economic development. Ultimately, however, his analysis does not adequately address the structure of global inequality as contributing to national poverty.

In *Development as Freedom* (1999) Sen argues that in the field of development, the success of policies should be measured in terms of real expansion of freedoms. This view challenges the conventional "narrower" (3) views that link development "with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise of personal incomes, or with industrializations, or with technological advance, or with social modernization" (3). One of his aims in prioritizing freedom is to emphasize both the means and the ends of development. Too often, he suggests, narrow views that focus solely on aggregate increases of personal income, for example, ignore that while this may be a mean that leads towards the end of economic growth, it may well also lead towards other ends, including greater inequality, or greater environmental degradation, both violations of his conception of freedom. Sen's account of freedom as fostered by an institutional climate committed to enhancing freedoms parts ways with libertarian accounts of freedom as well as with Rawls's account of justice as fairness.

With this notion of freedom as development, Sen enhances his earlier definition of the capabilities approach. In their early work on the capabilities approach, Sen and Nussbaum rethought the ends of redistributive justice in a way that moved beyond Rawls's emphasis on broadening the distribution of primary goods. For Rawls primary

goods include "rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect" (quoted 72). As Sen points out, however, Rawls's focus on primary goods does not address how people actually experience and make use of the goods they have access to, and that what goods they actually need in the first place varies from person to person and society to society. Sen defines freedom differently. He emphasizes "the *freedom* to achieve actual livings that one can have reason to value" (73). Here he calls for policy to shift its focus to a different space. Rather than focusing on the mere existence of utilities, or of primary goods, Sen wants to attend to whether or not these freedoms have substance. He writes: "for many evaluative purposes, the appropriate 'space' is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that of the substantive freedoms—the capabilities—to choose a life one has reason to value" (74). He defines that an individual's capabilities are "the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles)" (75). He goes on to distinguish between functionings and capabilities. Functionings refer to what a person actually achieves, while capabilities refer to that person's freedom to achieve. If one were to use the "capability approach" to evaluate the effectiveness of policy, one could either focus on "*realized* functionings (what a person is actually able to do) or on the *capability set* of alternatives she has (her real opportunities). The two give different types of information—the former about the things a person does and the latter about the things a person is substantively free to do" (75).

He notes that the capability approach includes the benefits of the utilitarian, libertarian and Rawlsian approaches, but does not suffer from their drawbacks. The capability approach, or "freedom-based perspective can take note of, inter alia, utilitarianism's interest in human well-being, libertarianism's involvement with processes of choice and the freedom to act and Rawlsian theory's focus on individual liberty and on the resources needed for substantive freedoms" (86). Sen's approach is able to have such a broad reach because it attends to both the means *and* the ends of policy implementation. He writes, "this extensive reach is possible because the freedoms of persons can be judged through explicit reference to outcomes and processes that they have reason to value and seek" (86).

For Sen, then, the global issue of greatest concern is the lack of freedom throughout the world. A freedom-centered approach to development calls attention to this and defines development as a process of "removing the unfreedoms from which the members of the society may suffer" (33). His is not a classical libertarian definition of freedom focusing on the absence of impediments to free choice, but rather reflects an appreciation of the kind of social policy and institutions that may render freedom meaningful. Sen breaks freedoms into five types, though he insists throughout that these types are interrelated. Freedoms include political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. These freedoms are interrelated and so cannot be analyzed as separate. Each of the following sets of freedoms are instrumental in that they "contribute, directly or indirectly, to the overall freedom people have to live the way they would like to live" (38). Political freedom refers to general liberal principles of self-determination within democratic governing structure.

This includes freedom of expression, uncensored press, choices between political parties, and voting rights (38). Economic facilities include "the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange" (39). Included here is the idea that when a nation's wealth increases, the wealth will be distributed in such a way that it improves the lives of all citizens (38-39).<sup>12</sup> Social opportunities are the "arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives...but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities" (39).

Transparency guarantees refer to the "freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity" (39). This full disclosure is necessary to prevent corruption, either political or financial. And finally, protective security refers to the existence of a social safety net for vulnerable populations as a means by which to "preven[t] the affected population from being reduced to abject misery" (40). He notes that these freedoms are instrumental to the broadening of individual capabilities, and in this claim, he challenges neo-liberal, utilitarian economic growth-centered approaches. Economic growth certainly contributes to the enhancement of individual capabilities, but Sen insists that growth on its own it is insufficient. Sen argues forcefully that the other forms of freedom he has defined are just as necessary but have generally gone under-appreciated in policymaking and analysis (40).

Sen's analysis of freedom highlights the significance of the state's role in creating the conditions for freedom in the first place. For example, he contends that "the contribution of economic growth has to be judged not merely by the increase in private

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<sup>12</sup> Cornell (2004) sees in this definition the possibility of framing claims for democracy in the workplace.

incomes, but also by the expansion of social services (including, in many cases, social safety nets) that economic growth may make possible" (40). He gives the example of Japan's economy as benefiting from the high literacy rate in the mid-nineteenth century. This early "human resource development" provided a solid foundation for the country's economic growth (41). He goes on to give another example, this time of the poor Indian state of Kerala, to further illustrate his overall point about the interconnectedness of national policy and influences on enhancing individual capabilities. Kerala is an example of "support-led growth" which Sen defines as operating "through a program of skillful social support of health care, education and other relevant social arrangements" (46). Sen notes that, in comparison with wealthier Indian states, Kerala has enjoyed an impressive decrease in income poverty due to its policies expanding education, healthcare, and designating more equitable land distribution (91).<sup>13</sup>

Sen's definition of freedom as grounded in social policy along with his advocacy of support-led growth basically amounts to an appreciation of Polanyi's account of the "embedded" nature of human economic life. This approach is certainly refreshing in an era dominated by neo-liberal celebrations of the self-regulated market to the detriment of all other spheres of life. His account provides a useful counter to the meager form of neo-liberal citizenship that is fast supplanting the possibility of more robust forms of democratic citizenship. Furthermore, his is an important corrective to Nussbaum's highly personalized account of world citizenship. Nonetheless, his definition of freedom and his program for enhancing freedom betray a paradox whereby he ignores the significance of

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<sup>13</sup> Uma Narayan has pointed out that this celebration of support-led growth in Kerala is misguided, in that, intriguingly, emigration seems to play a role in Kerala's success. Many educated residents of Kerala have emigrated overseas and their remittances are in part responsible for the state's economic welfare. E-mail correspondence, May 19, 2004.

national territory in one instance, while in another, he invests national institutions with far too broad a mandate. This paradox ultimately limits the reach of his otherwise innovative approach. In defining freedom, Sen reproduces a perennial liberal oversight regarding the relationship between territory to political identity. That is, Sen undervalues national identification and physical place in his definition of freedom and so fails to provide tools to address that the deterritorialized effects of labor migration may well controvert freedom. On the other hand, his institutional designs for social policies to enhance freedom are based solely in the national state. Because Sen locates the causes and solutions of poverty in local factors, his broad vision of freedom is essentially trapped in the nation-state. Therefore the interconnected and deeply unequal nature of the neo-liberal global economy and the effects of this interconnectedness on local conditions are obscured and ultimately left untouched by Sen's national approach to redressing poverty.

In his complex and grounded definition of freedom Sen puts forth a far more compelling account of the relationship between the market and society than does neo-liberalism, but he reproduces an oversight common to liberal political theory. In his trenchant critique of nineteenth-century liberalism, Uday Singh Mehta (1999, chap. 4) points to the ways in which liberalism ignores the relationship between political community and territoriality. Drawing on Edmund Burke to define this ontological claim, (though he could as easily, and I think less problematically draw on Polanyi for this), Mehta cites that "territory is both a symbolic expression and a concrete condition for the possibility (or aspiration to) a distinct way of life" (119). In his otherwise thorough

overview of what constitutes human freedom, Sen overlooks the role of political identity, and the significance of territoriality in grounding this identity.

Sen's oversight regarding territoriality has a further implication as it serves to reinforce the effects of contemporary global inequality in a fashion that is evocative of nineteenth-century liberalism's role in upholding British imperialism. Mehta notes that one effect of the nineteenth-century liberal tradition's ignorance of the significance of territory for communal attachment was that this disregard literally paved the way for the justification of Britain's imperial possession of most of the earth. That is, this aspect of liberal political theory cleared the way for empire-building as it blinded colonizers from recognizing the territorial integrity of political societies. Mehta suggests that because of the liberal emphasis on consent as the sole legitimate foundation for political society and "in the absence of a conception of belonging or territorial togetherness, liberals were unable to recognize and appreciate the political integrity of various nonconsensual societies" (121). Though Mehta speaks of liberal political theory, his point applies equally well (if not better) to the principles and policies of economic neo-liberalism. Just as the market system eviscerates the spheres of political and social life, commodifying land and labor, so too does it eviscerate the relationship between identity and territory. As we have seen with the de-territorialization of citizenship in the case of sending states, the relationship between political identity and territoriality is vulnerable to the vicissitudes of neo-liberal globalization. At the dawn of the twenty-first century and in the absence of explicit imperial political forms, the neo-liberal disregard for territorial integrity this time clears the way for conceptualizing transnational labor migration as an expression of individual choice. Sen's obfuscation of territoriality provides cover for the inegalitarian

conditions that give way to transnational labor migration from poor states to affluent ones. In sum, Sen ignores both that "locational attachments" (146) exist and should be taken up in his set of freedoms and that these very attachments are threatened, not by political imperialism, but by neo-liberal economic policies which in turn propel significant out-migration from poor countries.

Because of his oversight regarding the significance of territoriality in forming identity, Sen cannot provide a normative framework by which to weigh the effect of conditions of transnational labor migration on freedom. Viewed through Sen's framework, with its lack of attention to the relationship between territory and political community, transnational labor migration appears to reflect instances of individuals capable of realizing their functioning. Because his analysis does not include a more nuanced conceptualization of a more substantive freedom to choose to be a member of a political community in a particular geographic place, Sen provides no leverage with which to critique that poor states are structurally placed in a position whereby many create labor emigration policies to redress national poverty. Indeed, his approach offers no way to interrogate the essentially libertarian interpretation of the choice to immigrate as an unfettered choice. That the conditions of neo-liberal globalization create a vast community of stateless persons, or partial citizens, falls through the cracks of Sen's normative intervention.

Ironically, Sen's lack of regard for geographic national space on the political psyche is matched by a parallel overemphasis on national institutions to create the conditions of freedom. His national solution is marred with the same myopia as that of the national welfare state. As I have suggested in chapter four, this form of redistributive

policy binds citizens to the national state, but cannot address rights of those partial citizens inhabiting the de-territorialized transnational spaces that result from the neo-liberal organization of global economy. Of course, Sen is an economist by training. Nonetheless, his outline of development as freedom has deep normative political implications. It is of note that the political category of national citizenship is implicit throughout his effort since the notion of support-led growth implies a delimited category of membership by which to organize social policy. The ramifications of this are clear if we return to the work of T.H. Marshall (1964). The clearest articulation of the relationship between citizenship and redistribution can be found in T.H. Marshall's approach, as can the limitations of conceptualizing redistribution as a *national* project. Indeed, as John Crowley (1998) has rightly argued, national membership is essential to Marshall's notion of citizenship rights, especially in their social form. He notes that "identity and concrete fellow-feeling based on social intercourse and shared practices" (1998, 174) are structured into Marshall's definition of citizenship rights, especially in the case of social rights. That these prerequisites of membership match the historical form of the national state in Marshall's case is no coincidence, as Marshall essentially took the national form for granted. The problem with this framework is two-fold: first, the national form can no longer be taken for granted due to contemporary conditions of globalization, and second, *should* no longer be perpetuated, since national forms of social policy reinforce exclusionary practices in a variety of forms. They have in the past, and by definition, always will. Crowley is mostly concerned with the development of the supranational form of the European Union and suggests that a translation of Marshall's notion of social rights in this post-national political context will require the creation of a

sense of membership through institutions and practices shared in common (1998, 176). In his work, Sen does not consider extra-national factors shaping national policy options, emphasizing instead that all states, even poor ones, should be empowered to develop national social policy, and, implicitly, national citizens. This kind of national solution ignores first, that national conditions are deeply shaped by the pressures of the global economy and, in most cases, by demands from international financial institutions, and that second, national states possess very different levels of resources available for redistribution in the first place.<sup>14</sup> Nowhere does Sen call for a broader international response to the kinds of glaring inequalities between poor and affluent states engendered by colonial capitalism and entrenched by neo-liberal policy-making. And nowhere does he express concern regarding the exclusionary effects of national forms of social policy. For a broader view capable of considering poverty and inequalities from the perspective of global interconnectedness, I turn next to the work of Thomas Pogge. I will suggest that his broader global view is useful to the extent that he implicitly refutes national exclusionary forms, but in the end he too vastly underestimates the role of neo-liberal ideology.

#### Thomas Pogge: Thinking (and Doing) Outside the Nation State

Like Nussbaum, Pogge is motivated by a profound desire to shake up the moral apathy on the part of members of affluent societies to acknowledge and alter their participation in promulgating global inequalities. His diagnosis as to the causes, however, is quite different. Pogge (2002) points to international norms surrounding sovereignty,

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<sup>14</sup> Uma Narayan pointed out that the nationalist solution ignores that some states have far more than others to redistribute and that this difference is due in part to the macroeconomic forces shaping global inequality

authority and national governments as the source of global inequalities, rather than citing the moral failure of imagination limited by the national state as the culprit, as Nussbaum has. His work provides an important corrective not only to Nussbaum, but to Sen as well. Indeed, as I have suggested, Sen focuses too narrowly on reforming national institutional factors to create the conditions for freedoms. Pogge, in contrast, sheds light on the international institutional framework as largely responsible for perpetuating conditions of inequality. Pogge suggests that to date,

the explanatory debate is largely focused on nationalist explanations: on the question of what national economic institutions and policies in poor countries hamper or promote the eradication of domestic poverty. Some argue for free markets with a minimum of taxes and government regulations (the Asian tigers model), others for increased governmental investment in education, medical care, and infrastructure (the Kerala model). This debate is certainly important. But it would also be quite important to examine what *global* economic institutions hamper or promote the eradication of poverty worldwide. (2002, 116-117)

He wants to turn our attention to the global responsibilities on the part of citizens in affluent nations, and contests the widely held moral view that global poverty is not the problem of the affluent. To do this, he rejects the claim that is used to promulgate this moral apathy: "that we are not harming the poor, that the developed countries and the global economic order they sustain are not substantial contributors to life-threatening poverty suffered by billions in the developing world" (25). On the contrary, he argues, if we turn our empirical and normative attention to the realities of global interconnectedness, we begin to shed light on how by supporting a global order that in turn promotes corrupt governments in "weak" nation-states, we preclude the populations of those states from having a voice at the table, so to speak.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, "we [must] recognize the harms we are involved in producing or the benefits we derive from these

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in the past and present. Email correspondence, April 2004.

harms, find the case for ending poverty morally compelling, and act on this moral judgment" (25).

Pogge makes an important intervention and is quite right in his claim that we must broaden our analytical lens to see beyond national borders in assessing the causes of poverty. However, in my discussion of his work, I will suggest that his emphasis on democracy as a remedy for global inequality undercuts his efforts. He asserts a rather anemic conception of democracy as popular consent and overlooks that no amount of popular consent on the part of those in poorer states is going to rectify the unequal nature of international negotiations. I will argue that this is in part due to his misdiagnosis that there exists a healthy, but too narrow debate between Chicago-school free traders and socialist-style reformers. In his characterization of this debate, Pogge obscures the reality that the neo-liberal school of thought has increasingly dominated global policy-making since the 1970s. As many have noted, socialist style alternatives have largely taken up the logic of free trade, to the point where there no longer exists a clear distinction, as in the case with so-called "third way" politics (Callanicos 2001). Because he ignores the dimensions of ideology and political processes in shaping the global order, Pogge's analysis of the causes of global inequality as due to norms of international relations is incomplete. Moreover, his call for instilling democracy worldwide merely reinforces neo-liberalism's emaciated definition of democracy.

In his attempts to explain the existence of poverty in so many countries, Pogge hones in on the generally accepted norm regarding the respect in global negotiations for the sovereignty of national regimes. He suggests that the modern Westphalian form of the national state as the legitimate political entity in global politics lends to the conditions of

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<sup>15</sup> The term weak is from Pogge (2002), 20.

global inequality. But the national state is not a problem simply because it creates an arbitrary delimitation on moral sentiment, as Nussbaum has suggested. Rather, a system that hinges on national states representing the interests of their populations on the global stage is troubled at a deeper level. Global negotiations become the site of inequality whereby wealthier states negotiate in the interests of their populace, often at the expense of weaker states. Moreover, the political representatives on the part of weaker states are more often than not disingenuous in their claims to represent the interests of their respective citizenry. This because the global order contains no requirement that national representatives truly represent the interests of the people of their nation.

Pogge argues that international norms of national sovereignty merely require the existence of national authority and ignore entirely the means by which this authority has been achieved. He writes, "any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion within a country is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of this country's territory and people—regardless of how this group came to power, of how it exercises power, and of the extent to which it may be supported or opposed by the population it rules" (112). This international principle sets the stage for the promulgation of deeply problematic political processes at the domestic level. It creates the conditions whereby national governments, regardless of their legitimacy vis-à-vis norms of democratic self-representation may first, dispose of natural resources however government officials so choose and, second, may incur debt on behalf of the state. Pogge designates these privileges as the international resource privilege and the international borrowing privilege, respectively, and argues that neither is conducive to national democracy. Quite the opposite, as these global norms have the effect of rewarding

corruption. The governments that come to power are thus not accountable to the population, and so often act against the interest of their country's citizenry.

Of the international resource privilege, he writes, "indifferent to how governmental power is acquired, [this] privilege provides powerful incentives toward coup attempts and civil wars in the resource-rich countries" (113). To illustrate the resource privilege sanctioned by international norms, Pogge gives the example of the array of military officers who have by and large ruled Nigeria for most of its modern history and have enriched themselves off of Nigeria's oil resources. This internationally condoned privilege provides unfettered access to the riches of a nation's resources and has led to governmental corruption and widespread poverty. Pogge writes that, "able to buy means of repression abroad and support from other officers at home, such rulers were not dependent on popular support and thus made few productive investments toward stimulating poverty eradication or even economic growth" (113). He goes on to insist that theories that explain coups and anti-democratic governance solely with local factors overlook the role of global factors. He argues that "this nationalist explanation crucially depends on a global background factor, the international resource privilege, without which a poor country's generous resource endowment would not handicap its progress toward democratic government, economic growth, and the eradication of poverty—certainly not to the same extent" (114).

The international order also condones the borrowing privilege, to similarly devastating effects. National rulers may enter into loan agreements with banks and with other states regardless of the legitimacy of their rule. That is, they may incur huge amounts of debt in the name of the nation-state, while they apportion the available credit

amongst cronies in order to ensure their continued rule. This vicious cycle is further perpetuated by the fact that not only does it encourage coup attempts with its prize of unfettered access to loans but further, it discourages democratic reform, as the ensuing government inherits the debt created under a corrupt regime (114-115).

Pogge's focus on corrupt government leads to a narrow view of the effects of the global institutional order on global inequality. For him, global rules putting resource and borrowing privileges into the hands of national leaders regardless of the nature of their rule lie at the heart of the problem (22). These, he contends, create corrupt governments. He means to supplant explanatory nationalism, a perspective that would argue that local and cultural factors create the conditions for corrupt governments. In suggesting that the problem lies in the fact that corrupt governments fail to advocate on behalf of their people and corporations, he is correct to turn the focus beyond national borders, but this analysis of the causes of global inequality and his solution do not go far enough.

Pogge grounds his solution to global inequality on expanding political consent, and in so doing, argues that his is not an ideological argument. The problem with the global order is that it is designed without the consent of the world's poor. Thus, to reverse global poverty, we must create the conditions for democracy throughout the world, rather than fostering corruption. He writes,

[t]his critique is Lockean in spirit: 'Men being...by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of his Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent.' This principle forbids the developed countries' substantial contribution to subjecting the global poor, without their consent, to their local rulers and the rules of the world economy and to reducing the global poor, without their consent, below a proportional share of natural resources or its equivalent. This principle also challenges the benefits we derive from their subjection and deprivation, in particular through the cheap appropriation of global natural resources. (24)

So, following his theory, a perfectly democratic government in a poor nation will apparently fare much better at the negotiating table with wealthier states. This seems a far-fetched hope. While I am supportive of the effort to expand the political mechanisms by which to represent the political interests of the 6 billion now peopling the world, I fail to see how this reform alone can have the effect of eradicating the sources of economic insecurity and poverty.

In order to flesh out the inadequacy of Pogge's conception of democracy, let me return to his claim that the realpolitik norms of national interest in international negotiations drive the unequal institutional arrangements at the heart of global inequality. He writes, "our representatives in international negotiations do not consider the interests of the global poor as part of their mandate. They are exclusively devoted to shaping each such agreement in the best interest of the people and corporations of their own country" (20). But this does not go far enough since it does not explain the source of unequal power in negotiations in the first place. In other words, following Pogge's logic, if states were equally positioned at the negotiating table, with say, a one-nation one-vote system of representation, and state representatives from every nation in the world were democratically elected and so acting on the best interest of the people and corporations in their country, negotiations would likely favor the interests of poorer states, who outnumber wealthier states. Indeed, the various efforts of unity amongst poorer states in international negotiations have had some impact, but not much. Consider that the nascent G20 coalition of states from the global South were able to stall WTO negotiations in Cancun in the fall of 2003. However, the point is, that even there, the unity of 20 states

does not have the same negotiating force as the perennially powerful G-8.<sup>16</sup> Pogge cannot account for the causes of this imbalance in his argument regarding the "zeal with which our politicians and negotiators pursue the task" (20) of securing deals in our national interest. He concludes that

our new global economic order is so harsh on the global poor then, because, it is shaped in negotiations where our representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance, or corruptibility they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to shape each agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but rarely to the weak. (20)

In this claim, Pogge leaves unanswered the question of what are the ideological and structural conditions that create a global order of affluent states on the one side, and "weak" ones on the other? As a result of this oversight, his moral and political interventions remain at the surface of global inequality, ignoring both the historical forces undergirding global inequality and the contemporary ideological norms maintaining it.

I share Pogge's concern regarding democracy's precarious status in contemporary politics. However, I sharply disagree with the source of democracy's troubles and disagree even further that democracy as he conceives it is, in and of itself, necessary and sufficient for rectifying global inequality. That democratic governments will better represent their populations' interests at the negotiation tables of international policy-making may well be correct. However, this ignores that their voices at the table will still be faint. This relative weakness in voice is the direct descendant of the colonial organization of capitalism. Moreover, the maintenance of this weakness is the effect of the dominance of neo-liberal ideology in global policy-making, a factor Pogge ignores

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<sup>16</sup> For an excellent overview of how global inequalities are inscribed in international negotiations using the example of the course of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations which established the World Trade Organization, see Khor (2000), especially 13-23.

almost entirely. In contrasting his global approach with the work of economists who site national factors as responsible for poverty and in turn for its reduction, Pogge (2001) points to the "two main schools of thought" amongst economists. He writes:

The libertarians on the right ...argue that poverty persists because most poor countries do not follow the examples of Japan and the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea). These success stories show, so say the libertarians, that the best way to expel human misery is economic growth, and the best way to achieve economic growth is to foster free enterprise with a minimum in taxes, regulations, and red tape. (2001, 329)

Pogge then goes on to summarize the alternative view in this debate, implying that this view has equal weight at the ideological bargaining table. He writes,

[t]he other, left-leaning school of thought, represented by Amartya Sen, also has its favourite poster-child: Kerala, a state in India. Kerala is a poor state, but its socialist government gives priority to fulfilling basic needs. And so the people of Kerala do much better in terms of health, education, and longevity than the people of other, more affluent Indian states. (2001, 329)

Pogge sums up this debate as basically missing the mark because both sides view the cause and the solution of poverty as lying within the local conditions of poor countries.

While he acknowledges that local factors are indeed important, as we have seen, he argues forcefully that this debate overlooks that factors beyond the borders of poor countries help shape the local factors. But in his own zeal to highlight the role of the global order in creating an environment conducive to corrupt governments, he overlooks both neo-liberalism's stamp on this very order as well as colonial capitalism's continuing effects. Indeed, he ignores the link between historical imperialism and the coercive effects of the twentieth century's international financial institutions as these enact the principles of neo-liberalism in poor states.

These glaring oversights are especially apparent in his reform program. Pogge argues that reforms of the global order are absolutely necessary and would require a

transformation of both the resource and borrowing privileges. The modified privileges would entail a condition whereby the regime entering into agreements regarding national resources or borrowing would have to be a democratically elected government. But, even when modified, these privileges do nothing to rectify the damage sewn by either the hegemony of neo-liberal ideology in economic policy-making or the history of colonial capitalism. His oversight of colonial capitalism is especially apparent when he matches his call for creating the conditions for democratic flourishing with a mechanism by which to organize distributive justice at the global level. The Global Resources Dividend is meant to recalibrate benefits from natural resources in order to spread these benefits more broadly throughout the world, especially amongst the world's poor. What Pogge overlooks in this aspect of his reform program, however, is the role of the history of colonial capitalism in shaping the prevailing global order and political processes. Uma Narayan (2004) has argued that Pogge's attention to distributive justice ignores that global inequality is structured by the neo-colonial capitalist division of global labor which creates a limited set of wage-labor options for those living in poor, formerly colonized countries. She notes that Pogge's Global Resources Dividend fails to pay any "attention to the underlying structures of unequal dependence between developed and developing economies, that have their roots in colonial history, or to the structural disparities that cause disproportionate poverty in the developing world in the first place" (Narayan 2004, 20). The closest he comes is in his assertion that "present radical inequality is the cumulative result of decades and centuries in which the more affluent societies and groups have used their advantages in capital and knowledge to expand these advantages even further" (Pogge 2002, 205). But, just as he has charged that arguments

that seek to explain poverty through the lens of the nation ignore international causes, so too can he be charged with ignoring the context of neo-liberal and neo-colonial capitalism that explains the continuity of this centuries-long global inequality. Indeed he is guilty of the very charge he accuses explanatory nationalists with: of presenting one's interpretation as "exogenous fact: as a fact that explains, but does not itself stand in need of explanation" (2001, 330).

Furthermore, in ignoring that neo-liberalism is the dominant ideology shaping global economic policy, his reliance on democracy as a salve for global inequality is deeply problematic. This because he overlooks that first, neo-liberal hegemony has had profound effects on how democracy is conceptualized, and second, the anemic practices of neo-liberal democracy are creating a reaction of popular disaffection for democracy. Neo-liberalism portends to integrate democratic politics with capitalist market organization. But, in so doing, as increasing numbers of scholars are noting, and as I have argued, the very meaning of democracy is reconfigured. For example, Isabella Bakker (2003) has written, "the convergence of capitalist values and liberal conceptions of democracy is a global phenomenon, remaking notions of citizenship in the image of the market. The vehicle for this totalizing, conservative movement to a market-oriented model of citizenship is neo-liberalism" (66).<sup>17</sup> In this era, then, efforts to promulgate the norms of democracy through mechanisms of free and open elections, Pogge's definition (2001, 338), do little to interrogate the perpetuation of neo-liberalism and its redefinition of what constitutes democratic citizenship in the first place. Drawing on the work of Polanyi, and recent scholars who have taken up his analysis as relevant to contemporary

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<sup>17</sup> See also Stephen Gill (2003) on neo-liberal forms of governance in what he calls "new constitutionalism."

politics, I have suggested that democracy as a political form is imperiled by the dominance of neo-liberal economic policy-making. Pogge ignores this political process in his call to bolster the electoral processes of democracy—a conception of democracy that can harmonize all too easily with neo-liberal economic policies.

With this weak conception of democracy, Pogge's call for reform will do little to stave off popular disaffection with democracy, much less reverse the trends of global poverty. Consider the findings of the United Nations Development Project's recent report "Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' Democracy" (released April 2004). One of the most intriguing, and troubling, findings in the report is that 54.7 percent of the twenty thousand respondents from eighteen countries across Latin America would support an authoritarian regime if that regime could put an end to their economic insecurity. Clearly, the neo-liberal democracy that has been installed in so many middle- and low-income countries in Latin America and around the world has not provided the kind of widespread prosperity promised by those espousing the virtues of free trade, and this failure is having profound ramifications for democratic politics. Sounding somewhat similar to Pogge, the authors of the report suggest that strengthening democracy is the solution to this growing wariness that democracy can deliver the goods, so to speak. However, though not reported in mainstream U.S. press outlets such as *The New York Times*, the authors' definition of a stronger form of democracy is quite different from a neo-liberal definition as well as that of Pogge. Summing up the findings, the UNDP press release states that,

[t]he Report examines the state of democracy "beyond the ballot box." The authors argue that democracy must deepen, with a significant expansion of "social citizenship," including greater efforts to combat poverty and inequality. Latin America's extreme disparities of income pose a direct threat to the consolidation

of participatory democracy, they warn. Also critical, the authors say, is the need for reforms to ensure all citizens equal and effective protection under the law—*and adequate funding for social services.* (UNDP 2004, emphasis added)

It is of note that *The New York Times* editors completely ignore the report's emphasis on social services, choosing instead to focus on the report's call for reforms to strengthen the rule of law and independent judiciaries (2004). The editorial hails this, and this only, as the report's important intervention into the "twin obsessions of United States policy makers and multilateral financial organizations," these being open markets and free elections. In contrast, using T.H. Marshall's language on citizenship, the UNDP report advocates the expansion of "a system of electing authorities but also a form of organization that guarantees the rights of all: civil rights (guarantees against oppression); political rights (to be part of public or collective decision -making); and social rights (access to well-being)" (UNDP 2004). To return to Pogge, he, sounding more like an officer of the World Bank than even a *New York Times* editor, limits his notion of democracy to the "good governance" of the ballot box and the ballot box only.

In their calls for reform, the authors of the report make clear that economic policy-making is indeed imbricated in political processes, and visa-versa. The report details several areas for action and reform, and it is significant that one of these relates to reviving democratic accountability to curb the imposition of ideologically determined economic policy-making. That is, the report cites "the need to promote greater diversity and flexibility of economic policy options whilst maintaining macroeconomic stability. From this perspective, the discussion on the economy and diversity of forms of market organization must be part of any broad public debate" (UNDP 2004). The authors of the report seem to have learned well from Polanyi. The popular disaffection with democracy

and increasing turn towards authoritarianism is a symptom of the imposition and lack of transparency of neo-liberal economic policy-making across Latin America. To reverse this disaffection will require nothing less than re-embedding market organization through democratically defined social policy. This, however, is an insight that Pogge overlooks. Because of this glaring oversight, he sets forth a conception of democracy that reinforces the aims of neo-liberalism, ironically at the very expense of democracy. In sum, Pogge's efforts to think outside the national box in order to redress global inequalities are severely limited by his combined oversights of neo-liberal hegemony and the continued effects of colonial capitalism.

### Conclusion

In assessing liberal egalitarian philosophy as a source for framing counter-hegemonic responses to neo-liberal globalization, I mean to carve a space between the resignation on the part of Foucauldian scholars on one hand and, on the other, the hope that many scholars place in global civil society and its transnational NGOs. However, my overview of Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge suggests that if we are to rely on liberal egalitarianism to put forth a normative framework to reinvigorate democratic politics in the face of neo-liberal global hegemony, democracy's future may well continue to be imperiled. A stronger vision of democratic politics and political membership is needed to discern and frame alternative, counter-hegemonic responses to neo-liberalism's evisceration of democracy and its reinforcement of global inequalities. The burgeoning of illiberal religious fundamentalisms, for example, merely points to the urgency of the task. Having seen the shortcomings evident in Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge's efforts, it is

apparent that a more effective normative framework must accurately assess the current conditions of governance and must include a clear role for institutions to foster democracy, freedom and equality. However, the institutions needed to nourish democratic practices cannot be confined to the national. Indeed, just as neo-liberal globalization has escaped the bounds of national sovereignty, so must its critical alternative. Alternative political spaces by which to embed freedom and equality must be configured at multiple levels simultaneously—at the local, national, regional, and global levels. Meanwhile, a more vigorous notion of democracy and political membership is in order. Democracy is itself a contested term. As is clear in the case of Pogge's meager equation of democracy with free and fair elections, even if paired with a strong system of constitutional rule of law as the editors of the *New York Times* would have it, remains woefully inadequate to create the conditions for freedom and equality. In my concluding chapter I will put forth an alternative normative framework that includes a deeper definition of democracy and political membership to counter the political effects of neo-liberal globalization.

## Chapter 7:

## Conclusion: Social Reproduction, World Making and a Democratic Future

The conditions of neo-liberal globalization bring together two seemingly distinct processes: labor migration and domestic social policy. I have argued that neo-liberal policies have set in motion the retreat of domestic social policies, and as a result have created the conditions for mass migration from the global South to the global North. While it would seem that this era of globalization would render the category of national citizenship increasingly irrelevant, I argue to the contrary. Indeed, despite challenges, national citizenship remains very much a meaningful category in states around the world—wealthy, poor and those in between. What is notable are the ways in which citizenship has come to be reformulated along the lines of neo-liberal principles of privatization, market rationality, and individual responsibility. Moreover, the reconfiguration of citizenship is generated at the intersection of processes of transnational labor migration and the privatization of domestic social policies. To illustrate this claim, I have considered the case of the United States, citing the politics and rhetoric surrounding the 1996 federal reforms of immigration and social policy. I further supported my claim with an extensive illustration of the linkages between the restructuring of health care policy for senior citizens in the United States with the increased migration of women from the global South to provide low-wage direct care services for the aging population in the United States. The global division of reproductive labor highlights that the reconfiguration of citizenship in one country, the United States, for example, is tied to the reconfiguration of citizenship in another, such as, in the case of my analysis, the

Philippines. What is most striking in this era of neo-liberal globalization is not only the existence of this transnational link, but also the asymmetric dimensions of this link. As I have suggested, the neo-liberal scripting of citizenship along the lines of individual responsibility and market rationality in the United States is matched by an even deeper erosion of citizenship in the context of poorer states in the global South, such as the Philippines. In the United States, current and future beneficiaries of public provisions for retirement are weaned off these programs, encouraged to take responsibility for their own well-being into old age. In the Philippines, the erosion of citizenship takes on a different valence whereby the state actively encourages overseas employment as an economic development strategy, casting overseas workers as heroes of the nation. These reconfigurations of citizenship undercut the possibilities of popular participation as a mechanism by which to hold decision-makers accountable and, moreover, erode a broader individual identification with a democratic political community. As a result, democracy is threatened, and any moral political theory adequate to intervene in this condition must address this as well as the asymmetrical dimensions apparent in the domestic reconfigurations of citizenship.

In evaluating the work of Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge, I have argued that their respective efforts fail to offer effective interventions into the fate of democratic citizenship in an era defined by expanding inequalities and shrinking public spaces. I turn here to set forth my own alternative vision, a feminist theory of democracy and political membership that can meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and emerge on the heels of an era wherein citizenship has been successfully reconstituted to prop up the principles and policies of neo-liberalism.

### Embedded Liberalism for a Neo-Medieval Global Order

In his classic introduction of the concept of "embedded liberalism" to the study of International Political Economy, John Gerard Ruggie (1982) underscored Polanyi's 1944 observation that, following the First World War, national states around the world increasingly stepped in to regulate what had for decades been a self-regulated global market. In other words, in its reaction to the Gilded Age, society moved to protect itself from the vicissitudes of the self-regulated market, and to do so "seized upon the state" as Ruggie puts it (1982, 387). Our current era is once again dominated by a resurgence of economic policies championing the self-regulated market, similar to those of the Gilded Age; however, this time, the state is in little shape to step up to the plate. While perhaps not free to the same degree as the nineteenth-century global market, since the late 1970s, the contemporary global economy has consistently trended towards deregulation at the domestic and international levels. And while there is evidence of society seeking to protect itself once again, due to a variety of factors, the state, as such, is less and less in a position to be enlisted as a check on the self-regulated market. Indeed, because of a range of factors, including new technologies and modes of production, new structures of a global division of labor, large scale labor migration, the retrenchment of public spending on social policy, and international trade liberalization, the state is ill equipped to be the site for re-embedding the market. It is precisely because of these circumstances that Ruggie has recently suggested that re-embedding global markets "promises to be a Herculean task" (2002, 12). Many, including Ruggie, have observed that "global civil society" seems to be the only site for society to shore itself up against the effects of neo-

liberal economic policies. However, as I have suggested, though numerous scholars hail the emergence of global civil society as a foundation for new forms of democracy, there is good reason to proceed with caution. After all, in this era of "governance gaps" (Ruggie 2002, 12), there are no guarantees that democracy and freedom as principles will prevail in civil society. To further support this cautionary note, I turn to the work of David Held.

In *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995) Held provides a detailed overview of the sites of political power as they are currently being redefined in the global era. Borrowing from Hedley Bull (1977), David Held has aptly described the current era of diminished state governance as a period of "new medievalism" (1995, chap. 6). Held suggests that increasing interconnectedness in the spheres of the global economy, politics, law, the military and culture has had the effect of splintering (though not completely eradicating) state sovereignty by strengthening processes, identities and loyalties at the local, regional and global levels. Thus, in this context, it appears that any social reactions seeking to re-embed the market will likely invoke institutions at these multiple levels. The nature of the norms and values guiding both these institutions and the processes of social protection remains an open question, one which Held seeks to answer with a theory of democracy relevant to contemporary conditions.

To define this era, Held quotes Bull at length, concurring with him that we may well have entered an era that echoes the political organization of medieval Europe:

In Western Christendom in the Middle Ages...no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above... If modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world

authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged. (Bull quoted in Held 1995, 137)

The similarities between the splintered nature of sovereignty of the Middle Ages and of the current era are indeed striking. As Bull suggests, in the past, authority was divided amongst a number of sites, including cities and towns, local lords, dukes, monarchs and the institutions of the Catholic Church, from local parishes to the Vatican. After a brief interval dominated by the modern nation-state (very brief, as Timothy Mitchell (1998) has it<sup>1</sup>), now, authority is both stretching past state borders and shrinking within them. Indeed, sites of power continue to include state governments, but to these are added local sites including sub-national ethnic identities, municipalities, and workplaces; regional alliances, such as NATO and the European Union; and global forms of governance, authority and identity, such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the World Trade Organization, non-governmental organizations, transnational social identities, and multi-national corporations.

In this context the question for political theorists remains what will be the legitimating framework for governance in this complex era? Will it be one that reinvigorates principles of democracy and freedom, or not? Held is deeply concerned with these questions, noting that this structure of fragmented sovereignty has the potential to be a breeding ground for undemocratic and illiberal principles. After all, the elaboration of principles of freedom and democracy were invoked in the demise of the contemporary order's progenitor, Medieval Europe. So it seems reasonable to consider if

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchell notes that the world-historical moment whereby the world was organized according to national states only just began in the middle of the twentieth century, following the decolonization of vast parts of the globe.

the re-emergence of a quasi-medieval organization of global politics might well in return signal the withering away of the principles of freedom and democracy. Indeed, as sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) has suggested, even the modern nation-state, often (though by no means always) the vehicle for democracy and freedom in the past, may increasingly be subject to anti-liberal forces, which in our era, take the form of religious nationalism. Though Held does not include this in his concerns, forms of religious nationalism, along side the resurgence of transnational non-secular identities (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997), certainly underscore the precarious nature not only of national identity, but also of the *secular* nature of the quasi-medieval structure of global politics.<sup>2</sup>

Held is well aware that toleration, accountability and democratic legitimacy, for example, do not translate easily in a system of overlapping structures of authority (138-140). He asks,

can the principle of democratic legitimacy be defended when the international order is structured by agencies, organizations, associations and companies over which citizens have minimum, if any, control, and in regard to which they have little basis to signal (dis)agreement; and when both routine and extraordinary decisions taken by representatives of nations and nation-states profoundly affect not only their citizens but also the citizens of other nation-states? (135-136)

With the answer to the question far from certain, the task Held sets out for himself is one with the aim of anticipating and overcoming the dangerous threats to democracy inherent in this neo-medieval global order (140). Because he recognizes these dangers, his own efforts to develop a political theory for global democracy are far more salient than those

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<sup>2</sup> I do not mean to suggest that secularism can always be equated with democratic principles and non-secularism with non-democratic ones. For example, non-secularism can certainly be enlisted in support of democratic projects, such as is the case in liberation theology movements. However, a more thorough consideration of secularism and non-secularism lies beyond the scope of this project. That said, the

of Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge. Though they are each to be commended for tackling issues of global import, their various blind spots regarding the conditions of governance in an era of neo-liberal globalization profoundly limit the effectiveness of their interventions.

In his own elaboration of a political theory for global democratic governance, Held keeps in view the challenge of entrenching a set of common political guidelines in the context of fragmented sites of authority. Terming his theory a "cosmopolitan model of democracy" he prioritizes "a system of democratic governance which arises from and is adapted to the diverse conditions and interconnections of different peoples and nations" (140). In so doing, Held advances a theory of democracy based on local, national, regional and global institutions, which includes enlisting market players to foster democratic principles. As such, it is a more robust intervention than those offered by Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge. And, moreover, it is a more effective political theory in that it proffers a set of norms that represent an alternative to non-democratic and illiberal forms of counter-movement, such as religious extremism.

The principles of autonomy, accountability and participation lie at the heart of Held's cosmopolitan model of democracy. To secure these principles and entrench them at each level of authority, Held sets forth a schema of seven sets of rights. He explains that these rights are foundational to democracy: "if one chooses democracy, one must choose to operationalize a structural system of empowering rights and obligations, for such a system constitutes the interrelated spaces in which the principle of autonomy can be pursued—and enacted" (Held 1995, 190). Held offers a more robust schema of rights

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instances of non-secularism that I cite here, i.e. forms of transnational religious extremism, do indeed controvert the democratic principles as Held defines them.

than even that of T.H. Marshall. He explains that the rights that are traditionally equated with democracy, civil and political rights, have proven woefully insufficient to secure "equal autonomy for all participants in public life" (190) and therefore cannot ensure the kind of participation necessary for a healthy democracy. While adding social rights as necessary to underwrite democracy, Held does not stop there. After all, he would argue, civil, political and social rights on their own fail to establish grounds for other rights essential to democracy, such as the right to physical security, or the right to control over one's body (191). Thus, he proposes a broad reach of rights that, if entrenched in the multiple sites of political power, would create the conditions for democratic governance in a neo-medieval era. Rights can be clustered under seven categories: health, social, cultural, civic, economic, pacific and political. He explains that enjoying each of these rights, albeit to varying degree, is essential for participation in public life, which in turn is a prerequisite for democracy. He writes, "unless people enjoy liberty in these seven spheres, they cannot participate fully in the 'government' of state and civil affairs.... [T]he seven categories of rights do not articulate an endless list of goods; rather, they articulate necessary conditions for free and equal participation" (199).

The next stage of Held's definition of cosmopolitan democracy addresses the fragmented nature of the neo-medieval political organization of the globe. He explains that every site of power can, and should, adopt the principles of democratic law as outlined. In this, he accepts the dismantling of the modern equation of sovereignty with the national state. He writes, "sovereignty can be stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and territories and thought of as, in principle, malleable time-space clusters. *Sovereignty is an attribute of the basic democratic law, but it could be entrenched and*

*drawn upon in diverse self-regulating associations from states to cities to corporations"* (Held, 234, emphasis in original). This reconfiguration of sovereignty in turn impacts the structure of citizenship and citizenship rights.

The seven clusters of rights are not attached to citizenship in the traditional sense of *national* citizenship, as this would require a vibrant relationship between population, geographic territory, and the sole sovereignty of national representational government—an anachronism in light of current conditions.<sup>3</sup> He updates the definition of citizenship whereby "the rights at the centre of the democratic process are best distinguished from any straightforward claim to either citizenship or universality. They can be defended independently of the notion of national citizenship; that is, they can be justified directly in relationship to democracy" (Held 1995, 224). Unhinging sovereignty from the state and the state from citizenship, Held sets out a new ethical basis for democratic political membership. He explains that "empowering rights or entitlement capacities are intrinsic to the democratic process. There may be no religious, metaphysical or foundational grounds for becoming a democrat, but if one chooses to be a democrat, one must choose to enact these rights" (Held 223). So these rights are not entailed by national citizenship, but rather by choosing democracy.

Significantly, he heeds concerns raised years ago by Hannah Arendt that rights are meaningless unless reinforced by institutions. That is, the choice of democracy on the part of institutions requires the obligation of incorporating democratic law based on the seven clusters of rights. Moreover, while he is an ardent advocate of securing the conditions of popular participation and democratic self-governance, he also heeds the liberal concern for safeguarding individual freedom. His is not a call for reducing the

democratic process to the preferences of the electoral majority. Instead, accountability and a system of checks and balances are key. He explains that

the achievement of autonomy...must be conceived as based on the *multiple lodging* of the rights and obligations of democratic law in the organizational charters of the agencies and associations which make up the spheres of politics, economics and civil society. The liberal principle that a system of countervailing power is an essential component of any open and accountable order must be affirmed while being recast and rearticulated. (277)

Thus, the prevention of a tyranny of the majority is as essential to democratic law as are rights to self-determination, and therefore must be entrenched within the practices of institutions in all spheres.

In what amounts to a bold challenge to neo-liberal principles, Held insists that the institutions that neo-liberal policies generally situate outside the bounds of politics be held to account according to democratic principles. Held rightly recognizes that this prescription may seem a particularly bitter pill for economic institutions and devotes much effort to explaining the processes by which economic growth and democratic practices may be compatible. In his aim of entrenching democracy in economic life (251-258), he explains that the cosmopolitan model of democracy "requires the inscription of the principles, rules and procedures of the seven clusters [of rights] into the organizational rules and procedures of companies, and of all other forms of economic associations" (252). He goes on to argue that "companies, while pursuing strategic objectives and profit goals, must operate within a framework which does not violate the requirement to treat their employees and customers as free and equal persons, as specified by democratic law" (252). This framework includes establishing a standard minimum wage as a base line income and creating opportunities for employees to participate in, for

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<sup>3</sup> And, moreover, an undesirable return to the coupling of rights with nationality.

example, the creation of work regulations and the determination of resource allocation (253). The entrenchment of democratic practices in corporations would also include greater transparency and an acceptance of electoral decisions. In other words, corporations would agree to not influence outcomes of national elections. A final step would be the creation of a new international mechanism—a "new Bretton Woods"—that has as its aim preventing states from reneging on social policies in an effort to drive down labor costs and become more competitive on the global market.

Though Held does not address this, his last intervention into economic processes, a new Bretton Woods, could also tackle global inequalities. Consider the bind that debtor states find themselves in now. In 2002, Lula da Silva, the Worker's Party candidate, won Brazil's presidential election on promises to use government to temper the effects of a ravaged economy. However, as a recent article explains, da Silva, or Lula as he is popularly known, cannot simply redirect government spending towards redistributive social policies (Bearak 2004). Due to the organization of the global economy where international creditors are king, domestic reforms funding social policy are severely constrained by the likely effect of defaulting on international loans and the threats of capital flight that would ensue. Caught in this bind, Lula has been far more proactive in making calls for economic reform at the global level. Explaining his recent calls for a global tax to redistribute wealth worldwide he weighs approaches, "maybe we can tax the arms trade, for example.... Or maybe we could tax the tax havens. Or we could tax world trade. Something has to be done so we get beyond just making speeches" (35). The bind that the Brazilian reformist government finds itself in along with Lula's attention towards reform at the global level underscores that if global inequalities are to be redressed,

global economic reforms such as those represented by the idea of a new Bretton Woods must parallel, or even precede national economic reforms.

From this brief overview of his work, one can readily extrapolate that Held's normative efforts to entrench democracy in a variety of spheres and at a variety of levels of governance represent a useful framework for reinforcing democratic principles. This is all the more the case in that this approach to democratic theory can serve as a guide for the historical tendency of society to protect itself from the vicissitudes of the self-regulated market. This is especially so given the attention that he places on democratizing the economic sphere. Indeed, in contrast to the recent interventions on the parts of Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Thomas Pogge, Held's normative intervention is salient insofar as it is based on his accurate analysis of the contemporary organization and distribution of power and authority. However, it is significant that it is not a diagnosis of actual political currents moving through the world. And so, for all of Held's accuracy with regard to pinpointing the various dimensions of the global organization of authority, he underestimates the play of our era's version of two principles organizing society: what Polanyi referred to as "the principle of economic liberalism" and "the principle of social protection" ([1944] 2001, 138). For this kind of political analysis, I return to Ruggie's recent work on embedded liberalism in the global order whereby he puts forth his own estimation of the shape taken by the dynamics of social protection.

From the empirical perspective of the "is" as opposed to Held's "ought," Ruggie (2002) offers up evidence that suggests that some of Held's concerns, particularly those regarding the need to entrench democracy in economic associations, are indeed being taken up. In updating his earlier work on Polanyi and the postwar economy, Ruggie

points to developments amongst non-state actors as examples of contemporary modes of social reaction balancing the effects of neo-liberal economic policies. Recalling the work of many political theorists and social scientists, he points to civil society organizations as providing a site for the consolidation of counter-movements. But, usefully, he goes on to highlight "certification institutions" in particular, noting that these are rapidly emerging as mechanisms by which to check corporate power. Citing examples that include Fair-Trade Certified Coffee, the Forest Stewardship Council, and socially responsible mutual funds, Ruggie argues that these social checks on corporate practices "have become a major force to induce greater social responsibility in the global corporate sector, by creating transparency in the overseas behavior of companies and establishing links to consumers back home" (15). Corporations, for their part, are imposing checks on their own practices in response to popular scrutiny. One result of this latter development is that corporations are signing onto the Global Compact set forth by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and overseen by the United Nations. The Global Compact is designed as a set of guidelines to enable corporations to police their own practices by adopting principles culled from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization's Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development (21). As such, the Global Compact represents a second non-state mechanism by which concerns for protecting society from the dislocations of the market are guiding efforts to re-embed the global market in social communities.

Though these developments seem to put into practice Held's normative call to entrench democratic practices in economic institutions, their limited impact highlights oversights in Held's cosmopolitan model of democracy. Indeed, Ruggie is decidedly less

sanguine than Held with regard to implications of these kinds of developments for democracy and democratic citizenship. Ruggie points out that viewing non-state certification institutions and the Global Compact as "expressions of cosmopolitan democracy" is "at the least premature" (2002, 28). He goes on to suggest that while these burgeoning mechanisms of a global public domain suggest "greater pluralism," "we are a long way from turning the world's consumers, the employees of transnational corporations or even dedicated activists into global citizens" (2002, 28). Perhaps corporate social responsiveness is an improvement over religious fundamentalism as an expression of the need for social protection. However, Ruggie's cautionary aside underscores what remains glaringly under-theorized in Held's account of cosmopolitan democracy: the erosion of the public sphere resulting from neo-liberal globalization, and the attendant subjection of citizenship to principles of privatization. In other words, Held's cosmopolitan model of democracy does little to redress the massive tilt towards the private sphere that defines neo-liberal globalization. One could counter that his insertion of accountability into private associations, such as corporations, subjects these to the kind of scrutiny and popular engagement that makes up the "public" sphere. But public scrutiny is insufficient in an era whereby citizenship has been reconfigured in such a way as to shore up neo-liberalism. Held is certainly a welcome voice to the extent that he recognizes the need for institutions at the local, state, regional and global level to ground democratic rights. Moreover, his robust definition of democracy is itself a powerful alternative to the anemic conceptions of democratic governance that prevail in neo-liberal policies as well as in the work of many moral political theorists. However,

missing from his account is a political analysis that can help assess instances whereby aspects of his normative theory are being, or could be, taken up.

With regard to this last point, Ruggie's estimation of what he sees as tentative gestures towards non-state sites for embedding the global market in society suggest that Held's normative theory can only be enhanced by a more thoroughgoing discussion of the "social" in the first place. That is, to return to the two principles that Polanyi identified as defining society, it is clear that the first, economic liberalism, is seeping into many aspects of most societies, whether in the global North or South. And we can anticipate the inevitable tension from the tug of the second principle, social protection. What remains less clear is the form that this latter principle will take. As Ruggie argues, "devising effective institutional forms to 'embed' global markets in shared social purposes and practices promises to be a Herculean task" (2002: 12). While Ruggie (and Held) focus their attention on what forms embedding institutions are taking—or in Held's account, may take—I turn next to consider more fully the other side of this Herculean task: devising and/or identifying what exactly constitutes "shared social purposes" in the twenty-first century.

#### Taking the "Social" Global for the Twenty-First Century

Similar to Ruggie, feminist political economist Janine Brodie (2003) is interested in teasing out the political dynamics of neo-liberal globalization. In her own update of Polanyi's argument, Brodie underscores that the fragmented nature of the global organization of political authority is subject to the hegemonic forces of neo-liberalism. Thus, in her estimation, not only will a reinvigorated democratic vision have to make do

without the state, but furthermore, it will have to contend with the deleterious effects of neo-liberalism's decades-old hegemony on governance. Taking up Polanyi's language, she notes that, in light of these conditions, the very nature of the "social" must be re-conceptualized.

She would agree with Ruggie that a counter-movement reflecting the principle of social protection is inevitable. She notes that, similar to the conditions of the early twentieth-century that were the object of Polanyi's study, ours is an era whereby "political communities have been forced to temper the vagaries of market fundamentalism" (48). Indeed, in her own diagnosis of counter-movement, she would go further than Ruggie, citing what she sees as the rapidly growing disavowal of the "Washington Consensus." She writes,

the smug pronouncement of the 1980s that 'there is no alternative' to neo-liberal globalism has given way in the early twenty-first century to a belated recognition of the many failures of market-based governance and of the necessity of building a new consensus around a different governing strategy capable of underwriting some measure of human security on the global scale. (2003: 48)

This forecast seems a bit of a stretch, as the members she sees as making up this new consensus are participants of the World Social Forums, anti-globalization protesters, United Nations programs, socialist scholar Samir Amin and Joseph Stiglitz. Of these only Stiglitz, as a former Chief Economist to the World Bank, stands out as an example of potential reversal of opinion reaching into the ranks of international financial institutions. But Stiglitz has always been critical of neo-liberal policies, and for this very reason, was let go from the World Bank. That said, it is true that in the mid to late 1990s, the World Bank did adjust its rhetoric surrounding development strategies as reflected in the Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF).

But, though on paper these "holistic" approaches centered on partnerships with local actors seem to replace economic efficiency and growth as the sole goal of development, this has not been the case in practice (Klees 2001). So, though her optimism regarding responsiveness from within global development institutions is premature, Brodie is absolutely correct to suggest that in the face of inevitable popular reaction to neo-liberal hegemony, a reconfiguration of the concept of the "social" is needed to guide counter-movements (52).

Bringing together Polanyi's work and feminist insights, Brodie points out that past conceptualizations of the social are woefully inadequate to address today's conditions. This is in part due to limitations built into traditional conceptions of the social from the outset. First, Brodie picks up on the feminist elaboration of Polanyi's definition of the social. Polanyi speaks of the ontological condition of humanity whereby "normally, the economic order is merely a function of the social, in which it is contained. Under neither tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there... a separate economic system in society" ([1944] 2001, 74). For example, under the feudal guild system, production was undertaken according to customary laws and was in general "embedded in the general organization of society" (73)—this is in contrast with the stripped down liberal economic logic of producing solely for the purpose of selling. Feminists have built upon Polanyi's notion of the social with the concept of social reproduction defined broadly as,

refer[ring] to both biological reproduction of the species (and indeed its ecological framework) and ongoing reproduction of the commodity labor power. In addition social reproduction involves institutions, processes and social relations associated with the *creation and maintenance* of communities—and upon which, ultimately, all production and exchange rests.... In today's world social reproduction involves institutions that provide for socialization of risk, health care, education and other services. (Bakker and Gill 2003c)

With this kind of clarification, feminists have been able to specify the labor undertaken to secure the foundation of capitalist-era society through social reproduction and underscore the gendered and racialized division of labor that has been the mark of the modern organization of social reproductive labor. And reading Polanyi's insights back into feminist conceptions of social reproductive labor underscores the trouble with the neo-liberal effect of subjecting "care" to the logic of the market. Processes located in the social realm are inherently "non-productive enterprises" (Surowiecki 2003). For Polanyi these included labor, land and money, each of which had been transformed into "commodity fictions" in the nineteenth-century. Today, feminist analysis reveals that services providing for human well-being—including education, healthcare, child-rearing, emotional support, and so on—similarly cannot be translated into "commodities" for sale on the market or as responsive to the demand for improved productivity, though these concerns are precisely what have propelled the emergence of the global division of reproductive labor. That is, as James Surowiecki puts the matter using the example of education, "the average college professor can't grade papers or give lectures any faster today than he did in the early nineties" (2003, 27); the same holds for changing diapers, cleaning bedpans, and holding the hand of someone passing away. And yet, these are precisely the kinds of social activities that are being transformed into commodity fictions—a transformation particularly apparent in the global division of reproductive labor.

Drawing on the specification that Polanyi's notion of the social has, in a capitalist age, been translated in part into the realm of social reproduction, Brodie moves to critique the twentieth-century social policies put into place to manage this realm. That is, in an era

whereby social reproduction is being increasingly funneled into the market, Brodie reminds us that it is essential that we not be swayed by a nostalgia for the welfare state of the not so distant past. For example, while the historical emergence of the welfare state did indeed reflect a state response to the social need for protection from the vagaries of capitalist markets, it was also the cornerstone of a dubious compromise at the heart of the modern liberal state. On the one hand, the liberal state could continue to foster conditions favorable to capitalist markets and accumulation while on the other it offered the national population nominal forms of protection to secure legitimacy and prevent dissent. In this respect, social welfare policies served to dull resistance to the capitalist organization of the economy in part by "underwrit[ing] social solidarity amidst social inequalities" (55).

A second reason for critically reassessing the modern welfare state's dispensation of social rights is that, just as feminists have long held, a mere revival of past notions of the social is not only unrealistic, it is undesirable. It is precisely because feminists were never terribly enthusiastic about social policies as configured at the height of the "modern welfare state," that they are well-positioned to conceive of a reconfigured form of social citizenship relevant to the conditions of the twenty-first century. Indeed, any feminist will be quick to point out that most social policies developed in the twentieth century were marred even at the height of the modern welfare state. This is due to the fact that in general, redistributive policies rested upon and therefore reproduced the paternalist and gendered organization of the single-breadwinner nuclear family (Shola Orloff 1993; Brodie 2003, 54; Gordon 1990). Brodie notes that "the social citizen was universal in discourse and gendered in social practice" (34). Welfare state policies in general maintained a divide between productive labor and reproductive labor. That is, state social

policies "enforced a specific sexual division of labor that assumed a stable working-middle-class nuclear family, supported by a male breadwinner, containing a dependent wife and children, and maintained by women's unpaid domestic labor" (54). By this enactment, social policies ignored the conditions of reproductive labor, reinforcing gendered expectations that women as mothers, wives and daughters would naturally attend to material needs that lay beyond the purview of publicly funded social policies.

To Brodie's estimation of the limitations of the social as traditionally conceived, I would add the limitation inherent in the racialization of social policies as well. Indeed, the racialized inflections pervading the practices of social policy show up as pretense any claim that welfare policies effectively advanced universal principles of freedom and democracy (Schram 2000; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Mink 1990; Fox Piven and Cloward 1971). Moreover, the advanced industrial age-transfer of care services from the home into institutions has reinforced race and class hierarchies. As Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1992) has so effectively documented in her work on the division of health care labor, "with the expansion of commodified services..., racial-ethnic women are disproportionately employed as service workers in institutional settings to carry out lower-level 'public' reproductive labor, while cleaner white collar supervisory and lower professional positions are filled by white women" (3).

Finally, an updated configuration of the social must take note of the overlay of neo-liberal principles of privatization, market rationality and individual responsibility on the neo-medieval structure of global politics represents a deeply inhospitable environment for prior notions of the social which had been linked to the nation-state. First, these neo-liberal policies have vacated social policy, rendering these institutions

increasingly ineffectual and unpopular, leading to "the growing separation of the individual from the national state and national citizenship" (Brodie 2003, 58). A second aspect pertains to the historical fact that, in the past, social issues have generally been conceptualized through the mechanism of the national state (Brodie 2003, 55). This will no longer do, in part because of the erosion of the nation-state, but also due to the global processes that interlock the vastly unequal regions of the world. Having summed up the political climate imposed by neo-liberal globalization, Brodie recognizes that we must re-cast how we conceive of the relationship between governing institutions and human social needs. She writes, "the contemporary period ... invites a revival of our moral imagination and a reform of the tools of statecraft that stretch the goals of governance beyond short-term calculations of economic efficiencies to embrace the meaning of human well-being and security in a globalizing era" (65). She correctly notes that this reform must involve redistributive policies that move outside the social space of the national-state. Moreover, it will have to entail a reconsideration of the nature of care work as work. In an effort to revive moral imagination on these issues, I turn next to an unlikely source, Hannah Arendt.

### Social Reproduction, World Making and a Democratic Future

Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* is often read as an unabashed indictment of the modern age, with its nation-states, its glorification of job-holding, consumption and accumulation, and its denigration of public life in favor of exacting conformity to meet the needs of vast populations. Indeed, in the modern age, we are, according to Arendt, fated to perpetuate our centuries-old evisceration of politics and the public realm

due to our age's predisposition towards favoring individual livelihoods over the political action of ascertaining the common good of a community. Whether in our welfare state's myopic concern for the physical well-being of its members which takes form in the "gigantic nation-wide administration of housekeeping" ([1958] 1998, 28) or in liberal economists' false, but ever popular, equation of wealth accumulation with liberty (67), we moderns do seem a sorry lot to Arendt. In spite of this, I find in Arendt a helpful means of delineating what is at stake with the global division of reproductive labor, the retreat of the welfare state and the concomitant unraveling of "social citizenship." More importantly, Arendt can be helpful in framing the outlines of a revised concept of the "social" to meet the challenges of twenty-first century political communities. That said, Arendt, on her own terms, cannot readily be enlisted in a project that is favorable to a feminist vision of social citizenship. She was, of course, no great fan of feminist activism or of social citizenship, and so may seem an odd figure to invoke in a feminist project that seeks to revitalize this modern form of democratic citizenship. Nonetheless, by bringing Arendt together with feminist theory's insights about the politics of social reproduction I hope to develop a feminist framework to elucidate "shared social purposes" for the twenty-first century. Moreover, by reading Arendt in *The Human Condition* against Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, I tease out a level of concern regarding political membership expressed by Arendt that remains salient for our era. In the discussion that follows, I rely on the many lessons generated in feminist scholarship regarding care work and add these to concerns regarding political membership and "shared social purposes" in the twenty-first century.

In *The Human Condition* Arendt defines the social as the collapse of the public and private spheres that had been kept apart in ancient Athenian democracy. This division had served as a crucial foundation for the vibrant political community the *polis*, "the most talkative of all bodies politic" (26) in which, through speech and persuasion, the citizen realized his capacity as *zōon politikon*, or political animal. Of course, Arendt notes (as do many moderns—especially those with egalitarian and feminist inclinations) that a separate private sphere was essential to making possible this political capacity on the part of citizens. The domain of women and slaves, the private sphere served the purpose of assuring that the material needs and the maintenance of life of each citizen were taken care of. Thus, the function of the private sphere was to literally and figuratively free up citizens so that they could focus their complete attention to the exercise of politics (28-31).

In the modern age, the rise of society with its elevation of private concerns has rendered this kind of political life and division of public and private spheres impossible. Arendt explains, "the disappearance of the gulf that the ancients had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the household and 'rise' into the realm of politics is an essentially modern phenomenon" (33), the result being the realm of society. Arendt defines society as "the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public" (46). The ascendance of society has had the effect of filtering individual needs through the mechanisms of modern bureaucracy, flattening them into generalizable terms. In response, the human impulse for singularity has led to a turning inward. The sphere of intimacy that has resulted is marked by a

dramatic elevation of the self. Indeed, society and the need for intimacy create "an exclusive concern with the self, as distinguished from the soul or person or man in general, an attempt to reduce all experiences, with the world as well as with other human beings, to experiences between man and himself" (254). Needless to say, this stripped down level of individual self-preoccupation represents the modern age's paltry substitute for the concern with world-making and the common good undertaken in the Athenian *polis*.

Arendt's condemnation of modern life alongside her elevation of Athenian politics has of course been the target of much criticism. For example, reading Arendt against the modern normative organization of the male-headed nuclear family, feminists have been wary of her denigration of the feminized domestic sphere and valorization of the masculinized public sphere (Brown 1988). Arendt is but one of the many voices from the canon guilty of this disregard of the interdependency of the material realm and with social reproduction in general. Feminists have long sought to expose the gendered hierarchy that underwrites this kind of devaluation of "housekeeping" to use Arendt's word (Okin 1979; Pateman 1988). However, rather than throwing the baby out with the bath water, so to speak, some feminists have embraced Arendt's efforts to tease out the relationship between politics and the social.

Mary Dietz (1995), for example, has argued that Arendt's trenchant explication of the multiple spheres organizing modern life can be taken up to track and contest the gendered binaries enacted in each of these spheres (30-32). On this reading, Arendt's assignation of housekeeping as a feminized space does not necessarily denigrate material needs and women's labor, but rather alerts us to the possibilities of moving past the

stultifying aspects of modernity, be they located in housekeeping or in the masculinized realm of technology. On Dietz's interpretation, Arendt helps us to think past not only the "crisis of modernity" (30) but also past the gender binaries enacted in modernity so that we may design a feminist public sphere from which to practice politics and in so doing claim freedom.

Nancy Fraser (1990) has similarly made use of Arendt in her own work on social needs, and in the process, turns Arendt on her head. Fraser's redefinition of the social is especially noteworthy as it shrugs off some of the impatience with the modern state that is coursing through *The Human Condition*. Moreover, I will suggest that her reconstitution of the relationship between the social and the political is particularly relevant to the effort undertaken here to theorize the social in a way that is relevant for twenty-first century democratic politics. Rather than signifying a retreat from the political, the social on Fraser's interpretation is precisely the politicization of needs that are no longer sufficiently met by the private, a-political sphere. Fraser expands on Arendt's view of the private sphere, seeing it as encompassing the domestic as well as capitalist economic institutions.<sup>4</sup> But Fraser agrees with Arendt that the social represents a sphere separate from the private realm. Indeed, the social is the space that captures the needs that overflow the bounds of domestic and economic institutions. That is, these needs, which she terms "runaway needs" are the very stuff of politics. This is because the domestic and economic institutions are themselves a-political. In other words, as Fraser puts it, "family and official economy are the principal depoliticizing enclaves that needs

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<sup>4</sup> Fraser defines these institutions as follows: "They are, first, domestic institutions, especially the normative domestic form, namely, the modern, male-headed, nuclear family; and, second, official-economic capitalist system institutions, especially paid workplaces, markets, credit mechanisms, and 'private' enterprises and corporations" (206).

must exceed in order to become 'political'" (207). In the late capitalist era, the family and the institutions of the official economy are increasingly incapable of meeting needs such as child care. The runaway needs that result become politicized in the sphere of the social. In a reversal of Arendt's take on the social, Fraser claims it as the essence of the political, noting that the social is "a site of contested discourse about runaway needs" (208). As such the social traverses across the traditional divisions of the family, the official economy and the state.

Though perhaps not entirely true to the spirit of Arendt, this kind of reevaluation of Arendt's work for feminist aims is intriguing. But, in light of neo-liberal globalization, Arendt's work needs to be mined more deeply. While Fraser is sensitive to the effects of economic privatization in late capitalism, she underestimates the extent to which neo-liberalism diffuses political contestation—especially in the case of needs claims—having reconstituted citizenship along the lines of entrepreneurialism and self-reliance. Moreover, as is apparent in the international division of reproductive labor, capitalist economic processes have proven to be quite wily in their adaptation to meet "runaway needs"—albeit in ways that return these needs to the a-political private sphere, and that in the process reinforce gender, race, class and global inequalities. In this context, the social in the form of the modern welfare state has been eroded, whether understood in Arendt's terms as "national housekeeping" or in Fraser's as the political space of needs claims. That is, in our era, the social realm of the twentieth-century welfare state is receding under the weight of neo-liberal hegemony and its equation of freedom with self-sufficiency to be achieved through job-holding.

This rolling back of the social has not led to a revitalization of Arendt's sense of politics and the public sphere. Rather, the diminishment of the "collective housekeeping" (28-29) which had been the mark of the social in the modern state, has splintered the provision of social reproductive labor in such a way that, to borrow again from Hedley Bull, a neo-medieval form of the social might be said to have emerged. Arendt notes in passing the difference between the modern state and the medieval form of organization that preceded it. She writes that "the medieval 'nation' was a conglomeration of families; its members did not think of themselves as members of one family comprehending the whole nation" (29, fn 14). Add to this the overlapping structure of sites of power that is characteristic of globalization and the neo-liberal ideology organizing this structure, and it seems that the international division of reproductive labor is a parallel example of a neo-medieval form—in this case, the social taking the form of overlapping, transnational conglomeration of "families." Indeed the form of "family" or "housekeeping" in our era is one splintered and dislocated to the point whereby social needs are met through a patchwork system of care-giving. No longer is the male-headed nuclear family form viable—if it ever truly was; no longer is the welfare state secure; and no longer do kinship networks and communities find themselves in even the same geographical location. Writing of the "fragmented" nature of contemporary child-care in the United States, Nakano Glenn (2000) notes that more and more, this care is "divided among several caregivers and between 'private' and 'public' settings. Thus, a parent may take ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a child has care after school but delegate the actual work of care giving to a babysitter, a relative, a paid home care worker, and/or an after-school program" (87-88). And, as I have suggested using the case of eldercare

services, this system of fragmented care is not only gendered and racialized, but in an age of neo-liberal globalization, it is also formed along the currents of the transnational migration of women from the global South to North, leaving the care activities in the hands of women poorer than they (Parre as 2001, 72-78). So, just as Bull, and along with him, Held, understand the political organization of global politics as neo-medieval in form, so too can we identify the neo-liberal organization of social needs as similarly diffused and fragmented into local, national, and international forms. And, it is of note that the resulting global division of reproductive labor is one that enacts global inequalities alongside gender, race and class inequalities.

Just as the neo-medieval form of political organization poses profound challenges for democratic governance, so does its social counterpart. As Brodie (1994, 2003) suggests, one of the remarkable features of neo-liberalism is the absence of any plan for social reproduction. Drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi I have argued that this neo-liberal lacuna has potentially dire consequences for democratic citizenship. Though Arendt is no great fan of state social policy, she is at least aware that addressing the material needs of maintaining life is a necessary precursor for political participation. But neo-liberal globalization has by omission fostered a global division of reproductive labor that *requires* the deflation of political participation. With policies that include cuts in social spending and labor emigration programs, states participate by ushering their citizenry towards a de-politicized, privatized sense of citizenship.

The effect of this a-political neo-liberal form of citizenship is especially acute in the case of overseas workers. To explain this claim, Arendt's essay "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" from *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is

particularly useful. Here, Arendt makes what has become a classic illustration of the coincidence of a world political system of nation-states, the international system of human rights and the emergence of a class of vulnerable stateless people. For Arendt, the most dire consequence is not their vulnerability to the exclusions of national governments, but rather the utter abjection from political community that ensues. She explains, "the fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective" ([1949] 1979, 296). In this essentially Aristotelian claim, Arendt goes on to argue that to be in the position of falling between the cracks of national states is to have one's humanity threatened. She goes on to write, "man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity" (297). Neo-liberal globalization entails this kind of de-politicizing and essentially de-humanizing condition. The status of the stateless is most literally in evidence in the case of overseas workers.<sup>5</sup> However, it is also the case with neo-liberal American citizenship and its glorification of individual market rationality and self-reliance and its denigration of any world-making in common. In the absence of public institutions committed to democratic principles, other institutions will emerge to fill the void, offering individuals a means by which to secure social protection and gain a sense of meaning through membership. Religious organizations in settings throughout the world are already fast filling the void that neo-liberal globalization is

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<sup>5</sup> Some immigration scholars have argued that transnational labor migration has fostered new forms of transnational politics whereby sending states, eager to maintain the flow of remittances, cater more and more to the demands of their citizens working overseas (DeSipio 2003). But I would counter that this kind of politics remains beholden to the logic of upholding the commodification of citizenship entailed in labor export development strategies and so does not represent the flourishing of a public sphere untouched by economic calculations.

leaving in its wake. It remains to be seen whether these represent obstacles to democratic politics. Certainly the hierarchical and conservative nature of many forms of religious resurgence would not seem to bode well for the advancement of democratic practices (Keddie 1998).

Of course, the neo-medieval organization of power presents great opportunity, just as it poses great challenges. To counter the condition of anti-democratic forms of power and of the social within a neo-medieval political order, a schema such as that proposed by David Held is key. Recall Held's attention to defining democratic governance that has as its aim fostering political participation. To this must be added a commitment to creating the foundations for social purposes shared locally, nationally, regionally, and globally that are reorganized to counter the a-political effects of neo-liberal forms of social reproduction. In her generally thorough overview of the steps we need to take to transform social policy regarding care, Nakano Glenn (2000) concludes that "perhaps most fundamentally, the liberal concept of 'society' as made up of discrete, independent, and freely choosing individuals will have to be discarded in favor of notions of interdependence among not wholly autonomous members of society" (93). While I endorse her call to reform and value social reproductive labor, it is absolutely essential that this claim regarding society's interdependence not translate into a simple return to a system of "national housekeeping." First, this would simply lead to a reinscription of the equation of national well-being with the gendered notions of the family. For example, Filipino organizations advocating for overseas workers' rights run the risk of doing just that when the most prominent among them, Migrante International, has as its mission "strengthening unity among overseas Filipinos" driven by the rallying call, "we dream of

a future where families are not broken up by the urgent need for survival" (Migrante International). While I am deeply sympathetic to the dislocations in individual lives and communities that drive this sentiment, the conflation of nationality and family carries with it the potential to reinscribe gendered narratives of the nation. Another reason to avoid conceptualizing social needs through the lens of the national state is that this essentially leaves global inequalities untouched. That is, if each nation responds to dislocations by collapsing back in on its identity as a nation in a fit of protectionist zeal, we do nothing to redress the vast inequalities that plague the organization of the globe, in part because we ignore the transnational effects of domestic policy-making.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, reawakening nationalist identities would generally translate into further closing off borders and reproducing inequalities through exclusionary immigration policies (Stevens 1999).

Finally, defining human well-being solely in terms of meeting material needs is insufficient as it represents a short-sighted political strategy. Instead, human well-being must be cast along the lines of fostering political participation through creating social policies that can realistically create the conditions for individuals to meet needs through their overlapping communities—communities that operate at the local, national, regional and global levels (Yuval Davis 1999). Neo-liberal ideology is not the only way of organizing the dispensation of the social in a globalized, new medieval era. An alternative will likely involve invoking Held's democratic political theory. This is because Held is correct to recognize that in the face of the neo-medieval organization of divided and overlapping sites of local, national, regional and global power, we stand at a

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<sup>6</sup> That said, redressing global inequalities will likely involve some degree of protectionist economic measures on the part of developing, indebted states. See MacEwan (1999) for his discussion of the

crossroads regarding the kinds of norms and values that will define governance at each of these sites. But, as I have suggested, the kind of commitment to democracy that Held wants to elicit requires a concomitant commitment to devising practices, customs, and habits that secure human well-being across the globe. This may well entail the kind of world-making that Arendt called for. But this time, world-making must take seriously feminist lessons regarding social reproduction in order to devise the kind of social policies that could create the conditions for political participation on the part of the six billion of us. That is, the multiple sites of overlapping sovereignty must coincide with multiple sites of overlapping feminist inspired social practices and policies that have as their aim tempering inequalities, protecting people from the dislocations of the market, and fostering the conditions for political participation. Moreover, social policy must have as its aim creating conditions whereby individual choices, such as the decision to emigrate, are taken from a place that is truly free, rather than being driven by the urgent need for survival. To do otherwise is to ignore Polanyi's reminder that a community organized solely along the lines of the capitalist logic of the market is destined to provoke society's need for some kind of protection from the dislocations that unregulated capitalism creates. We can preclude non-democratic forces from rearing their ugly heads if we choose a democratic politics that takes seriously the need for social protection. One step in this direction would involve responding to political communities, heeding feminist insights, and re-embedding market activities in local, national, regional and global social institutions. In this way, democratic political membership could finally be rendered meaningful for all of us, for once.

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relationship between economic growth and state-led development.

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Occupations

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- 2002 "Disenchanted Rights: The Persistence of Secularism and Geopolitical Inequalities in Transnational Articulations of Women's Human Rights." *Critical Sense: Journal of Political and Cultural Theory* 11(1)
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- 2000 "Editing Pornography" in *Feminism and Pornography* (Oxford University Press)